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EASTERN PAPERS.

PART VI.

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

OF THE

LATIN AND GREEK CHURCHES

IN

TURKEY.

15

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey.

(EASTERN QUESTION.)

PART VI.

No. 1.

Mr. Hudson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 119. Confidential.)

Turin, December 15, 1854, 5·30 A.M.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to receive yesterday, at a quarter past 2 P.M., your Lordship's despatch marked Secret and Confidential, No. 76, of the 8th instant, instructing me to ascertain confidentially the views of the Piedmontese Government as to their disposition to accede to the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and France of the 10th April, 1854; and, should they be favourable, to propose (in conjunction with my French colleague) to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to sign the declaration which your Lordship transmitted to me.

Yesterday I was in conference with the Chargé d'Affaires of France upon your Lordship's instructions, when the Minister for Foreign Affairs entered my room, and I then read to him your Lordship's despatch (marked No. 76); and the Chargé d'Affaires of France then communicated to him the contents of a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, which, in substance, is identical with that addressed to me by your Lordship.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that at 6 o'clock in the afternoon he would take the King's pleasure upon the subject, and would receive us at 9 o'clock at night.

At that hour I proceeded with the Count de Guitout to the Department of Foreign Affairs, and there found the President of the Council, and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, of War, and of the Interior, waiting to receive us.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the King was disposed to accede to the Treaty of Alliance of the 10th April on certain conditions; but that there were two proposals to consider:

The first, the accession to the Treaty of the 10th April;

The second, the dispatch of a corps of 10,000 men to the Crimea.

That it was the opinion of the King's Government that it would greatly simplify matters if two Conventions were drawn up on those two separate proposals, and that both Conventions should be signed simultaneously.

The first Convention was political; the second military.

With regard to the first, which naturally entailed the second, they desired to point out that the feeling of the King was against subsidizing his troops, as was also that of the Government and of the country. But they considered they could arrive at the point desired by the Government of Great Britain in another and a less expensive manner to it; that they (the Sardinian Government) could

increase by one-half the number of men desired by Great Britain, and would be prepared to send 15,000 instead of 10,000 men; and would dispatch to the Crimea the entire force within less than one month from the present date, on a condition which I shall state in its proper place in this despatch.

Politically speaking, they renounced all intention of putting forward any pretension or claim to territorial aggrandizement; that they accepted the war on the same grounds as Great Britain and France: but entering into that war on those grounds, they naturally expected to take such a stand in the general questions which would arise after the conclusion of the war, as would be due to parties who had borne their share in the struggle.

That one of the main difficulties they would have to contend with at home would be the feeling of discontent which would be engendered by placing themselves in the same line as Austria, from whom Sardinia had recently suffered a series of unmerited and unjustifiable insults, breach of treaty stipulations and of international law, and with whom they barely maintain diplomatic relations.

That nevertheless they were quite prepared to stand whatever odium might arise from that source of public discontent, were prepared to use their best efforts to repel all attempts to revolutionize Italy on the part of demagogues or of foreign States, and were determined to do their duty to the great principles which had moved the allied Governments to take up arms against Russia.

They therefore entertained the just expectation that if they accepted the Treaty of the 10th April, and if they sent 15,000 of their best troops to fight alongside of the allied armies, they would be entitled to some political consideration, and, considering the financial condition of Sardinia, to some assistance.

They proposed, then, to accede to the Treaty of the 10th April, with the understanding that Great Britain and France should use their best efforts to induce the Government of Austria to undo the injustice of the Act of Sequestration; because the moment that they (the Sardinian Government) acceded to the Treaty of the 10th April, they gave the strongest possible guarantee with regard to their future political conduct: for Austria had declared that she used the measure of sequestration as a measure of protection, prevention, and surety against revolutionary attempts on the part of Piedmont.

This pretext, therefore, fell to the ground, and was no longer tenable the instant that Piedmont joined her powers to the allies, and sent nearly half her army to fight in the same cause in which Austria is embarked.

They thought that Great Britain and France would feel no difficulty in urging Austria to be just, nor in accepting another proposition, namely, to adopt an Article which should merely stipulate that the condition of Italy should be taken into consideration at the conclusion of this war.

Their object in desiring this stipulation is to be able to assure the Italians that they are not forgotten, and that the Sardinian Government go into this war from no selfish motive; and a knowledge of this at the proper time would tend greatly to disarm revolutionary attempts in Italy.

Militarily speaking, the Sardinian Government could not accept subsidies; the point of honour of the King and of his subjects is so utterly against it.

They therefore propose to send 15,000 men at their own expense (transport in part not being included) to the Crimea, in such proportion of the three arms as Her Majesty's Government deem best suited to carry on the war with the greatest efficiency.

They propose to borrow 2,000,000*l.* sterling of Great Britain, at 3 per cent. per annum, to be drawn and repaid in such manner as may be agreed upon. That this loan, if granted, saves the point of honour to the Sovereign and to the people of Sardinia, on the score of subsidies, and will subject the British Government to no absolute loss, as would be the case with subsidies.

They desire to stipulate for the free transport of part of the 15,000 men; they on their part using the means at their disposal, which are scanty and almost confined to the two steam-frigates, the "Carlo Alberto" and "Governolo," capable of carrying about 1,300 men.

They desire that the British Commissariat shall supply rations to the Sardinian contingent, they (the Sardinian Government) paying for the same at a rate to be agreed upon, all other expenses in the field being defrayed by the Sardinian Treasury.

These proposals having been discussed, were then reduced to writing, and I have the honour to inclose—

1. A memorandum upon the points which relate to the political part of this question; and,

2. The observations of the Sardinian Government to the proposal of Her Majesty's Government to send a contingent of Piedmontese troops to the Crimea, to be there placed under the orders of Her Majesty's Commander-in-chief.

These two papers, if their tenour is accepted, will serve as the bases of the Conventions with Great Britain and France, which the Sardinian Government are ready to accept.

The Chargé d'Affaires of France will communicate copies of these papers to the Imperial Government by this occasion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES HUDSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Memorandum.

LE Gouvernement Sarde désire adhérer simultanément au Traité du 10 Avril d'Alliance Offensive et Défensive entre les Gouvernements de France et d'Angleterre, en même temps qu'il signera une Convention spéciale par laquelle il s'engage à fournir un contingent de 15,000 hommes à des conditions qui seront stipulées et dont la première sera un emprunt de 2,000,000 de livres sterlings à 3 pour cent, remboursable à la paix à des conditions à convenir après.

Les deux Puissances Occidentales déclareraient qu'il sera tenu compte au Gouvernement Sarde à la conclusion de la paix, des services rendu par lui, et des sacrifices en hommes et en argent que le dit Gouvernement serait appelé à faire.

Par ce Traité le Gouvernement Sarde entre dans le concert Européen, prend part aux négotiations et intervient au Congrès ayant pour objet le rétablissement de la paix et l'affermissement de l'équilibre Européen.

Articles Secrets.

ARTICLE I.

Les deux Puissances Occidentales s'engagent à faire tous leurs efforts pour faire lever par l'Autriche le séquestre sur les propriétés des sujets Sardes, frappés par le Décret du 13 Février, 1853.

ARTICLE II.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes prendront en considération l'état de l'Italie au rétablissement de la paix.

Turin, December 15, 1854.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Memorandum.

ADMIS dans le concert Européen, la Sardaigne est disposée à fournir un corps d'armée de 15,000 hommes, organisé en deux divisions et en une brigade sous le commandement d'un Général Sarde.

Ce corps pourrait être réuni aux troupes Anglaises, et le Général Sarde être mis sous les ordres du Maréchal Raglan.

Ce corps serait prêt au départ peu de tems après l'échange des ratifications.

La Sardaigne n'ayant pas à sa disposition assez de moyens de transport, la France et l'Angleterre suppléeraient gratuitement aux moyens manquants.

Le Gouvernement Sarde pourvoirait à la solde et aux indemnités de

campagne de ses troupes, pour éviter les complications et mettre de l'uniformité dans le service très délicat des subsistances.

Le Commissariat Anglais fournirait les vivres à des prix convenus à l'avance et contre des bons Sardes payables aux époques convenues.

L'expédition en Crimée devant augmenter les embarras financiers de la Sardaigne, et un emprunt à des conditions supportables étant impossible dans les circonstances actuelles, les deux Puissances feraient au Gouvernement Sarde un prêt de 2,000,000 de livres sterlings à 3 pour cent., à des conditions de versement et de restitution à établir.

Turin, December 15, 1854.

No. 2.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Hudson.

(No. 86. Secret and Confidential.)

Foreign Office, December 28, 1854.

Sir,

YOUR despatch No. 119, marked Secret and Confidential, has been received and laid before the Queen.

Her Majesty's Government learn with sincere satisfaction that the Piedmontese Government have cordially responded to the invitation to accede to the Treaty of April 10, between England and France, and have announced their readiness to send an army of 15,000 men to the Crimea.

The conditions upon which the Piedmontese Government propose to accede to the Treaty have been anxiously considered by Her Majesty's Government, and I shall now state to you the result of their deliberations.

As regards the transport of the Piedmontese troops and the Commissariat arrangements for supplying them at the seat of war, Her Majesty's Government anticipate no material difficulty; but with respect to a loan of 2,000,000*l.* at 3 per cent., I have to observe that it would entail considerable expense on this country, as, at the present value of money a loan could not be raised here by Her Majesty's Government at a rate of interest so low as 3 per cent., and I have further to remark that a loan of 2,000,000*l.* appears to be greatly in excess of the requirements of the Piedmontese Government for the object proposed. The pay of a British soldier, and the general scale of expenditure in the British army, are higher than the Piedmontese, but the annual cost of 15,000 British troops would be less than 600,000*l.*, and a loan of 1,000,000*l.* therefore would appear to be sufficient at present, with the understanding that a like sum should be advanced on the demand of the Piedmontese Government at the expiration of a twelvemonth.

Her Majesty's Government attach great importance to the accession of Piedmont to the Treaty, not alone on account of the military support they will derive in the war against Russia from the Piedmontese army, but because they are convinced that it will be attended with signal advantage to Piedmont, by enabling her to take an active part in the great question which now agitates Europe.

It is therefore not without some regret that Her Majesty's Government have had to consider the political conditions which the Piedmontese Government desire to attach to their accession.

Piedmont, in consideration of the sacrifices she may make, desires to have a voice in the deliberations for peace, and upon that I have to observe that the Piedmontese Government may rest assured that no peace will be made in which Piedmont is not included, and her interests duly consulted; but Her Majesty's Government apprehend that Piedmont cannot seek to be consulted on the various questions that may come under discussion when negotiations for peace are undertaken.

Secret Articles to Treaties are generally speaking objectionable; their existence is always known, their purport is always exaggerated, they lead to misapprehension, and unless the necessity for them is absolute they should be avoided; but the Secret Articles proposed by the Piedmontese Government are peculiarly liable to objection. The first provides that England and France shall use all their efforts to induce Austria to remove the sequestration upon the properties of Sardinian subjects. Her Majesty's Government have often, but

in vain, endeavoured to induce the Austrian Government to perform this act of justice; but have always been answered that it was a matter of internal administration, in which the intervention of foreign Governments could not be admitted; but if England and France were now to enter into a Treaty engagement, whether patent or secret, with Piedmont on the subject, it would become a point of national honour with Austria to maintain the sequestration, and the proposed Article would be found to mar the object which the Piedmontese Government has at heart.

If Piedmont accedes to the Convention and is found engaged in the same cause with Austria, the Governments of England and France would consider that an opportunity most favourable for the renewal of their efforts had arisen, and they would use it to the best advantage; and with such an assurance it is hoped that the Piedmontese Government will be satisfied.

The second Secret Article provides that on the restoration of peace the High Contracting Parties shall take into consideration the state of Italy.

The intention of this Article is not manifest, but Her Majesty's Government must decline to enter into a vague engagement which might hereafter be the cause of misunderstanding.

Her Majesty's Government are informed that the object is to satisfy public opinion in Piedmont that the interests of Italy have not been forgotten; but as the proposed Article is to be secret, no such use could be made of it. On the other hand, however, it might be adverted to, and expectations of great and fundamental changes might be raised, to which Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to commit themselves.

Her Majesty's Government take a deep interest in the welfare of Italy, and they will miss no opportunity of affording their aid towards the improvement that the state of Italy imperatively demands; but Her Majesty's Government must reserve to themselves the unfettered right of acting at the time and in the manner that they think most expedient, and most likely to be attended with success. They are disposed to think that this object will be obtained more surely, because more amicably, by improving the relations between Austria and Piedmont, and by bringing the two Powers to cooperate cordially together in a great European cause, than if Austria were alarmed by a Treaty between England, France and Piedmont respecting Italy, to which she was no party, and the project of which, being concealed from her, she would naturally infer was hostile to her interests in that country.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 3.

Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 30.)

(Private.)

My Lord, *Erzeroom, December* 9, 1854.

THE communication which I made to Mr. Hammond on the 28th of November, will show your Lordship with what gratification I received your private letter of the 23rd of October, which records your Lordship's approbation of my conduct out here.

To save repetitions, and your Lordship needless trouble, I refer you to my despatch to Lord Stratford* which accompanies this private communication; facts will there speak for themselves. But your Lordship's remarks, with respect to the conduct of Lord Stratford, are couched in these terms, "There is a mystery about it all that I shall be glad if you can unravel." I will not flinch from doing so.

That "mystery" is of a double nature; one portion relates to the war, and another to myself.

With regard to the first part, I must inform your Lordship that even before landing at Constantinople from England, I sent a copy of my Foreign Office instructions to the Ambassador, and immediately waited on him at Therapia. I at once saw that a storm was raging in his breast, and, after a cool reception, he invited me into the garden; scarcely five minutes had been occupied in a

* Inclosure in No. 4.

conversation upon the war, when his Excellency broke out into a violent passion, and said, "I ought to have had a political direction of the naval and military operations of this war;" in saying so, he stamped on the garden walk, and I remained silent. I told his Excellency of the great importance attached to my mission by your Lordship and the Duke of Newcastle, and then conversed with him on the chances of my success, but he gave me no promise of assistance, nor let fall any expressions of sympathy. I dined with his Excellency, and started next day for Varna.

On my return, I sent Lord Stratford a copy of my instructions from Lord Raglan, where the former was praised for "his unrivalled discrimination" of the character of Turkish public men; and hopes recorded for his assistance. I saw Lord Stratford three times, and dined with him on all those occasions (after my return from Varna); the last time I asked him for his commands, as I was to embark the following morning. His Excellency first replied, "Anything I have to send would reach you on the road;" but he turned suddenly towards me and (with an eye which thirteen years have enabled me to read) added, "I have nothing for you." Thus his desperate determination was taken, although I did not comprehend its nature; indeed, when I was saluted by cannon at Trebizond and Erzeroom, I fully believed that the Turkish Government had been made acquainted with my mission; these honours were however due to Messrs. Stevens and Brant, who had announced my coming under the title of Commissioner and Brigadier-General, which they had heard I was.

On the receipt of Lord Stratford's only letter, which I have this day inclosed to Lord Wodehouse, I again fancied that all was right; and consequently considered the assertions of the Governor-General of Erzeroom and Zarif Mustapha Pasha (as to their ignorance of my mission and title) as mere specimens of Turkish cunning; so did Mr. Brant, although he informed me of their denials.

My Lord, I must conclude this too long recital by intimating that the solution of the first part of the "mystery" is contained in those few words which I have interlined; and your Lordship will bear with an opinion as to futurity, namely,—that as long as this war lasts, so long will Lord Stratford do as he pleases, and leave undone that which displeases him; and in closing this part of the task which your Lordship has invited me to undertake, I beg to be allowed to record a prayer—that he may be neither allowed to mar our cause during the war, nor direct the pacification and the thousand events which must ensue after the peace.

The second part of the "mystery" relates to myself, and I will be as laconic as possible. After having spent four years and a-half in this wretched place, in conferences on Turco-Persian affairs, and out of which grew the Treaty of Erzeroom, which stipulated for the appointment of Commissioners to go to the frontier, I received a letter from Lord Stratford coolly intimating that Mr. Layard was the person he designated for that office: I congratulated his Excellency on his choice; but Lord Aberdeen named me, without any application on my part directly or indirectly.

Lord Stratford's dislike to me has been marked from that moment, and the annoyances and mortifications detailed in my despatches from the frontiers of Persia (copies of which I presume his Excellency sent to the Foreign Office (?)) from December 1848 to September 1852, will prove how much he cared for me, as British Commissioner, under the insults of Dervish Pasha, my colleague, and Namick Pasha, the Governor-General of Bagdad.

I think I shall have given your Lordship a key to the second part of this, to me, lamentable "mystery."

Lord Stratford will now be to me a bitter, as well as a thwarting enemy; yet, I believe that your Lordship will allow that I should have been unmindful of my duty had I had flinched from throwing light upon a subject of which I was master; and that the last paragraph of your Lordship's letter has been complied with in the only manner left open to me, that of "insisting strongly through Lord Stratford upon whatever I think necessary," in my isolated and unenviable position.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) W. F. WILLIAMS.

No. 4.

Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 30.*)

(No. 55.)

My Lord, *Erzeroom, December 8, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, a despatch which I have this day addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. F. WILLIAMS.

Inclosure in No. 4.

Colonel Williams to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Erzeroom, December 8, 1854.*

SINCE I fulfilled the duties confided to me, as Her Majesty's Commissioner to the head-quarters of the army of Kars, I have had the honour of addressing to your Excellency fifty-four despatches, identic with those forwarded simultaneously to the Earl of Clarendon and General Lord Raglan. Each packet has been accompanied by a private letter containing details and suggestions, which, had they found place in my public communications, would have inconveniently lengthened those documents.

On the 23rd of September I was honoured by a private letter from your Lordship, appealing to my "spirit and humanity" relative to the captivity of those unfortunate Russian ladies who had then recently been seized and carried into the mountains by Sheik Schamyl, the Circassian Chieftain. Since the above date, I have not been favoured with a line by your Excellency, even with an acknowledgment of the reception of my public or private communications. To one who has served your Lordship for so many years, such an avowal, on my part, can only be recorded with feelings of deep disappointment and mortification—feelings which I have studiously endeavoured to conceal, even from my aide-de-camp and secretaries, because each successive post was anxiously looked for, in the hope of receiving answers from your Lordship on the pressing and important affairs connected with my mission to the head-quarters of the army of Kars.

Nor have I either, for the above reasons, directly or indirectly, to Lords Clarendon or Raglan, hinted at the silence which your Lordship has been pleased to preserve towards me, until the 28th of November, when I acquainted the authorities of the Foreign Office with my intention to make my representations on this, to me, distressing subject.

I need not trouble your Lordship with a recapitulation of the contents of my various identic despatches; but as the Earl of Clarendon and General Lord Raglan will be furnished with a copy of this communication, I owe it to Her Majesty's Government and to myself to remind your Lordship of communications, public—and private especially—addressed to you.

First. Independent of my various conversations with your Lordship, before and after my visit to Lord Raglan at Varna, I invoked, in a public despatch dated 20th September, your Excellency's "countenance and support" in my endeavours to save the remnant of the Kars army from the horrors of last year.

Secondly. I forwarded, with my first packet from Kars, for your Excellency's inspection, a Russian and a Turkish cavalry sabre; and having thus shown one of the principal causes of the want of efficiency of the Turkish Horse at the battle of Injédéré, I stated the necessity of having 5,000 English Light Cavalry sabres, as the only hope of rendering that important arm efficient for next spring. On this point I at the same time addressed a private memorandum on the necessity of allowing Baron de Schwartzenburg to reorganize and drill this wretched arm of the service.

Thirdly. In consequence of the great scarcity of a certain kind of ball-cartridge in the magazines of Kars, and applicable to the arms in use by the only really efficient troops in that intrenched camp, I hoped that your Lordship would excuse the great liberty I was taking, and respond to my urgent prayer for a supply to be sent me, when I inclosed two cartridges in a despatch, telling

your Excellency, at the same time, that it was only through you, and you alone, that I could hope for such a boon. I need not add that, in the event of an attack during the winter, this intrenched camp may owe its capture to the want of this ammunition; for none other, as I at the time explained to your Lordship, will fit the muskets and rifles of these corps of *élite*, which were the only regiments which behaved well at the battle of Injédéré.

Fourthly. I had the honour of offering to your Lordship my reasons for thinking that Arslan and Shahin Pashas (the two Poles) were Russian spies; but they are still at Constantinople, intriguing against the very existence of this army by corresponding with its Pashas, and sowing the seeds of dissension, and falsely accusing General Guyon of every species of military dereliction, who, whatever may be his faults—especially those arising from an unhappy infirmity of temper—is a brave man, and, as an Englishman, worthy of the protection of Her Majesty's Government.

Fifthly. When, at Kars, I first heard of the intention on the part of Shukri Pasha to treat me with contempt, I added to my public despatch on that subject a private note, assuring your Excellency that your promptly-exerted influence could alone stop this dangerous conspiracy, or effectually sound the real intentions, as regarded myself, of the newly-named Mushir; and I have faithfully detailed in subsequent despatches and private letters the insolence of Shukri and and Hussein Pashas since my arrival here.

The last report of Lieutenant Teesdale, which your Lordship will receive by this messenger, proves what results the fear of that retribution which I know they hourly expect, is working upon the minds of the Pashas and Colonels. For the safety of this army, I trust it will not be long ere it fall upon all those officers whose names stand forth in infamous notoriety in my despatches, either for theft, cowardice, or drunkenness: but, unhappily, the result I allude to by my quotation of Lieutenant Teesdale's report is merely temporary; for the consciousness of worthlessness on the part of those Pashas and Colonels will not render them either more brave or less thievish, and the danger to that garrison is consequently imminent.

Under these circumstances, I most respectfully, but as firmly, insist, through the influence and interference of your Lordship, that my reports be promptly attended to by the Turkish Government; that those officers, Pashas and Colonels, who have been convicted of robbery by false muster, direct theft, and drunkenness, be dismissed, and others named in their places.

With regard to the principal criminal, Zarif Mustapha Pasha, who, as I have stated in my despatches from Kars, might have, by his false muster-rolls and other dangerous deceptions, caused the discomfiture and disgrace of any British force sent to his assistance, I leave him in the hands of the allied Governments; for, happily, he can do no more harm here.

With regard to Shukri and Hussein Pashas, if they are not instantly recalled to Constantinople, there will be very little, if any, use in my attempting to execute the difficult and onerous duties imposed upon me. And, having made this appeal to your Lordship, in the name of Her Majesty's Government, it is my duty to state distinctly that I shall not be able to give such intelligence to my superiors as is absolutely necessary for them to be masters of; that I shall fail to preserve the power which I have, unaided, seized; and that I shall, consequently, not succeed in shielding the troops from starvation, without my demands be complied with. If they be not, the dissolution of this army and the fate of Asia Minor will inevitably follow, and a golden opportunity lost.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. F. WILLIAMS.

No. 5.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 30.)

(No. 757.)

Constantinople, December 14, 1854.

My Lord,

IT will be satisfactory to your Lordship to know that some apparent progress is making towards an improved state of things in what regards the Turkish army at Kars.

An intention had been entertained of sending Mustapha Pasha, the Mushir

commanding at Batoum, to take provisionally the chief command in place of Ismail Pasha, who is destined to command the army of the Danube during Omer Pasha's absence in the Crimea; but Vassif Pasha, late Commander-in-chief of the Arabian corps d'armée, being at liberty, it is intended to employ him for that purpose.

He will be instructed to attend to the advice offered to him by Colonel Williams; and he will be also empowered to remove, if necessary, Shukri and Hussein Pashas, of whom the Colonel has had occasion to complain. Letters of reprimand have been already addressed to those officers, at the same time that letters of approbation have been sent to Kerim and Hafiz Pashas, according to my application founded on the request of Colonel Williams.

The new Mushir is to inquire into the case of the cadets, which was brought under consideration by me in pursuance of your Lordship's suggestions.

Colonel Williams' diploma as Ferik is in preparation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 6.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 1, 1855.)

(No. 497.)

Vienna, December 27, 1854.

My Lord,

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch to me, No. 423 of the 18th instant, I inquired of Count Buol whether the Internuncio was instructed, in communicating to the Porte the Treaty of the 2nd of December, to communicate formally also the Secret Article of that Treaty; and his Excellency replied that he had not instructed the Internuncio to do so, as he conceived that such a course would be quite contrary to usage.

In obedience, therefore, to your Lordship's directions, I have informed Lord Stratford de Redcliffe that Baron de Bruck has not been instructed to communicate the Secret Article of the Treaty to the Government of the Porte.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 7.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 1, 1855.)

(No. 499.)

Vienna, December 27, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 426 of the 19th instant, requesting me to report what steps I have taken with respect to the correspondence as to the movements of the Ottoman troops in the Principalities, which was transmitted in Mr. Colquhoun's despatch to your Lordship No. 110 of the 27th ultimo, I beg to state that in my despatches Nos. 462 of the 6th, and No. 464 of the 9th instant, I have detailed to your Lordship all the proceedings of the Commission assembled in Vienna for the discussion of the circumstances stated in that correspondence, and the decision of the Commission was expressed in the memorandum inclosed in my despatch No. 462; and the general contents of which I communicated to Mr. Colquhoun in my telegraphic despatch of the 5th of December, a copy of which is inclosed in my despatch to your Lordship No. 462.

With reference to Mr. Colquhoun's No. 113 to your Lordship, which relates to the proposed arrest of certain individuals in the Principalities, I have already reported to your Lordship all that took place on the subject at a meeting to which Count Buol invited Baron Bourqueney and myself on the evening of the 12th of December, and the result of which I communicated to your Lordship in my despatch No. 469 of the 13th instant, to which your Lordship has replied in your despatch No. 424 of the 19th instant. I have now the honour to inclose to your Lordship a despatch on this subject which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul at Jassy, the inclosures to which Mr. Gardner

states he was about to transmit to your Lordship, and which I therefore do not inclose with this despatch.

This correspondence refers to the questions of arbitrary arrest which were submitted to Baron Bourqueney and myself, as reported in my despatch No. 469 above mentioned.

Your Lordship will perceive the asperity of the character of some of this correspondence, and the difficult position in which the Hospodar is placed by it, and indeed the awkwardness which must necessarily arise to Mr. Gardner, if he has to give protection to British Ionian subjects under such circumstances.

By the despatch of Mr. Gardner and its inclosures, the reasons in opposition to the proceedings of some of the Turkish authorities, such as Zadyk Pasha and M. Colombioni, are given, so that they can be considered and judged of; an advantage which I have regretted was not to be found in the reports from Mr. Colquhoun, who in forwarding the complaints, has never transmitted the answers or the reasons which may have actuated the conduct either of the Hospodar or of the Local Government, or of the Civil Turkish authority confided to Dervish Pasha.

The want of such information has sometimes been embarrassing in some of the discussions which have taken place at the Commission here, for the defence offered of measures which had been complained of were unforeseen by me, and I was consequently unprepared to reply to them.

The report of Mr. Gardner, together with the correspondence he incloses, is a proof how necessary it is that some such meeting as the Commission now existing in Vienna should be established for the purpose of controlling the irritating discussions which have been carried on in the Principalities; and for this reason your Lordship will no doubt consider that it is of great importance that the Government of the Sultan should transmit the required instructions to their Ambassador at Vienna, that he may act under that authority in the Commission.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 7.

Consul Gardner to the Earl of Westmorland.

Jassy, December 9, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency's consideration the important inclosures of correspondence between the Hospodars, the Ottoman and Austrian military authorities, relative to the arrest of some individuals by order of the Turkish General Zadyk Pasha, on suspicions entertained of their complicity with the enemy, and their liberation by order of the Austrian General Count Coronini. I hope sincerely that it will not lead to any further divergence of proceedings between the two authorities. Many Greeks and some Ionians are the persons thus treated, and I believe that the innocent have been confounded with the guilty. Suspicions may attach to some, but the distinction should be drawn between the free voluntary action of individuals and the position where no such liberty of action is allowed to them, under the name of Ionian or British protégé, when the country was occupied by the troops of a Power at war with Great Britain. They were forced to bend under the order of every authority.

I have had numerous fugitives at the Consulate amongst the Ionians, who have felt no security for their persons or property, but their apprehensions have ceded to better impressions, and they have gradually returned to their homes and families. The authority of the Government has been quite superseded, yet the perusal of these papers will convince your Excellency that we possess the elements of good government, and an able direction of it. I have sent by the Prince's messenger copies of them to Constantinople, and am sending them to England. I hope that my occupation will plead my excuse for the form in which I transmit them. As a corollary to their subject, I have this hour received the following communication from Fokschani, which I copy textually. The date is December 1:

"Ieri sera, alle ore dieci di notte, è arrivata una staffetta del Maresciallo

Omer Pacha che tutte le truppe Ottomane che si trovano a Foxiani e nelle vicinanzi devono partire al momento per Bucarest. Questa mattina alle ore undici è partito da Foxiani il Principe Gregorio Stourdza con tutto il suo stato maggiore, e questo dopo pranzo tutti i Turchi che se trovavono in Foxiani sono partiti per la Valachie.

"A Foxiani non abbiamo dei grandi disturbi per l'arrivata Austrinca. Mi riservo in persona dargli tutti i ragguagli," &c.

I have, &c.
(Signed) S. GARDNER.

No. 8.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 1, 1855.)

(No. 500.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December* 27, 1854.

I HAVE to express to your Lordship the satisfaction with which I have received the approval of Her Majesty's Government, conveyed in your Lordship's despatch to me No. 421 of the 18th instant, of the course adopted by me in signing the *procès-verbal* of the exchange of the ratifications of the 2nd of December in the manner desired by my Austrian and French colleagues.

With respect to your Lordship's inquiry as to which of the full powers I had used on the occasion, I have the honour to state that, as those dated the 1st of February were drawn up in contemplation of the signature of a Convention to which Prussia was to be a party, they did not seem applicable to a Treaty which was confined to Great Britain, Austria, and France, and that, consequently, I made use of the full powers dated the 31st of July, and which, as your Lordship observes, were not limited to the conclusion of this particular Treaty.

No question was raised relative to copies of the full powers being left for annexation to the copy of the Treaty to be deposited in the Imperial archives, as it appeared to be taken as a matter of course that the original should be left for this purpose; and as this course coincided with the experience I had had on similar occasions, I did not hesitate to give them up; and I have therefore only to express to your Lordship my regret if the course I have pursued is found productive of any inconvenience.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—Count Buol, to whom I have mentioned the remark of your Lordship relative to giving up the original document containing my full powers, observed that, that document being deposited in the archives of the Imperial Chancery of State, I could at any time withdraw it for the purpose of making use of it to sign any other document for which it might be required.

W.

No. 9.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 1, 1855.)

(No. 501.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December* 28, 1854.

HAVING received your Lordship's telegraphic message of the 25th instant, authorising me to sign a Protocol in which the terms of the proposed identic note should be textually reproduced, I immediately informed Count Buol of this decision, and of my readiness to consult with him as to the drawing up of this document, which was to be substituted for the identic note. Baron Bourqueney having already received the authorization of his Government, and having made a similar communication to Count Buol, we proceeded, together, to draw up the Protocol, which, having been most anxiously considered and compared with the two notes which had been transmitted to Baron Bourqueney and myself by our respective Governments, was signed by us in the form in which I have now the

honour of transmitting it to your Lordship. At the particular desire of Count Buol, your Lordship will observe that this Protocol is *réservé*, and therefore confidential.

Count Buol then stated that Prince Gortchakoff had considered his announcement that he had received full powers to treat with the allied Governments upon the four bases, as an invitation to them to enter into negotiations, and Count Buol said that he, as the Austrian Plenipotentiary, made to us that declaration.

Under these circumstances Count Buol considered that there no longer existed any impediment to the fulfilment of the intention, as stated in the preamble of the proposed identic note which had been transmitted to me by your Lordship, that I should take part at a meeting at which the Envoy of Russia should assist. Upon this point I felt that in accordance with your Lordship's instructions it clearly became my duty to concert with Count Buol and Baron Bourqueney as to the means of making known to Prince Gortchakoff the identic interpretation of the bases by our Governments; and after the most serious consideration it was determined between us that we should all three be present at the meeting to which Prince Gortchakoff was invited by Count Buol, and that it should be distinctly stated to Prince Gortchakoff, and recognized, that we met solely for the purpose of learning from him whether or not he would adhere to that interpretation, as upon that decision must depend whether any negotiation could be commenced.

Count Buol had represented to Prince Gortchakoff that I was still confined to my room, but that I wished, notwithstanding the contrary advice from my medical attendants, to make an effort to be present at the Foreign Office. The Prince, however, begged that I should not be allowed to do so, and expressed his willingness to come to my house, where the meeting accordingly took place.

Count Buol informed Prince Gortchakoff, in conformity with the previous understanding which had been come to, of the sole object of the meeting; to which the Prince having made no objection, Baron Bourqueney read the statement of the interpretation of the four conditions, preceded by the introduction, a copy of which I have now the honour of inclosing.

When the reading of this document was terminated, Prince Gortchakoff stated that upon the simple announcement of these conditions he could not be expected to give any detailed reply; but he would state what were his first impressions with regard to it. He would first remark upon the introduction, according to which reserves were stated as to the right of laying down such special conditions over and above the four guarantees as might, in the opinion of the three Governments be required, and he desired to know if these reserves were to be maintained; to which it was replied that they had been stated in all the preceding documents which had been drawn up upon this subject.

Prince Gortchakoff then proceeded to remark upon the first condition, to which he objected that it mentioned the Protectorate of Russia over Servia, which was an error, as the Government of Russia held no protectorate over that country. He also stated that the arrangements to be concluded for placing these provinces under the collective guarantee of the Five Powers could satisfactorily be made without any mention of the abolition of the former Treaties with Russia, as *ipso facto* the object would be obtained without stating that abolition.

Upon the second Article of the conditions, Prince Gortchakoff stated that, although he had no objection to offer to the placing the navigation of the Danube under the control of a corporate authority, yet he thought the territorial jurisdiction of Russia should not and need not be named, and he objected to it.

Upon the third Article Prince Gortchakoff declared that, although he did not object to the revision of the Treaty of the 15th of July, 1841, yet he protested against being called upon to give his adhesion towards putting an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea; a proposition which he supposed involved a limitation of the Russian navy, or a destruction of the harbour of Sebastopol, and which he conceived must refer to the interpretation which had been given to this proposition by the despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys of the 28th of July.

It was replied to Prince Gortchakoff that no mention of such projects was made in this condition; that our Governments in the interest of Europe felt that the preponderance of Russia, with reference to the Ottoman Empire, was a danger to the independence of the Sultan which ought no longer to exist, and

therefore that they felt bound to provide for its cessation. They required therefore, the acknowledgment of this principle, but they also stated that the basis for the arrangements to be made for this purpose could not now be laid down. Prince Gortchakoff declared, that if any bases were proposed to him which did not militate against the honour of his Sovereign and his country, he would not object to receive them for negotiation, but as they stood, unexplained, he could not undertake to do so.

Upon the fourth Article Prince Gortchakoff stated, that all the privileges of the Christian subjects of the Greek Church had mainly been obtained by the Treaties with Russia; that if these or more extensive advantages were secured that Church, in common with all other Christians, he should rejoice in the success of such an arrangement: but he felt that these advantages had been established by fixed stipulations with the Government of the Sultan, and without intending any disrespect to the word or authority of that Sovereign, he felt bound to say that before the treaty obligations which up to the present time had existed upon this subject, had been replaced by obligations as binding, he did not think the privileges of the different sects of Christians could be considered as established.

After Prince Gortchakoff had concluded this statement, we inquired of him what decision he had come to, as to the acceptance or non-acceptance of the interpretation of the four bases with which he was now acquainted, and Count Buol stated that if he wished for more time to come to that decision, it would be allowed to him. Prince Gortchakoff replied, that he did not refuse, but he could not, upon his own authority, accept this interpretation as it was now submitted to him, and he asked Count Buol if he was a party to this interpretation. Count Buol answered that he was. Prince Gortchakoff then stated that if this document which had now been communicated to him was entrusted to him as a mere memorandum, and as an unofficial record, which he might use as an assistance to his memory, and as such transmit to his Government, that he would to-morrow forward it to St. Petersburgh, and he would undertake in fifteen days to obtain the decision upon it from St. Petersburgh. Count Buol and Baron Bourqueney being both aware of the paragraph of your Lordship's instruction to me in your despatch No. 422, wherein it is stated that "should Prince Gortchakoff not reject the terms, but express a wish to ask for instructions from his Government, a time should be fixed for his answer," appealed to me to conform myself to Prince Gortchakoff's proposition, and I accordingly consented.

Prince Gortchakoff therefore took the document, without signature, which had been read to him, with a perfect understanding as to its unofficial character, and giving us the assurance that even at an earlier period than the one which had been fixed upon, if possible, he would communicate to us the answer of his Government.

In concluding the account of this meeting, I think it right to state, that Count Buol throughout maintained the most perfect concert with M. de Bourqueney and myself, and that Prince Gortchakoff in his last appeal to him, after he had learnt his entire adhesion to the document containing the interpretation, called upon him to inform the Emperor of Austria that he, Prince Gortchakoff, had objected to accede to a document which by the interpretation which had formerly [qu. formally] been given to the pretensions it put forward, he considered to be invested with a character offensive to his Sovereign.

If I was called upon to give your Lordship an opinion as to the probability of the acceptance of the interpretation of the four bases, as now transmitted to St. Petersburgh, I should say that (judging from the manner of its reception by Prince Gortchakoff) I should not expect it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Memorandum.

DANS le but de préciser le sens que leurs Gouvernements attribuent à chacun des principes contenus dans les quatre Articles, et se réservant d'ailleurs, comme ils l'ont toujours fait, la faculté de poser telles conditions particulières qui

leur paraîtraient exigées en sus des quatre garanties par l'intérêt général de l'Europe pour prévenir le retour des dernières complications, les Représentants de l'Autriche, de la France, et de la Grande Bretagne déclarent :

1. Que leurs Gouvernements, en jugeant de commun accord qu'il était nécessaire d'abolir le Protectorat exclusif exercé par la Russie sur la Moldavie, la Valachie et la Serbie, et de placer dorénavant sous la garantie collective des Cinq Puissances les priviléges reconnus par les Sultans à ces Principautés dépendantes de leur Empire, ont entendu et entendent qu'aucune des stipulations des anciens Traités de la Russie avec la Porte concernant les dites Provinces ne pourrait être remise en vigueur à la paix, et que les arrangements à conclure à leur sujet seraient ultérieurement combinés de façon à donner une pleine et entière satisfaction aux droits de la Puissance Suzeraine, à ceux des trois Principautés, et aux intérêts généraux de l'Europe ;

2. Pour donner à la liberté de la navigation du Danube tout le développement dont elle est susceptible, il conviendrait que le cours du Bas-Danube, à partir du point où il devient commun aux deux États riverains, fût soustrait à la juridiction territoriale existante en vertu de l'Article III du Traité d'Andrinople. En tous cas la libre navigation du Danube ne saurait être assurée si elle n'est pas placée sous le contrôle d'une autorité syndicale investie des pouvoirs nécessaires pour détruire les obstacles existants aux embouchures de ce fleuve, ou qui s'y formeraient plus tard ;

3. La révision du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, doit avoir pour objet de rattacher plus complétement l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre Européen, et de mettre fin à la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire. Quant aux arrangements à prendre à cet égard, ils dépendent trop directement des événements de la guerre pour qu'on puisse dès à présent en arrêter les bases ; il suffit d'en indiquer le principe ;

4. La Russie, en renonçant à la prétention de couvrir d'un Protectorat officiel les sujets Chrétiens du Sultan du rit Oriental, renonce également, par voie de conséquence naturelle, à faire revivre aucun des Articles de ses Traités antérieurs, et notamment du Traité de Koutchouk-Kaïnardji, dont l'interprétation erronée a été la cause principale de la guerre actuelle. En se prêtant leur mutuel concours pour obtenir de l'initiative du Gouvernement Ottoman la consécration et l'observance des priviléges religieux des diverses communautés Chrétiennes sans distinction de culte, et en mettant ensemble à profit, dans l'intérêt des dites communautés, les généreuses intentions manifestées à leur égard par Sa Majesté le Sultan, elles attacheront le plus grand soin à préserver de toute atteinte la dignité de Sa Hautesse et l'indépendance de sa Couronne.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

Protocol Réservé.

LES Représentants de l'Autriche, de la France, et de la Grande Bretagne, se sont réunis pour délibérer en commun sur la suite à donner à la démarche faite par M. l'Envoyé de Russie à Vienne, et de laquelle il résulte que l'acceptation par le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg des quatre points indiqués dans les notes du 8 Août dernier doit être considérée comme une demande d'entrer en négociation préliminaire sur ces bases avec les Représentants des trois Puissances signataires du Traité du 2 Décembre, dans le but de préparer le rétablissement de la paix.

Par suite de la démarche susdite ils ont été autorisé par leurs Gouvernements à prendre part à une réunion à laquelle assisterait le Prince Gortchakoff.

Toutefois le Traité d'Alliance qui existe aujourd'hui entre leurs Majestés l'Empereur d'Autriche, l'Empereur des Français, et la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, imposant à leurs Gouvernements l'obligation de n'entrer dans aucun arrangement avec la Cour Impériale de Russie avant d'en avoir délibéré en commun, ils ont été d'avis qu'il était essentiel, pour que les Plénipotentiaires des Puissances alliées tinssent le même langage, de constater qu'ils comprennent de la même façon l'application des quatre principes proclamés en commun.

Dans le but de préciser le sens que leurs Gouvernements attribuent à chacun de ces principes, et en se réservant d'ailleurs, comme ils l'ont déjà fait, le droit de modifier selon les circonstances, et notamment dans le cas où

l'Article V du Traité du 2 Décembre viendrait à se réaliser, l'opinion qu'ils expriment aujourd'hui, comme aussi de poser, conformément à l'Article I du même Traité, telles conditions particulières qui leur paraîtraient exigées en sus des quatre garanties par l'intérêt général de l'Europe pour prévenir le retour des complications qui ont si malheureusement troublé son repos, ils ont donc déclaré :

1. Que leurs Gouvernements, en jugeant de commun accord qu'il était nécessaire d'abolir le Protectorat exclusif exercé par la Russie sur la Moldavie, la Valachie et la Serbie, et de placer dorénavant sous la garantie collective des Cinq Puissances les priviléges reconnus par les Sultans à ces Principautés dépendantes de leur Empire, ont entendu et entendent qu'aucune des stipulations des anciens Traités de la Russie avec la Porte concernant les dites Provinces ne pourrait être remise en vigueur à la paix, et que les arrangements à conclure à leur sujet seraient ultérieurement combinés de façon à donner une pleine et entière satisfaction aux droits de la Puissance Suzeraine, à ceux des trois Principautés, et aux intérêts généraux de l'Europe ;

2. Pour donner à la liberté de la navigation du Danube tout le développement dont elle est susceptible, il conviendrait que le cours du Bas-Danube, à partir du point où il devient commun aux deux États riverains, fût soustrait à la juridiction territoriale existante en vertu de l'Article III du Traité d'Andrinople. En tout cas la libre navigation du Danube ne saurait être assurée si elle n'est pas placée sous le contrôle d'une autorité syndicale investie des pouvoirs nécessaires pour détruire les obstacles existants aux embouchures de ce fleuve, ou qui s'y formeraient plus tard ;

3. La révision du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, doit avoir pour objet de rattacher plus complétement l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre Européen, et de mettre fin à la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire. Quant aux arrangements à prendre à cet égard, ils dépendent trop directement des événements de la guerre pour qu'on puisse dès à présent en arrêter les bases ; il suffit d'en indiquer le principe ;

4. La Russie, en renonçant à la prétention de couvrir d'un protectorat officiel les sujets Chrétiens du Sultan du rit Oriental, renonce également, par voie de conséquence naturelle, à faire revivre aucun des Articles de ses Traités antérieurs, et notamment du Traité du Koutchouk-Kaïnardji, dont l'interprétation erronée a été la cause principale de la guerre actuelle. En se prêtant leur mutuel concours pour obtenir de l'initiative du Gouvernement Ottoman la consécration et l'observance des priviléges religieux des diverses communautés Chrétiennes sans distinction de culte, et en mettant ensemble à profit, dans l'intérêt des dites communautés, les généreuses intentions manifestées à leur égard par Sa Majesté le Sultan, elles attacheront le plus grand soin à préserver de toute atteinte la dignité de Sa Hautesse et l'indépendance de sa Couronne.

Après avoir ainsi constaté l'uniformité de leurs vues au sujet du véritable sens des quatre garanties, les Représentants soussignés se sont déclarés prêts à faire usage de leurs pleins pouvoirs, bien entendu que le résultat de la réunion préliminaire à laquelle ils sont autorisés à assister, serait communiqué immédiatement à la Sublime Porte, et que, si ce résultat était satisfaisant le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman serait invité à prendre part aux Conférences subséquentes, qui ne pourraient plus se tenir sans lui.

Vienne, le 28 Décembre, 1854.

(Signé) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
BOURQUENEY.
WESTMORLAND.

No. 10.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 1, 1855.)

(No. 502.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December 29, 1854.*

BARON BOURQUENEY called on me, at the request of Count Buol, to tell me that he (Count Buol) had this morning received a note from Prince Gortchakoff, accompanied by a document, and that he had since seen him.

Prince Gortchakoff stated that upon seriously reflecting on what passed at the meeting yesterday, and closely examining the paper he had brought away, he felt that he should not do justice to himself or his Government, if he did not make an attempt to reconcile the differences which appeared yesterday to exist in the understanding of the four Articles between himself and the three allied Ministers.

Count Buol stated that Prince Gortchakoff's object was, that the three Representatives should agree to another meeting with him to reconsider his decision as to our interpretation of the Articles, which decision he had endeavoured to explain in the document he had left in the hands of Count Buol, and that we should find it contained modifications to the objections he had made yesterday to accept our interpretation.

Baron Bourqueney informed me that he at once declared to Count Buol that he was unable, from the instructions he had received from his Government, to take part in any further meeting with Prince Gortchakoff, after he had declined to accept our interpretation without reference to St. Petersburgh; that, if we were to be called upon at another meeting to discuss modifications of the course which had been followed by Prince Gortchakoff, and which would lead to any decision on his part short of a complete adherence to our interpretation of the bases, he felt he should be going beyond the instructions he had received.

Count Buol having requested Baron Bourqueney to obtain my opinion upon this important subject, I desired him to state to Count Buol that I felt I was in the same position as Baron Bourqueney had described himself to be, and that I had no instructions which could allow me to consent to take part in another meeting, unless it was clearly understood to be for the purpose of receiving an adherence to the interpretation as laid down in your Lordship's despatches.

Baron Bourqueney undertook to convey my decision to Count Buol, from whom I have received no further communication.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 11.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 1, 1855.)

(No. 528.)

Berlin, December 29, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE obtained a copy of the despatch which was addressed on the 19th instant by Baron Manteuffel to the Prussian Envoys at London and Paris after the communication to his Excellency by the Representatives of the allied Powers at Berlin of the Treaty of the 2nd of December; and have the honour to forward the same herewith, in case Count Bernstorff should not have left one with your Lordship.

This despatch can have but little interest, except as a record of the opinions of the Prussian Government at the present crisis, and of the little desire it evinces to unite in the policy of Austria and the Western Powers; whilst the plea put forward, that a knowledge of our interpretation of the four points must be a necessary prelude to its entering into the proposed engagement, proves its anxiety to obtain a readmission into the European concert.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 11.

Baron Manteuffel to the Prussian Ministers at London and Paris.

Berlin, le 19 Décembre, 1854.

M. le Comte,

COMME j'ai eu l'honneur d'en informer votre Excellence par le télégraphe, c'est dans la soirée du 16 du mois que les Envoyés de France, d'Angleterre, et d'Autriche, sont venus me communiquer officiellement le Traité que leurs

Gouvernements ont signé le 2 Décembre à Vienne, et m'exprimer, conformément à l'Article VI, le désir d'y voir adhérer la Prusse. Je n'ai pas tardé de soumettre cette importante communication au Roi notre auguste Maître. Sa Majesté en apprécie pleinement la haute portée, et en en faisant l'objet d'un examen consciencieux, elle s'est laissée guider par le sincère désir de s'associer, autant que ses convictions et les intérêts de son pays le permettent, à l'œuvre commune du rétablissement de la paix générale sur des bases justes et durables. C'est avec satisfaction que le Roi a vu rappeler les Protocoles de Vienne. Sa Majesté ne discontinue pas de les considérer comme l'expression du concert des quatre Puissances et attache un prix particulier à tout ce qui est de nature à constater la durée de cet accord. A la vérité, la Prusse n'a point participé à l'échange des notes du mois d'Août. Le Gouvernement du Roi ne crut pas, dans la situation générale d'alors, devoir se lier à cet égard par un engagement quelconque, mais le langage qu'à plusieurs reprises il a tenu à St. Pétersbourg, et qui n'est pas resté sans effet, prouve suffisament qu'il s'est efforcé d'assurer aux garanties formulées à Vienne une valeur pratique, en les faisant adopter par le Cabinet Impérial de Russie. Tandis que d'un côté le concours diplomatique de la Prusse se trouve donc déjà acquis aux efforts des autres Puissances pour fixer les bases de la paix générale, ses transactions avec l'Autriche ne prouvent pas moins, de l'autre, que le Cabinet du Roi, en se pénétrant de la gravité des intérêts compromis par une prolongation de l'attitude menaçante de la Russie, a dans la limite de certaines éventualités engagé jusqu'à sa coopération militaire. Sous tous ces rapports l'analogie d'attitude entre la Prusse et les Puissances qui viennent de signer le Traité du 2 Décembre, existe déjà, et le Roi notre auguste Maître est trop éloigné de se faire illusion sur les incalculables dangers dont le déchaînement ultérieur des passions guerrières menacerait l'Europe entière, pour ne pas être disposé à cimenter, dans l'intérêt d'une paix prompte et équitable, et de l'équilibre réel qu'elle est destinée à garantir, par de nouvelles stipulations, un accord dont le poids pacificateur serait appelé à exercer une influence salutaire et décisive.

En envisageant de ce point de vue le Traité du 2 Décembre, et en reconnaissant avec satisfaction qu'il renferme des éléments de la nature sus-indiquée, le Roi notre auguste Maître a toutefois retrouvé dans la plupart de ces Articles l'empreinte fort naturelle du reste de sa destination spéciale, c'est-à-dire, d'une entente entre les Puissances Occidentales et l'Autriche. Il s'en suivrait, et certes la justesse de cette observation n'échappera pas à l'appréciation équitable des trois Cours signataires, que la Prusse, pour adhérer éventuellement à la tendance générale de cette transaction et à quelques unes de ses stipulations particulières, ne se trouve pas en mesure d'accéder à un Traité déjà conclu, mais plutôt de conclure, s'il y a lieu, pour sa part, un arrangement analogue. A cet effet et pour fixer avec clarté ses décisions éventuelles, notre auguste Maître a été porté à se demander de nouveau, quel était à peu près l'interprétation à donner aux quatre points convenus au mois d'Août comme base de négociation, entre les Cabinets de Paris, de Londres, et de Vienne, rappelés par eux dans leur Traité, appuyés à St. Pétersbourg par la Prusse, et adoptés maintenant, sans réserve et dans leur rédaction primitive, par la Russie. Il est évident que cette interprétation est destinée à former, pour ainsi dire, le centre, autour duquel tourneront toutes les démarches pour arriver au rétablissement de la paix générale et dont, soit diplomatiques, soit militaires, elles emprunteront leur véritable caractère.

Plus le Roi notre auguste Maître apprécie la haute importance de la démarche que les Cabinets signataires du Traité du 2 Décembre ont faite, en invitant la Prusse à y adhérer, et plus Sa Majesté est désireuse de répondre aux sentiments qui ont dicté cette démarche, plus nous croyons devoir nous abandonner à l'espoir que des explications confidentielles sur l'interprétation des quatre garanties nous mettront en mesure de juger la portée des engagements que nous serions dans le cas de contracter. En conséquence le Roi vous charge, M. le Comte, de vous prononcer dans ce sens envers M. Drouyn de Lhuys, en imprimant à votre langage ce caractère de franchise et d'abandon qui est la meilleure preuve du sincère desir de s'entendre.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 12.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 1, 1855.)

(No. 530. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December* 29, 1854.

BARON MANTEUFFEL having obtained permission to go to the country for a few days, is absent from Berlin and returns to-morrow.

Before his departure Count Esterhazy communicated to his Excellency a despatch from Count Buol on the subject of mobilising the Prussian army, and preparing to meet the arrangements stipulated by the Treaty of the 20th of April; and urged the placing 100,000 men without loss of time on the eastern frontier, for the purpose of covering the Austrian territory from any attack on the part of Russia. Baron Manteuffel appears to have replied that he would take the King's orders, observing that it was scarcely necessary to remind the Prussian Government of the obligations of the Treaty; and that he could inform him that the army would probably be placed on the war-footing by the 1st of March, and that Prussia would then be in a position to support whatever policy the King might think fit to adopt, and take up his attitude accordingly.

Count Esterhazy, in mentioning the foregoing to me, said Baron Manteuffel's tone led him to believe that there was no longer any question of the adhesion of Prussia to the Treaty of the 2nd of December, and that his language almost implied that it was doubtful if Prussia would keep the engagements which she had contracted with Austria in April last.

He added that after making some observations on the four points as bases for negotiations with Russia, and of the ignorance in which the Prussian Government had been kept as to the interpretation which had been put upon them by the allies, Baron Manteuffel said that it was impossible that Prussia could become a party to engagements of which she did not know the bearing and extent; he then hinted that Austria had been carried away from her German interests by England, and that he felt satisfied when England had obtained all she wanted in the Black Sea, she would cease to carry on the war with the vigour which was now displayed, and that Austria would then be left to seek support elsewhere.

Count Esterhazy is naturally extremely dissatisfied with the appearance of affairs here, and told me that Count Arnim, the Prussian Minister at Vienna, had lately read to Count Buol a despatch containing observations on the change which had come over the relations of Austria and Prussia, and throwing out a hint as to the Treaty of the 20th of April becoming a dead letter. Count Buol appears to have made no remark whatever to Count Arnim on this communication, and informed Count Esterhazy that as no copy of the despatch was left, he should take no notice of it.

In forwarding this intelligence to your Lordship, I cannot omit observing that we have now before us a further proof of the false and double policy of the Prussian Government. Baron Manteuffel has attempted to throw discredit on the intentions of Her Majesty's Government to carry on the war in good faith with our ally; whereas a few days ago he told me that the King of Prussia was desirous to effect a "rapprochement" with England, and for this purpose had sent a special Envoy to London; and to the French Minister he holds language which is more friendly to that country even than to England.

The drift of all this is clear enough. Prussia is becoming every day more resolved to remain neutral; Baron Manteuffel's language to Count Esterhazy is intended to intimidate Austria by hinting at the possibility of Prussia's withdrawing from her treaty engagements with her, whilst she makes vain attempts to cajole England and France by a special mission, and a proposal to make a Treaty with them separate from Austria; her own intention being to support the objects and favour the plans of the common enemy.

The opinion is gaining ground here that Prussia is preparing to maintain an armed neutrality, and I am assured on good authority that orders have already been issued to the Generals of Division to make arrangements to call out the reserves at the shortest notice; that orders for a considerable purchase of horses have been given; and that an additional battery of Artillery is to be immediately

made to each corps d'armée, which will give 96 guns for each, or 3 guns to every 1,000 men.

An article appeared two days ago in the "Kreuz Zeitung," which is remarkable as showing the feeling of the Court party on the subject of the position which they wish Prussia to occupy in the present crisis in Europe, and I have the honour to forward it in original and translation. I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to it, as representing faithfully the tone of the Prussian Government at this moment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 12.

Extract from the "Kreuz Zeitung."

(Translation.) *Berlin, December* 28, 1854.

IT is demanded of Prussia for the maintenance of her dignity and independence as a great European Power to join in a "concert," with the fundamental principles of which she does not harmonise, and never can harmonise. Prussia cannot and does not desire that Russia should be weakened and humiliated, and for the reason, independently of all motives of fidelity and honour, that Prussia in her position can gain nothing of what Russia may lose, and would consequently be a loser in comparison to the other gainers. Moreover, it is apparent that Russia, on the first occurrence of dissension in the European concert after the reestablishment of peace (as has already been hinted at in this paper, and which cannot be too often brought to notice), will try to repair her losses, and Prussia is the nearest neighbour against whom, no longer fettered by old obligations, she might be inclined to turn. That however the acquisition of the new friendship would counterbalance the loss of the old one, and that the European concert would again rise in favour of Prussia, is still less to be expected than that in such case a totally new and not very favourable coalition would be formed. The European concert accordingly appears to Prussia as a true "societas leonina," from which she has to expect no advantages, but rather disadvantages. To all this it must be added that Prussia, if she follows the counsels of liberalism in her foreign policy, will infallibly raise it to power at home.

"But," they say, "Prussia enters into the European concert for the purpose of consolidating her influence in it."

Independently of the consideration that he who enters into an alliance against his will cannot expect a very influential position in the same, Prussia has been already from the beginning out-voted in the present European concert, and it is as little to be expected that the majority will be drawn along by Prussia, as that Prussia will be drawn along by the majority. In any case Prussia will be enabled to cast her weight into the balance with more certainty by a position free on all sides, than if she stood on the inclined plane of an alliance which has been half-and-half forced on her, and the bases of which are not clear. To maintain such an independent position is now the most important duty of Prussia, and if it is her serious will, nobody is able to dispute it with her. Neutral Prussia might also, if attacked from without, have the same and even greater claims on the aid of the Diet than Austria has for her position in the Danubian Principalities.

No. 13.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 1, 1855.)

(No. 533.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December* 29, 1854.

NOTHING of importance has transpired as to the mission of Colonel Manteuffel to Vienna. Count Buol has informed Count Esterhazy that the letter of the King of Prussia to the Emperor Francis Joseph is couched in

vague and general terms, and that Colonel Mantoüffel was not the bearer of anything of interest to him. I understood from other quarters that the Colonel writes that he was much better pleased with the language held to him by the Emperor than by that of Count Buol, and that His Imperial Majesty had expressed the desire that Prussia would resume her position with the Powers. This intelligence has raised the hopes of the Prussian Government that she may be readmitted to the Conference, and I am assured that Count Alvensleben, who has already been employed on a special mission at Vienna, has been sent for to Berlin, in the event of its being thought advisable to send a negotiator to Vienna. Count Alvensleben is already here, and should the Conference be opened, Prussia hopes to obtain admission probably through the influence of the Russian Government, who are said to have declared that the Conference cannot be considered complete without a Prussian Plenipotentiary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD

No. 14.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 3.) *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to what your Excellency reports in your despatch No. 757 of December 14, respecting the progress of measures for ameliorating the state of the army at Kars, I have to express to your Excellency the hope of Her Majesty's Government that Vassif Pasha is fit for the post of Commander-in-Chief, to which he is to be appointed, and that this has been ascertained by your Lordship, as the object of Her Majesty's Government is to obtain an efficient Commander, and not simply a change of Generals.

As no result whatever has yet ensued from the repeated and urgent remonstrances of Her Majesty's Government, and as the improvement, such as it is, in the state of the army at Kars, is solely due to the exertions of General Williams, I have requested M. Musurus to convey to the Porte the dissatisfaction of Her Majesty's Government.

The rank of Ferik is necessary for securing to General Williams the authority and respect required for the performance of his arduous duties, and in your despatch No. 671 of November 15, your Excellency reported that your application for that rank had been acceded to by Reshid Pasha, yet your Excellency writes in your despatch No. 757 of December 14, that the diploma for Colonel Williams as Ferik is in preparation, and this unfortunately shows that the wishes of Her Majesty's Government and the interests of the Sultan are alike disregarded by the Turkish Ministers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

P.S.—Your Excellency will report to me the cause of the delay in issuing this firman.

No. 15.

The Earl of Clarendon to Brigadier-General Williams.

(No. 3.) *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1855.

Sir,

I HAVE to inform you that I approve of your proceedings as reported in your despatch No. 36 of the 22nd November; and I have no doubt that, notwithstanding the opposition which you meet with, you will continue, as hitherto, strenuously to perform your duty.

I inclose to you, for your information, a copy of the last despatch which I have received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople together with a copy of my answer,* respecting the army at Kars.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

* Nos. 5 and 14.

No. 16.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 4.) *Foreign Office, January* 2, 1855.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, copies of a despatch* and of its inclosures from the Earl of Westmorland, respecting the differences between the Sultan's authorities and those of the Emperor of Austria in the Turkish Danubian Principalities; and I have to state to your Excellency that it is difficult for Her Majesty's Government to understand why the Turkish Government persists in not sending instructions to their Ambassador at Vienna, to act as a member of the Commission appointed for the purpose of arranging these differences.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 17.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 3, 1855.)

(No. 535. Confidential.) *Berlin, December* 30, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 530 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Count Esterhazy has just mentioned to me some further details connected with the communication lately made to Count Buol, of a Prussian despatch which contained allusions to the possibility that the Treaty of the 20th of April might become a dead letter; and I beg to observe that they tend to confirm the opinion I had already given, that a change is working in the attitude of this country towards Austria, which may, perhaps, not be without influence on the future resolutions of the Cabinet of Vienna.

The despatch above alluded to is described to me as reproaching Austria with having contributed to the present isolation of Prussia, and to her exclusion from all Conferences; and states that the Prussian Government will make the execution of the Treaty of the 20th of April conditional with its readmission into the European concert.

Count Esterhazy has given me further to understand, that though Count Buol made no answer to Count Arnim's verbal communication, he immediately resolved to test the real intentions of this Government, and forwarded to Berlin the despatch which has been communicated by Count Esterhazy, demanding the execution of the Treaty of the 20th of April, and which has been left with Baron Manteuffel. The Austrian Minister informed me also that he has good reason to believe that every effort is being made at Vienna to work upon the Emperor's feelings, with a view to facilitate the restoration of Prussia to her place amongst the Great Powers, and that he hopes there will be no vacillation with his Government, and that she will not be readmitted if she does not adhere to the Treaty of the 2nd of December.

Count Esterhazy believes further, that one of the objects of the late special mission to Vienna is to make out a case against himself of having been the cause of the misunderstandings which exist between the two countries. There is no doubt that matters would have been very differently managed here by Count Esterhazy's predecessor, whose Russian predilections were too apparent to leave any doubt as to the direction which he would have desired to give to the policy of his Government; and the Prussian Government would have found it much easier to carry out their Russia-favouring policy with Count Thun than with Count Esterhazy: but it is to be hoped that the latter will meet with every support from his Government, for he has shown great zeal and intelligence in endeavouring to counteract and lay bare the machinations of the Russian party at Berlin, and to carry out the policy of his own Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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* No. 7.

No. 18.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 6.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 4, 1855.*

ON the 1st instant Count Bernstorff called here to inquire what answer he should return to the despatch of Baron Manteuffel, of which a copy was inclosed in your Lordship's No. 528 of the 29th ultimo. I told Count Bernstorff that Her Majesty's Government learnt with satisfaction that the Cabinet of Berlin was under no delusion as to the incalculable dangers that now menaced Europe, and was disposed to lend its aid towards the re-establishment of peace upon bases that should be just and honourable, and that should secure the real equilibrium essential to the maintenance of peace. Her Majesty's Government, I said, had the same object in view, and they would not continue the war one day longer than was necessary in order to obtain those guarantees for the tranquillity and independence of Europe which had been, and still were, menaced by the ambition and aggressive power of Russia.

It was also, I added, a matter of satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government that Prussia, although for certain reasons indisposed to accede to the Treaty of December 2, was nevertheless prepared to conclude an "analogous arrangement" with the three Powers that signed that Treaty, although, as a preliminary step, the Cabinet of Berlin desired to be informed of the interpretation given by England, Austria, and France to the four bases, and expressed a hope that they should receive confidential communications on this important subject, as well as that the whole question should be treated in a spirit of frankness and cordiality.

I said that Prussia was fully justified in inquiring what might be the consequences to herself of the engagement she was invited to contract; but while I declined to analyse the motives by which the Cabinet of Berlin now appears to be actuated, and disclaimed all pretension to interfere with the internal affairs of Prussia, yet Count Bernstorff, I said, must be aware that the policy of Prussia since she separated herself from the Conference in July last, and the unmistakeable feeling in favour of Russia and adverse to the Western Powers manifested in Berlin, had produced between the two Governments a state of things that was hardly consistent with the confidential communications that Baron Manteuffel now invited. Not, I added, that there was any desire on the part of Her Majesty's Government to maintain secrecy on the matters respecting which Baron Manteuffel inquired, and the Prussian Government were probably as well acquainted as Her Majesty's Government with the interpretation given to the four bases; but there was an obvious difficulty in making confidential communications where confidence had been shaken, and had not been re-established between the parties.

Count Bernstorff said he had no instructions to make the inquiry, but he asked me whether, if he received full powers to negotiate, I thought that a Treaty would be concluded, and I expressed my conviction that it would be equally agreeable to the Governments of Austria and France as to that of Her Majesty, to sign with Prussia the Treaty of December 2, after making in it such changes as should neither alter its spirit or its purport, but which simply might be required for the accession of Prussia on terms of perfect equality, and in a manner which she might think more consistent with her dignity. I then again begged of Count Bernstorff to be assured that the desire of the three Governments was to put an end to the estrangement that unfortunately existed with Prussia; that their object was cordially to cooperate with her in this great crisis of European affairs, and it would be to them a cause of sincere regret, when the time came for entering seriously upon negotiations for peace, that Prussia should by her own acts find herself precluded from joining in them.

Your Lordship is instructed to observe to Baron Manteuffel that the Treaty of December 2 does not bear the character attributed to it by his Excellency of an understanding with Austria alone; for the stipulations of that Treaty are not exclusive, but are essentially European, and the object of the Treaty is to record that the Contracting Parties take the same view of a state of things which equally affects them all, and with respect to which they desire to act in concert. There is nothing, consequently, in the Treaty that Prussia as an European Power

may not at this moment sign, on the same grounds and with the same propriety as Austria.

It is true that Article II does not concern Prussia, who has no army in the Principalities, and is indifferent with respect to the arrangements that a military occupation entails; but this Article has no political bearing, and might be omitted if Prussia were willing to accede to the remaining provisions of the Treaty.

With respect to the interpretation of the four bases, I have to observe that Baron Manteuffel asks more than was required by Count Buol, and your Lordship will inform his Excellency that no understanding was come to with the Austrian Government before the signature of the Treaty, beyond a general assurance on the part of England and France that they adhered to the principles laid down in the notes exchanged on the 8th of August, because the application of those principles, and the further conditions that might become necessary, depended on the events of war.

The explanations that have since taken place have been the result of the closer alliance between the three Powers, and Baron Manteuffel will hardly expect that Her Majesty's Government should adopt towards Prussia a course different from that which was pursued with respect to Austria; but they are prepared to act in the same way towards Prussia, and as far as possible to meet the reasonable wishes of the Cabinet of Berlin, for they are convinced that the united action of the Great Powers at this moment is necessary in order to save Europe from the calamity of a general and protracted war.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 19.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 5, 1855.)

(No. 775.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December 24, 1854.*

IT is with much satisfaction that I confirm to your Lordship what I have already intimated, that the Porte assents without reserve to the plan of taking a body of Regular Turkish Infantry into the pay of Her Majesty's Government, under the command of British officers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 20.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 5, 1855.)

(No. 778.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December 24, 1854.*

AT the suggestion of the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a meeting took place at this Embassy the day before yesterday, between Aali Pasha, M. Benedetti, and myself. The subject matter of our conference was a letter from Omer Pasha to the Grand Vizier, making difficulties as to his proposed expedition to the Crimea, and an application from the Generalissimo to be allowed to visit Constantinople for two or three days.

The Ottoman Minister had previously put us in possession of Omer Pasha's objections, and he now informed me that the Porte apprehended inconvenience from the proposed visit. On both points he expressed his wish to know my opinion, and also that of the French Chargé d'Affaires.

The conversation which ensued brought out the opinions of all parties, and we agreed that it would be better for Omer Pasha to relinquish his idea of visiting Constantinople at the present moment; that more advantage might result from his taking a different direction, and putting himself in personal communication with the Commanders-in-chief of the allied forces before Sebastopol; that

the execution of this idea ought, however, to depend upon its capability of being carried into effect, without retarding the preparations for embarking the expeditionary troops, and that, in order to prevent a signal failure, perhaps even a fatal calamity, it was essential to calculate beforehand the amount of steam transport required for conveying provisions, ammunition, and clothing, to the Crimea, for the use of the Ottoman forces there, and even to attach at once to that service the requisite number of vessels by specific appropriation.

The Porte has since caused an instruction to be drawn up in this sense to Omer Pasha; but the transmission of it is delayed by forms of office, and the necessity of taking the Sovereign's commands.

Omer Pasha's despatches to the Grand Vizier were forwarded to your Lordship in translation with my No. 770 of the 19th instant.

M. Benedetti, in the course of our conference, expressed surprise, not unmingled with intimations of censure, that the report of a British officer sent to prepare for the Ottoman expedition to Eupatoria, should have been so drawn up as to afford ground for the objections urged by Omer Pasha, and, although I endeavoured to soften his impressions, I could not in justice take upon myself to vindicate the circumstances of which he found reason to complain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 21.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 7.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 5, 1855.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 775 of the 24th of December, reporting that the Sublime Porte agrees, without reserve to the proposal of Her Majesty's Government to take into their pay and service a body of Turkish regular troops, and I have to acquaint your Excellency that immediate measures will be taken to carry this proposal into effect.

I am, &c
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 22.

Brigadier-General Williams to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 5, 1855.)

(No. 58.)

My Lord, *Erzeroum, December 12, 1854.*

I WAS informed by Her Majesty's Ambassador, in his private letter dated 28th September, that Ismail Pasha, the then newly appointed Mushir of this army, had been attacked by inflammation in the eyes, which threatened his sight.

On the arrival of Hussein Pasha (whose reprehensible conduct I have been obliged to bring before your Lordship on more than one occasion), I was informed by him that this inflammation was of a chronic nature, and that it never had threatened his sight. This was asserted in presence of Kerim Pasha. Be this as it may, it is my duty to inform your Lordship, that four orders, for its re-organization, have reached this army, addressed to it by Ismail Pasha. They have been read to the troops and stand as follows:—

1. The edging of the clothing of the army of Anatolia will in future be red instead of yellow.

2. Officers will wear black cravats.

3. The tassel of the fez will in future be worn on the left side over the ear.

4. Officers are not to frequent the baths where the men assemble to bathe.

Ismail Pasha has a high reputation, but I suggest for the consideration of your Lordship, whether this be not the place for that General to show that his renown is based on solid grounds.

Frost and snow have now given to this shattered army breathing time to reform and organize its ranks; and supposing that we begin to-day, we shall not have an hour to spare to prepare it for action in the spring. But if Ismail Pasha, under the pretext of wringing from the Porte all the stipulations he requires, should wish to escape the rigours of an Armenian climate, and pass the winter at Constantinople (which I shrewdly suspect he intends doing), he will find on his arrival here in April, strangers to command, instead of familiar faces to encourage; no magazines here to enable him to take the field; no entrenchments and redoubts to defend this, the heart of Armenia and the base of his operations.

I repeat it, my Lord, that not a day is to be lost; and I urgently impress upon your Lordship the necessity of prompt, active, and ample support in the execution of my duties. We are defending Turkey, and assuredly we have a right to insist on these things.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. F. WILLIAMS.

No. 23.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 6, 1855.)

(No. 367. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Copenhagen, December 30, 1854.*

I HAVE been informed by the Swedish Minister that M. Stirkey, the Vice-Consul of Sweden at St. Petersburgh, has arrived here, having left that capital on the 14th instant.

M. Stirkey reports the Emperor to be living at Gatchina, and to be in a state of great excitement respecting the events of the war. He also states that all couriers coming from the Crimea are sent direct to His Imperial Majesty, at whatever hour of the night they may arrive, without being allowed to communicate with any of his civil or military officers.

M. Stirkey describes the language of persons holding military and civil appointments, and particularly those about the Court, as being warlike, these gentlemen declaring that the most disastrous war would be preferable to the acceptance of conditions of peace humiliating to Russia. He believes, however, that the Emperor himself is anxious to bring the war to an immediate termination, and he entirely confirms the report which I had the honour of transmitting to your Lordship in my despatch No. 318 of the 4th ultimo, as to the general distress existing among the landed proprietors throughout the country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 24.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 3.)

My Lord, *Copenhagen, January 2, 1855.*

THE King held a Court yesterday, on the first day of the year, at Friederiksborg Palace.

The different foreign Missions were received in turn by the King in the morning, and a dinner took place in the afternoon, to which the foreign Ministers had the honour of being invited.

His Majesty received me most graciously, and after expressing his sympathy with me on a severe domestic affliction which I had suffered in the death of my wife, made some general observations on the events of the day, which enabled me to refer to the communications which have lately taken place between the

Conference of Vienna and the Russian Minister at that Court, and to the probability that the war would soon assume a more general character, if the Emperor of Russia was not disposed to make peace on the only terms on which the allies could treat with him.

The King replied, that those Governments, however, which were neutral, would naturally endeavour to remain so, and that he would be very unwilling to change his present policy.

I said I could quite understand such a wish on the part of His Majesty, but that the time had now arrived when it might be expected that Austria would become the ally of England and France if the war was prolonged; and that it appeared to me, under such circumstances, all Governments would do well to consider whether neutrality might not prove eventually prejudicial to their interests; as if any modification of the present general arrangements of Europe were to be made at the end of a great war, the interests of neutral States were not likely to meet with the same consideration as those of belligerents, who would have powerful friends to support them.

His Majesty admitted that this might be the case, and said that the next campaign would either find him the ally of the Western Powers, or still maintaining his neutrality, but as this must depend upon circumstances, he would not say at present which of these contingencies was most probable, but resumed the state of the case by using the words of a Danish proverb, which says, "Den tid den sag," namely, "to every day its own affair."

I replied that I did not expect to ask His Majesty to state what course he would pursue in the event of a continuation of the war, but I thought His Majesty would do well to consider the observations which I had ventured to make to him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 25.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 14.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 6, 1855.*

BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAMS has transmitted to me a copy of the despatch which he addressed to your Excellency on the 8th of December, recapitulating the various communications which he has at different times made to you on the state of the Turkish army in Asia, and of which it would seem that your Excellency has not taken any notice to Brigadier-General Williams.

Her Majesty's Government desire to receive your Excellency's observations upon the despatch of General Williams, which I need hardly say has been read by them with great regret after the anxiety they have felt, and the remonstrances which they have in vain addressed through your Excellency to the Porte, respecting the unfortunate army at Kars.

As an instance of the disrespect shown to Brigadier-General Williams by the Turkish military authorities, I transmit to your Excellency the cover of a letter addressed to him, which he has sent to this office.

Such is the conduct of Shukri Pasha, the man just sent from Constantinople to take the command at Kars, and who, if he had not positive instructions to treat General Williams with contempt, can have had none to show him respect, although your Excellency announced on the 15th of November last that he was to have the rank of Ferik in the Turkish service.

But Her Majesty's Government will no longer endure to be trifled with, and they are determined that if the Turkish Government still persist in treacherously disregarding the Sultan's interests, the Turkish officers shall at all events not insult the Queen's Commissioner; and your Excellency is instructed to demand the immediate dismissal of the person who gave orders that General Williams shall be thus unbecomingly addressed.

Your Excellency will also transmit to me a copy of your application to the

Turkish Government for the official recognition of General Williams when he went to Kars, and of the answer which you received, and you will also demand, if you have not got it, a copy of the instruction that was sent by the Porte.

Your Excellency will understand that Her Majesty's Government require to be furnished with a full and detailed report of everything which has passed between Her Majesty's Embassy and the Porte respecting the army at Kars, in compliance with the instructions that so frequently, but in vain, have been addressed to your Excellency.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 26.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 15.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 6, 1855.*

IT is again my painful duty to draw your Excellency's attention to General Williams' reports of misdoings at Kars and at Erzeroom.

General Williams writes to me on the 12th of December that the Turkish Colonels at Kars have begun to pillage rice, the most valuable of the stores which at his instigation the Governor-General had dispatched to that garrison; that he should immediately inform Shukri Pasha of these proceedings, but with slender hope of amendment, considering him to be as worthless as those Colonels, adding, as he does, drunkenness to unconcealed disregard for him or Her Majesty's Government; and General Williams most strenuously entreats that Saleh Bey, who is guilty of gross peculation, may be dismissed from his post in the Medical Department at Erzeroom, and a more capable chief appointed in his stead.

I have to instruct your Excellency to report to me what steps you have taken for the removal and punishment of these robbers who have been placed in command at Kars.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 27.

The Earl of Clarendon to Brigadier-General Williams.

(No. 4.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 6, 1855.*

I HAVE received your despatches Nos. 57 and 58 of the 12th of December, and I have to inform you that the most stringent instructions have been sent to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to insist upon the removal of the several officers who have so grossly misconducted themselves, and to carry out your other recommendations respecting the Sultan's army in Asia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 28.

Mr. Hudson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 1. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Turin, January 1, 1855.*

THE messenger Negrini, with your Lordship's despatch marked Secret and Confidential, No. 86 of the 28th of December, arrived here at 7 P.M. on the 31st ultimo.

The Court ceremonial consequent upon New Year's day, prevented my seeing the Minister for Foreign Affairs until 9 o'clock in the evening of this day.

General Dabormida read your Lordship's despatch, and asked me to leave it with him, in order that he might communicate its substance to his colleagues. I told the General that I was not authorized to give him a copy, consequently I could not leave the despatch with him.

He asked me, How do you propose to carry on negotiations?

I said, if he was disposed to accede to the Treaty of Alliance of the 10th of April last, I would then state, in a note, the interpretation which your Lordship gave to the propositions contained in my despatch No. 119; and I gave him the heads of that interpretation, together with the outline of a Military Convention, in order to serve as bases for the negotiation of the Treaties.

M. Dabormida then said that he regretted to find that Her Majesty's Government had misinterpreted the intentions of the Sardinian Government, for by the Secret Articles they desired to guarantee the interests of Sardinia, and not to raise difficulty. That so long as the Austrian sequestrations existed, it was impossible for the Sardinian Government to hope to be able to carry public opinion with them, or to procure the necessary authorisation for sending an army into the Crimea, or for maintaining that army during the war. That the Sardinian Government, however, did not insist upon the form of the stipulation for raising those sequestrations; they were ready to abandon the form of a Secret Article, provided by some means or other, which they left to the decision of the Governments of Great Britain and France, those sequestrations were raised.

In short, unless the sequestrations were taken off, the Sardinian Government cannot send an army to the East.

The General then said, "The Duc de Guiche will return to his post at Turin from leave of absence, probably to-morrow; I have reason to believe that he is instructed by his Government to demand such an alteration in our laws regarding the press, as will completely destroy the freedom of the press in this country. My colleagues and myself will retire from office rather than consent to any such alteration; consequently you perceive that when the British Government declare, and when the French Government reiterate, that the war with Russia is a war for the liberties of Europe, we must consider it a war for such liberties in Europe as satisfy and are agreeable to France and Austria, for I will not do your Government the injustice of supposing that it would countenance the destruction of the liberties of Piedmont; which has endeavoured to act up to a British model.

"You, therefore, see our position; our turn has come first. We are likely to be crushed (broyé) between those two Powers. Your Government probably never suspected that one of the first fruits of the war with Russia for 'the liberties of Europe,' was to be the downfall of the 'liberties of Piedmont.' However such appears to be the case, and if you, as British Minister, are not prepared to sign with me a declaration guaranteeing the constitutional liberties of Piedmont, I see no use in our discussing the bases of a Treaty which will probably never be signed by myself. We must wait till the French Minister arrives, and till we learn officially whether his instructions correspond with the declarations which he himself has communicated to me privately, and by which he meant to prepare us for the official demand. I now ask whether you will insert such a declaration as I have pointed out, in the interpretation to be given to the Treaty."

I said I was not prepared to sign anything of the kind, and I stated my reasons, with which it is unnecessary to trouble your Lordship. I added that

the question about to arise was grave—so grave that I thought the King's Government would do well to send a special Envoy to Paris and London, in order to know what are the intentions of France, and how far those intentions are either shared, or the reverse, by England; and who at the same time could carry with him full powers to sign the Treaty of Accession to the Treaty of the 10th of April; and to conclude such other negotiations as may be necessary and practicable.

I therefore despatch the messenger Negrini to your Lordship at once, as no negotiation could be carried on here until the return of the French Minister, and as I am desirous to convey to your Lordship intelligence which, considering the separate Treaty signed between France and Austria in regard to Italy, appears to me to be of considerable importance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES HUDSON.

P.S.—I have read this despatch to General Dabormida.

No. 29.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 7, 1855.)

(No. 764.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December 20, 1854.*

THE Grand Vizier, agreeably to his promise, assembled the leading members of the Cabinet, with the addition of the Sheik-ul-Islam and Mehemet Ruzdi Pasha. His Highness submitted to them the substance of my proposal for taking a body of Turkish Regulars into the pay of Her Majesty's Government, and on their assenting to the plan, he drew up a report, and sent it to the Sultan for His Majesty's approval.

It appears that the Sultan had sent beforehand to learn his Minister's personal opinion of the matter, and had received an assurance of his Highness's persuasion that the plan was one which ought to be accepted.

Inclosed herewith is a paper containing the heads of the proposal; and it was with a knowledge of the terms so expressed, that Reshid Pasha communicated with his colleagues on the subject, and having obtained their assent, applied for the Sultan's sanction, which, after what has passed, is not at all likely to be withheld.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 29.

Memorandum.

(Secret.)

A CORPS or Division of 10,000 or 12,000 from the Regular army;

Addition of Redifs, or other recruits, to the amount of 6,000 or 8,000 men;

A faculty of further extension, if found desirable by both parties;

All to be armed, fed, clothed, and paid by the British Government;

Also to be officered in part by the British Government, and, of course, commanded by a British General;

The necessary improvement in point of exercise, discipline, and arrangement, would follow;

Religious observances and peculiarities to be respected;

The details to be regulated by a Convention.

No. 30.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 7, 1855.)

(No. 766.)

Constantinople, December 20, 1854.

My Lord,

IN acknowledging the receipt of your despatch No. 775 of the 8th instant, I have only to express my official submission to the course deliberately adopted by Her Majesty's Government, and to avail myself of the explanations so seasonably afforded by your Lordship for a more complete apprehension of the spirit in which that decision has been taken.

I hope that, without exposing myself to misconstruction, I may at the same time offer two or three remarks not wholly unworthy of your Lordship's consideration, though by no means intended to provoke any further discussion.

Passing over the designation of an "elaborate protest," applied to a despatch which I meant to be a simple and respectful statement of my impressions before they were enlightened by any direct instructions from your Lordship, I submit that my objections bore rather on principles than on facts—on the results rather than on the means of arrangement.

With respect, however, to my colleague the Internuncio, whatever difficulty his previous opinions had occasioned, under circumstances which somewhat embarrassed my freedom of action, I reckoned upon the effect to be expected from the future more stringent instructions of his Government.

I quite agree with your Lordship that the appointment of Dervish Pasha as Commissioner was far from being an auspicious one; and, had it not been unavoidable, I should blame myself for having given it even a reluctant acquiescence. The fact is, that the choice rested finally upon him because, from accidental circumstances, there was no one else at the time to undertake the charge. It was hoped, moreover, that, by means of suitable instructions and admonitions, he would avoid a relapse into his former errors. Far from being an "unscrupulous" man, as your Lordship supposes, his faults are those of a pragmatical mind and a difficult temper, accompanied with strong feelings of national arrogance. In the affair of Kotoor it is presumable that he acted under instructions.

Your Lordship has done me the honour to cite a passage in my despatch No. 515 of September the 14th, wherein I stated that Reshid Pasha had himself proposed a reference to Count Buol with respect to the disputed point of Prince Stirbey's return. Allow me to remark that, in that very special case, the Porte was engaged towards the Austrian Government, and emphatically towards Baron de Bruck, to invite the Hospodar to return; and only demurred as to the execution of its engagement in virtue of more recent circumstances, and the considerations arising out of them. In that particular instance, therefore, the propriety of appealing to the Austrian Government itself from the Austrian Representative here was obvious enough. But does it necessarily follow that the proposal of such reference could be taken without objection as a precedent for general application?

I readily admit the advantages derivable from telegraphic communications between Vienna, London, and Paris; nor is it unreasonable to hope, in spite of delays so difficult to explain, that the same advantage will shortly be extended to Constantinople.

It only remains for me to explain that, in characterizing the proposed course of proceeding as "anomalous" with respect to Her Majesty's Embassy here, I sought not to circumscribe your Lordship's discretionary power of consulting the public interests, but simply to draw attention to the consequence, which it seemed to involve, of a departure from the usual routine of intercourse between the Agents of Her Majesty's Government respectively stationed, with unity of purpose but variety of attributions, in the capital and provinces of the Sultan's Empire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 31.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 7, 1855.)

(No. 767. Confidential.)

Constantinople, December 21, 1854.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith, for your Lordship's information, are translated copies of a letter addressed by Omer Pasha to the Grand Vizier, and of another written in his name to the same Minister.

The principal points of this correspondence are, a declaration of the Pasha's readiness to embark for the Crimea; an avowal of his apprehensions that the expedition will have to contend with perilous difficulties; and an expression of his wish to visit Constantinople for two or three days in the first instance.

I have not yet declared any opinion on these questions; but my impression, subject to reconsideration, is, that the Pasha ought not to shrink from complying with the requisition of Lord Raglan and General Canrobert, but, at the same time, that the actual departure of the expedition must depend upon the means of securing a sufficient supply of provisions, and the necessary amount of conveyance by steam. The slightest uncertainty as to these two essential requirements at this season of the year would obviously warrant the gloomiest forebodings as to the fate of the proposed expedition.

I have repeatedly told the Turkish Ministers that they must look exclusively to their own resources for provisioning the army and supplying it with ammunition. They, on their side, declare that without considerable assistance from the allied Commanders they cannot hope to provide for the conveyance of those necessary objects to the Crimea in sufficient quantities. The question is, whether the great demands upon our steam conveyance, especially in bringing up reinforcements from France, will allow the Admirals to pledge themselves to the assignment of a sufficient number of steam-vessels for meeting the wants of the Turkish army when landed at Eupatoria.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 31.

Omer Pasha to the Grand Vizier.

December 15, 1854.

(Translation.)

I HAVE received your Highness' despatch, stating that as it would facilitate matters if the Sublime Porte were to cooperate in the expedition of the Crimea with a large regular force, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan had ordered that I should repair thither with 20,000 chosen and experienced troops; and that as this force, united with that already in the Crimea, would constitute a large army, and as the steamers of the Sublime Porte would, alone, be insufficient to convey stores and provisions for it, the Admirals of the allied fleets were going to appoint special steamers for that purpose.

I was further directed to place myself in communication with the Commanders-in-chief, to hasten the execution of my orders, and to take with me, if I thought fit, more troops than the number above specified.

Your Highness will have already fully understood from my despatches that I had communicated with the Commanders-in-chief respecting my proceeding to Sebastopol with an adequate force, and that it had been approved of; and that, besides the 18 battalions already sent, under the command of Ferik Mehemet Pasha (including 2 batteries), another force was, in consequence, being prepared to be sent, consisting of 12 regiments of Infantry, 3 regiments of Cavalry, 500 Irregular Cavalry, and 11 batteries, all chosen and experienced troops. In the meanwhile your Highness' despatch arrived; and as my proceedings were conformable with the Imperial orders, the forces in question are being directed upon Varna and Baltchik. I myself left Bucharest, and arrived at Rustchuk two days ago, where I shall remain about five days, in order to make some

necessary preparations. I shall then proceed to Varna, and after the troops have embarked, leave for Sebastopol.

Besides the troops to remain here, two battalions of Infantry and one regiment of Cavalry will remain at Bucharest; the remainder will be stationed at Rustchuk, Islamboziya, Giurgevo, Silistria, Kalarasch, Shumla, Varna, and Tournavo, and remain there during the winter.

Ibraila is not a suitable position, and it would scatter the army to station any troops there. I have, therefore, not considered it advisable to leave any troops there, but shall attend to your Highness' orders on the subject.

The reason for increasing the troops for the Crimea is, that the Ottoman troops there have lost all consideration, owing to their ill-conduct at the action of Bulaklava, while what remains here is sufficient for the requisitions of the moment. But I cannot fully state in writing all my ideas respecting the administration and the operations of the troops in the Crimea, and it would be therefore necessary that I should have an interview with your Highness to communicate personally with you, and receive your instructions. Everything here necessary for the army is being got ready, and it can embark as the steamers arrive. I might return before this was completed in one or two days, leaving Varna, in a steamer lying ready there, for Constantinople.

I beg to receive your Highness' early instructions on this subject.

Inclosure 2 in No. 31.

Despatch from the Imperial Camp, dated December 14, 1854.

(Traduction.)

CONFORMEMENT à la lettre Vizirielle relativement au mouvement de son Altesse le Généralissime pour se porter avec une force suffisante détachée de l'armée Impériale en Crimée, on a commencé à faire les préparatifs nécessaires à cet effet.

Mais le Colonel Commissaire Britannique auprès de son Altesse, qui est parti il y a peu de tems pour Sébastopol, chargé d'une mission, et qui vient de retourner, a raconté ce qui suit.

L'armée Anglaise là bas se trouve à la distance de trois heures du port. Mais il y a peu de bêtes de somme, et le peu qu'il y a est excédé de fatigue; ainsi, le transport des vivres est devenue extrêmement pénible. Ce sont des soldats de l'Infanterie qui transportent pour à present les rations reduites à deux tiers. Quant aux troupes Françoises, comme leur port se trouve plus près, elles souffrent moins par rapport à leurs rations et le mal n'est pas bien grand pour elles à cet égard. Mais les fortes pluies ont inondé les batteries et comblé les approches de manière que les troupes sont dans l'eau et dans la boue. En un mot elles souffrent beaucoup, et se trouvent dans un mauvais état. Comparativement les troupes Musulmans souffrent sans contredit bien plus encore; des soldats en marchant tombent tout-à-coup et expirent, et comme cette circonstance est attribuée à une espèce de maladie, ils ne veulent pas s'approcher les uns des autres pour ne pas en être atteints. Les soldats Turcs sont reduits à mendier tout umment quelque chose pour manger. Voilà ce que, entre autres choses, le Colonel raconte avoir vu de ses propres yeux.

Les Généraux-en-chef ont décidé que son Altesse le Généralissime doit débarquer avec les troupes qu'il commandera à Ghidylévé. Mais Ghidylévé n'a pas un port, et débarquer tant de troupes et tant de munitions et les y maintenir, c'est pour sûr exposer ces troupes aussi à des difficultés et à une détresse extraordinaire. Plus encore on ne peut voir en cela aucun avantage pour les operations générales, et ce sera inutilement qu'on les y aura maintenues.

Dès le principe le Généralissime n'a pas trop approuvée l'expédition en Crimée, parce que la saison était passée; tant il est vrai qu'il a assez fait comprendre sa manière de voir à cet égard dans les représentations qu'il a faites dans le tems. Quoiqu'il en soit tout cela est passé, et tout est comme non avenu. Mais au moins, il faut arrêter un bon plan analogue aux circonstances actuelles, et trouver les moyens d'y remédier, car si on ne le fait pas les circonstances prendront un caractère encore plus difficile; et non seulement cela,

mais on prévoit par l'état des choses actuel que cet état ira jusqu'à devenir irremédiable.

Il est donc nécessaire que dès à present on cherche les moyens de faciliter les choses. C'est pourquoi son Altesse demande la permission de se rendre par Varna à Constantinople et partir pour retourner dans un ou deux jours, afin de soumettre à son Altesse le Grand Vizir de vive voix et en détail ses idées et sa manière de voir.

Je prie donc votre Altesse de communiquer secrètement le contenu de cette dépêche au Grand Vizir, et s'il faut de la lui faire voir aussi.

No. 32.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 7, 1855.)

(No. 770.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December 21, 1854.*

INCLOSED herewith for your Lordship's information is the translated copy of a letter addressed by Veli Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador at Paris, to the Commander-in-chief of the Sultan's army in Roumelia, accompanied with a copy, also translated, of the letter in which Omer Pasha transmitted it to the Porte. I have already drawn your Lordship's attention to the subject matter of this very delicate and confidential correspondence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 32.

Veli Pasha to Omer Pasha.

(Traduction.) 23 *Safer*, 1251. (14 *Novembre*, 1854.)

J'AI parfaitement saisi le sens de la dépêche que votre Altesse m'a écrite en date du 11 du mois passé. Dans cette dépêche votre Altesse répond à ce que je lui avais écrit, d'après les communications que son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères m'avait faites sur le campement de l'armée Ottomane et des armées des deux Puissances alliées, et sur les intentions actuelles de la Cour d'Autriche qu'on a cherché à comprendre. Votre Altesse me dit aussi que dans peu elle aura, s'il plait à Dieu, à m'annoncer la prise de Sebastopol. J'ai conformément à mes ordres communiqué le tout à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, qui en a été on ne peut plus satisfait. Il a fait votre éloge et puis il m'a dit qu'il a toujours l'œil sur la conduite de l'Autriche, à Paris et à Vienne, où il a écrit exprès à cet égard. Le Ministre m'a dit aussi que si l'Autriche s'oppose en quelque manière que ce soit à votre Altesse, cette circonstance regardera la France plus que tout autre; la France qui n'y consentira en aucun façon, et sera par conséquent obligée de l'empêcher.

Venons à la question des quartiers d'hiver. Le Ministre est revenu sur ce qu'il avait déjà dit tendant à faire voir la convenance que l'armée Impériale établisse pour ses quartiers d'hiver la Crimée, et il a dit: "Une fois la Crimée conquise il ne convient ni qu'elle soit laissée aux Anglais, ni qu'elle soit administrée par les Français; et cela étant, elle doit rester au pouvoir de la Sublime Porte, à laquelle elle a appartenu dans l'ancien temps. Et comme c'est une contrée très importante, il faut qu'elle soit confiée à l'administration d'un homme de caractère et d'influence. Et comme Omer Pacha possède ces qualités, et qu'il a rendu des services éclatants dans cette guerre, on pense de lui donner le poste en récompense des succès militaires qu'il a eu, et celui-ci gouvernera le pays au nom du Sultan, avec indépendance. Si Omer Pacha établit les quartiers d'hiver en Crimée, ce sera un moyen de faciliter les projets en question." Le Ministre m'a engagé à informer votre Altesse de tout cela, mais d'une manière très confidentielle.

Le Ministre m'a chargé de ce message confidentiel parce qu'il connaît les relations intimes qui existent entre votre Altesse et moi.

Je finis par prier de nouveau votre Altesse de tenir secret tout ce que je viens d'avoir l'honneur de lui faire savoir.

(Signé) RIFAAT VELI UDIN,
Ambassadeur à Paris.

Inclosure 2 in No. 32.

Omer Pasha to the Grand Vizier.

Bucharest, le 7 Décembre, 1854.

(Traduction.)

J'AI l'honneur de transmettre ci-joint à votre Altesse, afin qu'elle en prenne connaissance, une dépêche confidentielle que je viens de recevoir de son Excellence Veli Pacha, Ambassadeur à Paris.

Il est dit dans la dépêche du Pacha qu'elle a été écrite d'une manière très confidentielle; mais considérant qu'il est de mon devoir de tenir votre Altesse au courant de tout ce qui se passe, et surtout l'affaire dont il s'agit étant très délicate, je m'empresse de la lui communiquer, en la priant à mon tour de la tenir secrète.

Ce que l'on pense relativement à la Crimée, n'est nullement conforme à mes idées.

Moi, je ne suis rien du tout; je n'ai que quelques connaissances et quelque expérience militaires; je suis tout-à-fait incapable d'administrer un vaste pays qui a besoin d'être réorganisé. Je n'ai pour cela ni les connaissances ni la capacité nécessaires, et cela étant je n'accepte point la proposition. Ce que je suis sincèrement résolu de faire, c'est de sacrifier ma vie au Sultan dans le service militaire.

Seulement, et votre Altesse est trop éclairée pour ne pas le savoir, dans ce moment-ci la position la plus importante, la plus essentielle, c'est Sébastopol. Or, si, à Dieu ne plaise! cette place n'est point prise, et si les trois armées allaient retourner de là, ce serait un très grand mal. Il faut qu'une force suffisante, détachée de l'armée Impériale, soit envoyée en Crimée; et si on en fait la conquête, cela sera un puissant moyen d'en faire faire la cession à la Sublime Porte, lorsque la paix se fera.

Les papiers reçus de Paris par télégraphe, ainsi que les dépêches collectives reçues de la part des Commandants-en-chef, sont conçus dans le sens suivant, savoir: qu'il faut envoyer une force suffisante en Crimée, sous mes ordres. C'est pourquoi, et ainsi que je l'ai déjà écrit par le passé à son Altesse le Seraskier, je m'occupe des préparatifs pour me mettre en route, avec l'assistance Divine.

C'est pour informer votre Altesse de tout cela que je lui écris la présente lettre confidentielle.

(Signé) OMER LUTFI.

No. 33.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 7, 1855.)

(No. 771.)

Constantinople, December 21, 1854.

My Lord,

AMONG the despatches which I forward to your Lordship from Colonel Williams by the present occasion, is one which complains in no measured terms of my silence towards him and supposed neglect of the interests recommended to his care by Her Majesty's Government.

I have time at this moment only to remark that if the charge be correct, my reports to your Lordship must be a tissue of misstatements. Silent it is true I have been, in so far as my correspondence with him is concerned, for the simple reason of my wishing to avoid any risk of disappointment arising out of the dilatory and sometimes illusive proceedings of this Government. But to what degree and with what success I have laboured for the accomplishment of those

objects which Colonel Williams has so properly pointed out and so strongly recommended, I hope to place in a clearer light on the departure of the next messenger.

I trust, meanwhile, that the zeal displayed by that meritorious officer will not be encouraged at the expense of my character.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 34.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 7, 1855.)

(No. 772. Confidential.)

Constantinople, December 21, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith for your Lordship's confidential information, the copy of a letter which I received this morning from the Commander-in-chief of the Turkish army at Batoum. Your Lordship will find that its contents are not destitute of interest. A letter from Trebizond asserts that the Russians had attacked Redoute-Kaleh about the beginning of the month, but without success.

I have no sufficient reason for believing the report either of the attack or of the failure.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 34.

Mustapha Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe

Excellence, *Quartier-Général de Choorookséo, le 3 Décembre*, 1854.

L'ACCUEIL favorable dont votre Excellence daigne m'honorer me fait un devoir de lui écrire; les intérêts de la Sublime Porte l'animent au même degré que ceux de son propre pays, et c'est ce qui me fait un devoir de plus à la mettre au courant des choses du corps d'armée que je commande.

L'amélioration de son état physique et moral m'a occupé depuis mon arrivé à Choorookséo, et il n'a pas fallu moins que ce laps de temps pour obtenir de bons résultats, mais je puis dire actuellement que le soldat est bien vêtu, bien nourri et surtout bien portant; l'instruction et la discipline ont été également remises sur un bon pied. J'ai lieu d'espérer que le corps d'armée oubliera cet hiver les rigueurs qu'il a éprouvées l'hiver précédent, et quand il en sera temps, il se trouvera à même de remplir le rôle que le Ministère voudra lui prescrire dans un plan de campagne.

Les Russes pensent déjà à s'établir cet hiver de manière à paralyser au printemps prochain notre mouvement offensif; ils se proposent de s'emparer de Redoute-Kaleh, point par lequel la route de Souram est la plus vulnérable; aussi ont-ils effectué le 17, une forte reconnaissance armée sur ce point. Les renseignements qui me parviennent m'annoncent d'ailleurs le bruit qui court dans l'armée Russe du projet de reprendre toutes les positions maritimes évacuées l'année précédente. Ces positions, et surtout Redoute-Kaleh, sont assez bien occupées pour que je n'aie pas d'inquiétudes à ce sujet; les troupes Turques que j'attends de Constantinople compléteront les garnisons que j'ai assignées à chacune d'elles, et qui seront assez fortes pour tenir contre les attaques probables de l'ennemi. Toutefois je sens la nécessité d'avoir un escadre de trois "steamers" au moins, qui relieraient ces positions à Batoum, et qui les protégeraient par leurs feux; leur présence seule détournerait l'ennemi de tout projet contre ses positions. Les deux "steamers" qui sont attaché au corps d'armée font le service des vivres et de la correspondance entre Trébizonde et Batoum, et sont loins d'être à la portée de contribuer à la défense des côtes de la Circassie.

J'ai déjà fait une première excursion sur ces côtes; j'ai pu m'entretenir avec les notabilités Circassiennes qui sont venus me voir et j'ai reconnu chez elles une disposition d'esprit très favorable pour la Sublime Porte. Elles m'ont promis de se réunir à mon premier appel pour pousser des expéditions vers le Kuban, tandisque les Abhazes par leurs masses agiront contre la vallée du Kura, sur le gauche du corps d'armée de Batoum. Les travaux du corps d'armée m'ont empêché d'aller de nouveau à Soukoum-Kaleh; mais je me dispose en ce moment de m'y rendre et j'espère pouvoir amener dans le domaine des faits ce que j'ai déjà obtenu de ces populations en promesse. En ceci, comme en toute chose, mon but sera de bien servir Sa Majesté, et de mériter les souffrages dont je prie votre Excellence de couronner mes efforts.

Daignez agréer, &c.

Le Muchir Commandant-en-chef du Corps d'Armée de Batoum,
(Signé) MUSTAPHA PASHA.

P.S. La corvette-à-vapeur de Sa Majesté Britannique le "Wasp," qui était en croisière le long de la côte Circassienne, vient d'être appelée à rentrer dans la flotte, et je me trouve privé de son service. Les trois "steamers" que les Amiraux voudraient m'envoyer pour la défense des côtes trouveraient ici un excellent quartier d'hiver dans le port de Batoum.

No. 35.

Consul-General Colquhoun to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January 7*, 1855.)

(No. 121.)
My Lord,

Bucharest, December 22, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to inclose for your Lordship's information, copy translation of a note addressed the 1st by Count Coronini to the Home Office here, wherein he requires that the paper money of Austria shall be taken in payment of the provisions, &c., furnished to the Imperial and Royal army. This measure, in direct opposition to the proclamation of Baron Hess on entering the Province, has created a great sensation here: the paper varies from 20 to 26 per cent. discount, and the shopkeepers refuse positively to take it, as they did successfully resist all attempts of the Russians to render their bank-notes current here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

Inclosure in No. 35.

Count Coronini to the Home Office at Bucharest.

Bucharest, le 1 Décembre, 1854.

(Traduction.)

LE Ministère des Finances Impérial et Royal d'Autriche désire à l'avenir assurer l'entretien de l'armée et les autres besoins dans les deux Principautés uniquement contre payement en billets de banque.

Cette mesure pourra s'exécuter sans difficulté, attendu que les fournisseurs sont libres d'élever leurs offres en proportion de la différence qui existe entre l'argent et le papier-monnaie, ou de réclamer, lors des payemens en papier, la différence de la valeur, c'est-à-dire l'agio. Dans les deux cas les fournisseurs sont à l'abri de toutes pertes provenant de la différence des valeurs.

A l'effet de pouvoir déférer au vœu du Ministère des Finances, le Soussigné prie le Département de l'Intérieur de vouloir bien prendre les mesures nécessaires auprès des autorités locales, pour faire accepter partout et sans difficulté les billets de banque d'après leurs cours, et pour arriver ainsi à la possibilité d'assurer à l'avenir l'entretien et les autres besoins de l'armée Impériale et Royale de l'Autriche et de ses établissements, par le payement en billets de banque.

(Signé) CORONINI.

No. 36.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January 7.*)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, January 6, 1855.

THE Russian Minister has announced to Count Buol that in answer to his communication of the 28th of December, he has received from his Government instructions to reply categorically to the questions laid before him at the last Conference, and he requests another meeting with the three Representatives. The French Ambassador and I, together with Count Buol, have agreed to it, and it will take place to-morrow.

No. 37.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January 7.*)

(No. 5.)
My Lord,

Berlin, January 5, 1855.

WITH reference to my Nos. 530 of the 29th ultimo, and 535 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to forward an analysis of the despatch addressed by Count Buol to Count Georges Esterhazy, the Austrian Minister at this Court, directing him to invite the Prussian Government, by virtue of the Additional Article of the 26th of November, and the Federal Act of the 9th of December, to carry out the military arrangements stipulated between the two great German Powers. No answer has yet been returned to this communication, and I regret to say that the Prussian Government are not disposed to meet the requirements of the Court of Vienna. I spoke to Baron Manteuffel this morning on the subject, and he confirmed the impression which I had received. His Excellency said he should send off his reply to Vienna in a few days, and that he thought the moment had not yet arrived for the application of the Treaty, adding that the Austrian Government had made similar communications to all the German Courts, but that up to the present moment none had been addressed to the Diet at Frankfort.

I understand that the Prussian Missions here have reported that, when the measure comes before the Diet, Austria is certain of obtaining a sufficient number of votes to carry her object; still the Prussian Government seem for the present at least determined not to act in concert with Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 37.

Count Buol to Count Esterhazy.

Vienne, le 24 Décembre, 1854.

LE Gouvernement Impérial s'appuyant sur l'Article Additionnel du 26 Novembre, et l'Arrêté Fédéral du 9 Décembre, pense que le moment est venu de s'entendre avec la Cour de Prusse sur les nécessités militaires des deux Grandes Puissances Allemandes, ainsi que d'envoyer au Président de la Diète des instructions pour l'exécution de la partie militaire de l'Arrêté Fédéral.

Avant de soulever cette question à Berlin, le Gouvernement de l'Empereur a voulu attendre la réponse que le Cabinet Prussien ferait à la communication officielle du Traité du 2 Décembre, l'adhésion ou la non-adhésion de la Prusse devant naturellement amener des modifications dans les mesures militaires qu'elle aurait à prendre.

Notre désir le plus sincère était de reprendre avec la Prusse, sur un pied d'égalité politique complète, les délibérations concernant la mobilisation de l'Autriche, de la Prusse, et de la Confédération Germanique.

Le Cabinet de Berlin ayant déclaré qu'il ajournerait sa décision, nous sommes obligées de baser les négociations, uniquement, sur le Traité du 20 Avril et l'Arrêté Fédéral du 9 Décembre.

L

La Prusse s'est engagée, éventuellement, par l'Article III du Traité et par le paragraphe 2 de la Convention Militaire, à mobiliser dans le délai de trente-six jours 100,000 hommes et à placer dans un délai de trois semaines 100,000 sur ses frontières orientales, après la mobilisation du premier contingent.

Ces dispositions du Traité devant entrer en vigueur, quand besoin en sera il ne s'agit plus, entre les Parties Contractantes, que de s'entendre sur l'urgence.

Si les espérances d'une pacification générale ne devaient pas se réaliser dans un court délai, d'ici à la fin de ce mois, il ne serait plus permis d'élever des doutes sur la nécessité d'une mobilisation immédiate.

La Russie est prête; elle a concentré de grandes armées sur ses frontières occidentales; elle pourrait en très peu de tems réunir des forces considérables pour attaquer l'Autriche. Il faudrait à l'armée Russe moins de tems pour paraître sur la Vistule Supérieure, qu'il n'en faudrait à la Prusse pour mobiliser et concentrer une armée de 100,000 hommes.

La Prusse, veut-elle exécuter ses engagements et couvrir l'Autriche contre toute attaque, elle devra sans retard, et dans l'intérêt de la défense commune, mettre son armée sur le pied de guerre. Le Feld-Maréchal Hess déclare de la manière la plus formelle, que le moment est arrivé pour la Prusse de procéder à la mobilisation contractuelle d'une partie de son armée. Il ajoute que notre armée concentrée sur les frontières orientales n'atteindra une force suffisante et ne pourra accepter la lutte avec chances de succès qu'autant qu'il s'y joindra 100,000 Prussiens.

Le Cabinet de Berlin comprendra dès lors, qu'il est indispensable de s'entendre sans retard. Nous sommes prêts à envoyer de nouveau, dans ce but, un Plénipotentiaire militaire à Berlin.

Selon le Feld-Maréchal Hess nous n'aurions à demander à la Prusse que l'exécution de la Convention Militaire du 20 Avril, la mobilisation immédiate et simultanée des deux contingents de 100,000 hommes chacun, et leur concentration à Posen et à Breslau, alors même que les négociations seraient basées non seulement sur le Traité de Berlin, mais aussi sur l'accession du Gouvernement Prussien à l'Alliance du 2 Décembre. En ce qui regarde les mesures militaires à prendre à la Diète, nous avons l'espoir que la Prusse, d'accord avec nous, insistera pour l'exécution prompte et énergique des stipulations du 20 Avril.

Tous les Gouvernements Fédéraux manifesteront les meilleurs dispositions à cet égard, nous n'en doutons pas, si les deux Grandes Puissances leur donnent l'exemple de préparatifs militaires, à la hauteur des circonstances.

Les autres États Allemands auront à mobiliser la moitié de leurs contingents pour opérer de concert avec les armées Autrichiennes et Prussiennes.

On pourrait former quatre demi-corps d'armée, indépendants (abgeschlossen) commandés par un Général-en-chef qui leur serait propre. Les quatre corps d'armée seraient complétés selon les besoins par l'autre moitié du contingent.

On bien on organiserait deux corps d'armée combinées, au complet; l'un serait le Corps d'Armée Allemand du Sud, l'autre le Corps d'Armée Allemand du Nord.

Dans l'un et dans l'autre cas les corps fédéraux seraient incorporés aux armées Autrichiennes et Prussiennes, en nombre égal.

Du reste rien n'empêche qu'on abandonne aux délibérations de la Commission Militaire le mode de la mobilisation et de la concentration des troupes fédérales.

Si plus tard la Prusse devait adhérer au Traité du 2 Décembre, les deux Grandes Puissances pourraient proposer en commun, à la Diète, la levée totale du contingent fédérale à l'effet d'imprégner à la Confédération Germanique une attitude militaire plus imposante et de lui donner une force suffisante pour l'offensive.

Nous désirons connaître au plus vite les intentions du Cabinet Prussien, tant pour l'envoi d'un Plénipotentiaire militaire à Berlin, que pour les instructions que nous aurons à transmettre à Francfort.

No. 38.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 8.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 7, 1855.*

I AM just come from the meeting at the house of Count Buol, where the Russian Minister met the French Ambassador, Count Buol and myself, and declared himself to have been authorized to give a distinct answer to the questions brought forward on the 28th December.

After a lengthened discussion, and after many reserves had been put forward and withdrawn, the document containing the four bases that had been submitted to the Russian Minister at the last meeting was read to him; and upon his reply, my two colleagues and I felt ourselves authorized to declare that the preliminaries requisite for opening negotiations, as stated in your Lordship's despatch No. 422, in which negotiations the Turkish Ambassador shall assist, have been fulfilled by the Russian Minister's acceptance of those bases. Count Buol will record this result in a report to the Emperor of Austria, the French Ambassador in a despatch to his Government, and I in the despatch which I shall address to your Lordship to-morrow.

No. 39.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 8, 1 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 7, 1855.*

M. COLQUHOUN écrit de Bucharest, 7 Janvier, 3 P. M.:

"Omer Pasha left Varna by 'Inflexible' for Eupatoria; thence to go to head-quarters; then to return to Varna, to arrange for embarkation of his corps d'armée.

"Nothing new from seat of war. Varna, 4."

No. 40.

Mr. Howard to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 29.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 7, 1855.*

IT was only at a late hour this afternoon that I was able to see M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

His Excellency had received from M. de Bourqueney a telegraphic communication similar to the one which your Lordship will have received from Lord Westmorland.

With reference to it, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that the course to be pursued was perfectly clear in the event of Prince Gortchakoff proposing any modification, either in the sense or in the wording of the interpretation.

His Excellency thought that anything less than the pure and simple acceptation of the whole must be considered as a refusal on the part of the Czar to accept the conditions of the allies.

In the event, however, of its being the pure and simple acceptation of the interpretation, the line of policy to be adopted was not so clearly marked out. He could not for a moment believe that Russia would be acting in that case with sincerity; every precaution should, therefore, be taken that the attempt (for this would be her object in accepting the interpretation) to detach Austria from the Western Powers, and to gain time in order to pour reinforcements into the Crimea, might not be successful.

His Excellency proposes, therefore, should Prince Gortchakoff accept the interpretation, to submit to your Lordship the expediency of insisting upon the immediate evacuation of the Crimea by the Russian army, and upon their retiring beyond Perekop.

The acceding to this condition would not, his Excellency observed, prejudge any future question of territorial arrangement; it did not necessarily take the Crimea from the Russians, or give it to the Turks: it was merely intended as a measure of precaution upon which the safety of the allied armies might depend, and at all events it would afford no bad test of the sincerity of Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HY. HOWARD.

No. 41.

Mr. Howard to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 32.)

Paris, January 8, 1855.

My Lord,

LORD STRATFORD informs your Lordship in his despatch No. 789 of the 28th ultimo, that M. Benedetti had on that date received instructions to engage the Porte to authorize its Ambassador at Vienna to take part in the Conference to be held in that capital on the subject of Russia's acceptance of the four points as a basis of negotiation.

Although the news of the acceptance by Russia of the interpretation of the allied Powers of the four points reached Paris this day, some surprise may be felt, nevertheless, that at the date when M. Drouyn de Lhuys addressed his instructions to the French Chargé d'Affairs at Constantinople the possibility of such an event was foreseen by his Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HY. HOWARD.

No. 42.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 9, 1855.)

(No. 782.)

Therapia, December 28, 1854.

My Lord,

I THINK myself entitled to remark on the hasty manner in which Colonel Williams has allowed himself to suppose that I have neglected the important interests committed to his charge. Because he did not hear from me as soon or as frequently as he expected, he rushed to the conclusion that I gave him no support; and under this inconsiderate impression he has made a deliberate appeal to your Lordship and Lord Raglan.

These circumstances do not in the least degree warp my judgment as to Colonel Williams' excellent intentions and zealous exertions in behalf of the army at Kurs; nor am I at all inclined to depreciate the somewhat voluminous correspondence which contains the result of his researches and remonstrances.

Your Lordship is already aware of the pains which I took on the receipt of his principal reports, to put their substance into a working shape, and to engage the Turkish Ministers to enter both promptly and fully on the correction of the abuses which he had denounced. It is incumbent on me now to show that, as far as official assurances go, I have succeeded in obtaining their assent to his leading suggestions, and in some instances a positive execution of the engagements thus contracted.

In order to place my conduct in its true light, independently of my own assertions, I have addressed a set of queries to M. Pisani, by whose agency my representations grounded on those of Colonel Williams have been urged on the Porte, requiring that he should give a distinct reply to each of them, according to the exact state of the case as known to him.

The inclosure marked (A) is my paper of queries; the inclosure marked (B) is M. Pisani's paper of answers.

I have certainly to regret that the progress of the Turkish Ministers in acting on my suggestions has not kept pace with the desire of Colonel Williams, nor, indeed, I must say, with the requirements of the service which they

But the well-known proverb, which contrasts the facility of bringing a horse to water, with the impossibility of forcing him to drink, is no less true at Constantinople than in London or Paris. Unfortunately, too, the horses whose reluctance I have to overcome are not without circumstances to excuse, though not entirely to justify, the slowness of their pace.

Winter, distance, roads scarcely passable, want of funds, the extent of evil to be cured, the scarcity of trustworthy officers, the greater interest of operations elsewhere, the illness of Ismail Pasha, all these causes of difficulty, and others which might be enumerated, have concurred to produce hesitation and delay. I regret the existence of such obstacles, and blame the Turkish Ministers for not surmounting them with more activity. But can I wonder? No! Corruption, ignorance, prejudice, want of public spirit, and the instincts of selfishness, engender the same consequences wherever they prevail in long habitual exuberance. Such cankers, wide-spreading and deep-rooted, have ever been the harbingers and instruments of ruin, except in those few and favoured States where public opinion proclaims the danger and suggests the remedy in time.

Has England itself been always without a taint? Have we never heard of Bacon or of Marlborough? Have we forgotten the Memoirs of Pepys, the profligacies of his day, and the one claim of an exiled Sovereign to the gratitude of his country? Are not the denunciations of Burke still ringing in our ears? Place, time, and circumstances vary altogether, but the disease differs only in degree. In Turkey it has reached the stage of extreme virulence; in Christendom, generally, it is in abeyance, or shows itself only under mild forms; in Russia it mingles with the system of administration, and would, no doubt, fulfil its mission there, as elsewhere, if the power and energy of government did not maintain a counteracting vitality.

Within the last few days I have learnt from one of the Turkish Ministers, on whom I can rely in this instance, that the real cause of the culpable inattention shown last year by the Turkish authorities to the wants of the army in Asia was the jealousy entertained by Mehemet Ali Pasha, first Grand Vizier and subsequently Seraskier, of Mehemet Rouzdi Pasha, at one time his colleague, and at another threatening to become his successor.

Unhappily this is by no means a solitary instance. The present Seraskier and Omer Pasha have long been at variance with each other. Mutual accusations take place, and while the Seraskier asserts that he has sent ample supplies to the army in Roumelia, the Generalissimo complains of being neglected, and all is contradiction and uncertainty, except one painful fact, the suffering of the soldiers.

It remains for me to say a word respecting my silence towards Colonel Williams; it has, in truth, continued longer than I intended. It originated in my anxiety not to occasion disappointment by announcing measures which might or might not be carried into effect. I knew that during the winter season little, comparatively, could be done, and I preferred, under the pressure of business flowing in abundantly from other sources, to give my correspondent an answer in full, rather than keep up a succession of partial communications. To this may be added the total want of punctuality with which of late the packets for Trebizond have left Constantinople. It has happened more than once that the opportunity was not brought to my knowledge till within an hour or two of the vessel's departure; thus to the motive for not making preparation, was added the difficulty of writing at the moment, from want of time.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 42.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Queries.—1. HAVE I given Colonel Williams my general countenance and support?

2. What was done with the Turkish and Russian cavalry sabres sent by that officer?

3. What was done with the ball-cartridges sent also by him, for muskets and rifles at Kurs?

4. What has happened to the Polish officers with the army at Kars, in consequence of my representations, particularly to those known respectively by the Turkish names of Arslan and Shaheen Pashas? Are they here, and if so what are they doing?

5. Have any measures been taken with respect to Shukri and Hussein Pashas in consequence of my representations?

6. How do matters stand now with respect to them, and also with respect to Kerim and Hafiz Pashas?

7. What has happened to Tahir Pasha, in consequence of my representations in his favour?

8. What has been done with respect to the various supplies specifically demanded for the army at Kars?

9. What has been done with respect to the various officers charged with misconduct, and lists of whom have been sent in to the Porte by me?

10. What has been done or is doing with respect to Mustapha Zarif Pasha, on my demand?

11. What with respect to his two predecessors, Ahmet Pasha and Ferik Ali Pasha?

12. What has been done with respect to Colonel Williams himself, as to support, advice, and rank?

13. What has been done with respect to the command of the army?

Inclosure 2 in No. 42.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Answers.—1. DECIDEDLY. Strong and repeated representations have been made on the subject through me in the proper quarter.

2. The two sabres were sent to the Seraskier through the Porte, and the consequence was that about 4,500 larger swords were bought by the Turks, one of which was shown to the Ambassador previous to concluding the bargain. A still larger number is ordered.

3. The ball-cartridges referred to in the margin were given to the Seraskier, and a large supply of them was sent to the army at Kars.

4. The Polish officers at Kars have been recalled, in consequence of the Ambassador's representations; some have arrived here already, and the others are on their way hither. Arslan and Shaheen Pashas came here some time ago, and the former left for Paris, in company with General Count Montebello, in the French packet which sailed yesterday afternoon. The latter continues to be in the Turkish service, but not actively employed for the present.

5. A letter of reprimand has been addressed to Shukri and Hussein Pashas, and should this admonition remain without effect they will be recalled.

6. A letter of approval will be addressed to Kerim Pasha by the Seraskier, and another from the Porte to Hafiz Pasha.

7. Tahir Pasha has been promoted to the rank of Ferik.

9. A list of the various supplies sent to the army at Kars, since the Ambassador's representations, will be forwarded to his Excellency by the Seraskier Pasha.

9. The new Mushir is charged to inquire into the conduct of the officers alluded to.

Mustapha Zarif Pasha is actually under arrest at the War Department, and will be tried forthwith.

11. The trial of the two Pashas named in the margin is in progress, and their sentence will soon be pronounced by the Great Council.

12. Colonel Williams is made Ferik or General of Division. The new Mushir will have instructions to follow his advice, and his mission will be properly defined, in order to prevent further misunderstandings.

13. The command of the army has been given to Vassif Pasha.

(Signed) ET. PISANI.

Pera, December 22, 1854.

No. 43.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 9, 1855.)

(No. 789.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December 28, 1854.*

I AM informed by M. Benedetti that he has received instructions from Paris to engage the Porte to authorize its Ambassador at Vienna to take part in conferences expected to be held there between Prince Gortchakoff and Count Buol, in concert with the British and French Representatives, on the subject of Russia's acceptance of the four points as a basis of negotiation.

I told the French Chargé d'Affaires that I was not only without instructions, but even destitute of information on the subject to which he alluded.

In ignorance of your Lordship's views on this very important and delicate matter, I have thought it my duty to apprize the Grand Vizier of the answer which I had given to M. Benedetti's communication.

It appears that the French Chargé d'Affaires communicated to Aali Pasha the draft of a note, of which he was subsequently to send in a copy for the consideration of the Council—a note, as I imagined, received in draft from Paris. I am assured that the Ottoman Minister has received the communication thus far without committing himself to any definite reply.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 44.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 10.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 9, 1855.*

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bucharest, reporting that the Austrian Government have determined that the paper-money of Austria shall be taken in payment of the provisions and other necessaries furnished to the Austrian army in the Principalities, and I have to instruct your Lordship to make inquiries on this subject and report the result to me.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 45.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 9, 1855.*

I READ to Count Buol the passage in your Lordship's letter with regard to Prussia. He is very much satisfied with your expressions with respect to Austria. Your first recommendation to M. Usedom is the most natural, but if it is not agreed to, and if a separate Treaty with England and France would be satisfactory to Prussian feelings, Count Buol would not object to it, if containing stipulations of the same general importance as the one of the 2nd of December. Count Buol says that the simplest form of Treaty would be, that Prussia should adhere to the Protocol of the 28th of December, and engage to use her best means to enforce its stipulations in conjunction with the Governments of England, France, and Austria, giving her active military support to those Governments, and recommending a similar activity to the German Confederation.

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* No. 35.

No. 46.

The Earl of Clarendon to Brigadier-General Williams.

(No. 5.)

Foreign Office, January 10, 1855.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 50, of the 3rd of December, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government have demanded the immediate recall of Shukri Pasha from the army at Kars.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 47.

The Earl of Clarendon to Brigadier-General Williams.

(No. 6.)

Foreign Office, January 10, 1855.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to you for your information a copy of a despatch, and of its inclosures, from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, explanatory of his proceedings with the Porte relative to the state of the Turkish army at Kars, together with a copy of my reply.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 48.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 24.)

Foreign Office, January 11, 1855.

My Lord,

YOUR Excellency's despatch No. 782 of the 28th of December has been laid before the Queen.

It has received the careful consideration of Her Majesty's Government, and I have to inform you that it appears by M. Pisani's paper of replies to your Excellency's queries, that with the exception of some ball-cartridges, little or nothing seems to have been sent for the relief of the army at Kars. The Seraskier, indeed, says he will furnish a list of the supplies furnished, but the state of destitution in which General Williams found the army, and from which it has been suffering since his arrival at Kars, proves that these supplies either have not been sent or that they were insufficient, or, as in the case of the medical stores, that they were worthless.

Some Polish officers have been removed, the trial of some culprits is said to be proceeding, and letters of reprimand have been addressed to Shukri and Husscin Pashas, and letters of approval will be addressed to Kerim and Hafiz Pashas.

But this is all that has been done for the relief of the army, notwithstanding the repeated and urgent remonstrances of Her Majesty's Government, which are of a date long anterior to the departure of General Williams from this country.

The Porte was well aware of the anxiety felt by Her Majesty's Government on this subject, and of the importance they attached to the army at Kars being in a fit state to take the field next spring; yet knowing the necessity that General Williams should have rank in the Turkish army, in order to secure to him the respect and obedience required, not alone for the Sultan's interests, but for his position as the Queen's Commissioner, his diploma of Ferik has not yet been sent to him, nor does he appear to have been informed that the rank was conferred upon him.

General Williams was in a position of great difficulty and responsibility, surrounded by traitors and robbers with whose occupations he was bound to interfere, and he stood in need of all the support and encouragement that Her Majesty's servants could afford him.

It was my duty regularly to acknowledge the despatches of General Williams containing a painful recital of the difficulties against which he had to

* Nos. 42 and 48.

contend, and it has been to me a great satisfaction to convey to that gallant officer the entire approval of Her Majesty's Government of the energy and success with which he overcame the obstacles to improvements, some of which he found on his arrival, and others which have since been wilfully thrown in his way.

Her Majesty's Government therefore cannot but regret the silence observed by your Excellency towards General Williams, and they can well understand the discouragement and mortification he must have felt at receiving no acknowledgment of his fifty-four despatches, accompanied by private letters, for he looked to your Excellency as his natural protector, and must have well known that the great, the deservedly great influence of your Excellency, must be more powerful on the spot than any Her Majesty's Government could exercise to save him and the Turkish army from the consequences of that corruption, ignorance, prejudice, and want of public spirit which your Excellency so well describes, and the proofs of which are in every direction unfortunately but too apparent.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 49.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 25.)

Foreign Office, January 11, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 789 of the 28th of December, reporting that the French Chargé d'Affaires had received instructions to request the Porte to authorize its Ambassador at Vienna to take part in the Conferences expected to be held in that capital, I have to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government consider that the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna should receive instructions and full powers to act in accordance with the English and French Representatives in any negotiations that may take place there.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

P.S.—Your Excellency is instructed to communicate this despatch to the Turkish Government.

No. 50.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 26.)

Foreign Office, January 11, 1855.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government have learnt with satisfaction by your Excellency's despatch No. 764 of the 20th of December, that the Porte has consented to place at Her Majesty's disposal a division of Turkish troops to be employed in the present war.

I accordingly transmit to your Excellency the draft of a Convention for giving effect to this arrangement, which you are authorized to propose to and conclude with the Porte; but you will be at liberty to make such alterations in the draft as, without departing from the spirit and object of it, may be found necessary to meet difficulties which may be raised by the Turkish Government.

I leave in blank the numbers of the troops to be enrolled under this Convention, but it appears to Her Majesty's Government that the numbers specified in the memorandum inclosed in your despatch will be sufficient, at least in the first instance, namely, 10,000 or 12,000 Regulars, and 6,000 or 8,000 Redif.

I also leave in blank the proportions of the several arms of which the division is to be composed; inasmuch as the manner in which they shall be fixed must in some degree depend on the communications which you may have with the Porte; but your Excellency will be able to ascertain from the British

officers at Constantinople what proportion of each army should be employed in the division.

As regards the amount of pay, I presume that it will be sufficient to stipulate that the pay of the Turkish officers and men shall correspond with the rate to which they would be entitled in the Sultan's service; for as proper security will be taken by the British paymasters that the pay is duly received by the persons for whom it is destined, the advantage held out to the recipients in this respect will probably be sufficient inducement to them to serve with alacrity under British officers.

Her Majesty's Government would not, however, object to giving a small increase of pay over the rate of Turkish pay, if your Excellency should think it advisable to do so.

Your Excellency will inform the Porte that measures will be immediately taken for sending to Constantinople the British officers destined to be employed in organizing and commanding the troops to be placed at Her Majesty's disposal in virtue of the proposed Convention; and you may add that it is not intended to send more British officers than may be required to render the division efficient, and that the inferior ranks, with the exception, perhaps, of a few drill sergeants, will be filled by Turkish officers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 50.

Draft of Convention.

HER Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a view to the more effectual prosecution of the war in which Her Majesty, the Emperor of the French, and His Highness the Sultan are engaged, having proposed to His Highness the Sultan to take into the British service for a time, and in all respects to provide for, such a proportion of Turkish troops as might be agreed upon between Her Majesty and the Sultan; and His Highness the Sultan having signified his concurrence in that proposal of his ally; their said Majesties have seen fit to conclude a Convention for the purpose of determining the conditions on which such Turkish troops shall be employed, and have named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:—

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c., &c.;

And His Majesty the Sultan, &c., &c.;

Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following articles:

ARTICLE I.

Her Britannic Majesty engages to take into her service a body of Turkish regular troops, to consist of thousand men of all arms.

The above-mentioned troops shall be detached from the regular troops now serving with the armies of the Sultan, and in addition thereto, the Sublime Porte engages to assign for the same purpose thousand of the Redif.

The troops thus engaged in Her Britannic Majesty's service may be employed in any manner which may be deemed advisable for the purposes of the present war by his Excellency the Commander of the British forces in the East.

ARTICLE II.

The Turkish troops mentioned in the preceding Article, whether composed of Regulars or Redif, shall be placed under the command of one or more general officers, to be named by Her Britannic Majesty, who shall severally receive from the

Porte the rank and precedence of a general officer in the Turkish service; and Her Britannic Majesty will further appoint such a number of superior British officers as she may deem sufficient for the maintenance of the troops in a proper state of discipline and efficiency.

His Highness the Sultan engages to confer upon the officers thus selected by Her Britannic Majesty, such rank in the Turkish service as Her Majesty may recommend, and as may be sufficient to ensure the necessary subordination of the Ottoman officers and men employed in Her Majesty's service.

The Turkish troops in question shall in every respect be subject to the discipline and regulations of the British service. The colour of their uniform shall be left to the discretion of the Commander-in-chief of the British army, but its general style and appearance shall be similar to those of the regular Turkish army.

ARTICLE III.

The Turkish troops on being made over to the British service shall bring with them in the first instance their arms and accoutrements, but Her Britannic Majesty engages thenceforward to provide for the pay, arming, clothing, equipment, and maintenance of the whole of the troops thus placed at her disposal, and to furnish everything that may be necessary to enable them to take the field, as well as to provide the means of conveyance of the same from point to point by sea, whenever necessary.

[The pay of the Turkish officers and men shall correspond with the rate to which they would be entitled in the Sultan's service.]*

ARTICLE IV.

Her Britannic Majesty further engages that the Turkish officers and men so to be employed in her service, shall in no way be interfered with as regards the observance of the rites and ceremonies of their religion.

ARTICLE V.

The date at which the Turkish troops shall begin to be at the charge of Her Britannic Majesty, as well as all the details of the arrangement which forms the object of the present Convention, shall be settled by officers to be named for that purpose by the Governments of the two High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE VI.

When the present war shall be terminated by the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace, the whole of the soldiers forming the body of troops to which this Convention relates, together with all the Turkish officers, shall be placed at the disposal of the Turkish Government, which shall be at liberty either to incorporate them with the Turkish army, or to disband them either wholly or in part.

ARTICLE VII.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done, &c.

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* This clause is left to Lord Stratford's decision, as stated in the instruction.

No. 51.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 9)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January* 11, 1855.

A REPORT received at Bucharest of the 10th, and transmitted to me by Colquhoun, states that a detachment of Russian troops had crossed the Danube at Toultchia; that the Turkish troops had retired with the loss of a captain and thirty-one privates; that the Turkish commander, Achmet Pasha, had withdrawn his troops to Ibraila; and that the Russians had passed forward some troops towards Babadagh.

No. 52.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 12, 1855.)

(No. 793.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 31, 1854.

INCLOSED herewith, for your Lordship's information, is copy of the official note by which the Austrian Internuncio communicated yesterday to the Porte certain ratified copies of the Treaty concluded at Vienna on the 2nd instant, between England, France, and Austria.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 52.

Baron Bruck to Aali Pasha.

Constantinople, le 30 Décembre, 1854.

LE Soussigné, Internonce et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, qui a déjà eu l'honneur de porter confidentiellement le contenu du Traité d'Alliance conclu le 2 de ce mois à Vienne, entre l'Autriche, la France, et l'Angleterre, à la connaissance de son Altesse Aali Pacha, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Sultan, s'empresse, après que la ratification du dit Traité a eu lieu par les Hautes Puissances Contractantes, de lui en faire parvenir, ci-joint, trois exemplaires.

Le Soussigné s'acquittant ainsi, conformément aux ordres de son Gouvernement, du devoir de notifier officiellement à la Sublime Porte la conclusion du Traité dont il s'agit et dans lequel elle ne manquera pas de voir avec une vive satisfaction un acte de la plus haute importance pour la solution de la grave question qui l'a motivé, saisit, &c.

(Signé) C. BRUCK

No. 53.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 12, 1855.)

(No. 794.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 30, 1855.

AGREEABLY to your Lordship's instructions I have communicated to the Porte the Treaty of Alliance, eventually offensive and defensive, concluded at Vienna on the 2nd instant.

M. de Bruck and M. de Benedetti had previously made a similar communication on the receipt of the Treaty from their respective Governments.

Reshid Pasha is acquainted with the purport of the Secret Article.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 54.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 12, 1855.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 10th. If the Russians advance further or in greater numbers you will express to Count Buol our confident hope and expectation that Austria will take means for preventing it, or that she will announce to Russia that it will be considered as a *casus belli* by Austria.

No. 55.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 12.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January* 8, 1855.

I HAVE already stated to your Lordship by my telegraphic despatch of yesterday that Baron Bourqueney and myself waited upon Count Buol, at whose house we met Prince Gortchakoff, according to the desire expressed by the Russian Minister to Count Buol.

Prince Gortchakoff stated that he had received instructions from his Government which he had embodied in an unofficial document, which he read, and which enabled him to enter with us into explanations upon the subjects which had been brought before him at our last interview on the 28th ultimo.

With respect to the first Article Prince Gortchakoff said, he agreed to the interpretation given to that basis as having for its object to replace the present Protectorate of Russia over the Principalities by that of the European Powers. He stated his objections as he had done at our last meeting to the designation of Servia as being under Russian protection, but as this was acknowledged to have been an error, he would make no further remark with regard to it.

As to the second Article, after some discussion upon the various modes of carrying out its object, Prince Gortchakoff declared that he admitted the interpretation given to it with the view of facilitating the establishment of the entire liberty and free navigation of the Danube.

With reference to the third basis, he said that he did not refuse to recognize the principle of seeking, as an European object, to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, and he admitted that it might be an object for the allies of Turkey to desire; he would, therefore, adopt the proposal to enter into negotiations upon the principle which was put forward.

The other Representatives stated, that on reading the interpretation of that basis, it would be seen that it had for its object, to attach more completely the Ottoman Empire to the European equilibrium, and for that purpose to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea; and that the arrangements to be made for this purpose depended too directly upon the events of the war to allow of their being at once laid down. Prince Gortchakoff replied, that he acknowledged the principle so announced, and accepted it as a basis for negotiation.

As to the fourth basis, Prince Gortchakoff said, that he felt, not as a politician, but as a Christian, that it was necessary that the protection at present existing for the Christians of different denominations in Turkey should not cease until it was replaced by sufficient securities, and with this expectation he agreed to the adoption of this Article.

Baron Bourqueney then read out the identic interpretation given by the three Powers to the four bases, and pointed out to the Russian Representative, that the first Article implied the abolition of Russia's protectorate over the Principalities, the future organization of which would be based on the general interests of Europe; and that it stipulated for the maintenance of the privileges of the Principalities, whose future organization should find no obstacle in the provisions of former Treaties. The second Article had for its object, to put an end to the jurisdiction of Russia on the Danube, and to establish perfect freedom of navigation on that river. The third Article stipulated for the revision of the Treaty

of 1841, and for the cessation of Russia's preponderance in the Black Sea; and the fourth Article provided for the abolition of Russia's official protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Sultan belonging to the Greek Church, and for the non-renewal of the Articles of her former Treaties.

Prince Gortchakoff then withdrew the unofficial document he had read as merely a memorandum for his own guidance, and admitted that he accepted the interpretation of the four Articles, as they had again been read to him, as a basis upon which he agreed that a negotiation with the three Powers, whose Representatives were present, and with the Turkish Representative, could be established.

He announced that he had his full powers to enter at once into this negotiation, and, without unduly pressing the request, expressed his anxious desire that we would seek to obtain at an early period from our Governments the full powers for ourselves, and from the Government of the Porte for the Turkish negotiator.

Count Buol having summed up the results of the meeting in a few words, stated that he was ready to report them to the Emperor, and to ask His Majesty's authorization for him to make use of his full power.

Baron Bourqueney stated that he conscientiously felt himself authorised to declare that the preliminary formalities required by his Government had been fulfilled by Prince Gortchakoff, whose adhesion to the text of the interpretation of the four Articles he would report in a despatch to his Government, with a request to be furnished with full powers; and I stated that by the instructions I had received from my Government (referring to the last paragraph of your Lordship's despatch No. 422 of the 18th of December) I was authorized to make the same declaration, and that I would also apply to my Government for the full powers necessary to enable me to take a part in the negotiations.

I therefore submit this application for fresh full powers to your Lordship, believing that those which are deposited in the Imperial Chancery of State, and to which reference is made in your Lordship's despatch No. 6 of the 2nd of January, would not be sufficient for the present occasion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 56.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 29.) *Foreign Office, January 13, 1855.*

My Lord,

I HAVE received from General Cannon a copy of the letter which he addressed to your Excellency on the 20th of December, and Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that the best efforts of your Excellency have been used to procure relief for Eupatoria, which is now of great importance to the allies, and which must be held against the Russians as a place from whence the arrival of reinforcements to Prince Menchikoff may be checked. The Tatar horsemen should be turned to account, and their families should, if possible, be supported not alone as a work of charity, but on account of the bad moral effect that will be produced in the country if people are allowed to perish who took the first opportunity of exhibiting their disaffection to the Russians and their goodwill towards the allies.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 57.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 11.) *Vienna, January 9, 1855.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith in original and translation an article from the semi-official journal "Deutsche Post" upon the meetings which have taken place between the Representatives of the allied Governments and Prince Gortchakoff, as it will serve to place your Lordship in possession of the general effect produced by these meetings in this capital.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 57.

Extract from the "Oest. Deutsche Post Gazette" of January 9, 1855.

Vienna, January 8, 1855.

(Translation.)

THE news of the Conference which took place in Vienna on the 28th ultimo, has scarcely yet spread over Europe, when it has already been followed by the far more important Conference held on the 7th January, which presents a complete contrast to the meeting at Lord Westmorland's house ten days earlier. On that occasion Prince Gortchakoff declared the interpreted propositions of the allied Powers exorbitant, exaggerated, almost inadmissible; in the Conference of yesterday the Russian Minister, in consequence of instructions received the day before from St. Petersburgh, displayed great willingness to adopt the bases of the future peace in the manner in which they were again more precisely interpreted by the Representatives of the three Powers.

The courier, who is bringing Prince Gortchakoff new instructions and now powers, has of course not yet had time to accomplish his journey from St. Petersburgh to Vienna; but the preliminary instructions transmitted by telegraph suffice to show that the importance of this critical moment is fully appreciated in St. Petersburgh, and that, there, everything will be done, every effort made, to prevent the defensive alliance of the 2nd December being converted into an offensive one.

Russia has introduced, within the last few weeks, an entirely new system into the treatment of the great European question. Whilst her language hitherto had always borne the character of pride, overbearing importance, and perfect inflexibility, and was always seeking to bully or threaten, she has now, since November, assumed in all her public acts a spirit of mildness and of concession; she seeks to soften, to gain, we had almost said to touch (*sic*).

This character is also borne out by the last manifesto, whose whole spirit is very different from what the first telegraphic extract had led us to believe.

The general direction of this manifesto will probably be found to coincide with the new instructions sent to Prince Gortchakoff, whose willingness and conciliatory tone in the Conference of yesterday was as unexpected as surprising. The chief condition made by Russia was said to be: that there should be nothing in the conditions of peace restricting the sovereignty of the Czar in his own Empire.

There is much to be understood by this sentence. Sebastopol, before all, which is said, from a natural delicacy, not to have been alluded to in either Conference. The destruction of Sebastopol, the annihilation of the Russian naval establishments in the Black Sea, the reduction of the maritime power of Russia in her ports in that sea, this would all be a restriction of sovereignty in her own Empire.

Here lies the chief difficulty of the negotiations.

For besides the four points there is the great question; how is the Crimea expedition to be honourably terminated? Each of the contending parties must

seek to save their honour, and that can only be decided on the field of battle, not at the writing-table.

The prelude to the commencement of negotiations for peace took place yesterday at Count Buol's. The prelude to a decisive contest in the Crimea is at hand. All we hear confirms us in our opinion that the fight round Sebastopol will be immediately recommenced. That negotiations for peace need not impede the prosecution of hostilities has often been proved by examples from history. In the thirty years' war, Plenipotentiaries met to treat for peace in 1644, and in 1648 fighting had not ceased.

Heaven preserve us from a thirty years' war! But let the sword take what is the sword's; the pen what is the pen's. A great step in the road to peace has been gained by diplomacy; but the Generals alone can fully mature and bring it to a decision.

No. 58.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 20.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 13, 1855.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held in your conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, of which you give an account in your despatch No. 6 of the 12th instant, respecting the conduct to be pursued by England and France in the negotiations about to be opened at Vienna.

Count Walewski a few days ago read to me a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, suggesting, if it met with the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government, that, as a preliminary to negotiation, and as a test of Russian sincerity, a demand for the evacuation of the Crimea by the Russian army should be made by France, England, and Austria.

I observed to Count Walewski that it would be impossible for Russia to consent to such a proposal, and it was improbable that Austria would join us in making it; that we could not refuse to enter upon negotiation merely because a new condition, of which there had previously been no question, was declined; but that Russia, nevertheless, might accuse us of something like bad faith, and she might, not unsuccessfully, appeal to the public opinion of Europe against our determination not to make peace nor to adhere to the conditions of peace that we had already announced. Supposing, however, that Russia consented, what, I asked, was proposed with respect to Sebastopol? Was the garrison to be withdrawn in order that the allies might take the place; or was the garrison to be left when the main body of Prince Menchikoff's army quitted the Crimea? In the latter case the siege could not be continued, and the proposal would then, in fact, be one for an armistice on the part of England and France.

Count Walewski yesterday read to me another despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, stating that the evacuation of the Crimea should not be proposed as a preliminary step, but should be made if the negotiations were protracted and there appeared no prospect of Russia agreeing to our terms. I told Count Walewski that when it became clear that Russia would not agree to our terms, there could be no difficulty about breaking off the negotiations, and stating the true reason for it. There might, however, then be grounds for making the proposal suggested by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, but I ventured to recommend that no engagement to that effect should now be taken, as the two Governments could always consult together as to the course to be pursued with reference to events as they occurred.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 59.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 14.)

My Lord, *Paris, January* 14, 1855.

THE correspondence from Vely and Omer Pashas, relative to the future destiny of the Crimea, forwarded to your Lordship by Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, and inclosed in copy in your Lordship's despatch No. 2 of the 10th instant, to myself, accorded so little with what I had the honour to state to you on this subject in my despatch No. 1,557 of the 22nd ultimo, that I have taken an opportunity of inquiring of M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether he ever authorized Vely Pasha to make any proposals to Omer Pasha, on the part of the French Government. His Excellency assured me in the most positive manner that although he had spoken to Vely Pasha of the chances which an enterprizing man like Omer Pasha might have if he aided in freeing the Crimea from the sovereignty of Russia, he had been so careful not to engage his responsibility in conveying such sentiments himself to Omer Pasha, that he had expressly stated to Vely Pasha that if he (Vely) wrote on the subject to Omer, he must do it as if the ideas put forward in his letter originated with himself.

I have also had an opportunity of hearing the statement of Vely Pasha relative to this transaction, and so soon after my interview with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that it is impossible they could have seen each other in the interval. He confirmed M. Drouyn de Lhuys' statement word for word, and affirmed moreover that in hinting to Omer Pasha the possibility of his becoming Viceroy or Governor of the Crimea, he had expressly stated that it was an idea of his own, and he added that he had written in the same sense to the Grand Vizier at Constantinople.

What therefore I presume to be the case is this: M. Drouyn de Lhuys wishing Omer Pasha to go to the Crimea, very unguardedly throws out hints to Vely Pasha that by doing so he might possibly become Viceroy of that Province; Vely Pasha also, with the desire of overcoming Omer Pasha's indecision, turns these hints into a direct proposition coming from the French Government. Omer Pasha seeing the little success likely to attend any such scheme, shows up Vely Pasha to the Porte, and thus the matter has acquired an importance which never really belonged to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 60.

Lord Cowley to the Earl Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord, *Paris, January* 14, 1855.

WHEN M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me that he had received intelligence by telegraph that the Russians had again entered the Dobrudscha, I urged him to instruct M. de Bourqueney, by the same means, to call on the Austrian Government to endeavour to prevent the success of this movement against the Turks. His Excellency sent M. de Bourqueney the necessary instructions without loss of time.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 61.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15, 1855.)

(No. 799.)

Constantinople, December 31, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Colonel Williams, in forwarding to him the Sultan's firman raising him to the rank of a General of Division in the Turkish service.

The list of articles of supply prepared for the army of Kars, or already transmitted thither, as I have received it from the Seraskier, is reserved for a future opportunity, in consequence of the difficulty which has been experienced in translating some of the terms, which are little known in ordinary composition.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 61.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Lieutenant-Colonel Williams.

Constantinople, December 30, 1854.

Sir,

REFERRING to your despatch of the 8th instant, I send you herewith a copy of a despatch No. 782 of the 28th instant, addressed by me to the Earl of Clarendon, and containing such remarks as I have thought it necessary to make on the subject matter of your complaints.

I avail myself of this opportunity to transmit to you inclosed herewith a firman conferring upon you the rank of Ferik, or General of Division, in the Turkish service. A translation in French accompanies it.

I have, moreover, to direct your attention to the list, inclosed herewith, of articles of supply alleged by the Seraskier to have been forwarded by his orders to the army at Kars, in consequence of your demands, communicated to the Porte by me. It has been placed officially in my hands by his Excellency's direction.

The Porte is not a little perplexed by the difficulty of finding a General sufficiently qualified to take the command of an army like that at Kars.

Though Ismail Pasha is still the Commander-in-chief of that army, he is destined for the present to command the army of Roumelia, in place of Omer Pasha, who takes a strong division of it to the Crimea, under urgent circumstances.

The command at Kars has been recently declined by Mehemet Pasha, the late Grand Vizier. Vassif Pasha, who has the credit of being free from corruption, in virtue of an independent fortune, is now appointed to the temporary command. He enjoys a fair character in all respects, and his education was military. I am assured that he will shortly set out for the seat of his command, with instructions to attend to your advice, to look into the conduct of his subordinates, and to apply all his faculties to the improvement of the army placed under his orders. It is to be hoped that Ismail Pasha will be at liberty to exercise in person the functions of Commander-in-chief at Kars before any active operations can be resumed.

In consequence of your later representations, and previous to the receipt of your despatch of the 8th instant, I demanded the recall of Shukri Pasha, at the risk of your seeing reason to change your mind respecting him, as in the instance of Kerim Pasha.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 61.

Firman.

(Traduction.)

AU très noble, très grand, très honorable et illustre personnage, un des Colonels de l'illustre Gouvernement Britannique qui se trouve avec mon armée Impériale d'Asie, Williams Pasha, à qui le haut rang de Ferig, Général de Division, vient d'être conféré. Lorsque mon présent diplôme Impérial te sera parvenu, tu sauras ce qui suit:

Comme ma Sublime Porte connaît fort bien, par expérience, ta grande intelligence et tes vastes connaissances dans les affaires militaires, et que c'est pour cela que tu te trouveras avec mon armée Impériale d'Asie, et comme j'ai de l'estime et de bonnes dispositions pour toi, je t'ai, conformément au rapport du Seraskier, conféré le haut rang de Ferig, et telle est ma volonté souveraine en vertu de laquelle mon présent firman est émané de mon Divan Impérial.

Informé que tu auras été de tout ce que ci-dessus, tu feras tous tes efforts pour continuer à donner à ma Sublime Porte des preuves de ton dévouement, et à lui rendre de bons et loyaux services. Aye-le pour entendu et ajoute foi au noble chiffre dont est décoré ce diplôme Impérial.

Donné dans la première diyanie du mois de Rebiul-Akhir, 1271.

Vers la fin de Décembre, 1854.

No. 62.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 4.)

Constantinople, January 3, 1855.

My Lord,

THE Porte has received intelligence of the embarkation of Omer Pasha for the Crimea, with the view of consulting in person the Commanders-in-chief of the allied forces engaged in the siege of Sebastopol.

Yesterday a most gracious firman was conveyed to his Highness by an officer of distinction employed at the Porte. A translation of this Imperial letter is forwarded herewith. It may be hoped that so marked a proof of consideration for the Generalissimo will have the effect of soothing any irritated feeling which other circumstances may have excited in his Highness's mind.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 62.

Imperial Rescript.

(Translation.)

THE preservation and independence of my Imperial Government and dominions, and the prosperity of my loyal and faithful subjects, is to my Imperial Majesty, as well as to my faithful, loving, wise, and intelligent servants, the most urgent and honourable duty. Since the undertaking of the present war—which God prosper!—with this sincere and beneficent purpose you have merited my royal approbation and favour for your able administration of the military powers committed to your charge, and my Imperial forces acting under your orders have by their zeal, courage, and devotedness, proved to the whole world that they are the worthy descendants of those devoted heroes who shed their blood in the days of my noble ancestors, for the consolidation and prosperity of my Empire. I am confident that they will undergo all the fatigues and privations

of war, for the preservation of the honour and independence of our Empire, which they have already proved by their glorious conduct before friend and enemy, to my high Imperial satisfaction. I shall second with pleasure the services of your Excellency, together with those of all the officers and soldiers, and shall be ever solicitous for the comfort and prosperity of each and every one of them. My Imperial care shall always accompany my army wherever it may be.

On the present occasion, behold a large division of my army of Roumelia is sent with you to the Crimea, and you are commissioned to act with the Imperial troops already sent thither, and in concert with my illustrious and sincere allies against the enemy. Let me see what you are worth. You will thus also perform good services, with the grace of God, to the honour of the Empire, and be careful to act in concert and good fellowship with the armies of my allies in my just cause.

I have therefore issued this Imperial rescript from my Royal Divan to the purport that you do merit my increased favour by further acts of valour, military prowess and discipline, and devotion.

I have further charged Mahmoud Bey of the Foreign Office to convey to you verbally my Imperial orders, with the expression of my royal satisfaction, which you will communicate to the whole army, while you at the same time attend to their wants and comforts.

(In the Sultan's hand-writing.)

My well-beloved Serdra Ekram, Omer Pasha,

You will learn from this Imperial firman that I have duly appreciated the praiseworthy services which have been hitherto rendered by you, and which have merited you an increase of our favour. We are also pleased and gratified beyond measure at the faithful and brave conduct of all the officers and soldiers of our Imperial army under your command, as a mark of the zeal, devotion, and valour inherent in them. You will likewise, on the present occasion of proceeding to the Crimea, conformably with your spirit of zeal and devotion, and relying on the assistance of the Almighty God, endeavour to render good services, and to be on terms of cordiality with the officers and soldiers of the allied armies fighting in our just cause. You will thus increase your title to our favour, and be careful at all times to maintain military discipline, and to afford proofs of your devotion towards us.

End of December 1854.

No. 63.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 15.)

(No. 6.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 4, 1855.

A VESSEL, which arrived this morning from Balaklava, has brought me a despatch from Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, a copy of which I inclose herewith for your Lordship's information.

It is very satisfactory to find that Sir Edmund Lyons has felt himself warranted, with his usual activity and public spirit, to give assurance as to the timely and regular supply of steam-transport for the conveyance of provisions to Eupatoria.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 63.

Field-Marshal Lord Raglan to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Before Sebastopol, December* 31, 1854.

ADVERTING to your Excellency's letter of the 24th instant, in which you beg me to inform you distinctly and officially what can be reckoned upon with certainty as to the transport of provisions, ammunition, and stores for the supply of the Turkish troops conveyed, and to be conveyed, from Bulgaria to Eupatoria, and to my answer of the 29th, wherein I stated that at a conference which took place at this house on the 27th between Admirals Bruat and Lyons, General Canrobert and myself, the two former undertook to make the best arrangement they could for the due performance of this service; I have the honour to transmit for your information, a copy of a despatch I have just received from Sir E. Lyons, which, I doubt not, will satisfy your Excellency that adequate steps will be taken to bring the troops to the Crimea, and to insure their having provisions, &c., if the Ottoman Government will afford the assistance of two Turkish frigates, and, moreover, take care that the engagement made for a month's provisions being embarked with the troops in Bulgaria shall be fulfilled, and that the arrangement effected by the Government shall be communicated to Sir Edmund through Rear-Admiral Boxer, and be strictly adhered to, with regard to the bulk, nature, and weight of the provisions, as well as with respect to the places from whence they are to be shipped.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RAGLAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 63.

Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan.

My Lord, *"Agamemnon," off Sebastopol, December* 29, 1854.

IN compliance with the wishes of your Excellency and General Canrobert, Vice-Admiral Bruat and I met this morning for the purpose of proposing arrangements for the transport of Turkish troops from Bulgaria to the Crimea, as well as for conveying provisions to them when here.

Vice-Admiral Bruat finds that he shall be able to appropriate two steam-frigates for the transport of the troops, but the necessity of providing for the wants of the large French army before Sebastopol renders it altogether impossible for him to enter into any engagement for the conveyance of provisions.

For my part I understand that the Ottoman army in the Crimea will amount to about 35,000 or 40,000 men of all arms, of whom 10,000 are already here, and I am happy to assure your Excellency that with the assistance of the two French steamers I may reasonably expect, even at this inclement season, to be able to bring over the remainder, and that with the assistance of two Turkish steam-frigates, which I conclude the Ottoman Government will have no difficulty in providing, I shall have it in my power to keep up a supply of the usual Turkish rations for the whole number of 40,000 men.

It is, however, extremely desirable that the Ottoman Government should take care that the engagement made for a month's provisions being embarked with the troops in Bulgaria shall be fulfilled; and it is indispensable that arrangements should be made by the Ottoman Government, be communicated to me through Rear-Admiral Boxer, and be strictly adhered to with regard to the bulk, nature, and weight of the provisions, as well as with regard to the places from whence they are to be shipped, so that no delay may take place on the arrival of the transports.

If any modifications of these proposals should suggest themselves to your Excellency and General Canrobert, Vice-Admiral Brunt and I will be happy to attend to them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMD. LYONS.

No. 64.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 15.)

(No. 17.)
Vienna, January 10, 1855.

My Lord;

I HAVE the honour to report that the Government of the Porte has furnished the Turkish Ambassador here with the necessary authority to take part in the Commission established at Vienna, for the settlement of any differences arising in the Principalities from their joint occupation by the Austrian and Ottoman troops, and that his Excellency will therefore assist henceforth at the deliberations of that Commission.

I have &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 65.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 15.)

(No. 20.)
Vienna, January 10, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 445 of the 30th ultimo, together with its inclosures, and which alluded to a statement in Mr. Colquhoun's No. 112 of November 24, to the effect that Prince Stirbey was collecting a tax destined to liquidate a debt towards Russia, I have to state that I mentioned this circumstance to Count Buol, who expressed great indignation that it should be supposed that money raised in the Principalities while occupied by Austrian troops could be destined to be remitted to Russia, against whose aggression those troops were defending those countries.

As I entertained the same doubt as to the collection of a tax at this time in the Principalities for Russia, I wrote a telegraphic despatch to Mr. Colquhoun, a copy of which I herewith inclose, requesting he would transmit to me the authority upon which he stated that this tax was now in course of collection, for "the identical purpose" as that for which it has been established. I will inform your Lordship of the answer I receive.

I have inquired of the Turkish Ambassador whether he had any knowledge of such a destination of any sums raised by the tax in question or by any other, but he replied that he had none whatever; he will, however, upon my invitation write to his agent in Bucharest to make the inquiry. The Ambassador thinks it is not unlikely that the tax may continue to be collected, but that it will be applied in a very different way from that for which it was destined.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 65.

The Earl of Westmorland to Consul-General Colquhoun.

Vienna, January 9, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

IN your despatch to Lord Clarendon No. 112, referring to the tax for the repayment of the Russian debt, you state that summonses have been issued to collect the tax for the identical purpose

Let me know if you have the authority of Prince Stirbey, or any other official authority, for knowing that the money so raised is collecting for Russia.

Answer as soon as convenient, forwarding any official document as the authority.

No. 66.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 15, 8·50 P.M.)

Vienna, January 15, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT BUOL has just communicated to me the following despatch which has been placed in his hands by the Russian Minister:—

"*Le Prince Michel Gortchakoff au Prince Gortchakoff, Ministre de Russie à Vienne.*

"*Kiszenew, le* 12 *Janvier*, 1855.

"Le 27 et 27 Décembre, v.s., un partie Russe a traversé le Danube, et a passé jusqu'à Babadaz. Il a pris un drapeau Turc et fait quatre-vingt-trois prisonniers, dont un officier Major et deux officiers subalternes. Nous n'avons eu que quarante blesses; l'ennemi a eu plus 200 morts. Le 29, le détachement Russe est revenu à Ismaila. Bobinsky le cadet a fait partie de l'expédition, et je lui donne la Croix de St. Georges do Soldat."

"(Signé) MICHEL GORTCHAKOFF."

No. 67.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 15.)

(No. 8. Confidential.)
Berlin, January 6, 1855.

My Lord

PRINCE CARADJA, who has been lately appointed Turkish Minister at the Hague, is now here on his way from Constantinople to his post. He called upon me to-day, and informed me that the King of Prussia had invited him to dinner at Potsdam, and that His Majesty had received him most graciously. He said that the language which he heard around him at the palace teemed with hopes of peace being soon restored, and that the language of the King breathed nothing but neutrality. This, Prince Caradja said, had not surprised him, for he was prepared for such sentiments from the King of Prussia; but what had really surprised him was to have been spoken to in the same tone by the Emperor of Austria, who had also received him a few days previously on his way through Vienna. He describes His Imperial Majesty to have stated on this occasion, that he was most anxious to see peace reestablished in Europe, and that he had good reason to know that France was not ill disposed to negotiate, but that England was less so, and he regretted to say appeared resolved to carry on the war with renewed vigour.

I have thought it right to mention the foregoing to your Lordship; and I beg leave to add that I was so surprised to hear this from Prince Caradja, that I put several questions to him on the subject, and he declared to me that the sense of the words employed by the Emperor Francis Joseph was as clear and unmistakeable as those used by the King of Prussia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 68.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 9.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 9, 1855.*

I HAVE just returned from an interview with Baron Manteuffel, at which I read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch No. 6 of the 4th instant, which was delivered to me yesterday by Mr. Carruthers.

Baron Manteuffel had been fully prepared for this communication by Count Bernstorff's despatch, and seemed gratified to receive the assurances which I gave him of the readiness of Her Majesty's Government to meet the desire expressed in his despatch of the 19th ultimo, that the question which agitated the whole of Europe should be treated between the two Governments in a spirit of frankness and cordiality. His Excellency made but few observations as I proceeded to translate your Lordship's despatch. When I came to that passage which related to the interpretation of the four bases, upon which the Prussian Government was probably as well informed as Her Majesty's Government, he said that he certainly possessed, he believed, tolerably accurate intelligence on the subject, but still no official or confidential communication had been made respecting it. I then remarked that it was not to be expected that we could make confidential communications until we felt more satisfied that our confidences would be in safe keeping, for we felt that if secresy were to be observed in the matter, that it would stand a good chance of being betrayed by some of the persons about the King, who are one and all devoted to the interests of Russia, and who would take pleasure in conveying our confidences into the hands of our enemy. It became therefore, I said, a question for the King to decide in what manner he would be disposed to meet the difficulties he had placed himself in, by the political course which His Majesty had thought fit to follow during the last nine months.

Baron Manteuffel expressed great readiness to submit to the King the proposal that a Treaty should be signed between England, Austria, France, and Prussia, based on the principles of that of December 2, but omitting Articles II and VI, and he promised to take His Majesty's orders on the subject. I then proposed that this Treaty, which could soon be negotiated if the King were favourably disposed, might be signed at Berlin, in preference to any other place. To this his Excellency said that he believed the King would prefer Vienna, as being the seat of the negotiations. I replied that the place to be selected for this purpose mattered little, but that whilst Austria signed her Treaty at Vienna, Prussia might perhaps desire to have her Treaty with the allies dated from her own capital.

Upon that part of your Lordship's despatch referring to the interpretation of the four bases, in which you state that Baron Manteuffel required more than Count Buol had done, for that your Lordship had come to no understanding with the Austrian Government before the signature of the Treaty beyond some general assurances, Baron Manteuffel said that the King considered the Austrian Government had committed an error in signing this Treaty as long as it was in ignorance of the intentions of the maritime Powers. I rejoined that if the King now agreed to the Treaty proposed, His Majesty would not at all events have any reproach of the kind to make to himself, as the interpretation put upon the four points was almost a matter of public notoriety.

I must not close this despatch without observing that the communication with which I had been charged appears to be satisfactory to Baron Manteuffel; he evidently considers it to be indicative of a friendly disposition on the part of England, and he certainly appears to hope that the result may be that the relations of Prussia and England will be placed on a better footing.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 69.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 10. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 9, 1855.*

WITH reference to my preceding despatch, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that in the course of my conversation with Baron Manteuffel, I told his Excellency that as the King had chosen from his own free will to leave the Conference in July last, and had since that time given many proofs of his desire to favour Russia, he would not be surprised if I ventured to observe that in the event of Prussia's not entering into a Treaty with us, the Conferences might continue without the participation of the Prussian Plenipotentiary, and it was desirable that we should hold some guarantee as to the future policy to be pursued by the King. I said it was essential that we should appear in the Conference as all holding the same opinions opposed to the pretensions of Russia; this I said would soon lower the demands of our enemy, and show that if he did not wish sincerely for peace, and make offers that would be accepted, he would, if the negotiations were broken off, have no longer to deal with the Western Powers alone, but with Germany also.

Baron Manteuffel seemed to agree that I advanced nothing that was unreasonable under the circumstances. I said, of course a change of the King's policy must naturally involve a change of persons about the Court; for once a Treaty signed with us, it must be properly carried out, and that it became natural for us to expect that all those persons now devoted to Russian interests about the King, would consider it impossible to remain, and I might add if they did not retire, we should have no confidence that the King was in earnest, and would not desert to the enemy on the first occasion.

Baron Manteuffel endeavours to persuade me that if the Treaty were made, the King would keep to its stipulations whether the party were in power or not. I replied that the King might possibly not listen to them as much as heretofore, but their presence at Court would expose the King to continued suspicions on the part of the allies, whilst they must always be considered a rallying point for the Russian faction throughout Germany.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 70.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 12.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 12, 1855.*

IN my despatch No. 5 of the 5th instant, I inclosed an analysis of an Austrian despatch dated the 24th ultimo, which had been communicated to the Prussian Government calling upon them to mobilise a portion of their army and place it on the eastern frontiers. I reported at the same time that the answer of this Government would not be favourable, and I have now the honour to inclose a copy and translation of the despatch addressed by Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim, the Prussian Minister at Vienna, in reply to the abovementioned communication.

Your Lordship will perceive that the Prussian Government, in declining to accede to the suggestions of Austria, insists on the purely defensive character of its engagements, and does not allow that Austria has any cause whatever to apprehend danger from the side of Russia at this present moment, as such attacks would be inconsistent with the assurances which it has received, and is become even less likely as Russia has now accepted the four points without

reservation; but it states, nevertheless, that in the event of necessity Prussia's military preparations are so far advanced, that the requisite number of troops can be called out in less time than is stipulated by Treaty, and that the military Commissioner at Frankfort will be duly empowered to act in conformity with all engagements.

Allusion is also made to the right of Prussia, as a great Power, to take part in any discussions connected with alterations of the public law of Europe, in a tone which indicates feelings of vexation at her present isolated condition, and an ardent desire to re-enter the Conference. I regret to have to observe that the whole despatch is written in a tone which gives but little hope of an approaching change in the dispositions of the Prussian Government, or of any serious desire on its part to make an alliance with Austria and the Western Powers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 70.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim.

Berlin, January 5, 1855.

(Translation.)

YOUR Excellency will find annexed copy of a despatch dated the 24th of December last, addressed to Count Esterhazy, in which the Austrian Cabinet more particularly defines the military measures which in their opinion ought to be adopted on the part of Russia, as well as on that of the other Federal Governments, in virtue of the Treaty of the 20th April, and the Additional Article of the 26th of November. Count Buol very justly observes that the question was for the Contracting Parties to arrive at an understanding as to the necessity occurring on which the carrying into effect of the eventual military obligations contracted by Prussia depended. His Majesty the King, as your Excellency may suppose, has from this point of view ever given his unremitting attention to the development of the above relations, and long before this matter was brought forward in the form given in the despatch of December 24th, has conscientiously examined the obligation which it is incumbent on him to fulfil. I do not consider it my duty here to discuss the measures which His Majesty has taken with regard to the interests of his country and his people, as well as, with a continued view of the gravity of the times, for the purpose of ensuring to his army, in silent preparation, an increased readiness for war, and a further development of its strength. So far has been done that greater bodies of troops prepared for action can be placed in position in a considerably shorter period than that which the Military Convention of the 20th April eventually fixes, and we believe thereby to be enabled in some degree to reassure Count Buol with regard to the vigorous attack which he fears on the Austrian Empire by the Russian forces, did we even share the opinion that an aggressive advance was intended by Russia.

But having impartially examined the general state of affairs, we must strain our convictions in order to arrive at the conclusion that Russia, if she is not attacked, will take the offensive. I have more than once been in the position to charge your Excellency with confidential communications to the Austrian Cabinet, which in our opinion most decidedly refute that assumption. Our intelligence also of the movements of the Russian troops is by no means of a nature to justify the fears alluded to. I attach the greater importance to expressing this here, as a part of the press appear to have made it their object to mislead public opinion in this respect. In fact, the position latterly adopted by Russia in respect of the efforts to bring about negotiations of peace is such that it would be difficult, with an impartial estimation, to mistake in it the sincere wish for an understanding. Russia has accepted the four points without reservation as they were proposed to her. After the conclusion of the Treaty of the 2nd December, this acceptation was not only not withdrawn, but her readiness for peace was confirmed by Prince Gortchakoff being provided with extensive powers. His Majesty the King enjoys the gratifying conviction of having always exerted his personal and diplomatic influence at St. Petersburgh to induce the Russian Cabinet to declare itself ready to negotiate on the four

points, although that basis of peace still goes beyond what, at the conclusion of the Treaty of the 20th April, both the Contracting Powers had in view as the object which they were to attain together by means of the alliance. A confidential discussion has already taken place for the purpose of determining the four points more precisely. We do not know its result; but exactly because we do not know it, and as long as we do not know it, we consider it an imperative duty to adopt as our undeviating line of conduct, the simple and in themselves indubitable conditions of the Treaty; to keep the circle of our obligations free from every extension which cannot be distinctly foreseen, and especially as regards military assistance, inasmuch as it is pourtrayed to us as an obligation, strictly to adhere to the leading idea of the Treaty of April, which also is expressed in the end of the Military Convention, and designates as the object of mutual aid the defence against an attack. Even the obligations undertaken by Prussia in the Additional Article of the 26th of November last, although clearly extending much beyond the leading idea of the Treaty of April, preserve this defensive character. They are furthermore indissolubly connected with the supposition of common efforts to give effect to the four points. That such common action does not take place as long as Prussia does not take part in the definition of these points, nor exerts her influence on them, is clear. The title however to this participation, as far as it regards decisions which, though the intention is continuously pronounced to maintain the balance of power in Europe, appear to have the object of changing the whole of the international state of Europe, and of modifying Treaties which Prussia also has signed. This title Prussia does not derive from her participation in this or that stipulation referring to the present Oriental complications; she derives it from her quality of a Great European Power which has taken part in the conclusion of the Treaties regulating the state of public law in Europe by virtue of its own well acquired right. It hardly requires to be affirmed that His Majesty the King will steadfastly adhere to this view, and for the purpose of giving effect to it, if it should be menaced by any encroachment, will not be deterred by sacrifices and dangers, which his faithful people will share with wonted devotion, and with the whole force and endurance of true patriotism. It is least of all necessary to do so towards the august relation and ally of the King His Majesty the Emperor Francis Joseph. It is likewise not necessary with the Sovereigns and leading statesmen of other Powers. In spite of certain differences of opinion and interests, Prussia calculates with confidence in their just appreciation of her claims, and she is ready to bring them to be acknowledged by the way of an agreement and an arrangement.

Your Excellency will easily conceive from the above remarks on the principles which guide His Majesty the King with regard to his own military attitude, that he does not also at present consider it imperative to take the initiative in the Diet in favour of an immediate mobilisation of the several contingents. The mention of the project which was recommended to the Diet by ourselves and Austria as a basis has been particularly omitted in the proposition of the Committee, as well as in the Federal Decree identic with it, and Prussia considers it due to her other German allies not to recur formally to this proposition, and thus to anticipate the labours of the Military Committee. On the other hand, it follows of itself that the Prussian Military Plenipotentiary will always find himself provided with the necessary instructions to promote the activity of the Military Committee on the basis of the Federal War Constitution, and to assist in bringing it to a conclusion in a suitable manner. Thus the doubts which urge themselves upon us, as we do not conceal, with regard to the propositions of the Austrian Cabinet, mentioned in the despatch of the 24th ultimo, will be solved in the most appropriate manner in the way ordained by the Federal Constitution.

Your Excellency will communicate a copy of this despatch to Count Buol.

(Signed) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 71.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 14. Confidential.)

Berlin, January 12, 1855.

My Lord,

I CALLED this morning on Baron Manteuffel, and my first inquiry was, whether he had received any instructions from the King on the subject of the communication which I had made to him on the 9th instant, and whether anything had been settled about the proposed Treaty. His Excellency said that His Majesty was not indisposed to enter on the negotiation, but that before doing so, he wished to await some further letters from M. de Usedom from London.

I then asked if he had made any observations to the King as to the altered position His Majesty would occupy if he consented to this alliance. Baron Manteuffel said that he had done so, but that the King does not admit that this Treaty would imply a change in his policy. I rejoined that I could not understand how the King interpreted the object of the Treaty; he was at present in a position of neutrality, whereas the Treaty would bind him, under certain contingencies, to enter hereafter into certain engagements of an offensive and defensive character. Baron Manteuffel made no reply to this remark, merely saying that the above was the King's impression.

Your Lordship will thus perceive that no progress in this affair has been made since my first communication on the subject; on the contrary, I should say that Baron Manteuffel's tone was less satisfactory than on Tuesday last, and that some unfortunate influences appear to have already been at work, which have rendered the King less inclined to adopt the Treaty than Baron Manteuffel supposed at our first interview. This, perhaps, may be the result of the sudden and unexpected arrival of M. de Bismarck from Frankfort, who has seen the King several times within the last few days.

The language of that Minister is, that the true policy for Prussia is neutrality, and to avoid entering into alliances that will bind her to Austria at this moment. I cannot, however, aver that M. de Bismarck's opinions have made this impression on the King, but he may have brought assurances to His Majesty, which have not been without effect, that the South German States are ready to support Prussia in the present crisis, and are most of them bent on maintaining a neutral position that will enable them to leave their armies inactive, and give full scope to the intrigues of Russian diplomacy. I asked Baron Manteuffel whether there was any truth in a rumour which had reached me, that Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemburg had announced their adhesion to the policy of the King; and he replied that he had received no official intelligence from any of them, but that the Kings of Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemburg had written to the King of Prussia within the last few days, expressing their hope that he would maintain his neutrality. Having inquired if this announcement had produced any effect on the King, Baron Manteuffel answered that His Majesty's opinions were, that though Prussia, as a great Power, might take up arms for European purposes, the interest of the smaller States should be respected; that their positions were essentially defensive; and that they ought to be allowed to maintain their neutrality and independence.

This, I said to his Excellency, was a position which did not, as far as I was informed, at all agree with the views of Austria; and the information which he had just given me showed that the two Great Powers differed on an essential point, which I thought greatly to be deplored, as it might lead to serious disunion in Germany if the war assumed a more extensive character.

Your Lordship will judge from the foregoing how far we may count on the King's sincerity to enter into an alliance with us; and I would venture to suggest that, as we have not yet obtained from His Majesty any assurance of his desire to pursue a policy different from that which he has followed for many months past, but that we have a proof of the contrary in his despatch of the 5th instant to Count Arnim, whether we should not resist the readmission of Prussia to the Conference about to be held at Vienna, to consider the four bases accepted by Russia, until such time as the King has given some guarantee that his policy is modified. If Prussia is allowed to assist at the Conference without some such guarantee, we may be assured that her Representative will come in under doubtful colours, and would be more likely to favour the cause of Russia, particularly when the discussion is brought forward on the interpretation of the third basis. At present we know that we are, at all events, three to one in the Conference; and the admission of Prussia, who has, up to the present moment, refused to give any solid assurances of a willingness to act with us, and who, perhaps, only comes forward with unacceptable propositions to Her Majesty's Government, in the hope of regaining her European position, may advance the pretensions of Russia, create embarrassment to Austria, and thereby tend to weaken the influence of England and France in the scale.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 72.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 18.)

Paris, January 15, 1855.

My Lord,

IN transmitting to your Lordship the inclosed despatch*, which has reached me this day, under flying-seal, from Her Majesty's Minister at Turin, I have the honour to inform you that M. Drouyn de Lhuys has received from the Duc de Guiche copies of the two Annexes of the Protocol of Conference held at Turin on the 10th instant, similar to those inclosed in Mr. Hudson's despatch No. 6 of the 12th instant. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has no objection to either of them.

The Duc de Guiche asked at the same time for a draft of answer accepting the adherence of Piedmont to the Treaty of the 10th April, 1854. M. Drouyn de Lhuys is preparing one, a copy of which will be sent to London for your Lordship's approval.

His Excellency observed to me that, with reference to the Military Convention, and to the proposed contingent of 15,000 men, it would be advisable, as the charges would be supported by Her Majesty's Government, that a declaration to this effect should be exchanged between the English and French Plenipotentiaries at the time of the signature of the Treaty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 73.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 21.)

Paris, January 15, 1855.

My Lord,

I INQUIRED this afternoon of M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether M. de Bourqueney had received any answer to the representation which he had been desired to make to Count Buol respecting the entry of the Russians into the Dobrudscha.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that M. de Bourqueney had urged very strongly on Count Buol to send orders to the Austrian Commanders-in-chief in the Principalities to force the Russians to recross the Danube; that Count Buol had gone immediately to the Emperor, and had written subsequently to M. de Bourqueney to say, that if the Russian movement was a mere demonstration, the Emperor did not think himself called upon to interfere; but that if it was an expedition directed against the Turkish Empire, in that case, as Austria had engaged to protect the Turkish Empire, the Emperor would act up to his engagement.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 74.

Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 59.)

Erzeroom, December 16, 1854.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship will be informed through the copy of my despatch to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, inclosed in mine of the 8th December addressed to your Lordship, of the silence and disregard with which his Excellency has been pleased to treat my despatches and private communications relative to the affairs of this army, to which I am accredited as Commissioner by Her Majesty's Government.

Under these extraordinary, I may say unprecedented, circumstances, it behoves me to demonstrate to your Lordship that I have not failed in my duty, either towards Her Majesty's Government, or to his Excellency the Ambassador, with whom I was instructed to place myself in communication.

1st. Before I landed at Constantinople, I sent Her Majesty's Ambassador a copy of your Lordship's instructions to me, and afterwards had the honour of four interviews with his Excellency, in which, amongst other things, I mentioned the precise words of the Duke of Newcastle (addressed to me in my interview the day prior to my departure from London) on the importance his Grace attached to the duties of my mission—that it was second only as to the prosecution of this war.

2nd. On the receipt of my instructions from General Lord Raglan, which reached me after my return from Varna, I inclosed a copy of them to Her Majesty's Ambassador, accompanied by a despatch, a copy of which I beg to inclose herewith for your Lordship's information; a copy of this was also sent to General Lord Raglan as an inclosure in the despatch which acknowledged the receipt of his Lordship's instructions.

3rd. I have already inclosed through Lord Wodehouse a copy of my first general appeal to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe for his "countenance and support," written from Erzeroom on my way to the camp at Kurs. I now beg to forward, for your Lordship's information, a copy of my second and special one. In order to redouble the zeal of Mustapha Pasha and Emin Bey, I told them that I had brought their conduct to the knowledge of the Porte through the British Ambassador, and held out the hope of reward. Had that recompense followed my solicitation, it would have been known to every officer in the army, and incalculable results would have followed.

Having thus performed a duty which I think imperatively incumbent on me, I shall, for the present, abstain from any remarks, save that of announcing the arrival of another post from Constantinople without a line, public or private, from Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, although I have addressed sixty-two identic or special despatches, and many private letters bearing on public affairs, to his Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. F. WILLIAMS.

P.S.—I further beg to inclose for the information of your Lordship, the copy of a despatch I addressed on the 13th of October to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, when I was actively engaged in forming the nucleus of that garrison which now occupies the intrenched town and position of Kurs; it being one of the numerous communications to his Excellency which to this day remains unacknowledged.

W. F. W.

Inclosure 1 in No. 74.

General Lord Raglan to Colonel Williams.

Varna, August 20, 1854.

(Extract.)

HER Majesty's Government having been pleased to nominate you Commissioner at the head-quarters of the Turkish army in Asia, and to act in that capacity in communication with me, and under my orders, I have the honour to request that in obedience to their commands, you will lose no time in proceeding to Kurs, and assuming the duties confided to your discharge.

You will, however, in the first instance, take advantage of your being at Constantinople for the purpose of obtaining the necessary equipment, to solicit Her Majesty's Ambassador to get from the Turkish Government introductions to the authorities with whom you will have to communicate, and such recommendations as will facilitate both your journey and the accomplishment of the objects of your mission. You will also seek to obtain from his Excellency the advice which his great local experience, his knowledge of public men in this country, and his unrivalled power of discrimination, enable him to give better than any other man.

Inclosure 2 in No. 74.

Colonel Williams to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, August 23, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose for your Lordship's information, a despatch which I have this moment received from General Lord Raglan, and, in doing so, I beg to solicit from your Excellency the assistance and advice which are so necessary, and indeed indispensable, to the fulfilment of my mission.

My baggage has not yet arrived from England, but the "Medway" steamer is hourly expected. In the meantime I am occupied with my tents, and other arrangements for my departure on the 31st instant, when, I understand, an Austrian steamer goes to Trebizond.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. F. WILLIAMS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 74.

Colonel Williams to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Erzeroom, September 16, 1854.

My Lord,

AMIDST so general a remissness on the part of the superior officers of the Turkish army, I have great satisfaction to bring to your Excellency's notice the conduct of Mustapha Leva Pasha, the officer in charge of the depôt stationed in this city. I attribute to his care and attention the state of the hospitals and general arrangements, which I have had the honour of detailing in my despatch of to-day. I have received from his Excellency Ismail Pasha his acknowledgments of the valuable services of this officer.

I have also to bring to your Excellency's notice Emin Bey, the principal medical officer in charge of these hospitals, who, in his department, has so worthily seconded the efforts of Mustapha Pasha.

As the promotion of Mustapha Pasha is due to him for these services, and would encourage other superior officers to tread in his footsteps, I beg to recommend him to your Excellency, with a hope that your influence will obtain for him the rank of Ferik.

With regard to Emin Bey, I also venture to recommend him to your Excellency for an increase of rank, which would increase his pay, and incite him to a continuance of his zeal. I have assured these officers that I would bring their merits to the notice of the Porte through your Lordship, and I need not add that their promotion under such circumstances would add infinite weight to my influence as Her Majesty's Commissioner to this army.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. F. WILLIAMS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 74.

Colonel Williams to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Camp, near Kars, October 13, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to state to your Excellency that I have this moment inspected two battalions of Infantry and one battalion of Chasseurs of the army of Arabistan, and saw them march into winter quarters in this city. I carefully examined their pouches, and found them well filled with ammunition.

The percussion musket in use by these battalions carries a ball smaller than the rest of the fusils of the army, and there are but few left in the magazines. There will also be a scarcity of the conical ball of the Chasseurs. I inclose a cartridge of the former, and a ball of the latter, in the hope that, through your Excellency's influence, a supply of 2,000,000 of cartridges of each kind may be made in the arsenal at Constantinople, and immediately forwarded to Kars. I hope your Excellency will pardon this request, but I know that I shall obtain them in no other manner.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. F. WILLIAMS.

No. 75.

Mr. Hudson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 3.)

My Lord,

Turin, January 10, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship, that with my French colleague, I assisted last night at a conference with the Sardinian Government upon the subject of the accession of His Sardinian Majesty to the Treaty between France and England of the 10th of April, 1854.

General Dabormida repeated the objections which in previous conferences he had stated that he entertained to the accession of his Sovereign to that Treaty without some formal engagement on the part of the Ministers of England and France to induce the Austrian Government to remove the sequestrations upon the property in Lombardy of Sardinian subjects, and to make some mention of the present condition of Italy, and of its amelioration.

Myself and my French colleague repeated the objections which we were instructed to make known to the Sardinian Cabinet; and we declared with regard to the sequestration question, not only that we would sign no such engagement, whether patent or secret, but that we strongly recommended the Sardinian Cabinet not to insist upon a measure which must inevitably produce a persistance on the part of Austria in that state of things which the Government of the King was desirous to remove; and with regard to the question of Italy, that whilst the Governments of Great Britain and of France take a lively interest in the well-being of that Peninsula, and are disposed to afford their aid towards its improvement, they must reserve to themselves the unfettered right of acting at the time and in the manner they think most expedient and the most likely to be attended with success.

The President of the Council then said, that as it would be necessary to conclude certain details of the Military Convention, which would be the complement of the Treaty of Accession, he thought it would be advisable to send the Minister of War to Paris and London, where he might state the situation in which Piedmont found herself politically, as regards the sequestrations, and conclude at the same time the necessary arrangements respecting the Sardinian army corps of 15,000 men which will proceed to the Crimea.

To this idea my French colleague expressed himself entirely adverse; he said, that both on public and personal grounds he was bound to oppose the most

strenuous resistance to any such scheme, which he must consider as a slight upon his position and powers, and called in question the verbal and written instructions of the Governments of France and England to their Representatives at Turin: consequently, he protested against it, and declared that he would suggest to his Government not to receive the Sardinian Envoy.

On my part I restated the question at issue between England, France, and Sardinia. I pointed out that the Governments of Great Britain and of France, animated by the most friendly sentiments towards Sardinia, declined to concur in the desire of the Sardinian Government, from a conviction that it would mar the object which they had most at heart; consequently, the Sardinian Government would not do wisely in exposing its Envoy to receive, at Paris and at London, the same reply as that which the Representatives at Turin of England and of France had on more than one occasion returned to the demand in question.

The Sardinian Cabinet appeared particularly struck by the arguments of my French colleague, and took time to consider. They retired from the Conference whilst my French colleague and myself undertook, upon the demand of the President of the Council, to draw up a Protocol which should detail the proceedings of the Conference, and should contain the reasons for the rejection of the terms upon which General Dabormida so strongly insisted.

This Protocol (a copy of which I have the honour to annex), being then drawn up, the Conference re-assembled, and the President of the Council, and the Ministers of War and of the Interior, evidently approved it. The Minister of Foreign Affairs preserved a moody silence, and offered no observation upon it.

It was then agreed that a copy of the Protocol should be transmitted to the Sardinian Government at 7 o'clock A.M., on the morrow (it was then midnight), and that myself and my colleague should be invited to attend a further conference in order to hear the opinion of the Sardinian Cabinet upon the terms of that Protocol.

This morning we were invited to call at the Ministry of Finance, when the President of the Council, Count Cavour, informed us that the King had been graciously pleased to accept the resignation of General Dabormida, and that he (Count Cavour), had received from his Majesty the Portfolio of Foreign Affairs: that the Sardinian Government accepted the Protocol of Conference of the 9th instant (yesterday), acceded to the Treaty of the 10th of April between Great Britain and France, and would be prepared to settle the terms of the Military Convention between England, France, and Sardinia, for the despatch of 15,000 Sardinian troops to the seat of war in the East, and would be prepared to sign that Military Convention as soon as myself and my French colleague received our full powers to accept the accession of Sardinia to the Treaty of the 10th of April.

My French colleague and myself stated in reply that we would announce by telegraph to our respective Governments, the declaration now made to us by the President of the Council of the accession of Sardinia to the Treaty of the 10th of April; and that we had every reason to believe that the necessary full powers to accept that Treaty of Accession, and to conclude also the Military Convention, would be immediately forwarded to us.

As I am desirous to submit the Protocol of Conference to your Lordship with the least possible delay, I have now the honour to forward it with this despatch.

The declaration of accession to the Treaty of the 10th of April, as accepted by the Sardinian Government (and which is identical with that copy which I have had the honour to receive from your Lordship), and the project of the Military Convention, which form annexes to the Protocol in question, shall be forwarded to your Lordship by to-morrow's post.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES HUDSON.

Inclosure in No. 75.

Protocol of a Conference held at Turin, January 10, 1855.

LES Soussignés, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande; Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français; Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Président du Conseil des Ministres de Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne, se sont réunis le 10 Janvier, 1855, à Turin chez son Excellence le Président du Conseil, et ont délibéré sur l'invitation faite à Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne par les Puissances signataires du Traité du 10 Avril, d'accéder au dit Traité.

Lecture ayant été donnée de l'Acte d'Accession annexé au présent Protocole sous le No. 1, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, au nom de ses collègues, exprime le désir de son Gouvernement d'accéder au Traité du 10 Avril, et regrette de voir que d'après les communications qu'il a reçues des Ministres d'Angleterre et de France, leurs instructions s'opposent à ce qu'ils puissent signer aucune note secrète ou publique par laquelle leurs Gouvernements promettraient d'employer leurs bons offices pour engager le Gouvernement Autrichien à lever les séquestres des biens situés sur son territoire et appartenant à des sujets Sardes. Il désirerait savoir, avant de lier la Sardaigne à l'Angleterre et à la France par un Traité d'Alliance aussi intime, si quelques circonstances nouvelles, en modifiant la politique de ces Puissances, a motivé la réserve dans laquelle se renferment leurs Représentants.

Le Ministre de Sa Majesté Britannique, prenant la parole en son nom personnel et au nom de son collègue le Ministre de France, répond que les Gouvernements alliés, loin d'entretenir vis-à-vis du Gouvernement Sarde des sentiments moins amicaux que par le passé, croient au contraire lui donner une preuve nouvelle de leur amitié en l'invitant à entrer dans leur alliance. En ce qui concerne la question des séquestres ils ont souvent déjà, mais toujours en vain, interposé leurs bons offices près du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche. Il est évident que si les Gouvernements d'Angleterre et de France, dans un Traité public ou secret avec la Sardaigne, signaient quelqu'Article qui eût rapport à cette question, cette démarche, en blessant l'Autriche dans son honneur, rendrait la mesure désormais impossible et éloignerait à jamais peut-être la réalisation du but que poursuit le Gouvernement Sarde. L'alliance du Gouvernement Sarde aux Gouvernements de leurs Majestés promet au contraire un ensemble de circonstances dans lesquelles les bons offices des Puissances pourront se produire avec de meilleurs chances de succès.

Les Ministres d'Angleterre et de France ont ensuite demandé à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne, s'il était autorisé par son auguste Souverain à signer en son nom le dit Acte d'Accession; et sur sa réponse affirmative les Soussignés sont convenus de prendre jour prochainement pour procéder en due forme à la signature du dit Acte d'Accession et à la remise des Actes d'Acceptation de leurs Cours respectives, dès qu'ils auront reçu à cet effet les pleins pouvoirs nécessaires.

Aussitôt après les Ministres d'Angleterre et de France ont proposé à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne de souscrire une Convention Militaire dont la teneur est également annexée au présent Protocole sous le No. 2, et sur sa réponse affirmative il a été arrêté que la dite Convention serait signée simultanément avec l'Acte d'Accession au Traité du 10 Avril, 1854.

En foi de quoi les Soussignés ont apposé leurs signatures au bas du présent Protocole.

Turin, le 10 Janvier, 1855.

(Signé) JAMES HUDSON.
GUICHE.
C. CAVOUR.

No. 76.

Mr. Hudson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 15.)

(No. 4.)

My Lord, *Turin, January* 11, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that the President of the Council of Ministers notified to the Chamber of Deputies this day, that His Sardinian Majesty had been pleased to accept the resignation by General Dabormida of the Portfolio of Foreign Affairs, and had confided the management of that department to him, Count Cavour.

M. Valerio having inquired the reasons of this change in the Cabinet, Count Cavour replied that the circumstances which had led to the resignation of General Dabormida would very shortly be communicated to the Chamber, and that he should on that occasion make known the foreign policy of the Sardinian Government.

M. Valerio again rose to urge upon Count Cavour the expediency of tranquillizing the public mind by an early explanation of what had occurred, as the rumours in circulation had naturally produced considerable excitement; to which Count Cavour returned no reply.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES HUDSON.

No. 77.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 15.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 16, 1855.

COUNT COLLOREDO has communicated to me a despatch from Count Buol dated the 28th ultimo, stating that Prince Gortchakoff had informed him that he had received instructions for his guidance, and had shown Count Buol his full powers, authorising him to treat with the Plenipotentiaries of England, France, and Turkey. The wish of the Emperor of Russia being thus formally announced, Count Buol had made known to your Lordship and Baron Bourqueney the desire of Russia to enter into negotiations for peace.

There was therefore no obstacle to a preliminary conference being held between the Representatives of the allies and Russia, with the view of establishing whether Russia accepts the basis of negotiation in the sense fixed by the notes of August the 8th; and the Plenipotentiaries were to meet on that day for this purpose at your Lordship's house.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 78.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 16.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 16, 1855.

COUNT COLLOREDO has communicated to me a despatch from Count Buol, proposing that as the term of a fortnight was fixed at the Conference of the 28th ultimo, within which the answer of the Russian Government respecting

the opening negotiations for peace should be returned, the execution of Article V of the Treaty with Austria should be delayed for the same period.

Count Buol also suggests the expediency of the early appointment of a successor to General Du Plat.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 79.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 17.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 16, 1855.

I HAVE received your confidential despatch No. 14 of January 12, giving an account of your conversation with Baron Manteuffel with respect to the opinions expressed by the King of Prussia upon the Western Alliance, and I have to state to you that I approve of the language which you held upon this occasion.

Her Majesty's Government consider it impossible that Prussia should be admitted to take part in any negotiation until the three allied Powers have proofs that she is sincerely identified with their policy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 80.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 18.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 16, 1855.

COUNT BERNSTORFF has read to me a despatch from Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim in reply to the demand of Austria that the Prussian army should be mobilized and placed on the eastern frontier.

I expressed to Count Bernstorff much regret at the terms in which this despatch was written, as well as at the manner in which Prussia seemed to regard her treaty engagements with Austria, which afforded little prospect of that harmonious action between the two Powers which at this moment was so much to be desired.

Count Bernstorff replied in a tone of irritation and bitterness that the conduct of Austria had been perfidious to Prussia, who would not allow herself to be dictated to; that Prussia would not forego her rights nor permit any important European question to be settled, nor any Treaty to which she had been a party to be annulled or revised, without her concurrence. He declared that a great Power like Prussia could not remain isolated; that she would have to determine which side to select, and he thought if her overtures were still rejected by the Western Powers, there would be great danger of her joining Russia.

I told Count Bernstorff I was at a loss to understand what he meant by the rejection of overtures, as none that could be considered serious had been made; that Prussia had voluntarily retired from the Conference some months ago, since which time her hostility to Austria had increased, her Russian predilections had been undisguised, and her demand for peace "à tout prix" had been incessant. Count Bernstorff, I added, knew well how much the estrangement from Prussia was regretted by Her Majesty's Government, who were now as anxious as ever for her cooperation, provided it was sincere; because upon the firmness and union of the Great Powers depended the restoration of peace, which the Government of Her Majesty desired as heartily as the King of Prussia himself.

Without disputing the right of Prussia to interpret her own obligations, I at the same time requested Count Bernstorff to bear in mind that the Power which voluntarily abdicated its position and shrank from incurring the risks and dangers of war, forfeited all right to take part in negotiations for peace.

Count Bernstorff said he did not doubt the goodwill and friendly feeling

of Her Majesty's Government, but he did not feel as certain with respect to France and Austria; but I assured him that there existed no grounds for such doubts, and that those two Powers were as desirous as England to arrive at a real and *bonâ fide* understanding with Prussia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 81.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 1.)
My Lord, *Munich, January* , 1855.

THE hopes of a pacific solution of the present European crisis which were raised here by the news of the acceptance of the four points by the Russian Envoy at Vienna, have, upon calmer reflection, undergone a sensible modification; and, although there are still many who cling to ideas of peace, Baron von der Pfordten, who was among the most sanguine at first, is no longer of the number. He is, I understand, of opinion that the negotiations towards which a first step has been taken by the Russian Cabinet, do not offer any reasonable prospect of a satisfactory settlement of the question at issue, and he consequently declares it to be his intention to advise the King to proceed at once to make the military preparations called for by the actual state of affairs in Europe, and the interest of this country in particular. He considers, I am told, the mere fact of war breaking out between Austria and Russia under existing circumstances, in the light of a complete liberation of Bavaria from all her federal obligations, or, in other words, he looks upon such an event as necessarily leading to an immediate dissolution of the Germanic Confederation, and in that case he deems it to be the duty of the Sovereign alone to consult the interests of himself and his people; he acknowledges that the traditionary policy of this country ought rather to incline her to side with Austria; but he says that the conduct of the Imperial Cabinet towards the Bavarian Government has of late assumed a character so much the reverse of friendly or confidential, that Bavaria would not be justified in placing unlimited reliance upon its assurances, and that accordingly she must secure herself beforehand by putting a price upon her aid, and insisting upon Austria's subscribing to her conditions. In what the latter consist, I can do no more than conjecture, though I believe one of them to be the admission of a Bavarian Plenipotentiary to take part in the negotiations for peace which may ultimately be entered upon. This concession, however, it would not be in the power of Austria to make, unless with the consent of the other two Powers, and I do not think it would be possible for France and England to commit a greater mistake than to afford to any one of the minor States of Germany an opportunity of embarrassing the Conferences by a renewal of the Bamberg propositions, upon which, if there be a shadow of consistency in the policy of this Government, a Bavarian Plenipotentiary must, as a matter of course, take his stand. I need not call to mind the declared hostility towards the two Western Powers which was set forth in Baron von der Pfordten's celebrated memorandum, as well as in the despatch subsequently written for communication to Her Majesty's Government to the Saxon Minister in London by Baron de Beust, to show what sort of coadjutors in the work of establishing peace in the East we should be likely to find in the Representatives of either of these States, or, indeed, of many others.

But the eagerness with which this Government has, from the commencement of these Eastern complications, pressed for the participation of the smaller States of Germany in the negotiations for their final settlement, must not be misunderstood. It may certainly in part arise from the sympathy between the Courts of Greece and Bavaria, which is but natural, and it may also proceed from a certain amount of compassion felt by the German public for the hard and cruel lot of the Christian subjects of the Porte, which the Court and "Philhellenic" party have made repeated efforts to excite to a higher point of enthusiasm with a view to the advantage of the King of Greece; but the real object which none of the middle-sized States of the Confederation ever for a moment lose

sight of, is their own moral or material aggrandizement, whether at the expense of their friends or foes seems quite immaterial provided it is attained, and this country, which ranks as the third Federal Power, has of late made frequent, and not altogether unsuccessful, attempts to increase her influence over her smaller neighbours, for the purpose of controlling those more powerful than herself. If I am correctly informed, we are about to witness a new application of the balancing system in the matter of the federal contingents, for it is said that unless the demand of Austria for putting them on a war footing be supported in the Diet by Prussia, this Government will give what it denominates a reserved vote, which, I presume,—for I do not exactly comprehend the meaning of the term,—to be equivalent to imposing conditions on Austria. On the other hand, I have reason to believe that the proposals on military affairs made by my Austrian colleague to this Government within the last few days, have been well received, and that no difficulty will be made to placing the Bavarian contingent, should it eventually be called upon to take the field, under the orders of an Austrian Commander-in-chief.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 82.

The Earl of Clarendon to Brigadier-General Williams.

(No. 11.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 16, 1855.

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings, as reported in your despatch No. 59 of the 15th of December, which have been quite regular.

I have to instruct you to continue to report as hitherto to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and I trust that in future the demands that his Excellency will address to the Turkish Government at your desire, will be better attended to.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 83.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 23.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January* 13, 1855.

IMMEDIATELY upon my receiving the first intelligence, through a telegraphic despatch which had been received by Count Buol from Bucharest, of the movement of a corps of Russian troops into Toultcha, amounting to six battalions and some Cavalry and Artillery, I wrote to Count Buol the note a copy of which I have the honour to inclose, stating the alarm with which this news would be received in England, and asking if he did not think a demonstration on the part of the Austrian troops in Moldavia near the Danube, might prevent this Russian operation from extending itself. Count Buol replied that in his despatch it was stated that this news required confirmation; that consequently before he gave an answer to the question I put to him, he must ascertain what was the real state of the case, and yesterday when I waited upon him, he told me he was still without information on the subject, but that he could not but consider it a great neglect on the part of the Turkish Government, that upon the only frontier on which they were exposed to be attacked, and extending but from opposite Reni to the mouths of the Danube, they should have had but a small force of Light Cavalry which, upon the first advance of the Russians, left the whole defensive

position and retired to Ibraila. Count Buol said the whole frontier of Moldavia is defended by the Austrian troops; Omer Pasha had 80,000 men, of whom 30,000 are destined for the Crimea, and the rest ought certainly to have been destined to defend the only vulnerable point of the Turkish frontier which I have above alluded to. Count Buol, however, observed that if the Russian operation should turn out to be anything serious, he should be ready to deliberate upon it.

Since writing the above, I have received your Lordship's telegraphic despatch, dated yesterday 9 P.M., desiring me to express to Count Buol your feelings, upon your having received the intelligence above referred to, and I immediately wrote to Count Buol the note I have now the honour of inclosing, in which I transmitted your telegraphic message, and in which I expressed my anxious desire to receive a favourable reply from him, as he would himself be aware of the importance attached to it by your Lordship and by Her Majesty's Government.

Count Buol has just sent me word that he has received no further intelligence whatever from the Dobrudscha, so that he can at present form no judgment upon what is the real import of the operation which has been reported.

I write in great haste to make your Lordship this communication as it is post hour, and I have not a moment to spare.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 83.

The Earl of Westmorland to Count Buol.

My dear Count, *Vienna, January* 11, 1855.

BARON BOURQUENEY has just been with me to communicate the intelligence you had received that the Russian forces in considerable numbers had crossed the Dobrudscha, and advanced on Babadagh. This may be the commencement of an offensive movement towards Varna, and will be seen with great alarm in England by our Government. I should be most anxious to know if you thought a demonstration of a part of the Austrian troops in Moldavia and near the Danube might not prevent this Russian operation from extending itself. I shall be very anxious to hear your feeling on this subject.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 2 in No. 83.

The Earl of Westmorland to Count Buol.

My dear Count, *Vienna, January* 13, 1855.

I INCLOSE you a telegraphic message I have just received, and I will not delay sending it to you, as it bears out entirely the impression I expressed to you in my note of the 11th, and I am quite sure Lord Clarendon and Her Majesty's Government will be most anxious to receive a favourable reply from you. You may perhaps have received some further news from the Dobrudscha, if so I beg of you to let me know it; if you will appoint any hour I shall be most happy to wait upon you.

The "No. 10," to which Lord Clarendon refers, is my despatch giving an account of the interview with Prince Gortchakoff.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 84.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17, 11·55 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 17, 1855.*

MR. COLQUHOUN écrit de Bucharest le 17 :

"A report has this day reached us that the Russians have recrossed the Danube to Ismail; very few troops remaining at Toultcha; authority semi-official.

No. 85.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 20.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 17, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government approve the steps taken by you on learning the advance of Russian troops into the Dobrudscha, as reported in your Lordship's despatch No. 23 of the 13th instant; and if the Russians make any further advance, you will, in conjunction with M. de Bourqueney, strongly press upon Count Buol the necessity of Austrian intervention.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 86.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, January 17, 1855.*

I HAVE presented Her Britannic Majesty's letter to the King of Prussia this day, at a special audience, in the presence of Baron Manteuffel.

His Majesty, gratified at the improved relations between the two Courts, seems disposed to enter into further engagements with us. Violent against Austria, and at his exclusion from the Conference, stating that his future policy might depend on his readmission, and that in default of this, his attitude might become detrimental to us. He declared that Russia had been throughout wrong (or wrong-headed), but that he believed the Emperor of Russia was now sincere in his desire of peace.

No. 87.

Mr. Hudson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 6.)

My Lord, *Turin, January 12, 1855.*

WITH reference to my despatch marked No. 3 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to inclose herewith copies of the two annexes to the Protocol of Conference held at Turin on the 10th instant, upon the question of the accession of Sardinia to the Treaty between Great Britain and France of April 10, 1854.

These annexes ought to have been transmitted to your Lordship by yesterday's post, but the recent change in the Sardinian Cabinet prevented their due and proper collation with the originals of those of my French colleague and of the Sardinian Minister of Foreign Affairs, until this morning.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES HUDSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 87.

Annex No. 1 to the Protocol of Conference held at Turin, January 10, 1855.

SA Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne, &c., ayant été invitée amicalement par leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et l'Empereur des Français, à accéder à la Convention conclue et signée à Londres le 10 Avril, 1854, entre leurs dites Majestés, de laquelle Convention la teneur suit :

(Fiat insertio.)

Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne voulant donner à leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et l'Empereur des Français, toutes les preuves d'amitié et de confiance qui sont en son pouvoir, a autorisé le Soussigné pour, en son nom, donner acte de cette accession. En conséquence le Soussigné, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, déclare que Sa Majesté Sarde accède par le présent Acte à la susdite Convention en celles de ses clauses dont l'objet n'est pas encore rempli, et s'engage notamment à se concerter, lorsque besoin sera, avec Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, pour procéder, conformément à l'Article 11, à la conclusion des arrangements de détail qui régleraient l'emploi de ses forces de terre et de mer, et détermineraient les conditions et le mode de leur coopération avec celles de la Grande Bretagne et de la France.

Le présent Acte d'Accession sera ratifié aussitot après la remise de l'Acte d'Acceptation, et l'échange des ratifications aura lieu à Turin.

Les Soussignés déclarent que le présent Acte est bien celui qui est mentionné au Protocole de la Conférence du 10 Janvier, 1855, comme annexé au dit Protocole sous le No. 1.

(Signé) JAMES HUDSON.
C. CAVOUR.
GUICHE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 87.

Annex No. 2 to the Protocol of Conference held at Turin, January 10, 1855.

Convention Militaire entre leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur des Français, et le Roi de Sardaigne.

SA Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne ayant accédé au Traité d'Alliance conclu et signé à Londres le 10 Avril, 1854, entre leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et l'Empereur des Français, et s'étant engagé à se concerter, lorsque besoin sera, avec leurs dites Majestés pour procéder, conformément à l'Article II du Traité du 10 Avril, à la conclusion des arrangements de détail qui régleraient l'emploi de ses forces de terre et de mer, et détermineraient les conditions et la mode de leur coopération avec celles de la Grande Bretagne et de la France, leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur des Français, et le Roi de Sardaigne, ont en conséquence résolu de conclure une Convention Militaire destinée à régler les conditions, et le mode de la coopération des troupes Sardes avec celles de la Grande Bretagne et de la France, et nommé à cet effet pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, &c.

Lesquels, s'étant réciproquement communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont arrêté et signé les Articles suivants :

ARTICLE I.

Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne fournit pour les besoins de la guerre, un corps d'armée de quinze mille hommes, organisé en cinq brigades, formant deux divisions, et une brigade de réserve, sous le commandement d'un Général Sarde.

ARTICLE II.

Aussitôt après l'échange des ratifications de la présente Convention, on procédera immédiatement à la formation de ce corps et à l'organisation des services administratifs, pour qu'ils puissent être prêts à partir le plus tôt possible.

ARTICLE III.

La Grande Bretagne et la France se chargeront gratuitement du transport des troupes Sardes.

ARTICLE IV.

Le Gouvernement Sarde pourvoira à la solde et à la subsistance de ses troupes.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes se concerteront pour assurer et faciliter à l'armée Sarde l'approvisionnement de ses magasins.

ARTICLE V

La Grande Bretagne et la France garantissent au Gouvernement Sarde un prêt d'un million de livres sterling, à un intérêt annuel calculé sur le cours moyen des consolidés Anglais pendant le dernier trimestre. Les versements se feront de la manière suivante; savoir, cinq cent mille livres sterling, aussitôt après la ratification de la présente Convention, et une pareille somme six mois après.

A la fin de l'année, si la paix n'est pas conclue, la Grande Bretagne et la France garantissent au Gouvernement Sarde un second prêt d'un million de livres de sterling aux mêmes conditions d'intérêt et de versement.

Les conditions de la restitution des sommes prêtées seront réglées à la paix.

ARTICLE VI.

Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et l'Empereur des Français, garantissent l'intégrité des Etats de Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne, et s'engagent à les défendre contre toute attaque pendant la durée de la présente guerre.

ARTICLE VII.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée, et les ratifications seront échangées à Turin le plus tôt que faire se pourra.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé, et y ont apposé le sceau de leurs armes.

Fait à Turin le Janvier de l'an de grace, 1855.

Les Soussignés déclarent que la présente Convention est bien celle qui est mentionnée au Protocole de la Conférence du 10 Janvier, 1855, comme annexée au dit Protocole sous le No. 2.

Turin, le 10 Janvier, 1855.

(Signé) JAMES HUDSON.
C. CAVOUR.
GUICHE.

No. 88.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21.)

No. 5.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, January 18, 1855.*

I HAVE just learnt from good authority that a circular has been sent by the Austrian Cabinet to the several Governments of the Confederation, announcing the intention of the Imperial Government, in consequence of Prussia's refusal to place the force stipulated by the Berlin Treaty of April 20 in activity, to appeal to the Diet, and to give that body the opportunity of pronouncing on the point in dispute.

It seems that in one of the notes recently elaborated by the Berlin Cabinet (I believe it to be in one bearing date the 5th of January), an assertion is made that the Military Convention appended to the Treaty of April 20 is invalid, as being in contradiction with the Terms of the Federal Act, in as far as it stipulated conditions which might bring a portion of the military force of the contingents into the field without the sanction of the Diet, and solely by the independent action of the several Governments.

Without openly admitting this ground of invalidity of that Convention, the Government of Austria will, it seems, do so indirectly by the form of its intended motion in the Diet, which will be to the effect, that a portion of the Federal contingents shall be put on the war footing, and that the Military Commission shall be enjoined to settle the distribution of the corps so put in activity, and with the choice of the Generals who are to be placed in command.

I understand that Austria counts on a majority of votes; but it is not yet clear whether a matter of this importance will have to be decided in the Plenary Assembly, or in the restricted and more usual form of voting. In either case a simple majority is reckoned upon; but as Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemburg will, from all the information I can obtain, be in the minority, the actual value of the vote seems to be at least nicely balanced, and the crisis is one of very great gravity.

No sitting of the Diet takes place on this the ordinary day of assembly.

It is expected that this weighty question will be discussed in the sitting of Thursday next, the 25th instant, before which period M. de Bismarck is expected to return from Berlin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 89.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 45.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 18, 1855.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 4 of the 2nd instant, I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna has reported to me that the Ottoman Ambassador has been furnished with the necessary

authority to take part in the Commission established in the Austrian capital for settling the differences between the Austrian and Turkish authorities in the Principalities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 90.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 19.)

(No. 11.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 8, 1855.

ON the 5th instant I received through Her Majesty's Agent at Bucharest the following telegraphic message from the Earl of Westmorland:

"*December* 27, 1854.

"The Internuncio has not been instructed to communicate to the Porte the Secret Article of the Treaty."

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 91.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 19.)

(No. 16.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 8, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copies of three despatches which I have lately received from Her Majesty's Consul at Varna, relative to Omer Pasha's embarkation for the Crimea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 91.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, December* 30, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that, within the last few days, considerable activity has prevailed here in embarking for the Crimea the men and horses of the British depôt. At this date, about 500 men and 900 horses still remain to be embarked.

All the steamers available having been engaged lately in this service, the embarkation of the Turkish troops which remained of Ahmet Pasha's division has been suspended, but has now been particularly recommended, and about 2,500 men remain to be embarked for Eupatoria. There are, however, still two batteries of Artillery and 1,500 Cavalry and Artillery horses awaiting transport.

His Highness Omer Pasha is expected to arrive in Varna in the course of an hour. About 5,000 Egyptian troops destined to proceed to the Crimea have arrived within the last few days at Baltchik.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 91.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, December* 30, 1854.

I HAVE this moment received a private letter from Major-General Cannon, dated Eupatoria, the 27th instant, in which General Cannon writes as follows:—

The news brought this morning by Captain McCleverty, of the "Terrible," is, that the Russians are in force on the Alma, evidently with the intention of disputing an advance upon the north side of Sebastopol.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 91.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Extract.) *Varna, January* 2, 1855.

HIS Highness Omer Pasha embarked yesterday on board Her Majesty's steam-frigate "Inflexible," accompanied by Colonels Simmons and Dieu, and a few officers of his personal staff.

The "Inflexible" left Varna at 6 o'clock yesterday evening, and, at the request of his Highness, will first proceed to Eupatoria and Kamiesch or Balaklava.

The British hired steam-transport "Indiana" left Varna for Eupatoria a few hours before the "Inflexible" with 1,200 Turkish Infantry, and the last battalion of Mehemed Pasha's division will embark to-day on board the "Nubia," which also takes a battery of Artillery and 100 Turkish horses. Of this division a regiment of Cavalry and portion of another (about fourteen horses in all) remain to be embarked.

About 6,000 Egyptian troops are at Baltchik, and, having received clothing and a month's provisions, are ready for embarkation; but, as yet, only one Turkish steamer has arrived there. This steamer has been at Baltchik for the last seven days, but has been unable to embark troops or proceed on her voyage, having no coals, which, however, have now been sent to her from Varna. She can convey 800 men, and one battalion is ordered to embark, after which I understand no further Turkish troops will be embarked until his Highness Omer Pasha's return to Varna.

No. 92.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 19.)

(No. 17.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 8, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, herewith inclosed, copies of two despatches, dated the 30th and 31st of December last, which I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons, British Military Commissioner to the Turkish army in Roumelia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 92.

Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, December* 30, 1854.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter marked Confidential, of the 7th December, which I received at Bucharest on the 15th instant.

Having rejoined his Highness Omer Pasha at Rustchuk on the 17th instant, I gave him the letter of which your Lordship inclosed me a copy. He has desired me to thank you for that communication, and to state that it is with much pleasure that he has entrusted to General Cannon the command of one of the brigades of the troops which were selected in the first instance to go to the Crimea, as he has a high opinion of that officer's merits, and has already experienced the benefit of his services, as also of the officers who, by the liberality of Her Majesty's Government, are attached to him in the command of troops of the Ottoman army.

The Pasha has desired me to inform your Lordship that he is so penetrated with the justice of your Lordship's observations, that on the qualities of the officer depends the conduct of the soldier, as well as with a knowledge of the inferiority which unfortunately exists in the Turkish army generally, that he is quite decided, if ever he was entrusted with the control and organization of the army, to apply for officers from foreign Governments, for the purposes of forming an Etat-Major, and of taking a great part of the superior commands in the Ottoman army.

The Pasha is of opinion that this step should be taken by an official demand to foreign Governments, who would thus be responsible for selecting capable and efficient officers, who, by having Turkish officers judiciously associated with them, might be the means of eventually forming a superior class of officers to those which exist at present in the Ottoman army.

He desires me to state that he esteems the services of those officers who are now with his army so highly, that he has recommended some of them for promotion, and to be regularly enrolled in the Ottoman army.

The Seraskier has replied by asking if they were willing to be enrolled for permanent service; to which the Pasha replied by begging that the promotion might be made, when he would endeavour to get them to take permanent service in the army.

The Pasha has since received a letter from the Seraskier approving of some of these appointments being made temporarily.

On this subject I would remind your Lordship that it is only since the commencement of the war that the Turkish soldiers have been under the immediate command of Christians, and of the few who now have commands by far the larger portion are Englishmen. Your Lordship will also remember that at Silistria Omer Pasha gave the temporary rank of Mirali (Colonel) to three British officers, Captain Butler, Lieutenant Nasmyth, and Lieutenant Ballard, whose services he afterwards acknowledged by decorations which he presented to Lord Raglan with a request that his Lordship would take the necessary measures for obtaining Her Majesty's permission for them to receive them.

The Pasha desires me to render his best thanks to your Lordship for the assistance which you rendered him in seconding the demand which he has made to his Government to supply the necessities of his troops. Some of the articles which he has demanded have arrived at Varna, and have tended much to the efficiency and comfort of the division now going to the Crimea. He trusts that the Government will use their utmost endeavours to send such other things as he has demanded, and to place at his disposal the steamers and other transports demanded by him.

With regard to the investiture of the Order of the Bath, the Pasha desires me to express to your Lordship how highly sensible he is of the honour which Her Majesty has been pleased to confer on him, as well as of the gratifying manner in which your Lordship has expressed yourself on this subject. As events, however, have occurred which have prevented him from receiving the investment in the manner he had desired from the hands of your Lordship and Lord Raglan, he hopes, by deferring the ceremony, to add during the ensuing campaign in the Crimea some new claims to those humble services which Her Majesty has deemed worthy of this very distinguished honour.

The Pasha desires me to express his regret that he is not able to answer your Lordship's letter personally, and to add the assurance of his high respect and esteem for your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 92.

Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, December* 31, 1854.

I HAVE to inform your Lordship that his Highness Omer Pasha arrived here yesterday, having come from Rustchuk *viâ* Shumla.

His Highness informs me that he has made considerable progress in the preparation of provisions, clothing, and other things for the division which will accompany his Highness to the Crimea. The other preparations progress rapidly.

His Highness himself embarks to-morrow accompanied by Umdjis Pasha (Stourza), Colonel Dieu and myself, with two of his aides-de-camp, in Her Majesty's steam-frigate "Inflexible," Captain Popplewell, for Eupatoria, whence he will proceed to see Lord Raglan and General Canrobert, to confer with them as to ulterior proceedings.

His Highness purposes then to return to Varna to complete his arrangements before returning finally to the Crimea.

The embarkation of the division of 18 battalions, with a battalion of Chasseurs and 250 Suppers, which have been added to the division of Mehemet Pasha, will be completed to-morrow.

The "Inflexible" will take the Suppers, and the "Nubia," which arrived yesterday, will convey the residue, about 1,500 men.

The deficiency of horse transport will only have permitted of two batteries of Artillery being embarked.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS.

No. 93.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir J. Milbanke.

(No. 1.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 19, 1855.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 1 of the instant, on the policy of Bavaria in the present European crisis, I have to instruct you to avail yourself of such opportunities as may offer, without seeking them, to discourage the notion that Bavaria could be admitted on equal terms with France and Austria to negotiate for peace.

You will remind M. von der Pfordten that Bavaria, having constituted herself a partisan of Russia, cannot claim to be regarded with confidence by the Powers who are at war with Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 91.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 21.)

Foreign Office, January 20, 1855.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 10 of the 8th instant* was received on the 12th instant and has been laid before the Queen.

Your Lordship states in that despatch that Prince Gortchakoff having received instructions from his Court requested through Count Buol, on the 7th instant, a Conference with the Representatives of Great Britain, France, and Austria, and that his request having been complied with, the Russian Envoy announced that he had received instructions from his Government, which he had embodied in an unofficial document, which he read, and which enabled him to enter into explanations upon the subjects which had been brought before him on the 28th of December. Your Lordship proceeds to state that thereupon Baron Bourqueney read out the identic interpretation given by the three Powers to the four bases, and pointed out to the Russian Representative that the first Article implied the abolition of the Protectorate of Russia over the Principalities, the future organization of which would be based on the general interests of Europe, and that it stipulated for the maintenance of the privileges of the Principalities, whose future organization should find no obstacle in the provisions of former Treaties. That the second Article had for its object to put an end to the jurisdiction of Russia on the Danube and to establish perfect freedom of navigation on that river. That the third Article stipulated for the revision of the Treaty of 1841, and for the cessation of Russia's preponderance in the Black Sea; and that the fourth Article provided for the abolition of the official Protectorate of Russia over the Christian subjects of the Sultan belonging to the Greek Church, and for the non-renewal of the Articles of her former Treaties. Prince Gortchakoff then withdrew the unofficial document he had read, as merely a memorandum for his own guidance, and admitted that he accepted the interpretation of the four Articles, as they had again been read to him, as a basis upon which he agreed that a negotiation with the three Powers whose Representatives were present, and with the Turkish Representative, could be established.

It does not appear, however, that a procès-verbal was taken of this Conference, or that Prince Gortchakoff's acceptance of the bases was certified by his signature to any written document. This omission, which may be the cause of embarrassment hereafter, is a matter of much regret to Her Majesty's Government.

It is my duty to inform your Lordship that the sincerity of this acceptance is doubted, and that the proceedings of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh are regarded with suspicion by Her Majesty's Government.

In August last, when the Austrian Government, upon its own responsibility, and without the participation of England and France, urged upon Russia the acceptance of the bases that had been agreed upon between the three Powers as the indispensable "point de départ" for negotiations for peace, they were peremptorily rejected by Count Nesselrode, who, in his despatch of August 26th to Prince Gortchakoff, declared that the form of those bases was ill calculated to permit of their being honourably accepted by Russia, and that with regard to their object there could be no mistake, as by the "interest of European equilibrium" was meant the abrogation of all the former Treaties of Russia, the ruin of her maritime establishments, which were said to be a perpetual menace to the Ottoman Empire, and the limitation of Russian power in the Black Sea.

Count Nesselrode further stated, that it would be superfluous to enter into any examination of conditions which implied that the Russian Empire was already reduced to extremity by the exhaustion of a long struggle, and to which, if Russia could ever by the momentary force of circumstances be compelled to submit, so far from securing to Europe a solid and, above all, a durable peace, would only render that peace liable to eternal complications.

Count Nesselrode concluded by saying, that Russia having evacuated the Principalities, and withdrawn within her own frontier, would hence forward act on the defensive, and in that position wait until equitable overtures should enable her to reconcile her desire for peace with her dignity and political interests.

* No. 55.

It thus appears that the true interpretation of the bases, and the intentions of the allies, were fully understood by the Russian Government in August last, since which time, although the arms of Russia have met with severe reverses, yet she is neither reduced to extremity, nor are her resources exhausted, nor has she received the fresh overtures for which she was waiting. But towards the close of last autumn, she became aware that Austria was on the point of signing a Treaty of Offensive and Defensive Alliance with England and France, and the Russian Minister at Vienna then suddenly announced to Count Buol the pure and simple acceptance of the four bases by his Government.

To the great surprise and unconcealed mortification of Prince Gortchakoff the Treaty was nevertheless signed, and on the 28th of December, in consequence of his having formally made known through Count Buol the desire of Russia to treat for peace, the bases of negotiation were fully explained to him by the Representatives of England, France, and Austria, who, in order to prevent misunderstanding, placed in his hands a memorandum, which was an extract from the Protocol previously signed by the three Powers.

It appears by your Lordship's despatch No. 501 of the 28th ultimo, that Prince Gortchakoff at the first meeting stated, that upon the simple announcement of these conditions he could not be expected to give any detailed reply, but that he would state what were his first impressions with regard to it; that he would first remark upon the introduction, according to which reserves were stated as to the right of laying down such special conditions over and above the four guarantees, as might, in the opinion of the three Governments, be required, and that he desired to know if these reserves were to be maintained, to which it was replied that they had been stated in all the preceding documents which had been drawn up upon this subject.

Prince Gortchakoff then proceeded to remark upon the first condition, to which he objected, that it mentioned the Protectorate of Russia over Servia, which was an error, as the Government of Russia held no Protectorate over that country; and he stated that the arrangements to be concluded for placing these Provinces under the collective guarantee of the five Powers, could satisfactorily be made without any mention of the abolition of the former Treaties with Russia, as *ipso facto* the object could be obtained without stating that abolition.

Upon the second Article of the conditions Prince Gortchakoff stated, that although he had no objection to offer to the placing the navigation of the Danube under the control of a corporate authority, yet he thought that the territorial jurisdiction of Russia should not, and need not, be named, and he objected to it.

Upon the third Article Prince Gortchakoff declared, that although he did not object to the revision of the Treaty of the 13th of July, 1841, yet he protested against being called upon to give his adhesion towards putting an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea; a proposition which he supposed involved a limitation of the Russian navy, or a destruction of the harbour of Sebastopol, and which he conceived must refer to the interpretation which had been given to this proposition by the despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys of the 28th of July.

Upon the fourth Article, Prince Gortchakoff stated that all the privileges of the Christian subjects of the Greek Church had mainly been obtained by the Treaties with Russia; that if these or more extensive advantages were secured to that Church in common with all other Christians, he should rejoice in the success of such an arrangement; but he felt that these advantages had been established by fixed stipulations with the Government of the Sultan, and without intending any disrespect to the word or authority of that Sovereign, he felt bound to say that until the treaty obligations which up to the present time had existed upon this subject, had been replaced by obligations as binding, he did not think the privileges of the different sects of Christians could be considered as established. Finally he declared that he could not accept or reject the conditions without consulting his Government, and a period of fifteen days was allowed to him for obtaining the necessary instructions from St. Petersburgh.

These instructions must, however, have been sent by telegraph, as on the 6th instant Prince Gortchakoff announced their arrival to Count Buol, and on

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the following day he accepted, without reserve, the bases which, in August last, were designated as humiliating and dishonourable by Count Nesselrode.

Now, taking all these circumstances together, and calmly considering the course that Russia has hitherto pursued, and the unmistakeable objects of her policy, Her Majesty's Government cannot but distrust the sincerity of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh. They fear that the bases have been accepted for the purpose of detaching Austria from her alliance with England and France, and in order, by a hollow and protracted negotiation, to gain time until the season shall arrive for pouring fresh troops into the Crimea; that the interpretation of the bases will then be disputed, and the aid of Prussia and the German Courts will be invoked to impress upon Austria, that if she insists upon conditions that Russia cannot accept with honour she must be prepared for the neutrality, if not for the hostility, of Germany in a war against Russia.

Notwithstanding the reasons I have assigned for entertaining strong doubts of the sincerity of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh in its acceptance of the four bases, as interpreted by the allies, and the little hope with which Her Majesty's Government look to the success of any negotiation at this moment, they are prepared to act in conformity with the pledges they have given.

Prince Gortchakoff having announced that Russia had accepted the conditions laid down by the three Powers, Her Majesty's Government will be ready, according to the declarations contained in my despatch to your Lordship No. 422 of the 18th ultimo, to enter into negotiations for the restoration of peace; and they will do so with a sincere desire to remove, as far as it may be practicable, any obstacles in the way of a Treaty that will, by its provisions, afford security for its observance.

In order to obtain this end it is necessary that England and France should come to an understanding with Austria as to the meaning of the third Article. This is more especially necessary, as Prince Gortchakoff, before entering into negotiation, has attempted to secure to himself a retreat, by assuming that any destruction of the maritime arsenals of Russia, or any diminution of the forces which the Emperor may choose to maintain in and near those arsenals, would be considered as an interference with Russia's rights of sovereignty and derogatory to her dignity. Thus, were the belligerent Powers now to enter into negotiations, they might be occupied for weeks with details respecting the Treaties concerning the Principalities, and stipulations concerning the application of the Treaty of Vienna to the navigation of the Danube, and when these matters had been elaborately discussed, be stopped at the third Article by a declaration that Prince Gortchakoff had, from the outset, protested against any interpretation of that Article which compelled Russia to reduce her forces or abate her menacing attitude in the Black Sea.

The gain of Russia by such a proceeding would be obvious; she would for the next three months, or perhaps six, direct all her troops to the Crimea without having any interruption from Austria to dread.

It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that the three Powers should agree together upon the sense to be affixed to the third Article.

It would appear that there are but two modes of putting an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. Either a power, as strong as Russia now is, must be introduced into the Black Sea, or the force of Russia in that sea must be reduced.

The demolition of her arsenals and fortresses, and the limitation of the number of her vessels of war, are the most effectual means of securing that object.

The first of these methods, viz., introducing into the Black Sea a power as strong as Russia, seems to be impossible. Turkey cannot be raised to an equality with Russia as she now is. England and France could not engage to keep up eighteen sail of the line in the Black Sea, and if they did the Treaty containing that engagement would be an armed truce and not a peace.

It is obvious that the second method is the only one practicable, and Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that the Austrian Government will look at this question in the same light, and concur in the necessity of an agreement being established between the three Powers before entering into negotiation.

In the meantime they gladly assent to the proposal of the Austrian Government to give effect to the Vth and the Secret Article of the Treaty of the 2nd of

December, with the conviction that upon the firmness and decision of the three Powers at this moment may depend the success of negotiation and the prospects of peace.

Your Lordship is instructed to read this despatch to Count Buol.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 95.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Hudson.

(No. 6.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 20, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government have attentively considered the important documents forwarded by you in your despatches Nos. 3 and 6 of the 19th and 20th instant, and consisting, 1st, of the Protocol of a Conference held between the French Minister at Turin, the Sardinian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and yourself, on the 10th instant, recording the previous communications which had taken place between the respective Governments with a view to the accession of Sardinia to the Treaty between England and France of the 10th April, 1854, and announcing that accession, and the readiness of the Sardinian Government to conclude with the two Powers a Military Convention providing for the active co-operation of Sardinia in the existing war; 2ndly, of the form of the Sardinian Act of Accession; 3rdly, of the draft of a Military Convention.

I have in the first place to state to you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of your proceedings in this negotiation, and of the Protocol inclosed in your despatch No. 3; and I send you herewith the draft of the British acceptance of the Sardinian accession, which you are authorized to sign and exchange against the Act of Accession of the Sardinian Government.

As regards the draft of Military Convention, circumstances which I will proceed to explain, prevent Her Majesty's Government agreeing to it in its present form, though you will see that they fully concur in its substance. The amendment which is required, applies to the Vth Article of the Sardinian draft, which would stipulate for a loan to be guaranteed by England and France to Sardinia, to enable her to provide the military contingent specified in the Convention.

Her Majesty's Government are agreed with that of France, that the duty of providing for this loan shall be undertaken by England alone; and it would therefore seem to be unnecessary, and might lead to inconvenience, that France should engage to bear a part in the loan, which, in point of fact, it is not intended that she should do.

Her Majesty's Government therefore propose to strike out altogether the Vth Article of the proposed tripartite Treaty, and to record in a separate Treaty between England and Sardinia the terms in which the loan in question shall be advanced. Her Majesty's Government do not apprehend any objection on the part of Sardinia to so reasonable a proposal, but before I proceed to explain the intentions of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the loan, I will add, as regards the original Convention, that they think it desirable to insert in it two Articles; one providing that the military contingent to be furnished by Sardinia shall be composed of a due proportion of all arms; the other that the Sardinian Government shall keep up the contingent to the amount specified in the Convention. You will find drafts of the proposed Articles inserted as Articles III and IV in the draft of tripartite Convention which I inclose.

I also inclose the draft of Convention respecting the loan between England and Sardinia, which you will submit to the Sardinian Government. It differs from the original stipulation in Article V of the Sardinian draft, 1st, in containing no reference to France; 2ndly, in the terms on which the loan is to be made; 3rdly, in the arrangement for its repayment.

I have already explained why France should be no party to any stipulation touching the loan.

As regards the terms on which the loan is to be made, the Sardinian Government proposed that it should be lent at an annual rate of interest calcu-

lated on the average price of English consols during the last three months; and as regards the repayment, that the condition should be settled at the peace.

Now if the loan were to be made in the manner stated above, the interest payable upon it by Sardinia, would probably be found to be about 3¼ per cent,; and no part of that interest would be applicable in diminution of the capital, which would have to be repaid by the appropriation hereafter of a large sum in one or at all events in a few payments.

Her Majesty's Government, moreover, apprehend that some objection might be raised in the British Parliament to the indefinite nature of the proposed stipulation regarding the repayment of the loan. To obviate this last difficulty, Her Majesty's Government propose an arrangement which will be much more for the advantage of Sardinia, while it will enable them to satisfy Parliament that a substantial provision has been made for the repayment of the advance. The arrangement is, that the loan should be taken by Sardinia at 4 per cent., of which 1 per cent. shall be set apart by Great Britain as a sinking fund. Sardinia would thus have, in point of fact, only 3 per cent. to pay as interest on the loan, instead of 3¼, as she is now prepared to pay; and the amount to be provided by Sardinia for the periodical discharge of the interest of the loan will be progressively diminished in proportion as the capital is reduced by the application for that purpose of the 1 per cent. sinking fund.

This mode of providing for the loan is so clearly for the interest of Sardinia, that Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that the Sardinian Government will readily concur in it.

It only remains for me to notice the clause of the Article which makes the advance of the loan subject to the consent of Parliament. You will have no difficulty in explaining to the Sardinian Government the impossibility of the Queen contracting an engagement of this nature without such a reservation; but you may assure them that, immediately on the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty, Her Majesty will seek the concurrence of her Parliament for the proposed loan; and Her Majesty does not doubt that such concurrence will be given so promptly as to ensure her being able to advance the money to Sardinia in ample time to enable that Power to prepare to take part in the war at the earliest period at which arrangements can be made for the transport of her troops to the scene of action.

If, indeed, the Sardinian Government should consent to sign the Treaties as they are now sent to you in draft, it might save time if the Sardinian ratifications were sent at once to Paris and London to be exchanged against those of Her Majesty and the Emperor of the French in the case of one Convention, and against that of Her Majesty alone in the case of the other.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 95.

Draft of Act of Acceptance of the Accession of His Majesty the King of Sardinia to the Convention concluded at London, April 10, 1854.

HIS Majesty the King of Sardinia having, by the Act of Accession signed in his name by his Minister for Foreign Affairs, acceded to the Convention concluded at London on the 10th of April, 1854, between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, which Act of Accession is as follows:

(Fiat insertio.)

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland has authorized the Undersigned, her Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Turin, furnished with her full powers to that effect, formally to accept the said accession. The Undersigned accordingly, in virtue of his full powers, declares that Her Britannic Majesty accepts the said accession on the part of His Majesty the King of Sardinia, and that Her Britannic Majesty reciprocally engages, on her part, to cooperate with His Sardinian Majesty for the accomplishment of all the obligations contained in the Convention of the 10th of April, 1854.

The present Act of Acceptance shall be ratified; and the exchange of the ratifications of the Accession on the one part, and of the ratifications of the Acceptance on the other part, shall take place at Turin in , or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof, we, the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Her Britannic Majesty at the Court of His Majesty the King of Sardinia, have signed the present Act of Acceptance, and have affixed thereto the seal of our arms.

Done at Turin, the day of one thousand eight hundred and fifty-five.

Inclosure 2 in No. 95.

Draft of Military Convention between Great Britain, France, and Sardinia.

SA Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne ayant accédé au Traité d'Alliance conclu et signé à Londres le 10 Avril, 1854, entre leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et l'Empereur des Français, et s'étant engagé à se concerter, lorsque besoin sera, avec leurs dites Majestés pour procéder, conformément à l'Article II du Traité du 10 Avril, à la conclusion des arrangements de détail qui régleraient l'emploi de ses forces de terre et de mer, et détermineraient les conditions et le mode de leur coopération avec celles de la Grande Bretagne et de France, leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni, &c., l'Empereur des Français, et le Roi de Sardaigne, ont en conséquence résolu de conclure une Convention Militaire, destinée à régler les conditions et le mode de la coopération des troupes Sardes avec celles de la Grande Bretagne et de la France, et nommé à cet effet pour leurs Plénipotentiaires:—

Lesquels, s'étant réciproquement communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont arrêté et signé les Articles suivants:

ARTICLE I.

Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne fournira pour les besoins de la guerre un corps d'armée de quinze mille hommes, organisé en cinq brigades formant deux divisions, et une brigade de réserve, sous le commandement d'un Général Sarde.

ARTICLE II.

Aussitôt après l'échange des ratifications de la présente Convention on procédera immédiatement à la formation de ce corps et l'organisation des services administratifs, pour qu'ils puissent être prêts à partir le plus tôt possible.

ARTICLE III.

A due proportion of the body of 15,000 men, to be furnished by His Majesty the King of Sardinia according to the stipulations of Article I of the present Convention, shall consist of Cavalry and Artillery.

ARTICLE IV.

His Majesty the King of Sardinia engages that the said body of troops shall be supplied every three months, or at shorter intervals if necessary, with regiments or drafts to keep it up to the full stipulated number of 15,000 men.

ARTICLE V.

Le Gouvernement Sarde pourvoira à la solde et à la subsistance de ses troupes.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes se concerteront pour assurer et faciliter à l'armée Sarde l'approvisionnement de ses magasins.

ARTICLE VI.

Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et l'Empereur des Français, garantissent l'intégrité des Etats de Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne, et s'engagent à les défendre contre toute attaque pendant la durée de la présente guerre.

ARTICLE VII.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée, et les ratifications seront échangées à Turin le plus tôt que faire se pourra.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signée, et y ont apposé le sceau le leurs armes.

Fait à Turin, le 26 Janvier, de l'An de grace 1855.

Inclosure 3 in No. 95.

Draft of Supplementary Convention with Sardinia.

HER Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the King of Sardinia, being desirous to facilitate the execution of the Military Convention which has this day been signed between Her Britannic Majesty, His Majesty the Emperor of the French, and His Majesty the King of Sardinia, have resolved to conclude a Convention supplementary to the Convention abovementioned, and for that purpose have named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen, &c., &c.

And His Majesty the King of Sardinia, &c., &c.

Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:—

ARTICLE I.

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland undertakes to recommend to her Parliament to enable her to advance by way of loan to His Majesty the King of Sardinia, the sum of one million pounds sterling; of which sum five hundred thousand pounds sterling shall be paid by Her Majesty as soon as possible after the assent of Her Parliament shall have been given, and the remaining five hundred thousand pounds on the expiration of six months after payment of the first sum; and Her Britannic Majesty engages further to recommend to her Parliament to enable her, if the war should not have been brought to a close at the expiration of twelve months after payment of the first instalment of the abovementioned loan, to advance to His Majesty the King of Sardinia, in the same proportions, a like sum of one million pounds sterling.

ARTICLE II.

The interest to be paid upon the said loan or loans by the Sardinian Government shall be at the rate of four per cent. per annum, of which one per cent. per annum shall be for a sinking fund.

The said interest shall be calculated from the days on which the payments on account of the loan or loans shall be made, and shall be payable half-yearly; the first payment to be made within fifteen days after the expiration of six months from the payment of the first instalment of the loan, and so on successively.

ARTICLE III.

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande se chargera gratuitement du transport des troupes Sardes.

ARTICLE IV.

The présent Convention shall be ratified, &c.

No. 96.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Hudson.

(No. 7.)

Foreign Office, January 20, 1855.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch inclosing drafts of Treaties with Sardinia, I have to state to you that for the same reason that all reference to the loan is omitted from the Tripartite Treaty, it has been decided to include in the Treaty between Great Britain and Sardinia the Article providing for the gratuitous transport of the Sardinian troops, Her Majesty's Government undertaking to perform that service without calling upon France to contribute any portion of the expense to be incurred for it.

I am &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 97.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 52.)

Foreign Office, January 21, 1855.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information a copy of a despatch* to Her Majesty's Minister at Turin, inclosing the drafts of the proposed Convention with Sardinia, copies of which were forwarded in my despatch No. 45 of yesterday's date.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

P.S.—I inclose also for your Excellency's information a copy of a further despatch† which I have addressed to Mr. Hudson on the same subject.

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* No. 95. † No. 96.

No. 98.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January .)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January* 22, 1855.

OFFICIAL intelligence has been received here by telegraph from Constantinople of the 17th instant, that the Turkish Government, having learnt the acceptance by Russia of the interpretation of the four bases, have directed the instructions to be made out for their Ambassador at Vienna to join in the negotiations whenever they shall be established.

No. 99.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 17. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January* 17, 1855.

THE King of Prussia granted me a private audience this day at Charlottenburg, for the purpose of receiving from my hands the letter from Her Majesty the Queen, which your Lordship forwarded to me by the messenger Grattan.

The audience lasted one hour and a quarter. Baron Manteuffel was present.

To describe with accuracy the desultory, rambling conversation of the King is impossible; but I shall endeavour to repeat to your Lordship the leading points of it, and I regret to say that it has left me with the impression that there is very little prospect at the present moment of bringing the King round to our policy on the Eastern question; and that if we do succeed in effecting so desirable a change, the progress towards it will be attended with difficulty, and much provoking delay at every stage of the negotiation.

The King commenced the conversation by saying that he was glad to have an opportunity of seeing me, and spoke in the most kind and gracious manner. I delivered to His Majesty the Queen's letter, observing that the mission of M. d'Usedom had given sincere pleasure to Her Majesty, and that Her Majesty's Government hoped it was a prelude to a better and improved understanding between the two countries on the great political question of the day.

The King replied that he desired this most ardently, and that the reports which he had already received from M. d'Usedom had been highly satisfactory and useful to him, and that he was thankful to the Queen and to Her Majesty's Government for the kindness and frankness with which his propositions had been received.

I observed that we were desirous to meet the King's wishes as to the Treaty, and that Her Majesty's Government would consent to make any alteration that might be suggested in the form and words of it, provided the sense of the transactions of the 2nd of December were carried out, omitting those Articles which more particularly related to Austria.

On the word "Austria" falling from my lips, the King spoke of the conduct of Count Buol towards him in the most violent terms. His Majesty said that that Minister had taken an unjustifiable advantage of Prussia last July, and put a forced interpretation on the proceedings of Count Alvensleben at Vienna, which had led to his present difficulties. That he had always been ready to act up to the engagements of April 9th; that he had supported the notes of the 8th of August at St. Petersburgh, and that in reality he had never retired from the Conference; that he had been cheated by Austria out of his place; and that it was now attempted to treat him like a naughty child. That, however, he knew the strength of his position and the weakness of that of Austria; that he was perfectly aware that Austria could not move without him; and that if he was to be excluded from the Conference about to be held at Vienna, at which he considers that Prussia had a right as a great Power to assist, he should appeal to his people to stand by him, and felt assured that he should not do so in vain when the dignity of his Crown and the honour of the nation were so

deeply concerned; that he should in that case take up an independent position which might be detrimental to our interests.

After speaking for some time in this tone, and heaping endless abuse on the conduct of Austria—for he scarcely seemed to believe that England and France felt as Austria did on the subject of the King's retiring from the Conference—I availed myself of a pause to state that His Majesty had a remedy at hand, and that was to agree without delay to a Treaty that would bind Prussia to act with the other allies, and that His Majesty would, I was sure, permit me to observe that as Prussia had not taken part in the war, and had done nothing as yet to prove that she was disposed to do so, there appeared in fact no reason why she should participate in negotiations for peace; and I observed that as Prussia was not bound to us in any way, could we be certain that at the Conference she would not take the part of our enemy?

The King exclaimed with warmth, that he had always said the Emperor of Russia was in the wrong, that his opinion on the general question was unchanged, and that although he should feel it his duty to support the interests of peace, we should not find him the advocate of Russia; at the same time that he should not be disposed to support propositions that would be humiliating to the Emperor Nicholas, and as such inacceptable, and which if accepted might cost him his life; that however he felt satisfied nothing would be brought forward which would interfere with the just rights and dignity of a Sovereign.

Having observed that we had been taken by surprise on learning that the Emperor had accepted the four bases of negotiation after his peremptory rejection of them in August last, and that many doubted the sincerity of the proposal to negotiate, and considered it a scheme to prevent Prussia joining the alliance, whilst it intended at the same time to paralyze the action of Austria and of Germany, the King declared that he would vouch for the sincerity of the intentions of the Emperor, and that if there was one thing more than another which made him confident in the sincerity of his brother-in-law, it was his anxiety for the state of the Empress. That Her Imperial Majesty had suffered so much since the commencement of the war, that he would on her account endeavour to put an end to it as soon as possible.

I then asked the King whether he thought a peace thus negotiated would be a durable one, and whether it would be a wise and proper measure to bring the war suddenly to a close, without obtaining all the objects for which it had been undertaken, and whether it would not be better to go on with a war commenced on just grounds, and with such a favourable chance of succeeding under the circumstances of the alliance which had already been established; and I added that His Majesty must be aware that, notwithstanding the intended negotiation for peace, Austria had proposed to us to carry into execution immediately the stipulations of the Treaty of the 2nd of December, and to discuss the question of an alliance for offensive purposes. Why, then, I said, should not His Majesty proceed at once with a Treaty?

The King replied that M. d'Usedom was instructed on the subject, and that if we wished he would agree to arrangements to place 100,000 may 200,000 men if it were thought necessary, on his eastern frontier, which would serve to keep a Russian army of equal force in check.

Before coming to this decision I observed to the King that I hoped His Majesty would be pleased to state the purpose for which these troops would be so placed, because they might be turned against our ally as easily as against our enemy. The King exclaimed that he certainly had no intention of employing his army to support the cause of Russia, which he disapproved of, and that he could declare to me that it was not with any such object that this military movement might take place, but that it would be done with a view to serving our cause.

His Majesty alluded to the financial embarrassments of Austria, which is a favourite theme here just now, and spoke of them as likely to lead to bankruptcy, saying that he apprehended the Empire would be reduced to serious straits in a short time.

I replied that financial embarrassments certainly existed, but that she was engaged in a just cause, and that the profit that would fall to her share from the removal of all commercial restrictions on the Danube, and the impulse that would be given to trade in the Principalities, would be her reward, and that Germany would derive important advantages from the sacrifices of Austria in the cause of Europe.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

The above remarks appeared to make an impression on the King, for His Majesty immediately observed that the advantages of Austria were much greater than those of Prussia in the question, and he again inveighed in almost unmeasured terms, amounting to a tone of exasperation, against Austria, as having been deceived by her; but he said that, if attacked by Russia, he should be ready always to advance with his whole force to her defence.

His Majesty, however, said nothing that might lead to the belief that he would make a Treaty for offensive purposes, though he stated that if Austria were attacked, he should consider it his duty to adopt that policy towards Russia that would be most conducive to the interests of his German ally.

The King made repeated allusions to the manner in which he considered that he had been tricked out of the Conference, and to the resistance to his re-admission on the part of the allies; he contrasted the tone of the communications which were addressed to him from Russia, and those from London, Paris, and Vienna; and at one moment His Majesty even said that menacing language had been used to him.

I replied, that, certainly, I had never been instructed to speak in such terms, and His Majesty then appealed to Baron Manteuffel, who denied that the Marquis de Moustier had ever done so, and this matter was not further discussed.

Twice the King spoke, and with much warmth, of proceedings which had been reported to him of the Jesuits of a conspiracy against Protestantism, which His Majesty believes to have been set on foot by the Court of Rome, and to be fostered by Austria and France, and His Majesty said that he had directed M. d'Usedom to communicate with Her Majesty's Government on the subject, but that he had not yet heard from him on this matter.

I availed myself of an allusion being made by the King to his desire that the relations of the two Governments should be placed on a better footing, to say that this feeling was fully reciprocated in England, but that we despaired of seeing confidence re-established as long as His Majesty's Court was composed of persons whose sympathies were completely Russian. That this was at the present moment a serious obstacle to a renewal of confidence.

I waited anxiously for an answer from the King, but His Majesty was silent; his countenance betrayed, however, that I had touched a painful chord. He took what I said in good part, and after a considerable pause turned the conversation to another subject.

I am sorry to give your Lordship so imperfect an account of my audience, it is with difficulty that one can follow the King from one subject to another; but I think that I have not omitted mentioning the important parts, and those which may have been of real interest to Her Majesty's Government. His Majesty made several attempts to defend himself from the imputation of having acted unfairly in the late diplomatic transactions; but his arguments were really incomprehensible, and related to trifling incidents connected with the negotiations rather than to the real question under debate.

I think I have said enough to your Lordship to show that although the King may desire to be on better terms with the Western Powers, His Majesty is completely in the hands of the Russian party; he is, indeed, so surrounded by them that I doubt his having the courage to disperse the phalanx around him—indeed, I fear that he will never dare to break up this party, and that nothing will now change him but the force of circumstances.

He allows that the Emperor of Russia was in the wrong; he states that His Imperial Majesty has now made every possible concession to bring about the approaching Conference, that he is sincere in his desire for peace, and that peace will result from the negotiations if we do not demand things incompatible with the honour of Russia.

At the same time, however, that the King allows that Russia was the original cause of the present complications in Europe, he will not bind himself to act offensively either with Austria or with the Western Powers: he has declared that the time has not arrived for fulfilling the engagements contracted on the 20th of April; he declines to mobilise at the invitation of Austria; and at the same moment he proposes to us to place 100,000, nay 200,000 men on the Vistula, but will not bind himself to act against our enemy.

Such, indeed, are the continued inconsistencies of the King's policy that he would seem to be powerless, and the mere tool of the Russian party, whose

object would appear to be to isolate Prussia, and to establish an armed neutrality favourable to Russia: at the same time the King declares he will not support Russia, that he disapproves of her conduct; but he refuses to take an active part with us, and if not admitted to the Conference at Vienna, threatens to appeal to his people.

This is the present state of things at the Prussian Court, and I fear they are not likely to become improved after the arrival of Duke George of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, the Emperor of Russia's nephew, who is shortly to arrive here from St. Petersburgh.

This Prince did much injury to our cause last year, when, as your Lordship will recollect, he came on a visit to the King, and a more critical moment could not have been selected, or one more favourable to make an impression on the mind of a weak and vacillating monarch.

The time is come when it might be expected that His Majesty should take a decision that would bind him to us or Russia, or place him in complete isolation in Europe and in Germany; but I doubt that His Majesty will do anything to fix his policy: he is certainly unwilling to join the Western Powers; he is equally unwilling to ally himself openly with Russia, and which ever way he looks he sees war in the distance. To avoid this the King appears to consider that his best chance is for the present not to interfere actively one way or the other, to take no decision, but to place his army on the war footing, perhaps to declare his neutrality, and at all events to be prepared to repel an attack from either side, and hereafter to throw his weight into which ever scale may be most to the advantage of Prussia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 100.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 18. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January 18, 1855.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL begged me to call upon him this morning, when he told me that he had had some conversation with the King yesterday, after my departure from Charlottenburg, relative to what passed at my audience.

He asked what I thought of all that had been stated by the King. I replied that there was good and bad in what had been said, but that I could see little else in His Majesty's statements but a preparation for an armed neutrality, which was the policy suggested last year by Russia and rejected in March by the King; therefore I said I thought we had in reality made no progress towards better relations, on the contrary I saw nothing but difficulties in the way of our coming to an understanding, and that I was really grieved to learn the feelings entertained by His Majesty against Austria.

Baron Manteuffel observed that matters certainly looked serious, but that many difficulties would be overcome if the King were reestablished in his place at the Conference, and that he wished to speak with me on this subject and discuss what was best to be done. I told his Excellency that the course was plain enough, if His Majesty was disposed to follow it, and that was to sign a Treaty that would bind him to the policy pursued by the Western Powers and Austria; that we should endeavour to adapt the wording of the Treaty as far as possible to the peculiar position of Prussia at the present moment; and I said that we might easily prepare a draft based on the Treaty of the 2nd of December, perhaps inserting the Vienna Protocol of the 28th of December.

He replied that he did not think the King would be brought to accede to this, or bind himself to that part relating to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. I rejoined that really I did not see how the King could object to what was agreed to by the Emperor of Russia.

We then spoke of the King's feelings on his exclusion from the Conference. Baron Manteuffel said that if Prussia were not admitted the King would be driven to take some violent decision, and that he might at once ally himself with

Russia. I replied that, in fact, it appeared that this was already the case, for from the commencement of the present complication in Europe His Majesty had always gone with us unwillingly, and though he had apparently given his support to different measures that had been from time to time settled at Vienna by the allies, there was no evidence of Prussia's desiring to give more than a little moral support, with the view perhaps of advancing the prospect of peace, and that whenever we wished her to step beyond this, she declined.

He told me that he was anxiously expecting intelligence from London, and that he hoped to speak to me again on the subject in a few days; but in the meantime he could not conceal from me that there would be great difficulty, he feared, in negotiating the Treaty, for the King considered that he was unjustly excluded from the Conference, and that he would most unwillingly submit to the condition of signing anything to obtain his readmission, and he asked me how we could manage matters to save the King's feelings in this matter, and avoid its bearing the appearance of a conditional arrangement. I replied, that in the first place no time should be lost in useless discussion; that if the King would agree to the course that had been suggested, the signature of the Treaty and the admission to the Conference might be simultaneous.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 101.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 20.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January 19, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith copy, in original and in translation, of a circular despatch addressed by Count Buol to the Austrian Ministers at the German Courts, informing them of the result of the last Conference held at Vienna between the Ministers of the allied Powers and Prince Gortchakoff, stating that the hopes of peace could not be calculated upon with any degree of certainty, and that the attempts to negotiate should not exercise any influence on the projected military measures.

I likewise annex for your Lordship's information copy in original and translation of a second circular addressed by Count Buol to the Austrian Representatives at the German Courts, of which a *précis* is given in the Earl of Westmorland's despatch No. 30 of the 17th January, received under flying seal this day. This despatch has been instigated by the refusal of the Prussian Government to accede to the invitation addressed to them by Austria to place a military corps on her eastern frontier, and it announces the intention of the Austrian Government to submit to the Diet the proposal of mobilising one half of the Federal contingents, and the immediate election of a Federal Commander-in-chief. The Austrian Government further requests to be informed of the decision which the German Governments will take in this respect, and of the instructions which they will accordingly transmit to their Representatives at Frankfort.

I likewise inclose to your Lordship copy, in original and in translation, of a despatch addressed by Count Buol to Count Esterhazy, the Austrian Minister at this Court, in reply to the answer of the Prussian Government declining the Austrian overtures respecting the military preparations of Prussia and the Germanic Confederation. After attempting to prove that the dangers to Germany were undiminished so long as peace was not really secured, after citing the advance of the Russians into the Dobrudscha, the great exertions Russia was making to concentrate large masses of troops, and other eventualities as likely to render necessary not only the defensive obligations of Prussia, but also an active advance of both the German Powers as provided for by the Treaty of April, Count Buol informs the Prussian Government of the steps which the Austrian Government are about to take at the Diet.

I am also informed that Count Esterhazy has received copy of a confidential despatch (dépêche réservée) which has been addressed by the Austrian Cabinet to certain of the German Governments on whose support they conceived they could rely. This despatch is reported to me to promise those Governments who

shall decide in favour of the Austrian policy a guarantee of their possessions; and it is likewise stated that should Austria be in a minority at the Diet, she will then appeal to Article XLII of the "Pacte Fédéral," which permits a German State, in the event of danger, entering into separate Treaties with her German allies. This eventuality is not likely to occur as I am assured, and it is even admitted by members of the Prussian Government that Austria is almost certain of a large majority at Frankfort.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 101.

Circular to Austrian Representatives at the German Courts.

(Translation.) *Vienna, January 10, 1855.*

MY last communication has informed you that the Representatives of the three Powers, allied by the Treaty of December 2, at the meeting which took place on the 28th ultimo, entered into explanations to the Russian Minister as to the sense and meaning which their Courts assign to the four points laid down as the bases of peace, and that as Prince Gortchakoff did not consider his instructions sufficient to express himself on the explanations offered to him, but declared himself ready to procure the necessary orders from his Court, the Plenipotentiaries agreed after a delay of fourteen days to meet in a second Conference.

The result of Prince Gortchakoff's report to his Court has been that that Minister informed me on the 6th instant that he was now enabled, in the name of his Government, to declare himself on the subject of the communication made to him by the Representatives of Austria, France, and Great Britain. Thereupon a second Conference between the four Plenipotentiaries took place on the 7th instant.

On the basis of the discussions held, and the explanations exchanged in this new Conference, it was unanimously acknowledged by them, under reservation of the approval of the Cabinets of Paris and London, that no essential difference existed between the Courts of Austria, France, and Great Britain, and Russia, as to the understanding of the sense and general range of the four preliminary points, and that accordingly a common basis had now been attained on which regular negotiations of peace could be opened.

The Imperial Cabinet has forthwith conveyed this to its Ministers in Paris and London, as also to the Internuncio at Constantinople, with directions to urge the quickest possible transmission here of the full powers and instructions necessary for the commencement of the negotiations of peace.

You are requested to communicate this important fact to
We are convinced beforehand that you will participate in the high satisfaction with which the Imperial Cabinet has hailed the hopes of a speedy return of general peace, arising from the preliminary results already attained.

Moreover it scarcely requires to be specially remarked, that the real attainment of peace depends on the course of the negotiations which are to be opened, and that well-founded hopes may be placed on their successful result, although it cannot be calculated upon with any degree of certainty. The impending attempt at peace cannot therefore exercise any influence on our military measures, so long as its result is not assured, and we cannot doubt but that the Governments of Germany will approve of our solicitude and our attention continuing to be directed to the fullest extent towards the military preparations not only of Austria, but also of our German allies.

In conclusion, we observe that we shall soon have occasion to make a further communication on this subject on the receipt of the answer of the Prussian Cabinet to our despatch of December 24, addressed to Berlin.

Receive, &c.
(Signed) BUOL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 101.

Circular to Austrian Representatives at the German Courts.

(Translation.) *Vienna, January* 14, 1855.

AFTER the decision taken by the Assembly of the Germanic Diet by their resolution of December 9, we believed it to be a duty incumbent on us to confer confidentially without delay with the Prussian Court, as to the practical effect to be given to the resolution of the Diet.

The instructions which we gave to our Minister at Berlin for this end, have been made known to by my communication of December 26. It appears from the reply which we have now received, and of which I have the honour to annex a copy, that the views of the Cabinets of Vienna and of Berlin are not agreed in essential points.

Prussia denies the menacing character of the relations recognized by the totality of the Diet, on the ground of the assurance of Russia, unconfirmed by any species of guarantees, that she was desirous of confining herself to the defence of her own territory. We do not undervalue the worth which such an assurance may have to a Power involved in war for the circumscription of the complication, but the German Governments, as well as Austria, can never attribute to this promise, accepted by no one, a binding and a secure character which could act restrictively on the carrying out of the resolutions adopted by the Diet. Was a confirmation only required that Russia herself did not conceive herself able to subordinate the claims of her military position to this circumstance, it may be proved precisely at this moment by the advance of Russia against the Turks on the right bank of the Danube.

If we do not also relinquish the hopes which Europe associates with the late promises given by Russia at the Conference of the 7th instant, the definitive aim is nevertheless too far removed, the opinions concerning the practical accomplishment and application of the four preliminary points may be too manifoldly divided, and the dilemmas of the war may operate too variously, as that the Imperial Court can resign themselves to the belief that they already hold in their hands a sure pledge, in the already-attained preliminary result, that peace will be really assured.

We appeal to the upright sense of the German Governments, whether they can deceive themselves that the state of the world has lost as yet anything of that threatening gravity which the Diet itself has acknowledged as existing. His Majesty the Emperor, our august Ruler, considers it necessary to remain in the fullest preparation for all eventualities, and the impending negotiations for peace will consequently, so long as the certainty of success is wanting, neither influence the military measures of Austria herself, nor, in the opinion of His Majesty, ought they to check the obligations taken by his German allies for the attainment of a common purpose.

Such an attitude can alone promote the interests of peace, and enhance the probabilities of a successful issue of the negotiations. According to our deep conviction, therefore, our German confederates should also now come to a resolution to give to the totality of Germany a position commanding respect. The highest interest of the German nation and of their Princes appears to us to require that Germany should be sufficiently prepared for all possible events. Whatever expression also may be given shortly to the resolution of the Diet in its capacity as a political Power, at all events we must now again especially address our proposal to the effect that the necessary development of the military forces of the Diet should be provided for without delay.

You will easily judge that, guided by these views, we could not reply to the expression of the Prussian Cabinet with respect to the armament of Prussia and of the German Diet, otherwise than has been done in the accompanying despatch to Count Esterhazy.

The Imperial President of the Diet will consequently now move, in the appointed Committee, that the mobilisation of at least the half of the contingents shall be proposed in the assembly of the Diet, in case the opinion should not prevail, that it was preferable to render at once the whole Federal army disposable for operations. The question whether in the first case two combined corps d'armées, or whether four independent corps, should be formed, which would be

followed in the case of necessity by the other half of the contingents, as well as all other questions of detail, will have to form the subject of deliberation as expeditiously as possible, and of the resolutions of the Diet. The selection of a Federal Commander-in-chief will likewise be necessary, in order that the union of the different corps of the Federal army under one common supreme command may take place according to the constitution; and we are consequently of opinion that the Diet should occupy themselves immediately with this point, and take the proper steps for the election of the Commander-in-chief of the forces of the Diet; whilst in the separate States measures should be taken in order that the Federal corps may be ready equipped to be placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-chief to be elected.

You will communicate this despatch to with the request that they will be pleased to inform us of the determination to which this communication will give rise, as also of the instructions which they may be induced to send to their Representative at Frankfort, in order that we may cooperate towards the fulfilment of the important task which is submitted to the organ of the will of entire Germany.

Receive, &c.
(Signed) BUOL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 101.

Count Buol to Count Esterhazy.

(Translation.) *Vienna, January* 14, 1855.

COUNT ARNIM has communicated to us the despatch, copy of which is inclosed, in which the Cabinet of Berlin replies to our overtures of the 24th ultimo, respecting the military preparation of Prussia and the Germanic Confederation.

The Additional Article of November 28, and the Federal Decrees of December 9, were necessarily the cause and motive of our bringing forward this question. Our demand, therefore, could surely not be unexpected to the Royal Cabinet. Baron Manteuffel even appeals to Prussia having, in maintenance of the point of view of the military obligations contracted by her, with a continual regard to the gravity of the situation, already made proper arrangements to secure to her army an increased readiness for war, and to render it possible to place in position greater bodies of troops ready for action, in shorter periods than those of the Military Convention of April 20. We can only rejoice at this declaration, but must abstain from all judgment of the measures alluded to, as they have not been communicated to us more particularly, nor pointed out as the subject of an agreement with us.

The Prussian Government, further, does not enter into our proposal, on the grounds that they cannot share the opinion that an aggressive advance is intended on the part of Russia.

In their eyes this apprehension is contradicted by the repeated declarations of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and by its conduct with respect to the negotiations of peace, and is also not justified by the nature of the movements of the Russian troops. We, on the other side, can on no point and in no respect consider the danger of the situation to be diminished, as long as peace is not really secured. Russia is continually making greater exertions to concentrate the forces of her vast Empire, of which the newly-ordered levy also furnishes a proof, and no other limits are assigned to the way and manner of applying her means, than those which she deems advisable to observe in her own momentary interest. At this moment the Russian troops are again advancing into the Dobrudscha, to cut off the communications of the Turkish commander. The military calculations of Russia can menace any other point in the same way as they now do the right bank of the Danube, if the resolutions of the Court of St. Petersburgh do not incline towards the conclusion of peace.

The war can penetrate into our own provinces, into the Danubian Principalities, into the passes of the Balkan; and, according to the march of events, the armies of Russia can necessitate not only the realisation of the defensive

obligations of Prussia, but also the cases of an active advance of both the German Powers already provided in the Treaty of April. We regret that the Cabinet of Berlin attaches a weight to the views and measures of Russia alluded to, in which we cannot participate in such a state of things.

The communication of Baron Manteuffel touches further on the political position of his Court. We have anticipated the Prussian Cabinet in not acknowledging that, under present circumstances, the obligations of Prussia are limited to the conditions of the Treaty of April, to the Additional Article of November 28, and to the Federal Decrees following it. We cannot accept the remark of Baron Manteuffel that those obligations were indissolubly connected with the supposition of the common efforts to give effect to the four points, in a sense as if Prussia considered the force of the contracted obligations to be dissolved by the difference at present existing in the position of the two Powers. Moreover, as we can deduce nothing positive as to the further intentions of Prussia from that remark, we confine ourselves to assuring her that we will in no respect place ourselves in contradiction with the rights which Prussia derives from her quality of a Great European Power, and to manifesting on this fresh occasion our sincere desire of seeing the action of the two German Powers in one way or other soon reunited on a perfectly equal basis.

The German Diet has acknowledged by its decrees that the menacing attitude of European affairs rendered military arrangements on the part of the Germanic Confederation necessary. It has directed the Military Committee to make suitable proposals, and with this view the separate Governments have now freely to declare their views as to the mode of carrying out the resolutions passed by their instructions to the members of the Committee, and then by their vote. We for our part thought we only need abide by the agreements already made between Austria and Prussia on the 20th of April last, for the purpose of eventually regulating the military action of the two Powers, as well as the proposal which they were to address in common to the Germanic Confederation. Prussia does now not desire to take such an initiative with the Diet, but she informs us that the Royal Military Plenipotentiary will find himself provided with the necessary instructions to promote the task of the Military Committee according to the Federal War Constitution, and to help to bring it to a conclusion in a suitable manner. It can only be a matter of rejoicing for us to be able to derive the hope from this, that on the whole the influence of Prussia, as well as our own, will be directed to the object of the sufficient readiness for war on the part of the Germanic Confederation.

Accordingly the Imperial Government will, in the Committee of the Diet, declare itself in favour of a mobilisation of half of the Federal contingents. At the same time, in consideration of the fact that after the rules of the War Constitution, when the formation of a Federal army is decreed, the nomination of a Federal Commander-in-chief must take place, and that this election forms a preliminary condition for the union of the Federal corps under one common command, the Federal Government will add a proposition that the Diet shall occupy itself with the necessary preliminaries for the election of a Commander-in-chief. We do not delay to communicate our opinions to the separate Governments of the Confederation, and inclose in this despatch a copy of a circular which we have addressed to the Imperial Missions at the German States for that purpose.

You are requested to communicate the above remarks to the Minister President, and to inform him of the step we have taken towards our confederates in expressing a wish that we may be assured by the answer of the Royal Government that Prussia appreciates our proceedings in the spirit of an ally.

Receive, &c.

(Signed) BUOL.

No. 102.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 26.) *Vienna, January 17, 1855.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a statement of the numbers and distribution of the different Divisions of the Russian army, which I have drawn up from the official return made by the Austrian military authorities, and communicated to me by General Hess.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 102.

STATEMENT of the Force and Position of the Russian Army, extracted from the Austrian Official Report.

	Men.	Guns.	Men.	Guns.
In the Baltic Provinces.				
St. Petersburgh	72,876	252		
Cronstadt	11,920	16		
Finland	29,500	56		
Esthonia	20,510	48		
Total army in Baltic Provinces			134,496	392
In Poland and Western Provinces.				
Poland	147,100	484		
Lithuania and Volhynia	39,590	132		
Courland and Livonia	14,200	48		
Total army in Western Provinces			200,890	664
Army of the South.				
In Bessarabia	49,440	184		
Near Odessa	32,800	112		
Active reserve	24,920	88		
Total of army of the South			107,160	384
Army of the Crimea.				
Sebastopol	21,000	68 (field guns)		
Army in the field	78,500	352		
Reserve near Perekop	36,320	120		
Kertch	3,000	..		
Total of army in the Crimea			138,820	628
Reserve now being formed since March 22, 1854			61,850	120
Army of the Caucasus.				
Caucasus	121,000	164		
On the Anatolian frontier	54,300	184		
Total of army of the Caucasus			175,300	348
Total effective force of the Russian army			836,300	2,426

N.B.—This force involves more than 1,000,000 of soldiers to supply garrisons, guards for the interior, &c., when also the Cossacks are included in the calculation.

No. 103.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 28.)

Vienna, January 17, 1855.

My Lord,

THE Minister of Finance and of Commerce and Public Works, the Chevalier Baumgartner, has tendered to His Majesty the Emperor his resignation of the offices with which he was charged, and this resignation has been accepted by His Majesty. The appointments held by the Chevalier Baumgartner have been proposed to Baron Bruck, the present Internuncio at Constantinople, and a telegraphic message has been sent to him conveying the order of the Emperor by which he is appointed, and in case he should not assign any reason for not complying with the Emperor's commands, which it is in no way expected that he will do, he is requested to return to Vienna as early as may be convenient to him.

I have been informed, confidentially, that Baron Koller, the present Austrian Minister at Hanover, and who was formerly Chargé d'Affaires in London, will be sent, in case Baron Bruck comes away, on a special mission to Constantinople, where for the present he will not assume the rank of Internuncio, but, as Plenipotentiary, will be charged with the business of the mission in Turkey.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 104.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 29.)

Vienna, January 17, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, in translation, an extract from an article which appeared in the "Presse" journal of this day with reference to the alliance between France and Piedmont.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 104.

Extract from the "Presse" of January 17, 1855.

(Translation.)

IT must be looked upon as a satisfactory consequence of the friendly understanding existing between Austria and the Western Powers, that the alliance between Piedmont and France should not at the present moment be regarded by Austria with feelings either of mistrust or jealousy, as would have been the case in all critical moments in former times, and was but a natural consequence as long as there existed grounds for believing that such an alliance would be used, directly or directly, against the interests of Austria. Fortunately, that is no longer the case.

Austria and the Western Powers have united by the Treaty of December 2 for the maintenance of the European equilibrium. From this point of view alone, France, acting in direct contradiction to all the former traditions of her policy of conquest, could invite Prussia and the other German States to unite themselves closely with Austria, and from the same point of view Austria can look on the union of Piedmont with the Western Powers, if it has already taken place, as an accomplished fact, which will be conducive to the attainment of the objects of her own alliance with those Powers, and of those of the common interest of Europe.

No. 105.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 30.)

Vienna, January 17, 1855.

My Lord,

IN consequence of the Prussian Government having declined the invitation of Austria to mobilize her army in accordance with the stipulation of the Treaties existing between the two countries, or to propose to the German Confederation to agree to a similar measure, Count Buol has now felt it his duty to address a proposition to each of the German Governments, stating that although the attitude of Russia at the present moment is not one of immediate menace to the interests of Austria or of Germany, yet that while so large an army is assembled upon the frontiers of the two countries, it is impossible to lay aside all apprehension of hostilities taking place until some transaction for the settlement of the important questions which at the present moment are still menacing the general peace of Europe should have taken place.

Count Buol in this communication to the German Governments, makes an allusion to the late unexpected entry of the Russians into the Dobrudscha, as a proof that acts of hostility on the part of the Russian armies against the forces of the Powers with whom they are at war, and which might also take place against those with whom such a state of things might momentarily arise, is not to be unheeded.

Count Buol appeals, therefore, to the German Governments not to desist from their declared intention of being prepared to defend the interests of Austria and of Germany in case they should be attacked.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 106.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 31.)

Vienna, January 17, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith translation of an article which appeared in the semi-official journal "Oest. Deutsche Post," of this day, upon the attitude maintained by the Central States of Germany, with reference to the mobilisation of the contingents to the army of the Confederation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 106.

Extract from the "Oest. Deutsche Post" of January 17, 1855.

(Translation.)

WE have for many days past maintained silence upon the present attitude of Austria towards Prussia and the German Confederation, because we have felt convinced that very important diplomatic negotiations must take place between the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, which will soon throw abundant light upon the present situation.

Austria, as is well known, applied in the latter half of the past month to Prussia to mobilize that portion of her army which she is bound by treaty to put on foot for the eventual defence of the Austrian frontier. Prussia has used every pretext to avoid complying with this application. Since then it is true that the 7th of January has arrived, and with it some prospects of peace. We hardly think, however, that these prospects are sufficiently distinct to interrupt the preparations necessary, should they come to nothing, more particularly as that

is just the eventuality in which war would most unavoidably stand at our door. It is this which makes it indispensable for Austria to insist with the greatest possible energy upon the fulfilment of those liabilities which Prussia and the entire German Confederation took upon themselves in the Treaty of April and its Additional Article.

We propose to-day, in connexion with this wide ranging subject, to content ourselves with a side glance at the middle States of Germany.

The "Munich Gazette" gives the following report of a speech held in the Bavarian Chambers, by Baron von der Pfordten, on the 12th instant:

"The long years of a peace rich in blessings, seem on the eve of being exchanged for a state of warfare. Already three of the greatest Powers of Europe are engaged in a struggle too nearly touching the interests of Germany and her position, to allow her to neglect measures of precaution. With this object in view, the well known decisions of the Confederation were come to on the 9th of December. True it is, that quite latterly the hope that peace may be preserved has somewhat increased, yet no one can fail to see that spite of this, the probability of war has in no way receded behind that of the preservation of peace. In accordance, therefore, with the decisions of the Federal Military Committee, measures must be taken to have the army in a state of preparation, and to mobilize a portion of the same, and in consequence I have received the King's orders to bring before the Chambers a project of law for crediting the necessary supplies."

The Bavarian Minister has not shut his eyes to the dangers that may be hiding under the possibly deceitful veil of peace. He recognizes the necessity that even at this moment it is necessary to be prepared for the worst, and thereby gives a lesson to the Cabinet of Berlin, the value of which lies as much in its truth, as in the fidelity to engagements which it evinces.

Very differently do matters appear to be at Dresden. There the men of politics seem to be listening, within the shadows of Prussian statecraft, for the accents of true wisdom, and to be ready with the greatest possibly celerity to make the watchword given at Berlin their own matter. We lately gave a specimen out of the official "Zeit" of the anti-Austrian attitude assumed on the Spree. An article in the official "Leipzig Gazette," which pleads against the mobilization of the Saxon army, though less coarse, is, on that account, all the less honourable. It endeavours to set the public opinion of the country against the demands of Austria, by trying to make the citizen tremble for his money; it seeks to inspire the Leipzig merchant and the Chemnitz manufacturer with fears of increased taxation as the result of the proposed mobilization, and takes the opportunity of turning up to heaven a few mock-pious Pharisaical looks of gratitude for the blessings enjoyed by a land where the currency is subject to no fluctuations.

No. 107.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon—(*Received January* 22.)

(No. 33.)

Vienna, January 17, 1855.

My Lord,

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 10 of the 9th instant, I have made every inquiry respecting the regulation by which the paper money of Austria is proposed to be taken in payment of the provisions and other necessaries furnished to the Austrian army in the Principalities. I find that the transaction on the part of the Imperial Government is a *bonâ fide* one, and that it is by no means intended that the inhabitants of the Principalities should suffer pecuniary loss by this measure. The plan proposed to them for guaranteeing their interests is of a two-fold character: they are invited either to raise the prices chargeable upon the commodities they furnish to such proportions as should counterbalance the difference of value at present existing between Austrian bank notes and sterling coin; or should they prefer to leave unaltered the prices of their goods, they are invited to claim from the Imperial Government whatever losses they may suffer by the depreciation of the paper money of the Empire. In either case, therefore, it appears special provision is made that the interests of the inhabitants should not be prejudiced by the regulation in question.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 108.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 22.)

(No. 34.)

Vienna, January 17, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour of inclosing copies of the telegraphic despatches I forwarded to your Lordship on the 11th and 15th instant, by the latter of which the Russian Commander-in-chief, Prince Gortchakoff, announces the return of the Russian troops which had attacked the body of Turkish forces stationed on the right bank of the Danube, in and about Toultcha, to their original position near Ismail. In referring to my despatch to your Lordship No. 23 of the 13th instant, in which I inclosed the notes I had addressed to Count Buol upon the subject of these movements on the part of the Russian forces, and in which I state the answers I had received to the communications I had made to him of your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 13th, I have now to add that on the day after the date of my despatch No. 23, Count Buol announced that he had received a telegraphic message from Bucharest, stating that the Russian troops had not advanced further than Babadagh, and reporting that two Turkish corps, under the orders of Sadik and Achmet Pashas, had passed the Danube at Surdarei and Yarn Jahunizza, with the view of offering an effectual check to any further advance of the Russians towards the south, and he therefore believed that the movement made by the Russian troops had for its object only to attack the small body of Turkish forces which were immediately opposite to them.

On the same evening (the 14th instant) Baron Bourqueney received from his Consul at Bucharest, M. de Poujade, a most alarming telegraphic despatch, stating that the Russian corps of eighteen battalions of Infantry and a large body of Cavalry, and seventy-six guns, was marching with the greatest rapidity upon Baltchik, near Varna. I went early next morning to Count Buol to represent to him the gravity of this intelligence, of which, however, I had received no report from Her Majesty's Consul at Bucharest, when, to my surprise, he placed in my hands the telegraphic despatch of the 12th instant from Prince Gortchakoff, which put an end to all the reports of the advance of the Russians towards Baltchik and Varna, which had previously been announced with so much assurance.

Count Buol expressed his great satisfaction at the contents of this despatch, as it confirmed the belief that he had always entertained, that no serious operation by the Russians on the right bank of the Danube could be attempted, as he felt, in common with General Hess, that it was much too dangerous an operation for the Russians to undertake from their present positions, and in the actual state of the relations of Austria towards the Russian Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 108.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon, January 11, 1855.

[See No. 51.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 108.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon, January 15, 1855.

[See No. 66.]

No. 109.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 24.)

Foreign Office, January 22, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO, in obedience to his instructions, has communicated to me a despatch from Count Buol, dated the 8th instant, and giving an account of what passed in the Conference with Prince Gortchakoff on the previous day.

This account differs, in some very material particulars, from that given by your Lordship in your despatch No. 10 bearing the same date.

In the first place it states that Prince Gortchakoff announced, at the opening of the Conference, that he was instructed to abide by the document in regard to the four bases which he had delivered to Count Buol on the 29th of December, and which I conclude is the document that, as stated in your despatch No. 502 of that day, Count Buol said, that Prince Gortchakoff had left in his hands as containing modifications of the objections which he had made on the previous day to accept the interpretation given by the Plenipotentiaries of the three Powers to the bases set forth in the memorandum which had been read to him by Baron Bourqueney on the part of the three Representatives.

Your Lordship and Baron Bourqueney very properly declined to meet Prince Gortchakoff in conference, for the purpose of receiving the statement embodied in this document; but it now appears, from Count Buol's despatch, that the document read by Prince Gortchakoff in the Conference of the 7th of January was the identical document placed in Count Buol's hands on the 29th of December, although your Lordship, either from being ignorant of that fact, or from inadvertence, has omitted to notice it in your despatch No. 10 of the 8th instant; and Her Majesty's Government cannot but express surprise that Prince Gortchakoff should have been allowed, apparently without question, to read, in the Conference of the 7th of January, as the embodiment of instructions received from his Government, subsequently to his report of the Conference of the 28th of December, a document which he had actually prepared and communicated to Count Buol, and proposed to communicate to the Representatives of England and France also, on the 29th of December.

Count Buol goes on to say, that the three Representatives agreed, on the ground that both the memorandum read by them to Prince Gortchakoff on the 28th of December, and the paper first read to them by Prince Gortchakoff, were unofficial documents, that there was no objection to the two papers being examined together in order to see whether there was any real difference between the construction placed by them on the preliminary bases; and that it resulted from the detailed discussion which ensued, that there was no essential difference whatever between the sense attached by the three Representatives to the four bases, and the manner in which those bases were regarded by the Russian Minister.

I find in your Lordship's despatch no trace whatever of any such proceedings as are stated by Count Buol to have taken place, nor of any such specific result of the comparison of the two documents. On the contrary, you state expressly that Prince Gortchakoff having read his paper, Baron Bourqueney read out the identic interpretation given by the three Powers to the four bases, commenting upon the several points to which that interpretation applied: that thereupon Prince Gortchakoff withdrew his memorandum as being unofficial, and admitted that he accepted the interpretation of the four articles as it had been again read to him.

Count Buol then goes on to speak of the bases which may be considered

as established by common consent. It is unnecessary to recite the several points as set forth by Count Buol, and I will only observe, that the bases which his Excellency states to be established, differ very materially from those specified in the memorandum read by Baron Bourqueney in the Conference of the 28th of December, and more particularly as regards the total omission of specific reference to the abrogation of the Treaties between Russia and Turkey, out of which the existing complications have in a great degree arisen.

It is, however, of such great importance that no misunderstanding should exist between what Count Buol considers Prince Gortchakoff to have accepted, and what Baron Bourqueney and yourself consider him to have accepted, that I have to instruct your Lordship to ask Count Buol whether he understands that Prince Gortchakoff has accepted unreservedly the following terms, which I transcribe in the original French from the memorandum read by Baron Bourqueney on the 28th of December:

"Que [les trois] Gouvernements, en jugeant de commun accord qu'il était nécessaire d'abolir le Protectorat exclusif exercé par la Russie sur la Moldavie, la Valachie, et la Serbie, et de placer dorénavant sous la garantie collective des Cinq Puissances les privilèges reconnus par les Sultans à ces Principautés dépendantes de leur Empire, ont entendu et entendent qu'aucune des stipulations des anciens Traités de la Russie avec la Porte concernant les dites Provinces ne pourrait être remise en vigueur à la paix, et que les arrangements à conclure à leur sujet seraient ultérieurement combinés de façon à donner une pleine et entière satisfaction aux droits de la Puissance Suzeraine, à ceux des trois Principautés, et aux intérêts généraux de l'Europe.

"2. Pour donner à la liberté de la navigation du Danube tout le développement dont elle est susceptible, il conviendrait que le cours du Bas-Danube, à partir du point où il devient commun aux deux États riverains, fût soustrait à la juridiction territoriale existante en vertu de l'Article III du Traité d'Andrinople. En tout cas la libre navigation du Danube ne saurait être assurée si elle n'est pas placée sous le contrôle d'une autorité syndicale investie des pouvoirs nécessaires pour détruire les obstacles existants aux embouchures de ce fleuve, ou qui s'y formeraient plus tard.

"3. La révision du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, doit avoir pour objet de rattacher plus complétement l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre Européen, et de mettre fin à la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire. Quant aux arrangements à prendre à cet égard, ils dépendent trop directement des événements de la guerre pour qu'on puisse dès à présent en arrêter les bases; il suffit d'en indiquer le principe.

"4. La Russie, en renonçant à la prétention de couvrir d'un protectorat officiel les sujets Chrétiens du Sultan du rit Oriental, renonce également, par voie de conséquence naturelle, à faire revivre aucun des Articles de ses Traités antérieurs, et notamment du Traité de Kontchouk-Kainardji, dont l'interprétation erronée a été la cause principale de la guerre actuelle. En se prêtant leur mutuel concours pour obtenir de l'initiative du Gouvernement Ottoman la consécration et l'observance des privilèges religieux des diverses communautés Chrétiennes sans distinction de culte, et en mettant ensemble à profit, dans l'intérêt des dites communautés, les généreuses intentions manifestées à leur égard par Sa Majesté le Sultan, elles attacheront le plus grand soin à préserver de toute atteinte la dignité de Sa Hautesse et l'indépendance de sa Couronne."

Your Lordship will take the best means for ascertaining precisely whether Count Buol understands Prince Gortchakoff's assent to go to the full extent of the terms of the memorandum of the 28th of December, which I have now transcribed. The most satisfactory course would undoubtedly be that Count Buol should state this in a written communication to your Lordship, but if his Excellency should prefer to give merely a verbal answer, your Lordship will be careful to read over to him your report of what may pass between you in consequence of this despatch, and ascertain that he concurs in the accuracy of your report.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 110.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 25.)

Foreign Office, January 22, 1855.

My Lord,

AS your Lordship may not have in your possession a copy of the paper delivered by Prince Gortchakoff to Count Buol on the 29th December, and reproduced by him in the Conference of the 7th instant, as appears from Count Buol's despatch to Count Colloredo of the 8th instant, referred to in my other despatch, I inclose herewith a copy of that paper as communicated to me by Count Colloredo on the 9th of January.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 110.

Memorandum.

Ad. 1.—ABOLITION du protectorat exclusif de la Russie en Moldavie et en Valachie, les privilèges reconnus par les Sultans à ces provinces, ainsi qu'à la Servie, étant placés sous la garantie des cinq Puissances.

Ad. 2.—La liberté de la navigation du Danube, selon les principes établis par les Actes du Congrès de Vienne, à l'Article des communications fluviales. Contrôle d'une Commission Mixte qui serait investie des pouvoirs nécessaires pour détruire les obstacles existants à l'embouchure, ou qui s'y formeraient plus tard.

Ad. 3.—Révision du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, pour rattacher plus complétement l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre Européen. Je ne refuse pas de m'entendre dans les Conférences formelles de paix sur les moyens que les trois Cours proposeraient pour mettre fin à ce qu'elles appellent la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire, à condition que dans le choix de ces moyens il ne s'en trouve aucun qui puisse atteindre les droits de souveraineté de mon auguste Maître chez lui.

Ad. 4.—Garantie collective des cinq Puissances substituée au patronage exclusif que quelques unes d'entre elles possédaient jusqu'ici pour la consécration et l'observance des privilèges religieux des diverses communautés Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte sans distinction de culte, à condition que la réalisation des promesses solennelles faites à la face du monde par les Grandes Puissances Chrétiennes soit un œuvre sérieuse et de conscience, et que la protection promise soit efficace et pas un vain mot.

No. 111.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 54.)

Paris, January 21, 1855.

My Lord,

I COMMUNICATED to M. Drouyn de Lhuys yesterday afternoon the drafts of the two Conventions which your Lordship proposed sending to Mr. Hudson, respecting the military cooperation to be afforded by Sardinia in the present war. I pointed out to his Excellency the points in which these Conventions differed from that proposed by the Sardinian Government, observing that they were not likely to be objected to by the French Government.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that they were decided ameliorations. He remarked, however, that, as the Sardinian troops were to be under Lord Raglan's command, he should wish that the VIth Article of the Military Convention should be transferred to the Convention concerning the loan, or that, if it remained as

at present, some declaration should be exchanged between Her Majesty's and the Imperial Government, to the effect that the expense of the transport of the Sardinian troops should be borne by Great Britain.

The alterations suggested by Her Majesty's Government in the Act of Acceptation of Sardinia's adherence to the Treaty of the 10th April, are agreed to.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 112.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 55.)

Paris, January 21, 1855.

My Lord,

THE messenger who was the bearer of your Lordship's despatch No. 44 of the 19th instant, inclosing the drafts of two despatches which you proposed to address to the Earl of Westmorland, and which you desired should be communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, was delayed on his journey by the weather, and it became impossible for me to carry out your Lordship's further instructions to make you acquainted by the telegraph with the opinion of the French Government, so as to enable you to dispatch a messenger to Vienna yesterday evening.

I have now the honour to report that I read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the two drafts in question. His Excellency, after listening to them with attention, said that it was impossible to resume more impartially, or with greater force, the incidents which had preceded and accompanied Prince Gortchakoff's demand to treat for peace. He should have preferred however, his Excellency added, that the longer despatch of the two should have been written rather as a guide to Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, as to the language which he should hold in his conversation with Count Buol, than as a direct communication to be made to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. He quite agreed that the time was come when the Western Powers should not allow the Austrian Government to remain in ignorance of their firm determination to carry on the war until the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea was put an end to in the manner insisted on by your Lordship; but he asked himself, and he ventured to ask your Lordship, whether some inconvenience might not arise from demanding an immediate expression of opinion from Austria, whether in effect it was not hazarding an answer from her which might become a source of embarrassment for the future. Suppose an official demand to be made to Count Buol to assent to the interpretation given by your Lordship of the only practical mode of destroying the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, and the Count to refuse his assent to that interpretation, would it not be placing an obstacle in the way of a future understanding with Austria, which might be avoided by confining the communication to be made to Count Buol to a simple announcement of the intentions of the Western Powers? It was with this view, his Excellency observed, that he had written the despatch to M. de Bourqueney of which I made mention in my despatch No. 44 of the 19th instant, and of which Count Walewski has received a copy for communication to your Lordship.

Before adverting to M. Drouyn de Lhuys' remarks upon your Lordship's second despatch, I must state that in a conversation which I had with his Excellency the day before yesterday, I had suggested that in consequence of the conflicting accounts given of what occurred at the Conference of the 8th, and of the reports prevalent in Germany that Prince Gortchakoff's interpretation of the four points had been accepted by the allies, it might be advisable that Her Majesty's and the Emperor's Representatives at Vienna, should be instructed to call Count Buol's attention to these circumstances, and to request him to call a Conference at which a Protocol should be signed by the four Plenipotentiaries who had attended the former, attesting Prince Gortchakoff's acceptance of the interpretation given by the allies to the four points. It appeared to me that if Prince Gortchakoff refused, as he probably would, to affix his signature to a document which should declare that such acceptance was given plainly and without reserve, the negotiations from which nobody expected any result would, *ipso facto*, be broken off, and Her Majesty's Government and that of the

Emperor relieved from a position of which both felt the annoyance. That the two Governments, to cover their responsibility, would have a right to insist on such a preliminary step to further negotiations, there could be no doubt.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys highly approved this suggestion. He said that it would relieve the two Governments from considerable embarrassment, and that he would write immediately to Count Walewski on the subject.

I have to express my regret that this should have occurred, because on presenting the draft of your Lordship's second despatch yesterday, for M. Drouyn de Lhuys' acceptance, I met with objections which, under other circumstances, might not, perhaps, have been put forward.

His Excellency said that it was impossible to contrast more clearly, or in a more becoming tone, the differences which existed between Count Buol's account of the Conference of the 8th instant, and that given by Lord Westmorland, but that on every account he thought that these discrepancies should be cleared up in Conference, and not in a conversation between Count Buol and the Representatives of the Western Powers. It appeared to him that it was transporting the responsibility of Prince Gortchakoff's expressions from the Prince to Count Buol, and that it might lead to disagreeable discussions, and even to a quarrel, between Count Buol and the Representatives of England and France. He hoped therefore that your Lordship, who when you wrote must have been ignorant of the conversation which his Excellency had had with me the day before, would consent to the plan proposed of demanding a fresh Conference. Since that conversation had taken place, he had further reasons for desiring this. It was certain that Prince Gortchakoff would refuse to sign such a Protocol as the allied Powers would have a right to insist on, for he was in possession of a telegraphic despatch of the 19th instant from St. Petersburgh, stating that a courier had been sent to Prince Gortchakoff the day before, approving all his proceedings; enjoining him to abide by his own interpretation of the four points; and ordering him to insist on the participation of Prussia in any further negotiations for peace. We might, therefore, be sure that the signature of a Protocol would be refused, and the two Governments could desire no better.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that he had spoken to the Emperor upon the subject, and that His Majesty participated in his opinion; that he had consequently drawn up a draft of Protocol, such as he thought would meet the exigencies of the case, and that he would transmit it to Count Walewski for your Lordship's consideration.

His Excellency showed me the proposed draft, but the preamble was so confused that I recommended its being made more simple. He undertook to alter it, and late yesterday evening he sent me an amended form, of which I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy. The words within inverted commas were added at my suggestion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 112.

Project of Protocol.

LES Représentants de l'Autriche, de la France, et de la Grande Bretagne, voulant éviter tout malentendu et donner aux délibérations un point de départ identique et commun, ont pensé qu'il était nécessaire de consigner dans un Protocole l'acceptation par M. l'Envoyé de Russie de la réduction dont ils lui ont déjà donné connaissance le 28 Décembre, et dont ils lui ont renouvelé aujourd'hui la lecture dans les termes suivants:

Le Prince Gortchakoff a déclaré qu'il était autorisé par sa Cour à accepter, "et qu'il acceptait," complétement et sans réserve, la teneur de la réduction ci-dessus, ce dont les Représentants de l'Autriche, de la France, et de la Grande Bretagne ont pris acte en signant avec lui le présent Protocole.

En cas de refus.

Le Prince Gortchakoff ayant répondu qu'il n'était pas autorisé par sa Cour à accepter la réduction ci-dessus, les Représentants de l'Autriche, de la France, et de la Grande Bretagne ont pris acte de sa déclaration pour en donner connaissance à leurs Gouvernements.

No. 113.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 56. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 21, 1855.*

WITH reference to my preceding despatch, I have the honour to state that having been desired to wait upon the Emperor this morning, I had some conversation with His Majesty upon the points to which that despatch refers.

His Majesty's language was an echo of that of his Minister's, relative to the course which should now be pursued at Vienna.

It was clear to me that he felt the inconvenience of protracting the present negotiations, and that he had not that confidence in Austria which he appeared to entertain some time back; he had therefore caught at the idea put before him by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, of breaking off further negotiation by the refusal of the Russian Plenipotentiary to sign a Protocol declaratory of the interpretation given to the four points by the allies.

His Majesty, however, with his usual calmness and forethought, said that we must be prepared, even for the signature by Prince Gortchakoff of such a Protocol as was now suggested. It was evidently the game of Russia to force the allies, if possible, into negotiations. What was to be done if Prince Gortchakoff signed the Protocol?

I replied, that I did not like to hazard any further opinion until I knew your Lordship's decision in regard to a Protocol; but that it seemed to me that we must in that case open ourselves decidedly to Austria, and if we found that it was impossible to come to an understanding with her, we might with reason and justice ask her what use there could be in continuing negotiations with Russia, when the allies were unable to settle among themselves the conditions to be insisted upon.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 114.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 27.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 23, 1855.*

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship, for your confidential information, copies of despatches from Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin, reporting the substance of conversations which he has had with His Majesty the King of Prussia and with Baron Manteuffel on the position of Prussia in the present crisis of European affairs, together with copies of my replies thereto.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 115.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 23, 1855.*

YOU are not to press Count Buol for an answer to my despatch No. 21, the object being only to inform him of our views.

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* Nos. 99, 100, 110, and 117.

No. 116.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 24. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, January 23, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Lordship's despatch, No. 17 of the 17th instant, reporting what passed at an audience granted to you on the 17th instant by the King of Prussia, and I have the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that your language, and the manner in which you conducted the interview with His Majesty the King of Prussia, are approved by Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 117.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 25.)

Foreign Office, January 23, 1855.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by you in your conversation with Baron Manteuffel on the present position of Prussia, as reported in your Lordship's despatch No. 18 of the 18th instant. You will inform Baron Manteuffel that you have correctly stated the views of Her Majesty's Government, and that they are anxious that the King of Prussia by signing the proposed Treaty should re-enter the Conference before any negotiations commence.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 118.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 24.)

(No. 26.)

Constantinople, January 11, 1855.

My Lord,

THE Grand Vizier has expressed disappointment at the silence maintained with respect to Turkey in Her Majesty's speech, and more particularly in that of the French Emperor.

In reply to what his Highness remarked to me upon the subject, I said, that in ignorance of the real cause, if cause there was, I could only hazard a conjecture, which it gave me pain to enunciate, namely, that the two allied Courts having no new circumstance to announce in favour of Turkey, had exercised a friendly discretion in reserving the mention of its name. I ventured to add that the same friendly sentiment would doubtless inspire a more gratifying procedure as often as the Turkish Government or its armies gave proof of that progress in military and administrative improvement, on which so much depended for the success and ultimate benefit of the common cause.

I have since learnt that the Turkish Ambassador at Paris on observing the omission to which I have referred, applied to M. Drouyn de Lhuys in search of an explanation, and was assured by that Minister that the Emperor's silence, grounded upon nothing but a similar silence preserved by Her Majesty the Queen, would be forthwith rectified by the insertion of a suitable paragraph in the "Moniteur."

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 119.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 24.)

(No. 28. Confidential.)

Constantinople, January 11, 1855.

My Lord.

I WAS visited the day before yesterday by Vassif Pasha, who, as your Lordship is aware, has undertaken the charge of commanding the army at Kars during Ismail Pasha's absence in Bulgaria. I availed myself of the opportunity to recommend General Williams to his confidence and attention in the most unreserved terms, and I endeavoured to impress upon his mind the importance of his acting in cordial concert with that officer, if he wished to render the army efficient and to meet the views of Her Majesty's Government, identified as they were with those of the Sultan and the Porte.

The assurances with which he replied to my injunctions were quite satisfactory, and I hope that his conduct will be such as to redeem the pledge which they conveyed.

I cannot affirm that I was equally satisfied with the indications which he gave of being put in possession by the War Department of all that was necessary to meet the demands of General Williams, or to fulfil the expectations which I have been authorized to entertain.

The Pasha is military by profession, and his language is that of a sincere and well-intentioned man. He spoke unsparingly—though, of course, in confidence—of the deficiencies existing in the War Department; and I am under an impression that further exertions will be necessary to have him properly instructed, and promptly sent forward to his destination. I have already expressed myself with earnestness to Reshid Pasha on this subject, and I hope that my words have not fallen on a barren soil.

His Highness assured me that Shukri Pasha shall be recalled, that proper deference shall be paid to General Williams, as Her Majesty's Commissioner, and that a Council shall be formed at the War Department to assist the Seraskier, and to give a more steady and efficient direction to his operations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 120.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 25.)

(No. 37.)

Vienna, January 21, 1855.

My Lord,

A SHORT time ago the French Government directed M. de Bourqueney to invite the Austrian Government to send a general officer on a mission to Paris, that he might there take part in the discussion of the military movement which, consequent upon the stipulations of the 2nd of December, might call for the cooperation of the Austrian armies with those of France and of the allies.

M. de Bourqueney has within these few days been very pressing for the immediate nomination of this general officer, and yesterday Count Buol announced to him that His Imperial Majesty the Emperor had named the Major-General Count Crenneville, who had been called from Tuscany, where he had lately held a command in the Austrian corps d'armée in occupation of that country, and that he was expected in a day or two, and would as early as possible proceed to occupy the situation at Paris to which he had been appointed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 121.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 38.)

Vienna, January 21, 1855.

My Lord,

M. STEIGER, the Swiss Chargé d'Affaires, called upon me yesterday, to say that he had received a most satisfactory and courteous reply from Count Buol to the announcement he had addressed to him of the nomination by the Federal Government of the Commissioners destined to proceed to Milan for the purpose of entering into negotiation with the Austrian Governor of Lombardy, the Chevalier Bergen, for the settlement of all those points of difference which are at present existing between the two Governments. M. Steiger stated that Count Buol had concluded his despatch by expressing his anxious hope, that through the means of the Commission now established for the settlement of these affairs, an early and favourable solution would be arrived at, and that a termination would thus be put to the serious embarrassment which had been occasioned to both countries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 122.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 64.)

Paris, January 24, 1855.

My Lord,

THE French Government has been informed that the Emperor of Austria has named General Creneville to proceed to Paris in quality of Imperial Military Commissioner.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 123.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 69.)

Paris, January 24, 1855.

My Lord,

M. DE HUBNER has communicated lately to M. Drouyn de Lhuys two circulars addressed by his Government to the smaller Courts of Germany. The one will at all events be known to your Lordship through the newspapers. It is that calling upon them to instruct their Representatives at the Diet to put half their contingents on the war establishment, and to name a Generalissimo to command them. The other is no less important, as in case of the Diet refusing its consent to the demand of Austria, it proposes to the States who may find themselves in a minority to arm just the same, and place their contingents under the personal command of the Emperor Francis Joseph, guaranteeing to such as may accept the invitation assistance against all attack that might be made upon their territories during the present war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 124.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 70.)

Paris, January 24, 1855.

My Lord,

IN compliance with the directions sent in your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of yesterday, I transmit herewith copies of the French version of the Protocol of the 28th December, and of the memorandum read by M. de Bourqueney and given confidentially to Prince Gortchakoff at the Conference of the 8th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 124.

Protocol Réservé.

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 9.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 124.

Memorandum.

DANS le but de préciser le sens que leurs Gouvernements attribuent à chacun des principes contenus dans les quatre Articles, et en se réservant d'ailleurs, comme ils l'ont toujours fait, la faculté de poser telles conditions particulières qui leur paraîtraient exigées en sus des quatre garanties par l'intérêt général de l'Europe pour prévenir le retour des dernières complications, les Représentants de l'Autriche, de la France et de la Grande Bretagne déclarent que :

1. Leurs Gouvernements, en jugeant de commun accord qu'il était nécessaire d'abolir le protectorat exclusif exercé par la Russie sur la Moldavie, la Valachie et la Servie, et de placer dorénavant sous la garantie collective des cinq Puissances les priviléges reconnus par les Sultans à ces Principautés dépendantes de leur Empire, ont entendu et entendent qu'aucune des stipulations des anciens Traités de la Russie avec la Porte concernant les dites provinces ne pourrait être remise en vigueur à la paix, et que les arrangements à conclure à leur sujet seraient ultérieurement combinés de façon à donner une pleine et entière satisfaction aux droits de la Puissance Suzeraine, à ceux des trois Principautés et aux intérêts généraux de l'Europe.

2. Pour donner à la liberté de la navigation du Danube tout le développement dont elle est susceptible, il serait convenable que le cours du Bas-Danube, à partir du point où il devient commun aux deux Etats riverains, fût soustrait à la juridiction territoriale existante en vertu de l'Article III [du Traité] d'Andrinople. En tous cas la libre navigation du Danube ne saurait être assurée si elle n'est pas placée sous le contrôle d'une autorité syndicale investie des pouvoirs nécessaires pour détruire les obstacles existants aux embouchures de ce fleuve, ou qui s'y formeraient plus tard.

3. La révision du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, doit avoir pour objet de rattacher plus complétement l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre Européen, et de mettre fin à la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire. Quant aux arrangements à prendre à cet égard, ils dépendent trop directement des événements de la guerre pour qu'on puisse dès à présent en arrêter les bases ; il suffit d'en indiquer le principe.

4. La Russie, en renonçant à la prétention de couvrir d'un protectorat officiel les sujets Chrétiens du Sultan du rit Oriental, renonce également, par voie de conséquence naturelle, à faire revivre aucun des Articles de ses Traités antérieurs, notamment du Traité de Koutchouk-Kainardji, dont l'interprétation erronée a été la cause principale de la guerre actuelle. En se prêtant leur mutuel concours

pour obtenir de l'initiative du Gouvernement Ottoman la consécration et l'observance des privilèges religieux des diverses communautés Chrétiennes sans distinction de culte, et en mettant ensemble à profit, dans l'intérêt des dites communautés, les généreuses intentions manifestées à leur égard par Sa Majesté le Sultan, elles attacheront le plus grand soin à préserver de toute atteinte la dignité de Sa Hautesse et l'indépendance de sa Couronne.

No. 125.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 73. Confidential.)

Paris, January 24, 1855.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship will find inclosed herewith the copy of a letter which the Emperor did me the honour to address to me yesterday, relative to the measures His Majesty considers should be taken by the two countries for prosecuting the present war with vigour and success.

Whatever the opinion of Her Majesty's Government may be as to the practicability of the measures themselves, they will not fail to see, in this remarkable paper, a further proof of the anxiety of the Emperor for the success of the cause in which the two Governments are engaged, of the solicitude with which he looks into details, and of his desire to consult and act with Her Majesty's Government.

Your Lordship will perceive that the Emperor alludes to a conversation which I had the honour to hold with him. In this conversation His Majesty dwelt at great length on the general advantages of proceeding in the manner pointed out by him, and less on the details which occupy the greater part of his letter. His Majesty's theory is, as your Lordship knows, no new one. Since the beginning of this war he has insisted on the advantages which might be derived were each Government to take charge of the service for which each is more particularly adapted; and when I saw His Majesty on Sunday he again expatiated on what he called the folly of the two countries throwing away their resources; the one, by endeavouring to augment its naval means, which entails expenses that might be saved; the other, by striving to keep up an army, which was not in the spirit of the country, and thus crippling the energy which might be displayed on its own element—the sea. "What will be the state of things," asked His Majesty, "at the end of the war, if we continue as we have begun? Why, that I shall have a navy of which you will be the first to be jealous, and you will have expended millions to raise an army which will then be useless to you; whereas if we each take the part that Nature has assigned us, we may mutually assist each other materially, and at much less cost and inconvenience."

If I let many of those observations pass in silence, it was not because I felt that they were altogether unanswerable, but because I could not, with propriety, discuss the value of British troops as compared with French. On the other hand, there is so much plausibility in the Emperor's arguments, that I could not take upon myself to gainsay that upon which it is the province of Her Majesty's Government alone to decide.

One remark, however, I ventured to make, namely, that His Majesty overrated the powers of Her Majesty's Government. He seemed to think that their supply of ships and seamen were inexhaustible; whereas there were limits to both, as we too cruelly felt at the present moment. Neither was it to be taken for granted that if we took fewer recruits for the army, we should find the same hands ready to join the navy. When the Government was absolute, or when military or naval conscriptions were the law of the land, an army was easily raised—a fleet rapidly manned; but in England it was a matter of bargain, and all that a Government could do was to purchase the service of individuals as well as they could. "Then why not do as I have done?" exclaimed the Emperor. "Have a conscription, but allow every man to purchase his freedom from service. Money thus raised will, in the hands of the Government, soon purchase substitutes. Something of the kind you must do, or you will lose all your former reputation. It is already sad to hear how opinions have changed on the Continent as to your being a formidable Power."

I have thought it my duty to report these remarks to your Lordship, not that they were said as if the Emperor himself believed in the truth of the latter of them. Indeed, on my observing that Great Britain had never made such efforts as in the commencement of this war, and that there were circumstances attending it which could attend no other, but which told particularly on the efficiency of the British forces, His Majesty coincided in the justice of the observation.

Another matter which was discussed with His Majesty, but which is not alluded to in his letter, was the establishment of a Military Board or Council at Paris. I am persuaded that Her Majesty's Government would derive great advantage from associating in such a plan. The reports received by the French Government from the East are very detailed; they would, I am sure, be laid before any officers whom Her Majesty might please to send over, and future operations might be discussed with advantage. As it is, there is, I think your Lordship will admit, a want of unity between the two countries, not of purpose, but of plan; and I see no way of remedying this great evil but by the creation of a permanent council of war. That this Council should meet at Paris seems but reasonable, and I venture to urge the matter upon the consideration of Her Majesty's Government. The plan proposed is, that a general officer, an officer of Engineers, and a superior naval officer, should be sent over, and accredited for this purpose; and if the Austrian Government decides eventually on a military cooperation with the Western Powers, the general officer whom the Emperor Francis Joseph is about to send to Paris, might be added with advantage to the Council.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 125.

The Emperor of the French to Lord Cowley.

My Lord, *Palais des Tuileries, le 22 Janvier, 1855.*

JE mets par écrit le sujet de notre conversation d'hier.

Nous sommes naturellement préoccupés en France comme en Angleterre des premiers résultats de la guerre actuelle et des meilleurs moyens à employer pour la poursuivre avec avantage. De mures reflections sur ce qui a été fait nous apprendront ce qui reste de mieux à faire. Lorsqu'on a vu les deux pays s'unir pour la guerre, l'Europe, il faut le dire, a cru à une solution plus prompte et plus décisive. Si son attente a été trompée, la raison principale est que les deux pays n'étaient pas préparés à la guerre. Ce motif écarté, le second est l'insuffisance du matériel naval.

En effet, pourquoi n'avons-nous pas pu transporter en une seule fois sur les côtes de la Crimée l'armée qui étaient à Varna? Pourquoi n'avons-nous pas pu transporter assez tôt après cette bataille les renforts et les suppléments de parc de siège qui étaient à Marseille? Pourquoi les Anglais n'ont-ils pas pu faire parvenir en temps utile à Sebastopol les mulets achetés en Espagne ou ailleurs et qui seuls pouvaient approvisionner leur camp? Pourquoi nos baraques, nos effets de campement ou d'habillement, ne sont-ils arrivés que tard? Pourquoi nos blessés ont-ils eu à souffrir du froid sur les ponts de navires qu'ils encombraient?

L'absence de tous ces éléments indispensables a été occasionnée par la même cause, le manque de grands transports à-vapeur. Car il faut bien le reconnaître, il ne s'agit pas pour le succès d'une guerre comme celle que nous entreprenons, de pouvoir dire à la fin de l'année, nous avons envoyé en Crimée tant de mille hommes, tant de mille chevaux, tant de bouches à feu; il s'agit de savoir si nous les avons envoyés à la fois en assez grand nombre et en temps utile pour produire un effet décisif. Tout à la guerre se résume en une question de temps et d'opportunité. Qu'importe que notre Cavalerie arrive lorsque la bataille a été livrée? Qu'importe que les canons arrivent lorsque le moment de donner l'assaut est passé? Qu'importe que des renforts parviennent lorsque l'armée a déjà été trop affaiblie par la maladie et par une inaction forcée? Ce n'est donc pas l'armée qui nous a fait défaut en Crimée, c'est la marine—marine à vapeur pour porter les hommes et les chevaux; marine de transport pour les munitions

et les approvisionnements; marine légère pour s'approcher des côtes et surveiller Perecop et la Mer d'Azoff. Cela admis, il faut pour l'avenir tâcher d'y remédier. Or, la Providence a voulu que les deux Puissances étroitement liées pour la guerre possédassent ensemble les plus puissants éléments pour la bien faire; elles sont les plus riches; se trouvent à la tête des plus belles armées de terre et des plus belles flottes. Tout consiste donc à bien employer ces puissantes armées.

Une nation ne peut développer avec avantage et rapidité ses forces que suivant la nature de ses ressources, le génie de son peuple et la direction imprimée depuis des siècles à sa politique. Or de même que l'Angleterre doit sa prépondérance de sa marine, de même la France a du sa grandeur à son armée de terre. L'une est une Puissance essentiellement maritime, l'autre est surtout une Puissance continentale. L'Angleterre peut donner à ses forces maritimes un développement immense; elle en a l'instinct et les moyens. La France de son côté peut facilement mettre 600,000 hommes sous les armes. L'union de ces deux nations est donc capable de produire des effets prodigieux et nouveaux dans l'histoire. Mais pour cela il faut que chacune développe avec la plus grande vigueur ses ressources dans le sens le plus conforme aux moyens auxquels elle doit son existence comme grande nation.

Faute de cet examen et d'une entente préalable, voyons ce qui est arrivé. La France a cherché à augmenter considérablement sa marine, et cependant au bout de quelques mois de guerre et sans combat naval elle s'est trouvée à bout de ressources suffisantes. L'Angleterre a cherché de son côté à augmenter ses forces de terre et après une campagne de quelques mois elle s'est trouvé manquer d'hommes.

Si donc le Gouvernement Britannique peut poursuivre la guerre avec énergie et avec des chances probables de succès, il faut qu'il fasse d'immenses efforts pour augmenter sa marine à vapeur. Il faut qu'il ait un matériel suffisant pour porter à la fois 60,000 hommes et 20,000 chevaux (dont la moitié appartiendra à l'artillerie et aux équipages militaires) sans compter des bateaux-à-vapeur hôpitaux pour le transport des blessés, aussi que d'autres bâtiments pour approvisionner l'armée en munitions et en vivres. Il faut qu'il ait des batteries flottantes pour attaquer les places fortes, des chaloupes canonnières pour approcher des côtes.

De mon côté, sans négliger ma marine, je mettrai tous mes efforts à avoir une bonne armée de terre prête à chaque instant à être transportée d'un bout du monde à l'autre.

Si cet accord se réalise entre nous, nous pourrons facilement faire trembler nos ennemis; car supposons un moment que l'Angleterre accumule dans les beaux ports de la Manche que la nature lui a donnés, la flotte immense dont je viens de parler, et qu'elle embarque tout-à-coup les 60,000 hommes attendant impatiemment sur la côte de Boulogne le moment d'agir et qu'elle les transporte sur un point quelconque de la Baltique et de la Mer Noire. Quelle impression prodigieuse ne produirait pas une telle flotte arrivant à l'improviste sur le territoire ennemi!

Si au contraire on se borne, comme par le passé, à envoyer au fur et à mesure quelques milliers d'hommes les uns après les autres, on arrivera aux mêmes dépenses et aux mêmes sacrifices sans résultat décisif; car l'Infanterie arrivera sans Cavalerie ou sans Artillerie, ou l'Artillerie sans approvisionnements suffisants, ou les troupes sans leurs objets de campement, ou les armées sans bagages et sans chevaux pour les porter. En un mot nous épuiserons au fur et à mesure et en détail des forces qui réunies auraient étonné le monde.

En résumé, je voudrais que dans la campagne prochaine nos forces fussent réparties dans la proportion suivante.

L'Angleterre ne fournirait en troupes de terre qu'un contingent égal au cinquième de l'effectif de nos soldats de terre. La marine Française à son tour ne fournirait que le cinquième des bâtiments de guerre et des transports.

Pour donner à ces armées un élément de force nouveau, on admettrait que sur terre le Général Français commanderait seul les troupes, et que sur mer l'Amiral Anglais commanderait seul la flotte. Les troupes Françaises seraient nourries sur mer par l'administration Anglaise; le contingent Anglais serait nourri sur terre par l'administration Française.

De cette manière nos deux nations concourraient également suivant leur nature à la guerre. Les drapeaux de leurs armées de terre et de mer concourraient également à la gloire commune, et il y aurait dans leurs efforts la

même énergie, la même unité, la même entente qui existe déjà si heureusement dans les idées et dans les sentiments des deux Gouvernements.

Voici un aperçu de mes propositions. Supposons à embarquer une armée de 60,000 hommes, et 20,000 chevaux. L'Angleterre fournirait le cinquième, ou 12,000 hommes, la France 48,000 hommes; l'Angleterre 4,000 chevaux, la France 16,000.

Pour cette armée il faudrait:

60 vaisseaux ou frégates-à-vapeur, à 1,000 hommes par vapeur - - - - - -	60,000 hommes.
40 transports-à-vapeur pour la Cavalerie, faits exprès pour contenir chacun 200 chevaux - -	8,000 chevaux.
60 transports semblables pour porter le matériel et les chevaux de l'Artillerie - - -	12,000 chevaux.
40 vaisseaux de commerce à vapeur pour les approvisonnements.	
6 vaisseaux-à-vapeur hôpitaux pour transporter les blessés.	
206 vaisseaux ou bateaux-à-vapeur, de plus.	
120 chalands pour débarquer les hommes et les chevaux.	

Total, 266 bâtiments-à-vapeur, et 120 chalands.

La France aurait donc à fournir sur ce nombre 66 bâtiments, savoir:

12 vaisseaux ou frégates.
20 transports.
8 bâtiments de commerce.
24 chalands.
2 vaisseaux hôpitaux.

Total, 260

Voilà, Milord, ce que je vous prie de communiquer à votre Gouvernement, en exprimant à cette occasion aux membres du Cabinet Anglais ma haute estime et ma sympathie.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) NAPOLEON.

No. 126.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 24.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 23, 1855.*

AN article has been published in the Government paper "Zeit," which is deserving of notice, as it is said to contain the present impressions of the Prussian Government on their relations with Austria.

I have the honour to forward a copy of it, accompanied by a translation, and your Lordship will perceive from it that Prussia is determined to resist the proposition of Austria to mobilize the federal contingent.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 126.

Précis of Article from the Berlin Newspaper "Zeit."

(Translation.)

THE "Hamburgh Correspondent" a few days ago cursorily gave an analysis of the Austrian note of December 24, requiring Prussia to mobilize 200,000 men, and the Prussian answer of the 5th instant, declining this request.

The Austrian note founds its demand on the Military Convention of the

Treaty of April, according to which the necessity of Prussia's placing 100,000 or 200,000 men in position is to be determined by mutual agreement. The existence of this necessity is deduced from the circumstance that Russia stands "ready for battle" on the eastern frontiers of Austria; and therefore Prussia is by the Military Convention obliged to mobilize. It is added, that in the opinion of General Hess, Austria would only be strong enough to accept the combat with certainty of success if supported by 100,000 Prussians.

We have already stated that Prussia refused this demand of Austria, because the intention of Russia to attack Austria was in no way confirmed, and because according to all that we know of the intentions of Russia, an offensive war with Austria on her part was not to be feared. The Prussian note of January 5 says in this respect: "Austria and Prussia are bound to common efforts to give effect to the four points; such common action does not take place if Prussia has no part in their definition of the four points. Prussia derives her title to this participation regarding decisions which relate to the maintenance of peace, whilst they involve a change of the international state of Europe and a modification of those Treaties to which Prussia was a party, from her position as a great European Power, in virtue of which she signed those Treaties, and not from any recent stipulations. The King will steadfastly adhere to this view, and will fear neither dangers nor sacrifices if menaced by encroachments. Prussia is ready to enter into further agreements, but at the Diet she will designate the immediate preparation for war as not demanded by circumstances."

This passage fully bears out what we pointed out as the line of Prussian policy in our last article. The common action of Austria and Prussia cannot consist in Austria, France, and Great Britain defining the four points, and afterwards inviting Prussia to join, but must be shown in common consultations as well as action. Prussia cannot act where she has not taken part in the deliberations. This is so natural that one cannot conceive how it was overlooked at Vienna.

That the King will adhere to the views taken in the note of January 5, must give satisfaction throughout Prussia, and the nation will faithfully support him in this policy.

In the meantime we do not fear a continuous conflict. If a mistake has been made at Vienna as to considerations due to Prussia, if it even was expected to surprise us with an accomplished fact, the note of January 5 will, it is to be hoped, have had the effect of removing this error. From the first meeting of the Conference to the separate alliance of December 2, Prussia has not undertaken the least thing without the concurrence of Austria; Prussia may forget that the same was not done by her, but the first condition of an harmonious action in the spirit of the Confederation will and must be the reestablishment of deliberations in common. If this be not the case, well, then, Prussia will remain Prussia.

Whether after having deviated from the open and straight course by the Treaty of December 2, by the negotiations of December 28 and January 7, Austria may think fit to return amicably to it, will soon be shown. The Cabinet of Vienna knows by the Prussian note of January 5, that Prussia will oppose herself to a proposal for mobilisation to be made at Frankfort, as not necessitated by circumstances. Austria has announced that she is resolved to propose in the Diet that the Federal contingent, of which for the present only one-half is to be mobilized, be made ready for war, and at the same time the election of a Federal Commander-in-chief. We can only sincerely hope that Austria will desist from this attempt, in order that the unity and concord of Germany may be maintained.

No. 127.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 25.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 23, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a despatch which has been addressed by Count Nesselrode to Baron de Budberg, expressing the satisfaction

of the Emperor of Russia at the language held by the Mecklenburg Plenipotentiary at the Diet of Frankfort, on the late discussion on the Eastern question.

Your Lordship will perceive the air of protection which pervades this document, and it may be said that these two Grand Duchies fully deserved the mark of Imperial favour bestowed on them, for they were the only States in the Confederation whose votes were recorded against the Treaty of the 20th of April, and the Additional Article of the 26th of November.

Both these Grand Duchies are closely connected by family ties with the Courts of Russia and Prussia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 127.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Budberg.

St. Pétersbourg, le 14 Décembre, 1854.

L'EMPEREUR a eu connaissance du langage que le Plénipotentiaire des deux Cours Grand Ducales de Mecklenbourg a tenu à la Diète de Francfort dans les diverses circonstances où cette Assemblée s'est vue appelée à se prononcer sur la question d'Orient.

Déjà, dans la séance du 24 Juillet, lors des délibérations sur le Traité du 20 Avril, M. d'Oertzen avait déclaré que les deux Cours qu'il a l'honneur de représenter, tout en se félicitant de l'accord établi entre les Cabinets de Vienne et de Berlin, ne se dissimulaient point que l'accession de la Confédération Germanique à ce Traité d'Alliance Offensive et Défensive ne répondrait ni à l'esprit du Pacte Fédéral ni à la position qu'il assigne à l'Allemagne comme Puissance Européenne, qu'elle dépasserait mêmes les limites que l'Article XLVII de l'Acte Final de Vienne a tracées à sa coopération éventuelle, et que, par cette considération, ses augustes commettants ne croyaient pas pouvoir voter pour l'accession. Fidèle à cette manière de voir, le Plénipotentiaire de Mecklenbourg s'est abstenu encore en dernier lieu, lorsqu'il s'est agi à la Diète de se prononcer sur l'Article Additionnel du 26 Novembre.

Il est à regretter, M. le Baron, que le langage si correct de M. d'Oertzen n'ait pas prévalu dans l'Assemblée Fédérale. Il avait pour but d'épargner à l'Allemagne les complications dont le Cabinet de Vienne travaille de plus en plus à la rendre solidaire. Vous n'ignorez pas que notre auguste Maître a toujours soigneusement évité toute ingérence dans les questions soumises aux délibérations de la Diète et qui sont de son ressort exclusif. Mais Sa Majesté Impériale ne saurait se refuser à la satisfaction de faire témoigner aux deux Cours Grand Ducales, combien elle apprécie leur noble attitude en face d'une politique qui, sous prétexte d'assurer le retour de la paix, tend à faire de la guerre actuelle une lutte qui embrasserait toute l'Europe.

Veuillez faire parvenir ces témoignages d'intérêt de la part de notre auguste Maître à la connaissance de leurs Altesses Royales, de telle manière que vous jugerez la plus convenable.

Recevez, &c.

No. 128.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 26. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 23, 1855.*

I CALLED on Baron Manteuffel to-day, and regret to say that I am unable to report that the King of Prussia is better disposed to conclude with us a Treaty analogous to that of the 2nd of December, than His Majesty appeared to be last week.

Baron Manteuffel, however, assured me that he by no means despaired of

seeing the King ultimately come round to our views, but that we must wait until the storm with regard to Austria had passed over, before any progress was likely to be made. He told me that the prolonged stay of M. d'Usedom in London—to whom he had just sent instructions to remain there for the present—and the special mission to Paris, which had been entrusted to General Wedell (the Governor of Luxemburg, who had been sent for for the purpose), were evidences of the King's desire to act in concert with us, and he hoped that good would result from both these circumstances.

He then inquired if I knew whether the instructions and full powers had already been sent out to Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna to attend the Conference. I replied that I was uninformed on the subject; and on my observing that I presumed the Plenipotentiaries would meet about the end of the month, his Excellency said that he trusted facilities would be given to admit a Prussian Plenipotentiary. I replied by repeating the old arguments, that the King having retired from the Conference, he could not re-enter it until His Majesty identified his policy with that of the allies.

Baron Manteuffel replied that the King, he felt assured, would agree to a Treaty with us in a short time, but that the admission to the Conference must not be made conditional, for in that case the King would keep aloof; and he said that if His Majesty were given to understand that he was not excluded from the Conference, we should obtain many things that were now impossible.

His Excellency then remarked that the Emperor of Austria had sent a message to the King by Colonel Manteuffel, which had caused pain to His Majesty, and which was, that until he signed a Treaty with the allies, he could not participate in the negotiations for peace. This message, and the subsequent proceedings of the Cabinet of Vienna, he added, only tended to exasperate the King, and to confirm him in his resolution not to enter into any fresh engagement with us until he was reestablished in his proper place.

I said that I thought it was unwise to refuse to negotiate the Treaty that had been suggested; and I requested him always to bear in mind that it was impossible for us to place any confidence in the realisation of the King's intentions so long as His Majesty was surrounded by persons who were avowedly opposed to the policy of the Western Powers, and devoted to Russian interests. There, I said, lay the root of the evil; and His Majesty should understand this, and convince himself that, as long as the Court of Prussia was thus composed, we should never believe that the King was sincerely desirous to ally himself with us.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 129.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 27.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January 23, 1855.*

IN pursuance of the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 20 of the 16th instant, I mentioned to-day to Baron Manteuffel that Her Majesty's Government had received reports that Russian subjects were in the habit of obtaining passports at Memel which enabled them to proceed to England, and that I had been directed to draw his Excellency's attention to the subject. Baron Manteuffel replied that he was not aware that such facilities were given by the Prussian authorities, but would inquire; and he noted the name of M. Andromatski, and promised to let me know the result of his inquiry.

I availed myself of this opportunity to allude to the continued passage of arms from Belgium to Russia, and stated that I was in possession of positive information that these transports were effected with the connivance of the authorities, that these arms were entered at the frontier, the duty, 10 thalers or 30*s.* per cwt., was there paid, and they were then consigned to a commercial house, by which they were afterwards forwarded to their destination. His Excellency answered, that Belgium he knew was manufacturing arms for English and Turkish account at the present moment, and that if it supplied two of the belligerents, it might also supply a third; and that as far as Prussia was concerned, she could not prevent what I stated was taking place, as it was done legally; that the present laws permitted this mode of transport, though transit was prohibited, and that he should have to apply to the Chambers for a new law on the subject if it were to be prevented.

I replied, that the fact I had laid before him proved, I was sorry to say, the little disposition that existed in Prussia to stop the supply of arms from reaching our enemy, and that we must consider the proceeding at all events as an unfriendly act.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 130.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 28.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January 23, 1855.*

M. DE BISMARCK-SCHONHAUSEN, who had been summoned here to confer with the King of Prussia on the policy to be pursued by the Germanic Diet with reference to the Eastern question, returned to his post at Frankfort on Saturday last.

I am informed that M. de Bismarck will meet the Austrian proposal for a mobilisation of half the contingent of the Confederation, by submitting a counter-proposal requiring the Diet provisionally to decide whether they judge that the moment has arrived for carrying into execution the engagements to which they are bound in the Additional Article. He hopes to obtain a majority in favour of this proposal, counting largely on the great desire of the smaller States to avoid to the latest moment the expenses of mobilising their contingents.

Intelligence has this day arrived from Frankfort that the Austrian proposal was submitted to the Diet yesterday by Baron Prokesch, and that as the several Ministers declared themselves without instructions, its discussion was deferred. I am informed that Saxony has declared her intention of supporting Prussia, and that Bavaria, Wurtemburg, and Baden have agreed to act together, although it is not yet known in what sense their votes will be given.

I am told that M. von der Pfordten has written to this Government in the strongest manner, pourtraying the dangers to Germany which are imminent from a division between the two leading German Powers, and foreseeing with alarm the dissolution of the Confederation as a necessary consequence of their disunion. The object of this Minister has doubtless been to induce this Government to make such concession as will bring about an harmonious understanding between the two States, and prevent an open breach from taking place at the Diet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 131.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 73.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 25, 1855.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 26 of the 11th January, and I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve of the language which your Excellency held to the Grand Vizier in answer to his observations respecting the silence with regard to Turkey in the Queen's speech to Parliament.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 132.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 77.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 25, 1855.*

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of the manner in which you recommended Brigadier-General Williams to the confidence and consideration of Vassif Pasha, the new Commander-in-chief of the army at Kars, as reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 28 of the 11th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 133.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 73.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 26, 1855.*

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch No. 73 of the 24th instant, forwarding a letter from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of the French, containing suggestions for rendering more effective the military and naval force of England and France during the present war; and I have to state to your Excellency that that important inclosure shall immediately be laid before the Queen.

It is hardly necessary for me to inform your Excellency that the Emperor's letter shall have the respectful and anxious consideration of Her Majesty's Government, no less on account of the high source whence it emanates than of the remarkable ability by which this state paper is characterized.

In the meanwhile your Excellency will take a fitting opportunity for conveying to the Emperor the cordial thanks of Her Majesty's Government for this fresh proof of confidence, and of the ardent desire which animates His Imperial Majesty to cement the alliance between the two countries.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 134.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 85.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 26, 1855.*

MR. CONSUL-GENERAL MOORE in his despatch No. 62 of the 19th of December, a copy of which he will doubtless have transmitted to your Excellency, has called the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the great advantage which would result from various measures which he points out, and by which the agricultural resources of Syria might be improved and developed.

This matter has doubtless often engaged your Excellency's attention, and it appears to Her Majesty's Government to be one well deserving the consideration of the Porte. For not only would the Turkish Treasury be benefited by any measures which might increase the wealth of Syria, but the expenses of administering the Government of the Province would be diminished in consequence of the change which would be produced in the character of the inhabitants, by their adoption of industrial rather than warlike habits.

Whether the first steps towards this state of things should be made by admitting Christians to acquire landed property, or by encouraging immigration from foreign countries, or by holding out inducements to foreign capitalists to invest their money, either directly or indirectly, in Syria, must be determined by the Porte itself, on a just appreciation of the superior advantages of any one

of these measures; but it is unquestionable that if the Turkish Government could be induced to modify its laws in regard to the tenour of landed property, and to lay aside its distrust, not only of its own Christian subjects, but of others who may desire to settle in the Turkish dominions, a very decided improvement in the strength and resources of the Empire would result from its adoption of such measures.

Your Excellency will press these considerations upon the Porte on all suitable occasions.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 135.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 30.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 15, 1855.*

WITH reference to preceding parts of my correspondence, I have the honour to inclose herewith, in copy, an instruction addressed by me to M. Pisani, and his report in answer, concerning the arrangements required for securing to the Turkish army at Eupatoria, sufficient means of transport and a sufficient supply of provisions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 135.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, January 12, 1855.*

IN pursuance of your Excellency's instruction of yesterday's date, I waited on Ali Pasha, to whom I read word for word, and explained the contents of the said instruction, and have now the honour to report that his Highness gave me the most unequivocal and official assurances that the Ottoman Ministers engage to fulfil punctually the promises which the Field-Marshal and the Admiral equally require of them.

Two steam-frigates, said he, and a steamer of a smaller size, are already appropriated to the service of conveying exclusively provisions to the Crimea. Their respective names are "Muhbir Sourur," "Saik Shundi," and "Chulpper." The first is actually plying between Bourgas and Eupatoria, the second left this a week ago for Varna, with provisions for the troops to be embarked for the Crimea, and the third sailed three days since with provisions for the Ottoman troops stationed near Sebastopol.

With reference to a month's provisions being embarked together with the troops punctually in Bulgaria, the bulk, nature, and weight of provisions, and places whence they are to come, the Seraskier Pasha, and the head of the department which supplies the troops with provisions, assured me that arrangements have been made by the Generalissimo to send a month's supplies with the troops embarking at Varna, Baltchik, and Bourgas. As regards the provisions to be forwarded from Constantinople, and ready to be shipped immediately, they consist of 720 casks of cavourma, or preserved meat, 40 okes each; 1,300 bags of biscuit, containing each 35 okes; 140 hogsheads of grease, of 150 okes each; 5,000 chekis or loads of firewood, 20,000 okes of candles, 10,000 okes of oil, 10,000 okes of soap, 20,000 okes of beans, 15,000 okes of rice, 2,000 chekis or loads of firewood to be transported from Sinope, and 200,000 okes of beans to be shipped at Trebizond. Besides there are here ready to be towed four sailing vessels, charged with planking for making huts, and two vessels loaded with charcoal. These are the provisions to be sent this week. A similar quantity will be forwarded every week.

Before submitting this report to your Excellency, I read it to Aali Pasha, the Grand Vizier, and the Seraskier. They found its contents in perfect accordance with what they respectively stated themselves to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 136.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 34. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 15, 1855.*

I HAVE this moment received confidentially from Aali Pasha the accompanying copy of a telegraphic despatch addressed by Count Buol to the Internuncio on the 9th instant, and communicated to his Highness by the latter to-day.

I had already received a confidential communication of the same despatch from Baron de Bruck, who had not, however, permitted his secretary to leave a copy of the paper with me.

The Porte will, in all likelihood, wait for further information before it takes any decisive steps respecting the proposal contained in the concluding paragraph of Count Buol's despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 136.

Count Buol to Baron Bruck.

Vienne, le 9 Janvier, 1855.

LE Prince Gortchakoff vient d'être autorisé à négocier du rétablissement de la paix sur la base des quatre points, tels qu'ils se trouvent précisés dans les notes du 8 Août. Il a en conséquence demandé une réunion des Représentants d'Autriche, de France, et de Grande Bretagne, où il a été constaté que les principes auxquels la Russie adhérait, étaient conformes à ce qui a été posé dans les notes. Les Envoyés de France et d'Angleterre ont donc sollicité de leur Gouvernements l'autorisation d'entrer en négociations de paix.

Veuillez en informer la Porte Ottomane et l'engager à faire parvenir sans délai les pleins pouvoirs et les instructions nécessaires à Arif Effendi, ou à envoyer sans retard, si elle le jugerait à propos, un autre Plénipotentiaire muni des autorisations requises pour prendre part à ces Conférences.

Mon expédition du 8 courant vous apprendra tous les détails.

No. 137.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 35.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 15, 1855.*

AMONG the copies of official correspondence which you have done me the honour to forward to this Embassy from time to time for my information, I observe a despatch, No. 469 from the Earl of Westmorland to your Lordship, stating, on the authority of Count Buol, that it was the intention of the Ottoman authorities in the Principalities to expel a number of subjects from those Provinces, and that the property of certain Boyards among them was to be confiscated.

I have also received from Mr. Colquhoun, in copy, the notes which in

consequence of Lord Westmorland's transmission of Count Buol's communication, had passed between himself and M. de Poujade, on the one side, and the Wallachian Secretary of State, on the other. From this correspondence it appears that, according to the information conveyed to Count Buol, the Sultan was accused of having issued firmans against twenty-three Boyards, expelling these individuals, and confiscating their respective properties. It appears at the same time that the information thus filed against His Majesty, was altogether groundless and without a shadow of foundation. Had it been otherwise, my Lord, I think it highly improbable that any such measure would have been taken by the Turkish Government without its being known by Her Majesty's Embassy. It is all but certain, indeed, that the Porte would not have resorted, under present circumstances, to so violent an extreme without ascertaining beforehand the opinion of the British and French Representatives.

Mr. Gardner informs me that several Ionian subjects have been arbitrarily arrested in Moldavia by the Turkish military authorities, on a suspicion of being employed as spies by Russia. This I have no doubt is a local act unauthorized by any specific warrant from here. It appears that General Coronini reversed the irregularity by a proceeding equally inconsistent with the regular forms of justice. He caused the persons who had been arrested to be set at liberty without trial.

The arrest of these Ionians may probably have given rise to the story of the exiled Boyards. If so, it was for Her Majesty's Consul at Jassy to interfere on their behalf. At all events it does not appear that there was any case either against the Wallachian Government or against the Ministers of the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 138.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 36.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 15, 1855.*

THE Porte has received information that a detachment of the Russian army in Bessarabia, I know not of what number or description, has again passed into the Dobrudscha.

A report to the same effect had already reached me from Varna, but it was not followed up by any official confirmation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 139.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 37.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 15, 1855.*

INCLOSED herewith for your Lordship's information, in copy, is the continuation of my correspondence with Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons.

Referring to that part of it which concerns the more frequent appearance of the British flag on the Turkish side of the Archipelago, I have to remark, that during the whole of last year, according to my weekly reports from Her Majesty's Consul at Smyrna, the waters of that important harbour were not visited more than once or twice by any ship belonging to Her Majesty's navy. I make this statement without referring to the correspondence, but I have no reason to doubt the correctness of my recollection.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 139.

Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, "*Agamemnon*," *off Sebastopol, January* 1, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I yesterday succeeded Vice-Admiral Dundas as Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's ships and vessels in the Mediterranean and Black Seas, and I beg to assure your Excellency that I shall at all times be happy to pay every possible attention to any suggestions or requests you may from time to time have occasion to address to me, with reference to the important interests under your Excellency's charge and management.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMD. LYONS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 139.

Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, "*Agamemnon*," *off Sebastopol, January* 1, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to inclose for your Excellency's consideration a letter I have received from the Senior Officer of Her Majesty's ships at Eupatoria.

On the one hand, I feel that the poor Tatar population of the Crimea, who have incurred the displeasure of the Russian Government in consequence of their adherence to the cause of the allies, deserve my consideration; but, on the other hand, I do not know how far I should be justified in sending a number of paupers to the Ottoman dominions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMD. LYONS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 139.

Captain Hastings to Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons.

Sir, "*Curaçoa*," *Eupatoria, December* 30, 1854.

THE English Commissariat Officer stationed at this town, having solicited permission to embark some of the Tatar population (who are anxious to leave, and are in a most destitute condition) in any transports that come here on their way to Varna, may I request your directions on this subject?

I have, &c.
(Signed) GEO. HASTINGS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 139.

Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, "*Agamemnon*," *off Sebastopol, January* 1, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to inclose for your Excellency's information, copies of letters that I have addressed to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan and Rear-Admiral Boxer, with reference to the transport of Turkish troops from Bulgaria to the Crimea, and conveying provisions to them after their arrival.

I confess that I should have hesitated to accept so large a share of the

responsibility attached to the measures, if I had not been encouraged by the recollection of the signal proofs that all concerned in this expedition have had of the readiness with which your Excellency ever comes to their aid, and avails yourself of your vast influence at the Porte, to promote the success of their endeavours to win a glorious result.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMD. LYONS.

Inclosure 5 in No. 139.

Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons to Rear-Admiral Boxer.

Sir, "*Agamemnon*," *off Sebastopol, January* 1, 1855.

I INCLOSE for your information a copy of a letter that I have addressed to the Commander of the forces, from which you will perceive that I have engaged, with the assistance of two Turkish steam-frigates, and with the understanding that certain conditions shall be fulfilled by the Turkish authorities, to convey to the Crimea a regular supply of provisions for an Ottoman army of from 35,000 to 40,000 men, according to the usual Turkish rations.

2. I beg of you to bear in mind that the engagement I have made involves many important considerations of policy and humanity, and that we must not only take especial care to perform our own part to the best of our ability, but that we must at the same time be watchful lest the Ottoman authorities neglect theirs, and be prepared to offer suggestions or even courteous remonstrances if necessary, not however without consulting Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte and being guided by his Excellency's judgment.

3. Eupatoria is the place fixed upon for the depôt of the Ottoman army in the Crimea, and I have taken measures for ascertaining the quantity of provisions now there, the extent of the magazines, and other particulars that may enable me to write to you more fully upon this very important subject.

4. I have communicated the contents of this letter to Her Majesty's Ambassador.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMD. LYONS.

Inclosure 6 in No. 139.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons.

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 6, 1855.

I HAVE received with much satisfaction the announcement which you have done me the honour to make by your despatch No. 1 dated the 1st instant, of your having succeeded to the command-in-chief of Her Majesty's ships and vessels in the Mediterranean and Black Seas.

I thank you at the same time for the readiness which you have expressed to attend to my suggestions or requests which I may have occasion to address to you in the discharge of my official duties, and I beg to inform you in return that I shall always feel happy to cooperate with you most cordially for the promotion of those important public interests to which in different ways our respective services are now so emphatically directed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 7 in No. 139.

Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"*Agamemnon*," *off Sebastopol, January* 13, 1855.

My Lord,

AS your Excellency expressed a desire that a ship of war should occasionally visit Smyrna and the various islands in the Archipelago, I have the honour to inclose for your Excellency's information a copy of an order which I have in consequence addressed to the senior officer at the Piræus, directing him to take frequent opportunities of visiting those places, and in future I hope to be able to give a more extended effect to your Excellency's wishes in this respect.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMD. LYONS.

Inclosure 8 in No. 139.

Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons to Commander Chambers.

"*Agamemnon*," *off Sebastopol, January* 11, 1855.

Memo.

ALTHOUGH you are to consider the Piræus as your rendezvous, I wish you to take frequent opportunities of visiting the various islands in the Archipelago.

It will not be necessary for you to remain at any place more than a day or two at a time, the object being that the English flag shall be frequently seen, and that the knowledge of there being a steam-ship of war calling off the islands at uncertain periods, may be the means of checking piracy.

You will on all occasions place yourself in communication with our Consuls at the places you visit.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMD. LYONS.

Inclosure 9 in No. 139.

Lord J. Hay to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

"*Tribune*," *at Kuruteh, January* 8, 1855.

(Extract.)

I PROCEEDED to Redoute-Kaleh. I found the garrison in good condition and the works of defence in proper repair. A short time previous to my visit, the enemy had threatened an attack with a considerable force, about 7,000; the Mushir having thrown in reinforcements, the enemy retired without effecting anything.

On the 28th December, 1854, visited the Mushir at Choorooksoo. The Turkish army has improved greatly in health during the last two months.

Having expressed my surprise that the Pasha at Soukoum-Kaleh had not received orders relative to the suppression of the Slave Trade, the Mushir informed me that he was most anxious to give immediate effect to the Sultan's firman, but although he had received the firman six weeks previously, no opportunity had as yet presented itself of communicating itself with Soukoum-Kaleh; indeed the country boats passing with provisions were liable to capture by the enemy's gun-boats out of the rivers Poti and Anneid, and the only steamer at his disposal was merely sufficient to bring provisions from Trebizond for the use of the army.

I learnt from the Mushir that Hamid Bey had at last declared his willingness to desert the Russian interest: he was shortly expected by the Mushir to arrive at Choorooksoo.

No. 140.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 27.)

(No. 80.)

My Lord,

Paris, January 26, 1855.

I HAVE inquired of M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether the reports to which Mr. Wyse alludes in his despatch No. 7 of the 17th instant, of Austrian troops being about to replace the British and French troops of occupation in Greece, had reached his Excellency. He replied in the negative, and on my pressing him for an opinion as to the utility of such a measure, he said that he was decidedly opposed to it. There might have been a moment, he observed, when, in order to compromise Austria, the presence of her uniform in Greece might have been desirable, but that motive existed no longer, or at all events not with the same force, and he was quite against her military interference in Greece.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 141.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 27.)

(No. 83. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Paris, January 26, 1855.

THE substance of a despatch written by M. de Werther, the Prussian Minister at St. Petersburgh, to his Court, on the 26th ultimo, has been communicated to me confidentially, and as there is some interest attaching to his statements, I do myself the honour of repeating them to your Lordship, on the chance of your having no knowledge of the despatch in question.

M. de Werther states it to be the opinion of Count Nesselrode, of Count Orloff, of Count Kisseleff, and of Count Pahlen (the General), who are all at heart partisans of peace, that it will be impossible for the Emperor to accept conditions dishonourable to Russia, and that it would be far less dangerous to the Emperor to permit the temporary occupation of some of his provinces, than to make concessions that would be a triumph to the Western Powers. The Prussian Minister states further that, although the mass of the Russian people does not know of the true state of things, the more enlightened part are better informed, and are in favour of resistance; and if the attempts at negotiations lead to no result, and a coalition is formed against the Emperor, His Majesty will appeal to the Empire at large, and then will be seen what the enthusiasm of the Russian people really is.

It is evidently M. de Werther's opinion, that Russia may make a successful defence even against an European coalition. He observes that she wants nothing from other countries to enable her to carry on the war; that she can get as many soldiers as she wants, whom she can supply from her own resources with every necessary requisite, whether of arms, food, or clothing; that, so long as the war is confined to Russia, the want of a metallic currency will not be felt, though he admits that the depreciation of money involved in a long paper currency may lead to financial difficulties later.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 142.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 10. Confidential.)

Frankfort, January 24, 1855.

My Lord,

IN an address made recently by His Royal Highness the Prince of Prussia, to the corps of officers of the garrison of Coblentz, His Royal Highness said, that "to whichever side they might have to make front depended on the King's sovereign will."

That will appears to be still undecided; but there are, as your Lordship is well aware, influences at work which would unquestionably direct it against England and France in the present crisis, if their power corresponded to their inclination.

There is every reason to believe that the motion about to be brought before the Diet to-morrow, to place a portion of the Federal contingents on the war footing, is only not opposed by those who direct the counsels of Prussia, because they hope and believe that her armed force is as likely to be used against us, and still more against Austria, than against Russia.

The course to be taken by Prussia, in case she is excluded from farther participation in the Vienna Conferences, has been stated to me as follows:

She will hold herself absolved from all her engagements to Austria, as well as from those taken towards the Western Powers and Turkey, in the earlier Conferences of Vienna, and will consider herself free to take a posture of neutrality, or of active participation in the war on the side of Russia, as shall appear to her most advantageous.

From language which has been held to me, it is very plain that the contemplation of such a course is based on calculations which, however erroneous and perilous they may be, have a certain degree of plausibility and chances of partial success.

There is no question, for instance, but that the addition of 100,000 Prussian bayonets to the Russian force, ready to attack Austria, would imperil the safety of Vienna. A force of 300,000 men (which amount of force, it is said, might be employed) would have fair chances of defending the maritime frontier from insult, and of holding the frontier of the Rhine, even if the trans-Rhenish provinces fell into the temporary possession of France.

Then, again, as regards Austria, and the danger she encounters in hostility with Russia, even should Prussia remain neutral, language is held which sufficiently shows that the party calling itself Conservative is very far from excluding revolutionary aid, if its object of damaging an adversary would be furthered by such assistance.

Hungary would, it is averred, be in a rebellion in a fortnight after the breaking out of hostilities, and the south-western frontier of Austria would be exposed to the attack of 40,000 Servians.

The point of exclusion from the Vienna Conferences, and eventually from those which may be held for the negotiation of peace, evidently rankles in the minds of the Prussian statesmen whose conduct has exposed their country to this grave but well-deserved affront.

When my interlocutor spoke of the Berlin Cabinet feeling itself released from its obligations towards England, and France, and Turkey, by the exclusion of a Prussian Representative from the future negotiations, I could not help asking of what practical value those obligations had been, and wherein he conceived them to exist? The reply was, that Prussia held that they debarred her from allying herself with Russia. To which I observed that the attitude hitherto taken by Prussia had perhaps been useful to Russia in a less degree than would have been an active participation in the war upon her side; but that it would be very hard to point out in what way the moral support, which was all that Prussia had hitherto afforded to the principles she had joined us in espousing, had been of the slightest service to the common cause.

The line of policy, however, pointed at by the reasoning of my Prussian friend is too decidedly adverse to the views which must be taken by any serious advocate of the goodness of the cause for which we are at present engaged in warfare, to allow calm discussion, as it is not possible to hear similar opinions put forward without making rejoinders which soon bring such conversations to a close.

I have thought it right—although, doubtless, similar prospects of what is perhaps in preparation may have been opened to your Lordship from other quarters—to place these views of persons whose counsels may have a not unimportant influence on passing events before you; and will only further mention here that having, by the kindness of my French colleague, been kept informed of the correspondence which has recently passed between the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and the French Ministers at Berlin and Vienna, I have not been unprepared for the turn events seem likely to take in this very important crisis, and cannot help venturing to express an opinion that Austria will hardly yet dare to take any decided step in advance, while under apprehension from Prussia's attitude on her left flank and rear.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 143.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 28.)

Foreign Office, January 27, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT BERNSTORFF has this day read to me a despatch from Baron Manteuffel, of which he afterwards placed the copy in my hands; a copy of the despatch is herewith inclosed for the information of your Lordship.

I told Count Bernstorff that the position and attributes of Prussia, as one of the Great Powers of Europe, were fully recognized by Her Majesty's Government.

I again expressed to him the regret of Her Majesty's Government at the estrangement that had occurred between England and Prussia; and I renewed to him the assurance, that no effort on our part had been, or should be, wanting in order to secure unity of action between the two Governments; but that with every wish to arrive at this desirable result in the manner most conformable to the honour and dignity of Prussia, I did not see how England, France, and Austria, could admit the claim of Prussia unconditionally and without any previous engagement to take part in the negotiations for peace that might shortly be commenced at Vienna.

Of the Five Parties to those negotiations, four, I said, were actually belligerents, and the fifth was not only fully prepared for war, but had actually engaged to make war if the negotiations for peace should fail. The belligerents would not discontinue hostilities during the negotiations, and the non-belligerent was bound to commence them in a certain contingency. The position of all these parties was clear and intelligible; but what, I begged to ask, would be the position of Prussia at these Conferences, and upon what did she found her right to take part in them with Powers situated so differently to herself? Prussia had incurred no expense, had made no preparation, had entered into no engagement, and had announced she would contract none. She had declared that the Eastern question did not affect her as it did other Powers. She had proclaimed her neutrality, and had rendered eminent service to Russia by unremitting efforts to thwart the policy of Austria. In no one respect then did the position of Prussia resemble that of the Powers with respect to whose differences she would take no part, and incur no risk; but who, she now declared, had no right except in her presence to deliberate upon the conditions on which they would make peace. The claim of Prussia, in short, was to enjoy the privileges, and to evade the obligations of a Great European Power; but supposing, I said, that Prussia was admitted to the Conference unfettered by previous engagements, as Baron Manteuffel proposed, what, I asked, would be her course if Russia refused the terms of peace offered to her, and Austria, in fulfilment of the Treaty of the 2nd of December, declared war against Russia: would Prussia declare war also; or would she then abdicate her position as a

Great European Power, and assume that of a member of the Confederation, and again reverting to neutrality wait till the events of war once more led to negotiations for peace, and then again claim a right to take part in them?

These questions, I said, required definite answers, and a clear understanding must be come to upon them; for great Powers engaged in war could not lightly admit another into their deliberations without knowing whether that Power was a friend, a foe, or a neutral.

Count Bernstorff said he had no instructions as to the part that Prussia would take in the contingency to which I had adverted; but he reminded me that Prussia had entered into engagements, and had concluded a Treaty on the 20th April, and subsequently an Additional Article to it, with Austria.

I answered that that was an engagement taken by two non-belligerent German Powers exclusively for the protection of German interests, without reference to England and France, or to the war which they were carrying on against Russia; and although England and France wished well to Germany, and heartily desired that it should be protected from Russian aggression and relieved from Russian influence, yet their objects in the war with Russia were European and not German, and that until Prussia entered into engagements with England and France, I must persist in saying that as an European Power she had contracted none.

Count Bernstorff said, that Prussia having been a party to the Treaty of 1841, denied the right of the other Contracting Powers to modify that Treaty without her concurrence, and on that ground she insisted upon taking part at the Conference.

I answered that it was doubtful whether the Treaty of 1841 was not abrogated by the war, and at all events it would require to be renewed, and whenever its revival or modification came under discussion, a communication might be made to Prussia upon the subject, but that question was only one of the four bases, and upon that Prussia could not sustain a claim to take part in discussing the other three.

Count Bernstorff then again denied that Prussia had ever withdrawn from the Conferences, and said, that as the present Conferences were a continuation of the former ones in which Prussia had taken part, she must now insist on not being excluded from them.

I assured Count Bernstorff that he was in error, and that the present Conferences were not a continuation of the original ones in which Prussia had taken part; Austria, it was true, had proposed to resume the Conferences, in order to consider the interpretation of the four bases, but the answer of England and France was that the time for Conferences was gone by, and that they could not be renewed except as a consequence of some definite engagement between the three Powers; and this eventually led to the Treaty of December 2. But Prussia, I said, was now in the same position towards England and France as Austria when she proposed to renew the Conferences, and England and France might make to her the same answer as to Austria—enter with us into a contingent engagement for war, and we will then enter with you into immediate negotiations for peace. Prussia, however, complained of the IInd Article of the Treaty of December 2, as not affecting her interests, and of the VIth Article as contrary to her dignity; and I would therefore propose that those Articles should be omitted. Prussia had complained of the manner in which she had been called upon by Austria to mobilize her army, in fulfilment of the Treaty of April 20, and appeared disinclined to enter into any fresh engagement with that Power, and I accordingly suggested that the Treaty should be made with England and France alone, and that the same interpretation of the bases should be given to Prussia as to Austria, and a similar Protocol should be signed. The three Powers being then agreed among themselves, should announce the fact of that agreement to Austria, and Prussia would thus establish her claim to take part in the negotiations for peace upon a footing of perfect equality.

In offering this suggestion to the consideration of Count Bernstorff, I begged to assure him that I had not even submitted it to my colleagues, nor had I any authority to speak in the name of the French and Austrian Governments; but the desire of all was so sincere to re-establish cordial relations with Prussia, and to secure her active cooperation in the present crisis, that I felt sure they would readily concur in any plan for that object, and the more so because it would be

perfectly consistent with the honour and dignity, and, as I humbly ventured to think, with the best interests of Prussia.

Count Bernstorff assured me that he would duly inform his Government of the proposal, and your Lordship is instructed to bring it under the consideration of Baron Manteuffel, by reading this despatch to his Excellency.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 143.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Bernstorff.

M. le Comte, *Berlin, le 21 Janvier, 1855.*

NOUS avons accueilli avec un intérêt particulier tout ce que votre Excellence nous a mandé sur ses entretiens avec Lord Clarendon au sujet d'une entente à établir entre nos deux Gouvernements dans le sens de la dépêche que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous adresser le 19 du mois passé. A notre véritable satisfaction l'adhésion de la Prusse au Traité du 2 Décembre, telle qu'elle nous avait été proposée d'abord, a été reconnue depuis comme impraticable tant par le Cabinet de Londres que par celui de Paris, et l'idée d'un arrangement prenant son point de départ dans la situation et les intérêts spéciaux de la Prusse a fait l'objet de pourparlers confidentiels auxquels, nous n'en doutons pas un instant, a présidé, de part et d'autre, le sincère désir de surmonter les difficultés, en tâchant de concilier le but que les Puissances poursuivent en commun, avec les exigences dictées par les intérêts particuliers de chacune d'elles. Si cet échange d'idées n'a point encore eu de résultat conforme au desir réciproque, nous sommes d'avis, et nous nous expliquons à ce sujet vis-à-vis du Cabinet de Londres avec une parfaite franchise, qu'on doit en chercher la cause principale dans d'importants changements de fait, qui sont survenus tant depuis la signature du Traité du 2 Décembre, que depuis ma dépêche du 19 du même mois. A cet égard il importe surtout de ne pas perdre de vue que le terme fixé par l'Article V du Traité étant échu, ce qui lors de la conclusion du Traité n'avait qu'un caractère éventuel, a acquis depuis une plus grande actualité et que la tendance offensive du Traité, éclipsée en quelque sorte avant l'expiration du terme, assigne maintenant leur véritable portée aux stipulations du 2 Décembre, et doit indubitablement réagir sur la nature des engagements que la Prusse, de son côté, se déclarerait éventuellement prête à contracter. Il est évident que le Gouvernement du Roi, pénétré de la haute responsabilité qui se rattache à de pareils engagements, manquerait à ses devoirs les plus sacrés, en ne pas les faisant dépendre de la connaissance la plus complète et de l'examen le plus consciencieux des buts politiques qu'il s'agit d'atteindre. C'est cette conviction qui m'a engagé à exprimer déjà dans ma dépêche du 19 Décembre le désir de connaître l'interprétation que les Cabinets signataires du Traité du 2 Décembre donnent aux quatre points formulés par eux comme base de la négociation de paix, et acceptés par la Russie. Il paraît à la vérité que, lorsque je demandais ces indispensables renseignements, les trois Cabinets n'étaient point encore d'accord entre eux-mêmes sur la signification ou du moins sur la rédaction plus précise qu'il conviendrait de donner aux quatre points préliminaires. Toutefois, depuis cette époque, un changement essentiel s'est opéré dans la situation. Non seulement les Puissances Occidentales semblent être tombées d'accord avec l'Autriche sur la manière de préciser les quatre points, mais encore leurs trois Représentants doivent-ils s'être confidentiellement entendus avec le Plénipotentiaire Russe sur les bases préliminaires de la négociation de paix. Le Cabinet de Londres est trop éclairé dans son jugement et trop impartiel dans ses appréciations pour ne pas être, comme nous le sommes nous-mêmes, frappé de l'évidence de la connexité la plus intime qui existe entre le rapprochement diplomatique qui a eu lieu à Vienne, et entre les questions ultérieures pour la solution desquelles la Prusse serait éventuellement prête à assurer son concours par des obligations contractuelles. Or, le Cabinet du Roi ignore le détail des pourparlers confidentiels qui ont eu lieu. Il en ignore le résultat précis. Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg nous a officiellement communiqué un memorandum que le Prince Gortchakoff a confidentiellement présenté aux Représentants des trois

autres Puissances. Nous y avons trouvé des dispositions conciliatrices et pacifiques. Mais nous n'avons pu nous rendre compte de la portée de cette manifestation, parcequ'elle portait le cachet de n'être que le corollaire d'un autre travail des trois Représentants que nous ne connaissons pas. Il est en effet incontestable que, pour pouvoir nous former un jugement précis sur nos engagements éventuels, il ne saurait plus nous suffire, en présence de la tournure qu'ont prise les événements, de prendre connaissance de telle ou telle pièce sur laquelle les autres Représentants réunis à Vienne, soit tous, soit en partie, seraient peut-être convenus entr'eux, mais que nous devions à cet effet connaître l'ensemble des motifs qui ont influé sur les déliberations et en quelque sorte présidé à la naissance des documents.

Les considérations qui se rattachent à ce qui précède, et auxquelles je me dispense de donner plus de développement, n'ont pu que confirmer le Roi notre auguste Maître dans l'intime conviction que toute négociation, de la part de son Gouvernement, pour conclure un arrangement au sujet de son concours dans les complications éventuelles, restera infructueuse à moins qu'elle ne soit précédée par la présence d'un Représentant de Sa Majesté aux délibérations qui ont été ouvertes à Vienne entre les Plénipotentiaires des Puissances belligérantes, et dont notre auguste Maître appelle de tous ses vœux un résultat propre à assurer à l'Europe le plus tôt possible les bienfaits d'une paix solide et durable.

En faisant de cette conviction le point de départ de son attitude future, le Roi notre auguste Maître ne s'est toutefois point laissé guider exclusivement par les exigences pratiques que je viens d'indiquer. Sa Majesté a également puisé les motifs de cette résolution dans des considérations d'un ordre plus élevé. Je ne m'appesantis pas ici sur les conséquences que le Roi attribue à la qualité de la Prusse comme Grande Puissance Européenne. Je ne le fais pas parceque je n'ai aucun motif pour admettre que, de quelque côté que ce soit, on veuille révoquer en doute cette qualité ou porter atteinte à ses prérogatives.

Mais il existe pour le Gouvernement du Roi des titres plus positifs, plus spécieux, qui lui assurent non seulement le droit, mais qui lui assignent le devoir de concourir aux délibérations destinées à mettre fin à la crise Orientale, et aux complications qui en ont surgi. Ce sont les Protocoles de Vienne qui ont imprimé à la solution de cette question le caractère d'une œuvre commune. Le Représentant du Roi les a signés, et la Prusse a la conscience d'avoir fidèlement rempli les engagements qu'ils renferment. Je ne soulève pas ici la question si les conférences actuelles de Vienne sont la continuation de celles de l'année passée, et je m'abstiens de renouveler la controverse sur la cause de la cessation de ces dernières. A ce sujet j'attends avec confiance l'effet éclaircissant du temps et de la vérité. Mais, quoiqu'il en soit, les Protocoles qu'on ne discontinue pas d'invoquer contre nous, quant il s'agit d'en déduire des obligations, nous assurent aussi des droits, et nous ne saurions reconnaître les uns sans entrer dans le plein exercice des autres.

Voilà, M. le Comte, des principes tellement simples et naturels qu'ils semblent ne pas avoir besoin d'avocat. Veuillez les porter à la connaissance de M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat, qui, nous en avons la pleine confiance, ne leur refusera pas son suffrage et voudra bien, comme nous, considérer la franchise avec laquelle nous les avons énoncés, comme de nature à faciliter plutôt qu'à entraver l'entente éventuelle entre les deux Cabinets.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 144.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 29.)

(No. 41.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January* 24, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of the telegraphic despatches which I have addressed to your Lordship during the week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 144.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January* 19, 1855.

THE chartered steamer "Ionio," which sailed from Trieste on the 31st ultimo, laden with the goods for the Crimea, as reported in my separate despatch of the same date, arrived at Constantinople on the 7th, and its cargo was immediately transshipped on board an English steamer, which had left for Balaklava before the Lloyd boat quitted Constantinople.

Inclosure 2 in No. 144.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January* 22, 1855.

THE vessel containing the eighteen remaining woollen houses left Trieste for the Crimea on the 21st.

Inclosure 3 in No. 144.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon, January 22, 1855.

[See No. 98.]

No. 145.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 29.)

(No. 43.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January* 24, 1855.

I HAVE to express the pleasure with which I received your Lordship's despatch No. 20 of the 17th instant, and the gratification with which I learnt by it that the steps I had taken relative to the recent advance of the Russians into the Dobrudscha had met with the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 146.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 29.)

No. 45. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January* 24, 1855.

COUNT BUOL spoke to me to-day of the importance he could not but attach to the last communication he had received from the Prussian Government, and by which they appeared to have determined to separate themselves from the policy adopted by Austria, as well as by the Governments of England and France. Count Buol remarked that the announcement which had now been made by Prussia, that she would not support the proposition of Austria, that a part of the war contingent of the German States should be assembled, and that she would not mobilize any part of her own army, had placed her in an attitude of so much estrangement from Austria, whose measures with respect to Germany were regulated by the strictest adherence to the engagements she had contracted, that he felt it was of the utmost consequence that both France and

England should make the most pressing representations to the Cabinet of Berlin, in order to ascertain what line they would take, and the extent to which they would go in giving their assistance to the policy which they had hitherto supported. Count Buol stated that he made this appeal at the present moment, because on entering upon the discussion of the military plans to be adopted in case the state of things contemplated in the Vth Article of the Treaty of the 2nd December should arise, it was absolutely necessary to know the attitude which Prussia was determined to assume.

Count Buol said, that as far as Austria was concerned, he should be perfectly content to treat with Prussia, simply in her attitude as a German Power, leaving it to England and France to enter into engagements with her as an European Power. All, therefore, that he should desire of Prussia was, that she should recognize and become a party to the "Protocole Réservé" of the 28th ultimo, and that she should engage to act in support of its stipulations, and then that she would support the Austrian proposition to the Diet of Frankfort that a part of the war contingent of the Confederation should be mobilized and assembled, and that Prussia should consent to join her contingent to that of the rest of Germany. Count Buol begged that I would inform your Lordship that with such conditions from Prussia he would now be satisfied, but if they were refused, it would alter very much the position of things as they had hitherto existed in Germany, and that Austria, instead of being able to count upon the cooperation of a Prussian army, in conjunction with her own, might feel it necessary to keep an army of observation upon her frontier, which might become to her and to the allies a source of considerable anxiety and weakness.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 147.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 46.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 24, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the copy of a note which I addressed to his Excellency Count Buol on the 22nd instant, to notify to him the appointment of Brigadier-General Crawfurd to be Her Majesty's Commissioner at the head-quarters of the Austrian army, in the room of the late Brigadier-General Du Plat.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 147.

The Earl of Westmorland to Count Buol.

Vienna, January 22, 1855.

THE Undersigned has the honour to notify to his Excellency Count Buol, &c., that Her Majesty has been pleased to appoint Brigadier-General Crawfurd to be her Commissioner at the head-quarters of His Imperial Majesty's army in the room of the late lamented Brigadier-General Du Plat.

The officer in question, who is of high standing in the British army, and has for a long while held a command in the Grenadier Guards, the regiment of His Royal Highness Prince Albert, would have already proceeded to his post, had he not been prevented doing so by the sudden death of a near relation. He hopes, however, to arrive at Vienna on Thursday evening next.

The Undersigned, &c. (Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 148.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 47.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 24, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, in translation, the official return made by the Austrian military authorities of the numbers and distribution of the Russian army, which has been communicated to me by General Hess, and of which I had the honour to send a summary to your Lordship in my despatch No. 26 of the 17th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 148.

STATEMENT of the Position and Strength of the Effective Russian Forces in January 1855.

I. *In the Baltic Provinces.*

	Men.	Guns.
A.—In the circuit of St. Petersburgh, under Adjutant-General Arbatow; in winter quarters.		
1. The Reserve Corps of the Guards, with the 1st and 2nd Reserve Divisions of Infantry; 12 Depôt Battalions of the Guards, with Artillery; 20 Reserve and Depôt Squadrons of Reserve Guards, Cavalry; and the Pattern Troops of the Guards; in all, 30 Battalions, 24 Squadrons, 9 Batteries	28,090	92
2. The Reserve Grenadier Division, with the 2nd and 3rd Reserve Brigades, at Novgorod; 16 Reserve Battalions, and 7 Reserve and Depôt Batteries ..	15,000	64
3. The 1st Reserve Infantry Division (1st Corps), with the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades in Luga; and the Reserve Cavalry Brigade of the 7th Light Cavalry Division, with 4 Reserves, and 4 Additional Reserves or Depôt Squadrons, at Gatschina and Peterhoff, &c.; in all, 16 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, 5 Batteries..	15,480	40
4. Four Regiments of Rifles; 12 Battalions, with 4 Batteries	10,460	48
5. The 64th Pulk of Don Cossacks, 1 Rocket Battery, 1 Battalion of Sappers; 1st and 2nd Depôt Battalions of Sappers, &c.; 1 Pulk, 3 Battalions, 1 Rocket Battery	3,406	8
Total: 77 Reserve Battalions, 32 Reserve Squadrons, 26 Batteries, 1 Pulk ..	72,376	352
B.—Garrison of Cronstadt under General Dilin.		
From the Additional Reserve or Depôt Division of the 1st Corps of Infantry, the 2nd and 3rd Additional Brigades, 620 men each, with 2 Depôt Batteries, =16 Battalions, 2 Batteries	10,120	16
3 Finnish Battalions of the Line, Nos. 1, 2, 4	1,800	0
Total: 19 Battalions	11,920	16
C.—In Finland, under Adjutant-General Berg, at Wyborg.		
1. The 1st Active Division of Grenadiers, 16 Battalions, 4 Batteries	14,400	48
The 1st Reserve Brigade of Grenadiers, 8 Battalions, 2 Batteries	7,200	16
2. The 22nd Division of Infantry, with 19 Cordons Battalions	5,400	0
3. The 1st Finnish and the Reserve Battalion of Rifles; 63rd and 63th Pulks of Don Cossacks	2,600	0
Total: 35 Battalions, 2 Pulks, 6 Batteries	29,600	64
D.—In Esthonia, under Adjutant-General Grabbe, at Revel.		
1. The 3rd Reserve Division of Guards, 8 Battalions, 2 Batteries, at Revel;		
2. 1st Reserve Brigade of 1st Corps of Infantry at Lamburg, 8 Battalions, 2 Reserve Batteries; and the 1st Additional Reserve Brigade of 1st Infantry Corps, with 8 Depôt Battalions and 2 Depôt Batteries, at Revel;		
3. The 45th Pulk of Don Cossacks, 1 Five Corps of the Company of Captain Buxhoeft's Rifles, and 1 Company of 1st Depôt of Sappers Battalions;		
Total: 24 Reserve and Additional Reserve Battalions, 1 Pulk, 6 Batteries ..	20,510	48

E.—In Lapland and Courland, since the 15th December, 1854, the so-called "Baltic Army's Corps" has been forming under the command of General Count Sievers, at Riga, and will consist of troops belonging to the Active Army in Poland,

	Men	Guns
stationed in Courland and Lapland; and also of the 5th and 6th Reserve, and 7th and 8th Additional Reserve Battalions of the 1st Corps of Infantry, collected together as Regiments of Reserve. As these troops are to serve as a Reserve for the Active Army in Poland, their strength will appear in II, under D.		
Hence, the collective force near St. Petersburgh, and in the three northern Baltic Provinces, amounts to 134,206 men, and 382 guns;		
165 Reserve and Additional Reserve Battalions; 32 " " " Squadrons; 40 " " " Batteries; 4 Pulks of Don Cossacks.		

II. *The Active Army in Poland and the Western Russian Provinces, under the Command of the Prince of Warsaw.*

A.—In the Kingdom of Poland.

1. The 1st and 3rd Divisions of Infantry, and 1st Corps of Infantry, with guns, and 1 Battalion of Sappers; 34 Battalions, 8 Batteries of 12 guns	27,200	96
1st Light Cavalry Division at Turoggen, Rossieny, Telsch, &c.; 32 Squadrons, 2 Batteries	4,240	16
2. The 4th and 5th Divisions of Infantry, of 2nd Corps of Infantry, with 2 guns and 2 Battalions of Sappers; 34 Battalions, 8 Batteries of 12 guns	27,200	96
2nd Light Cavalry Division in Lublin; 32 Squadrons, 2 Batteries ..	4,240	16
3. The 2nd and 3rd Division of Grenadier Corps, with the Grenadier Sapper Battalion; 38 Battalions, 8 Batteries	27,200	96
7th Light Cavalry Division, with 32 Squadrons and 2 Batteries	4,240	16
4. The 2nd Reserve Division of Infantry (2nd Corps), with the 4th Reserve Brigade, at Rudom; 5th Reserve Brigade at Brzesitt; and 3rd Reserve Brigade at Nowogeorgiewitt; 24 Battalions, 6 Reserve Batteries	21,600	48
5. The 3rd Reserve Division of Infantry (3rd Corps), with 7th Brigade, at Warsaw; 8th Brigade, at Lütsk; and 9th Reserve Brigade at Zamosc; 24 Battalions, 6 Batteries of 8 guns	21,600	48
6. The 1st Reserve Battalion of Sappers (800 men each), the Garde de Corps, and a Pulk of Attaman Cossacks, 5 Pulks of Don Cossacks on the Gallician frontier, 1 Division of Mussulmans, 1 Division of Cossacks of the Caucasus; 8 Pulks, 4½ Cossack Batteries	6,000	36
7. In winter quarters in Poland, detached from the Garde de Corps, the Cuirassier Division of the Guard; 24 Squadrons, 2 Batteries	3,580	16
Hence, in Poland, in winter quarters of the Active Army, in 150 Battalions, 120 Squadrons, 8 Pulks, 48½ Batteries	147,100	484

B.—In Lithuania and Volhynia.

1. The Garde de Corps (Infantry), under the Grand Duke Hereditary; head quarters at Wilna;		
1st and 2nd Division of Guards, at Kowno, Grodno, Wilna; with 24 Battalions, 6 Batteries of 12 guns	21,600	72
The 3rd Division of Guards, marching to Lithuania, was on the 15th December at Walmar and Wenden, in Lapland; 12 Battalions, 3 Batteries	10,800	36
1 Battalion of Finnish Rifles of the Guard, and the Sapper Battalion of the Guard in Kowno; 2 Battalions	1,600	0
2. The Corps of Cavalry of the Guard;		
The Cuirassiers of the Guard;		
1st Light Cavalry of Guards Division, at Chlewicz and Sconim, in Volhynia; 20½ Squadrons, 2 Batteries;	5,590	24
2nd Light Cavalry of Guards Division, marching to Lithuania and Volhynia, 20 Squadrons, 1 Battery;		
Total; not including the Cuirassiers, 38 Battalions, 40½ Squadrons, 12 Batteries ..	39,590	132

C.—In Courland and Lapland, under command of General Count Stevers; head quarters at Riga.

Besides the Baltic Corps now forming, which will consist chiefly of the Reserve Regiments of the 1st Corps of Infantry;		
1. The 2nd Active Infantry Division of the 1st Corps of Infantry, at Mitau Guldigen; 16 Battalions, 4 Batteries. (Some detachments of the 1st Division of Light Cavalry, which is partly on the march to Poland, and therefore will be reckoned there);	14,200	48
2. The 14th Pulk of Don Cossacks;		
Hence the strength of the troop belonging to the Active Army under the Prince of Warsaw (II) consists of 204 Battalions, 64½ Squadrons, 9 Pulks, 160½ Batteries	201,000	684

	Men	Guns
III. *The Army of the South under the Command of Prince Gortchakoff; head quarters at Kischeneff.*		
To this army belong all the troops detached in Podolia, Kijeu, Bessarabia, South Russia, and Charkow. Of these are—		

A.—In Bessarabia, on the Pruth and Lower Danube.

1. On the Lower Danube, under General Count Lüders (between Ismail, Reni, and Kischeneff), the 7th Division of Infantry (the 3rd), 16th Infantry Division (the 5th), Light Cavalry Division (of the 5th Corps); also the 5th Battalion of Sappers, and 5th Battalion of Rifles, 2 Pulks of Don Cossacks, and 1 Cossack Battery; in all, 24 Battalions, 32 Squadrons, 2 Pulks, 12 Batteries	30,720	120
2. On the Line of the Pruth, from Vadului Isaktschi upwards to the Dniester, near Chotymes, 6th Division of Infantry (of the 2nd Corps), with 1 Brigade, in Chotymes, and the 2nd near Skuleni, in Leowa; 16 Battalions, 4 Batteries, 3rd Division Light Cavalry (of the 3rd Corps), with 1 Regiment of Hussars, near Lipetchani, and the other 3 Regiments between Leowa and Vadului; 32 Squadrons, 2 Batteries, 3 Pulks of Don Cossacks, Nos. 9 and 29, at Pely and Skuleni. In all, 16 Battalions, 32 Squadrons, 2 Pulks, 6 Batteries ..	18,720	64
3. Lastly, the Danube Flotilla, partly near Ismail, part near Ischatal, consisting of 4 armed steamers, 36 gun-boats, with 270 cannons on board.		
Hence, the strength of the disposable troops towards the Dobrudscha, or, the Danube Provinces, consists of 50 Battalions, 64 Squadrons, 4 Pulks of Cossacks, and 17 Batteries	49,440	184

C.—Along the Coast of the Black Sea, in Southern Russia, and in the Government of Cherson, under Command of General Schabelsky; head quarters at Odessa.

4th Division of Reserve Infantry (of the 4th Infantry Corps), with the 11th and 12th Reserve Brigades, at Odessa; 16 Battalions, 4 Batteries	14,400	32
14th Reserve Infantry Brigade (of the 5th Infantry Corps), at Nikolajeff, Otschakoff, and Kinburn, with 3rd and 5th Reserve Batteries; together, 8 Battalions, 4 Batteries	7,600	32
(At Kinburn is a flotilla of 2 steamers and 6 gun-boats.)		
2nd Reserve Corps of Cavalry or Dragoons, 6 Regiments of Dragoons (of 10 Squadrons), and 6 Batteries	8,400	48
Of these, 2 Regiments are with the Staff at Odessa; the rest, till December 1854, were cantoned in the Military Colonies in South Russia, but it is said that a Division, with 3 Dragoon Regiments, under General Montrésor, is ordered to Perekop.		
2 Pulks of Don Cossacks, Nos. 25 and 37, at Odessa; 1 Pulk of Don Cossacks, and 1 of Ural Cossacks; in all, 4 Pulks of Cossacks	2,400	0
Altogether, on the Coast near Odessa, 32 Battalions, 60 Squadrons, 4 Pulks, and 14 Batteries	32,800	112

D.—In the Governments of Kijeu, Tschernigow, Tekarionoo, troops ready for action.

The 6th Division of Reserve Infantry, with the 17th and 18th Infantry Brigades, near Nowe Baxany, in the Government of Czernigow; 16 Battalions, 4 Batteries (The 16th Brigade of Reserve Infantry, which is near Perekop, is said to be destined for the Crimea.)	14,400	32
The 1st Corps of Reserve Cavalry, or Cuirassiers, under General Nolfreich, 8 Regiments of Cuirassiers in cantonments, between Berdyczew, Roxyn, and Stary Konstantinow, in the Government of Kiew, with 4 Batteries	7,280	32
The 1st Combined Brigade of the Reserve Light Cavalry Division, with 3 Reserve Batteries at Lawran; 12 Squadrons	2,040	24
2 Pulks of Don Cossacks, Nos. 19 and 51, which are ordered to the Gallician frontier in Volhynia	1,200	0
In all, the Active Reserve ready for action consists of 16 Battalions, 60 Squadrons, and 11 Batteries	24,920	88
Hence, the collective strength of the Army in the South consists of 98 Battalions, 184 Squadron, 10 Pulks, 42 Batteries	105,160	384

IV.—*The Army of the Crimea, under the command of Admiral Prince Menchikoff. Head-Quarters, Baktschiserai.*

A. Troops occupying Sebastopol, Vice-Admiral Nachimoff.

1st Brigade of the 14th Infantry Division, 8 Battalions, 2 Batteries;		
13th and 15th Reserve Infantry Brigade of the 5th Corps of Infantry, 16 Battalions, 4 Batteries;		
6th Battalion of Sappers, the Greek Battalion of Infantry from Balaklava; 1 Cossack Infantry Battalion; 6 Battalions of Marines.		
Total for the Garrison: 39 active Battalions and 6 Batteries ..	21,000	56

	Men.	Guns.
B. Active Army of Operation.		
1. Left wing of the principal position near Sebastopol, above the Valley of the Tschernaya, as far as Tschorgun.		
6th Corps of Infantry, under General Prince Gortchakoff;		
16th and 17th Division of Infantry, with the 6th Battalion of Rifles; 33 Battalions, 8 Batteries	20,600	96
2nd Brigade of the Reserve Light Cavalry Division, under General Ryzoff, 12 squadrons, 1 Battalion near Tschorgun	1,640	8
3 Pulks of Don Cossacks, Nos. 53, 60, 67, with 1 Cossack Battery, 1 Pulk Ural Cossacks, half Squadron of Crim-Tartar Cossacks of the Life Guard; 4 Pulks, 1 Battery	2,700	8
2. In the centre of the principal position on the Belbek river, and near Baktschiserai (in tents).		
4th Corps of Infantry, under General Osten Sacken;		
10th and 11th Division of Infantry, 32 Battalions, 8 Batteries, on the Belbek River	20,000	96
12th Division of Infantry, with the 4th Rifle and 4th Sapper Battalions, is said to be ordered to join the left wing near Tschorgun; 18 Battalions, 4 Batteries	11,400	48
5th Division of Infantry of the 3rd Corps of Infantry (arrived at Baktschiserai on the 27th December); 16 Battalions, 4 Batteries	10,000	48
6th Light Cavalry Division of the 6th Corps of Infantry, encamped near Baktschiserai; 32 Squadrons, 2 Batteries	3,920	16
4 Pulks of Don Cossacks, Nos. 34, 39, 40, 42, with 2 Cossack Batteries ..	2,800	16
3. On the left wing towards Eupatoria—		
Reserve Division of Lancers (General Korff) of the 1st Reserve Corps of Cavalry, 32 Squadrons, 2 Batteries, is near Isaki, and 2 Pulks of Don Cossacks, Nos. 51 and 66	5,440	16
Hence the strength of the Inner Army of Operation in the Crimea will be 99 Battalions, 76 Squadrons, 10 Pulks, and 24 Batteries	78,500	352
C. Reserve Corps for the Army of the Crimea, near Perekop and Arnjansk, under the command of General Read, Commander of the 3rd Corps of Infantry (he is not yet arrived from Tiflis).		
9th Division of Infantry, with the 3rd Rifle and 3rd Sapper Battalions, 18 Battalions and 4 Batteries; and 2nd Brigade of 14th Division of Infantry, 8 Battalions, 2 Batteries	16,200	72
10th and 16th Reserve Brigades of Infantry of the 1st Corps of Infantry, 16 Battalions, 4 Batteries on the march	14,400	32
4th Division of Light Cavalry of the 4th Corps of Infantry, with 32 Squadrons and 2 Batteries on the march by Perekop, 3 Pulks of Don Cossacks, Nos. 38, 43, and 46	5,720	16
(A Division of Dragoons, 3 Regiments, with 30 Squadrons, is said also to be advancing from South Russia towards Perekop, but this news is not yet confirmed.)		
Hence the strength of the Corps collecting near Perekop is 42 Battalions, 32 Squadrons, 2 Pulks, 12 Batteries	36,320	120
D. On the Kertsch Peninsula, under the Attaman of the Don Cossack Reserve, General Chomutoff.		
5 Battalions of Cossacks of the line, with the local Azof Cossacks, &c., about	3,000	..
There are also under the command of General Chomutoff the Don Cossacks Pulks Nos. 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 65, and 66, with two or three Cossack Reserve Batteries, for the defence of the Peninsula and of the coast of the Sea of Azof; but their troops do not seem to be disposable for operations in the Crimea.		
Hence the collective strength of the Army in the Crimea (IV) under the command of Prince Menchikoff on the 10th of January, 1855, would be 174 Battalions, 108 Squadrons, 13 Pulks, 50 Field Batteries ..	138,800	528

N.B.—The army of the Crimea might be reinforced from Perekop by the disposable 17th and 18th Brigades of the 5th Reserved Infantry Division (D. III) which were formed in November near Koreletz, in the Government of Czernigow, as well as by the 3rd and 4th disposable regiments of Dragoons of the 2nd Reserve Cavalry Corps, by the end of January 1855, about 14,000 men Infantry, and 5,600 men Cavalry, with 8 Batteries; in all about 20,000 men, with 54 guns.

V. The Additional Army of Reserve.

Which, under the command of General Tschodajew, has been forming since March 22, 1854, and of which in last December the half was already formed, that is to say, the 6th Additional Reserve Battalions of the Regiments of the Guard, the 7th and 8th Additional Reserve Battalions of the 1st Infantry Corps, and lastly, the 7th Additional Reserve Battalion of the other 5 Infantry Corps,

	Men.	Guns.
up to the complete amount of 620 men per Battalion; while the 8 Additional Reserve Battalions of the other 5 Infantry Corps have been only "en cadre" since November 1854, and by the spring of 1855 may be placed in readiness to march to their drilling stations. These troops will have the following strength:—		
The Additional Reserves of the Guard and of the 1st Corps of Infantry is already counted in the Corps d'Armée in the Baltic Provinces (I).		
For the Grenadier Corps, since the 6th Battalions and Reserve Battalions have been placed in activity, no further 7th Additional Reserve Battalions have yet been forming.		
The 5 Additional Reserve Divisions—		
Of the 2nd and 6th Corps of Infantry at Moscow.		
3rd " Kijow.		
4th " Oxel.		
5th " Charkow.		
Each of 15,480 men, with 3 Reserve Batteries of 8 guns	77,400	120
To these may be added the 44½ Additional Reserve Squadrons of the 6 Light Cavalry Divisions, and of the 2 Reserve Cavalry Corps in the Military Colonies in South Russia, in the strength of 4,450 men, and the collective strength of the Additional Reserve Army not yet placed in activity, will amount to 120 Battalions, 44½ Squadrons, 15 Batteries	81,850	120
(Disposable for the 4 European theatres of war in the summer of 1855.)		

VI. The Active Army of the Caucasus, under the command of General Muramjew, at Tiflis.

A.—The Separate Corps of the Caucasus.

The 19th, 20th, and 21st Divisions of Infantry, the 19th Battalion of Grusinian, 13th Battalion of Caucasian, and 27th Battalion Chernomorian Cordon-; 15 Pulks of Cossacks, and of the Chernomorian Horse and Foot Cossacks; the Reserve Infantry Division of the Caucasian Corps and of the Caucasian Dragoon Regiments; making an active force of	121,000	164
(Which are distributed over the Cordon against the Mountaineers.)		

B.—The Active Army of Operation on the Anatolian Frontier, under General Prince Bebutoff. Head-quarters at Alexandropol.

a. The Right Wing, under Lieutenant-General Prince Andronikoff. Head-quarters at Achaleyche.

1. The Gurick Detachment, under Major-General Budberg at Ozurgeti and Zugdidi, consist of; The Infantry Regiment "Bialystok," the 13th Division Infantry, 1 Battalion of Woronzow's Infantry Regiment, and 6 Batteries = 5 Battalions, 6 Batteries	4,700	12
2. The main body of the Wing near Achaleyche: 13th Division Infantry, 3 Regiments; of the 20th Division of Infantry, of the Woronzow Regiment, 2 Battalions; ½ Reserve Battalion of Sappers; 1 Mountain Battery; 15 Sotnias of Don Cossacks; 10 Sotnias of Horse, and 20 Bands of Local and Gurian Foot Militia, with the Batteries belonging to them—about	16,100	56

b. The Corps of the Centre, near Alexandropol, under the orders of Prince Bebutoff. (Guards.)

The 18th Division of Infantry of the 5th Corps of Infantry, 16 Battalions, 4 Batteries; the Caucasian Grenadier Reserve Brigade, with the Caucasian Rifles and Sappers, 9 Battalions, 3 Batteries; Brigade of Dragoons of the 2nd Reserve Corps of Cavalry, and the Caucasian Dragoon Regiment "Prince of Wurtemberg," 30 Squadrons, with 3 Batteries; 7 Sotnias (Squadrons) of Don and 14 Sotnias of Caucasian Cossacks, 10 Sotnias of the Horse Mussulman Brigade, and 7 Sotnias of Free Foot Militia = 25 Battalions, 30 Squadrons, 31 Sotnias Horse, 7 Sotnias Foot, 10 Batteries	28,260	104

c. The extreme Left Wing, under General Wrangel, in the Pashalic of Bayazid (said to be near Toprak-Kaleh).

5 Battalions and 1 Battery of the 21st Division of Infantry; 7 Sotnias of Don Cossacks; 1 Sotnia of Kurds; 6 Sotnias of the Mussulman Infantry of Karabagh; the Bank of Poti, with 1 Company of the Grusinian Regiment of Regulars—about	5,360	12
Hence the strength of the Army of Operation against Anatolia is about 51,300 men, 180 guns; and the collective strength of the Active Army on this and that side of the Caucasus, under General Murawjew	175,300	348

FINAL RESULT.

	Men.	Field-guns.
The effective amount of the Armies of Russia stationed in Europe amounts to.	661,000	2,078
The Army of the Caucasus to	175,300	348
The effective strength of her Active Armies ..	836,300	2,426

N.B.—This strength implies a regular complete force of more than 1,000,000 of soldiers, without including local and garrison troops, separate mountain corps, the corps of Guards for the interior, troops employed in works and disciplining, and the Asiatic Cossacks.

Vienna, January 15, 1855.

No. 149.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 29.)

(No. 29.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January* 26, 1855.

THE Marquis de Moustier, the French Envoy, had an audience this day of the King of Prussia, to deliver to His Majesty a letter from his Sovereign. It was the answer to the notification of the marriage of Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia, and the usual etiquette was departed from in order to find an excuse for an interview between the French Minister and the King; Baron Manteuffel was present.

The Marquis de Moustier has given me the following account of his audience, which he said was extremely short and rather hurried. The King appears to have avoided politics as much as possible. His Majesty was most kind and gracious, making many inquiries about the Emperor and Empress, and said that he was glad to have an opportunity of expressing his desire to see the relations of his country and France placed on the best footing, and with this view he had decided on sending General Wedell to Paris, whom he should charge with a letter to the Emperor. His Majesty appears to have said that he hoped for good results from this mission; that it was a nail he was driving on which he fixed his hopes of peace, a thought which never left him.

M. de Moustier has assured me that he was unable to turn the conversation on any political question. The King seemed resolved not to go beyond the sphere of courtesy, which was however very marked, and the interview passed off without any result beyond that of proving a desire on the part of the King to go out of his way to grant a private audience to the French Minister, thus showing his desire to place the relations of Prussia with France and England on the same footing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 150.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 29.)

(No. 31.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January* 26, 1855.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 23rd instant, I have the honour to report to you, that at an interview which I have had this evening with Baron Manteuffel I mentioned to his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government were desirous that the King of Prussia, by signing the Treaty which had been proposed, should reenter the Conference before negotiations commenced, and that I should be glad to hear if there was any prospect of this arrangement taking place.

Baron Manteuffel replied that the King was disposed to discuss the question, but it was his duty to inform me that His Majesty clung to the assurance which had already been given to me, that he would not agree to any Treaty as a condition to the resumption of his place in the European concert, and that his mind was made up on this point.

I said that as some time would probably elapse before the Conference met at Vienna, it appeared to me that if the King were seriously desirous to identify his policy with ours, there could be no reason why we should not at once enter upon negotiations for the Treaty, without making allusions to the Conference,

"Let us," I observed, "try and forget the Conference, for the King's entrance into it will follow as a matter of course."

His Excellency rejoined that he would apply to the King again, and would tell me the result; and he then spoke in a tone which led me to believe that His Majesty was becoming alarmed at the state of confusion in Germany and in Europe, and at the determined language which was held in London and Paris as to the war. He spoke of the Prussian army, and said that the Government had not funds to commence active operations; that it was true they could bring 150,000 men into the field at a short notice, but that the military organization of this country rendered it extremely difficult to do more; and that the preparation for so large a force as this almost paralyzed further arrangements.

I rejoined that everybody was aware that war could not be carried on without great sacrifices, but that an appeal to the country in the sense of an alliance with the Western Powers would be successful, when in any other case it would assuredly fail.

Our conversation then reverted to the subject of the Treaty. I told his Excellency that up to the present moment Prussia was not bound to us in any way; that in fact she was following the policy of a neutral State, without having made any declaration on the subject, and that until her position was defined our present relations would remain as they were.

Baron Manteuffel said that Prussia was, however, bound to Austria, and would keep her engagements.

Yes, I replied, for defensive purposes, but not for offensive operations; and it was on this account that we were anxious to see a different state of things established that would pave the way for Prussia joining the general alliance. As to the Treaty of 1841, upon which the King claimed to enter the Conference, I observed that all Treaties were annulled by the war which had broken out, and that after all it was only on the third point that Prussia had any claims to enter into the discussion, and that if she did not agree to the Treaty which had been proposed, we could only look upon such refusal as a desire to see the war extended and prolonged.

Baron Manteuffel remarked that the Protocol of the 28th of December had never been communicated to the Prussian Government, and that if it were proposed to the King, it would surely not be expected that His Majesty should adopt it until it had been fully considered in all its bearings; and he added that at all events His Majesty took a most lively interest in the question of the Principalities, and especially in the state of the Protestant churches there established, which His Majesty is informed are exposed to great annoyances since the Austrian occupation.

I replied that the interest taken in this question ought to be a further inducement to the King to join our cause, which would entitle him to see justice done to his co-religionists.

Here the conversation came to a close, and I saw it was useless attempting to prolong it with such slender hopes of coming to any result, notwithstanding the expectation which Baron Manteuffel held out of a more favourable disposition on the part of the King.

I learned from his Excellency that an impression had been made on His Majesty by a despatch which he read to me from Baron Brockhausen, the Prussian Minister at Brussels, announcing that some modifications were expected in Her Majesty's Government, but that no abatement in the determination to carry on the war was likely to result from such changes in London or Paris. His Excellency added also that the King had been much struck by a rumour which had arrived from Paris that a French army of 100,000 men was being prepared to support Austria.

All intelligence of decided military cooperation of the allies is more likely to influence the King's resolution than anything else, and the policy of Prussia may become more identified with ours, when all doubts are removed as to any present chances of the restoration of peace, and when the action of the allies is imbued with still greater firmness and mutual confidence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 151.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 33.)

Foreign Office, January 29, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 469 of the 13th ultimo, reporting, on the authority of Count Buol, the intention of the Ottoman authorities in the Principalities to expel a number of Boyards from those Provinces, and to confiscate their property, I transmit to you a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, stating this report to be without foundation; and I have to instruct you to request Count Buol to communicate to you the source from which this information was derived, and to institute an inquiry on the subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 152.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 89.)

Foreign Office, January 29, 1855.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government have learnt with satisfaction, by your Excellency's despatch No. 30 of the 15th of January, of the intentions of the Turkish Government punctually to provide the Sultan's army at Eupatoria with sufficient supplies; but it will be desirable to ascertain from time to time that these intentions are carried out.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 153.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 86.)

Foreign Office, January 29, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch No. 80 of the 26th instant, stating that M. Drouyn de Lhuys is entirely opposed to the military interference of Austria in Greece, and I have to inform your Excellency that I entirely concur with M. Drouyn de Lhuys upon this subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 154.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 30.)

Foreign Office, January 29, 1855.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by you in your conversation with Baron Manteuffel on the present policy of Prussia, as reported in your Lordship's despatch No. 26 of the 23rd instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 137.

No. 155.

Mr. Hudson to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.)

Turin, January 29, 1855.

AVERAGE of Sardinian contingent for war with Russia, 15,500 men, 2,000 horse. They will have 6 guns, 250 waggons.

No. 156.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 82.)

Paris, January 26, 1855.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has informed me that he is about to send a circular despatch to the French Diplomatic Agents in Germany expressive of the regret of the French Government at the want of union which appears to exist in the Confederation on the Eastern question—union which the French Government had always, without interfering unduly with the prerogatives of the Confederation, assisted to maintain; and declaring that it was the fault of Prussia alone if she was not represented in the Conference at Vienna, she having retired from it at her own free will and choice.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that his despatch would be worded so as not to give offence, and to let the smaller States see that they had no reason to be apprehensive of France.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 157.

Mr. Hudson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 13.)

Turin, January 26, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to receive yesterday at 2 o'clock P.M., by the messenger Gasparini, your Lordship's despatch No. 6 of the 20th instant, transmitting to me the draft of the British Acceptance of the Sardinian Accession to the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and France of April 10, 1854; the amended draft of the Military Convention between Great Britain, France, and Sardinia; and the draft of a Separate and Supplementary Treaty for a loan by Great Britain to Sardinia.

And I have the honour to report to your Lordship, that I met the Duc de Guiche and Comte de Cavour in conference at 11 o'clock last night, when we discussed those several Acts and Conventions; and I have the satisfaction of informing your Lordship, that M. de Cavour, on the part of His Sardinian Majesty, accepted the modifications (with one exception), both of form and substance, as proposed by the orders contained in your Lordship's above-mentioned despatch; and that at 3 o'clock this day I again met my French colleague and Count de Cavour, when we exchanged the several Acts of Accession and Acceptance, and signed the Tripartite Military Convention, and the Convention for a loan between Great Britain and Sardinia.

The exception to which I have alluded is contained in the IVth Article of the Tripartite Military Convention, which in the British draft runs as follows:

"His Majesty the King of Sardinia engages that the said body of troops shall be supplied every three months, or at shorter intervals if necessary, with regiments or drafts to keep it up to the full stipulated number of 15,000 men."

For this draft M. de Cavour, after conference with his colleague the Minister of War, desired to propose the following reading:

"Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne s'engage à maintenir le corps expéditionnaire au chiffre de 15,000 hommes, par l'envoi successif et régulier des renforts nécessaires."

"His Majesty the King of Sardinia engages to maintain the expeditionary corps at the number of 15,000 men, by the successive and regular transmission of such reinforcements as may be necessary."

This alteration my French colleague and myself determined, after due consultation, to accept. The alteration is, as your Lordship will perceive, in the form and not in the substance. There is the same engagement to maintain the Sardinian force at the number of 15,000 men; but the Minister of War remarked, that if the British draft of the Article were accepted, it would entail the necessity of having transports constantly ready in the port of Genoa, in order to be able to act up to the letter of the stipulation as to time; whereas, whenever the corps in campaign fell short of its complement he could, on the spot, communicate with Her Majesty's Admiral, or other authority commanding the transports, and could with him concert measures more efficaciously, more surely, and more promptly, than by the method which he presumed was proposed in the British draft of Article IV.

The substance of the Article being preserved, my French colleague and myself did not hesitate to accept the Article as it now appears.

With the exception of this alteration, which I have now the honour to submit to your Lordship, the Acts of Accession and of Acceptance, the Military Convention, and the Supplementary Convention for the loan by Great Britain to Sardinia, are returned duly signed, and in the same shape as when transmitted to me by your Lordship.

I have only further to add, that at 4 o'clock this afternoon M. de Cavour made an official statement to the Sardinian Chamber of Deputies of the tenour of the several above-mentioned Acts and Conventions, with a view to the presentation to that House of so much of them as concerns the terms of the loan; a matter which the constitutional forms of the Sardinian States requires should be presented to them for their legislative action.

The House received the announcement with calmness and dignity, but with evident satisfaction. The only member who offered an observation upon it in a hostile spirit was the Deputy Valerio of the extreme left, who reserved his final opinion until he had had an opportunity of studying the documents in committee.

I have therefore the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship:

The Act of Accession of His Sardinian Majesty to the Treaty of Alliance of the 10th April, 1854;

A copy of the Act of Acceptance, which by your Lordship's instructions I have exchanged against the Act of Accession of Sardinia;

The Tripartite Military Convention between Great Britain, France, and Sardinia;

And the Supplementary Convention between Her Majesty and the King of Sardinia.

These four documents will be conveyed with my despatches to Paris by a gentleman attached to the French Legation, who will wait instructions at Paris as to his return with the ratifications of the abovementioned Acts and Conventions.

As I found my French colleague and M. de Cavour indisposed to concur in the exchange of these ratifications at any other place than Turin, I did not think proper to insist upon a change of place, as mentioned by your Lordship in your despatch No. 6 of the 20th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES HUDSON.

Inclosure in No. 157.

Acts and Conventions relative to Cooperation of King of Sardinia in the War.

[See Parliamentary Paper presented to both Houses, February .]

No. 158.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Hudson.

(No. 15.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 30, 1855.*

I RECEIVED this morning your despatch No. 13 of the 26th instant, inclosing the Acts of Accession and Treaties signed on that day by the Plenipotentiaries of England, France, and Sardinia.

As those instruments are, in all respects but one, conformable to the drafts sent to you in my despatch No. 6 of the 20th instant, I have no special remarks to make upon them, excepting so far as the alteration in the IVth Article of the Military Convention is concerned; and on that point I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government concur in the change from the original version.

I now transmit to you Her Majesty's ratifications of the Acceptance of the Act of Accession by Sardinia of the Treaty between England and France of the 10th of April, 1854, of the Tripartite Military Convention between England, France, and Sardinia of the 26th January, and of the Supplementary Convention between England and Sardinia of the same date; and I have to authorise you to exchange the same against the ratifications of France and Sardinia.

I have great satisfaction in conveying to you at the same time Her Majesty's gracious approbation of the manner in which you have conducted the negotiations with the Court of Sardinia on these matters.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 159.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 31, 1855.*

MR. COLQUHOUN écrit de Bucharest le 31 Janvier:

"I learn from Varna that the differences which had arisen between Omer Pasha and some members of the Turkish Government, and which even threatened the position of the Pasha, have been arranged. Ismail Pasha is to be subordinated to him; the whole had their origin in private intrigue.

No. 160.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 39.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 16, 1855.*

IN reply to your Lordship's despatch No. 822 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to state that more than a month has elapsed since the Porte instructed its Ambassador at Vienna to attend the meetings of what is called the Mixed Commission relative to certain matters in dispute in the Danubian Principalities.

Inclosed herewith is a translated copy of the Porte's instruction. It bears the date of December 15th.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 160.

Instruction to the Ottoman Embassy at Vienna.

December 15, 1854.

(Translation.)

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch, together with the other papers stating that the three Powers, having entered into communication on the subject, had deemed fitting that on the occurrence of any difficulty on current affairs between the Agents of the Porte and the Austrian Generals in the Principalities, it should be referred by those Agents to the Ottoman Embassy at Vienna, in the event of its being impossible to settle it on the spot, and that the matter was to be then discussed between your Excellency, Count Buol, and the Ambassadors of England and France, and the decision come to communicated to the Agents in question; and that it was required that the Sublime Porte should come into this arrangement, and issue the necessary instructions on the subject. Your Excellency's despatch has been laid before His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

This decision on the part of the Powers has proceeded from facilities which they foresee in the settlement at Vienna with your Excellency's concurrence of any difficulties which may arise between the Agents of the two parties. The arrangement is limited to the misunderstandings taking place between the Ottoman and Austrian Agents, and the Austrian Government has naturally her share in this; there is, therefore, no objection on the score of right to the settlement of such matters in the way decided upon at Vienna by the Representatives of the four Powers, more particularly as at the present time there is not much cause for such disagreements.

As, however, misunderstanding on some subjects may take place with the Austrian Agents, His Imperial Majesty's sanction was asked, and has been granted, to the purport that instructions should be sent to the Ottoman Commanders, who are to remainat Bucharest, to communicate, in that event, with the Embassy at Vienna and with the Sublime Porte; and that your Excellency should be likewise instructed to discuss the matter in question with Count Buol and the French and English Ambassadors, and report the decision come to to Constantinople as well as to the aforesaid Commanders.

On the occurrence, however, of anything affecting the internal administration of the Principalities, or the sovereign rights or the dignity of the Sublime Porte, any discussion or decision thereon must naturally be at Constantinople. In such a case, therefore, your Excellency is instructed not to apply the present arrangement, and to come to no decision without a reference to the Sublime Porte.

The necessary instructions have been, in consequence, sent to the Commanders in question, and your Excellency is recommended to observe the closest and most scrupulous attention with reference to the measures and proceedings had in the discussion and settlement of the disagreements in question.

No. 161.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 42.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 18, 1855.

I HAVE this day forwarded to Her Majesty's Consul at Marseilles, for transmission to your Lordship by telegraph, the following message:—

"I have been requested by Sir Edmund Lyons to transmit the following message by telegraph:

"Informés que des envois considérables de munition et de contrebande de guerre avaient lieu des ports neutres de la Méditerranée dans les ports d'Odessa et de Kertch, les Amiraux des escadres Anglaise et Française se sont décidés à établir d'urgence, et sans attendre de nouveaux ordres de leurs Gouvernements,

le blocus effectif des principaux ports Russes de la Mer Noire, et à notifier, par voie de parlementaires, la stricte exécution de ce blocus, à partir du 1er Fevrier prochain. Des mesures sont prises pour qu'avant cette époque des forces convenables, autorisées à agir au nom des deux Gouvernements, se trouvent stationnées devant les principaux ports mis en état de blocus."

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 162.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 43.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 17, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to reply to your Lordship's despatch No. 3 of the 1st instant.

There are two points requiring notice; the one is the efficiency of Vassif Pasha, the other regards Colonel Williams' Turkish rank.

On this point I have to state that the firman constituting that officer a Ferik, or General of Division, under the denomination of "Williams Pasha," was addressed to him by me on the 30th ultimo.

With respect to the qualifications of Vassif Pasha, the result of my inquiries, antecedent to the receipt of any instructions, was, that he is a man of military education; that he was engaged in active service against the Russians in 1829; that he possesses an independent fortune, and that no one suspects him of corruption. His language to me was that of an honest and conscientious public servant. On the other hand he is no longer young, and his appearance denotes but little energy of mind or body.

Your Lordship can hardly mean to hold me responsible for his success in command. The object of change in office or command throughout Turkey, when taken at the best, is not the promotion of known desert, but the removal of tried demerit. On such occasions the chances are quite as much in favour of change for the worse as of change for the better. As to the command of an army, I know but one man in the Sultan's service who enjoys the reputation of decided fitness for it, and that is Omer Pasha. In the present instance there is much to presume in favour of the new Commander; he shows public spirit in undertaking an irksome task, and a difficult journey in the dead of winter. Besides, he is not the Commander-in-chief destined for operations in the field, but an acting Commander appointed to keep the army together, and if possible to improve it during the season of retreat.

I hope he will act cordially in concert with General Williams. No efforts have been wanting on my part to make him do so.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 163.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 91. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, January* 30, 1855.

IN my despatch No. 59 of the 23rd instant, I had the honour to call your Lordship's attention to certain articles published in the Paris newspapers, reflecting on the conduct of Prussia. A representation on this subject has, I understand, been made from the Prussian Government through Count Hatzfeldt, confidentially, to M. Drouyn de Lhuys; M. de Manteuffel observing that the antidote (the article in the "Moniteur") is worse than the poison (the Duke of Bassano's letter published in the "Constitutionnel.")

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 164.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 92. Confidential.)

Paris, January 30, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE at various times, without showing any suspicion, for indeed I felt none, called M. Drouyn de Lhuys' attention to the different appreciation which existed in the mind of the Emperor of Austria and of his Government, of the intentions of Great Britain and France, in regard to the present war; France being constantly represented in Austrian communications, whether verbal or written, to be more disposed to peace than Great Britain. M. Drouyn de Lhuys stated to me yesterday in confidence, that he had, with the Emperor's sanction, sent a messenger on the previous day to Vienna, with instructions to M. de Bourqueney, to lose no time in dispelling in the most positive manner these illusions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 165.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 94.)

Paris, January 30, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT HATZFELDT has communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys a despatch of great length from his Government, dated the 22nd instant. It attempts to explain the position which Prussia has taken in the Eastern question, but is so verbose and obscure that M. Drouyn de Lhuys can gather little more from it than that the King of Prussia abandons the question of personal dignity, behind which he had entrenched his refusal to sign any Treaty with Austria and the Western Powers, and that His Majesty now says that his exclusion from the Conferences is a violation of the engagements contracted by the Four Powers in a Protocol signed by them all, and pledging them to consult each other on all questions requiring their joint concert. M. Drouyn de Lhuys proposes instructing M. Moustier to state to Baron Manteuffel, in language as conciliatory as possible, that there has been no violation of any engagement on the part of the Vienna Conference; that the King of Prussia first refused to attend a conference at which the very measures of joint concert, to which reference is made by His Majesty, were to be discussed; that he afterwards refused to exchange notes for a similar object, and again that he declined to adhere to the Treaty of the 2nd of December, all of which had been proposed to him; and that latterly the Prussian Government had been asked by M. de Moustier and by Count Hatzfeldt, at his (M. Drouyn de Lhuys') request, to propose such a Treaty as Prussia could sign, either with the Three Powers, or with the Western Powers alone, and that no answer had been vouchsafed.

Under these circumstances M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed to me he did not see what more could be done in regard to Prussia. The Austrian Government was as decided as the Western Powers not to admit the Prussian Cabinet to take any part in the negotiations for peace, unless the latter pledged itself to active operations in case of the failure of negotiations, and to this determination the Emperor would adhere in his conversations with General Wedell, whenever that officer arrived in Paris.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 166.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 95. Confidential.)

Paris, January 29, 1855.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informed me this afternoon that he had received a despatch from Count Walewski, stating the result of a conversation which he had had with your Lordship respecting the course which should be pursued at Vienna. Your Lordship's opinion was described by M. Walewski to be—

1st. That every means should be taken of informing Count Buol of the views of the allies in regard to Sebastopol and the Russian fleet, but without pressing him for a categorical answer as to whether he approved those views.

2ndly. That all questions which were likely to give rise to controversy should be discussed between the three Powers before negotiations were resumed, it being of the highest importance that Prince Gortchakoff should not be a witness of, or derive benefit from, any difference of opinion manifested in his presence.

To these views M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that he heartily subscribed. He had every desire that the fullest information should be given to Austria as to the wishes, plans, and intentions of the Western Powers, and he only deprecated the demand of a categorical answer from Count Buol. That answer would, he was convinced, be unfavourable at the present moment, and no advantage was to be gained by pressing Austria to give a decision to which she might think it right or expedient to adhere pertinaciously hereafter. He agreed, however, that before negotiations were resumed, all the questions of detail respecting the four points must be discussed between the three Powers.

He then adverted to the question of the immediate signature of a Protocol, which, to judge, he said, from your Lordship's observations to Count Walewski, he did not think had ever been properly placed before you. He still adhered to the opinion that it was the safest and easiest, as well as the most straightforward, manner of putting the sincerity of both Austria and Russia to the test, but it had never crossed his imagination to unite the four Representatives in Conference for the signature of a Protocol without some previous knowledge of the sentiments of Austria. His idea had been that M. de Bourqueney and Lord Westmorland should have treated the signature of a Protocol as a matter of course to which Count Buol could raise no objection, and should have asked him to procure the signature of Count Gortchakoff. If Count Buol had raised objections there would, of course, have been an end of the matter; but he thought, with all deference to your Lordship's opinion, that it would have been preferable that the French and English Governments should not of their own account have expressed a doubt as to Count Buol's viewing Prince Gortchakoff's acceptance of the four points in the same light as themselves. And he was afraid that by calling Count Buol's attention to the differences which existed between his version of the Conference of the 8th instant and that of Lord Westmorland, this doubt would be admitted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 167.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 97. Confidential.)

Paris, January 30, 1855.

My Lord,

M. DE HUBNER communicated officially to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the day before yesterday the intention of the Emperor of Austria to send General Cremeville to Paris to act as his Military Commissioner. The General, M. de Hübner stated, would be furnished with ample instructions to meet all the eventualities that could happen, should the present negotiations for peace be

attended with no result. The forces which Austria could bring into the field, as well as the forces which Russia could oppose to them, were accurately known to him, and he would be prepared to discuss the plans of operations which must be followed under the different phases of the neutrality of Prussia, of her joining Austria, or of her joining Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 168.

Mr. Hudson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 14.)

Turin, January 27, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 13 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, a report and translation of the statement made by Count Cavour on communicating to the Sardinian Chamber of Deputies the Accession of His Sardinian Majesty to the Treaty of the 10th of April last, and the two Conventions annexed thereto.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES HUDSON.

Inclosure in No. 168.

Statement of Count Cavour to the Chamber of Deputies.

Signori,

LA guerra d'Oriente chiamando a conflitto sul campo della politica nuovi interessi, ha reso altresì indispensabili nuove alleanze.

Il corso delle antiche tradizioni diplomatiche venne ad un tratto interrotto: e nell' attenta considerazione d'un presente gravissimo, e d'un futuro del quale una somma prudenza può solo antivenire i pericoli, fu chiaro ad ogni Governo che, a fronte di complicazioni così inaspettate sulla scena del mondo, era da cercarsi un sistema che procacciasse forza, appoggi e rimedi atti a provvedere alle mutate circostanze.

L'Inghilterra e la Francia diedero prime al mondo il generoso esempio del più completo obblio di loro gare secolari, scendendo unite sul campo ove si combatte la guerra della giustizia e del diritto comune delle nazioni.

Gli altri Governi intenti al rapido volo degli eventi, tutti si dispongono a prendervi quella parte che richiedono le necessità o la convenienza della loro politica.

In così serie condizioni, ed in mezzo ad apparecchi cotanto generali, il Governo del Re avrebbe gravemente fallito ai suoi doveri, se non avesse attentamente considerato esso pure qual fosse il miglior partito da scegliersi pel bene del Re e dello Stato, e se fissata la scelta, non l'avesse risolutamente mandata ad effetto.

I partiti erano due:

Neutralità, vale a dire isolamento;

Alleanza colle Potenze Occidentali.

La neutralità, talvolta possibile alle Potenze di prim' ordine, lo è rare volte a quelle di second' ordine, ove non sieno collocate in circostanze politiche e geografiche speciali. La storia però raramente ci mostra felice la neutralità, il cui men triste frutto è farvi, in ultimo, bersaglio ai sospetti ed agli sdegni d'ambe le parti. Al Piemonte poi, cui l'alto cuore dei suoi Re impresse in ogni tempo una politica risoluta, giovarono assai più le alleanze.

Il Piemonte è giunto a farsi tenere in conto dall'Europa più che non sembrerebbe chiederlo la sua limitata estensione, perchè al giorno del comune pericolo seppe sempre affrontare la sorte comune: come altresì perchè ne' tempi tranquilli su ne' Principi di Savoia la rara sapienza di venir passo passo informando le leggi politiche e civili ai nuovi desiderii ed ai nuovi bisogni, naturale conseguenza delle incessanti conquiste della civiltà.

Potè, è vero, a quando a quando venire per poco travolto dalla furia degli

eventi, ma, se cadde' risorse; ma non mai fu tenuto in dispregio o posto da canto, non mai fu spezzato il vincolo che lo lega ai suoi Re, e trovò sempre la sua salute nella fiducia e nella stima che aveva saputo inspirare.

Nuovo attestato d'ambedue fu la proposta di un' alleanza venuta al Governo di Sua Maestà per parte di quelli di Sua Maestà la Regina Vittoria e dell' Imperatore de' Francesi.

Gli esempi della storia, l'antiveggenza del futuro, le nobili tradizioni della Casa di Savoia, tutto s'univa onde scostare il Ministero da una politica timida, neghittosa, e condurlo invece per l'antica via seguita dai padri nostri, i quali conobbero la vera prudenza stare nell' onore d'esser partecipe ai sacrifici ed ai pericoli incontrati per la giustizia, ond' essere a parte poi della cresciuta riputazione, ovvero del beneficio dopo la vittoria.

D'ordine del Re, che in quest' occasione, come sempre, si mostrò pari alla grandezza degli eventi, ed alla virtù della sua Casa, venne fatta formale accessione al Trattato del 10 Aprile, 1854, ed insieme furono strette due Convenzioni dirette a regolare il modo di concorso da prestarsi dalla Sardegna in dipendenza di quell' atto.

Veniamo ora a sottoporle alla vostra approvazione.

Frutto d'una prudenza che tende all' ardito ed al generoso, confidiamo che questo Trattato possa ottenere il vostro assenso assai meglio che non l'avrebbe, se fosse invece suggerito da una prudenza timida e cieca calcolatrice.

Voi, eletti di un popolo che ebbe sempre un cuor solo coi suoi Principi ove gli avesse a seguire sulla via del sagrificio e dell' onore, non potreste aver in cuore diverso sentire.

Alla croce di Savoia, come a quella di Genova, son note le vie dell' Oriente. Ambedue si spiegarono vittoriose in quei campi, che rivedono oggi rifuse in una sola sui colori della nostra bandiera. Posta ora fra i gloriosi stendardi d'Inghilterra e di Francia, saprà mostrarsi degna di così alta compagnia, e la benedirà quel Dio che resse da otto secoli la fortezza e la fede della Dinastia di Savoia.

(Translation.)

Gentlemen,

THE war in the East, by calling into the field of politics new and conflicting interests, has at the same time rendered new alliances indispensable.

The course of ancient diplomatic tradition has been suddenly interrupted; and in attentively considering a present most grave, and a future the peril of which can be averted only by the utmost prudence, it became evident to every Government that in the face of complications unlooked for of the world's stage, it would be necessary to seek for some system combining strength, support, and remedies calculated to meet the change of circumstances.

England and France first gave to the world the generous example of a complete oblivion of secular discord, by descending into the arena where the war of justice and of public law was being waged.

Other Governments, intent upon the rapid course of events, are all preparing to take that part in the war which is dictated to them by necessity or their political interests.

Under circumstances so momentous, and amidst preparations so general, the King's Government would have been seriously wanting in its duty had it not considered with care the course which was most expedient for the King and the State; and that selection made, had it hesitated to carry it into effect with resolution.

Two courses were open to it: neutrality—that is, isolation; or an alliance with the Western Powers.

Neutrality, which is occasionally practicable in the case of Powers of the first order, is rarely so in the case of Powers of the second order, unless they chance to be placed in a position politically or geographically exceptional. History, indeed, seldom exhibits successful neutrality. Its least unfavourable consequence is usually to expose it to the suspicion and the anger of both sides. Piedmont, especially, on which the great soul of its Kings has in all times entailed a policy of resolution, has derived more advantage from alliances.

Piedmont has contrived to create for herself in Europe a position more than

commensurate with her limited extent, because on the day of common danger she was at all times ready to share the common fate; and also because in times of tranquillity the Princes of Savoy possessed the rare wisdom of gradually adapting the political and civil legislation of the State to the new desires and wants naturally growing out of the incessant advance of civilization. It may, it is true, from time to time during short intervals, have been overthrown by the fury of events, but if it fell, it rose again; the link which binds it to its Kings has never been held in contempt, or set aside, or broken, and it has ever found safety in the confidence and and esteem which it has known how to inspire. A new proof of both was the proposal of an alliance made to His Majesty's Government by those of Queen Victoria and the Emperor of the French. The examples in history, care for the future, the noble traditions of the House of Savoy, all united to prevent the Government from adopting a timid and vacillating policy, and to make them pursue the path trodden by our fathers, who knew that true prudence consisted in the honour of sharing the sacrifices and perils encountered in the cause of justice, so as to share also the increase of reputation, or the benefits after the victory. By order of the King, who on this occasion, as always, has shown himself equal to the magnitude of events, and to the greatness of his House, a formal accession has been made to the Treaty of the 10th April, 1854, and at the same time two Conventions have been signed to regulate the manner in which Sardinia shall lend her aid in accordance with this Act. We now submit them to you for your approbation. Being the fruit of a bold and generous prudence, we are confident that this Treaty will obtain your consent much more easily than if it had been dictated by a prudence timid and shortsighted. You, the elect of a people, always of one mind with its Princes, should it be called upon to follow them on the path of honour and sacrifice, you, doubtless, would not have two opinions. To the crosses of both Savoy and Genoa, the path to the East is well known. Both were victorious on those plains, which now see again the colours of those two crosses united on one banner. Now, posted between the glorious standards of England and France, it will know how to prove itself worthy of such exalted companionship, and will bless that God who has ruled for eight centuries the strength and the faith of the House of Savoy.

No. 169.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 2.)

(No. 48.)

Vienna, January 29, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE now received from Mr. Colquhoun the despatch in answer to my telegraphic message to him of the 9th instant, by which I requested he would transmit to me the authority upon which he had stated that the money raised by the tax in Wallachia which had been imposed for the payment of a debt to the Russian Government, was still collected for the identical purpose.

The reply of Mr. Colquhoun (a copy of which I inclose, together with its inclosures) states, upon reasons which your Lordship will judge of, that it had seemed strongly presumptive that the money raised by that tax was to be employed as above announced, and he cites in support of this opinion, a conversation reported to have been held a short time before his first despatch upon this subject between Prince Stirbey and Dervish Pasha, but he at the same time transmits a report of the conversation of Dervish Pasha with the Wallachian Finance Minister, who stated "that the sums lately received (from the produce of the tax in question) had been expended on various objects, and the sums figure merely nominally in the chest."

Mr. Colquhoun incloses in his letter four documents, the first being a memorandum by himself on the original establishment of this tax, the objects for which it was imposed in the year 1852, and the irregularity which he considers at that time to have accompanied its establishment. The second is the *procès-verbal* of the Wallachian Council of State of the 7th of May, 1852, according to which, a decision is taken that from that time "le Departement des Finances devra prendre de suite les mesures nécessaires pour que les sommes provenantes des deux-dixièmes et des 5 pour cent. du revenu des terres sans

cheaches soient mises à l'avenir dans une caisse *ad hoc*, pour servir uniquement à l'extinction de la dette dont il s'agit."

The other two documents are, first, the copy of a letter from the Chevalier Khaltschinsky, Russian Consul at Bucharest, of the $\frac{1}{13}$th May, 1852, to Prince Stirbey, and secondly, the copy of a letter from Count Nesselrode of the 15th February of the same year, addressed to the Chevalier Khaltschinsky, stating the amount of the sums due to the Russian Military Chests.

Neither of these documents afford any proof of, or relate in any way to, the payment of the money now raised by the tax in question, to the Russian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 169.

Consul-General Colquhoun to the Earl of Westmorland.

My Lord, *Bucharest, January* 16, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's despatch by telegraph of the 9th instant.

It is of course quite impossible to procure an assurance from Prince Stirbey, that the money now collecting, produce of the two-tenths, is specially raised for Russia: the Hospodar could never so commit himself.

The order for levying that tax was published in the Bulletin. The documents I have already forwarded in my despatch to Lord Clarendon No. 112, establish beyond a doubt that the said tax was specially established to pay Russia. No doubt can exist as to its being actually levied in spite of the number of years since it was first imposed, and of the numerous charges weighing upon the country, in consequence of the late occupation, which not only must have extinguished or cancelled the debt (a debt, I may here recall to your Excellency's mind, illegally established, which the Porte has never recognized), but must have given to Wallachia a balance in her favour.

It is now a question whether this tax is destined to pay off the old debt of the province to Russia. I confess I do not see how we are to arrive at a proof, other than those already given, which are strongly presumptive.

In fact a declaration was made to the Ottoman Commissioner by the Prince himself to this effect.

Dervish Pasha, when M. Poujade read to him, in my presence, M. de Bourqueney's letter on this subject, about the beginning of December, made use of the following words: "I asked the Prince for explanations on the subject of this tax of the two-tenths; he replied that the tax had been levied or created to pay off a debt of Wallachia to Russia, and that now the amount collected was deposited in a special chest, because the Wallachian Government had 'des comptes à régler' with Russia, arising from the recent occupation, which would be settled at a fitting moment."

Dervish Pasha subsequently applied to the Finance Minister, who gave the same account of the origin of the debt, but he said that the sums already received had been expended on various objects, and the sums figured merely nominally in the chest.

In conclusion, the tax was, without any doubt, levied for Russia; its levying still continues in spite of the cancelling of that illegal debt, whether by the state of war or by the fact of the late charges imposed by Russia on the province having exceeded the amount of the debt, while again a tax established merely temporarily, "pour cette seule fois," is being illegally perpetuated, and is illegally employed, and turned into a channel different from its first destination.

I annex herewith a memorandum on this tax, with three official documents appended.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 169.

Procès-Verbal.

Cejourd'hui 7 Mai, 1852.

(Traduction.)

CONFORMÉMENT au vœu de l'office de son Altesse le Prince Régnant en date d'hier, sub No. 525, le Conseil Administratif s'est réuni en séance extraordinaire, et prenant en considération les dispositions de cet office, ainsi que la note du Consulat-Général de Russie en date du 7/19 Mai, No. 96, adressée à son Altesse, et la dépêche du Ministère Impérial (dont copie sont annexées au présent procès-verbal), le tout concernant la somme mise à la charge de cette Principauté pour les frais d'occupation par les troupes Russes, depuis leur entrée jusqu'à leur départ définitif, laquelle somme s'élève à 2,581,582 roubles d'argent 41½ copecks (415,661*l.*); le Conseil voyant en outre que Sa Majesté l'Empereur notre auguste Protecteur a daigné, à cette occasion, donner un nouveau témoignage de son inépuisable générosité et de sa haute sollicitude pour cette Principauté, en voulant bien consentir à ce que le remboursement de cette somme, avancée pour l'entretien des troupes Russes, soit effectuée par des versements successifs auxquels on affecterait pour le moment les deux-dixièmes et les 5 pour cent. du revenu des terres non habitées, à la condition que plus tard, et à mesure que les finances de la Principauté s'amélioreront, la Vestiairie concernera, outre le produit de la taxe ci-dessus, d'autres sommes prises sur le budget général des recettes ordinaires, de manière à ce que la liquidation définitive soit opérée dans l'espace de six années à dater du 1 Juillet 1 prochain.

Le Conseil Administratif délibérant décide que conformément aux dispositions de l'office ci-dessus, le Département des Finances devra prendre de suite les mesures nécessaires pour que les sommes provenantes des deux-dixièmes et des 5 pour cent. du revenu des terres sans cheaches soient mises à l'avenir dans une caisse *ad hoc*, pour servir uniquement à l'extinction de la dette dont il s'agit.

Ce procès-verbal sera porté par le Chef du Département des Finances à la connaissance de son Altesse Sérénissime, et après avoir été sanctionné par elle, il sera mis à exécution.

(Signé) GEORGE PHILIPESKO.
EM. AGYROPULO.
J. MANO.
COM. CHERESKO.
J. PHILIPESKO.
T. BIBESCO.
J. OTETELECHANO.

The Russian Consul to Prince Stirbey.

Bucharest, le 7/19 Mai, 1852.

PAR ma note en date du 28 Février dernier, sub No. 89, j'ai eu l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Altesse le contenu d'une dépêche du Ministère Impérial, concernant les frais de l'occupation militaire de la Valachie, dont le montant, après l'apurement des comptes y relatifs, a été définitivement fixé à 2,581,582 roubles, 41½ kopecs argent.

A la suite de cette communication ayant reçu de votre Altesse les états dressés par la Vestiairie sur la situation financière du pays, à la fin de la dernière année, je me suis fait un devoir de les soumettre à son Excellence le Chancelier de l'Empire, avec les éclaircissements contenus dans la note que vous m'avez fait l'honneur, mon Prince, de m'adresser en date du 4/16 Mars.

Aujourd'hui M. le Comte de Nesselrode me charge d'annoncer à votre Altesse que les tableaux susmentionnés ont été placés sous les yeux de l'Empereur, et que Sa Majesté y a remarqué avec satisfaction la régularité maintenu dans le maniement des deniers publics, et la perspective d'une amélioration progressive dans les finances de la Valachie.

Dans cet état de choses, désirant donner aux Principautés une nouvelle preuve de son inépuisable générosité, et de sa haute sollicitude pour le bien-être de ces Provinces, Sa Majesté a daigné consentir à ce que le remboursement des

avances faites par son Trésor pour l'entretien des troupes soit effectué par des versements successifs, auxquels on affecterait pour le moment le produit des deux-dixièmes additionnels, et du 5 pour cent. du revenu net sur les terres non habitées, taxe établie dans l'origine à cet effet; mais à condition que plus tard, et à mesure que les finances de la Principauté s'amélioreront, ainsi que l'on doit s'y attendre, la Vestiairie soit tenue de consacrer, indépendamment du produit de la taxe susmentionnée, d'autres sommes prises sur le budget général des recettes ordinaires, de manière à ce que la liquidation totale soit opérée dans l'espace de six années à dater du 1 Juillet prochaine. Il reste bien entendu d'ailleurs que les versements de ces annuités n'éprouveront ni retards ni attermoiments [*sic*], et que le Gouvernement Valaque répondra par le bon vouloir et l'exactitude à l'indulgence de la Cour Impériale, qui dès les premiers jours de l'occupation militaire avait proclamé hautement les conditions expresses qu'elle rattachait à l'entretien de ces troupes dans les Principautés.

En conséquence, M. le Comte de Nesselrode, par sa dépêche en date du 17 Avril, me charge d'engager votre Altesse à donner immédiatement suite aux ordres sus énoncés de Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

(Signé) KHALTSCHINSKY.

Count Nesselrode to M. de Khaltschinsky.

St. Pétersbourg, le 15 Février, 1852.

JE m'étais réservé de vous transmettre ultérieurement les informations qui me parviendraient du Ministère de la Guerre au sujet des comptes restant encore à régler, afin de déterminer le montant de la dette contractée par la Vestiairie Valaque envers nos caisses militaires, pour l'entretien de notre armée d'occupation.

Il résulte des renseignements que je viens de recevoir à ce sujet, qu'indépendamment de la première liquidation terminée au 1er April, 1850, et dont je vous ai dans le temps fait connaître le chiffre, la Valachie aura encore à payer à nos caisses militaires pour la liquidation des comptes à dater du 1er Avril, 1850, jusqu'à l'entière évacuation des Principautés par nos troupes, les sommes ci-dessous désignées:

	Roubles.	Copeks.
Aux Départements:		
Des Ingénieurs, pour instruments, convois, chevaux	150	91
De l'Artillerie, pour remonte des armes et autres articles	3,361	83¾
Du Commissariat, pour suppléments de solde et les rations de 6 copeks argent	238,344	67½
Des vivres, pour approvisionnements, fourrage, bois, paturage, entretien du Commissariat	593,075	6½
Total	834,932	48¼

En revanche le Commissariat de 5me corps avait à payer à la Valachie pour dépenses effectuées pour organisation des hôpitaux, médicaments, &c., 53,212 roubles 56½ copeks argent.

Le Hospodar ayant désiré affecter cette dernière somme à l'extinction de la dette envers nous, les dispositions ont été prises par ordre de l'Empereur pour inviter le Ministère des Finances à décompter la somme précitée du budget du Ministère de la Guerre pour 1852, et à la porter au crédit de la Principauté, dont la dette totale se trouve ainsi définitivement fixée pour la Valachie, depuis le jour de l'entrée de nos troupes sur son territoire jusqu'à celui de son entière évacuation, à 2,581,582 roubles 41¾ copeks argent.

En portant ces donnés à la connaissance du Gouvernement Valaque, vous voudrez bien, Monsieur, l'inviter à nous faire connaître les mesures qu'il prendra pour assurer aussitôt que possible, le payement de la dette contractée envers le Gouvernement Impérial.

Memorandum on the Russian Debt.

RUSSIA, under the pretence of having been called in to pacify the country after the movement of 1848, demanded the "frais d'occupation."

To this end, a tax of two-tenths was levied on landed property; this tax was to yield annually 2,120,000 piastres (32,600*l.*).

In May 1852, M. de Nesselrode, in a despatch to the Russian Consul-General, establishes as the full amount claimed by Russia, 27,018,000 piastres (415,661*l.*); this sum was received without any opposition on the part of Prince Stirbey, but without any authority on the part of the Sublime Porte.

The tax, voted in the first instance for only one year, was continued, in virtue of an Ordonnance of the General Divan, for four years, confirmed by the Hospodar, with a clause appended, that its amount should be set apart in a special chest, and dedicated solely to the extinction of the Russian debt; and has subsequently been implicitly authorized for a further indefinite term, by the Minister's letter above-mentioned, which fixes for the liquidation of the debt a period of six years.

Since the late invasion, this tax on property has continued to be levied, and as it has been specially assigned for payment of the Russian debt, and does not figure, nor can figure, among the ordinary receipts of the budget, it is clearly evident, beyond doubt, that the Hospodar, even after declaration of war, and up to the present moment, continues to recognize the obligations he had contracted towards Russia before the war, even when he must have known that, *ab initio*, he himself had no right to sanction the demands of Russia, on principle, neither to fix their amount, nor to continue to levy for an indefinite period, this special tax which was to serve to pay off the debt, nor, in fact, to decide upon the application of money so collected.

Moreover, even supposing the balance due of this debt, which should now amount to merely some 14,000,000 piastres (207,000*l.*)—since the tax must have produced, since 1849, above 12,000,000 piastres—to be still due, surely this balance must have been more than compensated by the expenses of the late occupation, amounting to some 25,000,000 piastres, of which the major part is due by bonds granted to merchants, farmers, and other foreigners, by the Wallachian Treasury. Against this 25,000,000, Russia has only remitted about 5,000,000; but she must acknowledge herself indebted in the whole sum, since she herself laid down the principle of not considering the Principalities as integral parts of the Ottoman Empire; hence she cannot pretend, by any right of war, to impose war expenses on a country she would consider as neutral.

Before closing this notice on the management of the sums set apart for the liquidation of the debt claimed by Russia, we must take notice of a sum of 53,212 roubles (8,732*l.*), which Count Nesselrode in his letter authorizes the Prince to deduct from the total sum due, but which nevertheless has not been deducted from the Bilan presented by the Treasury of Wallachia. This circumstance could hardly have escaped the perspicacity of the Russian Consul Khaltschinsky, charged with the liquidation of these accounts! To elucidate the above, the *procès-verbal* of the Council of State, with two explanatory letters, are appended.

(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

Bucharest, January 15, 1855.

No. 170.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 44.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 19, 1855.

I HAVE communicated your Lordship's instruction No. 821 of last year to the Turkish Government in the manner prescribed by its closing paragraph.

Having previously explained in person the tenour of its contents to Reshid Pasha, I sent an extract of it, comprising all those parts which are most imperatively expressed, to the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, instructing M. Pisani to leave it in his hands, and to urge in strong terms upon

his Highness the importance of attending seriously and immediately to your Lordship's remonstrance.

M. Pisani has reported that the Pasha engaged his word to do so. In reply, moreover, to my repeated inquiries I am assured that Vassif Pasha will embark in two or three days for Trebizond in the steamer which is preparing for him, and that a copy of his instructions will be communicated to me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 171.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 46.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 20, 1855.

THERE is reason to apprehend that the Porte will encounter serious difficulties before it succeeds in restoring the Sultan's authority at Jezireh, and other neighbouring parts of Koordistan, where the influence of Yezdi Sheer Bey appeared to prevail up to a late period. This contumacious Chief belongs to the family of Beda Kan Bey. There is little sympathy between the two relatives; but in the absence of the uncle, who is still an exile, the nephew is supported by the adherents of their common family. I am informed that the occasion of placing himself on a footing of independence was furnished by the Turkish authorities themselves, who trusted him with a commission to raise a body of Irregular soldiers for the Sultan's service.

The Grand Vizier, when I urged the importance of taking effectual means for the suppression of so embarrassing a revolt, assured me that the movement was already checked, and that what remained to be done left no room for anxiety. Another and juster impression has succeeded to this ill-timed confidence. Remedial measures are now in contemplation, and the first idea entertained by the Porte was to detach a regular force from Kars or Erzeroum for the reduction of the rebels. Upon my objecting to any plan which could not be carried into effect without a diminution of the frontier army, it was decided that troops of the line, aided by Irregulars, should be collected from other quarters, and my advice that, the Sultan's dignity being thus provided for, conciliatory rather than forcible means should be employed, has been accepted. But the problem of finding a sufficient number of Regulars, independent of the army at Kars, may not be easy to solve; even at Moosul there are only four companies of the Line: at Diarbekir, as I am assured, there are none; and few, if any, are to be found disposable elsewhere. In this dilemma I have proposed that four or five battalions should be sent from here to Alexandretta by sea. The march overland would not, I believe, be greater than from Trebizond, and the road would lie through regions where winter is less severe.

Whatever may be done in a military sense, I am given to understand that the Porte intends to employ a confidential officer, whose local experience may enable him to impede the progress of Yezdi Sheer Bey, and to shake the steadiness of his adherents. A compromise would be attended with less difficulty if the Bey, on his arrival at Jezireh, had not consigned two or three of the magistrates to death without any legal authority.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 172.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 49.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 21, 1855.

I HASTEN to reply to your despatch No. 14 of the 9th instant, relative to General Williams and the Turkish army at Kars. It reached me yesterday, and the mail goes out to-morrow.

Your Lordship informs me that Her Majesty's Government desire to receive my observations on a despatch addressed to me by General Williams on the 8th ultimo, and forwarded in copy to your Lordship's office. Happy to have anticipated the desire of Her Majesty's Government, I beg to refer your Lordship to my despatch No. 788 of the 28th ultimo, which must have reached England almost immediately after the departure of the messenger. On perusing the observations consigned to it, your Lordship can hardly fail to have acknowledged that the remonstrances addressed through me to the Porte have not been made "in vain."

As an instance of the disrespect of which General Williams has complained on the part of the Turkish military authorities, your Lordship has sent me the cover of a letter directed to that officer by Shukri Pasha. I have caused an exact translation to be made of the superscription in question. It is inclosed herewith, and your Lordship will perceive that although the word Commissioner is omitted, its terms, far from being disrespectful, rather err on the side of compliment. The General is styled "Bey," which in this country is the equivalent of Prince, and he has, moreover, the addition of Excellency to his name. The Queen's Ambassador and personal Representative has no more.

I am spared the pain of demanding the dismissal of the person who ordered this direction to be written, as I have long since received the Porte's assurance that Shukri Pasha, whose seal is affixed to the cover, shall on other accounts be recalled, as soon as his successor reaches the army.

It remains for me to notice, with all becoming respect, the commands of Her Majesty's Government, as signified in the last two paragraphs of your Lordship's instruction. Notwithstanding a deep sense of the duty thus imposed upon me, it is not in my power to furnish with literal exactness the information required at my hands. On referring to the correspondence, I find that since the middle of August I have addressed ten despatches[1] to your Lordship on matters connected with the army at Kars. Those despatches contain the substance, and in some instances exhibit the particulars, of my communications with the Porte. To reproduce in full detail whatever passed between Her Majesty's Embassy and the Turkish Ministers from the date of the first to that of the last, is an impossibility. Much of my communication with them is oral, sometimes by means of a personal visit, and far more frequently through the channel of an interpreter. These modes of conducting business are traditional here, and such is the multiplicity of affairs, and such the obstacles to their progress, that a more formal course of proceeding and an accumulation of written documents would prove but little conducive to favourable results.

Bearing these in mind with reference to objects, circumstances, and resources, I would submit that although there has been much to blame and to deplore in the conduct of the Turkish authorities, there is less room for wonder at past delinquencies, than reason to hope that British influence has cleared the way for their correction in future.

Let it be remembered that the war began in hesitation and weakness even on the Danube; that the army in Asia was naturally a secondary object; that the known defects and abuses of Turkish Administration were no less rife in the military than in other departments; that officers of knowledge and capacity were scarce; that the deficiencies of the Line were necessarily supplied by hordes of undisciplined fanatics; that the Sultan's revenue was altogether inadequate; and that all these general causes of evil were aggravated, as to the army in Asia, by distance, by almost impassable roads, and at times by the rigours of a severe climate, to say nothing of personal intrigues and official jealousies, which are not confined to that army.

In spite of so many untoward circumstances, and the numerical losses experienced by Turkey during the past winter, Russia has made no progress on the eastern frontier of this Empire. In summer, the Sultan's army was able to take the field in respectable force, and finally to give battle, with an unfortunate issue, it is true, but not without inflicting a heavy loss on its enemy, who, instead of following up his advantage, retreated beyond the frontier river.

It was in consequence of my representations, at an earlier period, that supplies and artillery were sent to Kars, and that the Mushir, Ahmed Pasha, and his worthy associate, Ali Ferik, were recalled, arrested, and brought to trial. It is owing to the same influence, exerted under your Lordship's sanction or

[1] Nos. 453, 515, 553, 568, 636, 671, 709, 771, 782, 799, of Lord Stratford's despatches of 1854.

direct instructions, that Mustapha Zarif Pasha has been reduced to the same condition; that the supplies required, and the reforms recommended by General Williams, have been officially promised, and in part either forwarded or put into operation; that the intriguing foreigners denounced by him have been recalled; that promotions and dismissals have, in several cases, been ordered by the Porte on his individual statements; that he has himself been raised to the rank of a General of Division under the Sultan's firmun; that his own medical attendant had been appointed to superintend the military hospitals; that the Ottoman General next in credit to Omer Pasha has been appointed to the command of the army in Asia; and that Vassif Pasha, who is now on the point of starting for Kars in the capacity of temporary Commander, has, if I may trust the Porte's assurances and his own, been instructed to treat General Williams with due respect, and to receive his advice with unreserved confidence.

There is no denying that much delay has taken place in carrying out these important measures; but it would not be fair to overlook the Porte's embarrassments in other quarters, the constant pressure of business from all sides perplexing and harassing its Ministers, the state of abeyance into which the frost and snows of winter have necessarily thrown an army cantoned at an elevation of several thousand feet above the sea, the illness of Ismail Pasha, and his subsequent appointment to the command of Omer Pasha's army during the absence of that General in the Crimea with a considerable portion of it.

I have now to conclude by acknowledging without disguise that there exists no record of my having applied in writing for a formal recognition of General Williams as Her Majesty's Commissioner to the army of Kars. On looking back to your Lordship's instructions I cannot but admit that, in strict propriety, I ought to have done so, and I am really at a loss to discover how it happened that I omitted so obvious a formality. In the absence of any apparent reason for the omission, I must presume that the very facilities of my position with respect to the Turkish Ministers, betrayed me into an inadvertency which I regret, though, in point of fact, it was of so little practical importance as to escape the notice of General Williams himself, in so far as my recollection serves, and to leave him in full possession of the advantages imparted to him by his public character, and the confidence of Her Majesty's Government. His own correspondence has abundantly recorded the attention and honour with which he was received at Erzeroum and at Kars.

In a despatch, dated Erzeroum the 15th September, he uses these words: "I arrived here yesterday, and was received by the civil and military authorities with every possible honour."

In a despatch of the 24th from Kars, he expresses himself thus: "Having yesterday encamped at an hour's distance from the Turkish army, I entered their camp this evening, escorted by a squadron of Cavalry, and was received by two battalions of Infantry. I instantly waited on the Mushir, and his Excellency gave me a hearty welcome, at once promising me every facility in obtaining the necessary information for framing the report, which I informed him was the first object of my mission to his head-quarters."

In another despatch of the 26th of same month, there is the following passage: "The Mushir passed 10,600 Infantry (7,200 Regulars and 3,400 Redifi) in review before me this morning, they being the disposable men in this camp.

"The men off duty, the sick, together with 2,000 Infantry, encamped an hour from Kars, will bring the total up to 14,000 bayonets."

Surely, my Lord, there are no symptoms here of any disrespect to Her Majesty's Commissioner, who at that time, in military rank, was a simple Lieutenant-Colonel. Whatever feelings of a less respectful character were, as the General supposes, afterwards engendered amongst the Turkish authorities against that zealous officer, it is natural to attribute them to subsequent occurrences; and, after all, it is manifest that they did not prevent him from searching into all the details of the several military departments, and obtaining the execution of those arrangements which he thought it his duty to recommend for the comfort of the soldiers during winter, and their future efficacy in the field.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 172.

Form of Address on a Letter.

(Translation.)

With the grace of the Most High.

TO the most noble presence of the possessor of rank and nobility, his Excellency Williams Bey,* a military chief, Commander of the exalted Government of England, residing at Erzeroom.

No. 173.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 52.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 22, 1855.*

THE Sultan on being reminded privately by me of his promise that the "haratch" should be abolished, admitted the pledge, which he had so graciously given, and ordered my interpreter to see the Grand Vizier upon the subject, in order that his Highness might communicate with the Sheik-ul-Islam and settle the most advisable mode of proceeding. His Majesty, in explanation of the delay which had occurred, remarked that an imposition which had been enforced at Constantinople during four centuries, required some little time and some little consideration for its removal.

I have frequently pressed this important measure on Reshid Pasha, who is well disposed in principle, but apprehensive of producing discontent. I have told him repeatedly that if the Porte will secure a better administration of justice to the Sultan's Mussulman subjects, by means of suitable enactments properly guaranteed, they will not object to any reasonable relief acceded to the Rayahs. My firm conviction is that the "haratch" might in that case be frankly abolished without more ado. His Highness assures me that important measures of reform, which have been long in preparation, will be shortly promulgated; but in spite of the best intentions, I fear that several weeks may yet elapse before his assurances are realized.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 174.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 55.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 22, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship copies of despatches lately received from Her Majesty's Consul at Varna. Among other interesting matter they contain particulars relative to the late invasion of the Dobrudscha by a body of Russian troops. I add a copy of a memorandum on the latter subject which I have received from Mr. Colquhoun.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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* The form of addressing Ambassadors, Christian Princes, under the suzeraineté of the Porte.

Inclosure 1 in No. 174.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, January 14, 1855.*

WITH respect to the general subject of the supply of provisions for the Turkish army, I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Excellency, that great progress has already been made at Varna and at Bourgas in the purchase of a considerable quantity.

When I had last the honour to address your Excellency upon this subject, and when also Mashar Pasha proceeded to Constantinople regarding it, the authorities at Varna had declared the impossibility of procuring the quantity of stores of every kind which had been required of them, nor indeed would it have been practicable to have done so, if the usual system had been adopted, of making requisitions on the villages. But in my interview with the Mustechar Mahmoud Bey, and subsequently with his Highness Omer Pasha, I repeatedly and forcibly laid before them the practicability of purchasing a not inconsiderable quantity of provisions at Varna which were on the spot, and pointed out the merchants in whose hands they were. His Highness Omer Pasha and Mahmoud Bey, upon this, having overruled the usual scruples and difficulties made by the local authorities to deal with European merchants, or offer them terms which they would accept, the whole of the provisions I have referred to have been bought, and in great part already shipped; they consisted of 65,000 okes of rice, 2,500 kilos of barley, 1,000 kantars of biscuit; other purchases have also been made from other merchants. But I more especially laid great stress on the fact that there was actually in the Government stores at Varna nearly 100,000 kilos of wheat, which had hitherto been represented to be unavailable for the troops, because it could not, without great delay and difficulties, be reduced into flour; but I acquainted Omer Pasha and Mahmoud Bey that I had ascertained from the principal French Commissariat Officer in Varna, the Baron de Durand, that he would not object to allow the Turkish authorities in Varna to avail themselves for a fortnight of the steam flour-mill of Messrs. Charnaud, which had been engaged for six months by the French authorities; and this most important advantage has been taken advantage of by the positive orders of his Highness Omer Pasha and of the Mustechar, although this, the sole means of obtaining a large supply of flour at Varna, itself the port of shipment, had been rejected by Osman Bey and the ordinary local authorities, upon the plea that the merchants (Messrs. Charnaud) had demanded too much for the use of their mill, while, in fact, they had only sought to obtain equal profits to those which they derived from the French Commissariat.

The general result of the adoption of all these practical measures on the part of his Highness Omer Pasha and the Mustechar, is, that in regard to the chief essentials of biscuit or flour, a sufficient supply may now be assured for an army of 40,000 men for three months, and rice, if issued three times a-week, for six weeks. Further supplies will be purchased at Varna whenever they can be found.

At Bourgas, Mashar Pasha (Sir Stephen Lakeman), who is likely to remain there, I understand, for some time, has made considerable purchases of supplies, of the precise nature or quantities of which I am not acquainted; but I am informed that among these there are 30,000 Constantinople kilos of barley, equal to one month's supply for 1,000 horses.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 174.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, January 14, 1855.*

I YESTERDAY waited upon his Highness Omer Pasha, in the view of ascertaining if his Highness had received any authentic information respecting the number and composition of the Russian force which has again invaded the

Dobrudscha, and his Highness informs me that the reports he had received from that district represent the Russian force to consist of seven battalions of Infantry and four regiments of Cossacks, and that these troops were chiefly concentrated between Babadagh and Toultcha. His Highness said that he did not attach much importance to this movement on the part of the Russians, who had evidently undertaken it as a diversion, in the hopes of retarding the departure of the Turkish expedition from Varna to the Crimea. But his Highness Ismael Pasha was to send two or three regiments of Cavalry into the Dobrudscha, and that two battalions of Infantry would reinforce the garrison of Silistria. I observed to his Highness, that I presumed the chief evil arising out of the presence of the Russians in the Dobrudscha was that the communication between Rassova and Kustendje and Mangolia, which was at present made use of for the transport of provisions for the Turkish army about to embark at Varna, would be cut off. His Highness replied that it would have this effect at present, but that the supplies which had as yet been dispatched, had arrived safely at Baltchik, and that the forwarding of further supplies from Rassova had been suspended.

From other sources, however, I am informed that supplies had also been collected at Matchin, and that they have in all probability fallen into the hands of the enemy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 174.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, January* 14, 1855.

SINCE I had the honour of addressing your Excellency this morning by my despatch No. 7, I have again waited upon his Highness Omer Pasha, who informs me that he has received despatches from Toultcha, acquainting him that the Russians who had crossed over in the night of the 7th or 8th instant, had again all recrossed the Danube into Bessarabia. His Highness states that their numbers also had been exaggerated in the previous reports from Toultcha. However, his Highness informs me that they carried off with them about 100 of the Turkish inhabitants, some cattle, and such provisions as they found in the neighbourhood.

I apprehend, however, that the fact of the Russians having crossed the Danube, and of their having committed these ravages, with the possibility of their doing so again at any moment, renders all communication between the Danube and the sea coast across the Dobrudscha, impracticable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 174.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, January* 14, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches Nos. 1 and 2 of the 29th instant, and I have to report to your Lordship, that having presented to the Governor of Varna the Vizirial letters transmitted to me by your Lordship, directing him to afford all the assistance in his power to the Commissioner and Engineers which your Lordship is expecting to arrive from England, under contract to lay down a submarine telegraph between Varna and Balaklava, the Pasha assures me that he will not fail to do everything in his power to facilitate this work. The only want on the part of the Engineer which I can anticipate, is that of a station house conveniently situated near the sea, and at a point clear of the shipping or of boats; and with this view, I will fix upon upon two or three houses, and obtain the promise of

the Governor to hold them at the Engineer's disposal should this be in his power; but the houses in Varna being all private property, I apprehend they must be rented from the proprietors.

In regard to the subject of your Lordship's despatch No. 2, I have the honour to state, that Mr. Cadogan informed me that no measures had as yet been adopted by the French Government to form the intended line of Electric Telegraph between Bucharest, Rustchuk, and Varna, or at least the work has not been commenced at either end of the line.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 174.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, January* 17, 1855.

I YESTERDAY received a letter from Mr. Cunningham, dated Galatz the 11th instant. He writes: "The Austrians have about 5,000 or 6,000 men in Jassy, 3,500 in Galatz, and altogether in Moldavia not over 11,000 or 12,000 men, without artillery. In Wallachia perhaps 20,000 men; so that they have not in all more than 32,000 men. I believe that should war be declared, the Austrians will retire from Galatz and Jassy, in order to concentrate; and I am told the Moldavian Government has already taken measures to transfer itself to Romano. Whether the Russians will enter remains to be seen."

With respect to the number of Austrian troops in the two provinces, your Lordship will have been more exactly informed by Mr. Colquhoun. The French Military Commissioner, Colonel Dieu, however, informs me that they amount to 45,000. Mr. Cunningham adds, "It is generally estimated that the Russians have 30,000 men in Bessarabia."

I have, &c.
Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 6 in No. 174.

Memorandum noted down of a Letter communicated to Mr. Colquhoun by an Official Person, night of January 10, 1855.

Letter dated Ibraila, January 9.

"CINQ bateaux-à-vapeur, sept chaloupes canonières et un nombre de kerlatz (lighters) remorqués par une vapeur, ont conduit à Toultcha un détachement de troupes Russes, qui d'après les renseignements donnés par les Cosaques de l'armée Ottomane montaient à dix ou douze bataillons d'Infanterie, quelques escadrons de Cavalerie et un régiment de Cosaques avec Artillerie.

"Après une lutte d'une heure avec les Cosaques Ottomanes, qui ne montaient qu'à un Sotnia, ceux-ci se sont retirés, et les Russes ont occupé Toultcha.

"Dans cette lutte il y a eu un Capitaine et trente soldats parmi les Turcs qui ont été tués ou blessés.

"Des forces Russes débarquées, deux bataillons, avec Artillerie sont restés à Toultcha. Six colonnes d'Infanterie et de Cavalerie, ainsi que le régiment de Cosaques, se sont dirigés sur Babadagh en brûlant les villages en route, et sont avancés sur Kustendje pour intercepter la route de Baltchik; les autres se sont dirigés sur Matchin.

"Le restant de la Sotnia de Cosaques Ottomanes qui se sont battus à Toultcha, est retourné à Ibraïla.

"Achmet Pacha a ordonné aux troupes Ottomanes qui avaient déjà passé à Matchin, de retourner à Ibraïla."

No. 175.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 57.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 22, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of two despatches which I have addressed to Brigadier-General Williams; the one in reply to some remarks contained in his late despatches, the other inclosing letters from the Seraskier to the new Mushir of Anatolia, relative to Dr. Sandwith and other persons whose employment has been solicited by General Williams.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 175.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Brigadier-General Williams.

Sir, *Constantinople, January 20, 1855.*

I CANNOT more suitably acknowledge the zeal which you have displayed in calling my attention to a letter in the "Impartial" newspaper, eulogising Mustapha Zarif Pasha, than by informing you that the late Commander-in-chief of the eastern frontier army continues under arrest preparatory to his trial. The letter itself was certainly misplaced under the circumstances; but the Turkish press is, habitually, quite as full of incongruities as our own, and the very limited circulation of the "Impartial," in a language which is not that of Turkey, reduces the practical importance of the publication to a figure not greatly above zero. Some indulgence may also be granted to the friends of a "fallen man" labouring under accusation on grave charges, and previously so respectable in some parts of his conduct as to have made his appointment at Kars a subject of hope with those who knew him best. You may remember that you were, yourself, gratified with the reception and "cordial welcome" which he gave you in his camp near Kars no longer ago than last September; and I inclose herewith, for your consideration, extracts of two letters previously addressed to me by Her Majesty's Consul at Erzeroom, which show the favourable opinions entertained originally of the Mushir, as well by him as by General Guyon.

However correct the news which you give me "from the Turkish capital" may have been when your correspondent wrote, the French Colonel Count de Melfray, if I am correctly informed, has long since gone on to Paris. I had no opportunity of making his acquaintance, but it has come to my knowledge that he spoke in praise of Zarif Pasha to the Grand Vizier, and made no mention of you to his Highness, whatever he may have done elsewhere. This, no doubt, is a significant circumstance, considering M. de Melfray's position. The Pasha's sheet anchor is, however, the Seraskier himself, and the favour which he may still, to little purpose, expect from that quarter is a result of their antecedent relations here.

The classical expression which you apply to the corruptions of the Seraskier's department is, unfortunately, applicable, with few exceptions, to the whole extent of this Empire and its government, nor has it been the least laborious or the least invidious part of my duty, during more than ten years, to expose and correct a state of things which lies too deep to be cured by anything short of a sweeping and searching reform of the whole system.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 175.

Consul Brant to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Extract.) *Erzeroom, April 7, 1854.*

THE European Generals are held in much esteem by the new Mushir Zarif Mustapha Pasha; he attends to all their suggestions. Many improvements have been effected in the health of the men, their food, their quarters, and their discipline.

Inclosure 3 in No. 175.

Consul Brant to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Extract.) *Erzeroom, April 10, 1854.*

THE General tells me that Zarif Mustapha and the Musteshar Riza Bey were talking of resigning, so much were they discouraged by the want of almost everything, particularly of money, of which the military chest had been entirely emptied, there being debts to the extent of 40,000 purses, and monthly outgoings of about 12,000 purses. He tried to encourage them with the hope that money would come. In the latter part of the letter, which extended over five days, he says it was reported that the Mushir and Musteshar were to be recalled. On this he remarks that the Mushir is a good man, but not being brought up a soldier does not understand what he should do; when he sees some things in order he thinks all are right, but does not know that a link in the chain is wanting, and destroys its efficacy: but still, he is the best Mushir they have had, and would do well could the General be always at his elbow, but he has so many duties to perform which he cannot trust to others that that is quite impossible.

I find the Musteshar Riza Bey a perfect gentleman, and were I Mushir I do not know a man I should so much wish to have at my side as Riza Bey. I hope both will remain while the war lasts, as I should not find two others who like Europeans as they do; besides, the Mushir is a patriot and an honest man, who acts up to his duty. Do write to Lord Stratford to use his influence to prevent his recall.

Inclosure 4 in No. 175.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Brigadier-General Williams.

Sir, *Constantinople, January 16, 1855.*

INCLOSED herewith are two letters in Turkish with English translations, addressed on my demand by the Seraskier Pasha to the new provincial Mushir of the army of Anatolia. One relates to Dr. Sandwith, the other to Major Tashlar and Emin Bey, both in accordance with your request.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 176.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 16. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Copenhagen, January 26, 1855.*

IN the course of the conversation with M. de Scheel, reported to your Lordship in my preceding number, his Excellency having endeavoured to dispose of the question under discussion by expressing a hope that peace was about to be re-established, I said to him that whatever his hopes might be I was convinced he did not believe that there was any probability of their being realized, and

that in my opinion he would do well to look the future in the face, and think seriously on the line of policy which he ought to follow as most conducive to the interests of his country in the event of a general war. I repeated to him much of what I said on previous occasions to his predecessor on this subject, spoke of the disadvantageous position which Denmark would occupy by remaining neutral if Sweden should become a belligerent, and reminded him that the interests of Denmark would not be taken into consideration at a general peace if she selfishly withheld the trifling sacrifices which she might be expected to make for the common cause, and declined affording any assistance to the Powers who were fighting for the independence of Europe.

M. de Scheel replied that Sweden might certainly eventually consider it her interest to become a belligerent, and that Denmark might also consider it advisable to do the same, but that he could not understand why the Western Powers should think it of any importance whether Denmark renounced her neutrality or retained it, as they already derived from her harbours almost all the advantages which she could offer them as an ally. He said that he therefore trusted she would at all events not be forced to lay aside her neutrality.

I said there was at present no question of forcing her to act otherwise than as she might think best for herself, and that Her Majesty's Government had given her ample assurances as to her neutrality being respected; but, though I had no instructions to say so to him, I knew that her cooperation would be thankfully accepted, and were she to offer it she would obtain all the advantages of a belligerent, without being called upon to make any sacrifices of importance, whereas under her present circumstances she would have to furnish a contingent to the German Confederation, without gaining the goodwill of any one.

M. de Scheel said I must, however, remember that Denmark had great difficulties to contend with; that in the first place her financial resources were limited; and in the second her geographical position exposed her to many dangers. He said that he had entire confidence in England; that he trusted fully in the justice of Her Majesty's Government, and felt assured that as long as Denmark acted an honest and a friendly part towards England, which she would always do, she would have nothing to fear from her. "But," said he, "are we equally safe with respect to France?" His Excellency then, after observing that the French Government had been endeavouring to induce Denmark to renounce her neutrality, went on to say, "Let us suppose that a Power had given us to understand that Prussia wished a part of our territory as an inducement to go to war, and that we should afterwards learn that the Power in question had actually offered our territory to Prussia, what would you think of our position towards that Power?"

I replied that if he meant that France had offered Holstein to Prussia, I did not believe it. I said that your Lordship had once remarked to me in a private letter that if Her Majesty's Government were dishonest enough to hold out a hope that the Schleswig-Holstein question should be re-opened, there was little doubt that they might have thus obtained much support in Germany; that something of the same kind may have been said by the Emperor of the French or by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that the expression of such an opinion may have been perverted by others in order to excite distrust against the Western Powers, but that I felt assured no overture of the kind had ever been made to Prussia.

M. de Scheel finding me hold this language, replied he had not stated that such an offer had been made, nor did he believe it, and that he had merely spoken to me of a supposition.

I have thought it right, however, to mention this part of our conversation to your Lordship, though from not being yet much acquainted with M. de Scheel, I do not know what value I ought to attach to his observations, and though it appeared from some other remarks which he made to me that he is apt to hazard assertions with a view to gain information.

I touched upon the subject slightly in a conversation this morning with my French colleague, but he either attached no importance to what I said, or wished me to believe so. I have hitherto always found him to act towards me with the confidence which I have a right to expect; but if he has had any instructions to press the Danish Government to declare itself, he has not mentioned the circumstance to me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 177.

Mr. Hudson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 17.)

My Lord, *Turin, January 29, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Sardinian contingent, under the Convention of the 26th instant, will probably consist of 15,000 men of all arms, of 2,000 horses, of 36 guns, and of 264 wheeled vehicles of one sort and another.

It is for this number that the Sardinian Government will require the means of transport from Her Majesty's Government.

There will probably be a further number of 500 men attached to the train, hospitals and other departments of the Sardinian contingent, for which the Sardinian Government will themselves endeavour to find the means of transport.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES HUDSON.

No. 178.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received February 2.)

Sir, *Admiralty, February 2, 1855.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you a copy of instructions they have addressed to Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, relative to the raising of the blockade of the mouths of the Danube; and I am to request you will, with reference to your letter of yesterday's date, lay the same before the Earl of Clarendon, in order that his Lordship may make the necessary communication by to-night's mail to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. A. B. HAMILTON.

Inclosure in No. 178.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons.

Sir, *Admiralty, February 2, 1855.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you, for your information and guidance, copies of the following documents, relating to the blockade of the mouths of the Danube:

Extract of letter from the Foreign Office, dated the 28th of January;

Answer from Admiralty to Foreign Office, dated the 29th of January;

Letter from Foreign Office, dated the 1st instant, with inclosure from Lord Cowley.

And I am to signify their Lordship's directions to you to take the necessary measures, in concert with Vice-Admiral Bruat, for raising without delay the blockade of the mouths of the Danube, and to use every exertion to prevent the entrance of munitions of war, or the egress of the same from that river; maintaining for that purpose a sufficient number of cruisers in the vicinity, with directions to them to exercise the utmost vigilance to effect the object in view.

You will take the earliest opportunity of transmitting to this office a formal notification of the date on which the blockade shall have been raised.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. A. B. HAMILTON.

No. 179

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 14.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, January* 30, 1855.

THE secret note attached to Count Buol's open circular of the 14th of January is creating an extraordinary sensation in Germany.

The paragraphs of that note to which attention is mainly drawn are those in which Austria offers the German Princes who adhere to her policy a guarantee of their existing territories, and eventual advantages on the conclusion of peace, with the recommendation to place their contingents at the disposal of the Emperor of Austria.

It is represented by the antagonists of Austrian policy that this note is a flagrant and needless violation of the federal compact; that it is a provocation to division, and a step towards the dissolution of the Diet.

The XLIInd Article of the Final Act of Vienna, copy of which I beg to annex, provided (as it is alleged) a legal mode of resolving the difficulty, in case the proposals made by Austria in the Diet were rejected.

Austria has preferred, in her usual arbitrary way of proceeding, to take an extra-legal course.

Such are the reproaches addressed to the Cabinet of Vienna, founded upon this secret note to the several German Governments, and it does certainly seem most unfortunate that, in such a crisis, Austria should appear as endeavouring to make her profit of the petty jealousies and sordid ambition of dynastic egotism, rather than make the effectual appeal which she might have addressed to the patriotism and public spirit of the people of Germany, in support of a cause of which the principles are so generally and so warmly espoused by all classes excepting those who hold power, if she had indeed resolved to emancipate herself from the trammels and endless delays of the proceedings of the Diet.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

Inclosure in No. 179.

Article XLII of the Final Act of Vienna.

ART. XLII. Si la question préalable relative à l'existence du danger est décidée négativement par la majorité des voix, ceux des Etats confédérés qui ne partagent pas l'avis de la majorité, conservent le droit de concerter entre eux des mesures de défense commune.

No. 180.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 3.)

(No 15. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, January* 30, 1855.

I WAS last evening confidentially informed that a compromise was in progress respecting the propositions intended to be submitted to the Diet, reported in my despatch, No. 9, of the 24th instant, and that the changes likely to be made appear to be altogether to the advantage of Prussian policy.

I am assured that the proposal of mobilising the portion of the federal contingents would have been rejected by an even decision of votes, or only carried by a majority of one, and that Austria has now the intention of only proposing a partial preparation (bereitschaft) of the federal contingents, and altogether lets drop the invitation to elect a General-in-chief.

The Military Commission will sit either to-day or to-morrow to prepare the terms of the proposition to be made in the ordinary sitting of the Diet, on Tuesday, February 1.

It is, I think, very evident that the Austrian Government by the secret note annexed to the circular despatch of the 14th instant, alluded to in my preceding despatch of this day's date, has furnished arms against herself, and that the portion of ascendancy which she was regaining is again more than balanced.

Under these circumstances it is impossible not to recognize the strength of the ties, to which I have so often directed your Lordship's attention, which prevent Austria from separating herself from Germany.

In this respect the actual amount and position of the Russian force on her frontier command the utmost caution, and there seems to be every prospect that lapse of time, by increasing the relative disproportion of the military means of the two Empires, will bind Austria still more imperatively to the policy of expectancy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 181.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 51.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January* 31, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship a return of the force and position of the effective Austrian army destined for active operations in the field, which has been furnished to me by General Hess, and which I forward for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 181.

Amount of the Imperial Austrian Troops equipped for the field

	Men.	Cavalry.	Guns.
2nd Army (together with the Corps d'Armée in the Danubian Principalities)	139,600	16,500	384
4th Army	106,300	22,200	336
Amount of the two Armies in the field	245,900	40,700	720
Reserve at their disposal within 2 months	33,000	5,000	152
Reserve at their disposal within 3 months	45,000	..	208
Total	323,900	45,700	1,080

No. 182.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 53.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January* 31, 1855.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches Nos. 21 and 24, which relate to the proceedings which took place at the meetings between Count Buol, Baron Bourqueney, and myself, and Prince Gortchakoff, on the 28th of December last, and the 7th of January of this year.

These despatches—one dated the 21st, brought by General Crawfurd; the other the 24th, by the messenger Robbins—reached me within a few hours of each other.

Before proceeding to detail to your Lordship the result of my interview with Count Buol upon the subject of these despatches, I will beg leave to explain the grounds of the proceedings which I thought it my duty to adopt at these meetings, and first to state that I did so in pursuance of the instructions by your Lordship addressed to me in your despatch No. 422 of the 18th December, in which I am directed, after having obtained from Count Buol an adherence on the part of the Austrian Government to the interpretation of the four bases by an identic note (which was afterwards agreed should be by Protocol), which was carried into effect by the "Protocole réservé" of the 28th—to ascertain, before the question of negotiation could be entertained, that Russia, without reserve, adopts that interpretation; and I was to take care that Prince Gortchakoff was not left in doubt as to the true scope and meaning of the third basis, "the vagueness of which is unavoidable, because the events of war must determine the mode in which it will be carried into effect."

Your Lordship will allow me to state that I was made particularly anxious not to overstep the precise instructions thus given me, or to allow myself to enter into any explanations beyond what was stated in the identic interpretation of the bases which was consigned in the Protocol, because in your confidential communication of the same date as the despatch, and in that of the 26th of December, you state, "if a preliminary *pourparler* is to take place, do not let it be called a Conference, or entering upon negotiation; an accidental meeting at Count Buol's might do;" and you confirm this in your second communication by saying that your aversion to anything partaking of conference or negotiation remains unaltered.

It was under these instructions that my conduct was regulated, both at the first meeting, on the 28th December, and at the second, on the 7th January, for between these periods your Lordship addressed to me no other directions whatever. I was therefore surprised to find, in your Lordship's despatch No. 21, the remark that "it does not appear that any *procès-verbal* was taken of the Conference of the 7th January, or that Prince Gortchakoff's acceptance of the bases was certified by his signature to any written document;" an omission which your Lordship states "may be the cause of embarrassment hereafter, and is a matter of much regret to Her Majesty's Government."

I beg in reply to assure you that it was in the anxious desire to fulfil your Lordship's intentions, as expressed in the above-cited instructions, that I abstained, in as far as I was concerned, either to give to these meetings the character of a conference, or, by the proposal of recording their proceedings in a *procès-verbal*, to give them any appearance of their partaking of the character of negotiations, which they certainly must have assumed if the form of a *procès-verbal* had been introduced.

But I conceived that every object your Lordship had in view had been obtained by the reading which took place of the interpretation of the four bases, which had been entrusted to Prince Gortchakoff at the first meeting, and which had been transmitted by him to St. Petersburgh, and to which he stated that he agreed as a basis on which to commence negotiations. Count Buol, Baron Bourqueney, and myself were the witnesses of his acceptance of the interpretation, which was recapitulated to him, and of which he had been in possession since the 28th December, of the exact import of which he, therefore, could in no way be ignorant, and to which he explicitly stated that he adhered as embodying the principles upon which the negotiation might be commenced.

Your Lordship states in your despatch No. 24, that Prince Gortchakoff was allowed to read and to discuss the terms of the very same document which he had placed in the hands of Count Buol the day after the meeting of the 28th of December, which "either from ignorance of that fact, or from inadvertence, I have omitted to notice." I have to reply, in the first place, that I was in total ignorance of that fact, until two days after the meeting of the 7th of January; I had refused to enter into any consideration of any document presented by Prince Gortchakoff after the meeting of the 28th of December, unless it was a distinct acceptance of the interpretation we had submitted to him. I therefore never saw that document, nor, although it was proposed, would I take any cognizance of it, and it was only two days after the second

meeting (as I reported to your Lordship at the time), that Count Buol informed me that it was the same document; but with respect to any discussion having taken place upon it, I deny any such discussion, or my having in any way taken part in anything which I should have thought so contrary to the instructions under which I was acting. I could not, nor did I feel that any of the Representatives could, prevent Prince Gortchakoff from reading a paper, the contents of which we were not acquainted with; but I beg to declare distinctly, that it was not stated to be "the embodiment of instructions received by Prince Gortchakoff from his Government," nor did we agree to its examination with the memorandum of the interpretation which we had submitted to him; nor was there any discussion as to the terms of the two documents, nor as to any real difference which might exist as to the construction placed by them on the preliminary bases.

I am therefore not surprised that your Lordship has found no trace of such proceedings in my report of this meeting.

There certainly was some conversation upon what was taking place, but the termination of the proceedings was the reading by M. de Bourqueney of the extract of the memorandum containing the interpretation as consigned in the "Protocole réservé," the acceptance of that interpretation as containing the principles upon which the negotiation might be entered upon by Prince Gortchakoff, and the withdrawal by him of the document which he had read, of which no trace remained.

When these transactions had taken place, I felt that I was authorized by the last paragraph of your Lordship's instruction in your despatch No. 422 of the 18th of December, to inform Prince Gortchakoff that as soon as the Representatives of England, France, and Turkey received their full powers, negotiations might be commenced. I did not propose, nor did any other person, that a *procès-verbal* should then be signed, because your Lordship's instruction says, "negotiations may be commenced upon the bases of which the interpretation shall thus have been recorded in a formal document." That formal document was the "Protocole réservé," and the extract from it which had been placed in Prince Gortchakoff's hands on the 28th of December (which had therefore been about a fortnight in his possession), which had been transmitted by him to St. Petersburgh, and upon which he had received the instructions of his Government, and which had not again been read to him. This paper was therefore considered to represent the formal document to which your Lordship alluded, and no Representative at the meeting who was cognisant of the letter of my instructions, ever doubted for a moment that by the acceptation by Prince Gortchakoff of that document, your Lordship's intentions had been fully carried out.

Soon after I had received your Lordship's two despatches Nos. 21 and 24, Baron Bourqueney brought to me an instruction he had received from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, which he read to me, and which stated that the French Government had not been able entirely to conform themselves to the views of Her Majesty's Government, as recorded in these despatches, regarding the nature of the communications to be made to the Austrian Cabinet. In the first place they objected to detail the restrictions to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, namely, the destruction of the arsenals in the Crimea, and the future limitation of the number of Russian ships of war, and although they would not give rise to any appearance of dissension upon this point from the requirements of England, Baron Bourqueney was desired to mention it only conversationally to Count Buol, after I should have, in the fulfilment of my instructions, brought the question before the latter. The second point of difference was as to the elucidation of the question whether Prince Gortchakoff had accepted, and whether Count Buol recognized his having done so, the interpretation of the four bases as the principle on which a negotiation could be established. M. Drouyn de Lhuys recommends that this object should be carried into effect at a conference of the three Representatives, to which Prince Gortchakoff should be invited, when it should be proposed to him to sign a *procès-verbal* recording (constatant) his acceptance of this interpretation. M. Drouyn de Lhuys instructed M. de Bourqueney to bring these two proposals to my knowledge, and to invite me to adopt them, stating that he had not had time to bring them before your Lordship, but as it was of importance that M. de Bourqueney and myself should act in conformity with each other, he had

little doubt your Lordship would agree to the alterations he had suggested. I replied to M. de Bourqueney that I very much regretted that I did not feel myself authorized to adhere to his propositions, and that particularly with regard to the second I foresaw so many objections that I was obliged to decline their adoption.

I then waited on Count Buol, and I first read to him your Lordship's despatch No. 21. He remarked upon the expression of your Lordship's distrust of the sincerity of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh in accepting the interpretation of the four bases; that he could not pretend to guide or to judge of the feelings by which any person was inspired, either towards an individual or a Cabinet, but he hoped your Lordship had now sufficient acquaintance with the policy and conduct of Austria, to be convinced that the shallow pretences which you put forward as likely to be adopted by Russia to distract Austria from the performance of engagements she had contracted with the allies, would not be crowned with any success.

With respect to your Lordship's proposition that England and France should come to an understanding with Austria as to the meaning of the IIIrd Article of the interpretation of the bases, and your reasons for requiring it, Count Buol said, and he afterwards wrote down in my presence the following words:—"Quant au troisième point, le Protocole réservé est notre évangile. L'équilibre doit être établi, la prépondérance Russe doit cesser, la modalité dépendra des succès des opérations militaires. Nous resterons fidèles aux engagements contractés, mais nous n'avons nulle envie d'en élargir le cercle, et d'assumer de nouvelles responsabilités."

With regard to your Lordship's despatch No. 24 of the 22nd instant, which, equally with No. 21, I read to Count Buol, and in which your Lordship states, after recapitulating the discrepancies which exist between the account of the last meeting with Prince Gortchakoff of the 7th instant, and that which is given by Baron Bourqueney and myself; he stated, and he wrote down in my presence the following words: "Il ne peut point y avoir d'équivoque sur l'impression que nous avons de l'adhésion que le Prince Gortchakoff a donné aux quatre principes: il peut y avoir doute sur la pensée intime de ce dernier; mais pour tirer cela au clair, il n'y a que l'entrée en négociation. Rien de si naturel que de ce que notre dépêche du 8 et le rapport de Lord Westmorland n'aient pas été identiques. Notre dépêche n'a été qu'un résumé de notre réunion; le rapport de Lord Westmorland en contenait les détails consciencieux."

I hope I have thus, to your Lordship's satisfaction, fulfilled the views with which you have addressed to me the despatches Nos. 21 and 24. The distinct acknowledgment by Count Buol of his understanding of the meaning of the IIIrd Article of the bases, as well as his decision to take no further engagement upon the eventual application of that interpretation, are clearly brought before you. He would object to bind himself beyond the interpretation, which, upon your Lordship's proposal, he has agreed to in the "Protocole réservé," and upon the reasons stated in that interpretation, that "quant aux arrangements à prendre à cet égard, ils dépendent trop des événements de la guerre pour qu'on puisse, dès à présent, en arrêter les bases; il suffit d'en indiquer le principe."

Count Buol desired me to tell your Lordship that no Power whatever was so much interested as Austria, that a Russian force either by sea or land should not be able to occupy or establish itself at Constantinople, and, therefore, that you may be convinced, when the fitting time shall arrive, that the Imperial Government will not be behindhand in seeking the establishment of such barriers to any aggression of this nature as may be calculated to preserve Austria and Europe from the dangers and convulsions which would necessarily accompany such an attempted conquest. He says "attempted," because he feels that such a conquest could not be effected as long as Austria is in a position, by the entry of her armies into Bulgaria and Roumelia in aid of the Sultan, to threaten the retreat of a Russian force which might have adventured itself in Constantinople, as it would be impossible for it to establish itself permanently in that capital, and its retirement from thence would be rendered perilous in the extreme, if not impossible, by the position of the Austrian army.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 183.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.— (Received February 5.)

(No 33.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 2, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose, in translation, an article from the newspaper "Zeit," which is considered to be the organ of Baron Manteuffel, upon the subject of the secret circular despatch of Count Buol of the 14th ultimo.

It has caused some sensation at Berlin, and was considered so offensive by the Austrian Minister at this Court, that he has thought it his duty to call Count Buol's attention to it. The latter part is indeed written in such an acrimonious spirit, that if the paper had a wide circulation in Germany, it might be supposed that the Prussian Government had determined on the adoption of a policy directly hostile to Austria, but this can scarcely yet be the case. However Count Esterhazy felt his position to be one of so much delicacy here, that he has thought it advisable to hold a personal conversation with Count Buol, and has gone to Vienna for a few days.

I likewise annex herewith a copy in French translation of the Austrian secret circular of the 14th of January, to which the accompanying article refers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 183.

Extract from the "Zeit" of January 30, 1855.

(Translation.) *Berlin, January 29, 1855.*

WE do not positively know whether the text given of the secret circular despatch of Count Buol of the 14th instant, which we gave in our yesterday's number from the Dusseldorff paper, is authentic. We will wait to see whether they are enabled at Vienna to disavow this document. It cannot indeed be doubted from intelligence which has lately appeared in the press that there exists a despatch of the Austrian Cabinet of some such a nature. We again find that the document in question contains everything which has been notified from the most opposite quarters—offers of guarantee for the possession and the territorial position of the German States, a promise of participation in the advantages to be attained by the war, and finally the command-in-chief of the Emperor of Austria over the contingents to be furnished by the German States. We may therefore be permitted, until proof of the contrary, to consider the secret despatch of the 14th instant as genuine.

The Imperial Cabinet in Vienna is apprehensive that "Prussia may attempt still to persevere for some time longer in her undecided policy." They (the Imperial Cabinet) will indeed first strive for the attainment of constitutional decrees of the Diet, and will take upon themselves the consequences of such decrees; but they are not certain themselves whether the attainment of such a decree of the Diet as Austria is desirous of can really be expected. Now in such event, that is if the proposition submitted to the Diet by Baron Prokesch on the 22nd instant should be constitutionally rejected, Austria wishes to learn the intentions of those German Governments which are disposed, independently of the decree of the Diet to unite with Austria, or in other words to contract a separate Treaty with her.

Such an accession to Austria taking place beyond the Federal Constitution could not certainly be called an alliance for those States who might agree to it. Austria only wishes for the contingents of her German Confederates who may desert from the Federal Constitution, and join her. She barters for this the formal promise that their possessions and territorial position shall be guaranteed; indeed what is more, that they shall even have a share in the advantages of the war in proportion to the forces employed. It remains naturally reserved to Austria how these promises shall be afterwards fulfilled. The union with

Austria would signify nothing else than passing from a constitutional federal position to an Austrian vassalage. We are eager to know, if only any single one of the German Federal States will feel itself called upon to lend an ear to the Vienna siren-song. At all events the history of the present time will have to record this attempt of Austrian diplomacy against the political union of Germany for the maintenance and protection of which, at a time when it was justly and really questionable, Austria once exhibited such zealous efforts. If the Imperial Cabinet of Vienna exerted itself confidentially with the German Governments for votes in support of their proposal to mobilise, this might be blameable, for such conduct is always a manœuvre. But if the German Governments should be reduced to a desertion from the federal unity by a promise of advantages certainly of quite an indefinite character, we forbear to say how this action is to be denominated. This, however, is certain, that it is not honourably German. Advantages! For the first time since the "great question" is pending, we see this word used in an official document by the Austrian Government. Does then Austria seek "advantages"? This is quite new. What she seeks has not been thoroughly known up to the present hour, for the objects at which the Austrian policy aims are so continually concealed, that they may indeed be guessed, but by no means known with certainty. Now it is known Austria seeks advantages, for otherwise she could not offer to others a participation in advantages which are to be gained. Therefore she desires war for her own advantage, not for an European, not for a German interest. Thereby much is explained.

The secret despatch has no breath of a conservative policy. It is entirely revolutionary. The result which it has in view is a splitting of Germany into hostile camps, possibly a war of Germans against Germans. May Heaven prevent the attainment of such a result!

Inclosure 2 in No. 183.

Circular to Austrian Representatives at the German Courts.

(Confidentielle.) *Vienne, le 14 Janvier*, 1855.

IL nous est toujours permis de considérer l'entrée de la Prusse dans l'alliance conclue par le Traité du 2 Décembre comme une éventualité vraisemblable, et de son côté le Gouvernement Impérial considérera toujours comme un devoir de contribuer par tous ses efforts à ce que la différence qui, à son grand regret, existe actuellement dans la position des deux Grandes Puissances Allemandes, disparaisse d'une façon ou d'une autre.

Si l'espoir de voir la Prusse adhérer à l'alliance se réalise, le concours complet et sincère des deux Puissances en leur qualité de Puissances Fédérales Allemandes, se trouvera par là assuré.

Cependant l'expérience déjà acquise nous oblige à étendre nos prévisions au cas où la Prusse essayerait de persister plus longtemps dans sa politique d'indécision et s'efforcerait même, peut-être, d'agir à Francfort de façon à entraver nos propositions sur la nécessité pour la Confédération et de se tenir prête pour la guerre.

Dans ce cas, le Gouvernement Impérial n'en devrait que désirer plus résolûment de poursuivre, avec l'appui des autres Gouvernements Allemands, la voie tracée par la Constitution Fédérale en ce qui concerne la manière dont cette grande question doit être envisagée, et il croirait ne pas remplir un des devoirs les plus sacrés de sa mission en Allemande s'il ne s'efforçait pas avant toutes choses de parvenir à ce que la Confédération arrive à prendre des résolutions constitutionnelles et si, de sa côté, il n'était pas parfaitement prêt à prendre sur lui les conséquences de ces décisions.

Mais aussi, au moment où nos confédérés ont à déterminer leur participation à des événements peut-être décisifs pour les destinées de Allemagne, nous ne saurions hésiter à leur adresser confidentiellement la question de savoir ce qu'ils feraient dans le cas où, étant résolus à marcher d'accord avec nous, on ne parviendrait pas à une résolution conforme au sein de l'Assemblée Fédérale.

Nous n'hésitons pas à adresser ouvertement à nos confédérés la question de

savoir si dans ce cas, ils accorderaient à l'Autriche assez de confiance pour s'unir à ses destinées et si, dans le cas où tous nos efforts pour arriver à une paix solide et assurée échoueraient, l'Autriche dans l'éventualité la plus extrême pourrait également compter sur leur coopération active.

La Cour Impériale donnerait, dans un pareil cas, les assurances les plus solennelles de garantir contre toute éventualité leurs possessions et leur situation territoriales et, en outre, de leur accorder leur part des avantages à atteindre par la guerre dans la mesure des forces employées. En échange, l'Autriche devrait mettre pour condition qu'un corps de troupes à déterminer serait tenu prêt dès à présent, et réclamer que [ici le nom du pays auquel on s'adresse] témoignât à Sa Majesté l'Empereur la confiance de laisser, en cas d'appel, la direction de leur contingent au commandement supérieur de Sa Majesté Impériale.

Nous comptons sur une réponse franche et sans réticence, et nous verrons avec satisfaction que sa teneur remplisse notre but et qu'elle ait pour effet de jeter la clarté dans nos rapports avec les Gouvernements Allemands, de consolider surtout nos relations avec et de les entourer de toutes les garanties réciproques que les besoins de cette grave époque exigent.

Vous voudrez bien vous servir de la forme confidentielle en communiquant la présente dépêche à .

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) DE BUOL.

No. 184.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 34.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 2*, 1855.

IN obedience to your Lordship's instructions, I have this evening read to Baron Manteuffel your Lordship's despatch No. 28 of the 27th ultimo, upon the subject of a communication which has been lately made by Count Bernstorff, respecting the present position of Prussia with regard to the Eastern question.

His Excellency seemed well pleased with those passages which relate to the desire of Her Majesty's Government that the relations of the two countries should be placed on a better footing, and the disposition which exists to arrive at this result in a manner which would be conformable to the honour and dignity of Prussia; but notwithstanding all the arguments contained in your Lordship's despatch, Baron Manteuffel would not admit that Prussia could be excluded from the approaching Conference at Vienna, without entering into some previous engagement that would secure unity of action between the two Governments; on the contrary, his Excellency seemed to think that Prussia, as a Great Power, was not to be fettered by Treaty, and had a right to her position as an independent Power.

His Excellency said that it was not true that Prussia had not made military preparations, for they were busily engaged in them; and he added that she had never declared her neutrality. To this I said that she might not have issued any formal declaration on the subject, but that her policy was even more than neutral as far as Russia was concerned, because great favour had been shown to her in the transport of arms. This he did not deny; but he added that these favours were not exclusively shown to Russia; and he might mention that he had just received a communication from Baron Budberg on the subject of a quantity of lead which had been lately sold in Prussia to the French Government. "Well," I said, "this fact only shows that your policy is justly styled neutral, as you furnish munitions of war to the belligerents; and it is with a view to consider the best means of arriving at a change of system that I was charged with the present communication, and that we wished to have some definite answer to the proposals I had made, that Prussia should enter into an alliance by Treaty which would regulate her position towards us, as it was impossible for great Powers engaged in war to admit lightly into their deliberations another Power without possessing some knowledge as to its real intentions."

Baron Manteuffel observed, with reference to that part of your Lordship's

despatch which relates to the revision of the Treaty of 1841, that upon this point Prussia maintained her right to be consulted, and he was by no means disposed to allow that these rights were annulled by the abrogation of the Treaty, which he appeared to consider was only suspended; and the whole drift of his argument was to the effect that Prussia had never withdrawn from the Conferences, and that she considered herself bound by the Protocols which she had signed.

An impression appeared to be made on his Excellency by the remark that the present Conference was not a continuation of the original one, but had been renewed as a consequence of the Treaty of the 2nd December; and that it was now open to Prussia to enter with England and France into a contingent arrangement for war, which would give her a claim to enter into negotiations for peace; but I cannot say that Baron Manteuffel seemed inclined to adopt without discussion the interpretation of the bases as consigned in the Protocol of the 28th December.

I have now given to your Lordship the substance of Baron Manteuffel's remarks; and I regret to say that I did not find his Excellency more disposed than he has been heretofore to come to any definite arrangement, or to be prepared to propose to the King a Treaty in the sense suggested by Her Majesty's Government.

His Excellency said that His Majesty was anxiously awaiting further accounts from M. d'Usedom and from General Wedell from Paris, and that when these were received he would speak to me again on the subject of the communication with which I had been charged.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 185.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 36.)
My Lord, *Berlin, February 2, 1855.*

IT has been reported in some of the newspapers that three Prussian corps d'armée were immediately to be mobilized—one to be placed at Breslau, one at Magdeburg, and another on the Rhine. The rumour caused some sensation here, but I have inquired whether there was any foundation for it, and have reason to believe that it is devoid of truth.

I questioned Baron Manteuffel on the subject this evening, and was assured by his Excellency that preparations were continuing to be made, but that there was no question of any immediate embodiment of those troops, which if wanted could be brought together in a fortnight.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 186.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 6.)
My Lord, *Munich, January 29, 1855.*

THE Bavarian Government has recently made a first step towards putting its Federal contingent in readiness to meet any demand for its services which may be issued from the Diet at Frankfort, by requesting the sanction of the Chambers to a loan of 15,000,000 florins, which it is proposed to raise for military purposes and preparations. The project of law on the subject laid before the Lower Chamber, consists of five Articles, under the first of which 1,800,000 florins of the new loan would be devoted to the repayment of various sums appropriated to the requirements of the military establishments of the country out of funds destined to other purposes, which require to be made good.

The provisions of this Article are intended to supersede and take the place of the project of law requiring the authority of the Chambers to a special credit of 5,600,000 florins which was sought by the Government as the only means of covering the extraordinary expenses of the army in the years 1850 to 1853, at the end of which latter period it was submitted to the Chamber, where the proposal was so unpopular that the Government abandoned the hope of carrying it through in its original shape. The above sum was destined in part to defray provisionally, until they could be recovered from the Diet, the costs of the expedition into the Electorate of Hesse-Cassel in the autumn of 1850, and in part to cover the outlay incurred in providing for the better equipment of the army. Whether any or what portion of the expense of that expedition has been reimbursed by the Electoral Government, I am unable to say, with any approach to certainty, but the withdrawal of the demand would seem to indicate that some arrangement must have been concluded respecting it.

In the second Article it is stated that a sum of 8,200,000 florins is required to meet the extraordinary expenditure consequent upon the preparation of a portion of the Federal contingent likely to be occasioned by the present political situation of Europe.

In the third Article a further sum of 830,000 florins monthly is asserted to be necessary for the maintenance of the army on its augmented scale.

The fourth Article authorizes the Minister of Finance to contract a loan to the amount specified, upon the security of the entire capital of the State, and empowers him to provide for the punctual payment of the interest and sinking-fund, by the imposition, in the event of the ordinary resources proving insufficient, of an additional 10 per cent. on the direct taxes, excepting only from the operation of the law a certain class of pensions, and the income-tax of those persons whose annual income does not exceed 1,000 florins. The additional tax thus decreed is expected to produce for the year 1854-1855 in round numbers the sum of 700,000 florins.

The fifth Article confides the execution of the law in the customary form to the Ministers within whose departments the various matters to which it relates fall.

The calculations are based upon the supposition that only one-half of the Federal contingent, or about 25,000 men, will have to be put on the war footing in the first instance; but in them is also included the sums which are required for completing the whole of the Cavalry on the war footing which has now become indispensable. In order that this object may be properly and effectually carried out, the Minister of War must immediately take steps for the purchase of at least 8,000 horses, at the estimated expense of 2,200,000 florins; of these one-half would be allotted to the Cavalry, and the other to the Artillery and waggon train.

In addition to the foregoing, the report to the Chamber which accompanied the introduction of the subject, insists upon the absolute necessity of making all the preparations requisite to enable the whole of the contingent to take the field efficiently, without loss of time; since it is impossible to foresee how soon, in the present position of political affairs, this country may be called upon to fulfil its Federal obligations.

It states that the complete equipment of the 60,000 men who must be summoned to their standards by virtue of these obligations, will, at the lowest computation of 80 florins per man, cause an unavoidable outlay of 4,800,000 florins, which added to the sum required for the purchase of horses above-mentioned, and to a further sum of 1,200,000 florins for Artillery and train reserves and other miscellaneous outgoings, will carry the entire expense of putting the whole Federal contingent in a state to take the field to an amount of 8,200,000 florins. However, as under existing circumstances, it will only be necessary to provide for the maintenance of half of the contingent on the war footing, the Minister of War considers that a sum of 830,000 florins monthly will be sufficient to meet all expenses, including those consequent upon placing the Infantry of the other half on half its proper strength, whilst the Cavalry would be brought up to its full complement, and two companies of Engineers (Génie) would be put on the full, and four companies on the half war footing.

By this arrangement it is asserted that the Bavarian army might be rendered available at a short notice; but as the Government always entertains a lurking hope that it may by some happy chance escape the burthens which the obliga-

tion of arming would entail upon the country, the latter vote is only to be taken for six months, or for 5,000,000 of florins, in the first instance.

In the meantime, with a view to the projected increase of the effective force of the army, the conscription for the present year, comprehending the class of 1833, and amounting to 38,145 men, is to take place before the end of this month, and the legal number of 13,000, or one-sixth of the standing force, are at once, that is to say, between three or four months earlier than is customary, to join their respective regiments, where they will be apportioned as follows: 9,820 to the Infantry, 1,878 to the Cavalry, 1,068 to the Artillery, 127 to the Engineers, and 107 to the Sanitary Company.

I have entered into these details in order, with the assistance of the returns inclosed in my preceding despatch No. 5 of the 26th instant, to give Her Majesty's Government some insight into the organization and expense of the military establishments of this country; but I ought to add that, in my opinion, after the drain of horses from Bavaria to Austria during the last summer, the Government will experience infinitely more difficulty in completing the number of horses of which the army stands in need, and of which the 8,000 demanded form but the minimum, than it seems to expect, or at all events that it will have to content itself with a very inferior description of animal.

The project of law has just come out of the Committee of the Lower Chamber, with a recommendation on the part of the reporter to reduce the sum demanded to about one-half; at least so I understood from Baron von der Pfordten, who informed me that exclusive of the item of 1,800,000 florins required to reimburse advances for military expenses from other funds, which it was proposed to award in some other form, the Committee was only disposed to grant 6,000,000 florins for the required armaments. This sum, he said, although very insufficient, would, at all events, put the Minister of War in a position to make a commencement in the very essential point of the purchase of horses, &c., and that if at the expiration of a couple of months or so more was wanted, application must again be made to the Chambers for the necessary pecuniary aid. Having here ventured an allusion to rumours which have been for some time past in circulation, relative to certain difficulties which might be raised in the Lower Chamber to granting the funds demanded, in the shape of a projected attempt to extort some positive assurances from the Government as to their employment, Baron von der Pfordten replied, that the Constitution had vested the power of raising money in the hands of the Commission of the Chambers, which is always permanently established at the seat of Government during recess, thereby giving me to understand that in the event of a declared and unconquerable opposition, which, however, he did not seem to anticipate, the Chambers would be prorogued, and the Government carried on without them.

From all I can collect on the subject it would seem that, foreseeing the probability of a reduction by the Lower Chamber, the Minister of War had taken the precaution of asking for a much larger sum than is actually indispensable for putting the contingent on the war footing, which, according to all accounts, can be effected in a very respectable manner with the 6,000,000 florins that the Committee proposes to substitute for the original demand.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 187.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—Received February 5.

(No. 7.)

Munich, January 29, 1855.

My Lord,

I AM informed that the Austrian Cabinet is using the utmost exertions to secure the acquiescence and support of the minor German States to the demand just made to the Diet for a portion of the Federal contingents; and amongst them, may be reckoned the overtures recently made to this, and I believe to most of the other Governments supposed to be not positively unfriendly to Austria. These consist in an offer to conclude with each, separately and individually, a Treaty by which Austria would undertake to guarantee their actual territorial possessions in the most solemn manner, and further insure to them a participation in any advantage which may be attained by the war, commensurate with the charges they might be called upon to bear in it, on condition that they should at once conclude a close alliance with her, and place at her disposal the required number of troops. I am not aware what success this proposal has met with in other quarters, but here it was received, I understand, with extreme coolness; and so great is the distrust of the policy and intentions of Austria, that I cannot suppose it to have made any very great impression. The King is, as usual, desirous of putting off to the last moment a decision which he is conscious must be binding to his future policy in the present crisis; and he is, above all, anxious to gain time, in the hope that the late acceptance of the four points by Russia may give such a turn to the political situation of Europe as may absolve him from all the responsibility he might incur by entering too hastily into the proposed arrangement, and afford him some means of escape from the difficulties and dangers which menace the minor States of Germany.

Baron von der Pfordten, on the other hand, who seems rather to smart under the notion that he has been duped and overreached by the Imperial Cabinet, is extremely violent against the policy of Austria on the Eastern question, which he denounces as perfidious and treacherous to Germany in the highest degree; whilst he professes to consider her recent proposals in the light of a snare to entrap the smaller States into an alliance from which they can derive no solid benefit. He has on several occasions told me, and repeated the same to more than one of my colleagues, that Bavaria had no idea of allowing herself to be taken in tow by Austria, without being consulted and previously admitted into that confidence to which her position as an independent State justly entitles her in a question involving the probability of enormous sacrifices to herself, for which, notwithstanding the proffered assurances of advantage, Baron von der Pfordten says he does not exactly see from whence compensation is to come, and so nearly touching the interests of the rest of Germany.

Whenever any discussion has arisen on these points, I have always expressed an opinion that the Bavarian Government would do wisely to accept at once with a good grace a position which the pressure of events will infallibly ultimately force upon it; for, setting entirely aside the dangers of an over protracted resistance, no one in the least acquainted with the state of public opinion in this country can long doubt on which side it would pronounce itself. Under these circumstances, which owe their origin in part to the community of religious creed subsisting between the majority of the population of the two States, but in a far greater proportion to the close connection of their material interests, I cannot, whatever may be the efforts of her present rulers to retard the final step, contemplate the possibility of any other sound alliance for Bavaria than that of Austria, and to this I feel satisfied that all other considerations will ere long have to give way.

From the very commencement of these unfortunate Oriental differences, I never neglected an opportunity of trying to impress upon this Government the indispensible necessity of the united action of Germany on the Russian Cabinet in the earlier stages of the dispute by friendly admonition and advice, and subsequently by the adoption of a firmer and even menacing attitude; and I have from time to time reported the causes which I conceived to have mainly contributed to the total want of success which has attended all my attempts to weaken the Russian tendencies which prevail here. I do not, in fact, believe that in this respect the slightest change of opinion has occurred, and I am strongly disposed to regard the zeal which the Bavarian Government now displays to obtain the admission of a Prussian Plenipotentiary to the Conferences at Vienna, as an affair of connivance with Russia to gain influence in the negotiations, with the object of procuring more favourable conditions on the Article relative to the restriction of her preponderance in the Black Sea, which here and throughout Germany is considered to form the principal obstacle to the immediate conclusion of peace, and which is universally represented to be of small importance to every State in Europe excepting England.

Since writing the above I have seen the Baron von der Pfordten, who made me acquainted with the result of the votes of the Commission charged by the Diet to report upon the Austrian demand for mobilizing the Federal contingents, from which it would appear that whether the Imperial Cabinet obtains a majority in the Diet or not, the votes of the most powerful and influential Governments

are decidedly adverse to the measure, and in favour of preparation only, which, however, amounts to nearly the same thing practically, since, if the order for mobilizing was issued by the Diet to-morrow, several weeks would necessarily elapse before it could be carried into execution, whilst the same results would be attained, with but a trifling loss of time, by a simple order for preparation of the Federal contingents.

The whole controversy, which may be termed a distinction without a difference, must be almost inexplicable to those who are unacquainted with the trifling of the smaller German Courts; and I can only account for it in the present instance by the supposition that it is carried on solely for the purpose of making the influence of Bavaria felt at Vienna, for it is hardly possible that pecuniary motives can be the real cause, although they are put forward as the pretext.

Baron von der Pfordten informed me with, with evident satisfaction, that on this question the Cabinet of Berlin had ranged itself on the side of Bavaria; and I have learnt from another source that he has written to Vienna to endeavour to induce the Austrian Cabinet to consider whether it would not, in view of the evident disposition of the more influential members of the Confederation, be advisable to relax in its demands, and content itself with the order for preparation only.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 188.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 10.)
My Lord, *Munich, January 30, 1855.*

I HAVE just heard that the Austrian Cabinet has given way upon the Contingent question, by declaring here that it never understood the process of mobilising in any other sense than that applied to it by the Bavarian Government.

Having gained this advantage it becomes a matter of doubt in my mind whether in the next stage of the controversy, when the Federal troops are actually called upon to take the field, new difficulties will not be raised, and fresh delays essayed. Symptoms of the possibility of such a course have, I learn, already manifested themselves on the question of the appointment of a Commander-in-chief, which the Imperial Cabinet naturally enough wished to see confided to an Austrian General.

At first the Bavarian Government seemed inclined to accept an arrangement in this sense; but it now, I understand, proposes that the contingents should be divided into three distinct corps, commanded by different Generals—to wit, the Austrian corps by an Austrian General, the Prussian corps by a Prussian General, and the remaining corps composed of the combined forces of the Minor Powers by a General named by the Diet, or in other words, a Bavarian. It is to be hoped that this sub-division of force will be successfully resisted, for nothing but mischief and misfortune can come of it; but here a desire is evinced to retard the final settlement of this difficult point until the Federal troops shall be actually called upon to march.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 189.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 8.)
My Lord, *Stuttgardt, January 30, 1855.*

I NEED hardly mention that since the departure of my despatch No. 2 of the 17th instant, stating that no proposition had been made to this Government for mobilizing their contingent, the Austrian circular of the 14th instant, recommending such mobilization, has been received here, as well as another circular of the same date, signifying the disposition of Austria to avail herself, should it appear advisable, of her right to form a separate alliance in Germany.

The language held to me yesterday by Baron de Linden respecting those despatches was, that this Government objected to immediate mobilization because they considered it unnecessary, but that they were taking all the measures requisite for mobilizing their contingent in a week's time, should it be called for by the Diet; and that he should much regret to see Austria making use of a separate right, which might serve to create discord and disunion in Germany, of which even Russia might possibly take advantage.

I observed that nothing could of course be less desirable than to create discord in Germany, but that I considered the best kind of German Union to be such as would present a formidable front to Russia, and thereby favour the conclusion of peace; that any other attitude might have just the contrary effect, in the same way as last spring, when, had Prussia agreed to Austria's proposal to adhere to the Convention of England and France, the war might very possibly have been strangled in its birth; and that, whereas Prussia had apparently held aloof out of consideration for Russia, she had perhaps been the cause of her having to undergo the four points instead of reverting to the *status quo ante bellum*—an alternative which Russia could hardly consider but as a great calamity, since it was not to be supposed that she could bring herself to look upon the defeat of her Turkish policy, however dangerous, as a benefit rather than an injury.

I further observed that Turkey and the Danube, as regarded Russia, appeared to me open to comparison with Belgium and the Rhine, as regarded France, since the wishes of both on those points were opposed by the convenience of Europe, and since what was calculated to promote a general coalition could never be permanently accomplished; that this fact had been proved on the greatest scale by the Emperor Napoleon, who had shown that a country might be too powerful to be strong, by becoming the common enemy; that Count Nesselrode had appeared to me in error when he stated that a forced peace, on the principle of the four points, would exhibit anything but durability, since it must be recollected that the long peace which ended last year had been a forced peace as regarded France, and maintained principally, if not solely, by the permanent readiness of a general coalition; and that, consequently, even had Russia been allowed to make peace on *ante bellum* terms, her position would have undergone the great change of the discovery that any further aggression upon Turkey would raise Europe against her—a possibility of which the Emperor Nicholas, to judge by the despotic haughtiness of his language previously to the war, seemed not to have entertained the faintest idea.

Baron de Linden admitted that the Emperor had deceived himself, or rather that he had been deceived by the flatterers who surrounded him; but he proceeded to argue in the sense that the Eastern question could not be really settled, except by partitioning Turkey, and by relegating the Mahometans to Asia.

I replied that the partition of Turkey was considered in England to be the most difficult and perilous of all questions, and, consequently, to be avoided as long as possible; while we could not see the slightest reason for considering the question more urgent now than in past times, but on the contrary, since Turkey was making progress and improving the condition of Her Christian subjects; that I nevertheless believed the destiny of Turkey in Europe to be the gradual out-breeding of the Mahometans by the Christians, since the former diminished, while the latter increased; and that perhaps some future Sultan might preserve his throne by changing his religion; but, at the same time, that I could see no

reason why, the necessity of a change arising, Turkey should not become a Christian independent country, provided the Great Powers were willing she should be so; and that, as to the feasibility of partition, it appeared to me impossible to get over the difficulty which had stopped the Empress Catherine and Joseph the Second, namely, who was to have the lion's share; that is, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

I cannot say that my reasoning seemed to convince his Excellency; and his further observations appeared to indicate that he contemplated the possibility of a sort of arrangement which might perhaps be called putting the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles in commission.

Baron de Linden forcibly stated his conviction that the Emperor Nicholas was really desirous of peace, judging both by accounts from abroad and by indications at home.

I observed that I did not see how immediate peace was possible unless Sebastopol were either taken or surrendered; but the Baron's solution seemed to be that we should abandon the siege; while he repeated his belief that the Emperor would not consent to any one-sided limitation of ships of war, adding his impression that the liberty of the Black Sea would be a sufficient safeguard against Russian preponderance.

I replied, that what we sought was not mere safety, but convenient safety, and to be spared the necessity of being perpetually on our guard against Russian aggression.

In illustration of a part of the foregoing, I told Baron de Linden that, when I was Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople in 1849 and 1850, during the question of the Hungarian and Polish refugees, a Russian Prince had observed to an English officer that it was useless for England to thwart Russia in her Turkish policy, since it could not be doubted that Russia must possess Turkey sooner or later; and that I had remarked to my informant that, had the Prince made his observation to me, I should have said that I believed Russia would never possess Turkey, because I was convinced that Europe would always oppose it. I added, that such European opposition appeared to me, in point of fact, to have been going on now for nearly a year, since, although England and France alone had actually made war on Russia, the whole of Germany had told her they would do the same if she persisted to encroach on Turkey.

It may be worth mentioning that one of Baron de Linden's observations was that, were Russia to acquire Turkey, her preponderance might be prevented by the impossibility of so large an Empire's hanging together.

I simply replied that such cohesion might also be possible, and that it was, consequently, not to be risked.

Baron de Linden expressed his belief that Austria and Prussia would come to an understanding respecting the mobilization, but also that Austria had no chance of separate success in the Diet, on which latter point the Baden Chargé d'Affaires, M. de Dusch, has expressed to me a similar opinion, while he has also signified the opposition of his Government to immediate mobilization.

The Baron stated that his Government intended applying for contingent-funds to the Chambers, which are to reassemble on the 15th of next month.

Baron de Linden strongly expressed his opinion that Prussia ought to be admitted to the Conferences at Vienna; adding, that he thought such a step might go far to smooth existing difficulties.

I replied in the sense that no intention could exist of wounding Prussia; but that she could hardly be entitled to share the deliberations of the other Powers when she did not share their engagements.

I am of course aware of the comparative unimportance of a small country like Wirtemburg regarding a great European question like that of Turkey, but the triple Russian connexion of this Court has led me to venture occasionally upon troubling your Lordship at some length.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 190.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 103.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 5, 1855.*

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information a copy of a letter* from the Admiralty, inclosing copies of the instructions which the Board of Admiralty have addressed to Sir Edmund Lyons, as to the raising of the blockade of the Danube.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 191.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 110.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 5, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government approve of the manner in which your Excellency executed my instruction No. 821 of the 29th of December, as reported in your despatch No. 44 of the 19th instant, and Her Majesty's Government have learnt with satisfaction that Vassif Pasha was about to embark for Trebizond.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 192.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Hudson.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 5, 1855.*

WHEN will the first or any portion of the Sardinian forces be ready to embark?

Will Genoa be the port of embarkation?

No. 193.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 55. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, February 2, 1855.*

M. DE BOURQUENEY had yesterday an audience of His Majesty the Emperor, for the purpose of expressing to His Majesty his grateful thanks for the honour conferred upon him by his nomination as a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Leopold of Austria.

The Emperor expressed himself at this audience as most anxious as to the state of the allied armies in the Crimea, who, after having given proof of such devoted gallantry, of such discipline and good conduct, were now, he was sorry to learn, condemned, from the severity of the season, to so much suffering.

The Emperor also expressed to M. de Bourqueney the disappointment he felt at the delay which had taken place in commencing the negotiations with Russia, which each of the allied Governments had consented to enter upon, after the interpretation of the four bases, as announced in the "Protocole Réservé," had been accepted by the Russian Government as containing the principles upon which the negotiation should be established. He could not conceive the reason why the English and French Governments delayed to send their full powers to their Representatives. He remarked that the Turkish Government had already

* No. 178.

directed their Ambassador to take part in these negotiations whenever they might be commenced; and he thought it must be of the greatest interest to all the Governments concerned to ascertain as early as possible whether these negotiations were likely to lead to peace, or at once to be broken off. His Majesty said that by the latest reports he had received from St. Petersburgh, he was led to believe that the Emperor Nicholas was sincerely desirous of peace, and that he was ready to make sacrifices to obtain it; but whether this information was correct or otherwise, he thought no time should be lost in bringing the question to an issue, and that no person could be more interested than himself in a prompt decision in this matter, as no other State could suffer more severely than his own from the expenses of the immense war establishment which he had thought it his duty unhesitatingly to bring together, for the efficient support of the interests of his Empire, and for the maintenance of the engagements he had contracted with his allies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 194.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 41.)

Foreign Office, February 6, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the pleasure to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings as reported in your despatch No. 53 of the 31st ultimo, and they learn with satisfaction Count Buol's opinion as to the terms that have really been accepted by Prince Gortchakoff, and his Excellency's renewed assurance as to the interest of Austria in preventing Russian aggression on Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 195.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 135. Most Confidential.)

Paris, February 5, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE had this morning a conversation of some length with Count Hatzfeldt, the Prussian Minister. He told me that he had yesterday presented General Wedel to the Emperor, but that he had previously demanded the Emperor's permission to retire as soon as the presentation had taken place, as he did not wish to embarrass by his presence the confidential communication with which the General, for aught he knew, might have been charged by the King of Prussia.

I cannot help calling your Lordship's attention here to the difference of conduct which has been pursued by the Prussian Representatives in London and Paris. I am informed on authority which I cannot doubt that Count Bernstorff, far from desiring the mission of M. d'Usedom to lead to a profitable result, has done what little he can to thwart its success, while Count Hatzfeldt on the contrary would gladly see, and would equally gladly aid in promoting, a better understanding between his Government and the Western Powers.

General Wedel remained but a short time with the Emperor, and made no communication to Count Hatzfeldt of what occurred at the interview. I told the Count what M. Drouyn de Lhuys had stated to me respecting his intercourse with the General (see my despatch No. of yesterday's date), and I asked him whether he thought that the King of Prussia would accept such a position as that which M. Drouyn de Lhuys had sketched for General Wedel's consideration. I showed him at the same time your Lordship's despatch No. 28 of the 27th ultimo to Lord Bloomfield, observing that he would recognise in it the sincere desire of Her Majesty's Government to renew their ancient

amicable relations with Prussia, and that it indicated a measure of the kind proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys as calculated to put an end to the estrangement, which Her Majesty's Government lamented should exist between Prussia and the three Powers.

Count Hatzfeldt said that he was certain that the tone of your Lordship's despatch would give the King sincere pleasure. If it made no concession to Prussia, it evinced at all events a very friendly spirit.

With respect to General Wedel's conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Count Hatzfeldt observed that too much stress should not be laid on the General's opinions. The General was not a diplomatist, and would hardly understand the bearing of such a proposition as had been made to him by M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

The Count, however, went on to say that he had reason to know that the King of Prussia was really desirous of escaping from the isolated position in which he had placed himself. He described the King's feelings as follows:—Above all, a great horror of drawing the sword; fear of, but no real sympathy for Russia; great irritation against Austria; a natural antipathy to France; and a liking as natural for England, which had not been destroyed by late events, or by all the obloquy thrown upon him by the English press. The King moreover felt the danger of his present position. He saw that that the war might become general; that in that case Germany would become the battle-field; that he could not ally himself to Russia without seeking the disaffection of his people, nor could war take place without rousing the dormant passions of the German nation. He wished, therefore, to draw nearer to the Western Powers, but without wounding his own pride, or having the appearance of ceding to Austria. It would not be difficult, Count Hatzfeldt thought, to bring His Majesty to the signature of a Treaty, if the King was previously readmitted to the Conference.

I replied that unfortunately the whole question was involved in that point. Count Hatzfeldt asked what hope there would be of placing matters on a better footing if both parties maintained their present ground. Something should be ceded on both sides. If the King agreed to sign a Treaty, the terms of which might be arranged confidentially beforehand, why should he not be admitted to the Conference previous to the actual signature? I suggested that it might be possible to make it a simultaneous transaction, that is, a Conference—signature of the Treaty during the Conference—information given by the belligerent Powers on the one side of the Austrian Treaty to Prussia, on the other side of the Prussian Treaty to Austria. Thus all parties might again be brought together.

Count Hatzfeldt seemed to think that the success of that or any other scheme would depend on the nature of the proposition made to the Prussian Government. If the King was at once presented with an ultimatum which he was to accept without discussion, His Majesty would not be in the condition of a free Sovereign; his pride would again be alarmed, or at least others (the Russian party) would alarm it for him, and no good result could be anticipated. I asked Count Hatzfeldt why then did not the Prussian Government take the initiative, and itself make propositions. There was nothing undignified in that. But he met me with the King's objection to take any steps until he was readmitted into the Conference.

Count Hatzfeldt added that he did not think that many weeks would elapse before Prussia would, for her own safety, place her armies on the war footing. Everything was already prepared. The smaller States of Germany were, he said, urging his Government to take this step for their protection. And then, he asked, what would be the infallible consequence? Austria would be unable to assist the allies with a Prussian army assembled on her flank, and France could not leave her north-eastern frontier uncovered, which would seriously interfere with her military strength elsewhere. I replied that this might be very true, but what did it prove: that instead of confining the field of battle to the East, which a determined attitude on the part of Europe would ensure, the whole of Europe would be gradually involved in war, the end of which no one could foresee. Large armed bodies could not remain long in each others' vicinity without hostilities being the consequence. Let not the King of Prussia think that he could arm and long remain neutral.

I have been more particular in giving your Lordship some of the details of

the conversation, because I think that Count Hatzfeldt means well and would aid as far as he could in placing the relations of his Government on a better footing with the Western Powers. He has not, however, sufficient confidence in the discretion of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, nor does he feel that his own Sovereign entertains feelings towards France which would enable him to be of much use here; but he gave me to understand that he would undertake to be the medium of any propositions which Her Majesty's Government might like to make in confidence to the Prussian Government, provided he thought that such proposition had a chance of success, and he added that I knew him well enough to be sure that he would not betray any trust of the kind, if reposed in him.

I do not fear, my Lord, to take upon myself the responsibility of answering for Count Hatzfeldt's honesty and discretion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 196.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 137. Confidential.)

Paris, February 6, 1855.

My Lord,

THE interview which I informed your Lordship, in my despatch No. 126 of the 4th instant, M. Drouyn de Lhuys expected to have with the Austrian Minister took place yesterday. I saw his Excellency afterwards, when he told me that he had spoken with great frankness to M. de Hübner respecting the present position of Austria. He had told him, he said, that since the signature of the Treaty of the 2nd of December, the alliance with Austria, instead of being consolidated, had, on the contrary, he could not conceal from himself, become weaker. If France had seen with regret no symptoms of more active operations on the part of the Austrian army in the Principalities, she had been consoled by the more determined attitude which the Austrian Government seemed disposed to assume in Germany. But here again she had been disappointed, for she found Austria, after raising her standard as a rallying point for the smaller States who might be inclined to follow her fortunes, as suddenly lower it before the opposition of Prussia. In the meantime, a hostile incursion of Russian troops into the Dobrudscha had taken place without any remonstrance on the part of Austria. This conduct showed extreme weakness, and could not inspire the French Government with any confidence for the future. If Austria, however, supposed that the French Government sent an expedition 3,000 miles from France, in order that the Danubian Principalities might be placed partially under the protection of Austria; that a French fleet occupied the Black Sea in order that Austria might enjoy the advantages of the free navigation of the Danube; or that French blood and French treasure were expended, in order that Austria might have the same right to protect certain Christian subjects of the Porte as Russia had assumed, Austria was much mistaken. France had not undertaken, with England, the task of resisting Russia for Austria, but for European interests—and these interests must be placed under the safety of material guarantees before they could lay down their arms. It was in the East alone that the French Government could have any sympathies or policy in common with Austria, and if her alliance was not founded on identity of purpose there, it was worth nothing to France.

Although M. Drouyn de Lhuys fancies that the language which I have described made some impression on M. de Hübner, he no longer conceals from himself that the object of Austria is peace, which she hopes may result from the Conferences about to be opened at Vienna, and, moreover, that she is not prepared to support the pretensions of the allies in the Crimea, either morally or materially, if these negotiations fail.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys what, under this conviction, he proposed doing. I observed that the position of the Western Powers at Vienna was becoming untenable. They had engaged themselves to open negotiations with Russia, if the latter accepted their interpretation of the four points. This had

been done to a certain extent, and no doubt Prince Gortchakoff might be required to signify his acceptance of them in a more official manner; and, if he refused, the Western Powers would be free to retire from the Conferences. But, supposing him to fulfil all the terms required, what did M. Drouyn de Lhuys propose should be the next step taken?

His Excellency replied that he would turn the matter in his mind, but would, on the first opportunity, hear the Emperor's opinion. After that he would renew the subjects with me again.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 196*a*.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 138. Confidential.)

Paris, February 6, 1855.

My Lord,

THE perusal of Mr. Buchanan's confidential despatch No. 16 of the 26th ultimo, inclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 111 of the 3rd instant to me, induces me to trouble you with the following remarks.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in his conversation with me respecting the position of Prussia, and the possibility of inducing her to pronounce herself in favour of the Western Powers, has often remarked that nothing would be more likely to enlist the sympathies of Prussia and Germany than holding out the prospect of the annexation of Schleswig to the German Confederation, or of Holstein to Prussia, with a fresh arrangement of the Sound dues. He has as often, when speaking of the advantage which the allies would derive if the smaller Northern States were to declare for them, said that a hint to Denmark that Holstein might, whenever peace was signed, be more closely incorporated with Denmark, or an intimation to Sweden that Finland might again come under the Swedish sceptre, might convert the neutrality of those two States into an alliance.

I have in general treated these observations with very little attention, as they did not appear to be made seriously. It was not until two days ago that, finding that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had, as I had the honour to inform your Lordship in my confidential despatch No. 128, actually introduced into a Treaty which he wanted to conclude with Prussia, a clause relative to the navigation of the Baltic, that I observed on the consequences which such a proposition was likely to entail.

I had hoped that the ideas which M. Drouyn de Lhuys had, at various times, let fall in his conversations with me, and which, as I said before, seemed rather to rise up in the warmth of discourse than to be seriously entertained, had not been imparted to others. Unfortunately this does not appear to have been the case, and although I feel certain that his Excellency has never gone so far as to make any distinct proposition in regard to Holstein, as the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs seems to suspect, I cannot doubt that he has been so far indiscreet, both with his tongue and with his pen, as to throw out hints, both in speaking and writing, of possible contingencies which he has no more idea of seeing realized than have Her Majesty's Government.

It is in vain (I grieve to say it) to hope that a French Minister may be made to understand that such proceedings not only are not honest in themselves, but lead generally to the very reverse of what is anticipated from them. I shall be more careful in future, when I see any indications of such exuberant fancies on the part of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, to combat them at once.

In the meantime, I beg to acquaint your Lordship that his Excellency informed me yesterday that, in consequence of my observations the day before, he had retrenched from the Prussian "Projet de Traité" the clause relating to the navigation of the Baltic. I believe that the projet was sent last night to Count Walewski for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 197.

Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord, *Erzeroom, January* 16, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to transmit for your Lordship's information, the copy of a despatch which I have this day addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, demanding the punishment of Hassan Yaziji and Injeh Arap, of the Bashi-Bozouks.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. F. WILLIAMS.

Inclosure in No. 197.

Colonel Williams to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Erzeroom, January* 16, 1855.

YOUR Lordship may be aware that a certain chief of the Bashi-Bozouks, Injeh Arap by name, had, during the latter part of 1854, been convicted of many crimes of cruelty and peculation, and imprisoned in chains in this city, where, in spite of his well-known delinquencies, also resides Hassan Yaziji, the late Commander of the Irregular Cavalry of the Kars army, whose character, in conjunction with that of Zarif Mustapha Pasha, his coadjutor in dishonesty, I have had the honour to bring before your Lordship. It involved, as your Excellency knows, the most glaring cases of false musters and dangerous deceptions—doubly dangerous because they might have compromised the safety of any allied force sent to the aid of this "army on paper."

I have now to acquaint your Excellency that intrigue has at last succeeded, and that this notorious culprit, Injeh Arap, is at large on the bail of Hassan Yaziji, who, instead of finding himself a prisoner at Constantinople in the same strong-room with Zarif Mustapha Pasha, walks these streets and plays the part of protector to a culprit perhaps of not so dark a die as himself.

This scandal cries aloud for vindication; and I trust, by the return of post, that, through your Lordship's insistance, an order will arrive here to seize this man as well as his protégé, put seals on their effects, and send them under escort to Constantinople. They seem to laugh at the idea of retribution coming on them, and talk of their return to Damascus in the spring, there to enjoy the fruits of their iniquities.

I hope that all who have the success of this war at heart, may be spared this mortification, and, in consequence, I strongly insist on the prompt punishment of these men through your Excellency's influence. We are now thinking of the organization of an irregular force, to keep the enemy from our communications during the next campaign, and without the signal disgrace of Hassan Yaziji and Injeh Arap, it will be futile to attempt that organization.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. F. WILLIAMS.

No. 198.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 63.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 25, 1855.

THE Porte's new instruction to Arif Effendi, its Ambassador at Vienna, is with the Sultan. I have recommended its immediate transmission with the full powers prepared for his Excellency. I understand the purport of it to be that the four Articles consigned to the note of August the 8th, last year, are to be accepted by the Turkish Representative under our construction of their meaning, and with a reservation, after the example of England and France, of the Sultan's right to extend his guarantees according to what may be required in the progressive course of the war.

The first idea of the Porte was to send a special Plenipotentiary to Vienna. For the sake of not losing time, I advised that instructions should be sent, with suitable powers, to Arif Effendi. This would suffice for preliminaries; another arrangement might be made in the event of a definitive negotiation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 199.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

No. 69.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 29, 1855.

I HAVE communicated to Reshid Pasha the draft of Convention transmitted to me with your Lordship's instruction No. 26 of the 11th instant.

I adopted this course in order that his Highness might take the Sultan's pleasure at once, and settle the matter at a single meeting. He has proposed an amendment affecting Articles II and III, with a view principally to stipulating that the rations to be given to the Turkish troops in Her Majesty's service shall be of the kind to which they are accustomed, and that any punishments inflicted for the support of discipline among them, shall take place according to the established practice of the Turkish army.

It appears to me that these modifications of the draft are reasonable, and that they are by no means at variance with the spirit and general character of the intended Convention. But the wording proposed by Reshid Pasha being more vague and comprehensive than the proposed objects require, I have offered a version of my own, which I hope will be accepted.

It is not impossible that I may be able to send your Lordship the Convention signed and concluded by the next messenger.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 200.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 71.)

Constantinople, January 29, 1855.

My Lord,

IN pursuance of your Lordship's instruction No. 25 of the 11th instant, I have pressed the Turkish Ministers to lose no time in sending full powers and instructions to their Ambassador at Vienna. I have also had that despatch read to Aali Pasha and the Grand Vizier.

I have now the honour to inclose herewith, in copy, an instruction addressed by the former of these Ministers to Arif Effendi; and I avail myself of the same opportunity to forward a copy of the instruction which preceded, before I was authorised officially by your Lordship to take the same line with regard to the expected negotiations at Vienna as the Representatives of France and Austria.

The former of these instructions having to be translated was put into my hands at a late hour last night, and only this morning I sent M. Pisani to Aali Pasha with my remarks upon its contents. A copy of my instruction to that gentleman is inclosed herewith. He has returned, after acting upon it, with a message in reply from the Ottoman Secretary of State, purporting that the instruction explanatory of the Porte's views respecting the four points of negotiation will be followed by the transmission of full powers, with an additional instruction founded upon my advice, and directed to the same object.

The first idea was to send a special Plenipotentiary to Vienna, but it was dropped at my suggestion, to save time in the transmission of powers and instructions

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 200.

Instruction to Arif Effendi.

January 18, 1855.

(Translation.)

THE Legations of Austria and France have represented that in the event of the Russian Government accepting the last explanations communicated to Gortchakoff, respecting the four Articles, a Peace Conference would be opened at Vienna, and that in consequence the Ambassador of the Sublime Porte should also attend that Conference.

According to the telegraphic messages lately received from your Excellency and at the Austrian Legation, the Russian Government has accepted those Articles, and it was expected that a Peace Conference might be entered upon.

This is a matter of great weight and importance with respect to the Sublime Porte, and it is requisite that full and detailed instructions should be furnished to the Plenipotentiary of the Sublime Porte on the subject, and this must be fully and deeply considered and looked into.

It is therefore His Imperial Majesty the Sultan's orders, that for the present your Excellency should, on the joint invitation of the Austrian Government and of the Ambassadors of England and France, attend the Conference, and without entering upon any discussion whatever, simply listen to what is said, and report here.

Inclosure 2 in No. 200.

Instruction to Arif Effendi.

(Traduit du Turc.)

PAR une dépêche en date du 29 Rebiul-Akhir, 1271 (18 Janvier, 1855), j'ai informé votre Excellence que les ordres de Sa Majesté le Sultan sont que si le Prince Gortchakoff, Ambassadeur de Russie à Vienne, accepte au nom de son Gouvernement les quatre points en question, avec les interprétations que ces trois Cours ont données, votre Excellence aussi doit assister aux Conférences qui seront ouvertes, unis seulement pour entendre ce qui y sera dit, et nous le faire savoir.

Il est inutile de dire que comme cette question concerne la Sublime Porte plus que toutes les autres Puissances, et que c'est pour elle une question vitale, elle a besoin d'être profondément méditée, elle exige beaucoup de circonspection; cela est certain, et conséquemment tant que la Sublime Porte n'aura pas longuement réfléchi et conféré avec ses alliés sur les Articles de la paix, elle ne pourra pas donner à son Plénipotentiaire des instructions catégoriques sur les principes et les suites de chaque point relatif à cette question.

Afin, cependant, de donner à votre Excellence un précis d'instructions pour qu'au besoin elle y conforme son langage, je m'empresse de lui communiquer, pour à présent, les observations suivantes:

Aussitôt que le temps de la solution finale des quatre points sera venu, et que le projet d'un Traité de Paix aura été mis sur le tapis, comme la Sublime Porte aussi aura des choses à dire touchant les conséquences et les détails des chacuns des points en question, il faut, avant que le projet d'un Traité soit présenté et proposé à la Russie, que ces choses soient discutées entre la Sublime Porte et les Cours alliées, et résolues. Cela est tout naturel, et par conséquent on ne saurait douter que les Cours alliées ne pensent de même. Par précaution, cependant, et afin de prévenir tout ce qui pourrait donner lieu aux moindres malentendues, au moindres difficultés, la Sublime Porte veut que votre Excellence représente au Comte Buol, à Lord Westmorland, et à M. de Bourqueney ce qui suit.

Par le premier des quatre points il s'agit d'annuler la protection que la Russie exerce sur les Provinces de Valachie et de Moldavie, et de placer les privilèges que les Empereurs Ottomans ont octroyés à ces Provinces et aux Chrétiens, par un arrangement à faire avec la Sublime Porte, sous la garantie des Puissances, et convenir des détails de cet arrangement. Or, il y a ici, c'est à dire dans cet arrangement, bien des choses auxquelles il faut faire attention et cela tant dans l'intérêt de la Sublime Porte que dans celui de ses alliés; car les précédents Traités conclus entre la Sublime Porte et la Cour de Russie relativement aux trois Principautés ne donnent à cette Puissance aucune espèce de droit de protection à l'égard de ces Principautés. La Russie était seulement garanti du maintien de leurs institutions. L'expérience a fait voir, cependant, combien d'empiétements la Russie s'est permis en se prévalant du voisinage des pays et de la conformité de la religion; à quoi elle a réduit à son propre avantage le système organique, et la qualité de Princes monalement exercée par les Consuls Russes à Jassi et à Bucharest. Ainsi il est nécessaire, il est essentiel de faire voir et bien préciser que la garantie ne donnait le moindre droit d'intervention dans les affaires des dites Provinces, et qu'elle consistait simplement en celui de faire des observations à l'effet d'empêcher quelque chose qui serait de nature à anéantir les privilèges établis.

Il y a encore d'autres points de cette espèce qui sont propres à consolider les droits souverains de la Sublime Porte; elle les développera en temps et lieu.

Quant au second point, à savoir, la question du Danube, les embarras et le mal que la Russie, en prenant pour prétexte les anciens Traités, a causé sur les rives du Danube qui appartiennent à l'Empire Ottoman, sont visibles. Aussi la Sublime Porte fera-t-elle connaître séparément sa manière de voir et de penser à cet égard.

La vérification du Traité conclu le 13 Juillet de l'an 1841 de l'Ère Chrétienne, entre la Sublime Porte et les Cinq Grandes Puissances—rectification à calculer de manière à attacher plus complétement l'existence de l'Empire

Ottoman à l'équilibre Européen, et à faire cesser la supériorité de la Russie dans la Mer Noire—est le troisième des quatre points; et sur ce chapitre, loin d'avoir rien à redire, la Sublime Porte n'a que des remercîments à faire pour cette marque particulière des intentions sincères et du zèle de ses alliés. Seulement, il semble nécessaire que dans la rectification du dit Traité, on ait soin de maintenir les droits de la Sublime Porte en ce que regarde la sécurité future de l'Empire, et des droits sur les Détroits de la Mer Noire et de la Mer Blanche, et qu'on lui obtienne des assurances effectives et matérielles sur la cessation de la prépondérance qui va être discutée et combattue.

Venons au quatrième point. La Sublime Porte tache d'assurer sous les auspices de sa Hautesse le bien-être et le bonheur, à tous égards, de toutes les classes de ses sujets. Son propre avantage, ses intérêts, exigent que pour remplir ce but, elle employe sincèrement tous les efforts dont elle est capable. Cela étant, elle n'hésite nullement à déclarer de nouveau et à publier à la face de l'univers la ferme résolution du Sultan de maintenir les privilèges religieux qui ont été accordés par ses augustes ayeux à toutes les classes des sujets qui professent la religion Chrétienne, solennellement et formellement confirmés à diverses époques par Sa Majesté Impériale.

Seulement, et comme nous l'avons autrefois et dernièrement encore dit, mettre une question de cette nature dans la forme d'un Traité, et même l'admettre comme étant faite officieusement, c'est donner prise à une intervention de la part d'un Gouvernement étranger aux affaires des sujets; ce qui ébranlerait un des principaux fondements de l'indépendance.

La Sublime Porte en exposant cette pensée aux Cours ses amies et alliés, a voulu par là la leur faire connaître d'avance. Et comme il a été convenu que les conseils qu'elles auront à donner seront de nature à ne porter la moindre atteinte à la dignité ni à l'indépendance de Sa Hautesse, la Sublime Porte ne pourra dans aucun cas, et pour aucun motif, ni entendre parler, comme le Prince Gortchakoff le fait, de garantir des Gouvernements sur cette matière, ni consentir à l'insertion de quelques choses analogues dans le Traité de Paix. Nul doute que les alliés approuveront et confirmeront ce que je viens de dire.

Telles sont pour à présent les réflexions de la Sublime Porte sur les quatre points, et je m'empresse de les communiquer à votre Excellence par ordre du Sultan, afin qu'elles vous servent de règle de conduite.

Inclosure 3 in No. 200.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

British Embassy, January 29, 1855.

Sir,

I HAVE to direct you to inform Aali Pasha that I have read with attention the draft of his instructions to Arif Effendi, destined, as I understand, to accompany the full powers which are on the point of being sent to that Ambassador.

I presume that the full powers are to be accompanied with a more positive instruction, enabling his Excellency to agree with the Representatives of the other allied Powers in establishing with the Russian Representative preliminary articles of peace, supposing Prince Gortchakoff to be sincere in accepting the well-known four points or bases, with the interpretation attached to them by Austria as well as by the two Western Courts. The reservation expressly made in the third Article ought to have its full weight with the Ottoman Government.

I now repeat most earnestly the recommendation which I have already given to that effect. Surely the Porte cannot hesitate as to placing itself on the same ground with its allies in the acceptance of preliminary propositions which would go so far towards securing its interests without closing the door against such additional guarantees as may be found necessary hereafter.

Deeply as the Sultan's Ministers may feel the duty of guarding the rights of sovereignty and independence, they are called upon in the present instance to show confidence in their allies, and to afford facilities for giving effect to any pacific dispositions which the common enemy may declare, in accordance with

principles and grounds of arrangement calculated to secure the main object of the war, and to satisfy the just expectations of Europe.

The Porte is the only competent judge of what explanations it may be advisable to afford to its Ambassador, but it may be expected that full powers without greater latitude in the above-mentioned sense, will utterly fail to meet the views and proposals of the Porte's allies.

You will read the whole of this instruction to Aali Pasha, and make me acquainted, as soon as you can, with his Highness' reply.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 201.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 72.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 29, 1855.*

THE Turkish Ambassador at Paris is recalled. He is to take the Government of Broussa. His successor is Mehmet Bey, the Grand Vizier's eldest son. This young man enjoys a high character for steadiness and regularity. He filled at one time a subordinate place in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and was thence transferred to the Seraglio in the capacity of Second Secretary to the Sultan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 202.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 73.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 29, 1855.*

THE Sardinian Envoy has communicated to me the instruction of his Court, in virtue of an understanding with Her Majesty's Government to send an army of 15,000 to 20,000 men of all arms to the Crimea, and he has requested my assistance in obtaining the necessary arrangements here for the reception of the troops, and the establishment of a suitable depôt, wharf, and hospital.

Though not in possession of any instructions from your Lordship on this subject, I shall not hesitate to comply with Baron Tecco's request. There will be no small difficulty in finding the requisite accommodation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 203.

Mr. Hudson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February 8.*)

(No. 19.) *Turin, February* 3, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies and translation of a Report presented to the Chamber of Deputies by M. Larza, in the name of the Commission appointed to examine the Treaties of the 26th instant, between Great Britain, France, and Sardinia, which report is favourable to the Convention in question.

The discussion of the law sanctioning these Treaties is now proceeding in the Chamber of Deputies.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES HUDSON.

Inclosure in No. 203.

Report of the Commission of the Chamber of Deputies on the Draft of Law presented by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the Sitting of the 26th of January, 1855.

TRATTATO DI ALLEANZA FRA LA SARDEGNA, L'INGHILTERRA E LA FRANCIA. CONVENZIONE MILITARE COLLE POTENZE SUDDETTE. CONVENZIONE SUPPLEMENTARE COLL'INGHILTERRA PER UN IMPRESTITO.

Tornata del 1 Febbraio, 1855.

Signori,

NELLA lotta che ferve in Oriente tra le Potenze alleate e la Russia stanno avvolti i futuri destini d'Asia e d'Europa. Alieni da ogni esagerazione non chiameremo questa guerra la guerra della civiltà contra la barbarie, nel senso di temere che il trionfo della Russia possa ripiombare l'Europa civile nelle tenebre del Medio Evo.

La civiltà che in allora era ristretta a pochi popoli divenne retaggio Europeo. Essa s'impiantò in un altro emisfero; penetrò fra tutte le genti, e molte di quelle ordre selvagge e barbare che schiacciarono sotto i loro passi la civiltà Romana, furono rischiarate da quella stessa luce che esse tentarono di spegnere. Ma se la tema di ricadere nella barbarie non è ragionevole, nessuno però vorrà contendere che qualora riuscisse alla Russia la conquista di Costantinopoli, le sorti di tutti gli altri Stati d'Europa diverrebbero assai tristi.

Immaginatevi una Potenza di 80 milioni di anime, ciecamente obbedienti al cenno di un capo despota e pontefice, padrone assoluto del Baltico e del Mar Nero, di cui terrebbe le chiavi, e facilmente comprenderete quali sarebbero le condizioni d'Europa se quell'avvenimento si avverasse. Il commercio tra l'Europa e l'Asia dipenderebbe da'suoi cenni: nessun fatto politico di qualche gravità potrebbe compiersi in Europa senza il suo beneplacito.

La libertà dei popoli, e l'indipendenza delle nazioni, sarebbero subordinate ai voleri dell'Autocrata imperante sul soglio di Costantino.

Questi pericoli erano già presenti alla vasta mente di Napoleone il Grande allora che inviava dallo scoglio di Sant Elena questo consiglio all'Europa: "Quando la Russia minaccierà Costantinopoli, bisognerà suonare campana a martello in tutti i villaggi d'Europa."

Gli stessi pericoli presentiti da tutte le genti civili spiegano gli applausi universali che salutarono la dichiarazione di guerra fatta dalle Potenze alleate alla Russia.

Osservatori imparziali degli avvenimenti non celeremo che sopravvennero dappoi alcuni malaugurati fatti politici e militari i quali intiepidirono quelle

simpatie, generarono dei sospetti e dei dubbi sulle tendenze e sull'esito di questa guerra.

Ma se questi stessi fatti sono ponderati senza passione, non sarà difficile lo scorgere che i primi furono imposti alle Potenze Occidentali dalla ineluttabile necessità della comune salvezza; dal bisogno di coordinare tutte le forze Europee ad un solo e supremo scopo, quello cioè d'impedire che si avveri la fatale preponderanza di una sola nazione sopra tutte le altre.

Le difficoltà poi dell'impresa e gl'incompiuti successi della spedizione di Crimea, invece di alienare gli animi dagli Alleati, dovrebbero essere motivo e stimolo a tutti i Governi d'Europa per uscire da una pericolosa neutralità ed aggiungere le proprie alle altrui forze a fine di scongiurare in tempo il comune pericolo.

Lo scopo palese di questa guerra, i pericoli ed i benefizi che pendono dal suo esito spinsero pertanto le due grandi Potenze Occidentali, Francia ed Inghilterra, a segnare il Trattato del 10 Aprile scorso, facendo facoltà a tutte le Potenze Europee di aderirvi.

Il Governo del Re di Sardegna, sollecitato a sottoscriverlo, non si rifiutò, e statuì colle due grandi Potenze, Francia ed Inghilterra, due Convenzioni, delle quali una determina e regola la forza militare che somministrerà nella presente guerra il Regno Sardo; la seconda, supplementaria alla prima, provvede ai mezzi pecuniari per far fronte alle spese.

Sul merito di quest'ultima è particolarmente chiamata la Camera a pronunciarsi, ma non potrebbe farlo senza indagare lo scopo della spesa; quindi la convenienza, l'utilità, l'opportunità del Trattato stesso.

Tale doveva essere per l'appunto l'andamento della discussione nel seno dei vostri uffizi sopra questo gravissimo affare, ed essa ebbe luogo con tutta quella ampiezza e serietà che esigevano la somma importanza dell'argomento, l'enorme risponsabilità che deve essere profondamente sentita da ciascun Deputato prima di emettere un voto che può imporre non solo sagrifici di sangue e di danaro, ma da cui dipendono le sorti della nostra patria.

I sei primi uffici si pronunciarono favorevolmente al Trattato e diedero ai rispettivi loro Commissari il mandato di acconsentire alla domanda di mezzi finanziari per darvi compimento. Il settimo uffizio non si pronunciò nè in favore, nè contro; ma diede un voto di fiducia al proprio Commissario, coll'incarico di chiedere ulteriori spiegazioni al Ministero nel seno della Commissione stessa, e di emettere quindi un voto secondo la sua coscienza meglio informata.

Intervennero diffatti i due Ministri degli Affari Esteri e di Guerra e Marina, i quali somministrarono abbondanti schiarimenti sopra tutti i punti e tutte le quistioni che si affacciarono.

La Commissione rimase convinta che l'iniziativa delle trattative partì dalle due grandi Potenze; che quelle furono condotte dai Ministri della Corona con dignità e fermezza.

I sei primi Commissari attinsero da quella conferenza nuove ragioni per confermarsi nell'opinione essere il Trattato necessario, utile, opportuno, mentre opposta deve essere stata l'impressione prodotta dalle stesse spiegazioni sull'animo del Commissario del settimo uffizio, essendosi definitivamente e recisamente pronunciato contro, dichiarando formalmente che le trattative furono a suo avviso condotte con troppa precipitazione.

Già esponemmo le considerazioni generali che militano in favore di una coalisione di tutti gli Stati Europei contro la smisurata ambizione Moscovita. Il Piemonte, qual parte della gran famiglia Europea, deve soccorrere al comune pericolo con mezzi proporzionati alla sua importanza militare e politica.

Per quanto potè conoscere la Commissione, nessuno sostenne negli uffizi della Camera la convenienza di una neutralità od isolamento assoluto e permanente.

Quest'attitudine segnerebbe il decadimento della legittima influenza che la Casa di Savoia ha sempre esercitato nei grandi avvenimenti Europei quale Potenza Europea ed Italiana.

Tutti i suoi successi, il suo progressivo ingrandimento lo debbe alla attività, al valore, alla capacità spiegata in guerra e nei consigli diplomatici.

Da otto secoli in poi la Croce di Savoia brillò sopra quasi tutti i campi di battaglia e seppe sempre combattere con valore. Non rare volte strappò una fronda d'alloro alla vittoria, che accrebbe la gloria e la possanza de' suoi Stati.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Prese parte o direttamente od indirettamente a tutti i Grandi Congressi Europei, dove seppe trarre sagacemente profitto del suo sangue e del suo valore.

Non sarà certamente dopo gli avvenimenti del 1848 che inaugurarono una politica più larga e francamente nazionale, che la Sardegna vorrà recedere dalla via gloriosa fin qui battuta, per adottare una politica timida ed egoista, quasi che i suoi destini fossero già compiuti.

Questa politica converrebbe solo ad uno Stato che più nulla avesse a sperare, più nulla a temere; ad una nazione che potesse dichiararsi soddisfatta dello *statu quo*. Tale certamente non è la condizione del Piemonte costituzionale; del Piemonte parte non ispregievole d'Italia, che ha pur diritto a migliori destini; la quale ripone le sue più care speranze in questo felice angolo della classica terra.

Ripetiamo, per decoro del nostro paese e di questo Parlamento, che nessuna voce si alzò per propugnare un isolamento assoluto nella difficile crise in cui versa l'Europa.

Vi sono però parecchi Deputati che consigliano di attendere migliori circostanze per pronunciarsi.

Esse osservano che è troppo arrischiato il partito preso dal Governo di spedire il nerbo delle sue forze in paesi assai lontani, mentre nessuna delle Potenze pari alla nostra risolse ancora di prendere parte al conflitto; mentre due Potenze di prim'ordine rimangono tuttora indecise, ed una di queste sorveglia tutti i nostri andamenti con mire non guari amichevoli.

La prudenza suggerire quindi di attendere lo svolgimento ulteriore degli avvenimenti, e la decisione di queste Potenze; il qual partito è tanto più utile a noi, in quanto che le nostre finanze sono esauste; le quali dalla pace e prosperità interna soltanto possono trovare ristoro.

A tali obbiezioni, altre se ne aggiungono di diverso colore, ma non meno gravi.

Taluni dicono: da questa guerra nulla di favorevole può attendere l'Italia; nulla quindi il Piemonte che fa pur parte essenziale di essa, la cui politica generale deve identificarsi necessariamente al bene generale della nazione. Riserviamo le nostre forze, i nostri mezzi, le estreme nostre risorse per i momenti supremi in cui vengano in lotta interessi più vicini e più vitali per le sorti della patria. La guerra attuale secondo l'indirizzo che le fu impresso, è una guerra diplomatica; cioè di maggiore o di minore influenza che dovrà conservare o perdere l'una o l'altra delle grandi Potenze Europee; la civiltà, la libertà, l'indipendenza delle nazioni nulla guadagneranno da questa lotta. A che pro pertanto uno Stato come il nostro, di second'ordine, dovrà imprendere sagrifizi e correre pericoli per una causa da cui non può sperare nessun vantaggio? da cui nessuno dei grandi principii sociali può attendere una soluzione?

Non crediamo di avere esposte sinceramente le precipue difficoltà ed opposizioni che sorsero nel seno degli uffizi e della Commissione contro al Trattato d'Alleanza.

Riprodurremo pure colla medesima schiettezza e fedeltà le ragioni addotte per vibatterle.

Segnato il Trattato del 10 Aprile tra Francia ed Inghilterra era prevedibile che tardi o tosto anche il Piemonte sarebbe stato chiamato ad accedervi: però nessun urgente motivo, nessuna circostanza imperante esisteva ancora che valesse a spingere il Governo ad affrettare quel momento.

Senonchè sopravvennero alcuni mesi dopo tali atti diplomatici che il Ministero non doveva lasciar consumare prima di prestare la sua adesione a quel Trattato; altrimenti disponendo, forse gli accordi non sarebbero più stati così facili, nè le condizioni tanto vantaggiose: forse altri pericoli potevano soprastarci che colla opportuna accessione al Trattato crediamo scongiurati.

Colle adesione al Trattato ci assicuriamo inoltre un seggio onorifico nel futuro Congresso d'Europa quando dopo la guerra si dovrà trattare della pace.

La tema di una invasione straniera, ovvero di una guerra in Italia mentre un buon nerbo delle nostre forze combatterebbe in lontane contrade non è guari prevedibile.

E qualora mai ciò accadesse, oltrechè il Trattato ci guarentisce l'aiuto delle forze Anglo-Francesi, la guerra grossa sarebbe traslocata dall'Oriente alle sponde del Po e dell'Adige. In tal caso rivedremo i nostri valorosi soldati ritemprati al

fuoco delle battaglie d'Oriente, e li inverremo su' campi più geniali a raccogliere nuove corone d'alloro.

La finanza non avendo ancora rimarginate le ferite aperte dalla Guerra dell'Indipendenza avrebbe, è pur vero, bisogno della pace per rimettersi.

Ma non è il Governo nostro che abbia riaperto il tempio di Giano. Il Piemonte deve sottostare alle condizioni Europee che chiamano tutti i popoli alle armi.

Se Esso si pronuncia fra i primi, attribuitelo all'indole sua guerresca, alla politica passata e presente, alla posizione sua geografica, alle nuove relazioni stabilite o prossime a stabilirsi tra Francia e Austria.

Il Ministero fu pertanto costretto a prendere un partito per tempo dalla forza delle cose, e ci pare che quello scelto sia il più conveniente agli interessi presenti e futuri del Piemonte.

In quanto all'imprestito che si dovrà contrarre per le spese della guerra, opiniamo che non potevansi dignitosamente desiderare condizioni più vantaggiose: e non v'ha dubbio che ritardando di più si sarebbero incontrati maggiori oneri per procacciarsi dei capitali. Le finanze dello Stato rimarranno di certo maggiormente oberate dalla partecipazione del Piemonte alla presente guerra: ma tal fiata la guerra è come la lancia d'Achille, che fere e sana.

A coloro che mostrano di credere essere la guerra d'Oriente unicamente promossa e sostenuta dalla gara di primeggiare tra la Francia e l'Inghilterra da una parte e la Russia dall'altra; che affermano nessun giovamento e nessun danno poter risultare dal trionfo di questa o di quelle ai piccoli Stati d'Europa; che in questa gran lotta non hanno nulla a guadagnare e nulla a perdere i grandi principii sociali di civiltà, di libertà, d'indipendenza, rispondiamo che sentiamo venir meno le forze per combattere tali asserti, riflettendo che non bastano per convincerli del contrario l'opinione dei più grandi statisti, il consenso unanime dei popoli civili, l'evidenza dei disastri che soprasterebbero alle nazioni meridionali ed occidentali d'Europa quando il mostruoso disegno di Pietro il Grande fosse coronato dal successo.

E senza esitanza affermiamo che non meno di Francia e d'Inghilterra avrebbe l'Italia a piangere amaramente quest'infausto avvenimento.

L'Italia per la sua giacitura in seno del Mediterraneo troverà sempre le vie d'Oriente più convenienti ai suoi traffici. Questa stessa strada dovrà fra non molto condurre per mezzo di una facile e pronta comunicazione alle Indie Orientali, emporio del commercio universale.

Supponete ora lo Czar di tutte le Russie padrone delle chiavi del Mar Nero, e la libertà di questo immenso traffico starà nelle sue mani.

Ma il danno che minaccerebbe la nazione Italiana non si arresterebbe qui.

Una Potenza colossale quale sarebbe la Russia padrona assoluta dei cantieri e degli arsenali marittimi dell'Eusino diverrebbe fra breve tal Potenza marittima da dominare orgogliosamente entro e fuori dello stretto dei Dardanelli. Il suo naviglio guerresco solcherebbe minaccioso le acque del Mediterraneo e non sappiamo vedere quale sicurezza offrirebbe ai popoli liberi; quale speranza a coloro che anelano a libertà. Noi chiediamo in fine ai nostri onorevoli avversari; qualora tale fosse già stata la situazione e la possanza dello Czar nell'anno 1848, se i popoli delle diverse parti d'Italia avrebbero assaporato anche per poco le dolcezze della libertà? se la Guerra dell'Indipendenza avrebbe potuto iniziarsi con tanta speranza di successo?

Il trionfo della Russia, non vale il nasconderlo, recherebbe una profonda ferita alla civiltà Europea, e se pure si volesse concedere che il trionfo degli alleati non approfitterebbe alla libertà politica dei popoli ed alle nazionalità, è però ben sicuro che nuocerebbe grandemente ad esse la Russia vincitrice.

Ma non vogliamo neppure disconoscere l'affiliazione che allaccia tra loro i grandi principii sociali.

La civiltà Europea dovrà necessariamente condurre tutti i popoli alla libertà politica ed entrambe, assieme congiunte, alla conquista delle loro nazionalità.

Chi è convinto di questi indissolubili rapporti procuri il trionfo del primo di questi beni soccorrendo la civiltà in pericolo in proporzione dei proprii mezzi ed attenda fiducioso l'avvenire.

Se la civiltà uscirà vittoriosa da questa gran lotta, riceverà tale un

impulso in Europa che non tarderà a partorire tutti gli altri beni di cui è feconda.

Queste sono le considerazioni ed i motivi che principalmente condussero la gran maggioranza dei vostri uffici e della Commissione a credere che l'adesione fatta dal Governo del Re al Trattato Anglo-Francese del 10 Aprile, 1854, sia necessaria, utile ed opportuna.

Vi proponiamo pertanto di dare la vostra approvazione alle Convenzione Militare e Finanziaria che l'accompagnano.

Se non fummo tutti concordi nel pronunciare il nostro giudizio sul merito del Trattato di Alleanza, però una voce unanime sorse negli uffizi per raccomandare caldamente al Governo che qualora la spedizione in Oriente di un corpo di 15,000 uomini debba aver luogo, adopri ogni diligenza perchè il soldato sia abbondevolmente provveduto di tutto il bisognevole. Nessuna notizia potrebbe giungere più acerba e dolorosa ai rappresentanti del nazione di quella dei patimenti e degli stenti che per imprevidenza od incuria dovessero soffrire i nostri bravi soldati, mentre lontani dai loro focolori cimenteranno la vita a vantaggio e gloria di questa comune patria.

La sollecitudine del presente Ministro de Guerra e Marina per tutto quanto tende a migliorare anche la condizione materiale dell'esercito è a tutti nota; noi possiamo andare sicuri nel caso che la spedizione d'Oriente si compia, ache raddoppierà le sue cure perchè sia preparata e condotta con previdenza e cautela.

Tanto gli uffizi quanto la Commissione si preoccuparono vivamente del modo di assicurare i mezzi di trasporto al corpo di spedizione, per guarentirne gli approvigionamenti il ritorno in patria; del quali mezzi non si tiene parola nella Convenzione stipulata dal Governo colle Potenze alleate, Francia ed Inghilterra.

Il Ministro de Guerra e Marina, a cui dovevano specialmente essere rivolte queste istanze, dichiarò che si erano già concertate col Potenze suddette le disposizioni opportune per provvedere a tale bisogna; essersi quindi obbligate di fornire alle truppe Sarde le vettovaglie occorrenti per tutto il tempo della spedizione, mediante il rimborzo delle speze, e gratuitamente i mezzi di trasporto per il ritorno.

Ciò nullameno avrebbe il Governo pensato di prevedere e provvedere per qualsiasi eventualità, mettendo a servizio del corpo di spedizione la marina militare, e noleggiando all'evenienza quel numero di bastimenti mercantili che avesse giudicati necessari per tutti i bisogni e per qualsiasi caso.

Tuttavia il Commissario del settimo uffizio fece al Ministro esplicita e reiterata istanza perchè volesse mantenere durante la guerra, nei piraggi d'Oriente, ed a dispozione del corpo di spedizione, il maggior numero possibile dei nostri piroscafi da guerra, con alcuni bastimenti di grossa portata, perchè possano in qualunque emergenza sussidiare i nostri soldati.

La Commissione intiera appoggiò vivamente questa proposizione, ed il Ministro non solo l'accolse, ma assicurò la Commissione essere per l'appunto questo il suo intendimento.

E siccome questi provvedimenti non si possono mandare ad effetto senza incontrare una maggiore spesa, sorse la questione se coll'imprestito di 25,000,000 di lire si sarebbe potuto sopperire a tutto.

Il Commissario del settimo uffizio volle esaminare minutamente ogni spesa occorrente per cadun servizio durante il corso di dodici mesi, e cercò di provare che insufficiente credeva la somma di 25,000,000; questa bastare appena alle spese prevedibili, e forse neppure integralmente; rimanere ancora allo scoperto le spese imprevedibili, che pure possono essere molte e ragguardevoli. Lo stesso contrappose al calcolo minutamente presentato dal Ministro un altro calcolo, che venne da questi contestato.

Lo stesso Commissario espresse il desiderio che gli approvigionamenti si facciano quanto sarà possibile nello Stato per assicurare sempre più le sussistenze.

Infine, il prelodato Ministro e la maggioranza della Commissione conchiusero che la somma de 25,000,000 possa essere più che sufficiente a tutte le

spese che si possono prevedere e calcolare secondo le norme dell'esperienza e della probabilità degli eventi.

In quanto alle spese imprevedebili non essere possibile di stabilire un calcolo *a priori*: doversi tutt'al più tenere in riserva una somma cospicua par farvi fronte, e tal somma credersi già contemplata nell'imprestito del 25,000,000.

La vostra Commissione confida di avere portato la sua attenzione sopra i punti principali e vitali di questa Convenzione: sta ora a voi, o Signori, di giudicare se abbia degnamente compiuto l'arduo mandato che gli commetteste.

Progetto del Ministero.	*Progetto della Commissione.*
Il Governo del Re è autorizzato a dar piena ed intiera esecuzione alla Convenzione Militare stipulata in data d'oggi con Sua Maestà la Regina del Regno Unito della Gran Bretagna ed Irlanda e Sua Maestà l'Imperatore dei Francesi, ed alla Convenzione Supplementaria oggi pure firmata con Sua Maestà Britannica.	Il Governo del Re è autorizzato a dare piena ed intiera esecuzione alla Convenzione Militare ed alla Convenzione Supplementaria stipulate il 26 Gennaio scorso con Sua Maestà la Regina del Regno Unito della Gran Bretagna ed Irlanda, e Sua Maestà l'Imperatore dei Francesi.

(Translation.)

TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN SARDINIA, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE. MILITARY CONVENTION BETWEEN THE POWERS AFORESAID. SUPPLEMENTARY CONVENTION WITH ENGLAND FOR A LOAN.

Sitting of February 1, 1855.

Gentlemen,

IN the struggle now pending between the allied Powers and Russia, in the East, are involved the future destinies of Asia and Europe. Desirous to avoid exaggeration we will not designate this a war of civilization against barbarism; that is to say, in the sense of fearing that the triumph of Russia would replunge civilized Europe into all the obscurity of the middle ages.

Civilization, which was then confined to a few nations, has since become an European inheritance: it has taken root even in another hemisphere; it has penetrated into every nation, and many of those savage and barbarous hordes who trampled under foot the civilization of Rome, have since been illumined by the very light which they had attempted to extinguish. But if the fear of again sinking into barbarism is uncalled for, no one will deny that were Russia to succeed in possessing herself of Constantinople, the fate of all the other States of Europe would become most lamentable.

Picture to yourself a power of 80,000,000 of souls, obeying blindly the nod of a despot and Pontiff, absolute master of the Baltic and the Black Sea, of which he would then hold the keys; and you will easily understand, were that event to come to pass, what would be the condition of Europe? The trade between Europe and Asia would depend on his will; no political act of moment could be consummated in Europe without his sanction.

The liberty of peoples and the independence of nations would be dependent upon the will of an autocrat ruling on the throne of Constantine.

The dangers were present to the vast mind of Napoleon the Great, when, from the rock of St. Helena he gave the counsel to Europe: "It will be time when Russia threatens the existence of Constantinople, for every village in Europe to ring its alarm-bell."

The danger foreseen by all civilized nations will account for the universal applause which greeted the declaration of war against Russia on the part of the allied Powers.

We will not, as an impartial observer of events, deny that certain inauspicious political and military occurrences have subsequently taken place which

lessen that sympathy and generate suspicion and distrust as to the tendency and issue of the war.

But if these occurrences are dispassionately considered, it will be evident that they were imposed on the Western Powers by the unavoidable necessity of the common salvation; by the necessity of arraying all the forces of Europe in one supreme cause—that of preventing the accomplishment of the fatal preponderance of one nation over all the rest.

On the other hand, the difficulties of the undertaking, and the incomplete successes of the expedition to the Crimea, ought rather, instead of alienating the public mind from the allies, to be a reason and an inducement for the Governments of Europe to abandon a dangerous neutrality, and to join their forces to the others engaged, in order to ward off the common danger while it is still possible.

The avowed object of this war, the dangers and advantages which are dependent on its issue, therefore induced the two great Western Powers, France and England, to sign the Treaty of the 10th of April last, leaving to all the Powers of Europe the faculty of acceding to it.

The Government of the King of Sardinia having been solicited to sign it, did not refuse; and concluded with the two Great Powers of France and England two Conventions, one of which determines and regulates the military force which shall be furnished in the present war by the Kingdom of Sardinia; and the other, supplementary to the first, provides the pecuniary means required to meet the cost.

It is upon the merits of this last that the Chamber is particularly called to pronounce; but it could not do so without taking into its consideration likewise the object of the outlay, and thence the fitness, utility, and opportunity of the Treaty itself.

This, therefore, would naturally be the course the discussion would take upon this very important question, in the Offices (Bureaux) of your Chamber, and it was conducted with that fullness and gravity which were called for by the high interest of the subject, and the enormous responsibility which must be so deeply felt by every deputy before giving his vote, entailing not alone a sacrifice of blood and money, but on which may depend even the fate of our country.

The first six Bureaux pronounced themselves in favour of the Treaty, and directed their respective Commissaries to acquiesce in the demand for the pecuniary means necessary to carry it into execution. The seventh Bureau has pronounced neither for nor against the measure; but it gave its Commissary a vote of confidence, charging him to demand further explanations of the Ministry in this Commission, and to give his vote in conformity with his conscience thus enlightened.

The two Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of War and Marine did, in fact, assist at the meetings of the Commission, and furnished ample information upon all the points and questions which arose.

The Commission acquired the conviction that the initiative in the negotiations was taken by the two Great Powers; and that those negotiations were conducted with firmness and dignity by the Ministers of the Crown.

The six first Commissaries drew from this Conference fresh reasons for persisting in their belief that the Treaty is necessary, useful, and opportune; whilst it would appear that those explanations produced a contrary impression upon the mind of the Commissary of the seventh Bureau, inasmuch as he definitively and decidedly pronounced himself against it, declaring formally that, in in his opinion, the negotiations were conducted with too great precipitation.

We have already set forth the general considerations which militate in favour of a coalition of all the States of Europe against the extravagant Muscovite ambition. Piedmont, as a fraction of the great European family, is bound to come in aid of the common peril with means proportionate to its military and political importance.

So far as the Commission could ascertain, no one in the Bureau of the Chamber supported the propriety of absolute or permanent neutrality or isolation.

That attitude would have marked the decay of the legitimate influence which has been always exercised by the House of Savoy in the great march of events in Europe, as an European and Italian Power.

It owes all its success and its progressive aggrandizement to the activity, the valour, and the capacity displayed in war and in its diplomatic counsels.

For the last eight centuries the cross of Savoy has shone on almost every battle-field, and always combating valiantly. More than once it snatched from Victory a wreath of laurel, which increased the glory and power of its States.

It took part, directly or indirectly, in all the great European Congresses, when it profited sagaciously from its blood and valour.

It is certainly not after the events of 1848, which inaugurated a more enlightened and thoroughly national policy, that Sardinia should recede from the path of glory trodden till that time, and adopt a timid, egotistical policy, as if it had already fulfilled its destiny.

That policy would suit only a State which had nothing further to hope—nothing further to fear: a nation ready to declare itself satisfied with the *status quo*. Such certainly is not the condition of Constitutional Piedmont; of Piedmont, no contemptible portion of that Italy which is entitled to look forward to better destinies, which places its fondest hopes in this happy corner of the classic land.

Let us repeat, to the credit of our country and of this Parliament, that not a single voice was raised in favour of an absolute isolation in the serious crisis in which Europe is now involved.

There are, however, several deputies who are of opinion that we should await more favourable circumstances before pronouncing ourselves.

They observe that the policy followed by Government is too hazardous in sending the bulk of its forces to regions so distant, whilst none of the Powers of our standing has yet made up its mind to take part in the conflict; whilst two Powers of the first rank are still wavering, and one of these is watching our every movement with no friendly eye. That prudence would suggest, therefore, our awaiting the further development of events, and the decision of these Powers; which policy would be the more advisable because our finances are exhausted, and can hope for relief only from peace and internal prosperity.

In addition to these objections, others are brought forward of a different order, but no less grave.

Some say—From this war Italy can expect no good, and none therefore can accrue to Piedmont, which after all is an essential part thereof, and whose general policy must necessarily be identified with the general good of the nation. Let us reserve our forces—our means—our last resources—for the supreme moment in which interests more near and more vital to our country's fate shall be brought into play.

The war, as at present directed, is a diplomatic war; that is to say, a war, the object of which is to decide whether this or that great European Power shall preserve or lose more or less influence. Civilization, liberty, the independence of nations have nothing to gain in this struggle. Why, therefore, should a State like ours, of the second order, make sacrifices which incur risks for a cause from which it can hope for no advantages, from which no one of the great social principles can expect a solution?

We trust that we have candidly set forth the principal difficulties and objections which have arisen in the Bureaux and in the Commission against the Treaty of Alliance.

We will, with the same truth and frankness, reproduce the arguments alleged in answer to them:

On the conclusion of the Treaty of the 10th of April between France and England, it was to be foreseen that sooner or later Piedmont would be called on to accede thereto. No urgent motive, however—no imperious circumstance—yet existed of sufficient cogency to induce the Government to hasten that moment; only that some months after such acts of diplomacy took place, that the Government could not let them pass without signing its accession to that Treaty. Otherwise, perhaps, the arrangements might not have been so easy, nor the conditions so advantageous; perhaps other dangers might arise, which by an opportune accession to the Treaty we believe to be dissipated. By acceding to this Treaty, we secure, besides, an honourable place in the future Congress of Europe, when, after the war, the peace shall be discussed.

The risk of foreign invasion, or of a war in Italy, while a large portion of

our forces are fighting abroad, is not to be feared; and even if that should happen, besides that the Treaty guarantees us the help of the Anglo-French forces, the seat of war would be changed from the East to the banks of the Po and the Adige. Under such circumstances we shall again see our brave soldiers, hardened by the fire of Eastern battles, and shall send them to more genial camps to gain fresh laurels.

The finances not having yet recovered from the wounds inflicted by the War of Independence, requires, it is true, peace to recover. But it is not our Government which has reopened the Temple of Janus; Piedmont must submit to the conditions of Europe, which call all nations to arms. If she declare herself among the first, attribute it to her warlike character; to her past and present political state; to her geographical position; to the new relations established and about to be made between France and Austria. The Government was obliged to decide early upon its line of conduct by the force of circumstances; and it seems to us that the choice made was the one most conducive to the present and future interests of Piedmont.

As regards the loan to be contracted for the expenses of the war, we are of opinion that we could not with dignity desire more advantageous terms; and there can be no doubt that by longer delay we should have had greater difficulty in obtaining capital. The finance of the State will certainly be more encumbered by the participation of Piedmont in the present war, but such a war is like the spear of Achilles that wounds and heals. To those who seem to think that the Eastern war is solely carried on by the ambition of predominance on the part of England and France, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other; who declare that neither good nor harm can arise from the triumph of either party to the smaller States of Europe; that in this struggle the great social principles of civilization, liberty, and independence have nothing to gain or lose; we declare that we have not strength to combat such assertions, on reflecting that not even the opinion of the greatest statesmen, or the unanimous assent of civilized people, or the evidence of the disasters which befel the nations of Southern and Western Europe, when the monstrous design of Peter the Great was crowned with success, do not suffice to convince them. And without hesitation we assert that not less than France and England, Italy would have to deplore this unhappy event.

Italy, by her position in the Mediterranean, will always find the Eastern road most convenient for her traffic. This same road will soon, by a rapid and easy communication, lead to the East Indies, emporium of universal commerce. Suppose, now, the Czar master of the keys of the Black Sea, the liberty of this immense traffic will fall into his hands. But the injury which will threaten Italy will not stop here: a colossal Power such as Russia would be, mistress of the storehouses and maritime arsenals of the Euxine, would soon become so great a maritime Power as to dominate imperiously both sides of the Dardanelles; her war-fleet would plough menacingly the Mediterranean, and we cannot see what security there would be for free nations—what hope for those who pant for liberty. Lastly, we ask our antagonists what would have been the condition and the power of the Czar in 1848, if the nations of the various parts of Italy had tasted for a little time the delights of liberty; if the War of Independence could have commenced with so much hope of success? The triumph of Russia, there is no concealing it, would inflict a severe wound on European civilization; and supposing it admitted that the triumph of the allies would not profit the political liberty of the people and their nationalities, it is certain that the success of Russia would be very prejudicial to them.

Neither must we ignore the affiliation which connects the great social principles. The civilization of Europe must necessarily lead to political liberty, and at the same time to the nationalities of the people. He who is convinced of the indissoluble connexions, let him procure the triumph of the first by aiding civilization, now in danger, according to his means, and await confidently the result. If civilization triumph in this conflict, it will receive such an impulse in Europe that it would soon bring forth all the other benefits with which it is laden.

These are the considerations and the motives which have chiefly induced the great majority of your Bureaus, and of the Commission, to believe that the accession of the Government to the Treaty of the 10th April, 1854, is necessary.

useful, and opportune. I propose to you, therefore, to give your approbation to the Military and Financial Conventions which accompany it. If we were not all agreed in pronouncing our judgment upon the merits of the Treaty, at all events a unanimous vote was passed, warmly to recommend to the Government that when the expedition of 15,000 men is sent to the East, every effort be made to provide them with all things requisite. No news could be more bitter or painful to the representatives of the people than that of the sufferings and privations which through carelessness or improvidence our brave soldiers would have to suffer, while far from home they risk their lives for the advantage and glory of their country. The care of the present Minister of War for the amelioration of the condition of the soldier is known to all, and we feel certain that should this expedition take place, he will see that every precaution and care is doubled.

The Government and the Commission are much occupied in securing transports for the expedition, to guarantee its provisions and the means of return, of which no mention is made in the Treaty. The Minister of War, whom this chiefly concerned, declared that measures for this object had been concerted with the allies. They (the allies) had bound themselves to furnish the Sardinian troops with provisions, the price to be repaid them, and with means of transport for their return free of expense. Otherwise the Government would have foreseen and provided for any eventualities, placing at the disposal of the expeditionary army the marine force, and employing such mercantile vessels as they might consider necessary.

Still the Commissary of the 7th Bureau made an explicit and reiterated appeal that they should keep in the East, at the disposal of the expedition, the greatest possible number of our war steamers, with some heavy vessels, in order to succour it in case of need. The entire Commission earnestly supported this request, and the Minister not only received it, but declared that to be precisely his intention. And since all this cannot be done without a great increase of expenditure, the question was raised whether the 25,000,000 loan would suffice. The Commissioner of the 7th Bureau wished to examine minutely the expenses of each service for the last twelve months, and tried to prove that he thought 25,000,000 too little; that this would barely suffice for the expenses that could be foreseen, leaving the other expenses possibly considerably uncovered. He brought forward a counter-calculation on the subject to that of the Minister, which was contested by him. The same Commissioner proposed that the provisions should be as much as possible prepared in the State, so as always to secure the troops from want. Ultimately the Minister and the majority of the Commission decided that 25,000,000 would suffice for everything, according to past experience and the probabilities of events.

As to the unforeseen expenses, it was impossible to calculate them *à priori*: they ought at the utmost to keep a considerable sum in hand to liquidate them, and that sum be believed to be already included in the loan of 25,000,000 francs.

Your Commission considers that it has examined the principal and vital points of this Convention: it is now for you to judge, Gentlemen, whether it has worthily performed the arduous task committed to it.

Project of Government.	*Project of Commission.*
The Government of the King is authorized to execute fully and entirely the Military Convention concluded with Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and the Emperor of the French, and the Supplementary Convention also signed to-day with Her Britannic Majesty.	The Government of the King is authorized to execute fully and entirely the Military and also the Supplementary Convention of the 26th of last January with Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the Emperor of the French.

No. 204.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 9.)

My Lord, *Stuttgardt, February 5, 1855.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 8 of the 31st ultimo, reporting a conversation with Baron de Linden upon German and Eastern affairs, I have the honour to state that his Excellency also urged the following topics, which had escaped my memory, namely, that the demands of Prince Menchikoff would not have injured Turkey; that a peace on the bases of the four points would cause Russia to form alliances for the purpose of escaping from it; that a Russian Grand Duke on the Throne of Turkey would seem a good future arrangement; and that the best line of conduct for Austria was to continue on the defensive.

The topic last mentioned appeared to me if not beneath, at least beside, any reply from the Agent of a Government which had signed the Treaty of December, and with regard to the others, I observed that in the event of the fall of the Turkish Throne, I could see no more reason for supplying the vacancy from Russia, than there had been in the case of Greece; that I could not figure to myself where Russia would be able to find any such delivering alliance as his Excellency contemplated; and that whilst Her Majesty's Government considered that the demands of Prince Menchikoff were calculated to act fatally on Turkish independence, the mere fact of Turkey's right to reject them, whether injurious or not, constituted Russia's attempt to enforce them by violence an unwarrantable outrage.

For fear that the concluding paragraph of my above-cited despatch may have appeared to your Lordship somewhat obscure, I beg leave to state that my full meaning was, that the triple Russian connexion of this Court, and the intriguing activity ascribed to the King, perhaps invested the sentiments of the Government with a degree of importance not naturally belonging to so small a country as Wurtemburg, regarding so great a question as that of Turkey, and that it was this consideration which had occasionally induced me to take up more of your Lordship's time than I should otherwise have ventured to do.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

P.S.—Another point raised by Baron de Linden was, that independence could hardly apply to a country in so feeble a condition as Turkey, to which I replied, that I considered every country independent towards which more powerful States made use of no other than moral influence.

G. S. S. G.

No. 205.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 114.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 8, 1855.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a memorandum for the guidance of Her Majesty's Diplomatic and Consular servants with reference to the course to be observed by them in regard to blockades instituted by Her Majesty's naval forces, and I have to instruct your Excellency to pay particular attention to the directions contained in this paper.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 206.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 143. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 7, 1855.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS renewed with me yesterday the conversation which had been commenced between us on the previous day, relative to the course to be pursued in respect to the Vienna negotiations, and reported in my despatch No. 137. He said that he had been turning the matter anxiously in his mind; that he thought there were two ways in which negotiations might yet be avoided; the first, by requesting the Austrian Government to insert in the full powers to be given to their Plenipotentiary, the text of the memorandum accepted by Prince Gortchakoff. This had been done in the French and in the Turkish full powers. He hoped that Her Majesty's Government would adopt the same plan; and a request might then be made to Count Buol to conform to the course followed by the allies of Austria. If he refused, it might be a question whether such refusal would not justify France and England in demurring to commence negotiations. But supposing him to accede, and the Conference to meet, the first demand made by the French and English Plenipotentiaries should be the signature of a Protocol, or *procès-verbal*, recording in unequivocal terms the acceptance of the four points as interpreted by the allied Cabinets. M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed that he felt certain that Prince Gortchakoff would not concede this demand.

His Excellency had, he said, been informed upon authority which carried conviction to his mind, that it was understood at St. Petersburgh that Prince Gortchakoff's interpretation of the four points had been admitted by the allied Representatives. He had learnt further, that Prince Gortchakoff's proceedings, although supposed to have been so far successful, had not been approved; that he was considered to have gone too far; and that he had only not been disavowed, because it was thought undesirable to weaken his position at Vienna at the present moment. But the Prince had, M. Drouyn de Lhuys continued to say, received the most positive instructions to confine himself strictly within the limits of his own interpretation; and it might therefore be presumed that he would not sign such a Protocol as that which would be proposed to him. In this case there could be no doubt France and England would be justified in refusing to enter into further negotiation.

I replied to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that I sincerely hoped that his anticipations would prove true, but that it behoved the two Governments to be prepared for every eventuality. Prince Gortchakoff might, notwithstanding the information which had reached M. Drouyn de Lhuys, sign the Protocol. What course would his Excellency then propose to take?

M. Drouyn de Lhuys admitted the embarrassment in which the allied Governments would then be placed. Decline further negotiation they could not in honour, and yet to proceed involved a choice of difficulties. He alluded, but not in very distinct terms, to demanding an armistice and the evacuation of the Crimea—an idea, as your Lordship knows already, put forward by the French as an expedient to break off negotiations.

I observed that if an armistice was proposed by Russia, such a condition, however unlikely to be accepted, might perhaps be put forward. But what would be the effect of its coming from two Governments who had declared that they would not suspend their military operations before preliminaries of peace had been signed?

M. Drouyn de Lhuys did not press this point further.

He then said that one of two courses was still left open,—to begin the discussion of the points in the order in which they stood, or to require that the third should be first taken into consideration. The objection to taking them in the order in which they stood arose from the two first being those which admitted of the easiest arrangement, and which interested Austria and Germany the most, and that consequently it might be apprehended that the questions of the future relations of the Principalities towards Turkey and of the navigation of the Danube being settled, Austria would be less disposed to support our demands in respect to the Black Sea.

On the other hand, we must consider the position in which we should stand, if we insisted on commencing negotiations by an examination of the IIIrd Article. We must not forget that Austria, previous to signing the Treaty of the 2nd of December, had asked two questions of the belligerent Powers: first, whether they contemplated any considerable territorial alteration; secondly, whether they intended to require conditions which it could not fairly be expected would be accepted by Russia. Having received satisfactory assurances on these two points, Austria signed the Treaty. Now, in putting forward the third basis first, how would the two Powers stand in regard to these assurances? Could a demand for dismantling Sebastopol be considered as an infringement of the territorial sovereignty of Russia? Could it, in the second place, be looked upon as exorbitant and such as would prevent all chance of the restoration of peace? The first of these pretensions, M. Drouyn de Lhuys was inclined to think, might be successfully resisted; but, conscientiously speaking, he could not say as much in regard to the second; nor, whatever might be the confidential communications exchanged between the two Governments as to their intentions, did he think that they were in a position to demand of Russia, in the face of all Europe, the surrender of a stronghold on which their armies had, after four months' trial, been able to make no impression. He knew, moreover, positively that the Austrian Plenipotentiary would not support such a pretension. His opinion therefore was, saving the sovereign decision of the Emperor, that, if negotiations could not be avoided altogether, the bases must be taken in the order in which they had been offered to Russia. Supposing the discussion on the two first to terminate in a manner favourable to Austria, and to be broken off altogether on the third, Austria would not stand in a much better position, because no Treaty would have been concluded.

I observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in reply, that I inferred from his remarks that he had abandoned all hope of the active cooperation of Austria, since it was certain that, so long as we were in negotiation with Russia, Austria would not resort to hostilities; and it appeared equally certain, from information received by him, that Austria would not support us, either morally or materially, in any demands we might make in regard to the Black Sea. Whether, therefore, these demands were made sooner or later, did not seem to me to be of much consequence. But I owned that I could not conceive a more untoward position than for the two Governments to find themselves in the midst of a negotiation, with several points satisfactorily settled, and the negotiation to be broken off, in consequence of France and England insisting on conditions which Europe would in general pronounce they were not in a situation to demand. Let us suppose the question of the future protectorate of the Principalities settled, and the navigation of the Danube satisfactorily provided for, would it not be said that France and England were pursuing their own interests alone, in demanding more, and should we not risk having an European coalition against ourselves? Neither let it be forgotten that Austria would have no great desire to see the fourth basis settled; for, if she joined in denouncing the Russian protection of the Greek subjects of the Sultan, she would herself be obliged to renounce the protection which she exercised over a large portion of the Roman Catholic subjects of the Porte in Bosnia and Herzegowina,—a protection to which she had always held with extreme tenacity.

With respect to the assurances given to Austria before the signature of the Treaty of the 2nd December, I remarked that Her Majesty's Government had considered the questions of Austria to apply to territorial changes only, and that Her Majesty's Government had bound themselves no further than to consult with Austria, in case they had any changes of the kind to propose.

Not being in possession of precise instructions from your Lordship on these very important questions, I did not press the subject further. I should, however, add that M. Drouyn de Lhuys hinted that the negotiations, if begun, might easily be protracted so as to gain time, and that, in the mean while, every effort should be made to strike a serious blow in the Crimea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 207.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 145.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 8, 1855.*

AFTER writing my despatch No. 143 of yesterday's date to your Lordship, I saw M. Drouyn de Lhuys again, when he told me that the Emperor's sanction had been given to the course which his Excellency proposed to follow at Vienna, and your Lordship may, therefore, consider that despatch, which was marked "Confidential," to be an official record of the wishes of the French Government.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys went again through all the arguments which he had employed on the previous day. I abstained from any expression of opinion, but I asked him to tell me frankly whether I was still to understand that the Emperor and his Government felt that these negotiations could lead to no immediate result, and whether their object was to break them off without entangling the belligerent Powers in fresh engagements. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that my understanding of the views of the French Government was correct. I then asked him whether he had made any communication to the Austrian Government on the subject, observing that until the opinions of Her Majesty's Government were known, I trusted that the action of the French Government would continue suspended. M. Drouyn de Lhuys assured me that he had not as yet made, and would make, no communication to Vienna until your Lordship's answer was received.

Knowing your Lordship's great desire to prevent discussions in Conference, which might have the effect of showing Prince Gortchakoff that a difference of opinion existed between the Plenipotentiaries of England and France, and the Plenipotentiary of Austria, I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether he would object, should Her Majesty's Government desire it, to authorise M. de Bourqueney, on the receipt of his full powers, to go with the Earl of Westmorland to Count Buol, when the two Ministers, after showing their full powers, and inviting Count Buol, as proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, to assimilate his to theirs, might proceed to declare that they were instructed by their respective Governments, before proceeding further with the negotiations (their intentions to enter into which were proved by the transmission of their full powers), to explain themselves frankly with Count Buol in regard to the third point; and if they found a great divergence of opinion between themselves and Count Buol, and an unwillingness on his part to support the demands they were instructed to make, to ask him of what advantage it could be proceeding in the negotiations, which could only serve to show that the parties to the Treaty of the 2nd December were not agreed in their views.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that, not only he should have no objection to such a proceeding, but he thought that advantage might be derived from it. If Austria found that the allies were reluctant to enter into Conference unless she engaged herself more positively on the third point, she might be induced to take that course rather than see the negotiations on which she founded so much hope nipped in the bud.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 208.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 147. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 8, 1855.*

I INQUIRED yesterday of M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether the Austrian General, Comte de Crenneville, had made any overtures to the French Government with respect to the military assistance to be furnished by Austria, in case she became involved in hostilities with Russia.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that he could only inform me confidentially, that as yet Count Crenneville's communications had been limited to the statement of the numbers of the Austrian forces as compared with those of Russia which could be opposed to them; that the Emperor thought that in this statement the forces of Russia had been greatly exaggerated, and that His Majesty had ordered a counter-statement to be prepared.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 209.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 150. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 8, 1855.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informed me yesterday that he had received confidential information that considerable impression had been produced at St. Petersburgh by the intelligence which had been received there of the signature of a Treaty between the Western Powers and Sardinia. It was considered by the Russian Government as calculated to force Austria to abandon her present neutrality.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 210.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 133. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 9, 1855.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government concur in your views respecting the embarrassment which might result from any indiscreet language being held by M. Drouyn de Lhuys with regard to future arrangements in the Baltic, such as that reported in your confidential despatch No. 138 of the 6th instant.

On all future occasions, when a similar course of policy is proposed or suggested by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, it will be advisable at once to discourage it, upon the broad ground that however great may be the possible or contingent advantages expected from such a course, Her Majesty's Government can never sanction, or be a party to any measure that is not honest, and the objects of which they cannot openly avow.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 211.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 118
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 9, 1855.*

IN reply to your Excellency's No. 63 of the 25th of January, I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve the advice which your Excellency gave to the Porte respecting the transmission of full powers and instructions to the Ottoman Ambassador at Vienna.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 212.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 119.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 9, 1855.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 73 of the 29th ultimo, I transmit for your information copies of Treaties with Sardinia, which have been signed, but are not yet ratified, respecting the accession of that Power to the Treaty of April 10, 1854, between England and France, and the military contingent to be sent to the Crimea by Sardinia; and I have to inform your Excellency that a general officer is coming from Turin to Paris and London, when the time for the embarkation of the Sardinian troops will be fixed.

It will, however, be desirable that your Excellency should endeavour to procure accommodation for these troops at Constantinople or the neighbourhood.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 213.

The Earl of Clarendon to Brigadier-General Williams.

(No. 24.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 9, 1855.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 10 of the 16th of January, I have to state to you that I quite concur with you in opinion as to the course which should be followed by the Porte towards the culprits Injeh Arap, Chief of Bashi-Bozouks, and Yaziji, late Commander of the Irregular Cavalry of the Kars army; and I have instructed Lord Stratford to support your views respecting the punishment of those men.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 214.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 61.)
My Lord, *Vienna, February 7, 1855.*

COUNT BUOL in speaking of the dissolution of the Queen's Government at the present moment, which he very greatly lamented, more particularly observed upon the momentary suspense which it must occasion to the opening of the negotiation for peace which had been announced, and to the consequent solution of the important question, whether or not that negotiation would be entered upon by the Russian Government with the desire of bringing it to a satisfactory result. Count Buol stated that he had written a despatch to Count Colloredo, directing him as far as he was able to enforce these views upon Her Majesty's Government, since to Austria as well as to the whole of Europe it was of the greatest importance that the question should be decided upon without delay. He said that he was prepared, in conjunction with Baron Bourqueney and myself, at the first meeting of the Plenipotentiaries, to state that the negotiation must be based upon the acknowledged acceptation by Prince Gortchakoff of the principles as set forth in the interpretation of the four conditions which had been submitted to him at the meeting of December 28th last, and accepted by him at the meeting of January 7th. Count Buol stated that this interpretation to which he had been a party by the signature of the "Protocole réservé," was the foundation upon which the Imperial Government considered that the negotiation must be established, and to which they would implicitly adhere; and he remarked the more strongly upon this point on account of the discrepancy of the various reports concerning the acceptation of it by Prince Gortchakoff,

which had been circulated throughout Europe: one of these had lately been transmitted to him from Paris, which had been addressed by Count Arnim to his Court.

Count Buol regretted that Count Arnim, as he was not in a situation to be able officially to report the incidents of a meeting at which he was not present, should have stated what he supposed had passed there. He had recapitulated some of the conversation which had taken place there, although without the precision it required, but he had in no way correctly represented the result of that meeting, which was, that (setting aside as irrelevant to the question before it, all the remarks which were made by Prince Gortchakoff, which did not bear upon the acceptation or rejection of the interpretation which was recapitulated to him, and accepting none of the requirements he had mentioned), the simple acceptation of that interpretation, without any change whatever, was received from him; upon which the decision was taken that the conditions required for the commencement of the negotiation had been fulfilled.

Count Buol stated that Prince Gortchakoff, in speaking to him lately, left upon him the impression that he acknowledged that this was the true account of what had taken place, and he had added that his Government was sincerely desirous of the reestablishment of peace.

Count Buol read to me his despatch to Count Colloredo on this subject, which will be communicated to your Lordship; and in order that there should be no mistake in my representation of his language, I have read to Count Buol this despatch, and I have received his approval of its terms, as accurately reporting his conversation with me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 215.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 62. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, February 7, 1855.*

I COMMUNICATED, in compliance with your Lordship's wishes, the despatch No. 28 which your Lordship had addressed to Lord Bloomfield upon the questions at present in discussion with the Prussian Government. Count Buol desired me to thank your Lordship for the perusal of this despatch, the contents of which had been highly satisfactory to him. He hoped your Lordship would continue to press the Prussian Government in the same sense to unite with the allied Governments, and to take the very moderate engagements which were asked of them. Count Buol remarked, that at present the irritation and asperity of Prussia against Austria was very great; he did not therefore expect that she would immediately desist from the course she was at present pursuing, but he believed that as soon as she was persuaded that the Plenipotentiaries of the allied Powers were about to meet for the negotiation of peace, the Cabinet of Prussia would make concessions and take engagements which they would not now agree to, in order to become a party to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 216.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 38. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 9, 1855.*

BARON MANTEUFEL has just informed me, in the strictest confidence, that the Russian Minister has for some time past been pressing him to declare that Prussia accepted, in the broadest sense, the interpretation put on the four points by the Imperial Government, and promised, in consideration of the concessions made by Russia, to disengage herself from her alliance with Austria.

His Excellency stated further, that Baron Budberg had presented several memorandums on the subject, but that he had always refused to recommend the matter in any way, and had been exposed to some altercations with certain persons at Court who took a different view of the question; but that he had been pressed so hard, and assured that the King was disposed to yield the point, that he had seen the King this evening, who, on learning what had been told to Baron Manteuffel, assumed an air of great surprise that his opinions should have been represented as changed, and, instead of showing a disposition to adopt the suggested policy, has declared to Baron Manteuffel that he will not bind himself to Russia in the sense proposed by Baron Budberg.

I told Baron Manteuffel that I was glad to hear that he had so successfully combated the intrigues of the Court party, and that I hoped advantage would be taken of the King's present disposition to advance the object of M. d'Usedom's and General Wedel's missions, and that no more time would be lost in negotiating the Treaty which was under discussion. His Excellency replied that no progress had been made in this matter, and that His Majesty still insisted that he must be admitted into the Conference before signing the Treaty. I then observed to his Excellency that I did not see how we could well do more for Prussia that we had done for Austria in this respect; for if I was well informed, we had declined the proposal of Austria to enter into conference with her until she made engagements which would bind her future conduct, and the Treaty of the 2nd December had been the result of our refusal; and I added, will you answer for the King making a Treaty that will identify his policy with ours if he is admitted to the Conference? Baron Manteuffel replied, that he could not do so; and he gave me further to understand, that the King's mind appeared to be made up on the point; that his *amour propre* was concerned in it; and that if we did not choose to make this concession, we might find him disinclined to go on with the negotiations.

Having reported this conversation to your Lordship, it is my duty to add, that I by no means pretend to suggest that the course proposed by the King should be adopted, and that His Majesty should be readmitted to the Conference unconditionally; for, to judge from the little disposition which has hitherto been shown by this Court to join the alliance, it may be fairly doubted whether we should gain anything by acceding to the King's wishes, and whether it would be of advantage to our ulterior objects to permit His Majesty to have a Plenipotentiary at the consultations about to take place at Vienna, until he is bound to take part with us hereafter, in the event of the Conference not leading to the result which is so much desired by His Majesty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 217.

Brigadier-General Craufurd to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 3.)

My Lord, *Vienna, February 7, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose the document spoken of in my last despatch, viz., the most recent state of the Russian forces furnished by the Austrian staff.

These forces are divided into six armies. The tabular form in which the details are conveyed will, I think, carry to the mind a more clear and comprehensive idea of the nature and distribution of them, than if the various details were brought successively to the eye, and I therefore forward to your Lordship, a translation and copy of the Austrian paper.

The total number stated exceeds that given in a despatch addressed to your Lordship by Her Britannic Majesty's Minister, in the month of November last, No. 317. The disposition of the troops also varies, but the sum total would be in accordance with the calculation made by Mr. Buchanan in November 1854, together with his observation that it was stated in St. Petersburgh at that time, that the force indicated would be very considerably augmented before the spring.

In this immense number of soldiers, it must of course be recollected that great bodies of irregular troops are comprised, and also that the army of the Caucasus must be in a great part absorbed by furnishing an army to oppose the Turks in Asia Minor, and by supplying garrisons for the various Russian stations and forts in that country.

I had the honour of a long conversation with Baron Hess to-day. With regard to the military Conferences, of which mention has often been made in public prints, he expressed his surprise at the report having gone abroad that such Conferences had taken place. His Excellency said that he had received no intimation from His Imperial Majesty of the project of opening at present such Conferences, nor did Baron Hess appear to think that the moment had arrived when they could be held with advantage. The first necessity was considered by him to be, that of securing a sufficient force to cope with armies of the numerical strength presented by the inclosed document; secondly, that of securing Prussian cooperation, and also the support of the army of the German Empire in an offensive operation, and thus, as well as by the aid of the allies in other quarters, being able to count upon a mass of armed men, of numbers equal to those ascertained to be collected upon the side of Russia.

In speaking of the Russian army General Hess assumed a lower total (by about 100,000 men) than that indicated in the "general view" inclosed, and spoke of the number of 850,000 men as the force eventually to be opposed by the allies.

Without numbers approaching the above upon the side of the allies, the Baron considered that a war, surpassing, as he anticipates, all modern wars in magnitude, could not be undertaken with rational hope of success.

The collection therefore of a power from different quarters with which to act offensively against the Russian army in Poland, must, he conceived, occupy two months at the least, and the concentration of them for the purpose of warlike operations would, he estimated, require a month in addition; added to which, the state of the roads in Galicia made an earlier commencement of warlike movements nearly impossible, under any circumstances.

With all these considerations he considered the present moment too early for the opening of Conferences. The object of them must principally be the discussion of a plan of military operations, and since, if formed, it could only be executed after the expiration of three months, such a discussion would at present be useless. The greatest changes might possibly take place in the state of Europe before that period has elapsed, and should the war continue, the result of the siege of Sebastopol must influence incalculably its whole progress, and especially the disposition of the Russian armies.

Baron Hess's conversation lasted for a considerable time, and appeared characterized by great frankness. I will take more time than is at my disposal before the departure of the messenger, to reflect upon the tenour of his observations, and will write to your Lordship any conclusions I may be led to. As I hope to have the good fortune to meet Baron Hess soon again, he will no doubt make some observations in reference to what passed to-day, and I will merely remark, that with some qualifications of his Excellency's views, they are what I had anticipated from an examination of existing circumstances.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES H. CRAUFURD.

Inclosure in No. 217.

GENERAL VIEW of the Russian Forces, in January 1855.

Names of Armies and Generals Commanding.	Positions.	Effective Strength of Combatants.						Remarks.
		Battalions.	Squadrons.	Cossack Pulks.	Batteries.	Men.	Field-pieces.	
I. Troops in the Baltic Provinces, St. Petersburgh, Finland, and Estland	In the Environs of St Petersburgh, under General Arbuzon	77½	33	1	27	72,376	252	To these Troops must be added also 10 battalions Infantry of Finland, 6 battalions ditto "Chasseurs," the Imperial Regiment Rifles, and 3 other battalions.
	Kronstadt, under General Dilin	19	..	..	2	11,920	16	
	Finland, under General Berg	33	..	2	6	29,600	64	
	Estland, under General Grobbe (I)	24½	..	1	5	20,510	44	
	Altogether	156	33	4	40	134,406	376	
II. Army for Active Operations in Poland, Lithuania, Volhynia, Courland, and Livonia: Head-quarters, Warsaw.	On the Right Wing, in the Government of Radom	34	..	3½	9	31,100	104	
	The Centre, on the Vistula. Head-quarters, Warsaw	48	32	3½	19½	57,650	188	
	The Left Wing, in the Governments of Lublin and Volhynia ..	38	32	3½	16	36,440	160	
	The Reserve, in Lithuania and Government of Augustow	33	64½	..	14	43,170	148	
	In Courland, Livonia, General Sievers. Head-quarters, Mitau ..	16	32	1	6	18,440	64	
	Altogether	204	160½	11	64½	206,800	664	
III. Army of the South, under General Gortchakoff.	On the line of the Lower Danube and Pruth, General Lüders. Ismail (A)	34	32	2	10	30,720	120	
	In Bessarabia, on the Pruth and on each side of the Dniester (B) ..	16	32	2	6	18,720	64	
	In the Government of Kherson, and on the coast of the Black Sea, in Southern Russia, General Schabelski, at Odessa (C)	24	80	4	11	28,600	88	
	"Reserves that can be disposed of." In the Governments of Kiew, Czernigow, and Sekaterinoslow (D)	16	60	..	11	23,700	88	
	Altogether	90	184	8	38	101,740	360	

General View of the Russian Forces—*continued.*

Names of Armies and Generals Commanding.	Positions.	Effective Strength of Combatants: Battalions.	Squadrons.	Cossack Pulks.	Batteries.	Men.	Field-pieces.	Remarks.
IV. The Army of the Crimea, under General Menschikoff.	Garrison of Sebastopol, Vice-Admiral Nachimoff	33	..	..	6	21,000	56	The Army of the Crimea can be reinforced by a portion of the Reserve of the Army of the South; viz., by 2 Brigades of Infantry of the 5th Division, "Infanterie Reserve," also by 6th Division, "Infanterie Reserve," also by 2 Brigades of the Division of Light Cavalry of Reserves, and by the 2nd Division of Dragoons; that is, 16 Battalions, 2 Regiments of Cavalry Reserves, and 3 Regiments of Dragoons. Total: 105,000 men and 324 guns. N. B.—If at the end of February the state of roads, &c., permits of it.
	The Left Wing, towards Sebastopol to the north of the Valley of the Tchernaya, between Inkermann and Belbeck, Gortchakoff II.	51	32½	4	15	38,250	168	
	The Centre, in Camp of Baktchiserai on the Alma, under command of Osten-Sacken	48	44	4	17	38,850	184	
	The Right Wing, in the direction of Eupatoria, under General Kroff.	..	32	2	2	5,440	16	
	Headquarters, Iaktcha	..	30	2	13	10,600	138	
	Corps of Reserve, at Perekop, under General Rezi	42	..	..	..	3,600	..	
	In the Peninsula of Kertch, General Chrouleff	3	..	..	..	..	..	
	Altogether	179	138½	13	53	117,500	562	
V. "Réserves de Secours."	In the interior of the Empire, General Tchetwiajew	120	44½	..	15	32,325	564	
VI. Army of the Caucasus, General Mouravieff.	Independent Corps of Caucasians. Head-quarters, Tiflis	148	8	48	24	126,000	348	Included in this are 16 Sotnias of Mounted and 20 Bands of Foot Militia
	The Right Wing, General Andronikoff, at Achalzyche	30	..	23	3	20,800	68	
	The Centre, at Alexandropol, General Bebutoff	95	30	37	10	28,200	104	10 Sotnias of Mounted and 7 Foot Militia
	Left Wing, at Erivan, General Wraniegel	54	..	15	1	5,600	12	Included in this, 7 Bands of Foot Militia
	Altogether	1983	38	311	42	180,600	492	
	GRAND TOTAL	2471	394½	863	253	343,371	2,314	

No. 218.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 124.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 12, 1855.

IN reply to your Excellency's despatch No. 71 of the 29th ultimo, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve of the communication which you directed M. Pisani on the 29th of January to make to the Porte relative to the instructions to be given to the Ottoman Ambassador at Vienna, and which Her Majesty's Government hope will be received by the Porte as a judicious and friendly warning with respect to the course that the Turkish Plenipotentiary should pursue in the negotiations there.

A peace that should be inglorious and unsafe for Turkey would be equally so for England and France, and it is not to be supposed that those two Powers would submit to such a result of the struggle in which they are engaged for maintaining the independence of the Ottoman Empire, and guarding Europe against the aggressions of Russia.

Her Majesty's Government pronounce no opinion upon the sincerity of Russia in accepting the four bases. The negotiations which are about to commence may lead to a satisfactory arrangement, or they may at once be broken off, but Her Majesty's Government trust that no unnecessary obstacles or delays will be created by the Porte, and that the Turkish Plenipotentiary will be instructed to place confidence in the Representatives of England and France, and to act cordially in concert with them for the common object.

Her Majesty's Government have given so many proofs of their desire to uphold the sovereign rights of the Sultan, that any fresh professions on that subject would be superfluous; but at the same time they have a duty to perform from which they cannot shrink, and they desire the Porte distinctly to understand, that in return for the enormous sacrifices of every kind made by this country and by France, they have a right to expect not only that religious immunities, but a perfect equality of civil rights shall be effectually secured to the Christian subjects of the Sultan.

Her Majesty's Government do not doubt the intention of His Highness to promote the welfare and happiness of all classes of his subjects, but assurances of this description, however sincere and well intended, afford no guarantee against the oppression to which the Christian subjects of the Porte are at this moment exposed, and although the question is surrounded by difficulties, yet a solution must be arrived at and cannot longer be postponed.

Your Excellency will accordingly make known to Aali Pasha the views of Her Majesty's Government, and their desire that you should consult the Turkish Government upon this important subject in a frank and friendly spirit, with the hope that a mode may be devised of reconciling the just expectations of Christian Powers with the independence and sovereign rights of the Sultan.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 219.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 17.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 13, 1855.

COUNT COLLOREDO has communicated to me a despatch from Count Buol stating that the French Government had considered it necessary, in consequence of the difference which, according to the public newspapers, exists between the interpretation put by the allies upon the acceptance of the four bases by Prince Gortchakoff at the meeting of the 7th of January, and that which is assigned to it by the Russian Cabinet, that the doubts which have arisen upon this point should be cleared up; and with the view of ascertaining whether that acceptance refers solely to the statement of the four points which Prince Gortchakoff read to the Conference, or whether it refers to the extent of

the Protocol of December 28th, which was communicated to that Minister, M. Drouyn de Lhuys proposes that another Conference should be held at which Prince Gortchakoff should be asked to sign a Protocol, declaring that he is, or is not, authorized to accept without reserve the interpretation which was communicated to him on December 28th.

Count Buol then, after adverting to my despatch No. 24 of the 23rd ultimo, communicated to him by your Lordship, in which I pointed out the discrepancies between the account given in your despatch No. 10 of the 8th ultimo, of what passed at the Conference of the 7th January, and that which he had himself given in his despatch to Count Colloredo, and also to my despatch No. 21 of the 20th ultimo, explaining the views of Her Majesty's Government as to the third basis, proceeds to state the explanations which he had furnished on this subject to M. de Bourqueney and yourself.

The Austrian Government entertains no doubt as to the full and entire acceptance of the four bases by Prince Gortchakoff at the Conference of the 7th of January, and the fulfilment thereby of the condition laid down by the maritime Powers as indispensable to the opening of negotiations. They regard the different versions of what passed at the Conference, proceeding from non-official sources, and put about by the newspapers, as not being of sufficient weight to render advisable further explanations with Prince Gortchakoff on this point.

The fact then of the acceptance being in their opinion completely established, the only doubt that can be entertained is as to the intention with which that acceptance was given; but this intention, Count Buol argues, can only be ascertained by entering upon negotiations. All other attempts must necessarily fail, and will only cause delays, which will be assuredly turned to account, as they have already been but too successfully, by the partisans of Russia, to set on foot new intrigues, and to increase the existing elements of discord in the Germanic Confederation.

To obtain the complete certainty beforehand of the favourable issue of the negotiations is an impossibility; the essential thing is to lose no time in entering upon them. There is reason to believe that the Emperor of Russia has had great difficulty in resigning himself to the sacrifices imposed upon him by the acceptance of the four bases. Would it be prudent to give him a specious pretext for retracting a resolution which, if the Austrian Government is correctly informed, has met with a very doubtful reception from the Russian people? Would it not be a serious mistake to afford ground for the opinion that the Western Powers threw obstacles in the way of negotiations for peace, whilst the Emperor of Russia, after accepting the bases dictated by those Powers themselves, has, without delay, furnished his Plenipotentiary with the necessary full powers; when, moreover, this example has been followed by the principal belligerent, the Sublime Porte having sent full powers to Arif Effendi authorizing him to assist at the Conferences?

Under these circumstances the Austrian Government again urges the Cabinets of Paris and London to send full powers to the Representatives of France and England to treat for peace.

With respect to the meaning attached to the third guarantee, Count Buol says: that the profession of faith of the Austrian Government on this subject is contained in the formula inserted in the reserved Protocol of the 28th December: revision of the Treaty of the 13th July, 1841, with the double object of attaching more completely the existence of the Ottoman Empire to the European equilibrium, and of putting an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea.

The Austrian Government continues to believe that various modes present themselves of attaining this object, and consequently they reserve to themselves the liberty of appreciating them eventually, at the proper time and place, without wishing thereby to prejudge either the rights of the belligerents or the events of the war. I assured Count Colloredo that no intentional delay had taken place, as it was useless to send full powers to Her Majesty's Representative until a Turkish Plenipotentiary was appointed, and impossible to do so during the late Ministerial crisis in this country, but that there could exist no intention of avoiding the negotiations, and for the simple reason that the honour of Her Majesty's Government was pledged to enter upon them when certain conditions had been fulfilled by Russia. The full powers should, however, now be immediately prepared; but Her Majesty's Government, I said, were far from anticipating those satisfactory results from the negotiations that Count Buol appeared to expect: they feared, on the contrary, the meaning attached to the four bases by Russia would be found to differ widely from that of the Western Powers, and that Austria might be unwilling to support the terms which the Governments of England and France thought essential to a safe and honourable peace.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 220.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 45.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 13, 1855.

COUNT BERNSTORFF yesterday read to me a despatch from Baron Manteuffel, declining the Treaty that your Lordship was instructed by my despatch No. 28 of the 27th ultimo to propose for the acceptance of the Prussian Government, and renewing, on the part of the King, his demand that Prussia should take part in the Conferences at Vienna.

I asked Count Bernstorff if he had any counter-proposition to make.

He said he had not.

I asked him if, under any circumstances, the King would enter into any engagement.

Count Bernstorff said that he had no instructions to that effect; nor could he tell me what course His Majesty would take if he was readmitted to the Conferences, and, the negotiations being broken off, Austria declared war, and took part with England and France in active hostilities against Russia.

I inquired if, in that case, it was not the purpose of the King that his Representative should return to Berlin, and that the claim of His Majesty as a Great European Power to take part in the affairs of Europe should be suspended as long as the war lasted, and that it would again become active when negotiations for peace were resumed.

Count Bernstorff could give no assurance of any kind; and I remarked that, great as our desire was to place our relations with Prussia on a footing of cordiality, I feared it would be impossible until we got some clue to her policy or intentions. She would accept no propositions, and would make none; she would enter into no engagement, either immediate or eventual. There were at this moment two special Envoys in London and Paris who belonged to the Liberal party; and an active member of the Kreuz Zeitung party had just been sent to the Hague, Brussels, and Copenhagen, with objects altogether distinct from those of the two Envoys; in short, I said, we could not arrive at a conviction, or even an opinion, as to whether Prussia was a friend or foe, or whether she would persevere in that nondescript neutrality which in so many ways had served the Emperor of Russia, and was now rendering more distant the prospects of peace.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 221.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 14.)

(Extract.) *Munich, February* 10, 1855.

WITHIN the last few days instructions have been sent from hence to the Bavarian Minister at St. Petersburgh to enlighten the Imperial Cabinet as to the possible eventual attitude of Germany on the Oriental question. Count Bray is directed to notice the distrust which its policy has inspired in many quarters, and the anxious suspense which this state of things creates in others, and which is so detrimental to the common interests of Europe, and to Germany

especially. He is told to exhort the Russian Government to relieve all parties from the doubt which prevails as to its sincerity by immediately giving the most positive and solemn assurances that no attempt is to be made to retract in the slightest degree the engagements it has recently taken at Vienna by the acceptance of the four points; and, above all, to promise on no account to proceed aggressively against Austria. Should it, however, neglect or decline to subscribe to these conditions in such a form as shall offer a satisfactory security for their fulfilment, Count Bray is authorized to let Count Nesselrode clearly comprehend that the Emperor must not be surprised to see the whole of Germany arrayed against him.

This language, which conveys to the Russian Cabinet what nearly approaches to an indirect menace, and which is quite new, may, I hope, be accepted as the commencement of a change of system on the part of the Bavarian Government, and as the first step towards a reconciliation with Austria, to be followed, ere long, by the complete adhesion of this country to her policy. Other symptoms begin to indicate that, at all events, the extreme bitterness felt at what was regarded in the light of studied neglect on the part of Austria towards the minor States of Germany is on the wane; and in proof of this I may mention that, in a recent conversation (the substance of which has been repeated to me) with my Austrian colleague, Baron von der Pfordten went so far as to say that, if the Austrian Cabinet was in a position to demonstrate to the Bavarian Government that a menacing attitude towards Russia was in accordance with the interests of Germany, this country would not be backward in throwing its weight into the scale on the side of Austria.

This I believe to be the sense of Baron von der Pfordten's language, but I cannot vouch for the precise terms, for the information reached me (as did also that relative to the despatch to Count Bray) through the medium of a third person. However, from all I hear, very little coaxing just now on the part of Austria would secure to her the support of Bavaria, whose opposition hitherto, it must not be forgotten, has proceeded entirely from a very small but influential circle in the capital, and not in the least from the nation, as is I think sufficiently manifested by the result of the discussions on the demand for an extraordinary credit for military preparations in the Lower Chamber, on which occasion not a single voice, with the slightest claim to independence, was raised in approval of the policy of the Government. In point of fact, instead of its boasted victory it only narrowly escaped a vote of want of confidence, and it is by no means unlikely that the danger it then incurred may in reality have exercised a monitory influence to a greater extent, perhaps, than the Ministers themselves may be willing to admit. Still such is the variable and uncertain course of German politics that many different phases may yet be traversed before the final, and as I conceive inevitable, adhesion to Austria is declared. I am not exactly aware how matters stand in this respect with the other small States of the Confederation; but I have reason to believe that Saxony is the least manageable of all.

In all his recent conversations with my French colleague, Baron von der Pfordten has pleaded, in the strongest manner, the cause of Prussia, and has urged her readmission to a participation in the Conferences which are expected to be held at Vienna, on the ground of expediency and policy, arguing, as I understand, that the assertion that the Cabinet of Berlin is placed in its present isolated position by its own act is founded on an erroneous appreciation of the motives which dictated the withdrawal of Prussia from the path pursued by the other three Powers. In fact upon this point his Excellency seems to hold nearly the same language as the Prussian Government itself.

In the meantime the signs of military preparation are becoming more apparent as the moment for the solution of the actual crisis approaches. Orders have been issued for the immediate purchase of 4,000 horses, and a fresh conscription of 16,000 men, in addition to the 13,000 who have already joined their respective corps within the last fortnight, is to be carried out without loss of time. Indeed, I am told, that it is the intention of the Government to place, as soon as possible, an army of between 60,000 and 70,000 men on the war footing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 222.

Aali Pasha to M. Musurus.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. Musurus, February 17.)

Monsieur, *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, le 5 Février*, 1855.

AU moment où la Sublime Porte, sur la demande de ses alliés, autorisait son Ambassadeur à Vienne à prendre part aux négociations de la paix, elle a jugé nécessaire de lui apprendre en même tems ses réserves sur les quatre points qui doivent servir de bases à ces négociations.

Ci-jointe vous trouverez en copie la dépêche que je viens d'adresser par ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale notre auguste Souverain à Arif Effendi. Des copies en ont été données également aux Ambassades de Sa Majesté Britannique et de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français.

Le Gouvernement Impérial espère que le contenu de cette dépêche rencontrera en tous points les vues de ses alliés.

Nous pensons, et cette pensée se trouve basée sur des expériences chèrement acquises par la Turquie, qu'on ne saurait se prémunir assez contre la politique ambitieuse de la Russie, et qu'il faut faire tout ce qui est possible pour lui enlever tout prétexte de renouveler des exigences pareilles à celles qui ont amené la guerre actuelle.

Votre prudence, votre zèle pour les intérêts de notre pays, me dispense de vous dire davantage. Je me borne donc à vous prier de nous transmettre l'opinion que Lord Clarendon vous aura exprimée après avoir pris connaissance de la pièce en question.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) AALI.

Inclosure in No. 222.

Instruction to Arif Effendi.

(Traduction.) 11 *Djemazi-ul-evvel*, (31 *Janvier*, 1855.)

PAR ma dépêche en date du 29 Rebiul-Akhir (20 Janvier), je vous ai communiqué l'ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale d'après lequel, dans le cas où le Prince Gortchakoff, Envoyé de Russie à Vienne, déclarerait au nom de son Gouvernement accepter les quatre points de garantie avec l'interprétation donnée par les trois Puissances, votre Excellence devrait assister aux Conférences à ouvrir, mais comme simple auditeur, et nous informer de tout ce qui y serait traité. Il est superflu de faire observer que cette question, qui touche le Gouvernement Impérial plus directement que toute autre Puissance, étant pour lui une question essentiellement vitale, doit certainement exiger de sa part une très grande réflexion et la circonspection nécessaire. Par conséquent, le Gouvernement Impérial, avant d'avoir longuement examiné et discuté avec ses alliés les conditions de la paix, ne saurait donner à son Plénipotentiaire des instructions décisives sur chaque point dans son ensemble et dans ses détails. Aussi se borne-t-il à transmettre à votre Excellence les quelques considérations suivantes, qui lui serviront de notion succincte et de guide dans sa conduite et dans le langage qu'elle aura à tenir au besoin.

Dès que le tems de prendre une décision définitive sur ces quatre points sera venu, et qu'un projet de Traité de Paix aura été mis en avant, il va sans dire que la Sublime Porte aussi aura à émettre son opinion à cet égard. Avant qu'un tel projet soit présenté à l'acceptation de la Russie, il est indispensable qu'il soit discuté et adopté d'un commun accord entre la Sublime Porte et les Puissances alliées. C'est une chose naturelle; et, quoiqu'il n'y ait point de doute que les Puissances alliées ne partagent cette manière de voir, Sa Majesté Impériale veut que votre Excellence fasse entendre cela d'une manière convenable tant au Comte de Buol qu'à Lord Westmorland et à M. de Bourqueney, afin de prévenir tout malentendu ou difficulté future à cet égard.

Le premier de ces quatre points porte que le Protectorat de la Russie sur la Valachie et la Moldavie sera aboli, que les privilèges accordés à ces Provinces et

à la Servie par les Sultans seront placés sous la garantie des Puissances par une Convention à conclure avec la Sublime Porte, et que les questions de détail de cette Convention seront réglées de même. Sur ce sujet, c'est-à-dire, en ce qui concerne la Convention qu'il s'agirait de conclure, il y a bien des points que la Sublime Porte non moins que les Puissances alliées doivent prendre en considération. Car les Traités signés entre la Sublime Porte et la Russie n'accordent à cette dernière Puissance aucun droit de protection sur ces Provinces. La Russie n'était qu'une Puissance garante pour le maintien des institutions de ces Provinces. Or, on sait par l'expérience quels abus et quels empiètements la Russie, en se prévalant de son voisinage et de l'identité de religion, s'est constamment permis dans ces deux Provinces, comment elle maniait et remodelait les Réglements Organiques au gré de ses désirs, et quelle autorité exerçaient à Jassy et à Bucharest ses Consuls, qui étaient de fait les Princes de ces Provinces. Il importe donc que la garantie en question n'implique aucun droit d'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures de ces Provinces, mais qu'il soit bien déterminé et établi qu'elle ne consistera qu'en un droit de donner des conseils ou d'adresser des représentations, lorsqu'un acte quelconque, contraire aux institutions, c'est-à-dire, tendant à abolir les privilèges fondamentaux de ces deux Provinces, viendrait à être constaté. D'ailleurs, il y a encore bien d'autres points de la même importance, points propres à assurer les droits de souveraineté de la Sublime Porte, qui devront être développés en temps et lieu.

Le second point est relatif à la question du Danube. On connaît les entraves et les préjudices que la Russie, se prévalant des anciens Traités, a occasionnés aux pays riverains de la Sublime Porte. Aussi le Gouvernement Impérial se reserve-t-il à faire connaître ses idées et ses vœux pour assurer le repos de ces pays, ainsi que son commerce en général.

Le troisième point consiste à rattacher plus directement l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre Européen par la modification de certaines dispositions du Traité signé le 13 Juillet, 1841, entre la Sublime Porte et les cinq Puissances, de manière à faire cesser la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire. Cette intention est aux yeux de la Sublime Porte une preuve de la loyauté et de la sincérité des vues des Puissances alliées; aussi le Gouvernement Impérial ne peut-il qu'en témoigner sa reconnaissance. Mais lorsque ce Traité devra être révisé, la Sublime Porte ne pourra nécessairement qu'insister sur le maintien intact de ses droits par rapport aux Détroits des Dardanelles et de la Mer Noire, et sur l'obtention de garanties matérielles et morales pour la cessation de la prépondérance en question.

Passons maintenant au quatrième point. Le Gouvernement Impérial fait tous ses efforts pour que les sujets Chrétiens de Sa Majesté Impériale jouissent du bien-être et de la prospérité nécessaires; la Sublime Porte voue toute sa sollicitude à cet objet important, car elle n'ignore pas que c'est dans son propre intérêt. Aussi n'hésite-t-elle pas à declarer de nouveau, en face de l'univers, qu'elle est fermement résolue à maintenir et à respecter les privilèges religieux octroyés à ses sujets Chrétiens par les glorieux ancêtres de Sa Majesté Impériale et confirmées en dernier lieu solennellement par Sa Majesté. Mais ainsi que nous l'avons fait connaître plus d'une fois, comme il serait ébranler dans sa base l'indépendance d'un Empire que de rattacher des objets de cette nature à une stipulation internationale ou bien de fournir à un Gouvernement étranger le prétexte d'une ingérence, ne fut-elle qu'officieuse, dans les affaires concernant les sujets de cet Empire, que d'un autre côté les Puissances alliées et unies de la Sublime Porte, prenant en considération la gravité de cette question, sont convenues de consulter préalablement la Sublime Porte à cet égard, et qu'elles ont établi elles-mêmes que les conseils qu'elles pourraient donner à ce sujet n'affecteraient nullement l'indépendance et la souveraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale, la Sublime Porte ne pourra consentir en aucun cas soit à entendre parler de garantie des Gouvernements en pareille matière, ainsi que le dit le Prince Gortchakoff, soit à insérer dans le Traité de Paix d'autres clauses également nuisibles; et elle ne doute point que ses alliés ne veuillent bien lui rendre justice à cet égard.

Telles sont pour le moment les considérations générales de la Sublime Porte au sujet des quatre points de garantie. Elles serviront de règle de conduite à votre Excellence; et c'est à cet effet que j'ai l'honneur de lui adresser par ordre Impérial la présente communication.

No. 223.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 21.)

My Lord, *Copenhagen, January 30, 1855.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 15 of the 26th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that instructions were sent yesterday to M. de Bulow, the Danish Representative in the Diet at Frankfort, to vote against the proposal of Austria, that the contingent of the Confederation should be immediately organized for active service.

Being confined to the house by indisposition I have not seen M. de Scheel for the last three days, but my French colleague informs me that his Excellency says the King considers the measure proposed by Austria to be inopportune, and is of opinion that Denmark cannot vote for it consistently with her declaration of neutrality.

She will, however, conform herself to whatever resolution may be adopted by the majority of the Diet.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 224.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 75.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 29, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith three documents calculated to throw light upon the conduct of the Ottoman War Department with respect to the army of Kars and the points recommended by me for immediate adoption on the suggestion of General Williams. One of them is a report from the Council of the Seraskier's Office to the head of that department. The second is an instruction addressed by the Seraskier, Riza Pasha, to the new Commander-in-Chief, *ad interim*, who embarked for Trebizond a few days ago. The third is an instruction addressed by the Grand Vizier to the same Commander with the intention of supplying deficiencies in the former.

I have no choice but to reserve for another opportunity the comments which I have to make on these papers.

I think it my duty, in the mean time, to state that while Reshid Pasha has found it necessary to write the supplementary instruction, and while the state of things at the Seraskierat is such as to disgust the Members of the Council appointed to superintend them, the French Chargé d'Affaires has found access in private to the Sultan, and obtained from His Majesty, as I am informed on good authority, a promise that the Seraskier shall be retained in his office, because, for some reasons unknown to me, he has made himself agreeable to General Canrobert.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—I open my despatch to add three letters which relate to the subject matter of its contents.

S. DE R.

Inclosure 1 in No. 224.

Copy of a Paper of Suggestions to be delivered to his Excellency Vassif Pasha, Commander-in-chief of the Imperial Army of Anatolia, dated January 28, 1855.

(Translation.)

AS the numerous things written on the article of war, and of their being brought under a systematic and technical application, are subjects of delicate importance, it is impossible to enter here upon this great and weighty subject. His Excellency the Commander-in-chief is versed in the art of war and in military matters, and as, more especially, the manner in which the circumstances below related, and the necessary measures to be scientifically and wisely applied with respect to them, are not known, it is decided that it is not requisite to furnish him with full instructions on the subject; and a few needful suggestions are, therefore, only made to him.

A temporary Board has been instituted for looking to the administration of the army in question, and for attending to its affairs conformably with the military system and regulations. The settlement and execution of all military matters in conformity with the instructions and system, and with the orders to be issued by his Excellency the Seraskier, by the Board in question as now established in its complete state, and in other ways, and the necessary supplies of grain, &c., for the rations of the Imperial troops, have been already provided for by the Government, from the necessary quarters, and up to this time a considerable quantity has been sent to Erzeroom. If there be any deficiency in the provisions allotted, the Commander-in-chief will enter into communication with the authorities of those places, and see that proper measures are taken for feeding the troops, and providing for their comfort, as far as that is possible with reference to place.

Winter is not the season for military operations, and it is His Imperial Majesty's orders that the army in question should not act aggressively, but remain on the defensive. As the enemy, however, may attack the fortifications raised, and invade the Ottoman territory, in that case the Ottoman authorities will consult with the Ferik Williams Pasha, who is at the Imperial camp, and with the chief commanders, officers, and others, and see to repelling the enemy by adopting those measures and movements which may be approved of according to the proper application of military science.

This is not the weather for drilling; but the Commander-in-chief will, when the weather permits, see that the troops should load and fire off their guns, and practice ball-firing—a most essential thing.

There may be a deficiency in the army of gunners and cavalry horses; and the Commander-in-chief will on his arrival supply the deficiency of horses, and report upon the provisions of war and other things necessary to be sent from this, in order that they may be promptly forwarded.

It is highly requisite and important that precise information should be obtained with respect to the actual force of the enemy, to his operations and actual circumstances, and to be always well informed and on the alert; and in order that the enemy may not learn what is going on in the Imperial camp, it will be the constant duty of the Commander-in-chief to see that those individuals coming over to the camp, and the traders and merchants thereat, should not enter the camp and separate military detachments, and take information thereon.

It has been alleged, as an excuse, that the army being in the field, the reports drawn up have not been hitherto duly forwarded. The object of requiring those reports was to know the actual returns of the Regiments and Battalions in the Imperial camp; their position; and to acquire information concerning the the army, the importance of which it is needless to state. As it will be easier to dispatch a succinct monthly report, the Commander-in-chief will see that this is done.

The Commander-in-chief will, on his arrival, report accurately to the Seraskierat on the officers to be dismissed or changed.

It is superfluous to repeat how desirable it is that the commanders and officers of the army, should be on terms of perfect submission, concord and unity. A want of concord, that is: dislike of one officer towards another, is productive of all manner of disorder. The Commander-in-chief will, therefore, look to the establishment of concord, &c., among all the officers.

Inclosure 2 in No. 224.

The Grand Vizier's Addition to the Suggestions furnished by the Seraskier to the Commander-in-chief of the Army of Anatolia, Vassif Pasha.

(Translation.)

WHILST the force that ought really to have made an impression upon the Russians in this war was the army of Anatolia, the irregular proceedings of some functionaries, owing simply to their ignorance and carelessness, and the various misdeeds of others amounting to nothing less than robbery and corruption, have brought that army to its present state of disorganization; namely, they acted ignorantly and madly in the untimely offensive operations of last year. After going beyond the Russian frontier, it was necessary to reassure and protect in every way the inhabitants who came to make their submission and offer their services; but they frightened them by leaving the Bashi-Bozouks without any rule, and allowing them to commit all sorts of disorders, and even in the Imperial dominions themselves they exposed numberless helpless people to the acts of those vagabonds. Above all things, the disgusting practice of peculation is at all times an odious action; but more especially at a time when the Sublime Porte is engaged in a great question of vital importance to her, it is the bounden duty of persons who profess the least part of zeal, honesty, or patriotism, to abstain altogether from such matters, and never to leave the path of integrity. Some contemptible persons, utterly unmindful of such matters, have thought these troubled times an excellent opportunity for pursuing their own interested ends by buying up corn and provisions at a low rate, and then selling to the Government at double price. Others have had the audacity to defalcate from the established rations of the Imperial army, of which we take more care than of ourselves, and which we are bound to content more than our ownselves. These reprehensible acts, which have brought the Imperial army to such a state of disorganization, have left His Majesty's soldiers in a helpless state, and filled with dismay and with despair the inhabitants who were desirous of serving the Imperial Ottoman army with their heart and soul.

The Sublime Porte, however, considering it a matter of the highest importance to ameliorate the existing state of the army, and, by correcting all its deficiencies, to procure a real force to oppose the enemy; and, knowing from experience the fidelity and honesty of Vassif Pasha, has selected him for the command of the above army, and the execution of the following matter will form part of his duties.

Vassif Pasha, immediately upon his arrival at the army, will first make inquiries from persons conversant with the subject as to the proceedings and doings of the officers, high and low. As soon as he shall have, by putting upon their trial whosoever among them may have committed acts of corruption, proved their guilt, he shall cashier them, and send them here, along with the judicial proceedings, to be punished according to law; and since the Sublime Porte has come to the firm resolution not to grant impunity to such persons in future, but to be severe against them, such as shall have, by the commission of acts of corruption and robbery, degraded themselves below the scale of humanity, no matter how high their rank or connection, such reasons or considerations shall not procure them any indulgence, or screen them from punishment. In short, the Sublime Porte will not, for the sake of a few thieves, consent to tread under foot so many sacred imperial and national interests. It is, therefore, the decided wish of the Imperial Government that Vassif Pasha, free from any sort of anxiety, should exert himself effectually to purge the army of the band of peculators. After having done so, should the same inefficient mode of action be pursued, there is no doubt that the former state of things will return. Besides, it is not enough that the General himself be honest; he must also not allow

people in his suite to rob. It is, therefore, his bounden and faithful duty to act with great circumspection, and pay equal attention to the prevention of intrigues in the purchases, and the fair distribution of the rations and other necessaries of the army; and, in short, to be attentive in every way to the comfort of the troops: and, in order to convince his Excellency of the importance of this matter, it has been found necessary to add here that the odious acts of corruption and robbery which have taken place, and are still taking place in Erzeroom and Kars, besides having spread all over the Ottoman Empire, have even become a topic of conversation in Europe.

Now, seeing that a sentiment of honour and patriotism will not permit that any one of us should allow that our nation should be considered as an apathetic and corrupt people owing to the crimes of a few contemptible individuals, and that, too, while the bounty and generosity of the Sultan rewards his faithful servants in so conspicuous, persons guilty of such acts are not entitled to be called by the name of men. Vassif Pasha is, therefore, empowered and commissioned by His Imperial Majesty to use every species of severity towards such offenders: and should any, however small, act of corruption, for the future, be heard from this army, his Excellency will be liable to heavy responsibility.

The ex-Mushir of the army of Anatolia, Ahmed Pasha, and the Feriks Ali Pasha and Riza Pasha, have been tried here for their delinquencies respecting military operations, and it is reported that Ahmed Pasha, while Ferik, notoriously took all the purchases for the army into his hands, and committed acts of peculation, and afterwards was guilty of reprehensible acts as Mushir. The preceding Mushir, Zarif Pasha, is also generally reported to have been guilty of such acts. The Commander-in-chief will therefore see that these charges are fully brought home to them by competent persons, and will report hither. In the event of his Excellency being culpable of any deficiency in this investigation, or of concealing facts on imaginary considerations, he will be held responsible to the Porte, as well as in the next world.

Williams Pasha, a chief military commander of the British Government, on whom the Porte has conferred the rank of Ferik, is a very experienced officer, possessing the confidence of his Government. The friendly object of the Porte's sincere ally in sending that Pasha to the army of Anatolia, is, doubtless, that of organizing that army, and in order that the advantage of his counsels and suggestions on military measures should be reaped. Williams Pasha enjoys the high consideration of the Sublime Porte, and is counted as one of the chief commanders of the Imperial Government. The representations which he has heretofore sent hither have been taken into due consideration, and proper attention is being given to them. His Excellency Vassif Pasha will not look upon Williams Pasha as a stranger, but will consult with him frankly on subjects of reform and military matters, and he will do whatever is necessary to be done there, and report upon what it will be requisite to be sanctioned from hence.

Inclosure 3 in No. 224.

Report of the Military Board to the Seraskier on the Corps d'Armée of Kars, in September and October 1854.

(Translation.)

Art. 1.—*Infantry Troops in Kars at present Existing and Fit for Service.*

Regulars - - - - - -		7,200
Redif - - - - - -		3,400
		10,600
Unfit for service - - - -	2,000	
Encamped two hours' distance from Kars -	2,000	
		4,000
		14,600

Upon careful examination it has been ascertained that the above 10,000 men are well-conditioned and fit for service.

Fictitious amount appearing in the list exhibited by the Feriks according to Colonel Williams' report:—

Officers and men of the 1st Division - -	9,662
Ditto ditto 2nd ditto - -	8,243
Recruits - - - - - -	4,669
	22,574

Note.—With respect to the deficiency stated to exist by Colonel Williams in the numbers of this corps d'armée, it is recommended that the Commandant du Corps (or General in command) be ordered to verify their number in the presence of Colonel Williams himself, of the Feriks and other officers, and to report thereon after his arrival at his post.

Art. 2.—*Arms.*

Their fire-arms and bayonets are, upon the whole, good. Most of their muskets have flint-locks. Those of seven battalions are percussion-locked. The muskets of three Chasseur battalions are rifled. A soldier carries sixty rounds of ammunition when prepared for action. There is a depôt of 3,045,000 rounds of ammunition in store, but they are very old.

What is wanted:—

5,000 new cartouches.
8,000 black leather cartouche-boxes.
8,000 musket-sheaths.

Note.—It is presumed, that by cartouches are meant cartouche-boxes, but as no such demand for cartouche-boxes has ever been made from that quarter, the General in command must be instructed to report thereupon.

Art. 3.—*Clothing.*

In very bad condition—very old—and in tatters. No cloth trousers to be found for appearing on parade. No shoes for the winter season in such a country as this. No shirts or drawers. Great demand for knapsacks. Tin boxes also are wanting.

What is required:—

10,000 knapsacks to be made in Constantinople.
20,000 pairs of socks.
20,000 pairs of shoes.
10,000 tin boxes.
Also an assortment of shirts and drawers.

Note.—As the Seraskier knows right well, the troops composing this corps d'armée have enjoyed a preference over those of other corps d'armée, and the whole of their winter clothing was sent on. But when these troops were being mustered it was not found practicable to give a knapsack to each of them, and a bag of cotton cloth was sometimes substituted. Knapsacks are, however, in course of being manufactured or purchased as soon as practicable, and sent on to the army, so that every one will eventually be provided with this article. As for the tin boxes, it is presumed that water-flasks must be the thing meant; but as no such demand has hitherto been made from that quarter, the General in command must be instructed to report on this subject.

Art. 4.—*Food and Provisions.*

There is barely food enough for one day, and not three days' provisions in store.

Note.—It is true that there was for a time some degree of scarcity in the articles required for the rations of the army, but owing to repeated injunctions and instructions provisions are flowing into the camp, so that it is now to be hoped that this difficulty exists no longer.

Art. 5.—*General Officers.*

The general officers are utterly devoid of any capacity or fitness for their post, and they wink at the malversations of the public funds practised on all sides.

What is required :—

That two fit persons be appointed to succeed Veli and Kerim Pashas.

Note.—It is not stated who are the persons thus guilty of malversation, nor is it known at the Board of War. But hitherto nothing unfavourable has been heard of the Feriks Abdul Kerim and Veli, and they have always enjoyed the reputation of being fit for military commands. But as it is possible that they may have changed their natures, the General in command must be instructed to ascertain this point on his arrival, whereupon measures will be taken.

Art. 6.—*Drilling of Troops.*

The negligence shown on this score is really culpable.

Note.—It is said that this happened in consequence of the troops being some time ago employed in constructing fortifications. But as these works are now completed, and as drilling is in point of fact a matter of necessity, it is right that the Seraskier should issue instructions that the troops belonging to this corps be exercised when there is time for it.

Art. 7.—*Intrigues and Dissensions.*

Mussulman and Polish officers do not cease stirring up intrigues: the consequence of such a state of things must be pernicious.

What is required :—

To put a stop to these evils.

Note.—It is very true that such a state of things would be productive of disastrous consequences, and cannot be tolerated. It is also true that most of the officers of this corps have been recalled to Constantinople, by which measure this state of things has been put a stop to. Nevertheless, the General of this corps d'armée must be instructed to take such measures on his arrival at his post as will prevent the recurrence of such things.

Art. 8.—*Musket-Balls.*

The bullets of the percussion guns are smaller than those of others, and there are very few of them. Conical balls also used by the Chasseurs are very scarce. It is therefore necessary to procure musket-balls of the two sorts of which models are inclosed.

What is required :—

Two millions of cartridges of each of the sizes of which models are furnished.

Note.—As can be understood from the inventory in possession of your Excellency, we were in hopes that a considerable portion of the various ammunition stores sent on several occasions under your orders might still be found extant. The General in command must be instructed to report on his arrival whether there is still a lack of ammunition stores, in order that, if such be really the case, they may be sent to him without delay.

Art. 9.—*Cavalry.*

When Colonel Williams inspected the Cavalry, he was informed that they consisted of four regiments, or 2,222 men, and 2,212 horses; on being counted in their quarters they were found to consist of 1,568 men.

Note.—The General in command must be instructed to investigate and report upon this discrepancy.

Art. 10.—*Reinforcements.*

Regular troops at head quarters :—

Privates	2,168
Gunners	250
	2,418

Note.—It has not been possible to understand what is intended by this Article, but as it is very certain that it was written for some purpose or other, the General in command must be instructed on his arrival to ascertain from the writer what his meaning is, and to act accordingly.

Art. 11.—*Articles of Clothing and Implements.*

Both in very bad condition.

What is required :—

5,000 cloaks.
6,000 pairs of boots.
5,000 djamedan (?)

Note.—As is stated in the note on Article 3, the whole of the clothing of the troops has already been sent.

Art. 12.—*Horses.*

Although they are small in size, and in bad condition, they are very spirited; they only give them one oke of barley instead of three.

Note.—It has been reported from various quarters, that some time ago, owing to a scarcity of barley, and to its being meadow season, the horses' rations were temporarily reduced to an oke or an oke and a-half, but as such a state of things must not be allowed during war, the General in command must be instructed to prevent a recurrence of such circumstances, and to see that the horses' rations be always given them in full

Art. 13.

The sabres are short and unserviceable. The horseman is obliged to hold his carabine in his right hand, because the present carabine is both of inferior description and short in size, and he cannot therefore use his sabre freely.

What is required:—

5,000 sabres.
5,000 carabines.

Like those used by the English Light Cavalry.

Note.—It is true that owing to the sabres being short and unfit for their purpose, as it is wished it has been decided to purchase 10,000 sabres of the requisite description, and the necessary funds have been asked for. By carabine we conclude is meant the Cavalry rifle. As Colonel Williams has reported that this arm is unserviceable, and that the firearm used by the English Light Cavalry ought to be substituted for it, we beg to recommend that your Excellency enter into correspondence with Ahmed Fethi Pasha on this subject, and that it be submitted to the Porte that the amount of rifles recommended by Colonel Williams be brought out from England through the British Embassy.

Art. 14.

It is necessary to dismiss the Mirahys from their posts, and particularly Hussein, Ahmed, and Mustapha Pashas.

What is required:—

To appoint other persons in the places of the above Pashas and Beys.

Note.—As we also have heard that some of the Colonels have not proved themselves to be of any use, your Excellency is requested to instruct the Commandant de corps to report in detail, on his arrival at his post, who are the persons who have thus proved themselves unfit for employment; who are those who are fit for it; what are the faults imputed to the former; have they been tried by court-martial?

Art. 15.—*Artillery.*

Six batteries of Horse Artillery, that is, 36 guns; 5 of these are of 5-pounders, 1 is a 15-pounder. Seven batteries, of which 5 are of 9-pounders, 1 of 12-pounders, and 1 of 24-pounders; and 6 guns called mountain-guns (howitzers), these are 12-pounders. Total, 84 guns.

Note.—It is reported that in addition to these 84 guns, there are 60 odd more in the fortresses of Erzeroom and Kars, and in some fortifications. Looking to the amount of guns to be found at present in this corps d'armée, and considering that no demand for an additional supply has hitherto been made, the existing quantity appears sufficient. Nevertheless the matter has been referred to the Commandant de corps, who should be instructed on his arrival to report whether the above quantity is sufficient or not.

Artillery Horses.

There are six horses to a gun-carriage, and eight horses to heavy pieces. They are in pretty good condition, and if the horses that are fit for service belonging to the Horse Artillery were added, the total amount would be 1,962 heads.

Note.—This means to say that the Artillery horses are good in quality and sufficient in quantity.

Art. 16.

Artillerymen	-	1,822
Deducting men taken from Militia Cavalry	-	450
		1,372 is the remainder.

There are no reserve horses, whereas there ought to be a pair of harnessed horses in readiness for each gun.

What is required:—

500 well-taught Artillerymen, and 168 pair of horses from Constantinople. The horses do not get the amount of forage (oats) which is their right, because although the officers declare they give them four okes a-day, and make an entry to that effect, they hardly in reality give them two or three okes.

Note.—The want of reserve gunners and reserve Artillery horses in this corps d'armée is admitted, and the stinting of forage, if true, being an unwarrantable act, these two matters must be referred to the Commandant du corps, and measures will be taken on the arrival of his answer.

Art. 17.—*Ammunition.*

There are 80 pieces of shot for each of the big guns, and 120 for each of the small ones. Besides this there are in store 400 shot for every gun, with carriages and timber.

Note.—From this article it is evident that the store of shot is considered sufficient.

Art. 18.—*Harness.*

Although the harness is in want of repair, yet Tahir Pasha is entitled to praise on this score.

Note.—Although it is reported from some quarters that the harness is complete and fit to last a long time, yet the General must be ordered to inspect it on his arrival, and report thereon.

Art. 19.—*Clothing.*

In very bad condition. The trousers and boots are not fit to be seen.

Note.—As we have already observed that the whole of the clothing of this army has been sent, and that the troops have been clothed, we will not return to that topic.

Art. 20.—*Tahir Pasha.*

Colonel Williams bestows great praise on Tahir Pasha, to whom are to be attributed the losses sustained by the Russians in the battle of Kooroukdéré.

What is required:—

That Tahir Pasha be, in justice, made a Ferik.

Note.—Tahir Pasha being really deserving of encouragement, the above rank has been conferred on him.

Art. 21.—*Siege-Pieces.*

Twelve siege-pieces have arrived, a portion of these is in Erzeroom; 400 pieces of shot have come for each gun; 200 ditto for light pieces. Some shot and a larger quantity of powder are deposited in the fort, but the magazines are damp.

Note.—That the General be instructed to assure himself on his arrival that the ammunition stores are properly taken care of.

Art. 22.—*Magazines.*

Good, but their entrances are dangerous. The small magazines in which the ammunition is properly stored are in good condition.

Note.—As it is necessary to remove the danger above stated, the General is to receive instructions on this head.

Art. 23.—*Forts and Fortifications.*

Not bad. There ought to be one or two mounds for the placing thereon of flying-pieces.

Note.—It is clearly indispensable that there ought to be such mounds in fortifications, and the General must receive instructions to do what is needful on this point.

Art. 24.—*Providing of Comfortable Quarters, &c.*

More than 10,000 men cannot be lodged within the walls of Kars in such a manner as to be free from danger of disease.

Note.—It is true that it is a dangerous thing to huddle troops together in lodgings, but on the other hand to disseminate them here and there impairs their collective strength, and is not free from inconvenience. As we are ignorant of the number which can really be conveniently lodged in Kars, the General is to be instructed on his arrival to pay attention to the billet register, and regulate himself accordingly.

Art. 25.

It is much to be desired that some Artillery officers be sent this winter to teach gunnery; it is very essential that some good sanatory rules be established. The Mussulmans totally neglect ball-practice, which is very necessary and very useful.

What is wanted:—

An English Artillery officer, an Engineer officer, and an officer from the Rifles.

Note.—There are at present with this army a Prussian Instructor for Artillery, and a French one for Cavalry; these are the persons who ought to exercise the men. The General in command must report whether it is necessary or not to appoint additional instructors.

Art. 26.—*Tents and Culinary Apparatus.*

The utensils which require tinning being allowed to go untinned cause to arise serious dangers. The butter used for "pilav" is very bad, and exceedingly injurious. On these matters being reported to the Mushir, he appointed persons to investigate them.

Note.—It is really very bad and very pernicious that the culinary vessels should be untinned, and that the butter, one of the articles of food used by the army, should be of so inferior a quality; the preservation of the health of the Imperial troops, as well as the most complete attention to their comforts, being above all things essential, the General must receive instructions on this head.

Art. 27.—*Hospitals fit for the Abode of Soldiers.*

The hospitals are better than what was expected; but the medicines are very scanty, and there are no fire-places.

What is wanted:—

A set of medical men who must be authorized by firman to administer the hospitals. It is necessary to provide an ample quantity of medicines, and fire-places for winter. It is also necessary to reform the [? illegible].

Note.—It is reported that the hospitals are in good order. Medicines are being sent; but as it is necessary to know the number of medical men that are wanted, the General in command will receive instructions to report thereupon.

Art. 28.—*Bashi-Bozouks.*

There are at present 800 armed Irregulars. There is no delusion in the accounts given of their horrible practices. The muster-roll of this corps is a perpetual source of profit to the Mushir and other officers, because it is a convenient mode of robbing the public funds. It was stated in the muster-roll that the corps amounted to 10,000, but there was not in reality more than 6,000

Note.—As all sorts of accounts have been given of this corps, the General in command will receive instruction to ascertain, on his arrival, the truth of this matter, and make it known to us.

Art. 29.—*Recapitulation of Corps d'Armée.*

Said to consist of 40,000 men:

Infantry - - - - - -	14,600
Cavalry - - - - - -	1,568
Artillery - - - - - -	1,372
	17,540
Irregulars - - - - -	800
	18,340

Thus the amount of troops is less than half the number stated.

Note.—The investigation of the real numbers of this corps d'armée with reference to the discrepancies said to exist, has been treated of in the note on the 1st Article; the substance of this Article refers to same subject.

Art. 30.—*Zarif Mustapha Pasha.*

The said Zarif Mustapha, Kerim, and Veli Pashas are all together reprehensible characters, because the extensive frauds which they have committed are deserving of severe punishment. When the superiority of the Russian Infantry in firing, and of the Russian Cavalry in repulsing and discomfiting any amount of forces that may be sent against them, is so evident, it is very astonishing that Zarif Pasha should have forced the Russians to a battle in the open field by rushing upon them.

Note.—The contents of this Article are of too general a nature, and not sufficiently precise to form an accusation. It is therefore necessary that Colonel Williams should give detail of a precise nature whereupon to take measures.

Art. 31.—*Harvest.*

The harvest has been injured by hail and severe cold. It has been necessary to bring provisions from distant places, and the Governor of Erzeroom has been applied to on the subject.

Note.—The question of provisions was fully discussed in the note on the 4th Article.

Art. 32.—*Arrears of Pay.*

A portion of the army has not received its pay for twenty-two months, another for eighteen, and another for fifteen. The privates cannot purchase articles of the first necessity, even tobacco. The Redifs have been prevented from remitting anything to their families; many soldiers have deserted on this account. Privates maimed and wounded in action are obliged to beg their bread in the street. It does not require a strong feeling of humanity to point out the necessity of assisting these individuals. There is not the least doubt that the well known kindly feelings of the Sultan will be moved at the state of these men, and that a firman on the subject will be issued for the next campaign. The soldiers pull down the roofs of their houses in order to find wood to burn. The Pashas allow this to be done, whilst there is no lack of forests in the neighbourhood. The villages are thus exposed to damage in this and other ways, and are, therefore, entitled to commiseration. Very little money has been sent to the army, and what was sent consisted of paper, which is a dire calamity to the soldier, who loses considerably by it. Shopkeepers also are ruined by taking it, and some are shutting up their shops. It is very profitable to civil functionaries to take up out of circulation hard cash, and give out paper in lieu of it, but it is pure loss to the soldiers. Caimes are exchanged for cash at a discount of 20 per cent.

Twelve thousand cloaks, the property of deceased soldiers, have disappeared, and the Mushir and other general officers deal in the clothes of the dead men.

What is required:—

1. To pay the arrears of pay.
2. To pay the soldiers' wages in current coin.
3. To exercise a stricter supervision over the persons who furnish bread, because the bread is bad and not properly baked, and gives rise to divers diseases.
4. Colonels have dealt in caimes; this must be looked to.

Note.—As money has been appropriated and sent to this army for payment of arrears, the General in command will receive orders to investigate, on his arrival, the other points contained in this Article.

Art. 33.—*Officers.*

Officers have made drunkenness a habit; and this is even seen among the officers of the highest rank. This must be put a stop to, because it endangers the safety of the army. Several of the officers showed cowardice on the field of battle. Nadir Bey (of the 6th Arabistan) and Khoorshid Bey (of the 5th) took to flight along with their subalterns at Kooroukdéré as soon as the fight had commenced, and consequently were taken prisoners by the Russians along with the third part of their respective regiments.

Note.—These things have been heard of, and as it is superfluous to say how essential and important a matter it is to put a stop to the disgusting practice of drunkenness, the General will receive orders to pay strict attention to this matter.

Art. 34.

The following are the officers who are warmly recommended owing to their praiseworthy behaviour.

Artillery officer of the corps of Arabistan, Tahir Pasha; Colonel of the 1st Regiment of the same corps, Hussein Bey; Colonel of the 6th Rediff of the same corps, Zekeria Bey; Lieutenant-Colonel of Artillery of the same corps, Ibrahim Bey.

Note.—It was the bounden duty of the Pasha and Beys above-mentioned to show zeal in discharging the functions assigned to them. According to this report it appears they have fulfilled this their bounden duty, therefore there is no judgment to give on this 34th Article.

Inclosure 4 in No. 224.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Reshid Pasha.

Altesse, *Palais d'Angleterre, le 20 Janvier*, 1855.

LES nouveaux délais qu'éprouve le départ de Vassif Pacha m'obligent à vous soumettre quelques observations qui méritent une attention sérieuse de notre part.

Je ne veux pas vous faire la peine de passer en révue tous les malheurs qui dès le commencement de la guerre ont accablé l'armée dont son Excellence va prendre le commandement. Il suffit de citer le passé pour en tirer des leçons utiles à l'avenir. Un intérêt des plus grands se rattache au destin de l'armée de Kars, et votre Altesse connaît à fond les sentiments de mon Gouvernement à cet, les impressions douloureuses que les rapports de son Commissaire le Général Williams lui ont communiqués, et la constante sollicitude qu'elle porte à la réforme des abus qui en paralysent l'action. Dans les circonstances actuelles la solidarité d'intérêts parmi les Cours alliées est complète, et toute lenteur qui se laisse voir dans l'exécution des mesures nécessaires pour atteindre les objets de la guerre est un juste sujet de regret à l'une comme à l'autre. Le moment est critique surtout par rapport à l'armée dont il s'agit ici. Le Ministère que votre Altesse préside s'est engagé à donner toute son attention aux besoins urgents de cette force, tels que je les ai dépeints conformément aux représentations détaillées de M. le Général Williams. Il est vrai que des circonstances inattendues, telles que la maladie de son Excellence Ismail Pacha et le changement de sa destination, ont causé des retards à l'accomplissement de cette promesse. Il n'est, en outre, que juste d'admettre que le délai porte seulement sur une partie des mesures recommandées et adoptées. Mais il n'en est pas moins évident que l'ensemble traîne, qu'un temps précieux se perd, que la prolongation du commandement de Shukri Pacha est un véritable malheur, et que son successeur, en tardant à partir, rend de jour en jour plus difficile la tâche de porter un remède efficace au mal qui a été tant de fois signalé.

Je supplie donc votre Excellence de mettre fin à cet état de choses d'une manière digne de sa sagesse et conforme aux désirs bienveillants à la fois et péremptoires de son Gouvernement. Que son Excellence Vassif Pacha parte pour Erzeroom incessamment, que son entente avec le Général Commissaire de Sa Majesté la Reine soit garantie par les instructions les plus positives, et qu'il soit accordé non seulement la faculté d'accepter sans réserve les conseils du Général Britannique, mais encore celle, comme je prétends avoir le droit de m'y attendre après tout ce qui s'est passé à ce sujet, de mettre en pratique sur sa responsabilité personnelle tout ce qui est nécessaire pour suppléer aux besoins de son armée en l'épurant de tout abus, en éloignant tous ceux qui négligent leurs devoirs, soutenant au contraire les officiers de mérite, et finalement en lui donnant l'organisation, la discipline et la confiance sans lesquelles il lui sera impossible de remplir les conditions de son existence.

Veuillez bien, Altesse, émaner vos ordres, s'il y a encore lieu, afin que je puisse avoir la satisfaction d'annoncer à mon Gouvernement un moment plutôt s'achemine de fait et avec assurance vers l'accomplissement de son attente.

Je profite, &c.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 224.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Sir. *British Embassy, January* 26, 1855.

AS the departure of Vassif Pasha is fixed for to-day, I wish you to see his Excellency on board ship, if you have not time to reach him before he leaves his house. You may tell him that I should have called myself in return for his visit, if the pressure of business had allowed me sufficient leisure for the purpose. As it is, I beg you will repeat the assurance I gave him before; namely, that he may depend upon my good offices and friendly support as long as he acts in harmony with General Williams and carries rigorously into effect the measures deemed necessary for securing the welfare of his soldiers, and raising the army to a proper degree of discipline and efficiency. I have done what depends upon me to put him in possession of powers and instructions adequate to those purposes, and I am assured officially that his powers and instructions are framed according to the recommendations grounded on General Williams's suggestions which I brought before the Porte, as you well know, some time ago, and pressed repeatedly on the attention of its leading Ministers. His Excellency will, I am sure, bear in mind that General Williams is the Queen's Commissioner, that he is recognized as such by the Porte, that he is ordered to communicate his opinions on the state of the army at Kars as well to the Embassy here as to the Government at home, and that he is entitled, moreover, by his experience and zeal for the public service, to be treated with respect and confidence. His Excellency must also become aware that no army can be efficient unless it be fully supplied in time with all that is required for its maintenance, its health, and its equipment; that no officers can command the respect of their men unless they are sober, brave, honest, and active; and that it is in vain to look for such qualities among the Turkish officers, unless they are kept in strict order by the Commander-in-chief. Such officers as misbehave in any serious way should be forthwith dismissed, and proportionate encouragement should be given to those who discharge their duty with faithfulness.

You will read what precedes to Vassif Pasha, and offer him my best wishes for his safe journey and success on the scene of his future operations.

I am, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 6 in No. 224.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, January* 26, 1855.

IN pursuance of your Excellency's instructions of this day's date, I waited on Vassif Pasha, and communicated them to him verbatim. His Excellency gave me unequivocal and positive assurances that he would attend to their contents to the best of his ability, and ventures to hope that General Williams will have reason to be satisfied with his exertions to put the army at Kars on an efficient and respectable footing. He embarked this afternoon on board the English steamer "London," which left for Trebizond.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 225.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 77.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 31, 1855.

IN reply to your Lordship's instructions No. 39 of the 16th instant, received to-day, I have the honour to state that the superintendence of the medical hospitals belonging to the Sultan's army of Kars has already been conferred, at my request, on Dr. Sandwith, recommended by General Williams, whose request with respect to Baron Schwarzenberg, *alias* Emin Bey, and Tashlar Bey, were also complied with some time ago.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 226.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 83.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 31, 1855.

INCLOSED herewith is a duplicate of the instruction received by the Sardinian Minister from his Government a few days ago, and communicated to me officially by Baron Tecco.

In answer to the recommendation which I have addressed to Aali Pasha at the Baron's request, his Highness assures me that the Porte is disposed to afford every practicable facility for the accommodation of the Sardinian troops; but that so much has been given up to the necessities of the French and British armies, that there is no small difficulty in meeting the demands of another ally.

In fact, we are not yet sufficiently provided with accommodation ourselves. We want more stabling for 700 or 800 horses, according to the numbers announced by your Lordship, and Lord William Paulet would be glad to obtain a further extension of room for the reception of our sick and wounded.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 226.

Count Cavour to Baron Tecco.

M. le Baron, *Turin, le* 12 *Janvier*, 1855.

JE m'empresse de vous informer que le Gouvernement du Roi vient de signer un Acte d'Accession au Traité d'Alliance du 10 Avril, 1854, entre l'Angleterre et la France, et qu'il a en même tems conclu avec ces Puissances une Convention Militaire par laquelle il s'oblige d'envoyer en Orient un corps d'armée fort de 15,000 hommes.

Ces Actes importants doivent encore être revêtus de formes solennelles et ratifiés, et je me borne pour aujourd'hui à vous en indiquer l'objet, en me réservant de vous communiquer le texte aussitôt que possible. En attendant, je vous autorise à donner officieusement connaissance à la Porte de la détermination que le Gouvernement du Roi vient de prendre, et par laquelle il fournit la plus éclatante preuve de ses sympathies pour la cause de la Turquie et ses alliés qui soutiennent de leur côté, au prix des plus nobles sacrifices, non moins que de ses sentiments particulièrement bienveillants et amicaux envers la Sublime Porte.

Je m'empresse aussi de vous inviter, M. le Baron, à faire immédiatement les démarches nécessaires pour obtenir du Gouvernement Ottoman qu'il veuille bien s'occuper au plutôt de destiner un local, le plus vaste qu'il sera possible, pour y établir les magasins et les dépôts généraux d'approvisionnement

de tout genre, et des munitions, ainsi que les hôpitaux, &c.; en un mot, tout ce qui concerne le service d'administration du corps expéditionnaire Piémontais. Il serait à désirer que l'on put destiner à cet usage un local à Constantinople même, ou dans le voisinage de cette capitale, ou au moins le long du Bosphore, dans un endroit qui présente toutes les facilités nécessaires pour la relâche et pour les opérations de débarquement et de rembarquement. Ce que vous avez pu voir par vous-même ces tems derniers des différentes exigeances du service militaire, en pareille circonstance, vous sera sans doute fort utile pour juger si tel ou tel autre local qui serait proposé par l'Administration Ottoman pour le dit objet, réunirait toutes les conditions nécessaires pour que les divers services à la suite du corps d'armée Sarde, puissent y être convenablement établis.

Je dois aussi, suivant le désir de M. le Ministre de la Guerre, vous prier, en même tems, de solliciter les autorisations et toutes les facilités possibles pour l'achat, en Turquie même, pour le compte du Gouvernement Sarde, de 500 ou 600 chevaux de Troupe Légère, auquel effet mon collègue de la guerre expédie à Constantinople des officiers intelligents spécialement chargés de cet achat. Je ne saurais mettre en doute les dispositions empressées de la Porte à faciliter à ces officiers l'accomplissement de leur commission, et j'aime à croire que dès lors il leur sera d'autant plus aisé de s'en acquitter d'une manière satisfaisante qu'ils pourraient faire acquisition des chevaux ayant appartenu aux corps des Bachi-Bozouks qui ont été dissous récemment.

Connaissant votre zèle et les sentiments qui vous animent, je n'ai pas besoin de vous recommander, M. le Baron, de vous occuper de ce qui fait l'objet de la présente dépêche avec la sollicitude et les soins que la circonstance exige, et je saisis, &c.

(Signé) C. CAVOUR.

No. 227.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 40. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 9, 1855.*

M. NIEBUHR, the King of Prussia's private secretary, and one of the most influential and active agents of the Kreuz-Zeitung party, and an avowed partisan of Russia, has left Berlin for Brussels and the Hague. It was originally intended that this gentleman should proceed to Paris, and it was supposed that his journey was connected with the mission of General Wedel, and had for its object the neutralizing any attempt to bring about an understanding with the French Government. The project was objected to by Baron Manteuffel, and the journey to Paris has, at his suggestion, been abandoned for the moment, but it is my duty to inform your Lordship that it is generally believed here that the mission of M. Niebuhr, if it can be so called, to Brussels and the Hague, is to discover the feelings of these Courts as to the advantage of entering into a general league of neutrality.

This intelligence having reached me from quarters deserving of credence, I have spoken to Baron Manteuffel on the subject, observing that it seemed strange that at the very time the Prussian Government was discussing the question of a Treaty with England and France, persons about the Court should report that it was desirous to learn the opinions of the Governments of Belgium and Holland on a matter which implied the intention to adopt a policy of a totally different character from that which we were desirous to see established. His Excellency said that M. Niebuhr had received no instructions from him; that this journey had no official character; and that he had no knowledge of his being charged with any communication such as I suspected. His Excellency, in fact, denied that he was sent on a political mission; but from the intimate connection of M. Niebuhr with General Gerlach, and his confidential position about the King, it can scarcely be supposed that he has proceeded on this journey at this time of the year for recreation or repose from his arduous duties, and I am strongly impressed with the idea that he must be charged with some secret and important business.

The opinion, indeed, is general here, since the late differences with the

Austrian Government, that the King is intent on carrying out a policy of neutrality; and that, in addition to the States of the Germanic Confederation, he is in hopes of being able to bring into his views, not only the Courts of Brussels and the Hague, but also that of Copenhagen and even the Government of the United States. How far these supposed opinions of the Prussian Government will be listened to I am unable to judge, but the idea is not a new one; and if Prussia is not readmitted into the Conference at Vienna it is not impossible that she may have resolved to adopt this course, and I would venture to suggest the expediency, without loss of time, of endeavouring to counteract any attempts of the kind which may be made.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 228.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 57.)

My Lord, *Vienna, February 7, 1855.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 33 of the 29th ultimo, desiring to be made acquainted with the source from which Count Buol derived the report mentioned in my despatch No. 469 of the 13th of December, 1854, as to the intention of the Ottoman authorities to expel a number of Boyards from the Danubian Principalities, the property of some of whom was to be confiscated, I have to state that this subject was brought before the Commission which was assembled in Vienna for the affairs of the Principalities, and that this information (which has since proved to be entirely erroneous) was contained in a confidential correspondence from the Moldavian authorities to General Coronini, and by him transmitted to his Government; and that the originals of these documents were the grounds upon which the Commissioners (as stated in my above-named despatch), came to the determination of sending the confidential letters to the Consular Agents, Messrs. Colquhoun and Gardner, which are inclosed in that despatch.

As the directions given in that memorandum were only to act by way of advice, if the contemplated case arose, and as I stated in my letter to Mr. Colquhoun "that I was not inclined to believe the report," I did not think it necessary, when that belief was proved to be correct, to transmit any account of it to Mr. Colquhoun.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 229.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 128.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 12, 1855.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch* from the Earl of Westmorland, containing explanations as to the reported intention of the Ottoman authorities to expel a number of Boyards from the Danubian Principalities, as alluded to in Lord Westmorland's despatch No. 469, of which a copy was inclosed to your Excellency in my despatch No. 816 of the 28th of December last.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 228.

No. 230.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 130.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 12, 1855.

HER Majesty's Government have learnt with regret, by your Excellency's despatch No. 83 of the 31st of January, the difficulty which there is of providing accommodation at Constantinople for the Sardinian troops; but Her Majesty's Government trust to your Excellency's continued efforts in this matter.

It would not be prudent to send the Sardinian troops at once to the Crimea, till accommodation could be given the men.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 231.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 132.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 12, 1855.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 77 of the 31st of January, that Her Majesty's Government have learnt, with great satisfaction, that your Excellency has obtained the Porte's compliance with General Williams' requests respecting the appointments of Dr. Sandwith, Baron Schwarzenberg, *alias* Emin Bey, and Tashlar Bey.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 232.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 160.)

My Lord, *Paris, February* 12, 1855.

THE Sardinian Minister has been desired to communicate to me an instruction, dated the 1st instant, addressed by Count Cavour to the Sardinian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna.

As M. Villa-Marina could not tell me positively whether a copy of this instruction had been transmitted to M. d'Azeglio, for communication to your Lordship, I think it better to state, as shortly as I can, its substance.

It appears that, when M. de Bourqueney informed Count Buol of the intention of the Western Powers to accept the adhesion of Sardinia to the Treaty of the 10th of April last, Count Buol expressed a wish to see the diplomatic relations between Austria and Sardinia placed on a better footing. M. de Bourqueney repeated this fact to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who in his turn instructed the Duc de Guiche to speak to M. de Cavour on the subject. The result is, the despatch to which I am calling your Lordship's attention.

M. de Cavour states that the Sardinian Government is ready and anxious to renew its former amicable relations with the Cabinet of Vienna; but he points out that it is only possible, when the Decree of Sequestration, which weighs so heavily on certain Sardinian subjects, shall have been repealed. He observes that Count Buol himself admits that he has no ground of complaint against the Sardinian Government, though he thinks that the license of the Sardinian press ought to be repressed. To this M. de Cavour replies, that the liberty of the press, being essential to liberal institutions, must naturally exist in Sardinia; that he does not suppose that Count Buol's remarks apply to the

freedom with which the press examines affairs affecting the internal government of the country, but that they are directed against the attacks made against the Emperor of Austria and his Government; that an effectual remedy had been found for all such abuses—a remedy which has completely put a stop to attacks of a similar nature made against the Emperor of the French and the Queen of Spain, and which, if resorted to by Austria, would as effectually secure her Government from all further aggressions on the part of the Sardinian press. I do not enter more at large on this part of the despatch, as it is irrelevant to the main object at issue.

On the subject of the repeal of the Sequestration Decree, M. de Cavour observes that he is far from giving that extended sense to the rights of naturalization which is contended for by the United States, but that he must say that Lombardian subjects who have become subjects of the King of Sardinia with the full permission of the Emperor of Austria, acquire all the rights of Sardinian-born subjects, and that the Sardinian Government is justified in insisting on the repeal of the Decree of Sequestration so far as it affects such persons. It would only be worthy the generosity and magnanimity of a great Sovereign, Count Cavour remarks, if this repeal was made at once, and without reserve; but should this proceeding be declined by Count Buol, he suggests that the Austrian Government should carry the repeal out by degrees, and in selecting the persons to whom the exemption is from time to time to apply. The Austrian Government had already taken the initiative in such a course by raising the sequestration which had been placed on the properties of the Princess Belgioso and the Duke of Litta.

In general, the Sardinian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna is charged to receive with urbanity and frankness any overture that may be made to him by Count Buol, either directly or through M. de Bourqueney, and to keep M. de Bourqueney and Lord Westmorland informed of what may pass between him and the Austrian Cabinet.

I said that I was sure that Her Majesty's Government would learn with sincere pleasure the amicable sentiments which seemed to prevail in the Cabinets of Vienna and Turin, and that your Lordship would aid in any way you could to the conversion of those sentiments into more stable relations.

I observed, however, to M. Villa-Marina, that although the Austrian Decree of Sequestration might have fallen upon many innocent persons, there might be a few of whose dispositions the Austrian Government had real grounds for apprehension, and I suggested that some arrangement might perhaps be made between the two Governments for the purchase at a fair value by Austria of the property of such persons.

M. Villa-Marina seemed to think that any proposition of that nature must proceed from Vienna, and must be corollary to a general repeal of the Act of Sequestration.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 233.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 163. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, February* 12, 1855.

DURING a conversation which I had with M. Drouyn de Lhuys a few days ago, his Excellency reverted to the project of a Treaty with Prussia, and he expressed the hope that Her Majesty's Government would not consent to the re-admission of a Prussian Plenipotentiary to the Conferences at Vienna, unless the Prussian Government entered previously into some engagement with the Western Powers in the sense of the engagement which already existed between them and Austria.

I replied to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that I believed that the opinions of Her Majesty's Government on this matter coincided with his. I remarked at the same time that it might be worthy of the consideration of the two Governments whether some middle course might not be found by which the wounded dignity

of the King of Prussia and the interests of the allied Powers might be conciliated in a way satisfactory to both. His Excellency acquiesced in this remark.

This morning Count Hatzfeldt called upon me. He said that he regretted to see by his last despatches from Berlin that the King continued to insist on his readmission to the Conference as a right emanating from the Protocol of the 9th of April, and that His Majesty was resolved to consider a further refusal of the allied Powers to admit this right as absolving him from all other engagements contracted by the said Protocol. This, Count Hatzfeldt said, was the official language which he was desired to hold, but he would at the same time tell me confidentially that the letters received by General Wedel and by M. Usedom, who was now at Paris, showed a great desire on the part of the King to draw nearer to the Western Powers, and he again put it to me whether some scheme might not be devised for saving the King's *amour propre*, and yet restoring the united action of the Four Powers.

I told Count Hatzfeldt I could only refer him to the conversation which I had with him on the 5th instant, and which was reported in my despatch No. 135, of that date, to your Lordship.

The Count then inquired whether it might not be possible to place the interpretation given by the three Powers to the four points before his Sovereign, without referring to the Protocol to which that interpretation had been consigned, and whether, if the King signified his agreement in that interpretation, the signature of a Treaty, offensive and defensive, might not be postponed. I replied to Count Hatzfeldt that although I thought some plan might be devised to extricate the King from the untenable position which His Majesty had taken in assuming a right to be consulted on all matters regarding the settlement of the Eastern question, it could, in my opinion, only be done upon the understanding that His Majesty would frankly join the allies afterwards, for otherwise no advantage would accrue to the latter.

Count Hatzfeldt inquired further whether I thought that Her Majesty's Government would be satisfied with a declaration of strict neutrality on the part of Prussia. I replied that he must forgive me if I said that Her Majesty's Government could have no confidence that any such declaration would be fairly carried out.

In the course of this conversation Count Hatzfeldt said that there was one thing which might have a great effect with the King, if made use of at the right moment, namely, intimidation; but he did not think, he added, that either Austria or France were at this moment in such a state of military preparation as would enable them to make a demonstration that would alarm the Prussian Government. Austria was obliged to keep a large army to watch the forces of Russia; the flower of the French troops was in the Crimea. He hinted that what would be most feared would be a blockade; though he remarked that too much reliance must not be placed on such a measure of coercion, as the Prussian ports had been blockaded by Denmark in 1848, without creating much pressure on Prussian commerce.

Your Lordship will of course understand that this conversation was entirely of a private nature, both Count Hatzfeldt and myself having agreed that it was a mere exchange of personal opinions. I need not, therefore, request you not to mention Count Hatzfeldt's name in any communication which you may have either with Count Bernstorff or M. d'Usedom. At the same time I must again express my conviction of the sincerity of Count Hatzfeldt's wishes to lead his Government to a better understanding with the Western Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 234.

Sir R. Abercromby to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 13.)

(No. 14.)

My Lord, *The Hague, February* 11, 1855.

THE Count de Niebuhr has arrived here from Berlin.

The political opinions of this gentleman are already well known to your Lordship to be those of the ultra-Kreuz faction, of which General Gerlach, M. Le Coq, Count Westphalen, and others, are the principal supporters at Berlin.

Count Königsmark, my Prussian colleague at this Court, called on his Excellency M. Van Hall at an early hour yesterday morning, for the purpose of announcing the arrival of Count de Niebuhr at the Hague, and to declare that he is not charged with any special mission to this Court, and that it was not his intention to ask to be received in a private audience by His Netherland Majesty, although he hoped to be permitted to attend the ball which His Netherland Majesty gives on Tuesday next.

It is difficult to give implicit belief to the explanation given by Count Königsmark, that a person of Count Niebuhr's station and connection at the Prussian Court should, at this period of the year and in such rigorous weather, voluntarily choose such a moment to make a journey of pleasure and inquiry with respect to this country, without having some more important object in view; and in transmitting to your Lordship the version which M. Van Hall has given of the journey of M. de Niebuhr, as explained to him by my Prussian colleague at this Court, I am far from expecting that your Lordship should receive it with any degree of confidence. I shall shortly have another opportunity of addressing your Lordship, but I shall probably delay the departure of the messenger for twenty-four hours.

My belief is that his Excellency M. Van Hall, for the moment, knows no more respecting the real objects of Count de Niebuhr's visit to the Hague than he has learnt from the communications of Count Königsmark, though he may have formed some idea as to the hidden purport of his mission.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RA. ABERCROMBY.

No. 235.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 14.)

(No. 11.)

My Lord, *Stuttgardt, February* 10, 1855.

CONSIDERING the great importance of the present cordial state of relations between England and France, it may possibly be advisable to inform your Lordship, that in the course of conversation with the new French Minister, the Marquis de Ferrière le Vayer, he has completely agreed with me when expressing myself in the following sense: That the perfect intelligence now existing between our Governments, was the realization of the dream of my diplomatic life; that such relations appeared to me capable of dispensing incalculable good both to our own countries and to the world at large; and that whereas the Emperor of the French evidently comprehended thoroughly the vital benefit of such a state of things, King Louis Philippe had appeared to comprehend it only partially, as shown, among other things, by the Spanish marriages, when an alliance wanted in the highest degree was sacrificed for one not wanted at all.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM

No. 236.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 51.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 15, 1855.

I INCLOSE herewith for your Lordship's information, and for communication to Count Buol, a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Minister at Munich, relative to the language held by Bavaria to Russia on the subject of the war.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* See No. 221, page 219.

No. 237.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 21.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 15, 1855.

HER Majesty's Government learn with regret from your despatch No. 21 of the 30th ultimo, that the Danish Representative at the Diet of Frankfort had been instructed by his Government to vote against the Austrian proposal that the contingent of the Confederation should be immediately organized for active service.

Her Majesty's Government think that the proposal of Austria can only be considered inopportune as having been made too late, and that the instructions sent to M. de Bülow prove that the policy of Denmark is unfriendly to that of England and France, which is identical with the policy of Austria.

You will communicate these sentiments to M. de Scheel.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 238.

Mr. Hudson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 26.)

My Lord, *Turin, February* 11, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship, that the project of law authorizing the King's Government to carry into execution the Tripartite Supplementary Convention concluded on the 26th of January last, between His Majesty the Emperor of French and the King of Sardinia, was adopted by the Chamber of Deputies yesterday evening, by a majority of 31 votes.

The measure was carried by 101 votes to 60, at the public voting; and by 95 to 64 at a subsequent vote by ballot.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, a summary of the debate which has taken place on this occasion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES HUDSON.

Inclosure in No. 238.

Summary of Discussion in the Chamber of Deputies on Sardinian Alliance with England and France.

Farina.—WAS opposed to the Treaty; did not see why Piedmont should not remain neutral, as the other smaller States are doing. Piedmont has no interest in the preservation of Turkey. Russia too powerful to be coerced. Destruction of Sebastopol would not bring about the end desired, while Russia remained in possession of Poland, Bessarabia, &c. Nothing to be done without Germany; her business to attack Russia, let her do so. No material compensation, and not even glory, to be obtained by going to war. General commerce would suffer much, especially that of Genoa. Not a war of civilization, Turks being at least as barbarous as Russians. Rather war of European equilibrium, which Piedmont would best aid by defending herself.

Torelli.—In favour of Treaty, said: War was at first received unfavourably, but gradually the country became convinced of the urgent necessity of it. Policy of Russia always aggressive. Neutrality impolitic; as, if allies victorious, Piedmont would have no voice in Treaties; if Russia conquer, so much the worse, she having been for long time past hostile to Piedmont. By aiding allies Piedmont would gain their esteem and support, and avoid the possibility of being obliged to disarm.

Brofferio.—Opposed to Treaty; declared past conduct of Government a chain of contradictions. Russia on various occasions promoter of interests of Piedmont. Piedmont would be defending one barbarian against another. Liberal Governments those of France and Austria, forsooth! Little difference between transportation to Lambessa and Siberia. War not one of liberty; cited words of Cobden: "To conquer one despot we make alliances with other despots," &c. England and France have either commercial or political interests in the war. Piedmont would only lose the "Italian flag of Liberty" by an alliance with Austria. Even if she gained by it, she ought not to change her policy. Sweden, Norway, Holland, Belgium, in isolated positions different from that of Piedmont. There will now be three fatal periods, those of armistice of Vigevano, of Novara, and thirdly, of Turin, by which oracles of Vienna will gain ascendency.

Durando.—In favour of Treaty. Treaty naturally at first unfavourably received. Necessary to enlighten public as much as possible. War one of liberty and independence, in keeping with traditional policy of Piedmont. The greatest danger, preponderance of Russia. Every State must unite under one banner. At the peace a course the reverse of that of 1815 ought to be taken, another great Confederation in which Piedmont must join. Piedmont has a fixed object, but must not on that account keep herself apart, but do as a vessel which, with a fixed destination, stops at various places when necessary. The House of Savoy has developed its future more by chevaleresque wars than by political manœuvres. It cannot be said that Piedmont goes to war for interest of Austria. If a river overflow its banks, two proprietors contending for one piece of ground are called upon to unite and help in repairing the mischief. Some wish a neutrality favourable to Russia; useless, as, if she conquer, she will tend rather eastwards than southwards. Some are for waiting to attack Austria, others because later our aid might be more valuable. Russia not so barbarous as is maintained. A Power that can build Sebastopol, Cronstadt, and fortify Warsaw so strongly, is not to be despised; when connected together by railroads, her commerce increased, and a population which will by-and-bye amount to 100,000,000, she united will be more powerful than we shall be with 300,000,000 torn by religious dissensions. Three means of efficacious resistance present themselves—reconstruction of Poland; give part of Russia to the neighbouring countries; partition of Turkey—third measure alone possible, and advantageous to Piedmont. It is said Piedmont will gain nothing. First object of war, repression of Russian encroachment. Unnecessary to make stipulations with England. Sicily and Liguria both ceded to Piedmont by England, without stipulation. Still more now may Piedmont hope that England will look to her interests. Piedmont needs repose to recover from disasters of 1848; true! but how did France revenge herself for Waterloo? by holding out the hand of friendship to England. To recompense herself she made expeditions to Spain, Greece, Algiers, Antwerp, Ancona, Ulloa. If Piedmont reject the advances made to her by Europe, the present generation may live, but their children's children will die unhonoured, at the foot of the Alps, and with them will be buried the hopes of Italy.

La Margarita.—Refused to support Treaty until he should hear explanations of Minister. Questioned its advantages to country. To call Russia barbarous was to call every country where liberty was limited, and not in the hands of the people, barbarous. Austria might change her policy during the war, and attack Piedmont when her army was in the East.

Biancheri.—Against Treaty. Sardinia had changed her policy since 1848, so that her previous policy could be no argument on either side. Austria would gain by defeat of Russia, and *ergo*, Piedmont would suffer.

Galenja, in favour of, and *Michelini* opposed to Treaty.

Revel.—Reviewed policy of Piedmont since 1848, and blamed the political conduct of the President of Council (Cavour). Stated that England had invited Piedmont to join alliance to secure herself from possible future embarrassment on part of Piedmont; that the Treaty was forced upon them by their policy since 1848. Considered it would have been more politic to have joined later, as

then there would have been more to be gained. Wrong on part of Ministers to choose this period to sow dissensions by their late measures. Thought Piedmontese contingent disproportionately large; and that subsidy ought to have been asked from England, not allowing sense of dignity to stand in way of real interests.

Cavour, Minister of Foreign Affairs.—After giving summary of negotiations, denied the reason assigned by Revel for the invitation of the allies to be correct; as also that the Act which had separated the Government from the party of Count Revel had excited suspicions in the English and French Governments. To prove the reverse he read extract of letter from Lord Clarendon to British Minister, beginning "I shall ever recollect with pleasure that my last act;" down to "is received with feelings of enthusiasm." Russia victorious, mistress of Mediterranean. In moral point of view, Russia opposed to liberty, and every liberal principle. For a small State to remain neutral while the great ones are at war, her neutrality must be innocuous, and indifferent to both parties, as with Holland, Belgium, Portugal; but Piedmont could not remain neutral without doing good service to Russia. Piedmont would also lose sympathy of Liberal party in Europe, universally opposed to Russia. Proved such to be the case in England, instancing popular indignation against Cobden; election of Lord Ebrington, in favour of war, against a Radical indifferent to it, for a Radical borough. Subsidy not asked for, nor would have been accepted from England. England has suffered much, but disasters have always urged her on to greater efforts; for example, war with France in 1814, Cabul, &c. Denied that Treaty implied change of policy; always favourable to England; had been called Anglomaniac; Deputy Brofferio had called his journal "Milord Risorgimento." If Piedmont was now allied with Austria, what then? Why Austria had changed her policy towards Russia; that was all. Denied that Piedmont would lose sympathy of Italy.

Revel.—Had not meant to say that Treaty had been brought about by compulsion. Denied Cavour to have always sympathised with England. Quoted newspaper article to support statement.

Cabella.—Opposed Treaty, stating his opinion that it was only made to satisfy Austria, which Cavour denied.

Farini.—In favour of Treaty; stated the question to be about the balance of power in Europe. Russia certainly barbarous compared to other European Powers. Proceeded to review policy of Nicholas in past times to prove it one of oppression. Russian policy hostile to Piedmont. Neutrality useless, and would give Austria too great a preponderance at the peace.

Revel.—In consequence of the unanimity with which the Chamber declined his resignation, is induced to withdraw it.

Cavour, President of the Council, &c.—Regrets that in the heat of the debate Revel should have used an expression calculated to mislead. The conversation referred to being to a certain extent official, he can have no objection to withdraw the expression complained of.

Correnti (Left).—Is anxious to explain grounds on which he, for the first time, dissents from his political friends.

Is it not evident that, on the successful termination of the war, Germany, Austria, and France will recover their lost liberties? Is not this a war of civilization against barbarism? Even if, as has been said, one Emperor be worthy of the other, the heroism of slavery exists only in Russia.

Menabrea (extreme Right).—Enumerates all the Treaties contracted by the House of Savoy in order to prove that it has always treated on a footing of equality. At times subsidies have been accepted without dishonour, as the one party gives money, and the other, men. Hitherto the share allotted to this country in the councils of war was always stipulated, which in the present Convention is not the case.

Death, disease, and battle, will remove six-tenths of the force; and at that rate the annual contingent called out will be absorbed by these 15,000 alone.

The outlay incurred for the campaign in Lombardy in 1848-49 was 125,000,000 francs; at that rate, therefore, the 25,000,000 now asked for will be far from sufficing. The Minister of War has done much for the army, but the Administration is only now organizing. The allies have agreed to transport our troops; but why, in case of a disaster, were the means of retreat not provided likewise. In former Treaties the Contracting Parties mutually guaranteed their respective territories.

Are we to be represented in a Congress for Peace? Alludes to Lord Aberdeen's statement that Lord Raglan would command the Sardinian troops.

Lamarmora, Minister at War.—Regrets that M. Menabrea, a military man, should have delivered a speech calculated to make an unfavourable impression upon the army. M. Menabrea would have preferred a subsidy, fewer men, no reinforcements, and yet all the advantages. Doubtful whether papers have reported Lord Aberdeen correctly. The command of the allied armies being separate, it was wished to avoid the appearance of leaning more to the one side than to the other. It may happen that Lord Raglan being the senior, he will assume the command of both armies; but was never understood that our forces were to form part of the English contingent.

Question of subsidy most unpopular in the army, especially in the Brigade of Savoy. He would certainly have declined the honour of commanding the expedition had the principle of a subsidy been adopted.

Taking the cost of each Infantry soldier at 2 francs 50 per diem, and each Cavalry soldier at from 4 to 5 francs, the cost of 1000 men would not exceed 1,000,000 francs—unforeseen expenses will not double this.

Nor will the navy cost 3,000,000 francs; we shall send the few steamers we have armed *en flute*.

The deaths in the French hospitals are calculated at one-tenth, which is a wide difference from six-tenths!

Cosaretta.—Against the Treaties.

Cavour, G. (Right, not the Minister).—Will resolutely oppose the Treaty; because he fears more the barbarism of the communists than that of Russia.

Rattazzi, Minister of Justice, &c.—Spoke chiefly in reply to certain retrospective allusions of M. de Revel, with reference to the abrogation of the Constitution, &c.

Cavour, President of the Council.—Likewise defended himself from the charge of inconsistency, &c.

Tecchio (Left).—Can oppose the Treaty and yet remain a good Italian. Attacked Austria at great length and advocated an armed neutrality; but if the army goes to the East it will have his best wishes.

Quaglia.—Is averse to the system of armed neutrality and in favour of the Treaties.

Deviry (Extreme Right).—Would have preferred a subsidy. Piedmont should at least have deferred her accession until Austria had pronounced. Possibly at the peace, France will seek to annex Savoy, which would be a misfortune both for Piedmont and Savoy; wishes to know whether at the Conferences this point was touched on.

Cavour, President of the Council.—No allusion whatsoever was made at the Conferences in question, to the question touched upon by M. Deviry, and had the subject been mentioned, Government would have energetically repelled it.

Pareto.—Advocates a prudent armed neutrality.

Bo.—Upholds the Treaty and denies that it will be injurious to maritime trade.

Galvagno.—Although approving of the Treaty shall vote against the Convention.

Pallavicini, George.—Opposes the Treaty.

Menabrea.—Proposes the following amendment: "The Chamber, inviting the Ministry to negotiate a fresh Convention with the allied Powers, which shall be more in conformity with the interest of the country, passes to the order of the day."

Rattazzi, Minister.—Replies to Menabrea.

Revel.—Proposes an amendment obliging the Government to conclude a fresh Convention with Great Britain for a larger loan.

The House eventually divided; first by a public voting which gave:—

For . . .	101
Against . .	60
Majority . .	41

A second vote was then taken by ballot, when the result, which is the final one, was as follows:—

For . . .	95
Against . .	64
Majority . .	31

And the two Conventions are consequently adopted by the Chamber.

No. 239.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 86.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 3, 1855.*

IN pursuance of your Lordship's instructions, I have this day concluded and signed with Reshid Pasha, Grand Vizier, and Aali Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, a Convention in nine Articles, by which it is agreed on the part of their Majesties the Queen and the Sultan respectively, that a body of 20,000 Ottoman troops of all arms, commanded by British officers, shall be taken into the pay and service of the British Government during the present war.

Originals of this instrument in English and Turkish, signed and sealed by the respective Plenipotentiaries, are herewith inclosed.

A duplicate original in each language, signed and sealed in the same manner, remains in the hands of the Turkish Ministers.

Your Lordship will observe that the ratifications are to be exchanged at Constantinople within six weeks at the latest.

It has not been necessary for me to avail myself of the latitude afforded by your Lordship's instructions with respect to the amount of pay, which is limited to the rate established in the Turkish armies.

The two Articles VII and VIII, which I have ventured to add to the original draft, require a few words of explanation.

The Grand Vizier proposed two alterations in Article II.; first, by omitting certain words from the text of the draft, and substituting certain others; secondly, by the insertion of a fresh clause: the former amendment being ostensibly intended to provide that the Turkish troops should receive rations according to their customary practice; the latter, that any punishments inflicted upon the soldiers shall also be in accordance with the Turkish regulations.

The terms of the proposed amendments are submitted to your Lordship herewith in a separate inclosure.

Not seeing any material objection to the Grand Vizier's suggestions, but

desirous not to weaken or disturb unnecessarily the wording of the draft transmitted from your Lordship's office, I proposed embodying them in an explanatory Article (VIIth of the Convention now concluded), and I took advantage of the occasion to add another (the VIIIth), declaring in our favour the construction to be put upon the opening clause of Article III.

I venture to hope that these modifications will meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

The accompanying certificate delivered to me by Mr. Alison, the Oriental Secretary, will serve to show that the original versions of the Convention in English and Turkish may be relied upon as substantially identical in meaning.

Unnecessary though it be, your Lordship will excuse my observing how greatly the future efficiency of the Ottoman troops in Her Majesty's service will depend upon the selection of their officers, not only in respect to military knowledge and ability, but in point of qualifications adapted to the management and addressed to the confidence of soldiers differing so widely from the British in language, customs, and religion. Were greater difficulties likely to arise out this difference, they might be cheerfully encountered for the sake of a measure which tends to results beyond those of a military character, and which, if properly directed, may conduce more than any other to the extension of our influence, and the promotion of salutary improvements in this Empire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 239.

Proposed Amendments to the Convention of February 3, 1854.

(Translation.)

THE following passage is proposed to be substituted for the words underlined in Article II.*

"All the soldiers and officers of the Imperial troops shall, in all matters respecting war and military movements, be under the orders and command of the chief Commanders to be placed over them by the British Government, just as if they were appointed by the Sublime Porte; and their internal affairs, their discipline, their punishments, shall be as before according to the system pursued in the Turkish army. Their rations, pay, and clothes, shall, as stated in Article III, be of the description to which they are accustomed, and be distributed to them by the English authorities according to the established system of the British Government."

It is proposed to add the following passage at the end of Article III:

"And their rations shall be issued to them according to their custom."

No. 240.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 87. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 3, 1855.*

APPREHENSIONS have been entertained for some time by discerning people that the Mahometan male population of Turkey may become at no distant period inadequate to the demands of the military conscription. Measures for providing against such a deficiency were brought under consideration even before the war. A liberal and comprehensive policy would naturally suggest resources offered by those communities which acknowledge the sovereignty, while they repudiate the religion of the Sultan. It was thought not impossible to overcome the adverse prejudices prevailing on both sides, and by placing the Rayah on an equality of civil rights with his Mussulman fellow-subject to obtain

* Words underlined in Article II:—"The Turkish troops in question shall in every respect be subject to the discipline and regulations of the British service."

his voluntary service in arms for the support of the Ottoman Empire. Though nothing has yet been openly done to realize an idea so pregnant with important consequences, I would not willingly neglect any fair opportunity of opening a way for its eventual application. The Convention which I have signed to-day under your Lordship's instructions, appeared at first to offer the desired occasion, but I feared on reflection to retard its conclusion, and to create an ill-timed mistrust, by calling up an element of which the introduction was unnecessary and the reception doubtful.

I thought it more prudent to desist from any attempt to mix up the Christians with the Mussulmans in a Convention originally addressed to the latter only; but I saw no valid objection to placing in the hands of the Turkish Plenipotentiaries, after its signature, a memorandum, which, without betraying any object, might provide, in the Porte's own interest, a latitude of action capable of being turned to account hereafter, should Her Majesty's Government approve of it. The memorandum is inclosed herewith your Lordship's information. It takes note of a contingency which cannot be thought impossible, and provides for its occurrence in a manner which, in the supposed case, would entitle us to set the example of bringing Christian recruits, under due protection, into the ranks of the Sultan's army.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 240.

Memorandum.

THE present memorandum is intended to declare that the British Government, in leaving to the Turkish authorities the appointment of subaltern officers in the body of troops to be taken into its service according to the Convention signed to-day, reserves only the nomination among them of a few British drill-serjeants, and that in case of difficulty or delay in making up the complete number of privates agreed upon by the terms of the Convention, the British commanding officers shall be at liberty to recruit and make up the deficiency from the subjects of the Sublime Porte indiscriminately, without reference to their being already either Regulars or Redifs.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

February 5, 1855.

No. 241.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 16.)

(No. 89.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 5, 1855.

ALTHOUGH the afternoon is considerably advanced, and the weather fine, I have not yet received any advices from the Crimea. If the mail is arrived, it has not reached the Embassy, and I can only hope that, under the circumstances, it has passed on straight to England. My own state of ignorance, as to official information, is the more vexatious, as rumours of deep interest, not unattended with anxiety, have been afloat since yesterday. According to these reports a violent sortie has been made from Sebastopol against the French lines, and one of less force against the British. It is said that the Russians were repulsed in both cases, in the former with heavy loss, and not without inflicting considerable injury on the allies. The French are described as having lost 300 men, and the British 40. When the vessel which brought this intelligence left the coast, a large Russian force—so runs the statement—was seen to march in heavy masses towards Balaklava.

I grieve to add that the sick continue to come down in considerable numbers.

I had written thus far when Lord Napier, whom I had requested to see M. Benedetti, returned with a general corrobation of the preceding intelligence

His Lordship adds, that the Russians were defeated before they reached the French parallels, and that our allies lost two distinguished officers in addition to a considerable number of privates. It seems a question whether the second sortie was directed against the British or the French lines.

The demonstration against Balaklava on the 2nd, had not been followed by any attack as late as the 3rd.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 242.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 16.)

(No. 90.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 5, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith an extract from a despatch I received yesterday from Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Trebizond, announcing the arrival of Vassif Pasha, the new Commander-in-chief of the army of Kars.

Mr. Stevens states that the same vessel which conveyed Vassif Pasha to Trebizond had a large lot of military stores, chiefly for winter use, and 220,000*l.* in specie and paper money for the use of his army.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 242.

Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Extract.) *Trebizond, January* 30, 1855.

THE English steamer arrived yesterday brought Vassif Pasha, the Commander-in-chief of the Kars army, *en route* to Erzeroom. The same vessel had a lot of military stores, chiefly for winter use, and 220,000*l.* in specie and paper money for the use of the armies.

No. 243.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 16.)

(No. 91.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 5, 1855.

SINCE I closed the bag for the messenger, despatches have come in from the Crimea. Those from General Rose I have forwarded in hopes of their overtaking the packet. I inclose herewith an extract of the latest letter addressed to me from head-quarters. I rejoice to observe that the losses of the French have been much less severe than had been stated, and that in general the appearances were less gloomy than the rumours prevailing here had given us reason to suppose.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 243.

Field-Marshal Lord Raglan to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Extract.)

THE morning before yesterday, some time before daylight, the enemy made a sortie on the extreme right of the French advanced works. The Russians were eventually repulsed, but they, in the first instance, surrounded the covering

party which was protecting the advanced workmen, and they inflicted a loss of fifty men upon the French, who had a Chef de Batallion de Génie, of the name of Suchet, and a Captain of Engineers, Fourcade, badly wounded, and an officer is missing.

The weather, which had been fine for several days, changed yesterday; we had a wet evening, and at night the rain changed into snow, and this has been succeeded by a severe frost and a very cold wind from the northward.

No. 244.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 16, 4 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, February* 16, 1855.

COLONEL OLBERG returned to Paris yesterday, with full powers for General Wedel and M. Usedom to enter upon negotiations of a Treaty with the Western Powers. The latter will proceed to London without delay.

No. 245.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 16.)

(No. 176. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, February* 15, 1855.

COUNT HATZFELDT came to me this morning, and informed me that the Emperor had sent for General Wedel yesterday, and had placed in his hands the "Projet de Traité" which His Majesty proposed the Prussian Government should sign, in order that Prussia might resume her place in the Conferences at Vienna. Count Hatzfeldt added that he had learnt the fact through a confidential source; that the "projet" had not been communicated to him, though he believed that it had been sent for the approbation of the Cabinets of London and Vienna. Further, he had reason to know that General Wedel had not transmitted it to Berlin, nor as yet communicated the fact of its existence to his Government. Count Hatzfeldt attributed this seeming negligence to the existence of another "projet," concocted by M. d'Usedom and General Wedel, which had already been forwarded to Berlin for the King of Prussia's approval.

Count Hatzfeldt went on to say that he regretted that this overture had been made. In the first place, its originating in France was sufficient to set his Government against it; in the next, it was too crude, and would commit his Government too immediately to have a chance of obtaining the King's approval. Even that which was a Secret Article with Austria had been made patent in the "projet" destined for Prussia. All that could be hoped for at this moment (to use the Count's own words) was, to turn the horse's head in the right direction, in the hope that he might be coaxed or forced to go on hereafter.

There was, however, the Count continued to say, a change for the better at Berlin. His last despatches showed this. The King was not averse to some sort of transaction, such as my late despatches on this subject have given an outline of; but there were two points to which His Majesty would hold: the prevention of the march of French troops into Germany, and a guarantee that Poland should not be revolutionized. If these points were settled to the King's satisfaction, he (Count Hatzfeldt) thought that His Majesty would enter into further engagements to succour Austria, if she attacked Russia and met with reverses, and even, under certain eventualities, which must, however, be left for the King's appreciation, to assume the offensive against Russia.

With regard to the prevention of the entry of French troops into Germany, Count Hatzfeldt remarked that it was the King's apprehension of this—an apprehension which applied equally to their presence on German soil as friends or as enemies—which had created this sudden change in the King's feelings.

With regard to Poland, I said to Count Hatzfeldt that I would speak as frankly to him as he had to me. I could assure him with all honesty and sincerity, and so, I was sure, would Her Majesty's Government assure the King, that they had no thoughts of exciting or aiding, either openly or covertly, a

revolution in Poland; but I was equally certain that neither Her Majesty's nor the French Government would bind themselves by any engagements respecting the future lot of that country. If the war was to be prolonged with Russia, it was impossible to foresee to what further complications that war would give rise; and, independent of the sympathy which the cause of Poland had ever excited in the minds of the British nation, it would be impossible for any Government so to tie their hands as not to take advantage of any internal movement in Poland against Russia, which the prolongation of hostilities might accidentally produce. If the King of Prussia feared this contingency, the best plan to prevent it was to aid us in putting an end to the war.

Count Hatzfeldt has too much good sense not to comprehend and appreciate fully the position of Her Majesty's Government in regard to this question. Still he appears to apprehend that the King of Prussia will require explicit declarations regarding it, before he binds himself more closely to the policy of the allies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 246.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Jerningham.

(No. 11.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 16, 1855.

I LEARN with satisfaction, from your despatch No. 11 of the 10th instant, that the French Minister at Stuttgardt is, equally with yourself, sensible of the advantage to be derived by England and France from a cordial alliance.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 247.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 17.)

(No. 181. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, February* 16, 1855.

I HAVE not alluded to the reports prevalent of a body of French troops being about to be sent to assist those of Austria, referred to in your Lordship's despatch No. 147 of the 13th instant, because I was convinced that at the present moment there was no foundation for such reports, and that they had been put in circulation by those who thought that an apprehension of their proving true would indispose the smaller States of Germany towards the alliance between Austria and the Western Powers.

Nevertheless, I mentioned the subject yesterday to M. Drouyn de Lhuys. He assured me immediately that had any such project been in contemplation, Her Majesty's Government would at once have been informed of it. The reports had arisen, he supposed, in consequence of the double mission of Generals Cremeville and Wedel to Paris; but although these officers, somewhat irregularly he admitted, had been charged with letters direct to the Emperor, he (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) was well informed of what passed at the interviews with which they had been honoured by His Majesty, and he could state with certainty that the question of sending French troops to any part of Europe, except the East, had not been mooted.

There was nothing whatever military, M. Drouyn de Lhuys continued, in General Wedel's mission, nor did General Cremeville appear to be the bearer of any distinct propositions on the part of his Government. His object appeared to be to prove that the Emperor of Russia could bring 1,200,000 into the field; that to cope with them, Europe must have, at least, 1,500,000, and that the allies could not bring that number together. The Emperor, in admitting the truth of the latter assertion, had shown that so large a force was by no means necessary, even if Russia were as strong as Austria represented her to be; and that Austria,

France, and England, by assiduous employment of the means at their disposal, might so harass Russia as to compel her to make peace. Thus matters stood at the moment with respect to General Crenneville's mission.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys admitted, however, that he had written to M. de Tallenay, at Frankfort, to report to him whether the pretension put forward by Prussia that no German State could permit the passage of foreign soldiers through its territory without the consent of the Diet, was valid according to Federal law. He said that he had taken this step, without even asking the Emperor's sanction, in order to be prepared for every eventuality.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 248.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 185.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 16, 1855.*

I HAVE read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys your Lordship's despatch No. 124 of the 12th instant to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, respecting the instructions to be given to the Ottoman Ambassador at Vienna, with regard to the course he should pursue in the negotiations there. The sentiments developed in that despatch meet with M. Drouyn de Lhuys' full concurrence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 249.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 186.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 16, 1855.*

THE French Government has shown some irritation lately at the hostile language used by Prussian Agents at foreign Courts, when speaking of Great Britain and France, and more particularly of the latter, at the same time that the King of Prussia sends special Agents to London and Paris to assure those two Governments of the friendly sentiments which His Majesty bears towards them; and M. Drouyn de Lhuys a few days ago addressed a despatch on this subject to the French Minister at Berlin. In this despatch the language of the Prussian Ministers at Vienna, the Hague, Frankfort, and Copenhagen, is particularly alluded to; and the right of Prussia, as a German Power, to attempt to influence the smaller German States, except on questions brought under the cognizance of the Diet, is disputed and protested against.

I have, &c.
(Signed COWLEY.

No. 250.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 187.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 16, 1855.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has just informed me that, before sending instructions, such as your Lordship proposes in your despatch No. 145 of the 13th instant to address to Her Majesty's Ministers abroad, in consequence of the information which has reached you respecting M. Niebuhr's secret mission to the Hague and Brussels, the Emperor is desirous that categorical explanations should be asked of the Prussian Cabinet respecting the project of a

Neutral League. If these explanations are not satisfactory, the French Government will send a similar circular to your Lordship's.

The Emperor's scruples arise from not having the same information from Berlin as that received by your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 251.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 189.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 16, 1855.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS stated to me yesterday that the Emperor, having learnt through him that Her Majesty's Government approved the "Projet de Traité" with Prussia, which had been submitted to your Lordship by Count Walewski for their consideration, had, at an interview to which His Majesty had invited General Wedel the day before, given that officer a copy of the "projet," informing him at the same that, if the King of Prussia would sign it, the Conferences at Vienna would be again open to a Prussian Plenipotentiary.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that he had seen General Wedel afterwards, but found that he was totally unprepared to discuss any project of the kind. He had learnt also, about the same time, that the Prussian Government was likewise about to submit a "projet" of their own. From what he had heard of this "projet," it would contain conditions perfectly inadmissible; and he had determined, therefore, on being beforehand with the Prussian Government, and he was about to send his own "projet" to M. de Moustier, with directions to bring it at once to the knowledge of M. de Manteuffel.

I observed that perhaps some compilation of the two "projets" might be found possible. To this M. Drouyn de Lhuys did not refuse his assent; nor upon my putting the question to him, did he object to a transaction such as I have described in my former despatches to your Lordship on this subject, by which the readmission of a Prussian Plenipotentiary to the Conferences might momentarily precede the signature of a Treaty between Prussia and the Western Powers, provided that the conditions of that Treaty had been previously discussed and agreed to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 252.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 192.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 16, 1855.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informed me yesterday that he was about to send a further despatch to Count Walewski, relative to the course which he conceived should be pursued at Vienna, and which, if agreed to by Her Majesty's Government, would serve as a text for the rule of conduct of the French and English Plenipotentiaries.

I understand his Excellency no longer to require the insertion into the full powers of the Plenipotentiaries the text of the memorandum accepted by Prince Gortchakoff on the 7th ultimo, but he adheres to the project of requiring Prince Gortchakoff to sign with the other members of the Conference a Protocol at the first meeting of the Plenipotentiaries, declaring that the said memorandum is accepted by him as the basis of future negotiations.

Your Lordship need not be reminded that the original idea was to require Prince Gortchakoff to sign, at the first meeting, a "procès-verbal," recording his acceptance of this memorandum on the 7th ultimo; but on reflection, it appeared to me that the Prince might, with some show of justice, require that

everything that passed in the meeting of the 7th ultimo should be recorded in the "procès-verbal," and that his own memorandum, although eventually withdrawn, might thus find an official record, whereas, if at the first meeting of the regular Conferences, at which would be present Plenipotentiaries who only knew by hearsay what had previously taken place, it was proposed to record, without observations, the bases on which the negotiations were to be conducted, nothing would be more natural. I mentioned these reflections to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and his Excellency's present proposition is founded on this suggestion.

The order to be followed would be, therefore,—exchange of full powers; demand on the part of the French and English Plenipotentiaries that the first sitting should be consecrated to the signature of a Protocol determining the bases of negotiation. If Prince Gortchakoff assents, the Conferences would continue. If he hesitates, or enters into explanations, he would be stopped at once by a declaration of the French and English Plenipotentiaries that their instructions prevented their receiving more than a simple yes or no; further discussion would force them to retire, when they would refer to their Governments.

Their Governments, according to M. Drouyn de Lhuys' plan, would answer immediately that, in presence of so much equivocation, they could not continue the Conferences.

On the other hand, if Prince Gortchakoff signs the Protocol, negotiations should, in the opinion of the French Government, be continued, taking the four bases in the order in which they were communicated to the Russian Plenipotentiary.

I need not dwell on the reasons which induce the French Government to persist in insisting on this course. They are already known to your Lordship; but I may add, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys has assured me that he has no objection whatever that your Lordship should instruct the British Plenipotentiary to converse confidentially with Count Buol as to the intentions of the Western Powers in regard to the third point, and to bring those intentions forward at the first Conference, if Count Buol agrees to support them. He expects, on the other hand, that if Count Buol prefers a negotiation in the regular order of the Articles, his preference will be complied with.

I must defer to another opportunity that which I had intended to do to-day, namely, to explain how it is that, while the French Government desire sincerely to be released from the Vienna Conferences, they yet have the appearance of wishing to pursue the negotiations. Time fails me to enter into this matter to-day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 253.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 23.)
My Lord, *Frankfort, February 14, 1855.*

THE struggle at present going on between the two Great German Powers is in progress with more than usual activity, but the field is at present more confined to the separate Courts than to Frankfort, where the results of previous arrangements and decisions become finally apparent.

This is naturally and inevitably a crisis of great moment, and intense anxiety exists, for it cannot be doubted that the period is at hand when Prussia must take a decision, either for or against her alliance and cooperation with the Western Powers, as it is the general persuasion that a position of neutrality is untenable.

Although in this conjuncture the aim and wishes of a certain party in Prussia would inevitably lead to an alliance with Russia, I find so few opinions venturing to support that policy, that I cannot induce myself to believe in its being adopted in the last extremity; but if the same hands which now direct the powers of Government continue to hold them, Prussia, even if eventually seeking our alliance, can hardly be looked on as sincere, either by England, or France, or Austria,—of which latter Power, more especially, her jealousy and

dislike are so strong, that sooner or later they must, one would apprehend, find vent in open quarrel.

In this state of things, my Lord, I have carefully avoided language that could irritate the too great susceptibilities already existing on both sides. I have never failed to point out the advantages of union, or the fatal consequences likely to ensue from a breach between these two States, not to themselves alone, but to the whole Confederation. I have, indeed, so far deprecated the policy of Prussia, that I have never shrunk from qualifying it as, in my opinion, the least calculated for obtaining her professed object of obtaining peace, and have said that her attitude was such as must continue to encourage the resistance of Russia, while there would be every prospect of the common object being attained by a frank adhesion to the side of the Western Powers.

There have recently occurred such sudden changes in the views of some of the minor Governments, that it is extremely difficult to pronounce on which side lies the majority of votes in the Diet on any question decisive of the attitude to be taken by the Confederation; and, as generally happens, Bavaria thinking (and, perhaps, not erroneously) that the decision lies with her, is making her importance felt on both sides, and helping Prussia to delay decision.

The Secret Circular of the Vienna Cabinet of the 14th of last month has been adroitly turned to her own purpose by Prussia, and that Government, whose views as far as regards territorial arrangements and encroachments on her neighbours are notorious, has made use of that document to impute all sorts of projects of that kind to the Government of Vienna, and, as is said, with considerable success in detaching from the Imperial Government certain not very fast adherents.

The reported intended movement of French troops in support of Austria is now attempted to be turned to similar account, but I apprehend with less success, for it is not difficult to see that such assistance to Austria need give little umbrage, and would hold out but slight menace to Prussia if she honestly fulfils her professed wish of remaining immoveable, and that, if really contemplated, it is only provoked and rendered necessary by the doubtfulness of the attitude now taken by the Cabinet of Berlin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 254.

Sir R. Abercromby to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 15.)
My Lord, *The Hague, February 12, 1855.*

AN incident has recently occurred here which, although purporting to refer simply to a question of ceremony, has nevertheless, when taken in connection with other circumstances, some political colour, and I therefore think it my duty to report the affair to your Lordship as succinctly as possible.

On the arrival of the Ottoman Envoy at this Court, he addressed, after he had been received by His Netherland Majesty, the usual letters requesting presentation audiences of the other members of the Royal family of this country, and amongst others, to Her Majesty the Queen-Mother, and he received from Her Majesty's Grand Master, a perfectly civil and satisfactory answer, stating that Her Majesty having declined to grant any audiences this winter, Her Majesty must defer to some other occasion the reception of the Ottoman Envoy and of his son, first Secretary of the Ottoman Legation at this Court.

As this placed the Ottoman Envoy, Prince Caradja, exactly on the same footing as the rest of his colleagues with regard to their reception this year by Her Majesty the Queen-Mother, every form of attention and respect had been complied with on either side.

Subsequently, however, to the above exchange of communications between Her Majesty the Queen-Mother and Prince Caradja, my Prussian colleague, Count Königsmark, availed himself of an accidental meeting with Prince Caradja at the house of the French Minister, to state to him, in his capacity of "Doyen" of the Diplomatic body, that Her Majesty the Queen-Mother had informed him of her intention of not granting audiences this winter, and

therefore, that she would spare the members of the Diplomatic body the trouble of making the usual application on her return from the country; but the Prussian Minister added that he would invite Prince Caradja to abstain from taking any steps for obtaining an audience of the Queen-Mother so long as the present state of public affairs existed in the East.

To this communication Prince Caradja remarked that if the Count was charged to make him the above observations, he should have done so sooner, as he had already conformed to the prescribed practice on a first arrival; had made his application to Her Majesty, and had, by her orders, received a civil and suitable reply.

This proceeding, however, of the Prussian Minister struck Prince Caradja as being somewhat extraordinary, inasmuch as it gave to what had the appearance of being a communication respecting a simple question of etiquette, a political colour. The Prince, therefore, applied by letter to Count Königsmark to know whether he had been specially authorized by the Queen-Mother to make the communication he had addressed to him in the terms he had employed; and he pointed out to him that as a foreign Minister newly accredited to this Court, he would have been guilty of a want of proper respect towards the Queen-Mother had he omitted to announce his arrival at the Hague, and to request the honour of being presented to Her Majesty.

Several letters passed between Prince Caradja and Count Königsmark upon this subject, with the contents of which it is not necessary to trouble your Lordship. It is sufficient to state that Count Königsmark admitted in writing that he had not received from the Queen-Mother the commission to invite the Ottoman Minister to abstain from making any application to be received by Her Majesty so long as the present state of public affairs lasted in the East; nor did it appear that he was authorized by Her Majesty to make, in the communication with respect to Her Majesty's audiences, any difference between the Ottoman Minister and the rest of his colleagues, but that the counsels which he, Count Königsmark, had given, was the result of his private opinion only.

Prince Caradja having obtained this admission in writing, has been satisfied to allow the matter to rest, though he will probably report the circumstances to his Court for the information of his Government.

I should add that the conduct of Prince Caradja in this affair received the cordial approbation of my Austrian, French, and Belgian colleagues, none of whom concealed from Count Königsmark their opinion that the advice he had tendered to Prince Caradja, by placing him on a completely different footing from the rest of his colleagues, and more especially from that on which his English and French colleagues stood, would, had he been guided by it, have seriously compromised his official and political position here, and would have laid him open to the accusation of having been wanting in due respect to Her Majesty the Queen-Mother, and to His Netherland Majesty himself. In these views I also entirely agreed, and expressed to Count Königsmark my opinion to that effect.

I am quite willing to acquit my Prussian colleague, after his disavowal of all such intention, of a wish to create an embarrassing position in this country for Prince Caradja; but your Lordship will no doubt be struck by the rather unusual incident of so old a member of the Diplomatic body as Count Königsmark, having inadvertently advised a course so little in conformity with the usual and received proceedings of Diplomatic Agents on their first arrival at a foreign Court, and which was calculated to place the Ottoman Legation at this Court in a pointedly exceptional position.

It is also, considering my Prussian colleague's strong Russian sympathies, somewhat remarkable that it should so have happened that the advice he had tendered should accidentally have been offered to the head of the Ottoman Mission at this Court.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RA. ABERCROMBY.

No. 255.

Sir R. Abercromby to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 20.)

My Lord, *The Hague, February 14, 1855.*

M. DE NIEBUHR leaves the Hague on his return to Berlin to-day.

In a former despatch I reported to your Lordship that the Prussian Minister at this Court officially announced that M. de Niebuhr had come here on a party of pleasure only, and for the purpose of seeing a country he did not know; this explanation of the journey of the Secretary of His Prussian Majesty's Cabinet in the depth of winter, continues to be persevered in; but with what degree of belief on the part of the political public of this residence, I leave your Lordship to judge.

M. de Niebuhr, although applying through Count Königsmark for M. Van Hall's assistance to have an exception in point of etiquette made in his favour, by expressing a wish that His Netherland Majesty would be pleased to receive him at the Court ball of last night, though not previously presented to His Majesty, has not, so far as I am at present informed, had the civility to call upon M. Van Hall, or to be introduced to him; thus pointedly marking his want of courtesy towards the Government of His Netherland Majesty.

His Netherland Majesty is not a person to allow such a want of respect towards himself to pass unheeded; and I have good reason for believing that it has made due impression on His Netherland Majesty's mind. This belief has been strengthened by learning this instant that the King's reception of M. de Niebuhr at the ball last night was pointedly cold, the only words which His Majesty addressed to him, being to inquire whether he intended to remain long in this country; and on learning from M. Niebuhr that he proposed to quit the Hague to-day, His Netherland Majesty left him without speaking another word; and turning to my French colleague, who was standing at a short distance, His Majesty gave him the most marked and flattering reception. It was only at an advanced period of the evening that M. de Niebuhr thought proper to have himself introduced to his Excellency M. Van Hall.

I believe that I shall not be misleading your Lordship when I state, that my impression is, that the object of M. de Niebuhr's journey to this country has been to inquire into the state of public opinion here with regard to Prussia and Prussian policy; to judge how far it might be prudent for the Prussian Kreuz faction at Berlin to reckon on Netherland support and sympathy; to calculate upon what amount of opposition to the policy of the Western Powers, and to that of Austria in particular, might be expected from public opinion in the Netherlands; and lastly, to discover what chance existed of undermining the present Cabinet of the Hague, and of substituting in its place an Administration that should be more favourable to Prussia and to Prussian policy than the Cabinets of M. Van Hall.

Whatever foundation there may be for the first suppositions which I have ventured to suggest, there is abundant evidence to prove that the last is at least correct, and both His Netherland Majesty and his Ministers are profoundly irritated by the course of proceeding which the Court of Berlin has followed, and which is marked by such a want of the ordinary forms of decorum, and which is alike offensive to the dignity of His Netherland Majesty, and to the proper respect which the Government of one country owes to that of another with whom they profess to be on terms of amity.

I think the reception which M. de Niebuhr met with from His Netherland Majesty last night will be sufficient to prove to him that in that quarter he is not likely to find an ally in his wish to overthrow M. Van Hall and his Cabinet; and if he has really taken but ordinary pains to sift the opinion of political men here with regard to the expediency of an unrestricted adoption of Prussian policy, he will also have discovered that, with the exception of some individuals known for their extreme admiration and devotion to the Russian Court, he could count upon none who would be willing to embark their country and their own pecuniary interests in a course of policy that would probably be fatal to both.

I must also add my conviction that the more the public becomes acquainted

with the details connected with the arrival and proceedings of M. de Niebuhr at this Court, the more all sober thinking Dutchmen will feel offended, and the more they will resent a line of conduct so calculated to wound their feelings of self-love and of respect for their national dignity.

If Count Königsmark by his increasing activity in thwarting and counteracting the objects and the policy of the Western Powers and of their allies in all that concerns either Eastern affairs or those of Germany, is to be considered as faithfully representing the true views and opinions of his Court and Government, it must be admitted that the Western Powers and their allies will not find in Russia herself a more bitter or a more persevering enemy than they do in the Court and Government of Prussia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RA. ABERCROMBY.

No. 256.

Sir R. Abercromby to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *The Hague, February 13, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour confidentially to inform your Lordship that it has come to my knowledge that my Prussian colleague at this Court has applied to the Russian Minister to urge him to obtain from Count Nesselrode an ostensible despatch, to be communicated to his Excellency M. Van Hall, in which an energetic appeal should be made by the Court of St. Petersburgh to that of the Hague, to adopt and to support the policy of Prussia. My Prussian colleague, when making to the Russian Minister the above request, stated it to be his opinion that the communication, in the name of his Government, of such a despatch by the Russian Minister at this Court, would render him the greatest service, and most materially assist him in successfully counteracting the increasing endeavours of the Representatives of the three allied Western Powers to induce the Netherland Government to adopt a different course of policy.

I need not remark upon this somewhat extraordinary conduct of my Prussian colleague, further than by observing that the Prussian Representative at this Court thus adopts the not very consistent course of applying for assistance to that very Government, the policy of which Prussia, by an official Act signed by her Representative at Vienna, solemnly declared to be unjust and wrong; and this for the purpose of supporting Prussia in her opposition to the course pursued by those very States she had formerly joined with in reprobating the policy of Russia.

Further comment is unnecessary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RA. ABERCROMBY.

No. 257.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 68.)

My Lord, *Vienna, February 14, 1855.*

THE Turkish Ambassador called upon me to report his having received instructions from his Government relating to the negotiations which, in consequence of the acceptation by the Emperor of Russia of the interpretation of the four bases which had been submitted to Prince Gortchakoff by the allied Representatives, it was expected would be commenced at Vienna. The Ambassador stated that, according to these instructions, he was to attend at the Conferences which would be opened for the purposes of this negotiation, if he was invited to do so; but in case any resolution was arrived at, or any project of Treaty which it was intended to transmit to St. Petersburgh for the approval

of the Russian Government, the Ambassador was to require that it should first be submitted to the Government of the Sultan at Constantinople.

I asked the Ambassador if he had no other instruction by which his conduct would be regulated in the discussions which might arise during the negotiation, but he stated that he had not; but that he was informed that his full powers would be sent to him by Riza Bey, who was appointed Conseiller d'Ambassade, and who was to assist at the Conferences. I told the Ambassador that it appeared that his present instructions were very incomplete; that there was no probability that any preliminary arrangement which might be agreed to by the Plenipotentiaries would be transmitted for approval to St. Petersburgh, but that all questions of such a nature would naturally be referred by the Russian Representative to his Government; but the important question would be to know, if the Representatives of the other Powers, parties to the negotiations, agreed to any preliminary arrangement or Treaty, whether he would be authorised to take part in it; and upon his saying that he was not, and that both Count Buol and M. de Bourqueney had pointed out to him the difficulties which might arise from the nature of his instructions, and had recommended him to apply to his Government, in order that they might be rectified, I told him that I could not but concur in the same recommendation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 258.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 69.)

My Lord, *Vienna, February 14, 1855.*

I HAVE brought before the notice of his Excellency Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 40 of the 6th instant, informing me of the determination come to by the Government of Her Majesty, and that of the Emperor of the French, to raise the blockade of the Danube.

Count Buol will reply through Count Colloredo to the communication made by your Lordship to the latter.

His Excellency, in acknowledging the friendly consideration for Austrian interests displayed by Her Majesty's Government in adopting this measure, took occasion to remark upon the culpable conduct of the Russian military authorities at the mouths of the Danube, under whose sanction an Austrian ship had been fired into, and one of the crew killed. Reparation had been demanded for this violation of the public law, but as yet the question was still in a state of negotiation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 259.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 93.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 8, 1855.*

ALTHOUGH I have no particular intelligence to offer your Lordship respecting the course of events in the Crimea, I am happy to feel myself warranted in stating, on the authority of private accounts, both oral and written, that a marked improvement has taken place in the state and general appearance of things in that quarter, including, what is of much consequence, the health of the army.

I am informed by an officer of active observation and steady habits of thought, who left Balaklava four days ago, that the effective force of Her Majesty's army in bayonets may be reckoned at 15,000, and that about 3,000 more, dispersed throughout the camp and its neighbourhood, may be counted as

available in the day of battle. It is painful however to add, that the Cavalry is reduced to a few hundred horses; that 5,000 sick are still in the Crimea, and that 10,0000 more are either here, or on their way to more distant places.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 260.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 19.)

(No. 95.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 8, 1855.

A SECRET despatch from Bucharest, of which a copy is herewith transmitted to your Lordship, has just been put into my hands.

It is intended to prepare me for the continued intrigues of Prince Stirbey, who derives no small advantage from the dilatory proceedings of the Porte, and the countenance given to him by the Court of Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 260.

Consul-General Colquhoun to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Bucharest, February* 4, 1855.

FOR some days past it has been bruited that the Prince was to send a secret Agent to Constantinople, to advance his interests, and my special attention has been directed to the circumstances.

Yesterday a meeting took place at the palace, when three persons were put forward as fit Agents:

M. Jean Mano, some time Secretary of State; M. Plagino, at present filling that post (he is the Prince's son-in-law); and lastly, M. Rossetti, now Agu of the Police, some time Governor of Ibraila.

After some discussion the two first of these were rejected as being too well known as creatures of the Hospodar, and, by a strange resolution, the mission has been confided to the last-named, M. Rodolphe Rossetti, who is to be sent, early next week, to Constantinople.

One of his principal instructions is, to endeavour to ingratiate himself in the favour of the new Austrian Internuncio, Baron Koller, so as to secure his Excellency's sympathy in favour of Prince Stirbey. To enable him to effect this, he will be furnished with very strong letters of recommendation from certain Austrians here, staunch partisans of the Prince.

Of course no means are to be spared with the Turks.

I consider it my duty to warn your Excellency of this move, and to give you some account of this emissary (whose name has already figured, not over creditably, in several of my preceding despatches), that your Excellency may be able to take measures, if you think fit, to counteract so iniquitous a plan.

M. Rossetti is a bankrupt Boyard who has dissipated a large fortune, and, since Prince Stirbey's Hospodarat, has been an active tool of his.

When Governor of Ibraila he is known to have abstracted a sum of 120,000 piastres (2,000*l.*) from the Municipal Chest, of which he was the guardian. This sum has not been to this day replaced. He is reported to have paid a large sum for his post as Agu.

We now come to his acts since he has held this office, in which he was maintained by the Russian authorities as being an unscrupulous agent.

He it was who organised the band of Greek Volunteers; who drew up their rules and regulations, administered the oaths to the affiliated, &c.

He distinguished himself by the unrelenting severity with which he persecuted every Wallachian of known liberal opinions, as well as all deserters from the Russians about the period of their retreat from Wallachia in July last; and

within the first four days of the advent of the Turks to the capital, he sent off seven deserters after the rear of the Russians.

All these circumstances were made known to Omer Pasha, but his Highness was captivated by the apparent earnestness with which Rossetti offered his services to the Turk. He avowed his many obligations to Russia, which he told the Pasha he had served faithfully; but that from that day, if Omer accepted his services, he would as devotedly serve Turkey. Omer continued him in his post in despite of my remonstrances.

During his service with the Turk he repeatedly presented himself at my door, and, wearied at my refusal to receive him, he asked through Mazhar Pasha for an audience.

I received him, and frankly let him know that I had advised his being removed by the Pasha. He repeated all his confessions of error, saying he had served the Prince faithfully; as well as Russia, to whom he owed all. So had he served Turkey; and now—being, above all, more than either Russian or Turk, a sincere Wallachian, and seeing Wallachia's only hope lay in France and England—he offered me those services. This was after the Prince's return; and he finished by hoping I would hold out a friendly hand to the Prince, who was now a devoted patriot and friend to his country.

I told him I was no enemy to the Prince, but as he was under the weight of an official inquiry, I should be the first to congratulate him on the favourable issue of such inquiry; but, in the meantime, I must observe a distant attitude of simple observation.

Since that period I have kept my eye on M. Rossetti, and have no hesitation in saying that a more unprincipled and unscrupulous agent does not exist.

With these details, your Excellency will be the best judge of what should be done when M. Rossetti makes his appearance at Constantinople. I have reason to believe the French Embassy will be equally forewarned; and I learnt this evening that Baron Meusebach, the Prussian Consul-General, has, besides most of the above details, informed M. de Wildenbruch of certain acts in which M. Rossetti figured after my departure.

Your Excellency will observe that the principal grounds on which the Turkish Government may legitimately lay hold of M. Rosetti are, his having taken so open and notorious a part in the formation of the Greek Volunteers—a fact of public notoriety. This may offer fair reasons for taking measures to secure his papers before he be allowed to land in Constantinople. In case by any chance any stray document should be found to convict him, the Porte may act as it thinks consistent with its own dignity. He bears with him a very large sum, in specie or in letters of credit, which he should be asked to account for: and if he be permitted to land, he should be carefully looked after.

I have reason to believe he will be especially recommended to Fuad Effendi.

There was arrested, when I was at Constantinople, a certain person calling himself Baron Ellonier. He had contrived to get into the Turkish police service, but was convicted of being a Russian spy. This man was employed also by M. Rossetti at Bucharest, and was sent from this place by the Russians to act in their interest.

If I learn anything further on the subject, I will write by a return French Tatar on the 6th.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

No. 261.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 19.)

(No. 96.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 8, 1855.

INCLOSED herewith in copy for your Lordship's information, is a despatch addressed to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan by Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons from Varna, and communicated to me. It bears the date of the

6th instant, and contains some interesting particulars respecting the Turkish forces destined for Eupatoria.

That portion of its contents which relates to the provisions to be conveyed thither in British transports, I have sent to the Turkish Ministers with a strong recommendation in favour Colonel Simmons' suggestions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 261.

Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, February* 6, 1855.

I HAVE to inform your Lordship that, at the request of Omer Pasha, I embarked on the 2nd instant, on board the "Colombo," steam transport, for Bourgas, to expedite the embarkation of Artillery horses on board that ship, and to examine the state of the stores and the means of embarkation thereat.

I found the stores generally in abundance, that is to say, there are several hundred tons in the magazines ready for embarkation, and convoys of waggons are daily arriving from the interior. There is an ample supply of boats for embarking these provisions, but unfortunately great delays will occur from the scarcity of good sacks for holding some of the stores, which will cause a necessity for loading the articles in bulk into the ships, increasing the difficulty of disembarking them at Eupatoria. I would observe also that the bread for the troops is brought from the interior in very bad sacks, made up of all sorts of old materials, and the consequence is that many of them burst and a large proportion of the bread is lost in embarking and disembarking it; not less I should think that one tenth of bread will be thus lost.

Under these circumstances I think it would be of very great advantage if your Lordship could prevail upon the Turkish Government to send at least 30,000 good sacks to Bourgas, thus to prevent the waste of the bread and the loss to the British Government.

At Sisopolis there is a large supply of firewood, and the port is most favourable for the embarkation of Cavalry, but the means for embarking horses are deficient.

Orders have been given to construct two large flats at the ship-building yard at Sisopolis; in the mean time any horses that are to be embarked for the Turks will be shipped at Bourgas, where the French have some flats which they have been so good as to lend.

I inclose a list of the troops which will remain for embarkation after the ships now in this port are loaded. His Highness Omer Pasha embarks to-day in the "Colombo" for Eupatoria. He proposes to call off Kumiesch to see Sir Edmund Lyons.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS.

Turkish Troops remaining to be Embarked.

At Varna.—5 Battalions of Infantry; 2 Batteries of Artillery without horses; 1 Mountain Battery with mules.

At Batchik.—10 Battalions of Infantry; 3 Batteries of Artillery with horses; the guns of 3 Batteries without horses.

At Bourgas.—32 Squadrons of Cavalry (averaging 140 to 150 horses); 1 Troop of Horse Artillery with horses; the horses of 5 Batteries without guns; the horses of 1 Troop of Horse Artillery; the mules of 1 Mountain Battery; 300 waggons with 600 buffaloes, 1,000 bât horses.

No. 262.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 145.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 19, 1855.

IN reply to your Excellency's despatch No. 87 of the 3rd of February, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of the memorandum connected with the Military Convention of the 3rd instant, which was drawn up and delivered by your Excellency to the Turkish Plenipotentiary.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 263.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 147.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 19, 1855.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 86 of the 3rd instant, inclosing the Convention signed on that day between your Excellency and the Turkish Government, stipulating the terms on which 20,000 Turkish troops are to be taken into the British service during the present war; and I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of your alterations and additions in the original draft of Treaty.

The ratifications of this Treaty will be prepared and sent out to your Excellency as speedily as possible.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 264.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 45. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, February* 16, 1855.

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 23 of the 23rd ultimo, I have endeavoured to obtain reliable information upon the subject of the passage of contraband of war through this country into Russia; but I regret to say that what I have procured is not of the nature required by Her Majesty's Government. Such as it is, I, however, deem it my duty to forward it to your Lordship, and have the honour to inclose extracts from several letters which I have received from Her Majesty's Consular Agents on the subject.

Consul-General Plaw writes from Dantzic that the principal shipments of contraband of war for that port were made from London, Hull, and Newcastle, on Prussian account, in Prussian or foreign bottoms, sometimes in British. He states that 250 tons of lead appear to have been sent into Poland from Dantzic.

The report from Königsberg is, that though the importations of lead from England have not much exceeded the average, about 7,000 cwt. of lead and saltpetre had arrived by railway, and had, it was believed, been forwarded to Russia.

From Pillau the Vice-Consul writes that, in December last, 1,200 pigs of lead had been imported from Hull, and 1,000 pigs from Newcastle. It may be supposed that this lead was also on its way to Russia.

The table inclosed in Vice-Consul Campbell's letter shows a considerable increase in the importation of lead, saltpetre, and sulphur into Stettin, as compared with other years; the sulphur, however, appears to have been chiefly consumed in a sulphuric-acid manufactory in that town.

The letter from Mr. Vice-Consul Herislet from Memel states that he believes lead, to a large amount, has been sent from that place into Russia, but he is not able to bring forward any proof of this exportation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 264.

Consul-General Plum to Lord Bloomfield.

Dantzic, February 5, 1855.

(Extract.)

THE shipments made of any contraband of war have been made from London, Hull, and Newcastle. Of lead, 250 tons have been sent into Poland. These shipments from England are for Prussian account, in Prussian or foreign bottoms, sometimes in British.

Considerable quantities of saltpetre are being sent by land from Hamburgh to Königsberg.

Inclosure 2 in No. 264.

Vice-Consul Brockmann to Lord Bloomfield.

Königsberg, February 3, 1855.

(Extract.)

OF the lead imported last year, according to annexed table, undoubtedly a great part was smuggled into Russia.

The importations of lead by sea from England during last season, and of other articles of war contraband, were not much larger than in common years, which may be seen also by the annexed table of the importations of lead for the last twenty years; yet have the supplies from other countries and by land accumulated the quantity so as to be evident to have partly been for Russia.

Within the last few days considerable quantities of lead and saltpetre, amounting to about 7,000 cwt., arrived by railway, upon which the Prussian Government take the home-consumption duty, in order to prevent its going through the country. Notwithstanding, however, there is no doubt that it is gone and goes into Russia.

The receivers of this saltpetre and the lead are, among others, the Jewish house of Messrs. Marcus Cohn and Son, and Messrs. L. Ochmann and Co., who quite openly send those goods to Russia. Mr. L. Ochmann, the chief partner, is Austrian Consul at this place.

A large quantity of lead and saltpetre was intended, by a house at Warsaw, for this place, from Hamburgh for Russia, by way of Stalupönen and Kowno, but their direction has been changed for Mystowitz.

Imported into Königsberg, and arrived by Railway and by River Navigation, in the year 1854.

		Lead.		Saltpetre.		Sulphur.	
		cwts.	lbs.	cwts.	lbs.	cwts.	lbs.
	From England:—						
April 6	Per the Dutch vessel "Adelea Maria," Captain A. M. Prins, from London	37	85				
„ 7	„ Dutch vessel "Jeanne Agathe," Captain L. P. Jager, from Newcastle	76	18				
„ 14	„ Dutch vessel "Johanna," Captain W. L. Krannenberg, from London	163	14				
	„ Dutch vessel "Jacoba Gisina," Captain R. R. Rinders, from Newcastle	228	72				
„ 13	„ Dutch vessel "Concordia," Captain H. C. De Groot, from Newcastle	12	57				
25	„ Rostock vessel "President," Captain H. Jaeger, from Newcastle	114	92				
May 23	„ Prussian vessel "Eolus," Captain F. W. Wegner, from Newcastle	205	17				
Aug. 25	„ Hanoverian vessel "Engelina," Captain Meyer, from Newcastle	266	4				
Sept. 29	„ Dutch vessel, "Marchina Catharina," Captain D. J. Mulder, from London	344	2				
	Total	1,618	61				
	From Hamburgh and Lubeck	249	0	..		161	77
	„ Spain	586	15				
	„ Stettin	587	65	177	0	20	11
	By Land, Railroad, and River Navigation ..	2,064	40				
	Total	5,105	79	177	0	181	88

		Nitrate of Soda.	
		cwts.	lbs.
April 25	Per the Dutch vessel "Zarntina," Captain D. B. Schun, from London	93	0
May 1	„ Dutch vessel "Cornelson," Captain R. A Potyer, from London	1,327	27
	Total . .	1,420	27

Annual Importations of Lead into Königsberg during the Twenty Years from 1834 to 1853, inclusive.

		cwts.
In 1834	Total importation ..	756
1835	„ „ ..	660
1836	„ „ ..	879
1837	„ „ ..	1,456
1838	„ „ ..	1,223
1839	„ „ ..	1,078
1840	„ „ ..	1,030
1841	„ „ ..	614
1842	„ „ ..	2,609
1843	„ „ ..	1,461
1844	„ „ ..	2,304
1845	„ „ ..	2,205
1846	„ „ ..	2,092
1847	„ „ ..	2,442
1848	„ „ ..	1,921
1849	„ „ ..	2,397
1850	„ „ ..	1,856
1851	„ „ ..	2,327
1852	„ „ ..	974
1853	„ „ ..	606

Inclosure 3 in No. 264.

Vice-Consul Eleasser to Lord Bloomfield.

Pillau, February 3, 1855.

(Extract.)

IN December last, 1,200 pigs of lead were imported by the British steamer "Baltic," R. J. Nell master, from Hull. The "Arnold," Parow master, has now on board, from Newcastle, 1,600 pigs of lead, and the "Pfeil," Drasch master, 150 pigs of lead.

The 1,260 pigs of lead have paid duty, and have not been entered transit for Russia, but has left Pillau for Königsberg, addressed to Messrs. Joseph Simon and Sons.

Inclosure 4 in No. 264.

Vice-Consul Campbell to Lord Bloomfield.

Stettin, February 14, 1855.

(Extract.)

TWO small shipments of lead were made from this port *in transitu* to Russia, to Memel, November 20th, 184 cwt., per "Julius," Quartenberg.

December 31st, 100 cwt., per "Rosalie," Lange. The remainder of the quantity imported was forwarded to Berlin and the interior of Germany.

The saltpetre last year imported was almost entirely used in the province for agricultural purposes.

Annexed is a statement of the contraband of war imported into Stettin during the past year.

P.S.—Of the sulphur imported into Stettin, 14,500 cwt. were consumed in the sulphuric-acid manufactory in this city.

Extract from Stettin Import List.

Lead imported into Stettin.

Date.	Ships' Names.	Masters' Names.	Where from.	Flag.	Quantity in 1854.	Quantity in 1853.
1854					cwts. lbs.	cwts. lbs.
April 16	Fidelitas	Wiedbrock	Malaga	Prussian	734 66	
May 12	Anna and Gustav	Wegener	Malaga	Prussian	176 41	
,, 17	Pauline	Kneren	Malaga	Prussian	540 0	
,, 28	Herman Louise	Platz	Malaga	Oldenburg	240 0	
July 10	Margaret	Smidth	Malaga	Danish	305 0	
Aug. 10	Albertus	Bloem	Malaga	Hanoverian	951 13	
Oct.	Rendsburger Co. No. 2	Lund	Malaga	Danish	227 5	
Nov. 10	Euphemia Fullarton	Hughes	Malaga	English	31 99	
				Total Quantities	3,532 24	2,059 0

Saltpetre imported into Stettin.

Date.	Ships' Names.	Masters' Names.	Where from.	Flag.	Quantity in 1854.	Quantity in 1853.
1854					cwts. lbs.	cwts. lbs.
Feb. 16	Louise	Hildebrand	London	Prussian	112 54	
Mar. 22	Julius Cæsar Augustus	Kunow	London	Mecklenburg	110 19	
April 2	Argo	Spiegel	London	Prussian	210 84	
,, 20	Annonjus	Frey	Newcastle	Holland	5 66	
May 10	Leo	Blanck	Bremen	Holland	403 40	
,, 12	Charon	Schulte	Liverpool	Hanover	71 70	
Oct. 1	Lisette	Lurss	London	Prussian	112 32	
			Total	Quantities	1,046 42	657 0

Sulphur imported into Stettin.

Date.	Ships' Names.	Masters' Names.	Where from.	Flag.	Quantity in 1854.	Quantity in 1853.
1854					cwts. lbs.	cwts. lbs.
May 22	Frauke	Orth	Catania	Prussian	1,072 47	
,, 22	Johanne	Riegon	Messina and Catania	Hamburgh	2,903 15	
June 27	Lazzaro	Treppain	Messina and Catania	Italian	6,567 83	
Aug. 25	Erick Baker	Holdt	Messina and Alicant	Swedish	3,903 60	
June 27	Frederico	Cattaro	Neapel	Italian	2,843 26	
Sept. 12	Emanuel	Reckman	Georgentia	Hanoverian	2,697 0	
			Total	Quantities	10,084 41	6,417 0

Cement imported into Stettin.

Date.	Ships' Names.	Masters' Names.	Where from.	Flag.	Quantity in 1854.	Quantity in 1853.
1854					lasts.	
April 13	Bertha	Rose	London	Prussian	350	
,, 20	Belde Friederich	Blanck	London	Prussian	270	
May 17	Catharina	Drok	Newcastle	Holland	200	
July 29	Amalie	Parow	Newcastle	Prussian	54	
Aug. 2	Louise Charlotte	Rohr	London	Prussian	560	
,, 26	Johanna Maria	Wolter	Newcastle	Prussian	50	
Sept. 7	Louise	Altenburg	London	Prussian	50	
,, 21	Gen. von Thun	Grunow	Newcastle	Prussian	50	
,, 21	Anna Maria	Fischer	London	Prussian	400	
Oct. 6	Bertha	Sass	Newcastle	Prussian	100	
,, 27	Saucy Jack	Tunn	Glasgow	English	60	
Dec. 6	Urania	Ebert	London	Prussian	311	
			Total	Quantity	2,405	

(Signed) WM. CAMPBELL.

British Vice-Consulate,
Stettin, February 6, 1855.

Inclosure 5 in No. 264.

Vice-Consul Hertslet to Lord Bloomfield.

Memel, February 5, 1855.

(Extract.)

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 31st ultimo.

Definite information as to lead having been forwarded to Russia under the eye of the Russian Consul at this place, can only be obtained by the Prussian authorities. I, as British Vice-Consul, have not the power to do so, although I know it to be the fact, not only from here, but also from Pillau and Königsberg, in larger quantities. Your Lordship will observed from the inclosed list of the trade of Memel for 1854, that this article is quite omitted.

No. 265.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 48. Confidential.)

Berlin, February 17, 1855.

My Lord,

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 44 of the 13th instant, directing me to call Baron Manteuffel's attention to certain words which appeared in the paper drawn up by the Military Commission at Frankfort upon the subject recently discussed in the Diet regarding the Federal contingent, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I have this day inquired of Baron Manteuffel what interpretation his Excellency put upon the words, "to ward off danger from whatever quarter it may threaten." He replied, that the words bore a perfectly intelligible meaning, which he thought required no explanation, and that the readiness for war (Kriegsbereitschaft) was to meet any danger to which Germany might be exposed.

Upon my observing that these preparations might then be considered as being made equally against France or Russia, Baron Manteuffel did not deny that they might be so directed, and he gave me to understand that their object was none other than the protection of Germany. He added, however, that the Treaty of April had been taken as the basis of the motion before the Diet, and that the sense of that Treaty had not been departed from, and that if I referred to it I should find this to be the case.

I have since looked into the Treaty, a translation of which was forwarded to your Lordship in my confidential despatch No. 259 of the 5th of May, of last year, and find in Article II the following words:

"In the same manner the High Contracting Parties hold themselves engaged to defend the rights and interests of Germany against all and every injury, and consider themselves bound accordingly for mutual repulse of every attack on any part whatsoever of their territories."

Notwithstanding the above assurance of Baron Manteuffel, I apprehend that there can be no doubt that M. de Bismark has been unceasing in his endeavours at Frankfort to thwart the wishes of the Austrian Government at the Diet, and to advance the interests of Russia in Germany.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 266.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 49. Confidential.)

Berlin, February 17, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 40 of the 9th instant, in which I informed your Lordship of the departure of M. Niebuhr for the Hague and Brussels, and of the rumour that he was charged with a mission to those Courts, I have heard to-day from Baron Manteuffel that M. Niebuhr's journey would not extend beyond the Hague, where he now was, and that at the expiration of his leave of absence, which had been fixed at a fortnight, he would return straight to Berlin.

Having pressed Baron Manteuffel to inform me of the real object of M. Niebuhr's journey, his Excellency said, that he had had a misunderstanding with the King, and that a temporary absence had been recommended to M. Niebuhr for the benefit of his health.

It would appear also that this gentleman had tendered his resignation, and that there are still serious thoughts of removing him from his present confidential post about the King.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 267.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 50.)

Berlin, February 17, 1855.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL communicated to me a few days since the substance of a despatch which he had received from M. Wagner, the Prussian Consul-General at Warsaw, reporting the expulsion of certain missionaries of the London Society for the Conversion of Jews from Poland, by an order of the Chief President of the Committee of Ecclesiastical Affairs.

I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship a précis of M. Wagner's despatch to Baron Manteuffel, and likewise a translation of the order issued by the Viceroy for carrying into effect the decree of expulsion, together with a short account of the Mission established by the London Society in Poland, and under the special permission of the late and present Emperors.

Your Lordship will perceive from Consul Wagner's report to the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that he entertains a hope, that through the intervention of His Prussian Majesty permission might be obtained for the continuation of divine service at Warsaw by a Minister of the Church of England, as a large congregation resident there have been deprived of the means of public worship, by the harsh expulsion of the missionaries.

It appears, therefore, that if any relaxation of the present rigorous measures, or if any future concession, can be looked for, it can only be obtained at the instigation and through the intervention of the King of Prussia, and I have reason to believe that His Majesty would be disposed to forward this object, if it were agreeable to Her Majesty's Government that he should endeavour to do so.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 267.

Précis of Despatch from Consul-General Wagner to Baron Manteuffel.

Warsaw, January 23, 1855.

WITH reference to the expulsion of the missionaries of the London Society for the Conversion of Jews, they have received permission to stay some time longer, but must leave Poland in a few weeks. I have procured for them all the necessary facilities at the Douanes. Since the death of the Rev. — Smith, one of these missionaries performed the English service, and now there will be none. The congregation consists of 60 people, some of whom are Russian subjects. There are, all in all, about 300 members of the Anglican Church in Poland, who used to come to Warsaw. The expenses, amounting to 300 roubles silver, for the place of worship, and 750 roubles stipend, were defrayed half by subscriptions and half by the British Government.

The prohibition of Divine service has created great distress, and the congregation hope it will soon be again permitted in consequence of my intervention and the influence of His Majesty of Prussia.

As the missionaries were expelled, not because of their being members of the Anglican Church, but because their attempts at conversion are not favourably viewed in Russia, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia will perhaps permit a priest of the Church of England, who is not a member of any Missionary Society, to be appointed chaplain. As some rich members of the congregation have gone away, it will be difficult to raise the 150 roubles for the place of worship and the 375 for the clergyman. The Evangelical congregation might perhaps lend their church for the performance of the Anglican service. As the stipend of 750 roubles silver is not sufficient, it might be advisable to appoint as chaplain a person who could give English lessons.

Although the English are since the war excluded from Russia, an exception might be made in favour of an English clergyman, as has lately been done in favour of an English engineer to be employed in the waterworks of Warsaw.

Inclosure 2 in No. 267.

Decree.

(Translation from the Polish.)

(Transacted in the Council Chamber of the Lutheran Consistory of the Kingdom of Poland, December 22, 1855.)

IN carrying into effect an order of the Chief President presiding over the Committee of Interior and Spiritual Affairs dated the 19th of December, the President of the Consistory communicated to the missionaries, cited to appear for that purpose, an order of His Highness the Viceroy, in virtue of the will of the Emperor, that the missionaries are to be expelled (removed) from the Kingdom of Poland.

In executing this decree of the Monarch, His Highness, &c., has ordered that the shortest possible term for the departure of the missionaries and their families beyond the frontier shall be fixed, and that a prolongation of that term might be granted to such of them as had acquired immoveable property.

In pursuance of the said order, contained in the fore-mentioned rescript, the President of the Consistory informed those gentlemen present (names), that from henceforth all missionary operations in the kingdom must cease, and that they were held personally responsible (for acting contrary to the order), as well as for conducting any kind of public worship, or distribution of Bibles, Old or New Testaments, or any kind of publications whatsoever, to Jews or Christians, either directly or by the means of others. That they must also cease from printing or importing the said publications, and that they were bound to hand over and deposit in the Government Censor's Office all such books as they might have in store, to be dealt with according to existing regulations. In doing which they were also distinctly and specially to mention, under personal responsibility, all

such persons to whom such publications had been entrusted for circulation, to mention what they consist of, and the number of them.

At the same time the Rev. Mr. Becker, the senior missionary, who had lived thirty-three years in Warsaw, upon inquiry declared that there was one missionary at Lublin, one at Petrikau, and one at Suwalki.

In proof that the missionaries will strictly conform to the expressed Imperial will communicated to them, they returned the letters-patent delivered to them by the Committee of Interior and Ecclesiastical Affairs, and promised that they will leave the kingdom at the receipt of their passports, the very latest on the 13th of January, 1855, in token whereof they had subscribed this document with their own hand after it had been read to them.

Since the Rev. Mr. Becker alone possessed immoveable property, he begged for a prolongation of the term of departure for himself, to which the President acceded in virtue of the fore-mentioned rescript, and allowed him to remain in the country till the 13th of February.

Mr. Becker mentioned that it would be impossible to dispose of the printing and bookbinding business, and for the other missionaries who had families to get ready for departure in so short a time, and therefore begged the term to be prolonged for them also, to which the President declared that he had no power to grant that request.

(Here follow the signatures of four missionaries. Signed with all the titles, &c.)

(Signed) KRUSENSTERN.

Inclosure 3 in No. 267.

Account of the Mission established in Poland for the Conversion of Jews.

THE London Society for promoting Christianity among the Jews had an established Mission in the Kingdom of Poland for thirty-three years, by special permission of the late and present Emperors. The missionaries are seven in number, with their families. Their principal station was Warsaw, where four of the seven resided, and where they maintained an institution for inquirers and converts, with a considerable printing and bookbinding establishment.

During the thirty-three years of this Mission, none of its members were ever charged with any political offence, nor have they ever at any time taken a part, directly or indirectly, in any political movement whatsoever, so that the order for expulsion came upon them unexpectedly and took them much by surprise, since several of them were Russian subjects, two by birth and one from long residence. One of them has three sons married there and in the Russian Government employ. A fourth son, likewise a Russian subject, was expelled with his father (the translator), because it was known that he had assisted his father in his labours.

They had the first indication of the pending storm on the 22nd of December, 1854, when they were cited to appear at the Consistory before its President (and Chief of the Secret Police and Spies) Krusenstern, where the annexed Protocol was read to them and finally signed by them, and of which as a personal favour, a copy (in Polish) was handed over to them at their special request.

Besides Warsaw, they had also stations at Lublin, Suwalki, and Petrikau, where the other three missionaries were employed.

The date originally fixed for their expulsion, January 13, 1855, was in so far not strictly adhered to, as, when it was found impossible to wind up the business in so short a time, another week was granted them on their petitioning, for which they had to thank General Rüdiger.

And not only had they to suffer severe losses on the sudden disposal of their goods, but they were not even allowed to take the proceeds of it out of the country in hard cash, but in the deteriorated paper of the country.

Though the Government had granted them another week, yet they neglected to publish that favour in this country, so that the three missionaries in the provinces relying on that favour, were actually driven out by gendarmes.

No. 268.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 19.)

(No. 51. Confidential.)

Berlin, February 17, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 37 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Minister of Commerce has made a proposition respecting the prohibition of the exportation of arms and munitions of war, and that it has been submitted to the Council. The Minister of Finance raised objections to it, but the King, as Baron Manteuffel informs me, has determined that an Ordinance on the subject shall be published without delay, and I hear from another source that it is likely to appear next week.

The prohibition will extend only to the manufactures and produce of foreign countries, whilst those of Prussia and the States of the Zollverein will continue to be exported, but I understand that they are not likely to prove of any considerable amount.

There is but one private manufactory of arms of importance in Prussia, at Suhl, and this is in some degree supported by the Government. Orders from South America are occasionally executed there, but the manufactory has not been at all employed, as I am assured, for Russian account.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 269.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 19.)

(No 52. Confidential.)

Berlin, February 17, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE had the honour to inform your Lordship by telegraph that full powers had been sent to General Wedel and M. d'Usedom, to enter upon negotiations for a Treaty with the French and English Governments, but I have not been able to discover from Baron Manteuffel the nature of the instructions, or whether they are likely to lead to anything. His Excellency has only said that he was hopeful as to the result, but he was unwilling to give me any clue as to what General Wedel and M. d'Usedom would propose; and from the answers which he made to several questions which I put to him, I apprehend that the King of Prussia continues to cling to the insertion in the Treaty of Articles relating to Poland, and to the passage of French troops through the States of the Zollverein, though in a different form from what has been already proposed.

From what Baron Manteuffel also said, it would appear that he is indifferent as to an early conclusion of the Treaty, and that under existing circumstances he would almost prefer that Prussia did not take part at the opening of the Vienna Conferences, but wait to see what turn they are likely to take, by which means the future policy of Prussia would continue unfettered. Such is, I regret to say, the impression which I have received from my two last conversations with the President of the Council, but your Lordship will shortly be able to judge whether the negotiations with which M. d'Usedom is charged are likely to have any result.

The Marquis de Moustier received a messenger to-day from Paris, with a copy of a draft of Treaty, which it appears was delivered into General Wedel's hands by the Emperor of the French. The French Minister has not yet been able to communicate with Baron Manteuffel on this proposal, and it appears that General Wedel has sent this draft direct to the King; at least His Majesty has received, as Baron Manteuffel informed me to-day, a letter from the General, the contents of which were not known to his Excellency at the time I saw him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 270.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 19.)

(No. 54.)

Berlin, February 17, 1855.

My Lord,

THE French Minister has addressed a note to the Prussian Government, enumerating the quantities of arms and munitions of war which, according to reports that he has received from credible sources, have passed through this country into Russia. M. de Moustier has had the goodness to let me take a copy of this paper, which I have the honour to forward herewith.

Your Lordship will perceive that the quantities of contraband of war which have thus found their way to our enemy are very considerable; and it is probable that they are even greater than is stated in the inclosed paper, for many articles may have got into Russia without any knowledge of their passage through Germany having been obtained.

The greater quantities have apparently come from Belgium; but lead, saltpetre, and sulphur, have been imported into Prussia from England to so large an amount, that if Her Majesty's Government desires to place a more effectual impediment to this traffic, I would suggest the propriety of prohibiting the shipment of contraband of war in English ports for the Baltic, except under certain conditions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 270.

M. de Moustier to Baron Manteuffel.

Berlin, ce 16 Février, 1855.

LE Soussigné, Ministre de France, a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, que des informations parvenues de divers côtés au Gouvernement de l'Empereur ne lui permettent pas de douter que l'envoi en transit à travers le Royaume de Prusse, d'armes et de munitions de guerre destinées à la Russie, loin d'avoir cessé par suite des mesures ordonnées à cet effet par le Gouvernement Prussien, a pris depuis quelque tems un développement nouveau. En transmettant à son Excellence le Président du Conseil les différentes pièces qui constatent d'une manière plus précise le renouvellement de cet abus, le Soussigné ne croit point inutile de lui rappeler sommairement que dès le 1 Avril, il était chargé de signaler à l'attention du Cabinet de Berlin diverses expéditions d'armes en destination pour la Russie, envoyées de Belgique en Prusse non pas en transit mais pour la consommation, et qui, après avoir acquitté les droits de douane, étaient introduites en Russie par la voie de commerce interlope, ainsi que cela a lieu pour les armes fabriquées en Prusse.

Le 15 du même mois 6,000 carabines Miniés étaient transportées par des bateaux Prussiens à la forteresse de Modlin; enfin, quelques semaines plus tard, 450 caisses de armes de guerre étaient introduites en Russie de côté de Thorn, après avoir pu librement transiter à travers la Prusse.

Les efforts du Gouvernement Prussien pour mettre un terme à des faits aussi regrettables n'ont malheureusement pas amené les résultats que le Soussigné et le Cabinet de Berlin lui-même étaient en droit d'en attendre. En effet dans les derniers jours de Juillet divers envois d'armes de guerre, parmi lesquelles se trouvaient notamment une grande quantité de mosquetons du modèle employé dans les régiments de Dragons Russes, de nombreux wagons remplis de saumons de plomb venant de la Province de Luxembourg, ainsi qu'une quantité considérable de fusils et de carabines, étaient expédiés par Cologne sur Bamberg, dans le Duché de Posen.

Le 5 Décembre, le Soussigné était informé que des envois de poudre et des armes de guerre avaient été expédiées sans obstacle de Belgique en Russie à travers le territoire Prussien, et que dans les journées du 24-25 Novembre,

42 canons étaient parvenus par la même voie à la même destination. Dans les premiers jours du mois suivant le Consul Russe à Memel expédiait de ce port en Russie des quantités considérables de plomb brut; un peu plus tard, 500 pistolets revolvers, ainsi que des machines destinées à la fabrication des armes modèle de 1842, ayant ensemble une valeur de 500,000 francs, partaient de Liége pour Berlin, et étaient dirigées de là sur la frontière par les soins d'agents Russes.

Le Soussigné croit devoir encore signaler à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères un envoi considérable de plomb expédié d'Hambourg dans le courant du mois de Décembre et également dirigé sur la Russie après avoir traversé Berlin, ainsi que diverses expéditions de même nature et ayant la même destination qui se sont faites à peu près à cette époque soit à Memel, soit à Königsberg. Il appelle en outre l'attention de M. le Président du Conseil sur ce fait, que d'après le relevé officiel des armes exportées de Belgique du 16 au 23 du mois de Janvier, 35 canons à destination de la Prusse ont été dans ce court intervalle expédiés de Liége par voie de chemin de fer. Le Soussigné croit devoir faire observer qu'il n'a relaté que les faits sur lesquels il a pu avoir des renseignements précis, mais que les sources d'informations dont il dispose étant nécessairement fort restreintes, d'autres faits du même genre et en plus grand nombre ont dû nécessairement se produire sans qu'il soient parvenus à sa connaissance.

Il espère que la note ci-dessus, si incomplète qu'elle soit, ne sera pas inutile au Gouvernement Prussien pour l'éclairer sur les abus qui se sont produits et lui faciliter la recherche d'une mode efficace pour atteindre le but qu'il s'était proposé.

No. 271.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 49.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 19, 1855.

I INCLOSE herewith a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, respecting the language held by Prussian Ministers at European Courts with regard to Great Britain and France; and I have to instruct your Lordship to hold to Baron Manteuffel similar language to that which Lord Cowley states the French Minister at Berlin has been directed to use upon this subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 272.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 50.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 19, 1855.

I INCLOSE herewith a copy of a despatch† from Her Majesty's Minister at the Hague, relative to the conduct of the Prussian Minister in advising, as "Doyen" of the Diplomatic Corps, the Ottoman Envoy to abstain from a certain formality usually observed by Ministers accredited to the Court of the Hague on entering upon their functions.

I have approved the language which Sir Ralph Abercromby held to Count Königsmark; and I have to instruct you to inform Baron Manteuffel, that in the conduct of the Prussian Representative at the Hague, Her Majesty's Government cannot but see a proof of the unfriendly feelings of his Government to the cause espoused by England and France; but it will be to them a matter of much regret if this feeling is henceforward to be exhibited in attempts to disturb the relations of Foreign Ministers with the Courts to which they are accredited.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 249 † No. 254

No. 273.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 198. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, February* 18, 1855.

I PROMISED, at the end of my despatch No. 192 of the 16th instant, to explain how it is that, while the French Government desires to be released from the Vienna Conferences, they yet have the appearance of wishing to pursue negotiations for peace with Russia.

These facts may be reconciled in the following way: The French Government has no expectation that the Conferences about to be resumed at Vienna can lead, at the present moment, to such a peace as will justify the allied Governments in recalling their troops from the East; and they would be glad if negotiations could be broken off in a preliminary stage without calling in question the good faith of the two Governments. But if this cannot be done, they are then anxious to delay the discussion of those points on which they know beforehand they should not have the support of the Austrian Government. What, therefore, they would desire is, that Prince Gortchakoff should refuse to ratify by his signature a simple acceptation of the interpretation given by the three Powers to the four points, because they conceive that under such circumstances France and England would be freed from their engagements towards Russia, and could quit the Conferences without engaging in any discussion which would show them to be at variance with Austria; while the latter could not, if the Conferences were broken off through a refusal of the Russian Plenipotentiary to give a solemn ratification to his former declarations, escape from the engagements which she had contracted with the Western Powers. On the other hand, if those Powers put forward demands which appeared exorbitant and untenable to Austria, Austria might say that she was not bound to countenance such demands, and that if they were persisted in, she should consider herself free to act as she judged best for her own interests.

To my observation that this moment must arrive sooner or later, and that in the meantime, by continuing useless negotiations, we furnished Austria with an excuse for her continued inactivity, M. Drouyn de Lhuys has constantly replied that he prefers that, to her having an excuse to quit the alliance altogether. If the evil day must come, it is as well to put it off as long as possible, and to avoid, until the last practical moment, making demands to which it is known beforehand Austria will not give her support. In the meantime events may take a more favourable turn in the Crimea; the period which Austria had always fixed as the moment for active operations, if she was to engage in them, namely, the spring, was drawing gradually nearer; the attitude of Germany will be better defined, and the military power of France will be improved. Let it not be forgotten, says M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that a rupture with Austria may lead to her placing herself at the head of that armed German neutrality at which Prussia is supposed to be aiming; and that the country which that armed neutrality will threaten will be France.

This short explanation will, I trust, enable Her Majesty's Government to comprehend the otherwise somewhat inexplicable position assumed at this moment by the French Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 274.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 172.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 19, 1855.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 189 of the 16th instant, I have to acquaint your Excellency that there would be no positive objection to an arrangement by which the re-admission of a Prussian Plenipotentiary to

the Conferences might momentarily precede the signature of a Treaty between Prussia and the Western Powers, but the terms of the agreement that Prussia is to enter into must be settled, and Prussia pledged to it, before she is permitted to re-enter the Conference.

Count Bernstorff told me, a few days ago, that he had just been informed by telegraph that, if the King was admitted to the Conference, he would enter into engagements with the three Powers; but, upon my asking him what the nature of the engagement would be, he was unable to say; and I told him that, without meaning any disrespect to the King, yet that, after all that had passed, and with reference to the inexplicable policy of His Majesty, and the different language held by his Agents at different places, it was impossible to rely upon the vague assurance that Count Bernstorff was then instructed to give.

I am &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 275.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 177.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 19, 1855.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that I have instructed Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin to hold to Baron Manteuffel similar language to that which you report, in your despatch No. 186 of the 16th instant, that the French Minister at Berlin has been directed to use with regard to the hostile tone of the language of Prussian Agents at foreign Courts, when speaking of Great Britain and France.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 276.

Consul-General Ward to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 6. General.)
My Lord, *Leipzig, February* 14, 1855.

YOUR Lordship will have been already apprized from Frankfort that the Federal Diet has adopted (on the 8th instant) the recommendation of the Committee mentioned in my last two despatches, and has resolved that the contingents shall be placed in such a state of increased preparation for war that they may be ready to march within fourteen days after further orders. This resolution makes it necessary for most of the German Governments to purchase horses and ammunition, and to incur other expenses for completing the organization of their armies; and the effect is really not very different from that which would have followed the resolution to make the contingents actually "mobile."

A considerable activity appears, in consequence, to prevail in the military preparations of the German States generally. Two of the Prussian army corps, the 4th and 5th, stationed respectively in Silesia and Saxony, are said to be already in a state of entire readiness to receive marching orders, and they form a force, including the first call of the Militia attached to them, of 120,000 men. There is no doubt that the contingents will everywhere be in the requisite degree of forwardness by the time when the severity of the winter shall be over.

It would seem as if Austria had abandoned, or postponed, the intention threatened in Count Buol's well-known despatch of the 14th of last month, to form a separate alliance with such of the German States as concurred in her view of military policy. This threat has been much complained of by the Prussian partisans, as if it were revolutionary and subversive of the Federal Constitution, although the course intimated was in perfect accordance with Article XI.I of the Vienna Final Act.

The Berlin "Pamphleteer," who supports the policy of the Government under the motto of "Nondum Meridies," has put forth a new work for the

purpose of insisting that the Federal Diet ought to demand from Austria an explanation of her conduct and intentions. He contends that the Treaty of the 20th of April, 1854, is no longer valid, in consequence of the recent engagements which Austria has entered into with the Western Powers; he praises the dilatory policy of the Confederation; and remarks that the utility of the latter body to the petty German States is proved by the example of Sardinia which, standing alone, was unable to resist the influence of England and France. Such are the notions of the partisans of the Manteuffel Administration.

Much speculation is afloat in regard to the rumoured desire of Prussia to make a Separate Treaty with England and France, instead of acceding to the Austrian Treaty of the 2nd of December; and the missions of General de Wedel and of M. Niebuhr, the King's Cabinet Secretary, to Paris, are believed to have had this end in view. The jealous rivalry with which Prussia watches every step of the Vienna Cabinet would, of course, make a Separate Treaty more palateable in Berlin than that Prussia should be dragged in the train of Austria into the Treaty of the 2nd of December. But the Liberal party here do not believe it possible that the Western Powers could gain anything by such a Separate Treaty. They remark that Prussia will naturally not concede more than Austria has done by the Treaty of the 2nd of December, and that if she concedes as much, she will be sure to evade her engagements by differences of interpretation, in the same way as she has evaded her obligations to Austria under the Treaty of the 20th of April. The common opinion seems to be, that the object of the Prussian Government is rather to delude the Western Powers with the name of an alliance, than to do anything to assist their cause in the contest with Russia. The bad faith of Prussia is, unfortunately, so notorious, that the greatest suspicion cannot but attach to any overtures of an alliance with England proceeding from her. By the state of isolation in which Prussia has placed herself, she does Russia all the good, and the allies all the harm that she can. She cannot ally herself with Russia, for she knows that such a course would lead to the extermination of the Prussian Monarchy by external force and internal revolution. It would therefore appear more desirable to allow Prussia to remain in her self-chosen isolation, than to run the risk of the entanglements of any Convention with her, which should not give the Western Powers more than the Austrian Treaty of the 2nd of December.

I observe the official journal, the "Preussische Correspondenz," declares the rumoured Separate Treaty with England and France to be entirely out of the question, although the possibility of such a Treaty has certainly been contemplated by the Berlin Cabinet, for it is alluded to in official despatches which were published last month. The inutility of any such Convention to the Western Powers will become the more evident when Austria renews her motion in the Diet for making the contingents actually mobile, which she will be sure to do at the right time. Austria, for her own interests, will be obliged to use every means of pressing Prussia forward; and if she cannot do so with effect, there is very little chance of England or France being able to accomplish the object by the contingent stipulations of a Separate Treaty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. WARD.

No. 277.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 51. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 20, 1855.

I INCLOSE, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Minister at the Hague, relative to the proceedings of the Prussian Minister at that Court, to induce the Dutch Government to act in opposition to the wishes of the allies.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 256.

No. 278.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 53.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 20, 1855.

I HAVE to acquaint you that I have learnt, from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, that there has been no foundation for the reports circulated to the effect that a French army was about to traverse Germany, with a view to support Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 279.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Malet.

(No. 11.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 20, 1855.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 22 of the 9th instant, respecting reports that a French army was about to traverse Germany, with a view to support Austria against Prussia, I have to acquaint you that I have learnt, from Her Majesty's Minister at Paris, that there has been no foundation for the reports circulated upon this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 280.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 21, 1·20 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, February* 21, 1855.

M. COLQUHOUN écrit de Bucharest le 20 :

Colonel Neale writes from Varna, the 18th : "No news from Sebastopol. An expected attack on Balaklava spoken of. The road from the place to the camp makes good progress ; 500 fascines ready here for the boggy parts.

"French electric telegraph will be completed to Shumla in fifteen days ; to Rustchuk in six weeks. Turks are entrenching themselves between the two lakes near Eupatoria; their health good, not two per cent. sick."

No. 281.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 192.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 21, 1855.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 192 of the 16th instant, stating the course which M. Drouyn de Lhuys considers should be pursued at Vienna, and which, if agreed to by Her Majesty's Government, would serve as a text for the rule of conduct of the English and French Plenipotentiaries.

In reply, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government having at the request of the French Government adopted the proposal of inserting into the full powers of the Plenipotentiaries the text of the memorandum accepted by Prince Gortchakoff on the 7th ultimo, have agreed to omit it at the suggestion of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, which was communicated to me some days ago by Count Walewski ; and for the reasons given by your Excellency, Her Majesty's Government much prefer to the original proposal of a "procès-verbal" the project of requiring Prince Gortchakoff to sign with the other members of the Conference

a Protocol at the first meeting of the Plenipotentiaries, declaring that the said memorandum is accepted by him as the basis of future negotiations.

Her Majesty's Government concur in the order of proceeding proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and that if Prince Gortchakoff declines or hesitates to sign the Protocol, that all discussion should be stopped by the English and French Plenipotentiaries, who should refer the matter to their respective Governments ; but it would appear premature to fix the precise terms of the answer to be given to such reference, until the two Governments are in possession of all the circumstances that had occurred.

In the event of Prince Gortchakoff signing the Protocol, Her Majesty's Government will not object to the four bases being taken in the order in which they were communicated to the Russian Plenipotentiary, with the understanding that the intentions of the Western Powers with regard to the third basis shall be put forward at the first Conference, if the Austrian Plenipotentiary has previously agreed to support them ; but not otherwise.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 282.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 12.)

My Lord, *Stuttgardt, February* 17, 1855.

ALTHOUGH the information will probably not be new to your Lordship, I have the honour to state that M. de Titoff, the Russian Minister *ad interim* at this Court, has been ordered to proceed to Vienna for the purpose of taking part in the Conferences regarding peace ; and that it is supposed he will leave this Residence to-day.

Your Lordship is aware that M. de Titoff was for many years the Representative of Russia at Constantinople, where I made his acquaintance, and where he had the reputation of being upright, sensible, and moderate.

I have reason to believe that M. de Titoff was recently not impressed with much hope of peace, owing to accounts from St. Petersburgh, respecting the Emperor's exaggerated opinion of the influence and strength of his position.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 283.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 5.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 22, 1855.

THE Queen having been pleased to confide to your Lordship, in conjunction with the Earl of Westmorland, the duty of conducting on Her Majesty's behalf the negotiations about to be opened at Vienna, I have received Her Majesty's commands to convey to your Lordship such general instructions for your guidance as may serve to place on record the views of Her Majesty's Government with reference to this important crisis in the affairs of Europe.

It is indeed impossible to overestimate the magnitude of the interests for which your Lordship will have to provide. Certain it is that on the negotiations now about to be commenced will depend not only whether the war, in which some of the Powers of Europe are engaged, shall be brought to a speedy close, but whether, if the negotiations should not have that happy result, the rupture of

them shall lead to a further combination of the Powers of Europe against the aggrandizing pretensions of Russia.

It is, therefore, a duty of no ordinary character which Her Majesty has entrusted to your Lordship's wisdom and discretion. In common with the allies Her Majesty most anxiously desires to see peace restored to Europe in such a manner as to afford a reasonable assurance that it will long remain uninterrupted; but this can only be expected if the conditions of that peace are such as to afford a sufficient guarantee for the future security of Turkey. If however such a peace cannot be arrived at, it is Her Majesty's most earnest desire to see the Great Powers of Europe arrayed in a combined effort against the spirit of encroachment and wrong by which the councils of Russia have been animated: not only because such a league would most probably lead to an early termination of the existing contest; but because an assurance would thereby be obtained that the termination of the war would place on a solid and secure basis the general interests of all Europe.

It is with special reference to this last consideration that Her Majesty's Government are most anxious, before the commencement of negotiations at Vienna, to make one further effort to withdraw Prussia from the isolated situation in which she has unfortunately placed herself by the narrow view which she has taken of her position and duties as a Great Power, and by suffering herself to be unduly influenced by considerations, on the one hand, of friendship and family connection with Russia; on the other, of rivalry with Austria for supremacy in Germany. Instead of looking steadfastly at the great European interests which were at stake, Prussia has confined her views for all practical purposes to the acquisition of a greater degree of influence in the councils of Germany, forgetting that in the general conflict of nations, Germany, if she forfeits her position and stands aloof, must forego her claim to have her interests and wishes considered when negotiations for bringing the war to a conclusion are set on foot.

Her Majesty's Government would regret such a result, no less than they lament the estrangement which has of late prevailed between the maritime Powers and Prussia, and between the latter Power and Austria, and they apprehend that the first step, the only one in fact from which any permanent good can be expected, must be to endeavour to allay the irritation which prevails at the present moment between the two Great German Powers, and so to bring them to act cordially together, and in concert with England and France, for the achievement of the great European object which now occupies the attention of the world.

Your Lordship on your passage through Paris, which it is desirable you should visit for the purpose of having personal communication with the Emperor and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, will find the French Government no less anxious than that of Her Majesty to smooth the way for the admission of Prussia to take part in the negotiations about to be commenced at Vienna. The two Governments have spared no efforts to induce the Cabinet of Berlin frankly to enter into concert with them, and they have seen with the utmost regret a state of feeling on German questions grow up between the Austrian and Prussian Governments, which not only distracts all the States of Germany in their relations to each other, but causes those States to take a distorted view of the far more important question now pending in the East, at the same time that it serves as a direct encouragement to Russia to persevere in the war.

In the hope that your Lordship may have the means of effecting a change in the present feelings of the Cabinet of Berlin, Her Majesty desires that you should pass through Berlin on your way from Paris to Vienna.

Your Lordship may expect to find the Cabinet of Berlin irritated against Austria, and suspicious of the maritime Powers; the Prussian Government complains that it has been neglected, and even betrayed by Austria, and that the more intimate alliance which by the Treaty of the 2nd of December Austria has contracted with the Western Powers, without previous communication with Prussia, is an offence of so serious a nature as to justify Prussia in thwarting the policy of the allied Governments, in opposing the endeavours of Austria to enlist in the common cause the sympathy and support of the Germanic Confederation, and in refusing to concert with Austria for the repression of Russian domination in the east of Europe.

On the other hand, Prussia feels keenly the insulated position in which she now stands. The Court of Berlin is conscious that it has been left behind from its own backwardness; but having to choose between cordial cooperation for the attainment of a great European object at the risk of displeasing Russia, and a more intimate alliance, whether under the garb of neutrality or under that of open support, with the Court of St. Petersburgh, at the risk not only of endangering the position of Prussia as a great Power, but of running counter to the feelings and inclinations of the Prussian people, it pursues its vacillating course, and renders more difficult every day its readmission into the general councils of Europe. From those councils it has never been the wish of Her Majesty's Government nor of the Government of France to exclude the Cabinet of Berlin. But Her Majesty's Government cannot admit that because Prussia was a Contracting Party to the Treaty of July 1841, which is now placed in abeyance by the war, and because up to a certain point Prussia gave a reluctant assent to the agreements entered into at Vienna, she is now entitled, notwithstanding her voluntary secession for some months past, to resume her place in the Conferences at Vienna without giving any proof of her assent to the principles on which those Conferences are to be conducted, and without affording any pledge as to the extent to which she will be prepared to give effect to the conclusion which may be arrived at in them. Bearing these considerations in mind, your Lordship will be authorized while at Berlin to make such overtures to the Prussian Government, always however with the understanding that those overtures meet with the concurrence of the Cabinet of the Tuileries, as may be calculated to induce Prussia to enter cordially into alliance with the other Powers.

But it must be remembered that those Powers have entered into engagements with each other, which will come into operation if negotiation fails, and therefore it would be requisite that Prussia should contract some corresponding engagement, in order that she may enter into conference on precisely the same footing with the other Powers. If Prussia considers herself aggrieved by her exclusion, though brought about by her own act, from the Great Council of Europe, and claims to take her place among the other Powers, she must begin by placing herself in the same position with the other Powers, or else it is obvious that she cannot enter into conference on the footing of equality, which she now claims as her right. She cannot at one and the same time complain of being placed in an exceptional position by being excluded from the Conference, and insist upon taking up another exceptional position on entering into the Conference.

But even if your Lordship should succeed in leading in a right direction the hitherto wavering policy of the Cabinet of Berlin, you may still find some difficulty in rendering the adherence of that Cabinet to the policy of the allies, acceptable to the Cabinet of Vienna. Unfortunately the late conflict for supremacy in Germany has sown the seeds of bitter animosity between the two Great German Powers, and Austria has much to forget and much to forgive of what has passed within the last few months, before she can be expected to resume cordial relations with the Court of Berlin.

There are many considerations, however, which your Lordship may urge upon the Cabinet of Vienna, bearing not only upon the interests of Austria as a German Power, but upon her still more vital interests as one of the Great Powers of Europe, to induce her to abstain from raising unnecessary difficulties in the way of the admission of Prussia into the Conference. As a German Power it is evidently for the interest of Austria that the present schism should as soon as possible be ended, for its obvious tendency is to weaken the Germanic Confederation; and such a result, while it would be an object of general regret, would for the German Powers be pregnant with evil. As a great Power, called upon to take her place in the general councils of Europe, and to share with the other great Powers in successes or reverses, Austria cannot but feel that she has individual interests at stake which may be materially injured or promoted by the conduct of Prussia. She has interests to guard at the present moment on her eastern frontier, for the supremacy of Russia in that quarter would be pregnant with danger to Austria; but that she may guard against such danger with effect, she must feel assured that the measures by which she seeks to secure herself in one direction are not likely to be defeated by the open or covert hostility of Prussia in another. With Prussia on her side, and backed as she would in that case

be by the general support of Germany, Austria might regard with comparative indifference the threatening demonstrations of Russia on her northern frontier. It may be hoped, therefore, that by placing these points, if necessary, before the Cabinet of Vienna, your Lordship may be able to overcome any reluctance which the Austrian Government may at present feel to facilitate the return of Prussia to a better course than that which that Power has lately pursued.

I have dwelt so much on these points, because Her Majesty's Government are sensible that the success of negotiations for peace at Vienna, or the turn which events may take in the contingency of their failure, will depend in a great measure upon the possibility of bringing all the Great Powers of Europe to unite in a combined action for the purpose of securing Europe against the aggrandizing and insidious policy pursued by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh; and in the hope that the result of your communication with the Prussian Government at Berlin, and your subsequent endeavours to make that result acceptable to the Court of Vienna, will be crowned with success, I now proceed to state to your Lordship the views of Her Majesty's Government as to the manner in which the negotiations with the Russian Envoy should be conducted, and the principles which should be steadily kept in view in striving to bring those negotiations to a conclusion commensurate with the vast efforts which have been made by England and France for the prosecution of the war.

The doubt which, after all that has passed in regard to these matters, may fairly be entertained as to the sincerity with which Russia, through her Plenipotentiary, has accepted the interpretation placed by the three Powers on the bases on which the negotiations are to be carried on, renders it indispensable that the first step on opening the Conferences should be to place on record, in the shape of a Protocol signed by all the Plenipotentiaries who take part in them, the memorandum read by Baron Bourqueney on behalf of the Plenipotentiaries of England, France, and Austria, at the meeting of the 28th of December, at which Prince Gortchakoff was present, of which he obtained a copy, and which contained the interpretation placed by the three Powers on the bases for negotiation. This interpretation Prince Gortchakoff, in the meeting of the 7th of January, declared that he accepted. The memorandum, being thus placed on record, must be followed by the record of Prince Gortchakoff's acceptance. And here I would point out to your Lordship, as a *sine qua non* condition, that the acceptance of Prince Gortchakoff must be given wholly without reserve, and unaccompanied by any explanation of the sense he may attach to it. The Prince read, at the meeting of the 7th of January, but afterwards withdrew, a document purporting to be the substance of the instructions which he had received from his Court. Your Lordship will not allow that explanatory document to be inserted in the Protocol. The acceptance of Prince Gortchakoff, on the 7th of January, was ultimately given, unclogged by any statement or explanation whatever, and so it must be recorded on the Protocol. If the Prince declines doing this it will be useless to proceed further. With such a convincing proof of the continued insincerity of Russia in her professions of readiness to afford to Europe that security for her future abstinence from schemes of aggrandizement which it is the object of the war to obtain, it would be idle to protract a negotiation which could lead to no satisfactory conclusion.

As regards the subjects to come under the consideration of the Conference, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that they must be taken in the order in which they have hitherto stood, notwithstanding that the third basis is the one, the satisfactory development of which is likely to meet the greatest obstructions; but it will be in vain to stipulate that the Danubian Provinces shall be withdrawn from the exclusive Protectorate of Russia, or that the navigation of the Danube shall be set free from the obstructions which impede it, unless effectual precautions are taken to render the Turkish Empire an integral part of the European system, and sufficient restraint be imposed upon the military and naval power heretofore exercised by Russia in the Black Sea, and the overbearing influence which, by reason of that power, she has acquired over the councils of the Porte.

But, although much may be urged in favour of making the third basis the first for consideration, such a course would be open to objections of a serious nature, and Her Majesty's Government have reason to believe that Austria and France would both demur, although on different grounds, to force into discussion at the outset the important stipulations involved in the development of the third

basis. Nevertheless it will be for your Lordship to judge whether, before entering into negotiation with the Russian Plenipotentiary, or before the third basis comes into discussion in the Conference, it would be expedient for the three Powers to come among themselves to some general understanding, subject, indeed, to be modified by future circumstances as to the form which that basis should ultimately assume. The end in view is the formal recognition of the Turkish Empire in its character as an independent and self-existent State, as a member of the great European family, and as an essential element of the balance of power in Europe. One of the means by which that end is to be accomplished is the abrogation of Russian supremacy in the Black Sea. How this is to be effected with the least inconvenience to the Powers of Europe, is the problem to be solved.

It might be brought about, by a common agreement that the maritime Powers should maintain in the Black Sea a force adequate to counterbalance the naval forces which Russia has heretofore maintained, and, if uncontrolled, may again hereafter maintain, in that sea. But this would be nothing more than an armed truce, liable to be interrupted at every moment by chance collisions, and entailing on the maritime Powers a perpetual expenditure to keep up, at a distance from their arsenals, an efficient force in the Black Sea, while Russia, having her arsenals at hand, and her harbours of refuge always open, would be relieved in a great measure from the costs to which the other Powers would be exposed. It may well be doubted whether, after a few years, Great Britain would continue such an expenditure.

This object might be effected by a twofold process; by reducing the maritime force of Russia in the Black Sea within reasonable compass, and by opening that sea, with the consent of Turkey, to the maritime forces of other nations. Her Majesty's Government would much regret that the Porte should be so impressed with a sense of its own comparative weakness as to be prepared to abdicate its power to defend the Turkish Empire against even a limited display of hostile force. It would be better for the nations of Europe that the Porte should be encouraged to rely on its own resources, though left at liberty to call in the aid of friendly Powers to counteract the menaces of its powerful neighbour; but the reduction of the Russian naval force in the Black Sea within such bounds as might, in cooperation with an equal Turkish force, suffice to provide adequate protection for peaceful commerce, would have the further indirect advantage of preventing, at any future period, the march of Russian armies on Constantinople, or at all events of rendering any such operation one of extreme hazard; for, as far as present experience extends, the support of a powerful fleet, capable of cooperating with the advance of armies and affording the means of providing them with requisite supplies, is essential to the success of any movement on the Turkish capital.

The imposition therefore, of adequate restrictions on the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea, would give to Turkey the material protection of which she stands in need, while her recognition as an essential element in the balance of power in Europe, would afford her a moral guarantee under the safeguard of which she might fearlessly carry out those plans of internal reform and social reorganization which have been so earnestly pressed upon the Porte for many years. But in proportion to the importance of the sacrifice to be required of Russia, would in all probability be the reluctance of the Russian Plenipotentiary to enter into discussion of this vital question, on the satisfactory solution of which the continuance or premature interruption of the negotiations would depend; and Austria and France might on their part urge, with no small appearance of reason, that it would better to take up the points in the order in which they have hitherto stood, and take the chance of the events which might happen in the discussion of the previous points, or in the prosecution of the war, for defining the precise manner in which the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea should be put an end to.

Taking then the bases in the order in which they stand, the first point to be placed on record is, the entire abrogation of all former engagements between Russia and the Porte, in regard to the Provinces of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia. Not that those Provinces are again to be brought into immediate subjection to the Porte, but that Russia shall no longer have to plead special Treaty engagements with herself as justifying her single interference with the Sovereign Power, in regard to the relations between that Power and the established

authorities in the Provinces; and that those Provinces should not look to Russia as the arbitress of their destinies, and pay that court and deference to her which should be reserved for the Sultan alone. There would be no occasion to interfere, at least in principle, with the system of local self-government established in those Provinces, or to place the rulers of the Provinces in more direct dependence on the Sovereign Power than they now are.

It may be a question for discussion whether the tribute now paid by the Provinces to the Treasury of the Porte should be augmented, and whether, as in Servia, the Sultan should have garrisons in Wallachia and Moldavia. But the nomination of the Hospodars and the attributes of sovereignty in the Principalities, as far as other Powers are concerned, would rest with the Sultan, and the agents appointed by foreign Powers to watch over the commercial interest of their subjects, would still require the formal recognition of the Sultan for the legal exercise of their several functions. Remaining thus under the suzeraineté of the Sultan, the Provinces would be bound by the Treaty obligations of the Porte with foreign Powers no less than the other portions of the Ottoman dominions, and appeals for infraction of Treaty rights would be addressed to the Porte, as they now are, by the Representative of the aggrieved Power at the Court of the Sultan, who must therefore have authority to give redress.

Again, as regards the second basis, the abrogation of the rights of Russia to interfere with the freedom of the navigation of the Danube, might be most effectually secured by the retrocession to Turkey in the first instance of the territory at the mouths of the river which she renounced at the Treaty of Adrianople, subject to the condition that the retroceded territory should be placed by the Porte under the safeguard of the Great Powers of Europe, acting in concert with the Porte for the preservation of all the navigable channels of the river from the exclusive domination of any one Power, and for the removal of the obstructions which now impede and have long threatened to render the channel of the Danube altogether unserviceable for the purposes of commerce. Questions may, from the peculiar nature of the channels of the Danube, indeed arise, which cannot satisfactorily be solved without requiring from Russia some further and direct renunciation of territorial rights on the Bessarabian bank of the river. The territory might remain with Russia, or be transferred to Turkey, but in either case a mixed Commission in which England and France should be represented, should be appointed to regulate all matters belonging to the navigation. But if Russia enters upon the discussion with a sincere desire to meet the reasonable wishes of the Powers most interested in the navigation of the Danube, there may be ground to expect that those questions will receive a favourable solution by the establishment of a syndicate authority, invested with the necessary powers for the destruction of the obstacles now existing at the mouths of the river, or which might hereafter grow up there.

The basis which remains to be considered is one peculiarly calculated to call into action the sympathies of Christian nations, and therefore likely to be attended with more than ordinary difficulties in the discussion and settlement of it. For the object in view is to reconcile and to bring in harmony for secular purposes the conflicting passions and prejudices of Islamism and Christianity; and while reducing the oppressor to look upon those whom he formerly treated with contumely and violence, as subjects of a common Sovereign, and entitled to common privileges and equal rights, to prevent those who have been rescued from oppression from assuming an attitude inconsistent with their allegiance to their Sovereign, and incompatible with the maintenance of concord throughout the Empire.

Then again, it is almost needless to remark, much abnegation and self-control are required on the part of the Christian Powers in their dealings with the Porte in behalf of the Christian subjects of the Sultan. Unhappily there is no single and uniform standard of Christianity universally recognised among the nations of Christendom; and Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Greeks have long contended for mastery in the religions of the world; and the representations of each Christian dogma have sought in turn to acquire influence over the Christians in Turkey by supporting, to the exclusion and even prejudice of the rest, the adherents to the ritual to which they themselves belong.

It was said to-day to the peace of Turkey if the Powers of Europe would mutually renounce all sectarian prejudices as applied to the subjects of the Sultan, and look upon all Christians, whatever ritual they may belong to, as

entitled to an equal share in the religious privileges and immunities which the Sultan may, at the instance of the Great Powers of Europe, consent to accord to them. By acting thus in strict concert, they would disarm, in a great measure, the suspicions of the Porte; would deprive the Turkish Government of the means—ordinarily the resource of an enfeebled State—of playing them off one against the other; and would compel the Porte, even if otherwise disinclined, to listen with deference to the united representations of the Christian world.

It would seem desirable that the Sultan should, by his own act, abolish all legal and other distinctions between his Mahometan and Christian subjects, and formally communicate to the Powers of Europe the firmans by which this shall have been done.

I have thus briefly touched upon the several important points which, if the Conferences proceed, will successively be brought before the assembled Plenipotentiaries.

The intimate acquaintance which your Lordship possesses with the various points to which I have adverted, will suggest to you the fittest arguments in support of the policy of Her Majesty's Government, which is to restore peace to Europe on a solid foundation. The blood and treasure which have been so freely expended in support of that policy would be altogether thrown away, if the only result of our efforts should be a hollow truce to be broken whenever a suitable opportunity should arise for the attainment of the long-cherished objects of Russian ambition—the subjugation of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, and the enthronement of a Russian Prince in the capital of Turkey.

Her Majesty confides unreservedly to your Lordship the task of watching over the interests of her Empire, and of Europe at large, in the negotiations about to be opened at Vienna, being fully assured that so important a trust could be confided to no abler hands; and that, be the result what it may, the honour of Her Majesty's Crown and the welfare of her people will be safe while entrusted to your Lordship's care.

Your Lordship will communicate this despatch to Lord Westmorland for his instruction and guidance.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 284.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, February* 23, 1855

M. COLQUHOUN écrit de Bucharest, le 23 Février, 9·12 p.m.:—

Colonel Neale writes 22nd, 4 p.m.: "'Queen of the South' transport from Eupatoria, brings news, that Saturday, 18th, at 6 a.m., Russians about 50,000 strong, under General Liprandi, attacked Eupatoria. After combat of four hours, they were vigorously repulsed by the Turks with reported considerable loss.

"Turks lost 15 killed, 35 wounded. Suleyman Pasha, the Egyptian, killed. French manned one battery, and lost 4 men. It was expected the attack would be renewed. A French steamer which left Kamiesch on the 20th, brought no news up to that date."

No. 285.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 23.)

(No. 13.)

My Lord, *Stuttgardt, February* 18, 1855.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 12 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that M. de Titoff's departure for Vienna has been put off for three or four days, and that it is understood he will proceed by Berlin.

It may be proper to mention that he lately passed some days at Munich, though not for any evident political object.

Having met M. de Titoff last night at the Queen's ball, he entered very freely into conversation with me regarding his mission to Vienna, saying, in substance, that he had but little hope of any useful issue to the Conferences, since the question appeared to him at present to be in military and not in diplomatic hands; that he did not consider the proposed basis of peace calculated to bring about a state of things materially different from the former arrangement; that perhaps a few decisive inquiries between the members of the Conference would soon test the possibility of their coming to an understanding; and that he was glad of the appointment of Lord John Russell, who, he trusted, would do his best to instil peaceful sentiments into Baron de Bourqueney, whom he had known at Constantinople.

I observed to M. de Titoff that it was useless to deny the existence of a great obstacle to immediate peace in the siege of Sebastopol; but that some simplifying event might possibly take place before long, and that, at all events, the Conferences would serve the purpose of throwing light on many points of importance; in which last observation he concurred.

M. de Titoff subsequently touched upon the origin of the war; and he tried to prove that greater moral courage on the part of Lord Aberdeen might have rendered triumphant his evident bias in favour of peace. I replied, that Lord Aberdeen had been the last to cleave to the hope of peace, but that his Lordship had never shown any symptom of believing that war could be avoided were Russia not to recede.

The general tone of M. de Titoff seemed to me that of a person moderately disposed, and anxiously desiring, though far from expecting, an early peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 286.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 14. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Stuttgardt, February 18, 1855.*

IN conversing with me last night at the palace on the Oriental question, the King expressed doubts of the attainment of peace this year, adding, that another campaign might enable both sides to see more clearly.

As to the future, His Majesty said that the object being to diminish Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, he could "see no other solution" than guarding Constantinople by a foreign garrison, since that city was the principal seat of Euxine influence.

His Majesty further stated, as I understood him, that he had no wish to see Russia at Constantinople.

The King highly praised the bravery of our troops, and expressed regret at the reported recall of Lord Raglan.

His Majesty also agreed in my opinion, that another campaign would witness the correction of those defects of organization and administration from which the army had suffered so much.

With regard to the mission of Lord John Russell, the King observed that his Lordship might possibly find his position more or less injured by former expressions in Parliament, since people at Vienna had very good memories. Without knowing, or pretending to know, what expressions His Majesty alluded to, I replied that people might forgive although they did not forget.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 287.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 61.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 24, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government have learned with deep dissatisfaction from your Lordship's despatch No. 50 of the 17th instant, the unjust and arbitrary course pursued by the Russian Government towards English missionaries, whose residence in Poland was specially sanctioned by the late and present Emperors of Russia. Some of those missionaries have resided there for upwards of thirty years in pursuit of their pious labours without accusation of any kind being brought against them, and all of them have now been treated as criminals and with extreme cruelty.

The dissatisfaction of Her Majesty's Government is moreover increased by the fact that on the same day that your Lordship's despatch arrived, a despatch, of which a copy is herewith inclosed, was received from Her Majesty's Minister at Copenhagen reporting, on the authority of Baron Plessen, the Danish Minister at St. Petersburgh, that "the Russian Government does not consider the situation of British subjects residing in Russia as being changed in consequence of the war, and that M. de Seniavine regards the regulation according to which British subjects leaving the country are not permitted to return during the war, as the only exceptional measure which has been adopted with respect to them." The measure adopted towards the missionaries shows how little reliance can be placed on the assurance of the Russian Minister; but the expulsion of these worthy men has deprived the British residents in Warsaw of the celebration of divine service, and Her Majesty's Government being most anxious that they should still enjoy this all-important comfort, will be grateful to the King of Prussia for any measures which His Majesty may take to procure the restoration of the privilege.

It is hardly necessary to add that Her Majesty's Government ask no more than they have granted. At the commencement of the war they engaged that the persons and properties of Russian subjects should be safe in this country, and accordingly no Russian has been sent out of the country, or has been in any way molested.

Her Majesty's Government readily assented to the request of the Russian Government that the Chaplain of the Russian Mission should continue to reside in London, and perform Divine service as usual at the chapel of the Mission. That reverend gentleman has continued freely to exercise his functions, and even when detected in a correspondence with some Russian prisoners he was merely warned that if he persisted in it he could not be allowed to communicate with them. Promises of a similar kind were made by the Russian Government, but the treatment of the missionaries in Poland shows how those promises have been observed.

Your Lordship will read this despatch to Baron Manteuffel, and express to his Excellency the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the friendly intervention of the Prussian Consul-General at Warsaw in behalf of the unfortunate missionaries.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 288.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 214.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 23, 1855.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read to me yesterday a despatch which he had addressed to M. de Bourqueney, furnishing him with arguments to combat my indisposition which Count Buol might evince to commence the ensuing Conferences by the signature of a Protocol containing the formal recognition of the interpretation given by the three Powers to the four points, and verbally accepted by Prince Gortchakoff.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys' main, and in my opinion incontrovertible, argument is, that if any difference of opinion should arise in the course of the negotiations respecting what has, and what has not, been accepted by Russia, there exists no document to which reference can be made for deciding the point in dispute.

I doubt, however, and I ventured to state this doubt to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, whether a necessity exists for entering into any preliminary discussion with Austria upon this subject. If Count Buol inquires in what manner we intend to proceed, it may be quite right and proper to say that we shall require a formal acknowledgment from Prince Gortchakoff of his acceptance of our interpretation of the four points; but if Count Buol makes no inquiries, I do not see why we are to suppose that he will raise objections to a very natural course of proceeding, and, by mooting the question, allow him to infer that we expect him to oppose it. The natural course would appear to be, that the new Plenipotentiaries should, at the first meeting, require the signature of an authentic document, stating what had been agreed to previous to their taking part in the Conferences.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that the objections which I had urged against a preliminary understanding with Austria, respecting the manner of opening the Conference, had also struck him, and that the instructions which he had addressed to M. de Bourqueney were only intended to be made use of in case Count Buol should raise objections when called upon to sign a Protocol in the sense indicated above. I must, however, add, that this intention is not made apparent in the despatch which his Excellency read to me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 289.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 217.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 23, 1855.*

I HAVE read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys your Lordship's despatch to me No. 192 of the 21st instant, stating how Her Majesty's Government understand the propositions of the French Government as to the course to be pursued at Vienna are to be carried out.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that he was perfectly satisfied, and that your Lordship had rightly understood the proposal of the Imperial Government.

I have, &c.

Signed) COWLEY.

No. 290.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 104.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 12, 1855.*

INCLOSED herewith, for your Lordship's information, is a translated copy of the full powers prepared for transmission to the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna.

They are to be forwarded to their destination to-day; and I am assured by Aali Pasha that instructions will follow, directing Arif Effendi to put himself on the same footing as the Representatives of the allied Powers with respect to the acceptance of the four Articles as interpreted by them, and the reserve of such ulterior securities as the progress of the war may warrant and the important interests at stake may require.

I have, &c;

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 290.

Copy of the Imperial Rescript granting Full Powers to Arif Effendi.

(Copy of the hatti-houmayoun. We have granted full powers in accordance herewith.)

(Translation.)

AS it is requisite that a Plenipotentiary on the part of my Sublime Porte also should be present at the Conference established at Vienna, with the object of concluding a good pacification of the present war between my Sublime Porte and my illustrious allies, and Russia, Arif Effendi, one of the high dignitaries of my Empire, and now Ambassador Extraordinary at the Court of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria, &c., has been named and appointed to this important office.

These Imperial full powers have been therefore granted on our part to show that he is fully empowered by us to be present at the said Conferences; to enter upon the discussion of matters conformably with the instructions with which he is furnished by my Sublime Porte; and to act in concert with the Plenipotentiaries of the allied Powers.

Beginning of February 1855.

No. 291.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 26.)

(No 109.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 12, 1855.

CONSIDERING the interest which necessarily attaches to the disturbed state of Koordistan, I offer no excuse for troubling your Lordship with the accompanying copies of two despatches addressed to me by Her Majesty's Consul at Diarbekir and Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad, respectively, with reference to the progress of Yezdashcer Bey's rebellion in that province.

I continue to urge the importance of decided measures for the suppression of a revolt which may be productive of serious calamities, and the Porte has every appearance of being anxious to comply with my earnest recommendations; but the difficulty of directing a sufficient force of Regulars with due effect on so distant a scene of action, and at so inclement a season, is not easily surmounted

in the present condition of this Empire, and I fear that measures adequate to the occasion have still to undergo some further delay before they can be carried into effective execution.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 291.

Consul-General Rawlinson to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Bagdad, January* 10, 1855.

HIS Excellency Reshid Pasha has within these few days returned to Bagdad, and is now actively employed in preparing a respectable force of Regular Infantry and Artillery for service to the northward, if the course of events should render its employment necessary.

As dissensions, however, are said to have already broken out between the rival Koordish Chiefs, and Yezdasheer Bey is believed to have met with a reverse in Khirzan, his Excellency seems to anticipate that the insurrection in Bohtan will die a natural death, without requiring any further interference on the part of the troops or officers of the Porte.

In the meantime, although the Shumnar and Anezeh have retired to the Desert, the general state of the Bagdad Pashalic is not such as to admit, without risk, of the employment at a distance of any considerable portion of the military force of the province.

The navigation of the Lower Tigris is still at the mercy of the Albee Mahomed Arabs, and the communication between Bagdad and Bassorah thus continues to be suspended, to the very serious injury of trade; while the Tai and the Obeid having also resumed their depredations on the Upper Tigris, the Moossul merchants are afraid to permit their rafts to descend the river to Bagdad. That the commerce of the country, indeed, has not been entirely paralyzed by the stoppage of the communications both to the north and south, is merely owing to the enormous influx of Persian pilgrims, and their consumption both of goods and of supplies. It is calculated that above 40,000 of these strangers have poured into Bagdad during the last three months, and the numbers, of late, have been rather increasing than diminishing, notwithstanding that the country about Kerbelah and Nejif is still infested with Arab marauders, who are continually attacking the caravans, and notwithstanding that the quarantine subjects all arrivals from Persia to a detention of five days upon the frontier, where no accommodation is provided for them, and where, accordingly, at this inclement season they are exposed to much suffering.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. C. RAWLINSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 291.

Vice-Consul Rassam to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Moossul, January* 15, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that since the date of my last despatch, Namet Aga, the chief of Zibar, was summoned to Moossul by his Excellency Helmy Pasha, to consult with him upon the best mode of defending the mountain districts from the invasion of the Koords under Mansoor Bey, who were preparing to make a sudden descent upon this Pashalic also.

Namet Aga arrived here on the 3rd instant, and immediately handed over to the Pasha two letters which he had received from Yezdasheer Bey and Mansoor Bey, copies of which, with their translations, I have the honour to inclose.

Helmy Pasha at first urged upon Namet Aga to return and collect upon the mountains about 4,000 Koordish troops, and by the time he had done so, he, the Pasha, would have also raised a body of Irregulars, and early in the spring

the whole troop would march upon Zakho, to wrest that town from the rebels. Namet Aga, however, considered it advisable to wait until they could have the assistance of some Regular troops to cooperate with them, and until such aid could arrive, they ought to do all in their power to prevent the rebel Koords from advancing, by guarding the several places that were of importance, such as Omadiah, Akra, and Danodiah.

Namet Agha has returned to Akra to organize troops, and Helmy Pasha has sent 80 musketeers to Omadiah. It is also reported that Tahar Bey with about 200 Nizam and Irregulars, are on their way up from Bagdad, when I hope operations will immediately commence against the rebels.

The report which I mentioned to your Excellency in my despatch No. 22 of the 18th ultimo, that Sherif Bey and Ibrahim Effendi were liberated, and put into office at Sert, by Yezdasheer Bey, is confirmed in a letter received yesterday from his Excellency Mohammed Reshid Pasha of Van by Helmy Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. A. RASSAM.

Inclosure 3 in No. 291.

Yezdasheer Bey to Namet Aga Zibar Aghassi.

(Translation.)

AFTER salutations. You are aware that I have arrived at Yezerah, and of what I have done. I forced Osman Pasha to fly, and drove Baniste Pasha from Sert; I have taken possession of the country of Sert, and from the province of Diarbekir to Zakho, all these provinces are at present under my control.

You should remember the old friendship that existed between us; I shall never forget it, therefore I consider that it will be for your benefit and interest to become my vassal. It is my earnest desire to increase your political power, and to make you Governor of Akra, Zibar, and Omadiah. Your talent, zeal, and energy are wanted in these days, to protect your religion and country, which I am doing, and you should reward me with your services.

Multiplicity of words are unnecessary, as, according to the proverb, a sign is sufficient for a wise man, and, thank God! you are both discreet and judicious.

(Signed) YEZDASHEER.

Inclosure 4 in No. 291.

Mansoor Bey to Namet Aga Zibar Aghassi.

(Translation.)

AFTER cordial salutations. I may inform you that I have received a letter for you from the Ameer Yezdasheer Bey, who did not hear of the fight which took place between us.

From the contents of this letter you will perceive that he wishes to continue the old friendship that existed between us, and we consider that you are our vassal, and I trust that no impediment will be thrown in the way of our friendly relations. We demand that you will be our servant, to defend our cause in your country; but you must bear in mind that our service requires sincerity.

As to your men, they are not kept by us as prisoners, but as citizens of our country Bulotan, and we make no difference between them and ourselves.

(Signed) MANSOOR.

No. 292.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 110.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 12, 1855.*

WITH reference to my previous despatches on the subject of General Williams and the army to which he has been sent as Her Majesty's Commissioner, I beg to recommend to your Lordship's attentive consideration, the copies inclosed herewith, of two instructions addressed by me to M. Pisani in the course of last autumn.

I avail myself of this opportunity to forward the accompanying copy of my last despatch to General Williams.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 292.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Dear Sir, *Therapia, October 31, 1854.*

I SEND you herewith a work which has given me much trouble and taken up a large portion of time wanted for other affairs. It is a précis of Colonel Williams' despatches from Kars, after inspecting the different military establishments and troops of various descriptions, and after communicating with Mustapha Zarif Pasha and others in command and employment. The correspondence may be considered a complement to what Colonel Williams reported from Erzeroom, and which I desired you to recommend to the Seraskier's attention, not, as I have since learnt from you, without a certain degree of beneficial result.

I have endeavoured to present the later reports in such manner as to make it easy for you to explain their substance to the Turkish Ministers, particularly to the Seraskier.

The various departments of inquiry are distributed over several separate sheets, each exhibiting marginal heads, and the names and quantities of the several articles of supply which are most needed for the maintenance and efficiency of the troops.

These are to be found in the left-hand columns. The explanations—in summary—are consigned to the right-hand columns.

There are, moreover, two lists of names, explained by the titles, and referred to in sheet No. 7, together with a medical report worthy of serious and practical attention from Dr. Sandwith.

The object of the whole communication is threefold; 1st, to state the immediate wants of the army; 2nd, to give an idea of its true condition; 3rd, to bring the shameful conduct of the principal officers, and the merits of a few, to the knowledge of the Seraskier and his colleagues.

I venture to hope that the result will be a thorough amendment, both materially and personally.

In bringing the whole case before the Grand Vizier, Reshid Pasha, and the Seraskier, preparatory to a more formal communication, if necessary, to the Council and Sultan, you will remind their Highnesses and Excellencies, that Her Majesty the Queen has sent out an officer of weight and experience to the army of Kars, for the express purpose of inquiring into the causes of the late deplorable disasters and pointing out the means of preventing their recurrence.

That officer has now done his duty, and it is for them to do theirs.

I cannot conceal from them that Colonel Williams has little reason to be satisfied with the attention paid to his suggestions by the Mushir Zarif Mustapha Pasha. In one of his latest despatches he states that he had twice endeavoured with all seriousness and the necessary explanations, to persuade the Pasha to adopt certain measures of the most obvious prudence; that he could at first make no impression on his Excellency, who treated him with disrespect; and that he only succeeded later in obtaining some assurances of compliance, by

intimating his intention of reporting to Constantinople, and his determination not to remain an idle witness of the innumerable proofs of fraud, negligence, and incapacity, which passed under his eyes, and threatened the Sultan's interests in that quarter, immediately connected as they are with those of His Majesty's allies, with further loss and ultimate ruin.

The following were the points recommended by Colonel Williams to the Mushir of the Kars army on the occasion alluded to:

1. To send the weak and sickly, both men and horses, to Erzeroom, before the winter set in, and while they could move without precipitancy.

2. To make arrangements for drilling the men, and practising them in blank firing, as well as loading, &c., this essential matter having been grossly neglected, and large numbers of the Redif being wholly uninstructed in such duties.

3. To get in provisions of fuel before the snow falls.

4. To have the houses intended for the Sultan's troops cleared out and cleaned for inspection.

5. To have a sufficient quantity of sheep collected from a distance, and kept within reach, for the use of the troops.

6. To make the bread in the hospitals such as not to disagree with the sick and retard their recovery.

7. To prevent an intended separation of the army by detachments to sundry places, dangerous to its safety in spring, and making it too weak for defence.

The Mushir excuses himself on some accounts by pleading a want of money, and the large outstanding debts of the army.

There are some grounds, I fear, for this excuse, though 2,500*l.*, or a sum equivalent to it, had been recently received at Kars, not, indeed, in specie, which is essential, but in paper, as before.

The Porte is under no difficulty with respect to paying up arrears, and employing coin for that purpose, now that the proceeds of the loan are flowing into the Treasury. The needs of the army ought, therefore, to be supplied without further delay, and as for its debts, though provision must be made for their payment, the operation may be so conducted as to leave sufficient for supplying the immediate wants of the army, during the inclement winter, in Armenia, and enabling the poor soldiers to diminish, in some degree, the privations to which they are exposed on service and to which their families are also exposed during their absence from home.

It cannot be necessary for me to recommend the execution of these instructions to your utmost care. They form an important part of those extraordinary duties which we are called upon to perform under the present critical and urgent circumstances.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—Have the goodness to take special care of Sandwith's report, of which I have no copy. Every word of it is worthy of attention and calls for redress.

I send the two cartridges having different sized bullets with this, but packed up by themselves.

Inclosure 2 in No. 292.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

M. PISANI will communicate this paper, as he did the preceding similar ones, to Reshid Pasha, the Grand Vizier, and the Seraskier. He will require that the several things stated under the head of "Wanted" be done forthwith; and he will remind the Pashas of the previous demands, and report officially not only the promises given by them, but such positive statements as they may please to make of whatever has been already done in execution of the Ambassador's demands.

The immediate recall of the two Polish officers must be especially insisted on.

Two despatches and a list are added for communication to the Pashas.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

November 14, 1854.

Inclosure 3 in No. 292.

Wanted.

1. Orders to the Pasha of Erzeroum to send biscuit, flour, rice, butter, and tallow for lights to the army at Kars.

2. Orders to every part of Asia Minor, Bagdad and Moussul included, for sending forthwith supplies of provisions to Kars, the Province of Erzeroum being unequal to the demands.

3. Approval of Surri Pasha's conduct in giving up his house, and inducing the Feriks to give up theirs, for the accommodation of the garrison, at the suggestion of Colonel Williams.

4. Immediate recall of the two Polish officers, known by the Turkish names of Arslan and Shier Pashas.

Précis of Colonel Williams' despatches from Kars, of October , 1854.

The flour-mills at Kars are so few that, without assistance from Erzeroum, the flour in magazine cannot be ground fast enough.

Rations are now issued for 33,000 men daily, though the effective is only 14,000. This fraud and plunder must shortly produce famine.

Colonel Edhem Bey reported 400 men on the march to Altai, when the counted and real number was only 250. Mustapha Zarif Pasha is charged with knowing and correcting not these frauds, enriching himself by similar mal-practices.

The Ferik had occupied the best houses at Kars, forcing the soldiers to be crowded into small spaces, when disease and death were the natural consequences.

The two Polish officers are accused of intriguing in every possible way, and supporting the evil conduct of the Mushir.

See list of Cavalry, showing the numbers on parade, and the numbers for which rations are drawn—4,035, 4,742.

Inclosure 4 in No. 292.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Brigadier-General Williams.

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 6, 1855.

I HAVE received your despatches to that of the 23rd instant inclusive, and all due attention will be paid by Her Majesty's Embassy to the points which you recommend on sufficient grounds. The Quarantine Station at Topraldalé involves more considerations than those which belong to the victualling of the army.

I send you translations of the instructions given to Vassif Pasha by the Porte. You will observe that the instructions drawn up by the Grand Vizier himself is a supplement to the very imperfect document proceeding from the Seraskier's office.

There are other documents which I am desirous of forwarding for your information, but it is impossible to do so by the present opportunity. The papers are voluminous. My laborious assistants have constant and varied demands upon their time; and, notwithstanding every effort to ascertain the

day and hour of the packet's departure for Trebizond, I have only this moment learnt that the vessel is appointed to go to sea in an hour.

I state these circumstances for the satisfaction of Lord Clarendon, to whom a copy of this despatch will be transmitted.

Inclosed is the copy of a despatch of the 30th ultimo, addressed to me by Her Majesty's Consul at Trebizond.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 293.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 75. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, February* 21, 1855.

I HAD the honour a few days ago of meeting His Imperial Majesty the Emperor in society, when he expressed the satisfaction he had received from the communication Count Buol had made to him of the sentiments with which your Lordship had announced the appointment of Lord John Russell as associated with me for the negotiation for peace which was about to be entered upon. The Emperor stated that he looked upon this nomination in the sense given to it by your Lordship in your private letter to me, which I had submitted to Count Buol, as an earnest of the desire of Her Majesty's Government to commence that negotiation with the sincerest desire for peace, but that it must be a just, an honourable, and a safe one.

I assured His Majesty of the satisfaction with which I learnt from him these sentiments, which I should faithfully report to Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 294.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 26.

(No. 77.)

My Lord, *Vienna, February* 21, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to report that His Imperial Majesty the Emperor has appointed Baron Prokesch, now acting as President of the Diet at Frankfort, to be associated with Count Buol in the negotiations for peace about to be commenced in this capital, and Count Rechberg, who has been recently employed in the Civil Government of Lombardy, has been appointed to fill temporarily the post of Baron Prokesch at Frankfort.

I have also to report that Count Titoff is the person nominated by the Russian Government to take part with Prince Gortchakoff in the approaching Conferences.

Riza Bey has already arrived here from Constantinople, bringing with him the instructions of the Porte for the Turkish Ambassador here (a copy of which instructions have been communicated to your Lordship by Lord Stratford), and being himself authorised to assist in the Conferences. The Turkish Ambassador feels, however, as does also Count Buol, that the instructions brought to him by Riza Bey are of far too limited a character to enable him to act effectually in the negotiations for peace, and has, consequently, made application to his Government, requesting that these instructions may be very much amplified, or that a second Plenipotentiary may be appointed to be associated with him in the Conferences.

I have thought it right, in my private communications to Lord Stratford, to report to him the sense entertained by Arif Effendi of the insufficiency of the

instructions he has received, and the desire entertained by him, as well as by the Imperial Government, that more ample powers should be extended to him, or to the second Plenipotentiary who may be appointed to assist him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 295.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February 26.*)

(No. 78. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, February 21, 1855.*

COUNT BUOL yesterday inquired from me if I had learnt anything as to the progress which had been made by your Lordship, or by the French Government, in the negotiation of a Treaty of Alliance with Prussia. I replied, that by the latest official accounts I had received from Berlin it did not appear that our negotiation had at all advanced; and from what I had heard, the French Government (who had lately sent a proposal to the same effect as the one transmitted by your Lordship), were yesterday, as announced by telegraph from Paris, still without any reply.

I understand, from Count Buol, that the reports he receives from Count Esterhazy from Berlin, are very unfavourable to any arrangement by which Austria should be supported in any way by Prussia, or even protected by her from invasion, should such an operation be attempted against Austria, upon her undertaking any aggressive movements against Russia. Hear from intelligence I have received after the visit of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg to Berlin, that the irritation of the Prussian Government against Austria has not subsided, and was not likely to do so; for it appears to have been admitted in very influential quarters, that the Prussian Government had, from the beginning of the Eastern complications, but one object, which was to obtain the position and ascendancy in Germany which they had approached, but had not secured, in the years 1849 and 1850; or, to speak more correctly, to regain what they fancied they had lost since that period; and with this view that their leading principle had been since the commencement of hostilities to keep back their armies and their pecuniary resources, with the view of appearing in the field after Russia should be engaged in the contest, and then to dictate a peace, or at least to step forward as the mediator, with the view of turning that position to account in favour of exclusive Prussian interests. If this account of the policy and intentions of the Prussian Cabinet should be correct (and your Lordship will have the best means of ascertaining it), I cannot be surprised that the Prussian Government should still be so reluctant to take engagements with the allied Powers which would contain any portion of the stipulations and engagements embodied in the Treaty of the 2nd December.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 296.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February 26.*)

(No. 56.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 23, 1855.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch No. 52 of the 20th instant, inclosing copies of Sir Ralph Abercromby's No. 20, and of Lord Cowley's No. 187, both relating to M. Niebuhr's late journey to the Hague.

With reference to the statement that the French Government had not received intelligence from the Marquis de Moustier of the same nature as that which I had forwarded to your Lordship as to the supposed object of this mission, and that, under these circumstances, they hesitated as to the propriety of addressing a circular to the Representatives at foreign Courts, I have this

day made inquiries of my French colleague with respect to the information which he had transmitted to Paris.

I read to him my despatch to your Lordship No. 40 of the 9th instant, and, on finishing it, he said that he could not understand the impression which had been communicated to Her Majesty's Ambassador, observing that he believed he had written in stronger terms than I had done; and he then read to me passages in several of his own despatches, which prove that he had taken a similar view to myself, and had not only forwarded identical information to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, but attached so much importance to this mission that he had urged his Government to watch carefully the proceedings of M. Niebuhr.

The result of my interview has demonstrated that we both have written in the same sense; but as the French Minister alluded to M. Niebuhr's mission in despatches which also treated of other subjects, the impression produced on his Government by his reports may not have been as forcible as that which your Lordship appears to have received from the information which I have transmitted.

I am unable to offer any other explanation as to the French Government not having received intelligence of a similar nature, and if your Lordship were to refer to my No. 40, you would observe that I stated my belief that the object of M. Niebuhr's mission was to discover the feelings of the Courts of Belgium and Holland as to the advantage of entering into a general League of Neutrality; but I added that Baron Manteuffel had denied that M. Niebuhr was sent on a political mission.

There is certainly, at the present moment, no positive proof of his having been in communication with influential persons at the Hague; whilst, on the other hand, there can be no doubt that the publicity given to this journey, and the measures taken to counteract its object, have rendered it abortive, and this failure will perhaps obviate, for some time to come, a similar attempt on the part of this Government.

M. Niebuhr has now returned to Berlin, and I hear that the King has been much annoyed at all that has been said on the subject of this supposed mission; His Majesty asserts that the object of this journey was none other than recreation; and Baron Manteuffel related to me to-day that the King has himself written to General Wedel, at Paris, to declare this to be the case, and in the event of the question being discussed before him "de s'en moquer."

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 297.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February 26.*)

(No. 57.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 23, 1855.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 50 of the 19th instant, inclosing copy of Sir Ralph Abercromby's No. 15 of the 12th instant, relative to the conduct of the Prussian Minister at the Hague, in advising the Ottoman Envoy to abstain from a certain formality usually observed by Ministers accredited to that Court on entering on their functions, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I have this day mentioned the subject to Baron Manteuffel.

I read to his Excellency your Lordship's above-mentioned despatch, and stated to him also the substance of Sir Ralph Abercromby's communication. Baron Manteuffel said that he was quite ignorant of what had taken place on the occasion of Prince Caradja's arrival at the Hague, and appeared to disapprove of the account which I gave him of Count Königsmark's proceedings. I observed, that I trusted he would signify to that Envoy his disapprobation of his conduct. He replied, that he had already, in consequence of communications from the French Government, called Count Königsmark's attention to observations that had been made about him, and that he would willingly do as I requested; but that it was useless at this moment, as the Count was shortly expected at Berlin, to take his seat in the First Chamber.

I availed myself of the opportunity thus offered, of stating, that the

language of many of the Representatives of Prussia at foreign Courts was most unfriendly towards England; adding, that at a moment when an alliance was about to be signed between England and Prussia, such language did not argue well for any solid improvement in the relations of the two Governments.

I observed further that there appeared to me a total absence of discipline amongst the King's Diplomatic servants; that there was no similarity of language or opinion held by them; but that I hoped we might see some change effected when our Treaty was concluded, and that his Excellency would not fail, in communicating this document to them hereafter, to accompany it with a circular indicating the future policy of Prussia as being more in accordance with that of the Western Powers.

His Excellency appeared impressed with the justice of this remark, but he did not give me to understand that he should be disposed to take any decided step of this nature; and such is the double policy of this Government, that it may be fairly doubted whether we shall ever see the diplomacy of Prussia holding language of an honest and straightforward character.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 298.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 58.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 23, 1855.*

COLONEL OLLBERG has again arrived here with despatches from General Wedel, and returned to Paris with the answer last night.

In the course of my conversation to-day with Baron Manteuffel, I asked what progress was being made in the negotiation of the Treaty, but I could not obtain any satisfactory explanation on the subject. His Excellency said that the King had hurried the departure of Colonel Ollberg, and that that officer had left twenty-four hours sooner than was calculated, and that he hoped something would at last result from the communications which had passed. It was in vain that I endeavoured to learn the intentions of the King respecting the Treaty. Baron Manteuffel persisted in observing the most mysterious silence, and I am led to augur from it that the result will not be of much advantage to the alliance. I inquired if the King still desired the insertion of the Articles on Poland, and on the passage of troops, observing on the latter point that there was no foundation for the reports circulated, to the effect that a French army was about to traverse Germany with a view to support Austria.

Baron Manteuffel replied, that the King's wishes on these subjects were unchanged, but that a modification of the terms had been proposed; and that with regard to the question of the passage of French troops, it was suggested that this should be made dependent on the consent of the Confederation.

I rejoined that I did not see that much would be gained by this change in the words of the Article, for I apprehended that its effect would be to invite useless discussions at Frankfort; to increase, rather than allay, the rivalry which at present existed between Austria and Prussia, and that difficulties similar to those raised on the interpretation of the Treaty of the 20th of April, would, I feared, be the inevitable consequence of such a stipulation.

I asked if he thought the Treaty would now be agreed to at Paris, but his Excellency not giving me any reason to suppose it was so near its conclusion, I observed that the opening of the Conferences at Vienna could not be much longer deferred.

Baron Manteuffel seemed to attach less importance to this than I expected, and I have reason to believe that the King is at this moment more anxious than his Government for the immediate conclusion of the Treaty.

I then remarked that it should be borne in mind that though a continuation of the war might result from the Conferences, they might also end in peace, in which case it would be well for the Prussian Government to consider whether they would like to find themselves excluded from the negotiations. His Excellency seemed still to think that this was not a sufficient reason for hurrying the

conclusion of the Treaty, and I apprehend, from what dropped from him on this subject, that he has almost made up his mind that Prussia cannot assist at the opening the Conferences.

Our conversation closed by Baron Manteuffel informing me that the King was desirous to make separate but identical Treaties with England and France. I inquired what object His Majesty had in view by this arrangement, saying that I feared it looked as if he was indisposed to enter into any general alliance on the subject of the great question which agitated Europe, and that although Prussia might object to a fresh Treaty with Austria, what reason could there be against the triple alliance proposed? His Excellency did not attempt to explain what had given rise to this new project, and I must therefore believe that it has originated with the King.

It is, I think, much to be regretted, and a further proof of the difficulty and uncertainty attending all negotiations with this Court.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 299.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 60.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 23, 1855.*

COUNT ESTERHAZY communicated yesterday to Baron Manteuffel the intentions of the Austrian Government to associate Baron Prokesch, the President of the German Diet, with Count Buol, as Plenipotentiary at the approaching Conferences at Vienna, and announced also the further decision taken by his Government in consequence of the divergent opinions which unhappily existed between Austria and Prussia on German questions, which rendered it impossible to charge M. de Bismark with the interests and votes of Austria, that Count Rechberg should take Baron Prokesch's place during his temporary absence from Frankfort.

Count Esterhazy has informed me that Baron Manteuffel made no observation whatever to him upon the occasion of his fulfilling these instructions, and that all his late communications have been received by his Excellency with the greatest coldness.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 300.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 61.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 23, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, in translation, copies of two circular despatches addressed by Count Buol to the Austrian Representatives at the German Courts.

The first of these documents expresses the satisfaction of the Imperial Government at the late Decree of the Diet for placing in readiness (Kriegsbereitschaft) the contingents of the German States. The Austrian Cabinet considers it as an important step, not only because any schism in the Diet on this subject has been thus happily avoided, but that the Decree in question is of a nature to satisfy the urgency felt that the Federal army should be prepared to take up a strategical position without loss of time.

The Austrian Minister disavows any participation of the motives assigned by the Committee of the Diet for this measure, more especially that which represented it in the light of a demonstration directed against both quarters, stating that this Decree was rather the result of the Offensive and Defensive Alliance of the 20th of April. He considers, however, that any misinterpreta-

tion on this score will be obviated by the nature of the relations existing with the Powers to whom Austria is allied by Treaty.

Count Buol proceeds to announce that a summary of the Austrian contingent will be furnished to the Diet, and concludes by referring to the total impracticability of the Prussian proposal that the German contingents should be assembled within the territory of the German Confederation, stating that the defensive obligations undertaken by the Confederation are not only to protect the territory of the German Confederation, but also the whole territory of Austria and Prussia, and even the Austrian position in the Danubian Principalities.

The second despatch of Count Buol, of which a copy is inclosed, is likewise addressed to the Austrian Ministers of several of the German Courts, and refers to the question of the election of a Commander-in-chief of the Federal army. In giving general instructions for the guidance of the Austrian Representatives on this subject, Count Buol rather supports the idea put forth of forming the Federal army into independent divisions previously to taking any steps for the election of a Commander-in-chief over the whole.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 300.

Circular addressed to the Austrian Representatives at German Courts.

(Translation.) *Vienna, February 16, 1855.*

ALREADY, after our former conversation, you will not have doubted that the Decree of the Diet of the 8th instant, according to which the whole principal contingent of the Federal army is to be held ready for marching, and in fighting order, within a period of fourteen days after the summons is given, has been received by the Imperial Government with gratification.

In fact, we perceive in this Decree of the Diet an event of great importance, were it only for the reason that thereby the schism which the question of the military preparations of the Germanic Confederation threatened to produce has been thereby happily avoided. But also viewed by itself the Decree which was passed appears to us to be the logical consequence of the considerations which the present state of things calls forth; and to satisfy the necessary demand that the Federal army should be perfectly prepared to take up a strategical position without loss of time.

We have certainly not been able to appropriate to ourselves the motives on which the United Committees of the Diet founded their proposition which has now become a Decree.

It will be understood that we, for our part, could not permit our adherence to appear to the Western Powers in the light of a demonstration directed against both sides, but also the whole Confederation, which in this matter no longer rests solely on the basis of the Federal Act, but also on that of the Offensive and Defensive Alliance of April 20th, and of the subsequent Decrees connected with it, has already, in our opinion, assumed for too decided an attitude to be able to derive the motive for the measure now resolved on solely in general from the menacing position of European affairs.

Nevertheless we believe we can be assured that those considerations which are unsatisfactory in our eyes, will find a corrective in the legal and matter-of-fact state of the affair, and more especially in the nature of our relations with the Powers with whom we are allied by formal Treaty.

You will generally adapt your language respecting the present Decree of the Diet to these remarks.

The immediate and most energetic execution of this Decree now certainly appears as a matter in which the honour of Germany is implicated; and we do not entertain the slightest doubt that all the Governments of the Confederation will strive with the same zeal to give force on their part to the measure resolved on, and to contribute by their actions that the military constitution of Germany on this occasion may prove itself as practicably commensurate with the duty of the Confederation as a great combined Power.

As regards Austria in this respect, His Majesty the Emperor has immediately been pleased to ordain, that within the period of fourteen days fixed for the announcement of the measures adopted by the separate Governments, a summary of the situation of the whole army, which is on the war footing, under the command of the Imperial Lieutenant-General Hess, is to be communicated to the Diet, and thus a proof be given of Austria's readiness for the war, which far exceeds the demands of the Confederation. It will be scarcely necessary to state our special conviction that the total impracticability of the proposition made by the Prussian Military Plenipotentiary in the separate vote, unsupported on any other side, according to which the contingents would, in any case, have to be placed within the territory of the Confederation, will not have escaped the judgment of the German States, as this proposition overlooks totally that the present Federal measure is only the consequence of previous Decrees of the Diet, according to which the common defensive undertaken by the Confederation for the maintenance of the interests of Germany in consideration of the menacing political position is not only to protect the territory of the Germanic Confederation, but also the whole territory of Austria and Prussia, and even our position in the Danubian Principalities.

There is no objection to your making a confidential communication of the present despatch to .

Inclosure 2 in No. 300.

Despatch to the Imperial Royal Missions at Dresden, Hanover, Stuttgardt, Carlsruhe, Cassel, and Darmstadt.

(Translation.) *Vienna, February 16, 1855.*

YOU are aware that the Imperial Military Plenipotentiary in Frankfort had added a further proposition to that of the Military Committee which the Diet decreed on the 8th instant, the substance of which was, that the Diet should speedily take into consideration the provisions for the command-in-chief of the Federal army, ordained by Part VI of the Federal War Constitution. This proposition in the Military Committee only met with the support of a minority, which we could but regret, as the exigency of preparing for the election of the Federal Commander-in-chief, and the organization of the command-in-chief, certainly arises from the necessity apparent in the Decree to make the Federal army ready for mobilization within fourteen days, and as the Confederation cannot run the risk, at the commencement of the preliminary measures necessary, of proceeding to the election of the General and the formation of head-quarters only, at the moment when it really decrees the mobilization of the army within fourteen days.

The impossibility of avoiding the said proposition has not escaped the United Committees of the Diet, for they declare, in the report made to the Diet, that they do not especially adopt it from the reason alone because a special appeal did not appear necessary to direct the attention of the members of the Confederation as to the necessary provisions for the command-in-chief of the Federal army.

We are, accordingly, in a position in which we must draw the attention of our Representatives at the German Courts, not only to the urgency of confidential consideration of this matter between the allies, but also provide them with instructions as to the manner in which they have to express themselves with respect to the opinion of the Imperial Government in the present position of affairs and when occasion arises.

For the present, you will in any case only mention the question of the election of a Commander-in-chief of the forces of the Confederation when asked about it; then only in so far as you can express the conviction that in this respect the Imperial Government only has in view the object of an efficient and successful united command of the army which the whole Germanic Confederation, Austria and Prussia included, will send into the field, an object which is of the same importance to all.

The provision for this principal object, which must be made certain in one form or other, must therefore certainly not be anticipated.

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Then you can add, that the Imperial Government did not overlook the difficulty of bringing about, under the circumstances of the moment, an agreement on the election of the Federal Commander-in-chief, the formality of which, according to the Federal War Constitution, ought only to take place contemporaneously with the Decree for the definitive formation of the Federal army, and that they, for their part, are not disinclined to follow an idea already started from different quarters, according to which an agreement respecting the formation of independent divisions of the Federal army, under separate Commanders, would have to precede the order about the highest common command.

The Federal War Constitution permits of the formation of such army divisions, and the circumstances of the present case appear particularly to point to such an expedient, in so far as it is not only the question of the defence of the German Federal territory, but also of the whole territory of Austria and Prussia, as well as our position in the Principalities.

The Commanders of the Austrian and Russian Federal troops could then entertain relations with the Diet for the formal maintenance of the unity of the German Federal army. If such a proposition should be discussed, you will remember that we must remember the possibility of the execution, and the practical value of such an arrangement, as mainly depending on the views and wishes of the minor German States connected with it, for which reason you will have to confine the opinion you may express in this respect to a general acknowledgment that the said proposition merited to be taken into closer consideration.

Until further instructions, you will abstain from any interference in this matter extending beyond the above general hints, but at the same time make it your duty to render an exact account of the views which, according to your observation, this subject meets with in , and also the manner in which the same was mentioned to you.

No. 301.

Mr. Bligh to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 38. Confidential.)

Hanover, February 21, 1855.

My Lord,

WHILST conversing with Baron Lenthe to-day, his Excellency asked me if I had read in some of the Hanoverian newspapers that Her Majesty the Queen was supposed to have written privately to the King of Hanover, proposing an offensive and defensive alliance between the two Crowns. I said that I had, but that I had paid little attention to it, feeling assured that, from various reasons, there could be no foundation for such an assertion; amongst other reasons because it was notorious that so long as the Germanic Confederation maintained itself, no German State of the second order could enter into such a Treaty, and because I felt convinced that if that Confederation should be dissolved, one of the first objects of Hanover would be to seek earnestly of herself, to form, if possible, such an alliance; that I was still more confirmed in my belief of this report being apocryphal by the assurances which his Excellency now gave me, that he was as totally in ignorance of the existence of such a letter as I was. He then proceeded to state that he had, on more than one occasion, heard from Count Réculot language touching the Confederation very different from that which I had been in the habit of using; that my French colleague was in the habit of speaking of that institution as entirely inoperative, and his Excellency added that he knew that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had spoken in the same sense to a German diplomatist. In short, he said, that his impression was that France desired a disruption of the bonds which since the last war had united Germany, in order that her present Sovereign, who was so close an imitator of his uncle, might, out of some of the disjointed members, found a protectorate in the shape of another Confederation on the Rhine; and upon my observing that Count Réculot had never spoken in such a sense to me, he remarked that his silence was natural enough.

I must preface my report of what I said in reply, by stating that Baron Lenthe is of that school of German politicians who date back their views of France to Jena and to Austerlitz, and cannot think of a Buonaparte otherwise

than as a conqueror and a tyrant. I said to his Excellency that I considered a strict alliance between England and France, at the present moment above all others, to be of such paramount importance, that I would not easily allow any thing even in prospect to excite my jealousy against the latter country or her agents; that I should, however, consider it my duty to report what I had heard from him to Her Majesty's Government, although, as he must already know, my personal opinion was, that England could have no policy as regards Germany other than to see this great country (as a counterpoise between the East and West) united as closely as possible; that as positive unity could not, except by means of some terrible convulsion, be accomplished; that as the Confederation under its existing institutions, however imperfect they (like every human contrivance) might be, had maintained for forty years a certain unity, I should be unwilling to witness its overthrow, leading, as such a catastrophe certainly would, to partial protectorates, such as that to which his Excellency had alluded.

Being in ignorance of the views of Her Majesty's Government upon this matter, except so far as I know England to have constantly upheld, as far as possible, the political arrangements of the Congress of Vienna, I made the above remarks as the result of my personal opinions alone; but, if I have erroneously interpreted those of Her Majesty's Government, it would be advisable for the public interest, and agreeable to myself, that I should be set right, in case Baron Lenthe should again, as he did on this occasion, pointedly draw forth my views upon this subject, contrary, as they prove to be, of my French colleague.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. D. BLIGH.

No. 302.

Mr. Bligh to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 39.)

Hanover, February 24, 1855.

My Lord,

IN case your Lordship should not, from other sources, learn the decided tone which Bavaria adopts towards Russia at the present crisis, I beg to state, that in a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, which Count Réculot lately showed to me, the French Minister mentions that M. von der Plowden had written to the Bavarian Minister at the Russian Court, a despatch which was to be shown to Count Nesselrode, declaratory of the resolution of the Cabinet of Munich to make common cause, in every way, with that of Vienna, in case Austria should be attacked by Russia, or if Russia should, in the negotiations for peace, depart one syllable from the four points, according to the interpretation of them which has been accepted by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. D. BLIGH.

No. 303.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 26. Secret.)

Frankfort, February 23, 1855.

My Lord,

THE President of the Diet tells me that the Prussian Minister here informs him of the Cabinet of Berlin having received projects* through M. d'Usedom that there need be no fear that England would ever participate in any hostility against Prussia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

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* *Sic in orig.*

No. 304.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 26.)

(No. 28. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, February* 23, 1855.

I AM confidentially informed that, on the breaking up of the sitting of the Diet yesterday, M. de Bismark said to Baron Prokesch that he should shortly lay before the Diet a proposal for arming the Federal fortresses of Ulm, Rastadt, Landau, Germersheim, Luxembourg, and Mayence.

Although I am not entitled to report this incident as having been made in the form of an official notification on the part of the Prussian Minister, there can be no doubt that his Excellency has announced the present intentions of his Government in this respect, and the tendency and serious importance of such a resolution, if carried out, under whatever pretence it may be cloaked, can hardly be over-estimated.

As connected with this subject, I may remind your Lordship that there has been a force of rather more than 3,000 Austrians in Rastadt since 1850. Their presence there, occasioned by the disordered state of Germany at that period, is not in accordance with the ordinary military arrangements for garrisoning that fortress, and has already been a subject of much jealousy to Prussia.

I have reason to believe that the motion intimated as about to be made by M. de Bismark, will in some way be connected with a report on that subject, which has been for some time in preparation by the Military Commission, and which, in the ordinary course of business, would have been laid before the Diet within a short period.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 305.

Consul-General Ward to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 26.)

(No. 9. General.)

My Lord, *Leipzig, February* 21, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to report that a considerable sensation appears to have been produced in Germany by the news of the Czar's ukase and manifesto of the 29th of January (the 10th of this month), which order the calling out and arming of all the men in the Russian Empire capable of bearing arms. This proceeding, not adopted since the memorable year 1812, is universally thought to be of serious importance to Austria and the Western Powers, and to denote that the Czar has little confidence in the Vienna Conferences leading to a pacific result. The strong professions of a desire for peace with which the Imperial manifesto is accompanied, are considered as intended to fortify Prussia in her neutrality; whilst the levy *en masse* itself is to intimidate Austria, and to inspire her with the fear that Russia may decide upon taking the offensive against her in the war.

The Prussian liberal newspapers praise the high state of equipment and preparation of their army, which they declare to be the most effective in Europe, and the best armed, since the Minié guns have long been in general use in it. The German Federal army (according to the tables made up for 1853, and laid before the Diet) consists of 525,037 men, distributed into ten army corps, and a reserve, of which the Austrian contingent amounts to 153,293, and the Prussian to 170,509 men, besides the forces of those States not comprised in their Federal contingents. This large army is now so far prepared as to be able to put itself into marching order upon fourteen days' notice; and people ask, with what object? Against whom is the army to act? The Confederation is up to this time pledged to nothing more than to defend Austria in case of her being attacked, and the Prussian Government seems determined to persist in not making common cause with the Western Powers; still a general impression seems to prevail, that it is the destiny of Germany to become involved in the

war, and that the course of events will accomplish that, eventually, which the egotism of the Governments is working so hard to prevent.

The Saxon Cabinet, whose policy was openly avowed in its despatch of instruction to its Envoy at Vienna of the 19th of January last, has been publishing a series of articles in its organ, the "Leipzig Gazette," for the purpose of showing that neutrality is still the wisest course for Germany to pursue; that Austria, having got possession of the Danubian Principalities, has no further interest in the war; that the designs attributed to Russia have never been proved; and that the best plan is to let the Western Powers and Russia exhaust their strength on both sides by the war, for, when they are exhausted, then will be the right time for Germany to appear with her million of fresh soldiers, and to mediate, or rather dictate the conditions of peace. Such are the sentiments of the Saxon Minister, M. de Beust, and they seem to agree essentially with those entertained in the Cabinets of Berlin and of Munich. These arguments, however, have been so repeatedly and so well refuted by the liberal press (such as the "National Gazette," "Voss's Gazette," the "Prussian Weekly Journal," the "German Universal Gazette of Leipzig," the "Cologne Gazette," &c.) that I cannot believe M. de Beust's organ will produce much effect upon the public mind, or convert many to the opinion that Germany has no interest at stake in the war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. WARD.

No. 306.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 169.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 27, 1855.

HER Majesty's Government have learnt with satisfaction, from your Excellency's despatch No. 104 of the 12th of February, the nature of the instructions to be sent to the Turkish Plenipotentiary at Vienna, and Her Majesty's Government trust that the Plenipotentiary will fulfil the assurances given to your Excellency by the Reis Effendi, respecting the course which he is to pursue in the Conferences.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 307.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 64.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 27, 1855.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 56 of the 23rd instant, relative to M. de Niebuhr's mission to the Hague, I have to acquaint you that M. de Niebuhr having failed in his mission, as you will have perceived from Sir R. Abercromby's despatch of which a copy was forwarded to you in my despatch No. 52 of the 20th instant, and having, as stated by your Lordship, returned to Berlin, Her Majesty's Government have no intention of issuing the circular alluded to in Lord Cowley's despatch No. 187, of which a copy was also sent to you in my No. 52.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 308.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 65.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 27, 1855.

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which your Lordship held to Baron Manteuffel, as reported in your Lordship's despatch No. 58 of the 23rd instant, relative to the negotiations opened by General Wedel, at Paris, for a Treaty between Prussia and the allies.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 309.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 69.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 27, 1855.

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which your Lordship states, in your despatch No. 57 of the 23rd instant, that you held to Baron Manteuffel on the proceedings of Count Königsmark at the Hague, and on the language used by Prussian Ministers at foreign Courts.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 310.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 70.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 27, 1855.

I SENT on this day in cypher a telegraphic despatch to you for Lord John Russell, in the following words:

"I have received your letter from Brussels. Pray suspend any proposal to Prussia respecting the integrity of the Turkish Empire. I write to you about it by the messenger this day."

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 311.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Bligh.

(No. 21. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 27, 1855.

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which you state, in your despatch No. 38 of the 24th instant, that you held to Baron Lentlie, on the policy of England with regard to the Germanic Confederation, and you will inform his Excellency that you have been instructed to acquaint him that you have received a despatch to this effect.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 312.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Malet.

(No. 16. Secret.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 27, 1855.

I SENT to you this day by post, a despatch, partly in cypher, in the following words:

"Sir,—With reference to your despatch No. 26 of the 23rd instant, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government do not contemplate hostilities against Prussia, and would deeply regret if the necessity for them should arise; but the subject has not been mooted between Her Britannic Majesty's Government and M. de Usedom, and he has consequently no authority to make any communication on the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 13.)

My Lord, *Galatz, February* 12, 1855.

IN obedience to your Lordship's desire, communicated to me by Mr. Under-Secretary Hammond, under date of the 19th ultimo, No. 1, I have lost no time in preparing copy of my correspondence with his Excellency the Ambassador at Constantinople, and I have now the honour to wait on your Lordship with the with the whole of my correspondence regarding my mission to Bulgaria, Nos. 1 to 20, also one marked Confidential, of November 18, from Shumla, inclosed in two envelopes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Rustchuk, October* 18, 1855.

IN execution of the mission intrusted to me by your Lordship to proceed to Bulgaria, and there to observe the effects of the measures to be taken by the Turkish Commissioner, Medhet Effendi, to put an end to the murders practised on the Turkish Rayah subjects, and also to observe the general state of the country, I left Constantinople on the 30th ultimo, and arrived at Varna on the following day.

Having fully explained to Mr. Consul Neale the object of my mission, he informed me that Medhet Effendi had arrived some days previously at Varna; that he had made a short excursion in the neighbourhood, and returned; that he had left Varna the day before, for Buzarjik, and would return to Varna in five days. Colonel Neale therefore recommended that I should remain at Varna not only until Medhet Effendi returned, but further for several days after Medhet Effendi had commenced his tour. Although I agreed with Colonel Neale as to the propriety of allowing Medhet Effendi to have a sufficient start of me, yet I preferred making some excursion in the neighbourhood, to remaining idle in Varna; I therefore left Varna on the 4th instant, for Shumla and Rustchuk.

On leaving Varna I was not aware that the route I was about to take was infested with robbers, but such proved to be the case. Two hours out of Varna, we met with two Armenians, who complained of having been robbed near

Devina. I passed the night at Devina, and was informed by the villagers that robberies were committed almost daily, at about an hour's distance between that place and Varna. I had a Turk with me, conducting the araba with my luggage, and also a zabtiyie or guard; the arabagee declared he would not proceed with me unless I took two more guards at the village of Yasitepe, as between that village and the next there was a regular band of robbers, and that four days previously he himself had seen them attack a party of travellers and murder one of them. Wherefore, when we arrived at the village of Yasitepe, our zabtiyie went to look for guards to accompany us, but he could not find any, and after considerable delay I prevailed on our arabagee to proceed. We passed the haunt of the robbers without any interruption, having found a convoy of buffalo carts resting at the place. In half-an-hour we arrived at the Turkish village of Uniseui, and passed the night at the khan.

The Agn happened to come to the khan, and I asked him concerning the robberies, and why he tolerated them so near his residence. He did not deny that a band of robbers frequented the vicinity of the village, but he said the place was out of his district, and that he was about to leave his situation, and was expecting his successor to arrive in the course of four or five days.

At the khan there was a party of ten or twelve Bulgarian travellers; on entering into conversation with them, they informed me that they came from the town of Kasan, and were going to Varna; that the roads were very unsafe, and that they did not venture to travel in smaller parties than twelve, and that consequently they were sometimes very much inconvenienced in their affairs, by being forced to remain a long time, in order to make up a party; and one stated that he had been detained at home a whole month after his affairs called him to Varna.

These people stated to me that Kasan was in a manner besieged by the Turks of a village in the vicinity, called Karagios, consisting of about sixty families, all robbers; that about three weeks previously these Turks had seized three lads belonging to Kasan, and had held them to ransom until nearly 10,000 piastres had been paid for their liberty; the uncle of one of the lads was present at the khan, and said he had contributed 2,000 piastres. They further stated that six of these robbers had been taken, and were in prison in Shumla, but that the authorities of that place were about to set them free.

I arrived at Shumla on the forenoon of the following day, and waited on the Pasha, and having explained to him my character, I inquired if he were aware of the mission of Medhet Effendi, and he answered that he was. I then inquired if he knew of the abduction at Kasan, and whether he had six of the robbers in prison. He answered that he knew of the Kasan affair, and that he had the six robbers in prison. I then told him that I had been informed he was about to set them free, and I stated that I hoped he would hold them in prison until the arrival of Medhet Effendi. This he promised to do.

I stated distinctly to the Pasha that the Turkish Government was determined to put an end to the murders and robberies which were being committed on the Christians, and that as the British Ambassador took great interest in the matter, he had taken effectual measures to be fully and correctly informed of all that took place, and that he would not fail to make known to the Porte any neglect on the part of the Turkish authorities.

The Pasha said that he was anxious to put an end to these excesses, but he asked how he was to do it; that he could not keep those guilty in prison always; that after he had kept them six or seven months in prison, he could not do otherwise than set them free. As the translation of the firman regarding punishments, alluded to in my instructions, was not inclosed in them, I could not give any distinct solution to the Pasha's difficulty, but I answered without hesitation, "Send them for soldiers." The answer seemed to please the Pasha; and on reflection, I consider that, excepting in cases of murder actually proved, this would be the best way of disposing of the robbers. At present the Turks seem to have no means of punishing short of death.

My information leads me to conclude that these robberies and murders are committed by resident Turks exclusively; that the residence of the robbers is generally known, and very often the individuals by whom the robberies are committed. No robberies have come to my knowledge as having been committed by the Bashi-Bozouks.

I left Shumla on the 9th instant, and arrived at Rustchuk the following day.

My further proceedings until this time not having reference to the principal end of my mission, will be the subject of another despatch.

I am now about to take up the course of my mission, and hope that I shall find on my return towards Varna that Medhet Effendi has taken a sufficient advance on me to allow of my judging whether he is performing his task with good faith and sincerity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Rustchuk, October 18, 1855.

My Lord,

MY previous despatch of this date informs your Lordship of what I have done hitherto in the main object of my mission. I have now to state that having arrived at this place on the 9th instant, I found the Austrian steamer about to start for Galatz, and taking into consideration that I could not at that time make progress in my mission, that your Lordship had expressed a desire to know the state of the Danube, and the force and position of the Russians, being also anxious to form an opinion whether my presence as Vice-Consul was required at Galatz and Ibraila, I decided on embarking by that steamer for Galatz.

Nothing worthy of remark occurred until the steamer arrived at Silistria, where we remained some hours. A great many Turkish troops were being brought over in boats from the Wallachian side to the Turkish. On the Wallachian side a considerable fortification in earth was being constructed. I had time to go to the Arab-Tabia, and found the fort was being entirely reconstructed.

Continuing down the river we passed Hirsova, which proved to be entirely abandoned, and we could not see a living creature; the houses seemed to be in good order, excepting that the doors and windows were carried off.

On arriving at Ibraila the steamer goes down as low as the junction of the Matchin branch in order to turn; there, at Getshed, on the Turkish side, were twelve Russian Cossacks. This picquet, two nights before, had fired across the river on a Turkish round, and killed two men.

The town of Ibraila was occupied by about 1,500 Turkish Cavalry, and some squadrons had been pushed forward as far as Vadeni on the Sereth. There were no Austrian troops in Ibraila, but I was told that some had been there, and that on hearing the Turks were to enter, the Austrians left. As the Turkish soldiers are not quartered on the inhabitants, I heard no complaints regarding billets. The officers are quartered in the houses.

After a delay of three hours at Ibraila, the boat proceeded down to Galatz, where we arrived on the 12th instant. So soon as my arrival was known a great many friends came to see me. When I informed them that I had not returned to remain, the Ionian subjects expressed great disappointment, and a hope that I would not long delay to return to establish myself at my post. On enquiring the reason of their anxiety for my return, considering there was no trade, I discovered that the Ionians were only anxious to have me in Galatz in the hope that I could free them from the quarters of Austrian soldiers and officers.

There were some 4,000 Austrians quartered in Galatz, and every person I spoke with joined in declaring that their manner of proceeding with regard to quarters, was most arbitrary and rough; that the officers entered the houses and took possession of such rooms as pleased them, and took the horses of the owners out of the stables in order to put in their own; and all this without notice to or concert with the authorities of the town.

Had it been optional to me to remain at Galatz or to leave it, this state of affairs would have decided me to leave, but having no express authority from my superiors to return to my post, I felt I would be doing wrong to sit down there and commence an annoying correspondence with the Austrian authorities at Galatz, about quartering troops on British-protected subjects, without knowing whether such a line of conduct were agreeable to the British Government. On the other hand, I felt I should do much better to leave the place than to remain there and lend a deaf ear to the complaints of the subjects; but being charged

with an important mission by your Lordship, I did not hesitate a moment to carry out my mission.

As to the value of the complaints of the Ionians and Greeks generally, there can be no doubt that it is a severe trial to have one's house taken possession of by soldiers, and soldiers, too, differing from one in every respect—language, religion, and customs: still the law regarding the quartering of troops must be one and the same without reference to particulars; and whatever rights the Ionians may have had to be exempt from giving quarters, I consider they renounced them by voluntarily giving quarters to the Russians. It is too much to have voluntarily received the enemies of England into their house, and now to call on England to prevent the troops of a non-hostile Power from being billeted on them. Had the Ionians and Greeks of Galatz shown a little of the goodwill to accommodate the Austrians which they showed for the Russians, perhaps they would have found the Austrians somewhat more conciliatory: but whilst they were very friendly to the Russians, and gave them all they required, they are very hostile to the Austrians, and would give them no assistance whatever; and in order to obtain anything, these last must proceed with a good deal of the arbitrary.

Your Lordship, in your instructions to me on sending me on this mission to Bulgaria, says that I should return to Galatz and Ibraila as soon as I knew that the Russians had actually evacuated Galatz and Ibraila, and that I had reason to believe that my presence was required for the protection or promotion of our commercial interests. With regard to the first point, certainly the Russians had retired across the Pruth: parties of them returned daily into Moldavia under pretext of cutting reeds (I presume for the construction of huts), and came near to Galatz; also the Russians were opposite to Galatz and Ibraila, on the Turkish side of the Danube; therefore I do not see that it would have been prudent to open the Vice-Consulate within half-a-mile of the Russian troops. As regards the second point, I do not see that my presence in Galatz and Ibraila would be of the slightest avail to British trade or interest. When I was at Galatz and Ibraila, I may remark that Mr. Consul Gardner had not returned to Jassy, and that, although Mr. Agent Colquhoun was at Bucharest, yet he had not entered into official relations with the Wallachian Government.

On my return up the Danube to Giurgevo, I went to Bucharest to see Mr. Agent Colquhoun, to whom I communicated verbally my observations on the state of the Lower Danube.

I did not obtain any exact information of the number of the Austrians in Moldavia. It is said that there had been 50,000 Russian troops in Bessarabia, in addition to which number 30,000 had just arrived in the neighbourhood of Reni. The Russians had about 1,000 men at Issaktchi, where the bridge was; none at Toultcha, and some hundreds at Babadagh, chiefly Greek volunteers and Cossacks.

It was said that the Austrian officers had communicated freely with the Russians on the other side of the Pruth.

I left Galatz on the 13th instant, and arrived at Giurgevo on the following evening.

The Turks had in the Lower Wallachia—2,000 men at Calarash, 1,000 at Jalonitza, 8,000 on their way to Ibraila, besides 2,000 Cavalry already there. There were about 20,000 men at Silistria. In all, about 35,000 men at Silistria and lower down the Danube, on both sides of the river.

On the 15th instant I left Giurgevo for Bucharest, where I passed two days with Mr. Colquhoun, and returned here this day.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 3 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Shumla, November 18, 1854.

My Lord,

IN order not to delay unnecessarily, I did not stay at Varna to send report of my proceedings from Rustchuk to that place, and now beg to supply the omission. At Rustchuk I saw the Pasha, and spoke to him of robberies.

He said robberies were committed in that vicinity, but that many of them were committed by Austrian shepherds called Moclians; and that when the Turkish authorities arrested them, they were claimed by the Austrian Consuls, and set free. A Consular Agent whom I found with the Pasha left at the same time as I did. He said that Rasgrad was a great place for robbers, as they had been protected by the late Governor of that place; that the Governor of Rasgrad had lately poisoned himself on learning that his conduct was to be inquired into. He stated that a chief robber, who had committed fifteen murders in the course of the year preceding his death, had been killed lately while resisting the Zabtivies, and his head was brought to the Pasha of Rustchuk. The same person told me that another robber was then in prison in Rustchuk, who had committed nearly as many murders within the same space of time; that the authorities at Rustchuk had at various times administered to him 1,500 bastinadoes, some of these on the belly, in the hope of killing him, but that the robber was still alive in prison. It was quite out of my power to verify whether there was any foundation for these strange stories; I believe they are exaggerated, at all events, but mention them as coming from a Consular authority, and to show what strange accounts one hears. Since my arrival here I have made inquiries about them, and a person has told me that the account of the robber being killed is correct, but he knows nothing of the robber said to be in prison. He says the Governor of Rasgrad died lately, after an illness of some duration; that the reason for so many robberies being committed about Rasgrad is, that the peasantry thereabout are rich.

I left Rustchuk on the 20th ultimo, going along the Danube to Silistria; between these places we heard no complaints of robberies. There are few villages in that tract, and the inhabitants say they are too poor to be exposed to robbery. There were parties of Turkish soldiers at various places along the Danube employed in cutting wood, and the inhabitants of the Christian villages complained that these soldiers come into the villages and forced the villagers to give them provisions without payment. It is true these soldiers sometimes gave a "senet," or acknowledgment, but the villagers seem to consider that it was much the same thing whether a "senet" was given or not.

I arrived at Silistria on the 23rd ultimo, and left next day for Tatar Bazardgik. That night we slept at a Turkish village, where the Russian Cossacks had been several times last summer, and had carried off all the fowls; but the inhabitants had saved their sheep and cattle by driving them into the woods. On the 25th ultimo I arrived at Bazardgik. The Christian villages had nearly all disappeared from this track. We heard nothing of robberies.

At Bazardgik the only recent matter of robbery we heard of was that of a Chourbagee of that town, who had been carried off by robbers about a month before our arrival; but after he had been some days in their power, he had found means to escape from them during the night. This person had an opportunity of seeing Medhet Effendi at Bazardgik after his escape from the robbers; and as suspicions fell on a Turk in the employment of the Chourbagee, as accomplice, this Turk was arrested and sent to Varna.

I saw the Medir of Bazardgik, and explained to him the nature of my mission. From what he said, it appeared that the principal motive of the visit of Medhet Effendi to Bazardgik was to inquire into the circumstances of the destruction of that town, and the means of restoring it; but I did not learn the conclusion he had come to on either of these points. Meantime there is the town three-fourths burnt down, and the other fourth nearly in ruins. Nearly all the inhabitants had left it, many of them going to Russia; a few were returning, but these must suffer great misery during the winter, which must be passed without sufficient food or shelter. There were few robberies in the neighbourhood of Bazardgik, from the simple reason, as the inhabitants said, that there was nothing to rob. The Medir told me that he had strict orders to prevent and put down robberies. The Medir mentioned that out of ninety villages which had been in the district of Bazardgik, sixty had totally disappeared. Portion of the inhabitants had gone into Russia.

On the 26th I left Bazardgik, and slept that night at a village of Turks and Christians. The people of this village seemed to be in easy circumstances, and to have plenty of corn, cattle, and fowls.

On the 27th I arrived at Varna, and remained there until the 30th ultimo.

At Bazardgik I learnt that Medhet Effendi had returned to Varna, and from thence had gone to Shumla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 4 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Shumla, November 18, 1854.

My Lord.

HAVING returned to Varna, as mentioned in my previous despatch of this date, I considered the time was come for setting seriously about the carrying out of the object of my mission, namely, to inform myself of the proceedings of Medhet Effendi, and the effects of them as they might tend to put an end to robberies and murders; also to observe the actual state of the country as regards robberies, and I set out on my tour from Varna accordingly on the 30th ultimo.

As I heard a great many robbers came from Aidos into Bulgaria, I resolved on visiting that place, although not in Bulgaria; and having communicated my intention to Colonel Neale, Consul at Varna, he recommended that I should go to Messembrio, being only a short distance out of the way, and there investigate the case of a Chourbagee who had lately been carried off from that place, and only liberated against a ransom of 30,000 piastres, I did not hesitate to agree to his suggestion.

Arrived at the village of Dervis Joan on 1st November. We were informed that two Chourbagees of this village had been carried off and murdered about the end of June last; also that two lads; sons of the man in whose house we lodged, had been carried off about the 15th of August last, o.s., and ransomed for 1,200 piastres. A Bulgarian of the village of Ernech came to give notice, and settled and received the ransom. The master of the house says he does not know the Bulgarian.

Caltilear, November 1st.—On arriving at this village in the evening, we saw a person named Christo Grunceni, a currier, who had just arrived and declared that he had been robbed two hours before, by six Turks, at an hour and a-half distant from the village, near a mill belonging to Murat Aga near Carambere. The robbers took from him, 16 okes silk, 10 or 15 pairs of shoes, 6 okes ruhat-tukum, a little money, portion of his cloths, and 2 pairs of pistols, and a yatughan. The chief robber is supposed to be an ex-Zabtiyie of Achlee, named Manive.

Arrived at Messembrio on 2nd November. We found that the Chourbagee whose case I had come to investigate, did not belong to this place. We learnt, however, that about two months before a person named Dracos Cardomatie, Chourbagee, of the village of Zopoli, had been taken away from the Baths of Litza in open day, and from among a number of bathers, and that he had to pay 30,000 piastres of ransom. When we passed the Baths of Litza next day we were told by the keeper of the coffee-house there, that the robbers had been taken and sent to Aidos or Adrianople.

At Messembrio a person named John Samicovlee came to see me, and stated, that he lived in that place, and that he was a merchant of staves. That having had a quantity of staves prepared in the forest, they were given into charge of certain Turks three years ago to convey them to Burgas; but these staves had never been delivered. That about the middle of May last he was in the interior for his affairs, having a Zabtiyie with him, and when near a village called Scotina, in a wood, he was fired at, and three slugs went into his arm, and a ball and some slugs into his body; he did not fall from his horse, but was able to reach the village, and it was nearly two months before he recovered from his wounds. He suspects the assasins were the Turks to whom the staves had been given to transport to Burgas, and which he says they had taken to Varna and sold for their own account. Samicovlee says he did not make any

complaint at the time to the authorities; but about ten days before he saw me he had obtained a letter for the Governor of Aidos to oblige the Turks to make him satisfaction for his staves, but hitherto this letter has had no effect.

Arrived at Aidos on 3rd November. On alighting at the khan a man named Dobree, of the village of Chiugel, came to us and recounted the following occurrence: about ten days before that time three Turkish robbers took his son, a boy twelve years of age, out of the house; the mother of the boy went in search of the father (Dobree) and told him what had happened. He thereon took his gun, and went after the robbers, whom he overtook and threatened to shoot if they did not set his son free, on which the Turks ran away, but first gave the boy a severe stab on the back of the head. A Balookbashi (a police officer) went after the robbers, and captured them: he then arrested Dobree, and, as Dobree says, put him to the torture to cause him to declare that the robbers taken were not the persons who committed the act. Dobree, however, persisted in accusing them, and after some days' detention the three robbers and Dobree were brought to Aidos, and all thrown into prison together, and Dobree had been liberated only two hours before our arrival, after having been detained for five days in the prison heavily ironed. I saw the boy, who was at the same khan as I was, and he had a severe wound in the head.

On the morning of the 4th, I waited on the Governor of Aidos, who acknowledged that what Dobree had said was correct; he said Dobree had been harshly treated by the Balookbashi, because he had been in league with the robbers, and had harboured them without reporting to the police. The Governor of Aidos said he was about to send the robbers to Selimnia. I mentioned that Dobree was afraid to return to his village, lest the robbers getting free, or their friends, might injure him; the Governor promised that he would take measures for his safety.

Carnabat, November 4th.—On arriving here, we learnt that eight days before, three Bulgarians (two brothers and a son of one of them) had left the place, to go about an hour distant to plough. Three Turks came on them, and carried away the uncle and nephew, and allowed the father to return to get their ransom, which they fixed at 30,000 piastres. At this time the ransom had not been raised, and the men were still in the hands of the robbers. We went to the Governor's, but he was not at his office.

Arrived at Selimnia on 6th November. On 7th, waited on the Caimacam to whom I related the cases of Aidos and Carnabat. He said neither case had been reported to him. The Caimacam immediately called a Balookbashi, who had been sent over from Shumla by Medhet Effendi on some business regarding robbers, and sent him off to Carnabat.

The Caimacam said it was an error to suppose that all the robberies were committed by Turks; that Bulgarians disguised themselves as Turks, and robbed also; that he had then in prison a Bulgarian and a Turk, who had confessed to having murdered a Christian Bacal.

Baseni, November 8th.—Haggi Demetri recounted that, about a month before, he was at the fair of Osmangen, and left that place in company with twenty-four persons, and all slept at a village. Next morning, portion of them being anxious to get forward, Haggi Demetri and eleven others left the village together, and they went to a village called Carack Malisi to breakfast. As they were entering the village, they saw a Turk coming towards them, who turned back. On leaving the village, they met the same Turk with seven others, who demanded their tescarets, and while they were showing them, the Turks fell on them and robbed them all. There were three Turks of this party who were robbed also. The amount taken from this party was about 35,000 piastres. Afterwards the same Turks robbed the twelve Bulgarians who had remained behind, and murdered one of them, taking about 50,000 piastres. It is said that on the same day these Turks robbed other parties to the amount of 100,000 piastres more. The chief robber is well known: he is called Ballibuvoglu, and is of the village of Eski Zaar. These people reported the fact of having been robbed to the Caimacam of Selimnia. Excepting the chief, nearly all these robbers belong to the village of Foudoklee, near Jamboli.

Kassan, November 10th.—Until now we were in the Pashalic of Adrianople; now we are in that of Rustchuk and the Caimacam of Shumla. Medhet Effendi had been at Kassan seventeen days before my arrival there. About a week before the arrival of Medhet Effendi at Kassan, a Christian having sold wheat there for 36,000 piastres, was murdered on his return to Turnova, four hours out of Kassan; and two days afterwards a Turk was fired at and wounded on the same road.

Osman Bazar, November 11th.—About forty days before this date, two Bulgarians named Stoga and Stogano left the town to purchase cattle. Nothing was heard of them for ten days, when one morning their horses were found in the town, with a virile member tied to each saddle. Shortly after the return of the horses, Medhet Effendi passed through the town, and the case was duly reported to him. Up to the time I was in that place, the bodies had not been found, nor any light thrown on the subject. I had my information chiefly from the widow of one of the missing men.

At Kassan I saw one of the men who had been taken by robbers, and held to ransom as mentioned in my first despatch of October 18. He said that he and another had been at Shumla, and that ten days before 2,000 piastres and 12 mantles of Aba had been restored to them.

November 13th.—Arrived at Shumla.

Your Lordship will be able, from what I have stated, to form a pretty correct idea of the state of the country through which I have passed, as regards robberies, abductions, and murders. Your Lordship will observe that nearly all the cases I have cited have taken place within the last two months, and all relate to cases which took place on the line of road I passed over, or had happened to persons with whom I actually conversed. All the cases are grave, excepting that of Christo Grunieni, which I would not have recorded, had it taken place under my own eye, as it were; the probability is, that similar cases are of daily occurrence all over the country, and to which no one attends as being too trifling to merit notice. I have excluded all mere hearsay reports; and as the towns and villages through which I did not pass must have as full a catalogue of murders and robberies as those through which I did pass, the state of this country is fearful—unsupportable—for Christians.

The arrival of Medhet Effendi seems certainly to have put the authorities on the alert, and they are pursuing robbers and making prisoners; whether they are capturing the proper persons may be a matter of doubt. I much fear, however, that they are seizing insignificant persons, and leaving the great and formidable robbers at liberty; at least, no robber of note is yet reported to have been taken.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 5 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Shumla, November 18, 1855.*

HAVING arrived here on the 13th instant, I inquired after Medhet Effendi, and was sorry to learn that he had left this place some days previously for Varna. He is to return here, and has left a portion of his luggage; and on leaving, he said he expected to be back in ten or twelve days; but I now learn that he goes round by Carnabat on his return, and that the time of his arrival here is quite uncertain, so that I must leave this place without seeing him.

I was not anxious to see Medhet Effendi before I was well informed of the state of the country; but, as I consider I am now sufficiently informed as regards robberies to have been able to judge of the efficiency of any measures he was taking to render the roads safe, I would have been well pleased to have met him here.

I have taken information of what Medhet Effendi had done since his arrival here to put down the robberies now so prevalent in this province, and the result is that thirty or forty persons, said to be robbers, have been brought here from different parts of the country, and put into prison; he has caused fifteen or twenty of these robbers to be sent to Varna, to be from thence sent to Constantinople, and he has caused a gipsy to be hanged.

Those who had expectations that the mission of Medhet Effendi would have tended to put down the robbers and murderers, have been disappointed and dispirited; they say that, when so many murders have been committed here lately, the authorities must have more than one murderer in prison whose execution, by way of example, is urgent. Then they interpretate the fact of the authorities having chosen a gipsy for capital punishment as a manifesto that they will on no account put a Turk to death for the murder of a Christian; and they fear that the visit of Medhet Effendi, far from preventing or causing a diminution in the number of murders, will, on the contrary, cause an increase, as the Turks will now consider themselves exempt from capital punishment for the murder of a Christian, as they have been heretofore. As to sending guilty persons to Constantinople, that can have little or no effect on the robbers, as every one, robbers and others, expect to see them back here shortly; and, even if some of those sent to Constantinople be capitally punished, that could not serve as a warning to robbers here.

The gipsies no doubt profess the Mahometan religion, but they are a degraded race in Turkey, as they are in other countries.

The crime for which this gipsy suffered was, that he, another gipsy and a Turk, seized a boy of twelve years of age, near a village called Smedova, and carried him to the mountains. They then sent to the father of the boy to say that, for 3,000 piastres and some clothing and provisions, they would set the boy free. The father sent the ransom by a relation, an old man of ninety, supposing a man of that great age would be respected, but the robbers took the ransom, and murdered both the old man and the boy. I am told that both the Turk and the gipsy remain here in prison, the gipsy ready to be hanged should another execution be necessary, and the Turk to be hanged also in an extreme case.

Your Lordship, having taken a first step to put a stop to these murders, will not desert this sacred cause of suffering humanity, and will not desist because of the weakness of the Turkish Government, nor of the weakness or bad faith of its officer; therefore I doubt not that your Lordship will insist that the mission of Medhet Effendi do not remain a mere mockery.

Had I seen Medhet Effendi, I should have sought an opportunity of stating to him that he was not carrying out his mission; but I have no authority to remonstrate with him, and therefore do not go to find him through many difficulties and uncertainties. I may mention that, wherever I have made known my mission, it has caused the greatest satisfaction to the Christians to know that your Lordship is taking an active part for the security of their lives.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 6 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Shumla, November 18, 1854.*

MY official despatch of this day will show that Medhet Effendi has stopped very short of carrying out the object of his mission. The following communication, made to me by a person who was in intimity with Medhet Effendi while here, may explain the cause. My informant said to Medhet Effendi (I make use of his own expression), "You must hit the Cadi and the Mufti over the nose, and make them hold it lower." Medhet Effendi replied he would do no such thing, otherwise when he returned to Constantinople he might find they had

broken his nose altogether, and that he did not mean to expose himself to that risk.

The same person told me that Medhet Effendi had considerable difficulty in getting the Cadi to make the needful acts for the execution of the gipsy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 7 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Shumla, November 20, 1854.

My Lord,

I BEG to inform your Lordship of my intentions as regards my future movements. I leave this place to-morrow for Turnova, and as the days are short, and as I travel without changing horses, I shall be at least four days on the road. I intend to remain eight days at Turnova, from thence I go to Sistova, and from Sistova to Rustchuk. I expect to be in Rustchuk in about twenty-four days from this date. Arrived at Rustchuk, and not receiving instructions from your Excellency, I will proceed to Galatz, by steamer or by land, as circumstances may render most expedient.

However, I must say, that unless for the purpose of giving advice of military movements, I do not see that the presence of a Consul can be of any use there this winter, and the position seems to be so uncertain, that I consider it would be imprudent to unpack the archives, but of this I shall be able to judge on my arrival there.

I have to add, that I consider, that since your Excellency has once so far interested yourself for the protection of the Christians from murder as to send a person here, your Lordship ought to keep some one in this neighbourhood to watch over the proceedings of the Turkish authorities, until they do something satisfactory and which promises to give security to the Christains of their lives; and I recommend that your Lordship send some one here without delay to take my place.

In case, however, your Excellency has difficulty in finding a person to take the place, and you consider my presence at Galatz not necessary this winter, then I would not object to remain here until spring. A letter addressed to me by the Turkish post of Monday, December 4, care of M. Stefiano di Giovanni, British Vice-Consul at Giurgevo, to be kept until my arrival, would be received by me.

Your Lordship will not suppose that I should have any advantage in remaining in Bulgaria in preference to being at Galatz; on the contrary, the residence here is very far from agreeable: but I consider I might be useful here during the winter, and of no use at Galatz.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM

Inclosure 8 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Turnova, November 27, 1854.

My Lord,

WHILE I was at Shumla, a man and a woman arrived there from a village named Dragunevo, nineteen hours' distant from Shumla, on the road to Turnova; when they arrived at Shumla, the Caimacam sent them to a person to give them lodgings, but by some mistake they were brought to me. I inquired of them who they were, and where they came from, and why they had come to Shumla, but all they could tell me was, that they were natives of Dragunevo, and had been sent to Shumla by the Pasha of Turnova, under the charge of a Zabtiyie; that as they had no money to pay the expenses of their journey the Pasha of Turnova had given them ten piastres, and with that, and I presume the aid of some charity on the road, they had come on foot from Turnova, a

distance of eighty English miles, and in very bad weather; and they assured me that they did not know why they had been sent to Shumla.

On further inquiry of them and of other persons, I found that the man was named Sebbi and the woman Vilica, father and wife respectively of a man named Ivan, a miller, who was murdered six months ago at a place called Kiopeclee, in the district of Pravoda; that the murderer had been taken and was in prison in Shumla; and that the father and wife of the murdered man had been sent for in this manner by Medhet Effendi, to know whether they would accept "the price of blood" in order that the murderer might be set free.

I endeavoured in vain to get information who the murderer was, and what position he held in society, but those I had an opportunity of asking knew nothing of the matter. In fact, it was not probable they should, as the murder had taken place at some distance, and such matters were of such common occurrence, that no one took any particular interest in any case which did not touch himself. The last time I saw the Caimacam I introduced the subject, by asking whether he had sent the man and the woman to me, and for what reason; he told me that he had not sent them to me, and that they had been brought to me by mistake. I thereon inquired why they had been brought to Shumla, and what their story was, but he confined his answer to telling me that they had been sent by the Pasha of Turnova on the demand of Medhet Effendi, and that he was ordered to keep them in Shumla until the Effendi returned. He seemed not at all inclined to be communicative on the matter.

The wife said that the murdered man had left his village two years ago, and was engaged as miller at Kiopeclee, at the rate of 2,000 piastres a-year; that he had served one year and a-half and had only taken up 400 piastres of his wages, which he had sent to her to pay off a debt, and that consequently he had 2,600 piasters due to him. No doubt he might have taken up the whole of his wages without the wife knowing anything of the matter.

With regard to the position of these poor people, what chance is there? I should rather say, what possibility is there of their refusing "the price of blood" should it be offered to them? They had been taken away from their home, and taken twenty miles to Turnova; from Turnova they had been sent to Shumla, a distance of eighty miles, on foot, and with only twenty pence between them to pay the expenses of the journey; now, were they to refuse "the price of blood," in what a miserable position would they be, having to walk sixty miles to their home, in the very midst of winter, without anything to pay their expenses by the way, and probably no food when they returned home. On the other hand, with 2,000 or 3,000 piastres for "the price of blood" of their relation, how much better off would they be. And even were they to refuse "the price of blood," probably the murderer would be set free all the same.

I repeat, these poor people told me that they did not know why they had been sent to Shumla; and although I knew the reason from other quarters, yet I did not mention it to them, as I felt myself unequal to give them any advice how they should act when the offer might be made to them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 9 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Turnova, November* 27, 1854.

AFTER I had sent off my letters to your Lordship from Shumla on Monday last, a poor old woman came to me to tell her sad tale.

Her two sons, her only children, Demetrio and George, left Shumla to go to Varna to sell horses at the beginning of August last, o.s. They took with them five horses, four of which they were to sell; they had also sixty bank-notes of 20 piastres.

They had agreed with a Turk named Sulimun, then and now resident in Shumla, that he was to go with them; but when they went to Sulimun's house on the morning of their departure his wife said he had already gone.

The two brothers arrived at Varna, and sold the horses; they got back to Devna, where they dined, and where they were last seen alive; they were both found murdered, with their heads separated from their bodies, near to a village called Oekgotshed. They were murdered on the day of the Holy Virgin (15th August, o.s.)

Suliman had been that day at a place on the road called Monistir. He was in the employment of an Englishman as "seize" or groom.

These sons leave their mother, an old woman of seventy, and their father an old man of ninety, in want. Besides the loss of the assistance of the sons, the money lost with them is a fortune in this country.

I do not know the woman's object in telling me her story; but I suppose she hopes that through my means Suliman, who she appears to believe is the murderer, may be seized and punished. I thought she might only be seeking relief to her feelings by recounting her sufferings once more; but she told her story with the greatest composure and firmness.

I have made no mention of this matter to the authorities of Shumla; in order to have the case of Suliman inquired into, some person of much more influence than I possess must interfere to cause the inquiry. Had I mentioned the matter to the authorities it would have probably been used as a warning for Suliman to take himself out of the way.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 10 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Turnova, November 27, 1854.

My Lord,

I GIVE your Lordship the following narration, to show the state of this country as regards robbers, although the chief point in it refers to a somewhat distant date.

On Monday last, at Shumla, two merchants came to me, one named Abbagè Pietro, and the other Panajotti Haggi Sava, and told me that two years ago they had sent money from Shumla for Varna; the first 10,000 piastres, and the second, 10,000 piastres. By the same opportunity other persons sent money, so that in three arabas travelling together there were about 80,000 piastres. Three Turks stopped the arabas and robbed them. There was one Turk in company of the arabas, but the robbers told him that if he remained quiet he had nothing to fear, so that he stood a passive spectator.

These robbers could not be found, but an accomplice of theirs, who sheltered and fed them, was arrested at Selimnia, and 12,000 piastres taken from him.

It was afterwards ascertained, beyond a doubt, that the three Turks who had robbed the arabas had in their turn been murdered by other Turks, and robbed.

The accomplice had been sent to Shumla, and is now in prison there.

The merchants who came to me, wish to receive a portion of the money taken from the accomplice, and had applied for it to the Caimacam of Shumla without effect; they applied to Medhet Effendi, and he said he would write to Constantinople about it. And lastly, they came to me, hoping that I could assist them in the matter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 11 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Turnova, November 27, 1854.

My Lord,

WHEN I was at Shumla, I asked the Caimacam how many cases of robbery and murder had been submitted to the consideration of Medhet Effendi at Shumla. He replied, that at the arrival of Medhet Effendi there were about sixty persons in prison accused of murder or robbery; that while he was in Shumla about forty more prisoners were brought in accused of these offences. That Medhet Effendi had caused about forty of these to be set at liberty, as being innocent; he had caused about fifteen to be sent to Constantinople, and one to be hanged.

He further stated, that after the departure of Medhet Effendi, seventeen more had been brought in accused of murder and robbery; so that on Monday last there were upwards of sixty persons in the prison of Shumla accused of these offences.

This state of things must surely fix the attention of the Turkish Government. A district must be in a fearful position when eighty robbers can be accounted for, that is, sixty in prison in Shumla, and twenty sent to Constantinople, without any diminution in crime being perceptible.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 12 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Turnova, November* 30, 1854.

I LEFT Shumla on Tuesday the 21st instant, to come to this place. The post-road from Shumla to Turnova is by Juma and Osman-Bazar, in all twenty-four hours; but as I had passed over the ground from Osman-Bazar to Shumla the preceding week I preferred proceeding to Turnova *viâ* Rasgrad, a distance of twenty-eight hours.

I arrived at Rasgrad on the morning of the 22nd instant, and remained there all that day. The road between Shumla and Rasgrad, and the country around Rasgrad, appears to be pretty free of robbers at present. I have only the two following cases to record, neither of them of a very recent date. Two persons coming from Constantinople in August last were attacked by robbers, about four hours' distant from Rasgrad; one of them was killed, and the other was rescued by some Bashi-Bozouks who came up. No one has been arrested for this offence.

A person belonging to the house in which I lodged at Rasgrad recounted that, last winter, he with four or five other Bulgarians went to a village near Rasgrad; during the night the house in which they were, was attacked by robbers; they endeavoured to force the door, but not succeeding, they fired through the door and windows, and wounded one of the party inside. The robbers then went away, carrying with them all the horses belonging to the Bulgarians. The man who was wounded died while being transported to Rasgrad. Last summer a Turk came to Rasgrad, and the horse he rode was recognized to be the one which had belonged to the man who had been killed. The Turk and the horse were carried before the Medjlis; and although there were fifteen of the most respectable Bulgarians of the place ready to swear to the horse, their evidence was not received. They were asked if they had any Turkish witnesses; and as they had not any, the Turk was allowed to depart unquestioned, taking the horse with him.

When about to leave Rasgrad on the morning of the 23rd, we were told that our Zabtiyie was not ready, as a man had been killed, and all the people of the police had gone to the spot. When the Zabtiyie came, he told us that it was merely a quarrel at a mill, who was to have his grain first ground, and one Turk had drawn his pistol and killed another.

Slept the night at Teukai-Cuzee; on going out of the village next morning, we overtook a Turk who told us he had lost his son, a boy of twelve years of age, and that he was going in search of him. It was not known whether the boy had been carried off or had strayed.

Chiereine.—Slept at this village on the night of the 24th–25th November. Was there told that two Christians had been murdered a month before, two hours distant from that place, near to the village Sedieni; and ten days before a party of Turks had been attacked by robbers, and one of them killed; two were wounded, and escaped. This took place near the village of

Cadicui about three hours distant. On arriving in the evening at Dohra Racovitz, we were told that the two wounded men had died of their wounds.

On the morning of the 26th November arrived at Turnova.

I have, &c
(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGAAM.

Inclosure 13 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Sistova, December* 6, 1854.

DURING my stay at Turnova, I gave every attention to get information of the state of the country, as regards robberies and murders, and the follwing are the only matters which were reported to me:

A person came to tell me that his man, named Gavriel, had left Turnova on Sunday 26th November, to go to Selimnia. On Monday night he slept at the village of Starik, twelve hours from Turnova, and left on Tuesday morning. Two hours after he had left, his horse returned to the village without saddle or bridle. The man's body has not been found. Gavriel had 400 piastres, which his master had given him, and he was carrying a sum of about 1,600 piastres for another person.

In this case I will not believe that a murder has been committed until the body is found. The man may have found a better horse than his own in the fields, and put his saddle and bridle on it and gone off to Adrianople, where he has his wife and family.

On 27th November I was informed that a Christian had been found murdered, with his head cut off, near the village of Hoggia Osmani, two hours and a half distant from Turnova. Some days afterwards the Pasha informed me that a Christian had been arrested for the murder, and had confessed to have committed it.

From Turnova I have come on here, and neither on the road, nor since my arrival here, have I heard of a single act of violence. The Pashalic of Turnova may therefore be considered as almost free from robberies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 14 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Sistova, December* 6, 1854.

WITH reference to the murder of a Turk, near the village of Cadicui, three hours distant from Turnova, mentioned in my despatch of 30th ultimo, I have to state that a person in Turnova, who has the means of being well-informed, told me that the murder was certainly an act of private vengeance. The murdered man had married the daughter of a late Pasha, a woman of large property, the management of which she left to her husband. The two brothers of the lady had repeatedly urged her to leave her husband and go and live with them, hoping thus to have control over her property; but she always refused, and the brothers had threatened to murder her husband. The suspicion of the murder, therefore, rests on the brothers-in-law of the murdered man.

This, if correct, goes far to confirm that Turks are not exposed to be injured by mere highwaymen.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 15 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Giurgevo, December* 11, 1854.

I TAKE the earliest opportunity of making a report on the causes of the frequency of robberies and murders of Christians in Bulgaria, and the means of putting an end to them.

The causes of these robberies and murders, and of their frequency, are:

1. The desire of plunder.

2. The small esteem in which the lives and property of Christians are held by the Turks, and that no infamy attaches to a Turk for the murder of a Christian.

3. The very great chance of not being arrested, through a defective police and good protection, and, when arrested, of not being punished, through the same protection.

As the first cause requires no remark, I may at once proceed to the second.

My belief, founded on a long residence in Turkey, is that a Turk does not value the life of a Christian at all, not so much as he values the life of a dog; nay, I believe, that by many Turks it is considered meritorious, not infamous, to take the life of a Christian. Persons who have resided in Turkey may say that the foregoing is too severe; that they are acquainted with many Turks who, far from killing a Christian, would not intentionally do him harm. This I freely admit; still that same Turk looks on the taking of the life of a Christian as a very different matter from taking the life of a Mussulman. It is only justice to the Turks to add, that the Christians of Turkey, generally, do not consider it a very heinous crime to take the life of a Turk. Christians seldom take the lives of Turks, because punishment is almost certain; Turks often take the lives of Christians, because impunity is almost certain.

When public opinion among Turks does not place the murder of a Christian in the rank of crime, and the law seldom punishes the offence, it is evident that no infamy can, in the opinion of the Turks, can attach to the murderer of a Christian.

The Turks have somehow or other got a great name for honesty, and so far they deserve it, that they seldom or never steal clandestinely; but they will take anything openly from a Christian; without force, if yielded freely, and by force, if opposition is offered; and sometimes they murder the person on taking his property. The Turks will also deprive a Christian of his property by false witnesses, or through any other injustice or chicane of the law. Therefore the Turks are honest in a very limited sense of the word.

On the third point, with regard to a defective police, I will state some of those defects in the words of a person in authority in this neighbourhood:

"All the Zabtiyies belong to the district in which they act, and, consequently, have friends and relations all around, and are frequently connected in friendship or interest with the robbers, and therefore will not seize them. When it is attempted to appoint strangers as Zabtiyies, the members of the Medjlis are opposed, saying, that natives of the district should be provided for.

"The Zabtiyies have no uniform, and, therefore, on the road cannot be known for good or for evil. The Zabtiyie not unfrequently acts the part of the robber, stopping passengers, and robbing and murdering them; while the robber again often assumes the part of the Zabtiyie, stopping passengers on the road under pretext of examining their tesarets, and then falling on them unawares. The robbers also enter the villages under the assumed character of Zabtiyies, and obtain lodgings and food for themselves and horses without payment; and happy for the villagers if the robbers content themselves with this.

"*Insufficient Pay.*—The pay of a mounted Zabtiyie is one hundred and forty piastres per month (or twenty-two shillings), for which he must provide his horse and arms, and feed himself and horse."

On this present journey I have paid as much as 8 piastres per month for

barley for the feed of one horse, morning and evening, and no where have I paid less than 3½ piastres. Therefore, supposing the Zabtiyie only to pay the lowest rate, 3½ piastres, 105 piastres is required monthly for his horse's barley, leaving 35 piastres on which to support himself and family for a month. Now this low pay does not permit a Zabtiyie to perform his duty faithfully; he cannot live on his pay, and must seek illegitimate means of supporting himself, among which tribute from robbers, and robbery itself, may be reckoned. It is true that in Christian villages, the Zabtiyie never pays for his own or his horse's food; the law says he should pay for both, but he has not the means were he willing.

But besides these defects pointed out of the Zabtiyies, it is generally believed that higher officers, even to the chiefs of districts, prevent robbers from being arrested, either directly by not taking the needful measures, or indirectly by their known indifference.

Another great obstacle to the apprehension of robbers is the number of districts into which the country is divided; each with its separate police and authorities, and the officers of one district not being allowed to act in another district. The Zabtiyies of a Pasha can no doubt act all over the Pashalic, but the Zabtiyie of a sub-Governor can only act in a sub-district. A robber therefore has only to retire into another district, after having committed a crime, and he is secure from immediate arrest. The Governor of the district wherein the crime was committed, must write to the Governor of the district into which the criminal has retired, to have him arrested. The Governor written to seldom takes any trouble in the matter, because the crime not having been committed in his district his reputation does not suffer. And perhaps he is pleased that an offence has been committed in the district of a neighbour.

Good protection from arrest and punishment.—All persons with whom I have had an opportunity of conversing, Christians and Turks, agree that everywhere hereabouts the robbers have protectors in powerful Turks, both in and out of office, and down to the common people. The motives for giving protection differ in degrees; from a partnership with the robbers and sharing the plunder, to a mere desire of protecting the Turk from being punished for an offence against a Christian, and to hinder the late reforms, which give protection to Christians from being carried into effect.

In every Medjlis (Municipal Councils), and in every district, the person is openly named who is the chief protector of the robbers. But even when the protectors of robbers are known, it must still be difficult to ascertain the motives of each person, and in what degree he is influenced by interest, relationship, and friendship, or the hatred of Christians and opposition to reforms for their protection. I consider, however, that all Turks of the old school, that is, those opposed to reforms for the benefit of the Christians, see these robberies and murders of Christians with no unfavourable eye; and if they do not instigate to the committal of these crimes, they at least do all in their power to screen the criminals from arrest and punishment. This I believe to be the great difficulty of putting down these robberies and murders now so frequent. But besides the mere hatred of Christians there is a powerful class of Turks in Bulgaria (and probably all over Turkey), who have interested motives for preventing the reforms for the protection of Christians coming into force. These are the great landed proprietors, who even now in some instances oblige the Christians to cultivate their land, secure their crops, &c., without payment. Then there are all the Turks, and some Christians also, who are in the habit of taking the "ietisams" or tithes; who at present profit by the unprotected state of the Christians to take more from them than they are entitled to take, and which they will not be able to do once the reforms are real.

How it comes about it is difficult to explain, but certain it is that the Christians have got the idea that the Tanzimat is the cause of the great increase of murders and robberies; whenever I have asked the Christians to what they attribute the great increase of robbery of late, they have always answered, "to the Tanzimat." They say that since it was put in force the Pashas and Turks in office have no longer the power to punish robbers and murderers, and thence the great increase.

With regard to the means of putting an end to the robberies, I will commence by the most important point, although the last in order; that is, the punishment of the criminals. In order that there may be a chance of justice being done, the trial must be taken entirely out of the hands of the local tribunals or Medjlis: on the members of which local influence, old prejudices and interest are so strong, and a Commission or Commissioners should be sent from Constantinople to judge the criminals. The sentence of death should be passed in every case of murder where clearly proved, and in some cases of abduction, and inexorably carried into execution. The manner of execution should be by hanging; and, if possible, in some cases the body should be ordered to be hung in chains, to render the crime infamous, and to be a memorial to the living. As to leaving the body of the criminal exposed, this would not be a novelty but a revival: twenty years ago, on the borders of Servia, I saw exposed on waggon wheels on the point of stakes, three several skeletons. No person should be condemned to death who had not committed murder or been guilty of cruelty, however large the amount he might have robbed.

But besides the actual robbers it would be necessary to inquire for and bring to punishment all their aiders, abettors, and protectors, Turks and Christians, and the Commission sent should have special instructions to attend to this. All such as came within the scope of the criminal law should be proceeded against criminally; and some who had not brought themselves within the scope of the criminal law, should still be removed from the district (for a time at least) as perturbators of the peace.

As to the means of taking the robbers, I consider that it would be necessary to send a person of standing, with authority both in Bulgaria and Roumelia, and that he should have a special corps of Zabtiyies with him; the authorities of the different districts to have to assist him in every way, and with the Zabtiyies of the district. But as it is important that the chief robbers should be taken, their names should be obtained and a liberal reward should be offered for their apprehension, and be paid to Zabtiyies or others who took them dead or alive. As an encouragement to the Zabtiyies, a certain reward should be given for any robber they seized, payable on conviction of the robber.

No doubt it would be well to reform the local Zabtiyies by giving them an adequate pay, a uniform, and by employing persons who have no local ties.

The Pashas and other local Governors should have more security of office, and be more protected than they seem to be against the Medjlis or local Councils, in order to be able to do their duty faithfully. There is always some person in the Medjlis of greater influence than the others, he therefore generally commands a majority in the Medjlis; the Pasha or Governor must then either put himself under the protection of this person, and do his bidding, or the Medjlis opposes the Governor in everything he wishes to do. The consequence then is that the affairs of the district are badly managed and get into confusion; and on this, although caused by itself, the Medjlis sends complaints against the Governor to Constantinople. At Constantinople there are always many waiting for a vacancy, who eagerly support the complaint, and the Governor falls a victim to the influential men of the Medjlis. The succeeding Governor enters on office, and holds it on condition of conforming to the will of the great men of the Medjlis, who thus governs the district to his own profit, and without responsibility.

In order to put down the robberies in these parts, the persons having the charge must have no expectation or desire of making friends in the locality; they must not be afraid of the enemies they may make; they must be firmly supported at Constantinople; they must have the will and the nerve to do their duty. On these terms robberies will soon be put down; otherwise, little or nothing can be done.

But in order to insure that the persons charged do their duty, they must know that full and correct accounts of their proceedings will reach Constantinople. This can only be insured by your Lordship keeping agents where necessary, to give information.

There can be little doubt that Christians are sometimes concerned in committing robberies and murders on travellers, but they never do so alone; they only assist the Turks, and then they also disguise themselves as Turks: they also shelter and feed the Turkish robbers, but this they no doubt do more often from fear than from love, or even interest.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 16 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Giurgevo, December 11, 1854.

My Lord,

I ARRIVED here on the afternoon of Saturday, the 9th instant. Yesterday the post from Constantinople arrived here, and as it did not bring any fresh instructions from your Lordship for me, I will now proceed to my post at Galatz and Ibraila. I intend to set off the day after to-morrow, but will again address your Lordship from this place. I give this to M. Ionides, the Vice-Consul, to go forward, should any express to your Lordship be passing.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 17 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Giurgevo, December 12, 1854.

My Lord,

AS I have alluded to the practice among the Turks of depriving Christians of their property by means of false witnesses, I have here to state that according to what has been told me, the practice is so common as regards cattle, that a Christian can hardly consider his horse or his cow as his own. However, as I did not make any particular inquiries on this point, I can only cite two instances which were particularised to me.

At Shumla, on the 14th ultimo, a person informed me that a relation of his had purchased four oxen from a Christian, and two days after the purchaser was called to the Mekhemet by a Turk, who said the oxen were his and had been stolen from him. In support of his claim he brought forward his own nephew, who swore simply that the oxen were his uncle's property, but without specifying when they had been lost, nor any other particulars. The oxen thereon were adjudged to the Turk by the Cadi. The Christian possessor had present the Christian of whom he had purchased the oxen, and who had had them in his possession five months, and, I believe, the former possessor, also a Christian was present, but they were informed that testimony of Christians could not be heard.

At Sistova, on the 6th instant, a doctor called on me; he was boiling over with indignation at an act of injustice he had that day witnessed at the Mekhemet. A Christian, a poor man, had bought an ass, which a Turk claimed as belonging to him; at the Mekhemet the Turk produced one witness, who simply swore that the ass belonged to the Turk; the Cadi merely asked him if he were quite sure of the ass; the witness answered, I have sworn to it. On which the Cadi pronounced sentence—"Give the ass to the Turk, it belongs to him."

The Christian was provided with witnessess; the man of whom he had bought the ass, and who had got it four months before when it was quite a colt, also the man who had previously possessed it. The doctor said to the Cadi, "Will you not hear the witnesses of the Christian?" to which the Cadi replied, "The law forbids it." The Cadi, I am told, is reckoned a sensible man, and of liberal ideas, but such is the law.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 18 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Giurgevo, December 12, 1854.

My Lord,

THE following instance of the Guards or Zabtiyies committing murder and and robbery was related to me in Turnova. It is true that, in this instance, the Zabtiyies did not succeed in the robbery.

About two months ago a merchant, the nephew of the Archbishop of Turnova, was travelling between Plevna and Rahova; he had four persons with him as guards. When about six hours distant from Rahova, the party met seven Turks on horseback, who first allowed them to pass, and then turned round on them and ordered them to show their "tescarets," declaring they, the Turks, were a Baloük-bashi, and his party. To this the party of the merchant replied, that there on the road they would not show their "tescarets;" that they did not know that the other party were really of the police; that if they were so they had only to follow them to a village which was near, and there they might examine their papers.

The party of the Baloük-bashi, however, insisted on seeing their "tescarets" at once, and was about to attack the other party, when one of the guards of the merchant, an Albanian, dismounted from his horse, and placing himself behind it, threatened to shoot any of the other party who advanced. This kept in check the party of the Baloük-bashi for some time, by which the merchant and his three remaining guards profiting, they set spurs to their horses and fled, abandoning the Albanian to his fate. They were soon pursued, however, by a portion of the party of the Baloük-bashi, who got so near to the fugitives as to be able to shoot one of them dead; he was a Mussulman gipsy. The other three made good their escape. The Albanian after a time yielded himself prisoner.

The Turkish party was really a Baloük-bashi, with six Zabtiyies. My informant told me that some of them had the indiscretion to avow that they intended to have murdered the whole of the merchant's party, for the sake of robbing them; had they succeeded, the crime would no doubt have been laid to the charge of robbers unknown.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 19 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Giurgevo, December 12, 1854.

My Lord,

IN Bulgária there is no relaxation of the old restraints to the celebration of the rites of the Christian religion.

In a large village in the district of Turnova, composed partly of Christians and partly of Turks, there is no church. The Christians of the village applied to the Pasha for permission to build a church, which the Pasha granted. The Turks of the village, however, prevent the church from being commenced, and remonstrated with the Pasha for having granted the permission. As the Pasha would not recall the permission, the Turks have sent a complaint against him to Constantinople, and in this state the affair is at present.

I was well aware that the use of bells was prohibited, but I thought that the use of the sounding-board was permitted to Christian churches all over Turkey, the same as in Constantinople; such is not the case, however, and the use of the board is not permitted in Bulgaria.

Some time back the Archbishop of Turnova obtained a firman permitting the use of the board in the Greek churches of that town; but when the Turks learnt this, they signified to the Archbishop that they would oppose the execution of the firman; therefore the Christians did not attempt to introduce the use of the board. The Pasha encouraged the Archbishop to carry out the firman, but the Archbishop refused to do so at the risk of causing a demonstration of the Turks against the churches and Christians.

I was informed that the Greeks of a neighbouring town (Plevna, I believe) had got a similar firman some time back, and were determined to give force to it notwithstanding the enmities of the Turks; the board was accordingly fixed in a small wooden tower. When, however, the person commenced to sound the board at the dawn of day, he was fired on by several Turks lying in wait for him, and shot; since then, the attempt to sound the board has not been renewed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 20 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Giurgevo, December 14, 1854.

My Lord,

MY previous letters have, I hope, given your Lordship a tolerably correct idea of the state of the country through which I have travelled, as regards robberies.

I regret to have to state that, according to all accounts, the Pashalic of Widdin and all the upper part of Bulgaria, from the Danube to the Balkans, is in a much worse position, as regards murders and robberies, than the portion I have visited. I am told that the Christian inhabitants are much more oppressed and ill-treated in the Pashalic of Widdin, both by the authorities and by the Turks generally, than in the districts situate lower down the Danube, and all over that Pashalic the old custom still prevails that a Christian on horseback must dismount when he sees a Turk coming, and stand until the Turk passes.

There does not appear to be any pass over the Balkans through which a Christian native of the country can pass without great risk of being robbed and murdered.

I may add that, from what I hear, the part of Roumelia which is near the Balkans, is in quite as bad a state as regards robberies as any part of Bulgaria.

It would appear that robbers never attack persons travelling with post-horses; at least, I have never heard of any instance of the kind. I have heard that the post carrying the letters was plundered in Bulgaria six or eight months ago.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 21 in No. 313.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Ibraila, December 30, 1854.

My Lord,

IN my letter of the 14th instant from Giurgevo, I mentioned that, according to information I had received, the lot of the Christians was much more wretched in the Pashalic of Widdin than in the district I had visited. Yesterday, I saw the Austrian Vice-Consul, who has resided some years at Sofia, and who arrived here yesterday from that place; his description of the sufferings and indignities to which the Christians in and around that place (in the Pashalic of Nissa) are exposed, is such as to cause horror and indignation. According to his account, the honour of the Christian women, married and virgins, is daily outraged by the Turks, and the young children taken from their parent and made Mahometans. Robberies, murders, and every sort of oppression, is there practised on the Christians.

M. Martyrt, the Austrian Vice-Consul, found the country in the same state all the way from Sofia to the Danube at Nicopolis. On passing through the town of Plevna, he was informed that seven Christians had been murdered in that town a few days before, and no inquiry had been made by the authorities. He particularly mentioned Yenga, the Governor of Racova, as a great oppressor, or rather a monster, of cruelty, and this description agrees with what I heard of him when at Turnova.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

No. 314.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 79.)

My Lord,

Vienna, February 24, 1855.

IN conformity with your Lordship's direction, contained in your despatch No. 51 of the 15th instant, that the despatch of Her Majesty's Minister at Munich, No. 14 of the 10th instant, should be communicated to Count Buol, I placed it in his hands. His Excellency, after perusing it, desired me to make his acknowledgments to your Lordship for this interesting communication, and to state that the circumstances related by Sir John Milbanke were, as far as he was informed, perfectly correct; that he had lately received very friendly assurances from the Bavarian Government, and he relied upon their carrying out, if the occasion should call for it, the sentiments they had expressed.

Count Buol said that the Bavarian Government were always pressing for information since the meeting of the allied Ministers with Prince Gortchakoff on the 7th of January, and that he had no other reply to give them, except that he had nothing to report to them, for that, since that time, nothing of any importance, or affecting any changes in the position of the parties concerned, had taken place. At the same time, Count Buol said that he gave the Bavarian Government the assurance that he would not fail in keeping them informed of any result which might be arrived at after the opening of the negotiations, and in accompanying such information with the explanations it might require, whether the report he should have to make would be of a tendency to encourage a hope of a successful termination of the negotiations, or of the probability of their being concluded without the attainment of a satisfactory peace.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 315.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 229.)

My Lord,

Paris, February 27, 1855.

COUNT HATZFELDT called yesterday morning upon M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and informed him that he was commissioned, in conjunction with General Wedel, to enter into communication with the French Government respecting the project of Treaty which had been placed in the latter's hands by the Emperor, as I had the honour to state to your Lordship in my despatch No. 139 of the 16th instant. Count Hatzfeldt accompanied this announcement by the extraordinary addition, that the King of Prussia had been much gratified by the invitation of the Emperor, conveyed through General Wedel, to resume his place in the Conferences at Vienna; an invitation which the Prussian Government hoped that M. Drouyn de Lhuys would have no objection to repeat in writing to Count Hatzfeldt.

It is almost needless, after the communications which have passed between Her Majesty's and the French Governments, that I should state to your Lordship how greatly General Wedel, probably from being an imperfect French scholar, has exaggerated what passed between the Emperor and himself. I believe the facts to be, that General Wedel, on receiving the draft of Treaty from the Emperor, expressed doubts, in consequence of the King of Prussia's susceptibility about the Vienna Conferences, of His Majesty's entering into further engagements before receiving an invitation to take part in those Conferences, from which His Majesty considered himself to have been excluded, and that the Emperor, pointing to the draft which he had given the General, rejoined, "There is my invitation," or words to that effect.

However this may be, M. Drouyn de Lhuys stated to Count Hatzfeldt that the Emperor's words had been misinterpreted, and that His Majesty intended to say no more than that, if the Treaty was accepted by Prussia, a

Prussian Plenipotentiary would naturally assist at the Conferences; that if he (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) was to address a note to Count Hatzfeldt, he could only make the desired invitation depend on the previous acceptance of the Treaty, for that the French and English Governments maintained their determination not to admit a Prussian Plenipotentiary to the Conferences, until the King of Prussia had bound himself by more positive engagements in respect to the war. He thought, however, if the King of Prussia's dignity could be saved thereby, that an arrangement might be made, by which the terms of a Treaty might be discussed and settled; and this having been done, and a binding declaration obtained from Prussia that so soon as she had resumed her place in the Conferences, such Treaty should be signed, there would not be the same objection to issuing such an invitation as His Prussian Majesty desired. Perhaps, as there was now but little time to be lost, Count Hatzfeldt would refer to his Government upon this point, and in the meantime the discussions between himself, Count Hatzfeldt, and General Wedel, might be begun and continued.

I understand Count Hatzfeldt to have agreed to this course, and to have fixed to-day for the first meeting.

It appears to be the wish of the Prussian Government to make separate Treaties with England and France.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether Count Hatzfeldt had given him reason to suppose that the French draft had found favour at Berlin. His Excellency replied, that he had been induced to hope, from M. de Moustier's despatches, that such had been the case; but that Count Hatzfeldt's language, although very general, had not been satisfactory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 316.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 171.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 29, 1855.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of the instructions which you addressed on the 31st of October and 14th of November last, to M. Pisani, respecting the state of the Turkish army at Kars, and your Excellency will no doubt direct him to ascertain how far your requests have been acted upon by the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 317.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 123.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 19, 1855.

IN one of the despatches recently addressed to me by General Williams, and I believe to your Lordship also, there is a statement which has obtained, as in truth it deserved to do, my immediate and active attention. In reply to information conveyed to him by me, that I had successfully interfered to dissuade the Porte from weakening the army at Kars, by employing any part of it in the suppression of Yezdasheer Bey's revolt, he affirms that Shukri Pasha had actually withdrawn a detachment for that purpose from the important fort of Toprak-Kalé, and that he had done so in execution of instructions from Constantinople.

On the receipt of the Commissioner's despatch, I addressed an instruction to M. Pisani, explaining the circumstances in question, and directing him to demand a full and distinct explanation from the Grand Vizier.

Copies of this instruction and of M. Pisani's report are inclosed herewith, for your Lordship's information.

It is matter of regret that Reshid Pasha allowed so important a step as the withdrawal of a portion, however comparatively small, of the army at Kars, from the defensive positions which it occupies, to be taken without the knowledge of Her Majesty's Embassy, and I intend to apprise him in becoming language of my opinion in that respect.

He appears to have been ignorant of the mission given by General Williams to Mahmoud Effendi, whose success—if he obtain any success—will probably be derived from a declaration hazarded with his habitual zeal by Her Majesty's Commissioner, but which, in so far as my information extends, will be more likely to end in delusion than to be justified by reality.

I refer to that part of the Commissioner's instruction to Mahmoud Effendi, which authorised him to intimate to Yezdasheer Bey the expected arrival of an allied force, not only to attack the Russians, but to put down the Koordish revolt.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 317.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Sir, *British Embassy, February* 17, 1855.

YOU informed me some little time ago, that the Grand Vizier had expressed his intention to send a detachment from the army at Kars against the Koordish rebel chief, Yezdasheer Bey. I desired you to request that his Highness would give up that intention, which could not be carried into effect without weakening the frontier army, and exposing it hereafter to an attack from the enemy. I advised, at the same time, that troops should be sent with all practicable dispatch from Constantinople, and that joined by others from Syria, they should march by way of Aleppo against the Koords. You assured me afterwards that my proposal had been accepted, and that a detachment from the Sultan's forces in the province of Bagdad would also be sent to the same destination.

Notwithstanding these communications and assurances, I learn from Brigadier-General Williams that a regiment of Infantry, a regiment of Cavalry, and a battery of six guns, had been ordered to leave Toprak-Kalé, and to advance upon Sert and Jezirah.

Besides the contradiction which is thus shown to exist between fact and assurance, it appears that Toprak-Kalé is the most important outpost of the Kars army; that the detachment could never reach its destination, owing to the deep snow and intense cold; and finally, that so hazardous a measure as the one in question was adopted without reference to the opinion of the British Commissioner, and by orders transmitted from Constantinople.

You will read what precedes to Reshid Pasha, and you will express the deep concern with which I contemplate this inconsistency of conduct on the part of Government over which he presides. You will prepare him for the impression which will be made in England by a knowledge of the circumstances, and you will observe how impossible it is for the allies to act with any confidence of success, or to provide for their own responsibility, if the principal functionaries of the Porte exhibit so lamentable a want of fair dealing and common prudence.

You will draw up an official report of his Highness' reply, and you will ascertain its correctness, by reading it over to him before you send it to me for transmission to the Earl of Clarendon.

Your, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 317.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, February* 28, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have, in pursuance of your Excellency's directions, read and explained, word for word, to Reshid Pasha, your instructions to me of yesterday's date.

His Highness, far from denying your Excellency's statement, has fully confirmed it; but he does not accept the charge of having dealt inconsistently and unfairly with Her Majesty's Embassy. He said, that the order to Shukri Pasha to detach a brigade from the frontier, and send it against the Koordish rebel chief, was forwarded long before your Excellency had made any representation to the Porte on the subject; that subsequently, on your suggestions, the Council having decided upon adopting them, the Seraskier sent a counter-order to Shukri Pasha, to abstain from disposing of any of the troops under his command, and informing him that the Porte had adopted other measures to quell the disturbances in question. Besides, the Grand Vizier himself gave verbal instructions to the new Commander-in-chief, two days previous to his departure, to prevent any of the troops of the army at Kars or Erzeroom leaving their posts.

As to the non-reference to the opinion of the British Commissioner, his Highness observed that Shukri Pasha was not bound to do so, because the orders he received from his superiors were peremptory, and consequently could on no account disregard them without swerving from his duty. The British Commissioner, added he, has a right to be consulted on matters immediately connected with the army in general, but not to interfere with orders issued direct from the Porte to its own officers on internal questions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

P.S.—Having read the whole of this report to Reshid Pasha, he found it to be in perfect accordance with what he said to me.

E. P.

No. 318.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 134. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 28, 1855.*

THE meeting of which I had the honour to speak to your Lordship in my despatch No. 229 of the 27th instant, took place yesterday between M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Count Haltzfeldt, and General Wedel.

Before entering on the general discussion of the Treaty proposed by France for the acceptance of the Prussian Government, Count Hatzfeldt asked whether M. Drouyn de Lhuys would object to an alteration of the terms of the Protocol of the 28th December, to which reference is made in the 1st Article.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied at once that he could not consent to any proposition of the kind. It contained an interpretation of the four Articles, which had since been accepted by Russia, and any alteration proposed by Prussia must have the effect of strengthening or of weakening that interpretation. But the allies could not, with loyalty, add to the stringency of an interpretation on which they had consented to treat with Russia, and if, as was more probable, the Prussian Government were desirous of weakening its sense, they were, in fact, showing themselves to be more Russian than the Russians themselves. His Excellency considered this objection alone to be fatal to the proposal; but if that was not sufficient, what chance, he asked, could there be of any successful issue to negotiations, the bases of which were comprehended by five out of the six parties concerned, in one sense, and by the sixth in another.

Count Hatzfeldt replied that it would be useless to open any discussion on the Treaty, if this was the decision of the French Government, as his instructions obliged him to insist on a modification of the Protocol in question.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys rejoined that he considered his reasoning to be so conclusive that it could not fail of obtaining the concurrence of the King of Prussia when laid before His Majesty. He, therefore, engaged M. de Hatzfeldt to refer to Berlin, and in the meantime to begin confidential discussion of the terms of the Treaty itself.

Count Haltzfeldt having agreed to this course asked for an alteration in the wording of the preamble. On referring to it your Lordship will find that it is

proposed to conclude "un Traité d'Alliance." The Prussian Government objects to the word "alliance," and demands its omission, and suggests other changes in the wording which weaken essentially the object for which the Treaty is to be concluded.

In the 1st Article the Prussian Government requires that all reference to the right which the allies have reserved to themselves of putting forward in the interests of Europe other conditions than those contained in the four Articles should be omitted, and they propose such an alteration in the wording of the second as would render it impossible to ask for the active military cooperation of Prussia, unless she consented to breaking off negotiations.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys of course combatted the whole of these pretensions, and here the conversation (for it was not to be considered in any other light) terminated, the Prussian Representatives saying that they would renew it on the remaining Articles another day. The impression left upon M. Drouyn de Lhuys' mind is, that these discussions will lead to no result, because he has reason to believe that even if these points, and others which will probably be raised in the remaining Articles, should be settled, the King of Prussia is still determined to insist on some engagements being taken with respect to Poland, and to the passage of French troops through Germany, as a *sine qua non* to the signature of any Treaty.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether M. de Hatzfeldt had informed him more particularly of the modifications which the Prussian Government desired to introduce into the Protocol of the 28th of December. He replied that the Count did not offer to read them to him, until after he (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) had refused to admit of any, and that he had thought it would weaken his position if he had then consented to listen to them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S.—The text of the proposed alterations will be sent to Count Walewski for communication to your Lordship.

No. 319.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 62. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 28, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a confidential communication from St. Petersburgh, containing some information concerning the increased defences at Cronstadt, and also an allusion to the sufferings of the Russian forces in the Crimea, which may not be without interest to Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 319.

Extract from a Confidential Letter, dated St. Petersburgh, February 8, 1855.

THE fleet at Cronstadt is not to be manned this year, and the sailors are to be employed on board the gun-boats, of which a great number are being built. In the island are upwards of 15,000 soldiers and sailors. They have built four new large batteries, I believe on the north side, and all the old ones have been repaired and strengthened; preparations are ten times greater than last year. The Government have made a contract for the delivery of 80,000 square fathoms of stone; these will be employed to block up the passage from Kronslot to Riesebank, about a verst and a quarter from the island; in fact, on both sides of Cronstadt, no vessels except those of very small draught will be able to approach nearer to the island itself than seven versts, for the stone will be placed across the channel, leaving a depth at low tide of only 1 foot of water, and when the

water is higher, from 4 to 6 feet. My informant had seen the infernal machines tried upon an old barge, but did not consider them very effective, and thought it would be a failure. The explosive powder is made by a great humbug, yclept Jacobi, and the caissons by one Dobell, a Swede, at St. Petersburgh. He was also informed by more than one Russian officer that all the batteries were to be removed from Revel, as they thought that the place, if left unprotected, would not be so likely to provoke an attack, and might therefore escape, as they felt that they could not eventually defend it. There is a great deal of distress and discontent here at present, and all persons are heartily sick of the war. In the course of a few weeks we shall hear of stirring events.

I trust that matters are at present wearing a brighter aspect in the Crimea, though I believe that the Russians have suffered much more than our men. One of the Russian Sœurs de Charité lately wrote, saying that there were 20,000 sick at Simpheropol; and in conducting a body of 3,000 men to that place from Sebastopol, a medical man asserted that only 850 reached the place alive. The wife of this person mentioned this to Mr. Yeames, who lately arrived here on his way to England from Taganrog and Odessa. They have also a want of water at Simpheropol.

No. 320.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 65.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 28, 1855.*

HAVING received information from Mr. Bligh, Her Majesty's Minister at Hanover, that a number of cases of arms, chiefly Colt's revolvers, were about to be forwarded through the Prussian dominions to Russia, I felt it my duty to call Baron Manteuffel's attention to the fact; and I have the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship copy of a note which I addressed to his Excellency on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 320.

Lord Bloomfield to Baron Manteuffel.

Berlin, February 27, 1855.

THE Undersigned, &c., has the honour to inform his Excellency Baron Manteuffel, &c., that he has received information that twenty cases of arms, marked "E. N. D.," weighing 3,954 lbs., and containing Colt's revolvers, had arrived at Harburg on the 24th instant, and were forwarded on the 25th instant from Hamburgh, *viâ* Berlin, on their way to Russia, to Dirschau, addressed "C. Stobbe," of that place.

The Undersigned hastens to communicate this intelligence to his Excellency, and avails, &c

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 321.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, March 1, 1855.*

THE Emperor of Russia is very ill. He has an attack of grippe, which left him in such a state of weakness that his life is considered in danger.

Lord John suggests that Lord Lyndhurst might be requested to defer his motion, in consequence of the critical state of affairs.

No. 322.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, March 2, 1855.*

THE Emperor of Russia died at 12·10 this day.

No. 323.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 26. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Copenhagen, February 24, 1855.*

I HAVE been informed by one of my colleagues that M. de Scheel has expressed to him great confidence in the prospect of an immediate re-establishment of peace, and that his Excellency mentioned, among other grounds on which this feeling was founded, the language which has been lately held by Count Buol. It would appear, according to my informant, that from the reports received from Vienna by M. de Scheel, the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs had expressed an opinion in his communications with the Diplomatic corps, that the allies must not be too difficult in their interpretation of the four points; and this language is attributed here to the attitude of the German Confederation, and to a fear on the part of Austria that she may not succeed in inducing the Diet to be guided entirely by the policy which she may think fit to adopt. M. de Scheel has not made any communication of this kind to myself, although he professes to hope that peace may be re-established; but it is far from improbable that M. de Bille-Brahe, whose reports, since the commencement of the Eastern question, have been invariably peaceful, and have always been contradicted by events, may have written in the sense which I have mentioned above. The Prussian Minister here is also, I have no doubt, industriously spreading reports of a similar character, and the present "cry" in society is a lamentation on the unfortunate position of Austria in the hands of the Western Powers, who are driving her to war in spite of herself, by the threat of unchaining the revolution in Hungary and Italy, if she hesitates in the course which they are determined she shall pursue.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 324.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 29. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Copenhagen, February 24, 1855.*

AN intelligent Danish officer, with whom I have lately had some conversation, is of opinion that, if Denmark is obliged to send a contingent to the army of the German Confederation, German troops will be selected for the service, and that as the skeletons of the regiments likely to be employed are now in Zealand, the contingent will be organized in the neighbourhood of Copenhagen, and consequently, considering the present difficulty of communicating with the different parts of the Monarchy, at least a month will elapse before the men, and the horses required for the Artillery and the Cavalry, can be collected. The contingent will amount, I understand, to 3,600 men. On my inquiring of my informant how many men were now under arms throughout the Monarchy, he said certainly not more than 8,000; but this force, he added, with the present staff of officers in active service, and the present organization of the army, might be raised to 35,000 in the course of a couple of months.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 325.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 30.)

My Lord, *Copenhagen, February 24, 1855.*

I HAVE made M. de Scheel acquainted with the contents of your Lordship's despatch No. 16 of the 3rd instant, wherein you express the regret of Her Majesty's Government that Denmark should be pursuing a course adverse to Austria in the Diet at Frankfort, and thus indirectly encouraging Prussia to persevere in a course which, by disuniting Germany, will render the war general.

His Excellency defended himself against any intention of supporting either one or the other of the Great German Powers by the instructions which he sent to the Danish Plenipotentiary with respect to the question lately under discussion in the Diet. He said that if Denmark might have voted, if a certain contingency had arisen in opposition to the wishes of Austria, the Danish Government would only have been actuated by a sincere and honest opinion as to the duties and obligations of the Confederation in such circumstances, and that his instructions to M. de Bulow, with respect to the immediate mobilizing of the army of the Confederation, were accompanied by others directing him to lend himself to every arrangement by which the two Great Powers could be reconciled and the unity of Germany preserved.

With reference to this subject, I may mention in corroboration of M. de Scheel's assurances to M. de Dotezac and myself of the readiness of Denmark to fulfil her Federal obligations, that the Minister of War, in a late debate in the Folkething upon the Budget of the War Department, while defending the number of officers on the active list of the army, observed that their services, if not at present required, would soon be so, as he would probably, in the course of a few days, have to call upon the Chamber to sanction the arrangements which would be necessary for preparing the Federal contingent of the Danish army for service in the field.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 326.

Sir R. Abercromby to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 2.)

(Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *The Hague, February 26, 1855.*

THE Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg is at this moment involved in some discussions with that of Prussia, with reference to matters connected with the Zollverein, which they are anxious to get adjusted in a manner less onerous for the interests of the Grand Duchy.

M. Simons, the President of the Government of Luxemburg, who is still here, had recently a visit from my Prussian colleague, Count Königsmark, previous to his departure from hence for Berlin, whither he has gone to take his seat as a member of the Upper House, to which branch of the Prussian Legislature he has just been named by His Prussian Majesty, having been selected by his Sovereign from amongst the other members of the Königsmark family to represent, for his life, the Königsmark family in the Prussian House of Nobles.

In the course of this visit M. Simons adverted to the discussions pending between the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and the Zollverein, and expressed the hope that as Count Königsmark was on the point of proceeding to Berlin, he would avail himself of that visit to contribute his good offices towards facilitating a satisfactory arrangement of the points in dispute between the two Governments, and to induce the Prussian Government to show towards Luxemburg a somewhat more friendly feeling than had recently been exhibited.

Your Lordship will no doubt be surprised to learn that the substance of Count König-mark's reply was to the effect, that so long as the Government of

the King Grand Duke did not more cordially support the policy of Prussia in German affairs, the Government of Luxemburg must not expect that Prussia would be disposed to show greater favour or interest for the concerns of Luxemburg than she had recently done.

This answer Count Königsmark has since substantially renewed in writing to M. Simons, who, I have reason to believe, will consider the communication to be of such importance as to render it his duty to lay this letter officially before his Sovereign the King Grand Duke.

The King Grand Duke, I have no doubt, will lose no time in desiring that this document should be officially transmitted to his Excellency M. Van Hall, for the information of the Netherlands Government, thus following the official routine in the usual transaction of business between the King's Government at the Hague and the Grand Duke's Government at Luxemburg.

What course his Excellency M. Van Hall may deem it to be his duty to advise his Sovereign to adopt with reference to ulterior proceedings connected with this incident, is at present undetermined; but I am in a position to assure your Lordship that M. Van Hall, on learning the above facts, fully appreciated the highly indecorous and offensive nature of the Prussian Minister's communication, and the character of menace which it bears.

Your Lordship will form your own opinion as to the importance which this incident has with reference to this country, and to its position as an independent State, and I therefore abstain from offering any reflections on that point.

But when I sum up together all the various circumstances which it has been my duty to report to your Lordship of late, with regard to the conduct of the Prussian Court and Government, and of their Representatives, ordinary and extraordinary, in this country, I will venture, even at the risk of being thought too prolix, to remark to your Lordship how actively hostile the Court and Government of Prussia are, if their Representatives are to be considered as their faithful and authorized organs abroad, to the policy pursued, and to the cause that is upheld by the Governments of Great Britain and of France in the contest in which they are at present engaged.

Your Lordship will be better able than I can be to distinguish in all these transactions the share that reverts to the Prussian Court and to the Kreuz party, on one side, from that which appertains to the Prussian Government, on the other; or to both if they are to be considered as forming a single and united Government; but it is impossible to shut our eyes to the fact, that so long as such proceedings are tolerated, and that the agents employed to carry them out are not only not disavowed, but that they are specially selected as objects for particular marks of favour and of protection by the Sovereign in whose service they are engaged, it is clear that no reliance can be placed in the sincerity of the assurances given by Prussia of her wish to unite herself with the objects or policy of the Western Powers or of their allies; nor can we hope to receive at her hands anything but deceptive propositions, put forward for the sole object of secretly assisting the enemy that is opposed to us, and to gain time during which she may, with greater effect and success, carry out her underhand intrigues to counteract our interests, wherever any chance of doing so may seem to her to offer.

The Hague has been the scene of her most recent exploits in this course of policy, and although I am happy in being able to express to your Lordship my belief that her attempts have in this instance signally failed, enough has come to our knowledge to establish beyond a doubt that the Western Powers and their allies have no more active or uncompromising enemy engaged against them than the Court and Government of Prussia, on all matters connected with Eastern affairs, or those which may have for their object the reducing the Emperor of Russia to the necessity of making peace on such terms as can alone satisfy the allies, and enable them to offer to the acceptance of Europe a settlement that shall effectually secure her from a renewal of that aggressive policy on the part of Russia which has unhappily disturbed the general tranquillity of Europe, and rendered the position of some States insecure and precarious.

Since writing the above it has come to my knowledge that M. Simons has drawn up and laid before the King Grand Duke a detailed report on the subject of the grievances which Luxemburg has to complain of against Prussia, to which is annexed, with commentary, the letter of Count Königsmark, to which I have already alluded in a preceding portion of this despatch.

I have also reason to believe that yesterday a conference took place, at which were present His Netherlands Majesty, his Excellency M. Van Hall, and M. Simons, but not His Royal Highness Prince Henry, who was absent at Rotterdam with the Princess; and that at the above-mentioned conference the conduct of Prussia towards Luxemburg was fully discussed.

I shall endeavour, if possible, to learn what decision was then come to, and I shall not fail, if successful, to communicate it immediately to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RA. ABERCROMBY.

No. 327.

Sir R. Abercromby to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 2.)

(Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *The Hague, February 26, 1855.*

MY despatch marked Secret and Confidential, dated yesterday, will have put your lordship in possession of the details connected with the incident that has recently occurred here, with reference to the conduct pursued by Count Königsmark relative to the affairs and position of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.

I therein stated to your Lordship that a conference had been held upon this subject between His Netherlands Majesty, his Excellency M. Van Hall, and M. Simons, and that I hoped to be able to inform you in a subsequent despatch of the determination come to in that conference.

I am now happy to be able to report to your Lordship that I have learnt, on confidential authority, on which I can rely, that this affair has followed exactly the course which I had previously indicated it would take, with reference to the preliminary steps required to bring it officially before His Netherlands Majesty's Government at the Hague.

The King's Government have not failed to appreciate the gravity of this affair,—to perceive the importance of the language employed by Count Königsmark on this occasion, if authorized by his Government, and the character of menace which under such circumstances it would unquestionably bear.

His Netherlands Majesty and his Government determined in the conference above alluded to, that an official communication upon this subject shall be addressed by the Cabinet of the Hague to that of Berlin, detailing all the circumstances of this case, and communicating the language employed by Count Königsmark in his letter to M. Simons.

The Government of His Netherlands Majesty will state, while they make their communication and seek for satisfactory explanations with regard to it at the hands of the Prussian Cabinet, their readiness to believe that in the affair in question Count Königsmark has been led to give utterance to his own personal and private opinions, not to the avowed and official instructions of his Government.

Your Lordship will, I think, approve of this course, which I have reason to believe it is the intention of the Netherlands Government to pursue in the management of this affair: it is calm and firm, and leaves the King's Government at liberty to adopt such further measures in vindication of the dignity and independence of the Netherlands as may be considered necessary after the reply of the Prussian Government to the representations of the Cabinet of the Hague shall have been received, should such a course be deemed expedient. This matter, therefore, remains for the moment on the above footing.

Before closing however my present despatch, your Lordship will perhaps allow me to add a few observations with regard to the particular position of this Government in this business, and to state what, from my own knowledge of their feelings with regard to it, would, I am confident, be agreeable to them as regards any immediate support which friendly Governments might be disposed to afford them at Berlin.

As I have already reported to your Lordship, I am satisfied that both on the part of His Netherlands Majesty himself, and on that of his Government, every disposition exists to do all that is necessary to uphold alike the dignity and the independence of this country in its relations with neighbouring States, and particularly with Prussia, whose long-practised system of attempts to exercise a preponderating influence here, is keenly felt and openly avowed.

I cannot, therefore, doubt that under the able management of M. Van Hall, whose personal position is also somewhat attacked by the recent proceedings of Count Königsmark, this affair will receive all the attention, and be met with all the firmness, which it so clearly deserves.

Such being the case, it would be for the honour and for the proper respect due to an independent Government, that their representations at Berlin should, for the present at all events, bear all the character of being uninfluenced by the advice or assistance of other Governments, and the Netherlands Government are, I am confident, extremely anxious to avoid all appearance of allowing whatever causes of complaint may exist between them and the Government of Prussia to become, in the present state of European politics, a source of increased difficulty or discussion between the Cabinet of Berlin and those of other States.

Such feeling, on the part of the Netherlands Government, I am certain your Lordship will not only approve of, but respect; and in expressing them, I have only to add that which I am satisfied would also be the wish of the Netherlands Government, though they are at the same time fully sensible of the active interest which Her Majesty's Government would be disposed to exert for the prosperity and independence of this country, if thought advisable, namely, that for the moment at least, Her Majesty's Government should, out of consideration for this Government, abstain from adding at Berlin any representations of their own upon this subject, to those which the Government of His Netherlands Majesty have deemed it to be their duty to make on their own behalf.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RA. ABERCROMBY.

No. 328.

Sir R. Abercromby to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 27.)

My Lord, *The Hague, March 1, 1855.*

M. ELOUT, a member of the Second Chamber of the States General of the Netherlands, belonging to the Grön von Prinsterer or ultra-Protestant party, which holds, with regard to politics, much the same opinions as those which are advocated by the Kreuz party in Prussia, addressed, in yesterday's sitting of the Chamber, some questions to the Government with respect to their intention of maintaining their policy of neutrality for this country in the contest now carrying on by the Western Powers of Europe and their allies against Russia.

M. Elout founded the expediency of addressing his questions to the Government on the repeated assertions contained in various public journals, that the Netherlands were about to enter into an alliance with the Western Powers, and thus abandon the neutral position which they had hitherto held; and that, in order that the public mind might be set at rest with respect to a subject so materially affecting the interests of this country, it was highly desirable that the Government of His Netherlands Majesty should have an opportunity afforded to them of explaining their views and intentions.

The Chamber having consented to allow these questions to be put, and having decided that the Government should be permitted to accomplish their wish of replying to them immediately, his Excellency M. Van Hall rose, and in distinct terms declared that the Government of His Netherlands Majesty had no intention whatever of altering the course of policy they had hitherto pursued with regard to the war now in course of progress between certain European States; that there was no truth in the various reports which had been circulated by the public press, of the intention of the Netherlands Government to relinquish the system of neutrality which they had hitherto adopted, and which would be persevered in; and his Excellency concluded his reply by observing that he could give the Chamber the most positive assurances that no influence ("pression")

had been employed by any of the belligerent Powers to induce the Government of His Netherlands Majesty to depart from that system of Netherland neutrality which it had been the object of the Cabinet of the Hague to establish, and to adhere to from the commencement of existing hostilities.

These explanations satisfied and were well received by the Chamber. His Excellency M. Van Hall, in his reply, did not make any reference to the course pursued towards his country by other European States, not belligerents, feeling that to establish a difference between them, which it would have been necessary for him to have done in the course of those explanations, which he could not then have omitted to give, would have led him on to dangerous ground, and into a critical position with regard to some States, which, under existing circumstances, he considered it would be most prudent for him to avoid.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RA. ABERCROMBY.

No. 329.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 3.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, March 3, 1855.*

THE Emperor of Russia received the great officers of State and Court yesterday afternoon. The garrison of St. Petersburgh had sworn allegiance. The Empress-mother was well.

No. 330.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 240. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, March 1, 1855.*

I LEARN, from a confidential communication made to me by M. Usedom, that General Wedel, feeling the impossibility of effecting anything at Paris in regard to a Treaty between France and Prussia, under his present instructions, has returned to Berlin in hopes of inducing the King to be more reasonable in his demands. M. Usedom, whose presence here is no longer necessary for the moment, returns to London to-morrow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 331.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 242. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, March 2, 1855.*

IN my confidential despatch No. 234 of the 26th ultimo, I recounted to your Lordship M. Drouyn de Lhuys' version of what had passed on the previous day between himself, Count Hatzfeldt, and General Wedel, respecting the Treaty which is in contemplation between France and Prussia.

This morning Count Hatzfeldt was good enough to read me his account of the same conversation. Although on the whole it leaves matters much in the same state as was represented to me by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that is, without any decision being taken, yet it shows a much greater inclination on the part of M. Drouyn de Lhuys to accept the Prussian alterations than his Excellency had admitted to me. This, however, is of less consequence, because Count Hatzfeldt had a further conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys yesterday, in which the latter quite altered his tone, and informed the Prussian Minister that it would be impossible for the French Government to assent to any of the modifications proposed by the Prussian Government.

Count Hatzfeldt, in remarking upon this alteration of tone, insisted upon reading to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the report which he had made to his Government the previous day. M. Drouyn de Lhuys admitted the correctness of it: and excused his change of tone by saying, that he had been desirous, in the first instance, of receiving the Prussian propositions with courtesy, but that upon reflection he had convinced himself, that if Prussia was really desirous of taking part in the Conferences she would accept the Treaty as it had been offered; and that if she was not, there was no object in continuing negotiations which could lead to no practical result.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 332.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 243. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, March 2, 1855.*

WITH reference to Lord Bloomfield's despatch No. 58 of the 23rd ultimo, giving an account of a conversation which his Lordship had had with Baron Manteuffel respecting the negotiations now going on at Paris for a Treaty between Prussia and France, and reporting, that in his opinion M. de Manteuffel was less anxious for the immediate conclusion of such a Treaty and the reappearance of a Prussian Plenipotentiary at the Vienna Conferences than was the King of Prussia, I have the honour to state that I have been shown, but in the strictest confidence, a private letter from M. de Manteuffel to Count Hatzfeldt, dated the 21st ultimo, in which the Baron states that the King is most anxious that a Treaty of the kind should be speedily concluded, and that he (Baron Manteuffel) partakes the King's wishes; that, consequently, Count Hatzfeldt is to do all in his power to facilitate the negotiation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 333.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 3, 1855.*

I INQUIRED this day of Count Buol whether, in consequence of the death of the Emperor Nicholas, he had any message to communicate to Lord John Russell. He replied, this event will delay the negotiations; Prince Gortchakoff must have new credentials; but if the intention of sending them were notified by telegraph to St. Petersburgh, the delay would not be considerable. In the meantime, by the arrival of Lord John, I shall have an opportunity of greater communication with him, and of settling all the questions which may arise in the negotiation, should it be continued on the basis already agreed to. I have telegraphed the above to Berlin, and have desired Lord Bloomfield to communicate it to Lord John.

No. 334.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 1.)

My Lord, *Berlin, February 28, 1855.*

I ARRIVED here this morning, and Lord Bloomfield having announced my arrival, I saw Baron Manteuffel in the course of the afternoon.

It appears that a negotiation is going on at Paris on the subject of a Treaty between France and Prussia; and in answer to an inquiry of mine, Baron Manteuffel informed me that M. Usedom had orders to proceed to London for the

purpose of proposing to your Lordship a Treaty exactly similar in substance and in terms to that which may be agreed upon with France.

He likewise informed me that the King had acceded to the Protocol of the 28th of December, to which Austria, France, and Great Britain are parties.

I will state to your Lordship in my next despatch the other material points touched upon by Baron Manteuffel in his conversation with me.

The King has been pleased to fix 1 o'clock to-morrow for my audience of His Majesty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 335.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 2.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March* 1, 1855.

I PROCEED to give your Lordship some further account of my interview with Baron Manteuffel.

Deeming it of essential importance that the two Great German Powers should assist each other in the present European contest, I urged on Baron Manteuffel the duty of considering rather the permanent interests of Germany than the conduct of Austria towards Prussia during the last few months. I said, that without entering into the merits of their disputes, and admitting that Austria had been altogether in the wrong, it was wise to meet in concert the great danger which threatens Europe from the preponderance of Russia; that unfortunately when the independence of the European States was last in danger, that danger had been very much aggravated by the jealousies of Austria and Prussia; that when Prussia stood forward Austria held back, and when Austria made her struggle, Prussia took no part in it. Thus each had been separately overcome, and the cause of Germany and of Europe suffered. The present was a period when united action for a common object was most desirable.

I cannot say that the language or the tone of Baron Manteuffel were at all satisfactory on this subject. He said, indeed, that the King, acting against the wishes and opinions of his people, was willing to concede the supremacy in Germany to the Emperor of Austria. But he, Baron Manteuffel, showed great irritation in speaking of Austria, spoke of the tricks she played, the Jesuitical character of her policy, and the probable insincerity of her present assurances: he hoped we might not have to repent of the confidence we placed in her, and complained somewhat of the unfriendly bearing of England.

To this I replied that it was our earnest wish to be on the most cordial terms with Prussia, and that if we had at times been more favourable to Austria it was because she concurred with us in warding off a great danger, while Prussia kept aloof.

It is clear that the feelings of irritation between Austria and Prussia, with which unfortunately the statesmen of both countries are animated, will be a serious obstacle to the common pursuit of a common object.

It appears, indeed, from Baron Manteuffel's statement, as I have already reported to your Lordship, that a negotiation is going on at Paris with a view to the conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance, and the admission of Prussia to the Conference.

But although I am of opinion that such admission, on terms acceptable to the Western Powers, will be less injurious than the total exclusion of Prussia for the first time since 1815 from the deliberations of the Great Powers, we must not conceal from ourselves that the part to be taken by Prussia in the Conferences will not, in all probability, be conducive to the end we have in view. The course chosen by Austria has been one in accordance at least with the views of the Western Powers, and the course to be taken by Prussia will, there is reason to fear, be in favour of the views of Russia. There is a very strong Russian party in the Court here openly favoured by the King; half the Ministry have Russian tendencies; many, indeed most, of the smaller Courts of Germany look upon the Emperor of Russia as their only safeguard against democracy, and they court the King of Prussia as a possible help against the avowed policy of

Austria. This unusual preference of Prussian to Austrian policy falls in with the known ambition of Prussia, and this ambition, under the guise of a love of peace, may work great mischief and prolong the miseries of war.

Baron Manteuffel spoke lightly of any danger to be apprehended to Prussia from the aggression of Russia, and expressed more fear of France than of Russia.

I expressed my satisfaction at hearing that the King had given his assent to the Protocol containing the interpretation of the four points. Baron Manteuffel said that this interpretation was somewhat vague, and wished to know our meaning further.

I replied that this must be the subject of negotiation when we came to frame a Treaty on these bases. He did not desist, however, from objecting to such an interpretation of the third basis as would involve a limitation of the Russian naval force in the Black Sea. He reminded me that at the Peace of Tilsit, Napoleon insisted on the limitation of the army of Prussia to 40,000 men; he stated that, notwithstanding this stipulation, Prussia, by judicious dismissals and recruitings, had always kept up a force of 200,000 men. So vain and ineffectual, he argued, would always be any attempts to limit the forces, military or naval, of a great Power.

I confined myself to stating that there was at all events a great danger to be guarded against. That eighteen or twenty sail of the line at Sebastopol could not be maintained to protect commerce or guard against an enemy; they could only be intended for purposes of aggression. That Marshal Marmont, in his travels, points out more than once, that 60,000 men might be embarked at Sebastopol, and be in the Bosphorus in forty-eight hours, and in possession of Constantinople before the Cabinets of Paris and London could have a suspicion of any hostile intention. That this danger was a very real one, and it was the business of those who were to frame a Treaty of Peace to guard against it.

I will not trouble your Lordship at present with any further details.

When I have seen the King, I will endeavour to give your Lordship a general view of the policy and intentions of the Court of Prussia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 336.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 3. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March* 1, 1855.

THIS day, at 1 o'clock, I saw the King. He was profuse in his cordial expressions of welcome, and said he had watched my progress from place to place with interest. His Majesty soon entered on the subject of the negotiations for peace, and said that he believed, in the bottom of his heart, that the Emperor of Russia sincerely desired peace, and would make any sacrifice for it compatible with the dignity of his Crown. I said we must have securities in order not to have the war renewed again in two or three years. He said we might be quite sure the Emperor of Russia would not begin again—that he had not intended war—had not meant to overthrow the Sultan, but only to give him a shake, or some equivalent phrase.

I said I hoped the King would join the Alliance, and gave reasons for that course. He complained he had been very ill-treated; that he had agreed to everything; taken every prescription which had been offered him, but had still been kept out of the Conference. He resented this treatment, and said it was his right to enter the Conference. I showed him that France, Great Britain, and Turkey on the one side, and Russia on the other, being at war, had a right to meet to arrange terms of peace; that Austria having bound herself in certain contingencies to take part in the war, was likewise entitled to enter. But that Prussia, not having entered into any such engagements, and not being at war, had no claim to enter into a Conference which had the restoration of peace for its object. He thought he had a right to enter the Conference without entering into any Treaty beyond that already existing with Austria. I said I

hoped this difficulty, which was one of form rather than of substance, might be overcome, as I understood from Baron Manteuffel that negotiations were going on at Paris, and had already made progress. "Progress!" said the King, "no, not progress." There were certain things he required, and which had not been assented to. After some general conversation I returned to the subject. The King said that General Wedel was coming from Paris, and he should give him further instructions for the negotiation. I said I hoped General Wedel would come back with a Treaty signed. The King said no, not that; and he then declared he would sign no Treaty as the price of his admission to the Conference: that the admission was his right, and he should not sell it for a Treaty. He also at this, or at a former part of the conversation, said, those who excluded him would repent of it.

I said the accession of the King to the Treaty was essential; the precise period of the invitation to join the Conference was matter of form and might be arranged.

The King repeatedly declared he was not an adherent of the Emperor of Russia; that he was his friend, and as his friend had frequently given him advice which was unpalatable to him. After some very friendly expressions, reverting to the time when the King first became acquainted with me, he asked me to dine with him the next day, and wished me good morning.

It will be clear to your Lordship from this account that there is no change in the King's feeling. He wishes to avoid a war either with Russia or with the allies, and seeks by every resource to avoid any act which may commit him to the Western Powers. While he resents his exclusion from the Conference, he is not disposed, for the sake of admission, to engage himself to a definite course or period of action. While pursuing a policy to the last degree selfish, he gives himself the air of an injured Prince, and assumes for his State a position ambiguous rather than dignified. His object evidently is to restrain Austria from acting on behalf of the allies, and perhaps to induce the Western Powers to accede to such terms of peace as may be compatible with the interests of Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 337.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 4. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March 1, 1855.*

ALTHOUGH your Lordship is fully aware of the present position of Prussia, I cannot forbear making some remarks on the anxious aspects which that position has assumed during the last few weeks.

The King holds in his hands the direction of the whole of the foreign policy of his kingdom. Baron Manteuffel, and various other instruments, official and non-official, are taken up and laid aside, supported or disavowed, exactly as the King pleases. Nor is there any man in Prussia who seems to have sufficient independence of mind to resent the manner in which he is flatly contradicted or quietly dismissed.

It seems to be the King's settled object to refrain from taking any part in the present war. He has no partiality for Russia as a Power: he has no sympathy with the cause which the allies have undertaken to uphold. The decision perhaps is not surprising, but the mode of adhering to it is singular. Instead of standing still and refusing to move, the King agitates and busies himself in every direction: an agent is sent to London, whose liberal views might induce Her Majesty's Government to suppose the King was about to change his Ministers and his policy; another special agent in Paris is so ignorant of diplomacy that his negotiations are sure to produce misunderstandings and delay; a third agent, with no ostensible mission, is sent to Holland to create a Prussian interest, and disturb, if not insult, the Ministers of the Crown. All these special Envoys are employed in crossing and in thwarting the ostensible foreign missions of the Court. The object seems to be to give rise to hopes;

afterwards to be dashed to the ground, and to gain time till fresh pretexts for delay can be invented.

The period is come, however, when the Conferences at Vienna will be opened. The position of Prussia, it must be confessed, may seriously affect the conduct and materially disturb the action of Austria. But it appears to me to be better to accept and count upon these consequences, than to give a feather's weight to the consideration that by further delay, by protracted efforts or fresh compliances, we shall obtain the cooperation of Prussia.

A very grave question remains for the decision of Her Majesty's Government.

Supposing Prussia to refuse all aid to Austria, and Austria on that account to hesitate committing herself against Russia, what are the terms of peace, within the meaning of the memento, which the allies will think absolutely necessary for their own honour and the security of Europe? Upon this important subject I shall have the honour of addressing your Lordship soon after my arrival at Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 338.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 6.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March 2, 1855.*

I HAVE forwarded to your Lordship this day by telegraph a despatch in the following words:

"The King of Prussia has sent Count Keller to tell me that the last accounts from St. Petersburgh represent the Emperor of Russia to be at the point of death, and that he has taken leave of his family.

"Pray send to Lady John to set out for Vienna on the 6th instant. I expect to be there on the 4th."

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 339.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 7.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March 2, 1855.*

THE transit of rifles for the use of the Russian army has been lately carried on in the following manner:

The manufacturer or purchaser at Liege exports the arms to a fresh firm at Aix-la-Chapelle, which pays the duty, and then exports them to Russia. The state of the law which forbids the transit of arms or munitions of war does not prohibit this trade.

But Baron Manteuffel, to whom I mentioned the facts, stated to me that a law was about to be passed prohibiting the export of arms or munitions of war to Russia.

It appears that the Minister of Finance has made some opposition to this new law, ostensibly on the ground that it will be difficult to control the export, as no export duties exist in Prussia. But these objections will be overcome.

The same assurances have since been confirmed by the King, who is, however, anxious to maintain the freedom of export from his ports of Russian produce. Nor would it be easy, while we permit the import of Russian produce into England, to object to its export from Prussian any more than from Dutch or Belgian ports.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 340.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 8. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 2, 1855.*

I HAD this morning the honour of an interview with the Prince of Prussia.

The death of the Emperor of Russia was not known at that time. Indeed it took place at the very hour when I was proceeding to the Prince's residence.

As, however, the intelligence of this important event was expected every moment, His Royal Highness alluded to it very early in our conversation. The Prince said that the Hereditary Grand Duke had always given advice in opposition to the policy which had been pursued, and that if that advice had been followed, there would have been no war. But when I asked whether the accession of the Grand Duke might not be the cause of tumults, His Royal Highness answered that unless the Grand Duke declared his intention of following the policy of his father, there might be discontent, and even tumults. Many would be disposed to adopt the Grand Duke Constantine as their leader.

I remarked that His Imperial Highness might be sent to Sweaborg to inspect the fleet.

It will not be difficult, however, for the young Emperor, if he is disposed to peace, to change gradually the direction of his policy, and under the able guidance of Count Nesselrode to consent to guarantees that might satisfy the jealousies and fears of Europe.

The Prince of Prussia, as your Lordship is aware, is entirely opposed to the policy of the King; and he had no difficulty in stating in the strongest terms his belief that if Prussia were at any time to join the Western Powers, peace would be made in a fortnight.

This opinion often expressed has led to a complete estrangement from the King, and the Prince of Prussia seemed to be very incompletely informed of the state of the negotiations between France and Prussia. His Royal Highness, however, was fully aware of the two conditions respecting Poland and the passage of foreign troops through Germany, upon which the King lays so great a stress; and the Prince thought very justly that neither condition could be maintained.

With regard to Poland he said no insurrection existed, and therefore nothing had arisen to justify such a demand; while if a resolution should hereafter take place, no one could prescribe beforehand what course would be justifiable on the part of the allies.

With respect to foreign troops, he said, "They will either be our allies, and then we shall be glad to see them aid us, or they will not be our allies, and then they have no claim to ask us for a passage."

In short the ingenious speculations of the King find no receptacle in the plain and honest mind of the Prince.

His Royal Highness still entertains some hopes of the success of the negotiations for a Treaty of Alliance with the Western Powers. He disapproves, however, of the demand for a limitation of the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea, and thinks it would be more efficacious for the allies, and less humiliating for the Russian Government, to provide by Treaty arsenals and fleets of Great Britain and France on the coast of the Black Sea.

I combatted this opinion, but it was unnecessary to argue the question with the Prince of Prussia.

It may, however, be useful to mention to your Lordship, that it is the only one of the four bases upon which I have heard any discussion upon the Continent, and the only one to which the advocates of Russia seem to have any strong objection.

The Prince of Prussia spoke in the highest terms of admiration of the English army.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 341.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 177.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 5, 1855.*

HAVING learnt from Vice-Consul Cunningham that he was waiting for instructions from your Excellency as to whether he was to forward to this office copies of his correspondence with the Embassy, regarding his recent mission to Bulgaria, I desired him to transmit them without further delay; and I have in consequence received his report, contained in his despatches Nos. 1 to 20 to your Excellency.

I presume your Excellency supposed that Mr. Cunningham would have transmitted his report to the Foreign Office, or you would not have failed to convey to Her Majesty's Government information which throws such a terrible light upon the internal administration of one of the largest and most important provinces of the Turkish Empire.

Her Majesty's Government have taken this correspondence into their serious consideration, and I have to express their deep concern at finding, that in Bulgaria, people say no Turk is put to death for the murder of a Christian; that every means is used by persecution and annoyance to compel the relations of murdered Christians to accept the "price of blood;" that in the case of a Turk accused of a murder committed near Rasgrad last August, the evidence of fifteen most respectable Bulgarians was rejected, and there being no Turkish witnesses, the murderer was allowed to depart unquestioned; that a practice prevails among the Turks of robbing Christians of their property by means of false witnesses, and so common is this practice as regards cattle, that a Christian can hardly consider his horse, or his cow, his own; that at Shumla and at Sistova, Mr. Cunningham met with cases of this kind, where the testimony of Christians was deliberately rejected by the Cadis, and, in spite of the tender of such evidence, the stolen property was adjudged to the Mussulman claimant; that the police openly rob travellers; that there is no relaxation of the old restraints upon Christian rites; that a Christian on horseback meeting a Turk is obliged to dismount and stand until the Turk has passed; that, according to the statement of the Austrian Vice-Consul at Sofia, the sufferings of the Christians in the Pashalic of Nissa, from the cruelty and oppression of the Turks, are indescribable; that, in short, as Mr. Cunningham expresses it in one of his letters, the state of the country is fearful and insupportable for Christians.

Her Majesty's Government are bound to believe that the Porte was in disgraceful ignorance of this state of things in Bulgaria, although its attention should have been awakened to it by the indignant remonstrances of Lord Raglan and the Duke of Cambridge, against the iniquities committed almost within the pale of the British camp, and which were made known by your Excellency to the Turkish Government.

Her Majesty's Government do not, however, doubt that upon the receipt of Mr. Cunningham's despatches, your Excellency communicated their contents to the Porte, and demanded that measures for the punishment of offenders, and for giving some security to life and property in Bulgaria, should forthwith be adopted, and I have to instruct your Excellency to report what was the nature of your communications, and with what results they were attended; for the Porte must not suppose that at the conclusion of the war, a state of things so revolting to humanity, and so degrading to the Christian religion, will be tolerated by the Christian Powers of Europe.

The Porte in its instructions to the Turkish Plenipotentiary at Vienna, states: "Le Gouvernement Impérial fait tous ses efforts pour que les sujets Chrétiens de Sa Majesté Impériale jouissent du bien-être et de la prospérité nécessaires; la Sublime Porte voue sa sollicitude réelle à cet objet important, car elle n'ignore pas que c'est dans son propre intérêt. Aussi n'hésite-t-elle pas à déclarer de nouveau en face de l'univers qu'elle est fermement résolue à maintenir les privilèges religieux octroyés à ses sujets Chrétiens par les glorieux ancêtres de Sa Majesté Impériale et confirmés solennellement, avant comme en dernier lieu par Sa Majesté Impériale. Mais ainsi que nous l'avons fait connaître plus d'une fois, ce serait ébranler dans sa base l'indépendance d'un Empire que de rattacher des objets de cette nature à une stipulation internationale, ou bien

de fournir à une Gouvernement étranger le prétexte d'une ingérence ne fût-elle qu'officieuse dans les affaires concernant les sujets de cet Empire."

The desire and intention of Her Majesty's Government to uphold the independence of the Sultan, are well known to the Turkish Government, and need no repetition; but Her Majesty's Government are still more deeply interested in upholding the honour of England, and fulfilling the obligations of a Christian country, and they would ill perform these duties if they forebore to exercise the right which England has acquired by the vast sacrifices made in the Sultan's cause, to put an end to the atrocious misgovernment that prevails in Bulgaria, and which, in a greater or less degree, exists throughout the Ottoman Empire.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 342.

Brigadier-General Craufurd to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 6.)

My Lord, *Vienna, February 28, 1855.*

I WENT to Feldzeugmeister Hess on Friday 23rd instant, according to his wish, and met him already leaving his office to go to the Emperor. He returned with me, and put into my hand a state of the armies under his command, viz. 3rd and 4th armies, with every detail bearing upon their strength, composition and station at the present time. Upon doing so, Baron Hess added, that the Emperor desired this document should be used or shown with reserve; and he requested me not to forward the paper itself in a despatch, but to reserve it for use and reference here, and to content myself with a summary of the details contained in it, for conveying the information I might wish to send to England.

The 3rd and 4th armies are under the command of Baron Hess, and comprehend all the troops to be employed in the first line, in case of hostilities either in Poland or the Danubian Principalities. These two armies are stationed near the frontiers, both to the north and south-east; and their united numbers amount to 244,978 men, with 720 pieces of Artillery. The proportion of Cavalry is 39,364 men.

Each army contains three Infantry armée corps. Each corps consists of five brigades, and each brigade of a regiment, which last, if complete, has four battalions containing 1,080 privates each; besides this one battalion of Jägers of battalions containing 1,080 privates each; besides this one battalion of Jägers of nearly the same strength, completes the brigade. The six corps of Infantry, composing the 3rd and 4th armies, are numbered as follows: (3rd Army), 9th, 11th, 12th army corps; (4th Army), 2nd, 4th, 10th army corps: one regiment of Cavalry, numbering 1,460 men, divided into eight squadrons, is attached to each Infantry army corps. The proportion of guns attached to Infantry and Cavalry together, is something under three guns per 1,000 men; but this does not include the reserve Artillery.

The Cavalry not attached to the army corps, is formed into two Cavalry corps. The first of these in Hungary, while No. 2, to which it forms a reserve, is in Galicia, with its head-quarters at Lemberg.

The army corps are stationed along the frontier from Cracow to Hermanstadt, and in the Danubian Principalities, in the following order as to head-quarters:

2nd Infantry Corps	- - -	Cracow.
4th ,,	- - - -	Przemyzl.
10th ,,	- - - -	Tarnopol.
12th ,,	- - - -	Czernewitz.
11th ,,	- - - -	Klausenburg.
9th ,,	- - - -	Kronstadtin.

Transylvania, Bucharest, and the Principalities, appear to be occupied by a corps of Banat-Grenzers, amounting to 47,026 men, with 88 guns.

The reserve to the two armies on the frontiers, is formed by the 1st army, commanded by General Count Wimpfen. The head-quarters of its three army corps, viz. 1st, 3rd, 6th, are in Prague, Gratz, and Treviso.

These armies are completely furnished with every facility for entering on warlike operations.

They are provided with twenty-four "equipages de pont," have their means of transport complete, and every part of their field equipage ready for service, together with materials for forming reserve depôts of clothing, &c. at hand.

It is calculated that in forty days, 280,000 men, out of these three armies, might be concentrated on any point; and that in three months 47,000 more might be added to that number; in all composing the total strength of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th armies, viz. 327,000 men, with 1,096 pieces of Artillery. Such is the present state of the Austrian army ready for hostilities.

A report has been current here that great sickness prevails amongst the Austrian troops in Poland. I have authority for saying that this sickness is very partial, having attacked especially three Cavalry regiments, and one Infantry regiment, in Poland.

It appears to have excited more attention than would otherwise have been given to it, from its being of an unusual character in those provinces; the complaint being an agueish fever, which has not been considered a characteristic malady of those districts. As it has prevailed principally in the Cavalry, the sickness of one man obliges a second, who is charged with the care of his horse, to be also absent from parades, and some other duties; and it has given the appearance of the illness being more extensive than is really the case. The average throughout the two armies under the command of Baron Hess, does not exceed by the last report 7 per cent., which is below the usual sick state of Austrian troops when concentrated in readiness for war.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES R. CRAUFURD.

No. 343.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 84.)

My Lord, *Vienna, February 28, 1855.*

THE Turkish Ambassador called upon me to announce that he had received the full powers to take part in the negotiation about to take place in this capital, with the Plenipotentiaries, for the reestablishment of peace. He stated that he had at present received no instructions by which to regulate his conduct, but a copy of the "Protocol réservé" of the 28th of December had been transmitted to him as the basis upon which the negotiation was to take place.

I understand from M. de Bourqueney, that he applied to him for a copy of the note inclosed in your despatch No. 1,234 of December 15, 1854, to Lord Cowley, and which embodied the opinion of Her Majesty's Government as to the concessions which ought to be required from Russia, both as to the destruction of the naval arsenal of Sebastopol, and the number of ships of war which Russia might hereafter retain in the Black Sea. The Ambassador stated that this document, together with the reply to it of the French Government, had been communicated to his Government.

Baron Bourqueney informed me that not being aware that these confidential documents had been communicated to the Porte, or by whom they had been so, had declined for the present to conform to the Ambassador's request.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 344.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 69. Secret.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 2, 1855.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch marked Secret, No. 68 of the 27th ultimo, inclosing copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister at Frankfort, reporting information which had been received by him from the

President of the Diet, to the effect that the Cabinet of Berlin had learnt from M. d'Usedom that England would not engage in war against Prussia, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I have alluded incidentally to the subject in conversation with Baron Manteuffel, and was assured by his Excellency that he had no recollection of any such intelligence having been sent to him, either officially or unofficially, but that the King was certainly under the impression that a rupture between Prussia and England was an occurrence which he looked upon as highly improbable, nay, almost impossible.

From the manner in which his Excellency spoke, I should be induced to think that though M. d'Usedom may have expressed an opinion in the sense of Baron Prokesch's assertion, he has never declared anything so positive as might be implied from the language attributed to him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 345.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 70. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 2, 1855.*

WHEN I was with Baron Manteuffel this evening, his Excellency read to me a despatch just received from Count Arnim, from Vienna.

The Prussian Minister states that he has nothing new to report, except that in consequence of the nomination of Count Rechberg to Frankfort, Count Thun had been appointed to succeed him as an adjoint to Field-Marshal Radetzky, in the Lombardian Kingdom, and that Count Thun would shortly repair to Berlin to deliver to the King his letters recalling him from the post of Envoy at this Court.

Count Arnim states that the desire for a pacific settlement of the Eastern question, is daily increasing at Vienna; that money is scarce, and provisions dear; and that he believes the Austrian Government are most anxious to come to an arrangement which would enable them to reduce their military expenses. He adds, that questions are frequently put to him as to General Wedel's mission to Paris: that he is happy in being unable to give any information on the subject, and hopes for the interest of his country that no change in the present political relations of Prussia will take place, for a Treaty with France and England would assuredly not have the effect of improving the prospect of peace, but, on the contrary, of increasing the pretensions of the Western Powers.

Baron Manteuffel after reading this despatch, said, that he begged me not to imagine that he participated in these sentiments, for he regretted that Count Arnim should write in the above sense.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 346.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 71.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 2, 1855.*

THE impression produced here by the late manifesto of the Emperor of Russia, and the simultaneous appeal to the Russian nation, ordaining the formation of a general militia for the defence of the Empire, has been of a varied and opposite nature, according to the political opinions of the judging parties. To the friends and devotees of Russia, it has been viewed as a proof of Russian omnipotence, tempered with that spirit of conciliation and love of peace which in their blind fanaticism they are still willing to adjudge the Czar; nor do they appear to attribute any undue importance to the claims of Russia put forth in that document to protect the rights of her co-religionists in the East, and to

raise her arm in defence of the orthodox Church, as this language is evidently addressed to the Slavonic races in Russia, and is equally applicable to those of Galicia, Bohemia, and Servia. On the other hand, those who are opposed to the Russian policy, view in this manifesto a threat of defiance to Europe, and a wish thereby to deter the minor European States from entering into the Western coalition.

Taken generally, it would seem to offer some proof of weakness, an apparent sign that the ordinary means of conscription in Russia have reached their utmost limit, and that it has been found necessary to give the war a fresh character of religious zeal, in order to stimulate the popular and national enthusiasm. It may be however further affirmed, that a feeling of indifference has of late sprung up here in the public mind, which may be traced to two causes, aided by the constant endeavours of Baron Manteuffel's Cabinet. The first cause to which I allude, is a general feeling that Prussia has allowed the favourable moment to go by when she might have taken the lead of Germany, and have played a conspicuous part in Europe; it is felt that she has been forestalled, if not put aside by Austria, and that inactivity is now preferable to playing a secondary part under the control and at the bidding of Austria. The second cause is a very general feeling of want of confidence in the Sovereign, a feeling that it were perhaps better for Prussia to bide her time, and to husband her strength and resources for some future occasion, rather than to incur sacrifices, and possibly to risk disasters, without sufficient hopes of corresponding gain.

With respect to the general levy ordered in Russia for the defence of the Empire, it may be calculated to amount to about twenty-five per mille of the male population, which would for the whole Empire amount to 500,000 in round numbers.

Hitherto only eighteen Governments have been ordered to furnish their quota, but as they are the most populous parts of the Empire as regards serfs, the levy may be calculated to produce about 300,000 men. These levies, although nominally forming a sort of local militia, are at the complete disposal of the Emperor, and as was the case in 1812 and 1813, would be incorporated into line regiments, in case of need, to fill up vacancies.

Poland, Lithuania, Podolia, and other Polish and Russian provinces and Governments, are not as yet included, but on the other hand, the landed proprietors are to pay 15 silver roubles per hooft (about 60 Prussian acres) of land, in money, as an indemnity, and I believe without any regard as to their being arable, pasture, woodlands, or steppe.

Owners of serfs are to provide the entire equipment (except arms and ammunition) for all men supplied by them, and a sum of money, or *in naturâ*, equivalent to nine months' consumption of food. They are likewise to contribute to their pay, at the rate of less than one farthing per day whilst the men are under arms, that is, during the war, and are to provide for the wounded and invalids afterwards. If men die, the owners are to receive a certificate, which will entitle the latter to proportionate exemption at future ordinary levies. This fresh exaction will prove a heavy burthen on the landed proprietors; for independently of the costs, they will be deprived of a large population for tilling the estates, and of the means of obtaining thereby some remuneration for the losses they incur.

It is very difficult to form any just appreciation with respect to the state of the finances of the Russian Empire, but the foregoing would seem to indicate that the Government is reduced to the necessity of increasing their armaments at the expense of the landed proprietors, and a question of economy may in some way explain their not again recurring to the usual mode of conscription.

I am informed by a person who served with the Russian army in 1812 and 1813, that the body of men raised by a similar process, then proved to be totally useless and inefficient, so much so, that they could not even be employed on services of the most trivial nature.

With respect to the large emission of paper-money which has taken place since the commencement of the war, it may be observed that as long as Russia carries on war within her own territory, and the popular feeling is in favour of the war, the paper currency will maintain its credit. As far as I am enabled to learn, and judging from the large armaments which have been lately going on along the Baltic coast, no symptoms have yet been manifested that funds are wanting to the State.

In conversing with Baron Manteuffel on this subject, his Excellency informed me that he was not aware that the Russian Government were in any financial embarrassment, and his Excellency further assured me that the amount of reserve bullion kept at the fortress at St. Petersburgh was still intact.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 347.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 72.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 2, 1855.*

I AM privately informed, and this information is corroborated by a statement inserted in a Berlin journal of this date, that the Russian Legation at this Court are about to establish a French journal here, to be called "Le Journal du Nord," as a counterpoise to the "Journal de Francfort" in Southern Germany.

The editor is to be a M. Solly, and Belgian writers are engaged to cooperate with him. M. Schöpping, the former Councillor of the Russian Legation here, is to be the superintendent and director of this journal, and the expenses will be borne by the Imperial Government.

I am told that the authorities are much opposed to this plan, as they expect continual embarrassment to arise from the tone which this journal is likely to assume against England, France, and Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 348.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 73.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 2, 1855.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 66 of the 27th ultimo, inclosing copy of Sir Alexander Malet's No. 28 of the 23rd ultimo, stating that M. de Bismark had announced the intention of laying before the Diet of Frankfort a proposal for arming the Federal fortresses, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I inquired this day of Baron Manteuffel if M. de Bismark had been instructed to speak in this sense. His Excellency replied that the idea had originated with M. de Bismark himself, and that he had brought it forward as an answer to the Austrian proposal, but he added that he had instructed the Prussian Minister to desist from taking any further steps in the matter, and that the question would be dropped.

Baron Manteuffel then referred to the intended appointment, as reported in my despatch No. 60 of the 23rd ultimo, of Count Rechberg to the post of temporary President of the Diet during Baron Prokesch's absence, and said that the Prussian Government had made known at Vienna their objections to the form in which it was intended to be made, as being contrary to the laws of the Confederation, and that Count Esterhazy had now communicated to him the reply of the Austrian Government to these objections.

His Excellency observed that he could not admit the justice of their arguments, saying that his objections were only to the form, which it would be easy for Austria to change, and that when she adopted the prescribed regulations for such cases, Prussia would say no more on the subject.

It would seem from what Baron Manteuffel said to me, and from what I have heard from other sources, that the difficulty can be easily removed, and that Count Buol has in reality put forward a pretension in this question, which is not borne out by the laws of the Confederation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 349.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 74.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 2, 1855.*

WITH reference to my telegraphic despatch of this day announcing the death of the Emperor Nicholas, I have the honour to inclose, in translation, the telegraphic reports addressed by Count Münster, the Prussian Military Agent at St. Petersburgh, to the King's aide-de-camp, which have been published in the Berlin official paper of this evening.

They contain the only details of this event which have as yet reached the Prussian Government.

It would, however, further appear, from what Baron Manteuffel has said to me, that the Emperor had been ailing for some days previously; the immediate cause of his death was an attack of grippe, which ended in paralysis of the lungs.

Prince Charles of Prussia will proceed to St. Petersburgh on Sunday morning, accompanied by the Dowager Grand Duchess of Mecklenburgh-Schwerin, the Empress's sister.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 349.

Extract from the Prussian Official "Gazette."

(Translation.) *Berlin, March 2, 1855.*

ACCORDING to a telegraphic despatch received in the middle of to-day from St. Petersburgh, His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas I of Russia expired, after a brief struggle, at 10 minutes past 12 o'clock on the 2nd of March.

The previously received telegraphic despatches give the following accounts of the illness of His Imperial Majesty.

Lieutenant-Colonel Count Münster to His Majesty's Aide-de-camp in Waiting, Berlin.

St. Petersburgh, March 1, 1855, 1·25.

The state of the Emperor became considerably worse yesterday evening. The bulletin says: "A violent attack of fever came on yesterday, and the right lung was affected. The fever continued during the night, and prevented sleep. Secretion continues uninterruptedly; symptoms of gout are perceptible."

To this I have to add, that the Emperor's weakness has much increased, and that, in the opinion of the medical attendants, His Majesty's state is, to say the least of it, become very serious.

Her Majesty the Empress is tolerably well. I will forward another despatch to-day, and have to request that this intelligence may be forwarded to Strelitz to Duke George.

(Signed) COUNT MUNSTER.

Lieutenant-Colonel Count Münster to His Majesty's Aide-de-camp in Waiting, Berlin.

St. Petersburgh, March 1, 1855, 4·10 P.M.

His Majesty's state has in nowise improved since this morning. I will report further this evening. Her Majesty the Empress has palpitations of the heart, but is otherwise in good health. I have to request that intelligence may be sent to Schwerin, Strelitz, and the Hague.

(Signed) COUNT MUNSTER.

Lieutenant-Colonel Count Münster to His Majesty's Aide-de-camp in Waiting, Berlin.

St. Petersburgh, March 1, 1855, 9·30 P.M.

The state of His Majesty has become much worse in the course of the day. Secretion takes place with difficulty, and the substance indicates strong affection of the lungs. Paralysis of the lungs is to be feared. Dr. Carell is much alarmed.

The Hereditary Grand Duke has, at the desire of the medical advisers, begged the Emperor to receive the sacrament.

The Empress is in good health. I will send another report to-day.

(Signed) COUNT MUNSTER.

Lieutenant-Colonel Count Münster to His Majesty's Aide-de-camp in Waiting, Berlin.

St. Petersburgh, March 1, 1855, 10·30 P.M.

The Emperor has refused to receive the sacrament at present; it is therefore deferred until to-morrow morning. The Emperor only sees the Empress and the Hereditary Grand Duke.

The Empress is aware of the danger, and has caused directions to be given me to report this to His Majesty the King, and to request that it may be communicated to Strelitz and the other august relations.

(Signed) COUNT MUNSTER.

Lieutenant-Colonel Count Münster to His Majesty's Aide-de-camp in Waiting, Berlin.

St. Petersburgh, Winter Palace, March 2, 6 A.M.

The Emperor received with calm Dr. Mandt's communication that paralysis of the lungs was possible; and only asked, "When shall I be paralyzed?" To this the medical advisers were unable to give a decided answer. The Emperor then asked Dr. Carel, in Russian, "When shall I be suffocated?"

The Emperor received the sacrament, took leave of his consort and of his children, blessed each one separately, as also his grandchildren, in a strong voice and fully conscious, with great calm and composure. The pulse is said to be still strong, but musk has already been administered.

The Empress maintains her composure.

(Signed) COUNT MUNSTER.

No. 350.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 75.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March* 2, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith an extract of a private letter which I have received from Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Memel, conveying certain interesting remarks on the arguments lately used in the debate in the House of Commons, with respect to the transit trade through Prussia of articles of Russian produce.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 350.

Vice-Consul Hertslet to Lord Bloomfield.

(Extract.) *Memel, February* 27, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to bring to your Lordship's notice, that I have observed from the debates in the House of Commons that Mr. Mitchell, M.P., of the large mercantile firm of same name in London, has always been most prominent in pressing the stoppage of the overland Russian trade through Prussia. This appears the more extraordinary as Mr. Armisstead, the chief of the house Mitchell and Co. in Riga, has been all along, and still is, the largest exporter of flax and hemp brought in this manner to Memel, and has created depôts for these articles through persons in his employment, at the Russian border villages of Garsden and Plungalm, and is at the present moment almost the sole purchaser here.

The objection to stopping this trade for fear of German manufacturers buying up all Russian produce at a cheap rate, and competing with British manufacturers, appears to be too far extended. As long as the Russian ports are blockaded, the land carriage to any part of Germany will always prove an effectual barrier against cheapness, and it would require years to set up sufficient machinery in Germany to manufacture a fraction of the usual export of Russia, and an enormous outlay of capital to build them; to which must be added the want of customers when the goods are finished, and the general dulness of trade in warlike times.

It would require a lengthened period of years of similar circumstances to enable German manufacturers to grow to a formidable rivalry. The instantaneous effect of the stoppage of the trade would in England be a reaction both in the price of raw material and manufactured goods in Great Britain, by which the heavy losses which have so paralyzed trade in England might be made good again, whilst from the heavy stock said to be accumulated there, and the slack demand, no actual want of the raw materials is likely to take place in 1855.

The instantaneous effect of the same cause to Russia would be incalculable. The nobles and producers of the raw article in Russia may have obtained a less price for their goods in 1854; but it has been fully made good to them by the employment of their horses, sledges, and labourers, in transporting the goods.

I have myself heard Courland noblemen state, that their farmers and serfs (Bauern) never had so much money in 1854; that they never before lived so well, and never paid the head and other taxes more easily than in that year: and indeed it is obvious that a ton of flax or hemp at 42*l.*, at Memel, for which about 20*l.* has been expended on land carriage, must leave more money in the country than the same flax or hemp shipped at St. Petersburgh at or under 34*l.* per ton, although the money flows back to the producer in a different or unusual manner.

The effect of such a stoppage would be the immediate cessation of all the present bustle on the Russian goods, and render useless all the plans which have been executed by that Government for carrying on this trade, and paralyze the country.

Having opportunity daily of seeing Russian, English, Prussian, and Jewish Polish merchants, I have endeavoured to convey to your Lordship the result of my private reflections on the subject, and the interesting debates in the House of Commons lead me to believe that any remarks from a party on this side might not be looked upon as over officious.

No. 351.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 77. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 2, 1855.*

THE Marquis de Moustier has communicated to Baron Manteuffel an instruction which he has received from M. Drouyn de Lhuys upon the subject of a misunderstanding which had arisen respecting the nature of the invitation to the Conference of Vienna, which the King of Prussia supposed he had received from the Emperor of the French. It would appear that at an audience granted some days ago by the Emperor to General Wedel, that officer alluded to the desire of the King, his master, to be admitted to the Conference, and that His Imperial Majesty replied that the acceptance of the Treaty which His Imperial Majesty had prepared would be his invitation. When the King of Prussia received General Wedel's report of his interview with the Emperor, His Majesty turned the expression into an unconditional admission, and immediately wrote in this sense to General Wedel. This misapprehension of the Emperor's meaning has called forth the present communication, which places the matter on its proper footing; and I am assured that it is next to impossible to comprehend how the Emperor's message could have been so perverted and wilfully misinterpreted.

In consequence of the contradictory and impracticable instructions which the King has himself addressed to General Wedel, pending this negotiation, by which the General is placed in a most awkward position at Paris, he requested permission to repair to Berlin for the purpose of explaining matters, and if not already arrived is expected every moment.

Such, indeed, are the endless tergiversations which have been practised during the course of these negotiations, that one is unwillingly compelled to think that there is no serious intention on the part of the King to bring them to a conclusion, or at all events to bind himself by any act that will identify his policy with that of the allies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 352.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 19.)

My Lord, *Stuttgardt, February 28, 1855.*

ALTHOUGH only a few weeks have elapsed since his arrival here, the Marquis de Ferrière has informed me that he had seen enough to convince him of the general absence of Russian sympathy, though he naturally does not question its existence in individual instances; an opinion which, I need hardly add, coincides with my own, as long since expressed to your Lordship.

He has been particularly struck by the fact that no newspaper but the "Wurtemberg Moniteur" ever contains an article in favour of Russia.

A few persons, he says, have tried to prove to him that the alliance of the Western Powers against Russia could turn only to the advantage of England, but he seems to have summarily disposed of such threadbare sophistry; one of his arguments being, that England had often profited by supporting the weak against the strong, and that France would now probably do the same.

Whilst the people of this country are anything but in favour of Russia, it may perhaps be said that the King is in favour of himself; and that the Ministry are in favour of the King.

Having spoken of Russian sympathy, I may perhaps mention that soon after the Polish insurrection of 1831, and when I was Chargé d'Affaires at the Hague, Count Maltzen, the Prussian Envoy who was afterwards Minister of Foreign Affairs, told me that his Government had found the greatest difficulty in keeping the army quiet, so strong was their sympathy with Poland, and that, had the insurrection lasted another year, it might have become necessary to aid the Poles.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 353.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 20.)

My Lord, *Stuttgardt, February 28, 1855.*

YOUR Lordship will have learnt, by my telegraphic despatch of the 24th instant, that M. de Titoff left this Residence for Vienna on that day.

He may possibly have delayed his departure in order to be at Berlin either after or at the same time as Lord John Russell, so as to have the chance of neutralizing any impression produced by his Lordship.

It occurs to me that, during the conversation I had with M. de Titoff at the palace on the 17th instant, reported in my despatch No. 13 of the 18th instant, he observed that perhaps humanity required that peace should be made before the siege of Sebastopol had been decided in favour of either party, which appeared to me merely another way of saying that Russia would like to save Sebastopol; and to which accordingly I made no reply.

It struck me at the same time that this point might very possibly be urged by the Russian Plenipotentiaries at Vienna, more particularly as it had always seemed to me that the Emperor Nicholas had signified his acceptance of the four points for the double purpose of saving Sebastopol and of preventing the hostility of Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 354.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 21. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Stuttgardt, February 28, 1855.*

I FIND from my French colleague that, on the 17th instant, at the Court ball, the King recommended to him the same "solution" of the Eastern question as His Majesty did to me, and which I had the honour to mention in my despatch No. 14 of the 18th instant, namely, that a foreign garrison should occupy Constantinople.

I perceive by the newspapers that Prince Gortchakoff is reported to have made an equivalent suggestion to Count Buol.

It would seem possible that the object may be to entrap the Western Powers into doing what might compromise Turkey's independence, and so enable Russia to turn the tables on them.

Your Lordship may recollect that another observation made to me by the King on the said occasion was, that it might be difficult to obtain peace this year, and without another campaign.

Had not some casual hindrance intervened, the replies I should naturally have made to both of those observations would have been, that the foreign garrison in question might be incompatible with the independence of our ally, and that a speedy pacification perhaps depended this year, as last, on the conduct of Prussia.

I expressed myself in both those senses to-day when conversing with Baron de Linden.

As regarded Prussia, his Excellency said little or nothing; but, as to the other point, he declared himself strongly in favour of a joint occupation by the Great Powers of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, and of a suitable partition of the remainder, adding that such an arrangement would settle both the political

and the commercial question, while it would also render fertile and flourishing Provinces now laid waste by Mahometanism, and make Constantinople a most magnificent emporium of commerce.

I replied, as on a previous occasion, that England would avoid the question of partition as long as she possibly could, but that, were it some day to be really forced upon her, perhaps recourse might be had to some such solution as his Excellency contemplated, since no single Power could ever be permitted to hold either Constantinople or the Dardanelles, and much less both of them; but I added that any such arrangement would be lastingly impracticable, unless Russia were to place herself on precisely the same line as the other Great Powers, and give up all pretension to superiority of interest in Turkey. In this opinion Baron de Linden concurred.

I took care to prevent his Excellency from supposing that Her Majesty's Government had the slightest notion at present of even the most distant necessity of any such partition or joint occupation; but the truth is that Baron de Linden seems to have acquired a fixed idea that the preservation of Turkish independence is simply an impossibility, and that the belief in it is a gross absurdity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 355.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 22.)

My Lord, *Stuttgardt, February 28, 1855.*

I ASKED Baron de Linden to-day if he considered that the Confederation would march to the assistance of Austria were she to attack Russia first, and were the consequence to be a Russian inroad upon the territory of Austria or the Principalities. His Excellency replied in the affirmative as to Austria, but not as to the Principalities, adding, that the King had observed to him that no matter who attacked first, it would never do to allow Russia to march upon Vienna.

The obvious reflection seems to be, that the Confederation would thus have brought itself into war with Russia, through an ill-advised excess of anxiety to avoid it, since, had the Confederation identified itself with the Western Powers a year ago, and shown the courage of its opinion like them, Russia would in all probability have been brought to terms; in which sense I have frequently, and long since, expressed myself here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 356.

Mr. Bligh to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 45.)

My Lord, *Hanover, March 3, 1855.*

I TOOK your Lordship's despatch No. 21 of the 27th ultimo, to M. de Lenthe, and translated for him both it and the report of what I had said to him on the policy of England with regard to the Germanic Confederation, as given in my despatch No. 38 of the 24th ultimo, as I thought it better, since your Lordship, by approval of them, had adopted my opinions on the matter, that his Excellency should know exactly what I had written, and I was gratified to hear from his Excellency that I had written to your Lordship neither more nor less than what I had said to him.

His Excellency expressed his gratification at finding that I had rightly interpreted the policy of England upon this matter; and upon his saying that, having made to the King a report of what had passed between us about it, it might be agreeable to His Majesty to have cognizance of the exact terms which I had used, I promised his Excellency to give him an extract from my despatch

to be read to His Majesty, if His Majesty should express a wish to that effect, unless, which I should prefer, His Majesty would deign to hear it from myself. This last remark gave his Excellency the opportunity of remarking upon, and regretting His Majesty's extreme reserve upon all matters of foreign policy, as he said that not only did His Majesty never speak upon them with foreign Ministers, but with none of his own, except with himself.

M. de Lenthe stated as a confirmation of his opinion that France was endeavouring to meddle in German affairs, prejudicially to the maintenance of the Confederation, and for ulterior objects of her own, that Count Reculot had shown him a despatch which he had communicated to the Duke of Brunswick (which I also had seen), wherein it is stated that France would not permit the smaller States of Germany to be coerced as to their policy by Prussia. Upon this I remarked that he had no right to assume that language calculated to encourage perseverance in a policy such as that adopted by Brunswick, covered ambitious views as to the future upon the part of a belligerent, naturally desirous of securing allies in the existing contest.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. D. BLIGH.

No. 357.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord, *Munich, February 28, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt, by the messenger Fendall, who arrived here on the morning of the 24th instant, of your Lordship's despatches to No. 7 inclusive (with the exception of No. 2, which has not yet reached me), and one marked "Circular," of the 19th instant.

I have no change of importance to notice in the attitude of this, or, as far as I am aware, of any of the other minor States of Germany; but increased confidence that they will ultimately be able to avoid any active participation in the present struggle, either by means of what would be equivalent to an armed neutrality, or by throwing the weight of their united forces into the scale of peace, is clearly perceptible among them. This notion, which is evidently encouraged as well by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh as by that of Berlin, which seeks thereby to secure their support in the Diet, at any rate until its position towards the Western Powers shall become better defined, and until the turn which events may give to the approaching Conferences at Vienna shall relieve them from their present state of anxious suspense, coupled with the lurking hope that the Austrian Cabinet may at last be drawn into their views, is, it appears to me, the principal, if not sole cause of the abatement of irritation at the conduct of the latter which has been observable here for the last fortnight. In order to place itself in a condition to give effect to this policy, which has from the very first been advocated by the leading members of the Bavarian Government, great efforts are being made to put the military force of the country on a respectable footing. The number of horses for the purchase of which orders have been given, and are in a satisfactory course of execution, has been increased from 4,000 to 6,000. The new conscripts and soldiers absent on furlough are rapidly rejoining their regiments, so that at the expiration of the period fixed by the Diet, the returns will present a disposable force of upwards of 31,000 men, with 10,000 more, equally effective, which Bavaria is bound to furnish for the garrisons of her different fortresses.

The Minister of War will at the same time adopt the necessary measures for immediately calling in an additional 25,000 men, to replace in the country the Federal contingent in the event of its being summoned into the field; and, in the meantime, in order to facilitate its concentration, it is, whilst awaiting the orders of the Diet, to be quartered in the vicinity of the various lines of railroad.

However, the military preparations of this country are to be by no means limited to the numbers above stated; for I understand that, according to plans submitted for the approval the King, arrangements are suggested by which,

including the Landwehr, invalids, and other available materials of defence, the total force might be carried up to at least 250,000 men.

It is certainly within the range of possibility that, for purposes of defence, the country might be so far roused as to make some extraordinary exertions; but when I consider that parts of it are not particularly well affected to the present system of government, and would probably not be overwilling to make very great sacrifices to uphold it, I can scarcely believe that above five per cent. of the entire population could be got under arms, except in a case of unforeseen emergency; nor do I see from whence the funds for the support of such a force are to come, without involving the whole community in utter ruin. The same considerations, to which none of them are blind, are applicable to all the other small Federal States, who are at this moment occupied with military preparations on a scale far beyond their means, in the vain expectation of retrieving their damaged importance, by making their influence felt against that Power which they think most likely to plunge them deeper into those inextricable complications which they anticipate with the greatest dread.

Russia takes advantage of these apprehensions to inculcate the prudence of adhering to Prussia, whose exertions are directed towards procuring the exemption of Germany from the sacrifices and misfortunes of war, altogether regardless of the great European interests for which the conflict has been undertaken. Accordingly all the Russian agents and organs are louder than ever in the proclamation of the pacific intentions of the Emperor, and in their endeavours to throw the odium of the war more especially on England. All attempts to convince the admirers of Russian policy that it is essentially of an aggressive character, or to persuade them of the importance of the diminution of Russian power in the Black Sea, even to purely German interests as identified only with the free navigation to its mouth of the river which traverses their country, are vain; they appeal to all the documents, even to the late ukase relative to the organisation of the militia in Russia, which proceed from the Imperial Cabinet as so many proofs of the desire of the Emperor for peace.

The answers received from St. Petersburgh to the despatch addressed by Baron Von der Pfordten to Count Bray, which I mentioned in my preceding despatch No. 14 of the 10th instant, breathes precisely the same pacific sentiments, accompanied by the most satisfactory and solemn assurances that the Emperor does not entertain the slightest intention of retracting anything in his acceptance of the four points. These continual direct communications, and the apparent frankness with which they are interchanged, flatter the smaller Courts of Germany, and make the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh almost certain of their cooperation against any Power hostile to its views, so long at all events as it shall be wise enough to refrain from positive encroachments upon what they understand by German interests—an event not very likely to occur at a moment when their neutrality is of so much value to the Emperor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 358.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 33.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, March 1, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that Baron de Prokesch, who is summoned to Vienna to take part, as is said, in the negotiations about to be opened there, has informed me that he intends leaving Frankfort this day.

His Excellency will be temporarily replaced in the Presidency of the Diet by Count Rechberg, who has been removed from his position in the Lombardo-Venetian Provinces of Austria, as is stated on apparently good grounds, for this express object.

Count Rechberg was expected to arrive here last night.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET

No. 359.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 35.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, March 2, 1855.*

IT was yesterday notified to the Austrian Legation here by telegraph, that M. de Rechberg would not arrive till to-morrow, Saturday, the 3rd instant; and Baron de Prokesch was instructed by the same occasion not to leave Frankfort till after M. de Rechberg had made his appearance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 360.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 36. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, March 2, 1855.*

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 16 of the 27th ultimo reached me last night. With reference thereto, and to my despatch No. 26 of February 23rd, to which it relates, I think it right to put your Lordship in possession of the exact circumstances under which M. de Prokesch told me that his Prussian colleague had affirmed that the Cabinet of Berlin had received from M. d'Usedom the assurance, that in no case whatever would Great Britain participate in hostilities against Prussia, which assertion was the tenour of what I thought it my duty to write to your Lordship in my despatch above referred to.

I have already more than once touched on the animosity evinced by M. de Prokesch towards Prussia. Late events have not tended to modify that feeling; and the occasion on which he gave me the information above referred to, was in a conversation which I had with his Excellency immediately after the sitting of the Diet of February 22nd, in which he had had what he himself styled "a most disagreeable discussion" with M. de Bismark; the main points of which discussion, and the check which M. de Prokesch met with, were detailed in my despatch No. 27 of February 23rd.

M. de Prokesch was therefore not unnaturally in a state of considerable irritation. Speaking with reference to the intended Prussian proposition of arming the Federal fortresses, reported in my despatch No. 28 of February 23rd, and the general adhesion which her policy met with among the minor States, he declaimed with much vehemence against the continual thwarting which his own national policy met with from that quarter.

England and France had, in his opinion, treated Prussia with far too much indulgence: "Vous ne leur avez donné que de bonnes paroles tandis qu'il fallait leur faire peur."

"Prussia," he said, "wholly relies on your forbearance, and that whatever she does will be indulgently viewed and interpreted by you."

It was not my place to make any observation which should add to the irritation under which M. de Prokesch was speaking; but I thought it not amiss to observe, that if such opinions prevailed in Prussia, they might lead to very mistaken conclusions. In my own judgment, much, if not all of the friendly feeling hitherto existing in England towards that country, had been seriously weakened, if not obliterated, by the conduct of the Berlin Government, and had given place to feelings of an opposite nature. I did not think, I said, if Prussia provoked France to hostility, which was what he seemed to believe was her project, that she could in any way reckon on our neutrality, or even on our not acting against her; that in many of the transactions which had taken place since the earlier Conferences of Vienna, Prussia had, in my judgment, played the part of "faux frère," and indignation at being deceived was usually proportionate to confidence previously reposed.

Here it was that Baron de Prokesch said what I reported to your Lordship of the nature of M. d'Usedom's assurances; but whether he meant me to

understand that M. de Bismark had spoken to him on the subject as of an official communication of M. d'Usedom's to his Government, or merely of that gentleman's impressions as to what was likely to be the course taken in certain eventualities by Her Majesty's Government, I cannot take on myself to affirm.

I had, however, last evening, an opportunity of speaking with M. de Bismark himself on the subject, after your Lordship's despatch, which says that M. d'Usedom could have had no authority for such a communication, had reached me.

I put the question to him very directly; firstly, whether he had a knowledge of M. d'Usedom's having given an assurance of the kind to his Cabinet; but did not succeed in eliciting a direct reply. His Excellency went off upon the subject of the intended or alleged intended obstacles to be placed on Russian commerce through Prussian ports; and when I brought him back to the point, and told him distinctly I had learnt he had said that M. d'Usedom had reported that England would never take part in any hostile measures against Prussia, his answer was still indirect, and I thought embarrassed; so that the impression I received is, that he has used language of that import, but is indisposed to avow having done so to me.

The object of spreading such a report might either be to produce its effect on the minor German States, in leading them to think Prussia risks a danger the less in her present course, or upon Austria, though in the latter case the effect would not be durable, as the Imperial Cabinet must be well aware what the state of the case really is.

That there is a party, however, in Prussia, actually calculating the chances of a war with France at this moment, there can be no sort of doubt; and the same amount of political sagacity which would plunge the country into such a struggle, may very likely also calculate on the neutrality, or even on the support of Great Britain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 361.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 86.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 2, 1855.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No 48 of the 29th of January, I have now the honour of transmitting the inclosed copy of a despatch which Prince Stirbey has addressed to Aali Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Constantinople, upon the accusation which had been brought against him, of raising money by a tax in Wallachia which had been imposed for the payment of a debt to the Russian Government, and which was still collected for the identical purpose. This document has been placed in my hands by M. de Philipsborn, the agent for the Principalities, to whom, as stated in my despatch No. 44 of the 24th of January, I had addressed an inquiry with the view of ascertaining what truth there was in the accusation in question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 361.

Prince Stirbey to Aali Pasha.

Le $\frac{5}{17}$ Janvier, 1855.

EN réponse à la dépêche que votre Altesse m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 8 courant, je me trouve dans le cas de dire qu'il est positivement faux qu'un rescrit princier ait jamais ordonné le prélèvement d'aucune taxe, sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, pour l'amortissement de la dette Russe, ou en destination pour la Russie.

Si l'on a voulu faire allusion aux deux-dixièmes additionnels à l'impôt

direct, établis en 1848 sous la Caimacamie à la demande du Gouvernement Russe, pour faire face aux frais de l'occupation, il est assez connu qu'ils n'ont été prélevés que pour cette année; qu'après ma nomination à l'hospodarat j'en ai fait interrompre la perception: et qu'elle n'a été reprise qu'en 1851, lorsqu'en vertu d'une délibération du Divan *ad hoc*, il fut décidé que cette taxe serait perçue pendant quelques années pour servir à l'amortissement de la dette intérieure du pays, et non de la dette Russe.

Cette disposition fût exécuté à la lettre en dépit du vif mécontentement et des réclamations réitérées du Consulat de Russie. Ce n'est que depuis la fin de 1852, qu'à la suite d'un ordre impératif et péremptoire du Cabinet Russe, le produit de cette taxe pendant dix-huit mois, jusqu'à la retraite des Russes, fût remis au susdit Consulat.

Si donc depuis le 1 Juillet dernier, cette taxe continue à se prélever, c'est tout naturellement en vertu des dispositions sus énoncées du Divan *ad hoc*, et le produit en est affecté à l'acquittement de la dette intérieure contractée dans le pays, et à venir en aide au trésor dans l'état d'épuisement où il se trouve.

Votre Altesse voudra bien se convaincre encore une fois que les informations parvenues au Ministère Impérial ne sont que la suite du système de dénonciations calomnieuses dont on abuse depuis quelque temps auprès de la Sublime Porte; mais bien que je sois reconnaissant à votre Altesse de me fournir les occasions d'en faire justice en leur opposant les faits et les actes publics, il m'est bien pénible d'autre part de voir que votre Altesse puisse leur accorder la moindre créance. Dans tous les cas la production de l'officiel conçu dans les termes qu'on prétend, m'aurait paru indispensable pour pouvoir prouver un fait moralement et matériellement impossible.

No. 362.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, March 6, 1855.*

PRINCE MENCHIKOFF has been recalled to St. Petersburgh; General Prince Gortchakoff to succeed him in the Crimea; Osten-Sacken Beord in command.

No. 363.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 6, 9 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, March 6, 1855.*

THE Emperor of Russia has ordered instructions and full powers to be transmitted without loss of time to Prince Gortchakoff at Vienna, to enable him to take part in the Conferences.

No. 364.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 6, 11 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 6, 1855.*

COUNT BUOL has informed me that the full powers of Prince Gortchakoff have been renewed, and the existing basis for peace-negotiations confirmed by telegraph from St. Petersburgh.

No. 365.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 259.)

Paris, March 5, 1855.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS mentioned to me this afternoon that Count Buol had expressed to M. de Bourqueney a desire that the Moldavian and Wallachian Governments should be requested to send each an Agent to Vienna during the Conferences, to give any information that might be required as to the wants and resources of those two Provinces. His Excellency observed that he did not think that the present Hospodars were the proper persons to be entrusted with this selection, though he admitted that the measure might be a good one; nor would it be proper, he added, to take such a step without the consent of the Porte. He desired, moreover, that a Servian Agent should likewise be required to attend, as it appeared to him that the Austrian Government always aimed at excluding Servia from any participation in the affairs of Turkey, which were now, if possible, to be regulated.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 366.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 75.)

Foreign Office, March 6, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 65 of the 28th ultimo, stating that you had informed Baron Manteuffel that certain cases of revolver pistols had been expedited through Prussia to Russia, I have to instruct your Lordship to ask his Excellency whether he made any inquiry, and with what result, upon this matter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 367.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir R. Abercromby.

(No. 18. Secret and Confidential.)

Foreign Office, March 6, 1855.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatches marked Secret and Confidential, of the 25th and 26th of February, containing an account of the proceedings of the Prussian Minister at the Hague, with regard to certain discussions which have taken place between the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and that of Prussia on matters connected with the Zollverein; and I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government learn with regret the conduct of the Prussian Minister, who, in this as in other matters, cannot have acted without the instructions or knowledge of his Government, which thereby marks its disregard for the dignity and independence of the Netherlands, and its hostility to the cause in which England and France are engaged.

The course which the Netherlands Government proposes to pursue appears to Her Majesty's Government judicious and dignified; and if the opinion of Her Majesty's Government had been asked, it certainly would have been given in favour of a remonstrance to the Cabinet of Berlin, unsupported by any foreign Power.

No instructions, therefore, will be sent to Lord Bloomfield on the subject;

but you will inform M. Van Hall that he may count upon any support on the part of Her Majesty's Government that his Excellency may hereafter desire against the policy which Prussia seems determined to pursue against the Netherlands.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 368.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 7.)

Foreign Office, March 6, 1855.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which your Lordship reports, in your despatch No. 2 of the 1st instant, that you held to Baron Manteuffel on the attitude of Prussia with regard to the war.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 369.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 8.)

Foreign Office, March 6, 1855.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which your Lordship held to the King of Prussia at the interview with which His Majesty honoured you, as reported in your despatch No. 3 of the 1st instant; and they concur in your Lordship's views therein expressed respecting the policy and intentions of the King.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 370.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 197.)

Foreign Office, March 7, 1855.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Consul at Monastir has transmitted to me a copy of a despatch which he has addressed to your Excellency on the 25th of January on the subject of the forcible abduction of women, and their persecution, by Mussulmans in the district of his Consulate, and I now transmit for your information a copy of a despatch which has been addressed to Mr. Consul Longworth, approving his firm and judicious conduct.

Mr. Longworth's report shows how little reliance can be placed on the Sultan's firmans, or the measures said to be taken for the reform of abuses.

In the present instance it is clear that, but for the judicious and determined intervention of Her Majesty's Consul, atrocities against Christians worthy of the worst times of Ottoman history would have been perpetrated, not only with impunity but with the sanction of the highest Turkish authority in the district; and this state of things, revolting as it is and hopeless as it appears to be, assumes a most serious aspect, now that the question has to be considered of reconciling the independence of the Sultan with the amelioration of the condition of his Christian subjects. The one is a political obligation, the other is a duty imposed upon us by religion and by Christian charity, and if compelled to choose between the two, there can be no doubt on which side our option must lie; but they do not appear to be irreconcilable if proper measures for that object are taken and enforced.

If, however, the Turkish Government are unable to control, or are unwilling to punish, Turkish authorities who set the Sultan's decrees at defiance, the Sultan will have no cause of complaint against the Christian Powers when they determine themselves to protect their coreligionists, and to carry out the benevolent intentions towards all classes of his subjects that the Sultan professes but is powerless to execute.

I have to instruct your Excellency to make known the contents of this despatch to the Turkish Government, in whatever way you may think best calculated to produce the desired effect.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 370.

The Earl of Clarendon to Consul Longworth.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 6, 1855.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 3 of the 25th of January last, inclosing a copy of a despatch which you had that day addressed to his Excellency Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, on the subject of the abduction of Christian women by Mussulmans; and I have to convey to you my entire approval of the firm and judicious conduct which you have pursued with respect to these atrocious practices, as reported in your despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 371.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 248.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 7, 1855.*

IN reply to your Excellency's despatch No. 259 of the 5th instant, I have to state to you that the necessity of sending Agents from the Principalities to Vienna for the purpose of giving any information that may be required at the Conferences with regard to the wants and resources of those two Provinces, is not apparent; but the selection of such Agents, if sent to Vienna, should certainly not be left to the Hospodars, but they should be appointed by the Porte, whose rights and authority it is the interest of France and England to uphold.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 372.

Mr. Hudson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 37.)

My Lord, *Turin, March 3, 1855.*

WITH reference to my despatch marked No. 36 of yesterday's date, inclosing copies of a report presented to the Sardinian Senate, on the two Conventions of the 26th of January last, I have now the honour to report to your Lordship that the Law approving those Conventions was this day adopted by the Senate by sixty-three votes to twenty-seven.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES HUDSON.

No. 373.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 124.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 19, 1855.*

INCLOSED herewith for your Lordship's information is a translated copy of the supplementary instruction addressed by Aali Pasha to the Porte's Ambassador at Vienna with reference to his participation in the expected Conferences for peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 373.

Aali Pasha to Arif Effendi.

(Traduction.) *Le 15 Février, 1855.*

J'ENVOIE ci-joint les pleins pouvoirs que Sa Majesté Impériale vient de donner pour que votre Excellence assiste aux Conférences qu'il est question de tenir à Vienne.

Les demandes fondamentales de la Sublime Porte par rapport aux conditions de la paix, ayant été consignées dans la dépêche que, par ordre de sa Hautesse, je vous ai envoyée en date du 30 Janvier, 1855, il n'est pas nécessaire que je les répète ici. Ces demandes ne sont autres choses sinon des éclaircissements ultérieurs à mettre en avant lorsqu'on traitera de la paix sur les interprétations données par les Hautes Puissances alliées aux quatre points connus; et il n'y a dans la pièce dont je vous envoie aussi copie ci-inclus, et qui a été rédigée de commun accord par les Plénipotentiaires d'Angleterre, de France, et de Autriche, rien qui affaiblisse ou qui annule ces interprétations.

De même que les Puissances susmentionnées ont parlé plus d'une fois de leur droit de proposer, indépendamment des quatre points renfermés dans le préambule de la pièce susdite, des conditions que les intérêts généraux de l'Europe semblent exiger, la Sublime Porte aussi a la faculté de proposer les conditions qu'elle jugera nécessaires pour le maintien de sa parfaite indépendance; et il n'y a aucun doute que, vu les sentiments sincères et les instructions bienveillantes de nos alliés à l'égard de la Sublime Porte, ils accepteront et confirmeront complétement la nécessité et la modération des conditions susmentionnées.

Je m'empresse donc d'appeler l'attention de votre Excellence sur ce point-ci, à savoir, qu'elle ne doit pas hésiter à chercher, de concert avec les Plénipotentiaires ses collègues, à faire accepter par la Russie dans les Conférences qui auront lieu, les dispositions de la pièce dont j'ai parlé plus haut.

No. 374.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 125.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 19, 1855.*

ALTHOUGH I have no official, nor indeed any direct, advices from the Crimea, I am happy to state that the prevailing reports brought down from Balaklava, still confirm the impression that a general improvement continues to take place in the health and situation of the army. I wish it were in my power to add that professional opinions, in so far as they can be ascertained in society, are favourable to our prospects of early success at Sebastopol. There is certainly reason to presume that the Russians have had to contend with the same difficulties which have thinned our ranks; that their means of subsistence are diminished, and that in numbers also they have suffered a considerable reduction.

On the other hand, fresh arrivals of provisions and ammunition are talked of; reinforcements are said to have reached the entrance of the Peninsula; and the Porte has received intelligence, I know not from what quarter, that the Emperor of Russia is himself on the way to Sebastopol, with a large proportion of his Guards.

With respect to the Turkish expedition at Eupatoria, I cannot do better than refer your Lordship to the letter, inclosed herewith in copy, from Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons to Lord Raglan, communicated to me this morning. Omer Pasha is there with a force of 26,000 men, and a fair prospect of receiving reinforcements, and holding the position in defiance of the Russian army, whose picquets surround it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 374.

Colonel Simmons to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan.

Eupatoria, February 11, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE to inform your Lordship that Omer Pasha called off Kamiesch on the 7th instant, and saw Sir Edmund Lyons, when he explained to him his wishes with respect to the embarkation of the remainder of his troops, provisions, &c.

At present there are about 26,000 men here, with two batteries of artillery horsed.

A third battery has arrived this morning, but is not yet disembarked.

The Russians surround this place at a distance of about 3000 yards, by a cordon of videttes, supported by a line of picquets, which are again supported by a line of strong guards.

There may be about four squadrons constantly on this duty, with six pieces of Artillery.

According to the best information we have, there are about four regiments of Cavalry in this neighbourhood.

About a week ago the Turks made a reconnaissance up to within a mile of the village of Sak, supported by Her Majesty's steam gun-boat "Viper."

In driving in the Russian picquets, they killed five men and four horses, and afterwards destroyed the guard-houses, and captured some hay. There were no casualties on the side of the Turks.

It is reported by deserters, of whom three or four have lately come in, that since the reconnaissance, a regiment of Dragoons has arrived from Simpheropol to reinforce the Cavalry at Sak, and that a regiment of Infantry has come to the neighbourhood of Tipi Mumai; also that the Russians are on half rations of bread, and there is much sickness among them.

In coming from Kamiesch, we passed close along the coast, but saw nothing of the enemy.

In rear of Cape Ulukul there appeared, at some distance inland (three or four miles), a good deal of smoke, as if rising from what might be the fires of a camp or large occupied village; otherwise there was no trace of the enemy visible.

The troops here appear to be in good health; there are about 650 in hospital, amongst which several cases of typhus.

The small-pox, which had broken out on board the "Curaçoa," does not appear to spread.

There is a plentiful supply of bread and vegetable food, peas, rice, &c., for the men here, but little meat.

Forage also and firewood are not in abundance, but the stores appear to improve daily, by the arrivals from Turkey.

I shall, however, in a few days be able, I hope, to give your Lordship a more particular account of the position of affairs here.

At present I am much occupied in laying out for the Generalissimo a chain of works to surround the town at a distance of about 1,000 yards, thus to obtain space for a camp and for manœuvring.

This measure is the more necessary as the town is very full, and, owing to the defective police, very filthy; and if the troops are more crowded in it, disease may ensue.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS.

No. 375.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 128)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 21, 1855.

BEFORE the receipt of your instruction No. 122 of the 9th instant, I had brought before the Porte the names of those military officers who are mentioned therein as worthy of punishment, on the assertion of Brigadier Williams.

I have now sent into Aali Pasha an extract of your Lordship's instruction, not doubting that the Turkish Minister will appreciate its importance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 376.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 129.)

My Lord; *Constantinople, February* 21, 1855

ACCORDING to the tenour of your Lordship's instruction No. 123, dated the 9th instant, I have called upon the Porte to send 1000 gunners, and an additional quantity of ammunition, to the Sultan's army at Kars.

I had previously acted in those respects on the recommendation of General Williams, but the communication of your Lordship's instruction will no doubt come powerfully in aid of my exertions.

I question, however, whether the Turkish Government have 1000 spare gunners at their disposal, and still less is it to be expected that they have the number of 2000, required by Brigadier Williams.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 377.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 130.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 21, 1855.

INCLOSED herewith, for your Lordship's information, are copies of an official note addressed to me by Baron Bruck at the moment of his departure the day before yesterday, of another addressed to me by his successor Baron Koller, announcing his arrival as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the Court of Vienna, and of my reply to the latter communication.

Not having been at home when Baron de Koller did me the honour to call, I have not yet had the advantage of conversing with his Excellency. I understand that his language to the Turkish Secretary of State is favourable to peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 377.

Baron Bruck to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

M. l'Ambassadeur. *Constantinople, le 18 Février*, 1855.

APPELE par la confiance de mon gracieux Souverain à d'autres fonctions, je vois avec regret cesser par mon départ de cette capitale les excellentes relations que j'avais le plaisir d'entretenir avec vous, M. l'Ambassadeur, et dont je garderai toujours un souvenir agréable et reconnaissant.

M. le Baron Koller, qui me remplacera ici en qualité d'Envoyé Extraordinaire et de Ministre Plénipotentiaire, s'estimera heureux, je n'en doute pas, de pouvoir continuer ces rapports dans un sens entièrement conforme aux liens d'étroite amitié qui unissent si heureusement nos deux Gouvernements.

Je ne saurais terminer ces lignes sans offrir à votre Excellence encore une fois mes sentiments de reconnaissance en la priant d'agréer, &c.

(Signé) BRUCK.

Inclosure 2 in No. 377.

Baron Koller to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Constantinople, le 19 Février*, 1855.

M. LE BARON DE BRUCK a eu l'occasion de prévenir votre Excellence de la nouvelle destination qu'il a reçu et qui l'oblige à quitter aujourd'hui cette capitale, où par ordre de mon auguste Souverain je dois le remplacer en qualité d'Envoyé Extraordinaire et de Ministre Plénipotentiaire.

Arrivé depuis hier je m'empresse d'informer votre Excellence de mon entrée en fonctions, tout en la priant de vouloir bien me continuer les bonnes et agréables relations qui subsistaient entre votre Excellence et mon prédécesseur et que je tiendrai à cœur de cultiver et de développer d'une manière conforme aux rapports intimes qui unissent nos deux Cours.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) B. KOLLER.

Inclosure 3 in No. 377.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Baron Koller.

M. l'Envoyé, *Constantinople, le 22 Février*, 1855.

J'AI l'honneur de vous accuser la réception de l'office par lequel vous avez bien voulu m'annoncer votre arrivée dans cette capitale en qualité d'Envoyé Extraordinaire et de Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, et m'exprimer le désir très flatteur pour moi d'entretenir avec l'Ambassade de ma gracieuse Souveraine des rapports conformes aux liens d'étroite amitié qui unissent si heureusement nos Cours respectives.

Je m'empresse, M. le Ministre, de vous réciproquer de la manière la plus cordiale les sentiments que vous venez de me témoigner, et tout en regrettant l'interruption de mes rapports personnels avec votre digne prédécesseur, appelé à porter ailleurs l'éclat de ses talents et le poids de ses services, je m'estimerais heureux de vous montrer combien je mets de prix à conserver avec votre Excellence les mêmes bonnes et agréables relations que j'ai eu le bonheur de maintenir avec lui.

Je profite, &c.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 378.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 9.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 5*, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to report that I arrived in this capital yesterday evening. It is right that I should state to your Lordship that I did not present my credentials at Berlin. As it was clear that the King did not mean to negotiate at Berlin, and indeed was alarmed at the prospect of being forced to come to an immediate decision, it seemed to me that neither the credentials nor the full powers intrusted to me by Her Majesty were likely to prove of service.

I have only further to state that Lord Bloomfield gave me the full advantage of his experience, and that I feel greatly indebted to him for his cordial assistance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 379.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 5*, 1855.

COUNT BUOL having fixed 1 o'clock this day to receive me, I was introduced to him by Lord Westmorland at that hour.

Count Buol received me with great cordiality. Our conversation naturally turned, in the first instance, upon the sudden death of the Emperor Nicholas.

Count Buol said that this event would make no change in the policy of Austria; what they thought necessary before they thought necessary now, neither more nor less. The only change would be in the weight and authority of the Emperor of Russia; the present Sovereign could not have the authority which, from the length of his reign and the force of his character, attached to the late Emperor.

I remarked that, however true that observation might be, the policy of Russia was not a thing of yesterday; that, in 1875, it might be what it was in 1775, and that it behoved the Powers of Europe to take guarantees against the progress of her ambition.

After a time Lord Westmorland left us, and I had a conversation of great interest with Count Buol.

He told me that he thought Austria had more interest than any other Power in checking the advances of Russia, and that he was prepared to act with us in conformity to that view.

I said I thought there was an obvious difference in our positions: that England had made great sacrifices in fitting out fleets and incurring great expenses; that she had felt deeply the sufferings of her army; that any peace which did not provide solid guarantees for the future would be a severe disappointment; that Austria, not having shed her blood in the cause, might more easily content herself with less efficient securities; that I believed, though I did not pretend to answer for it, that the feeling in France was similar to that in England.

Count Buol said that Powers already at war felt less difficulty in continuing hostilities than a Power at peace felt in commencing war; that each Power must make allowances for the different situation of the other, and that the object ought to be to bring Austria, France, and England, to agree on the terms they would think necessary to ask of Russia.

Adverting then to the mode of proceeding, he proposed that Lord Westmorland and I should meet Baron Bourqueney at his house previously to the opening of the Conference.

To this I willingly agreed. He then suggested that we might meet Prince Gortchakoff and M. Titoff before the Conferences began, in order to settle the form of meeting.

I did not give any positive answer to this proposal, but it seems to me very objectionable. We might thereby be led into a discussion without clear or formal results; for mere points of form it is quite unnecessary, and for points of substance might be entangling and dangerous.

It would be, besides, a departure from that which has been agreed upon both in London and Paris.

Coming to the points of negotiation, Count Buol, like every one else, very soon entered upon the third point. By common agreement, it seems to be supposed that the third point is the rock upon which negotiation may split.

Count Buol said that, provided we obtained security for Europe against the aggressive policy of Russia, we ought to endeavour to obtain that security in a form not incompatible with her dignity and not wounding to her feelings. That if we insisted upon such terms, we should have a short and precarious peace. That Russia might fairly object to any limitations of her sovereignty "chez elle."

To this I replied, that the objection thus made seemed to me untenable. That no one would object to any number of ships Russia might choose to keep at home, were it not that every one knew the object was to send them abroad. That in point of fact, no Power had the right to assemble a vast army on its neighbour's frontier; that any such proceeding led to a demand for explanation, and if that explanation was unsatisfactory, to war. It was therefore an idle pretence to say that Russia might be what she pleased at home. That the maintenance of a great fleet at Sebastopol, and a great army in its neighbourhood, was a perpetual menace to Turkey.

Count Buol, agreeing with me apparently in these general remarks, said there were two modes of guarding against the danger; that the first mode was to limit the naval forces of Russia in the Black Sea; the second was to raise up some counterbalancing power.

I agreed with Count Buol that any proposal of the kind deserved examination. I said the only proposition my Government had to make was the first he had mentioned, and that if the second on examination was found inefficacious, we should expect Austria to concur with us on the first, which was simple, safe, and direct.

He agreed to this, and added, that possibly on the securities of the second kind being stated, the Russian Plenipotentiary would of his own accord choose the first mode.

Observing upon a memorandum Count Buol had given to Lord Westmorland, I said it seemed to me that the admission of Russia into the guarantee weakened the security. That after the Succession War, and after the last war, the Powers which thought themselves menaced by France combined together for their protection. That a similar Treaty between Austria, France, and England, seemed now the proper remedy against the aggression of Russia.

Count Buol said that he disagreed with me. That the participation of Russia in the guarantee would be a great security for Turkey. Russia had hitherto always refused such a guarantee, and had kept her relations with Turkey studiously separate from her engagements with the other Powers of Europe.

I said my suggestion was one which had occurred to me, and was not to be considered a proposition of my Government. He said he so accepted it, and that he would reflect on my suggestion, and begged me to reflect on his. But indeed besides the general guarantee he had mentioned, there might be a Treaty of other Powers against Russia in particular, as the only Power which threatens the integrity of Turkey.

He dwelt much on the importance of the four points, as concessions on the part of Russia of immense value. That they formed a security for the balance of power, which until lately could scarcely have been hoped for.

According to his view the Christians would be secured in their privileges by the intervention of all the Ministers of the Great Powers of Europe at Constantinople, and not by Russia alone. That such intervention would be confined to representations, and would stop short of force. That Austria, France, and

England would always be upon the spot ready to resist the first aggressions of Russia.

He feared if the war were prolonged, Turkey would be exhausted, and we should find ourselves unable to prolong her independent existence.

He wished a Commission to be named by the Conference on each Article. Nor does he at all incline to the delay which is implied by the proposal that the first and second points should be finally settled before the third is discussed.

The matters here treated of were but lightly touched upon in a conversation which lasted scarcely more than an hour.

They are still more imperfectly discussed in this despatch. But it is my duty to state to your Lordship that I came away much impressed by the sincerity of Count Buol in his endeavour to seek a solution of our present difficulties, which shall not only be peaceful but satisfactory.

I am persuaded that he is greatly apprehensive of the preponderance of Russia, and seeks anxiously for securities by which Europe may be guarded against her craving and never-satisfied ambition.

Whether in framing such securities Count Buol is not too tenacious of present peace, and too confident of the efficiency of moral guarantees, may well be questioned.

If Russia feels herself foiled, and sure to be foiled if she commences the struggle afresh, Europe may rest satisfied. If, on the other hand, Russia were willing to escape from present difficulties, relying upon her unbroken strength as the element of future success, her attempts to break the present alliance might be more successful in peace than in war.

I was informed to-day, on good authority, that the finances of Russia are scarcely at all impaired.

Turkey, on the other hand, might be exhausted by the drain upon her Treasury; her power of borrowing is limited.

This country is likewise embarrassed by the state of her credit, and this consideration makes her averse to war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 380.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 144.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 26, 1855.*

IT is a great relief to me to learn from the inclosure contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 142 of the 16th instant, that there is no longer any call for providing accommodation at Constantinople for the Sardinian contingent destined to serve with the allied armies in the Crimea. It is extremely difficult to find sufficient room in suitable buildings, even for the British and French depôts, hospitals, and stores. I beg to observe at the same time, that although the arrangement announced by the War Office appears to be the most judicious course of proceeding under the circumstances, the Sardinian army is nevertheless likely, I conceive, to have need while in the Crimea of room for an hospital and stores, perhaps even for a depôt in the neighbourhood.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 381.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 145.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 26, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith for your Lordship's information, in copy, a letter which I received to-day from Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons, R.A., and also the latest despatches which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul at Varna.

They relate principally to the unsuccessful attack made on the 17th instant by the Russians on the Turkish positions at Eupatoria. Your Lordship will doubtless read with interest Omer Pasha's own account of the action as addressed by his Highness to Colonel Neale.

I propose to obtain some mark of distinction from the Sultan in favour of the Hungarian officer Kutchinski, whose name is mentioned by the Pasha with so cordial an eulogium.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 381.

Major Simmons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Eupatoria, February 20, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE to inform your Lordship that very considerable convoys of waggons, and some troops, having been seen moving from the eastward along the north shore of the Lake Sasik, on the 15th instant, we had reason to suspect that the enemy were reinforcing themselves in this neighbourhood, but to what extent we could not ascertain.

The smallness of the detachment of Cavalry here, 200 Regulars and about 250 Tartars (very imperfectly armed), effectually prevents any reconnaissance to the front, where the enemy always keeps strong guards of Cavalry, more than a match at each point for nearly the whole of the Cavalry here.

On the 17th, at daylight, the intentions of the enemy were declared by his bringing into position at distances varying from 400 to 800 yards from our lines of entrenchments a powerful artillery, supported by riflemen who concealed themselves in pits, speedily dug in the intervals between each gun.

The enemy immediately opened his fire from I should think near 80 pieces of Artillery; amongst them were some guns which threw shells of the calibre of the English 32 pounders. The Artillery was supported by heavy columns of Infantry in its rear, with masses of Cavalry on either flank.

At first the position taken by the enemy extended along our whole front, but after continuing their cannonade for nearly three hours, the columns and masses took ground to their left, and it was evident that their principal efforts would be directed against our right.

This may probably be attributed to the protection afforded to our left by Her Majesty's ships "Valorous" and "Viper," which threw some well directed shells.

In the meantime, the Turkish Artillery, which consisted of some 47 guns and howitzers of all calibres, from the English 32-pounder gun down to the field 6-pounder, had replied briskly to the fire of the enemy.

Omer Pasha seeing the concentration of the enemy in front of his right, moved up some battalions of reserve from his left to the threatened point, and a battery of mounted artillery to replace one which had been completely silenced, every gun having been disabled.

He also sent to Captain Hastings of Her Majesty's ship "Curaçoa," the senior naval officer, informing him of the concentration of the enemy opposite our right, who immediately moved the "Viper" gunboat towards the right, and with the "Furious" and "Curaçoa" observed also in this direction.

The enemy having continued his cannonade for about three hours and a half, moved up a column of attack on our extreme right, under the cover of some rising ground and a wall.

They advanced three times to the assault, but were each time driven back by the fire from our lines; on the last occasion the Turkish Cavalry charged upon the retreating column and did much mischief.

At length, about half-past 10 A.M., the whole of their columns were drawn off under the cover of their Artillery and Cavalry.

Unfortunately the weakness of our Cavalry precluded all possibility of pursuit, even for a few hundred yards beyond our line; and so the enemy were enabled to remove all their wounded and many of their dead, and to get away their disabled guns.

They left, however, 453 dead on the field, and five prisoners were taken (four of whom wounded), and nearly 300 horses were also left dead on the field.

That the attack was intended to be seriously pushed, is evident from the fact that the enemy left a great many planks and scaling ladders on the field, and that each Infantry soldier was provided with a small faggot about 18 inches long by 8 inches in diameter; but whether these latter were intended for incendiary purposes or to fill up the ditches has not been ascertained.

The attacking force consisted, so far as I can ascertain, of the 8th Division (16 Battalions), of the 3rd Corps of a Division, formed of 16 Reserve Battalions of different Regiments, which all came from Perekop; and of the Azowski, 23rd Regiment, belonging to the 12th (Liprandi's) Division, which came from cantonments five versts from Sievernaya, and 1500 Greek volunteers, who wear the cross on their appointments.

Besides this force there must have been 100 pieces of Artillery in the field, of which about 80 were brought into position, and 6 Regiments of Cavalry, besides Cossacks, or altogether a force of near 40,000 men.

Their loss must have been heavy, probably in killed and wounded not less than 2,000.

The Turkish force engaged might have been about 27,000 men with guns.

They turned out with great alacrity, and behaved with perfect steadiness.

Several battalions who were disembarked during the cannonade, showed the greatest energy in getting to the front.

The Turks' loss amounts to 87 killed and 277 wounded, of all ranks. The French naval detachment behaved most admirably; they lost 4 killed and 7 wounded.

Among the population 13 were killed and 11 wounded, and the Turks lost 79 horses killed and 18 wounded.

I regret to add, that among the killed was Selim Pasha, who commanded the Egyptian Division with his Highness Omer Pasha's army. He was a General of much courage, and at all times a most zealous, hard-working officer.

Suliman Pasha, the Egyptian General of Brigade, who has succeeded in the command, was wounded in the head, but did not retire from the field.

Among the officers there are included in the numbers above, 7 killed and 17 wounded.

His Highness Omer Pasha has requested me to inform your Lordship, that Kutchinsky, who is attached to the Egyptian Brigade, having been recommended some years ago by your Lordship for the military service of Egypt, distinguished himself in the most marked manner.

In the battery, when all the 6 guns were disabled, the Captain of Artillery having been killed, Major Kutchinsky took charge, and under a very heavy cross fire of artillery, continued to direct the guns until the last.

His Highness is much satisfied with the conduct of the whole of his troops, and has expressed himself in the most flattering manner as to the able cooperation of that portion of Her Majesty's fleet which was in the bay under the command of the Honourable Captain Hastings, of the "Curaçoa."

Since the 17th, there has been a great movement of convoys of waggons to and from the eastward, to the north of Lake Sasik, but being completely surrounded by the enemy's Cavalry in considerable force, we can obtain no accurate information as to whether they are entirely decamped or not.

The difficulty of watering and provisioning a large force near here is so great, that I should be inclined to believe they had decamped; but again, after the works I have seen executed by the Russians, in the Wallachian steppe, for watering an army, I should not be surprised if they had found the means of removing these obstacles.

In the meantime his Highness has been most active in augmenting the defences of these lines, and many additional guns have been mounted, so that I do not think I exaggerate in stating that the place is nearly doubled in strength since the 17th.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 381.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, February* 19, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that a report is prevalent in Varna, yesterday and to-day, that the Russians had again crossed the Danube to Tultcha and Babadagh. The local authorities here, however, state that they have received no official information to this effect. A Turkish convoy, with provisions, is however known to have recently left Hirsova for Baltchik, and it is not improbable that a party of Russian Cossacks have crossed, with the view of cutting it off.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 381.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, February* 19, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency, that the embarkation of the Turkish troops for Eupatoria has been continued with activity during the last week, both at Varna and at Baltchik. At the latter place the weather has been unfavourable, and there has been a deficiency of boats at that port. As soon as the two remaining battalions at Varna are embarked, Her Majesty's ship "Sphynx," now here, will proceed to Baltchik, and assist in the embarkation. From Bourghas I have received no very recent intelligence, but the steamers appear to be detained there, owing to the loss or damage done to nearly all the lighters, in a gale of wind, which is said to have occurred there a few days ago. Her Majesty's ship "Inflexible" was at Sisopoli, where the Cavalry would chiefly be embarked.

By the latest intelligence I have received from Eupatoria, I find that 26,000 Turkish troops were assembled there, and were intrenching themselves on a line drawn between the two lakes, at a distance of about 1000 yards from the place.

Four regiments of Russian Cavalry were before Eupatoria, and their videttes were placed round the town, at the distance of about 3,000 yards.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE

Inclosure 4 in No. 381.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, February* 24, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship, a copy of an official letter which I have received yesterday from Omer Pasha, informing me of the victory which the Ottoman army, under command of his Highness, in conjunction with some British and French ships of war and detachments, had gained over the Russians before Eupatoria, on the 17th instant. I had previously received a despatch from his Excellency Lord Raglan, addressed to Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Bucharest, conveying a telegraphic message from his Lordship to the Minister-at-War, respecting this victory.

I avail myself of this opportunity to inform your Excellency that all the troops, artillery, and stores in Varna for Eupatoria, have now been embarked.

At Baltchik there are still 5,000 men and two or three batteries of Artillery to be embarked. Her Majesty's steam-sloop "Sphynx," now here, will proceed there to-morrow, to expedite the embarkation.

From Bourghas Sir Stephen Lakeman writes me under date the 20th instant, that he had already embarked 380 Cavalry and Artillery horses, and several hundred tons of barley and straw, which latter was much wanted at Eupatoria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 381.

Omer Pasha to Consul Neale.

M. le Consul, *Quartier-Général d'Eupatoria, le 22 Février*, 1855.

JE m'empresse de vous informer d'une belle victoire que Dieu nous a aidé d'emporter sur les Russes. Le 17 du courant à l'aube du jour l'ennemi est venu attaquer Eupatoria. La force se composait de 36 Bataillons d'Infanterie, 6 Régiments de Cavalerie, et plus de 80 canons.

Le combat a commencé par une forte canonnade, après quoi son Infanterie, munie de planches et d'échelles, s'est portée plusieurs fois à l'assaut sur nos fortifications à demi-terminées et incomplétement armées. Elle fut chaque fois repoussé.

Le combat a duré quatre heures durie, et après quoi les Russes se sont retirés en laissant sur place 453 tués, en emportant avec eux probablement le double nombre de blessés et beaucoup de tués.

Nous avons eu aussi de pertes. Selim Pacha d'Egypte est tué, Soliman Pacha, Général de Brigade, blessé; en outre 87 hommes tués et 277 blessés.

Les Russes ont aussi perdu jusqu'à 300 chevaux de leur Artillerie; notre perte en chevaux est de 79.

Le jour après le combat le temps a changé au froid très sensible, accompagné d'un vent tranchant. Le corps Russe a campé près d'Eupatoria sans tentes, sans bois et même manquant de vivres; dans ces circonstances les plus difficiles il est aujourd'hui, sans doute avec des pertes en hommes et chevaux gelés, en pleine retraite vers Simpheropol. Un steamer Anglais observe sa marche et en même l'occasion de lui envoyer quelques boulets.

D'après le dire de prisonniers la troupe ennemi se composait de la 8e Division du 3e Corps, d'une partie de la 12e et d'une Division formées de réserves arrivées de Perekop. Les bâtiments Anglais, la "Curaçoa," le "Furious," le "Valorous," le "Viper," et les bâtiments-à-vapeur Français le "Véloie," et l'Ottoman le "Schelpaer," ont beaucoup contribuée à la gloire de cette journée.

Le détachement Français qui se trouve ici a eu aussi quelques hommes en tués et blessés. J'étais très content de la conduite de mes troupes et je m'en fais les meilleurs augures pour l'avenir.

Recevez, &c.
Le Généralissime de l'Armée Ottomane,
(Signé) OMER.

No. 382.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 88. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 4, 1855.

BARON BOURQUENEY has stated to me, that having waited upon Count Buol to discuss with him the order in which it would be advisable to proceed after the commencement of the negotiations, supposing that no objection was made to the acknowledgment of the acceptation of the interpretation of the four bases as the principle upon which that negotiation was to be established, Count Buol remarked that he thought it would be advisable to wait for the arrival of Lord John Russell before coming to any settlement of these

questions, but that his idea upon this subject would be, that Lord John Russell, Baron Bourqueney, and myself, should meet together to inquire into the four Articles of the bases, and to come to some settled agreement with regard to the mode and extent of the propositions we should submit to the Russian Plenipotentiaries.

Baron Bourqueney objected to this proposal, stating that he thought it would be preferable to bring before the general Conference each Article of the bases in the order in which they stood, so as not to arrive at the third basis till the points comprised in the two former ones had been agreed upon. Count Buol said he thought otherwise, and that it would be better to look to the whole negotiation at once, and as Baron Bourqueney combatted this idea, Count Buol asked upon what ground he could object to it, saying, "Si vous avez un secret dites le, car nous ne pouvons pas attendre le mois de Mai ou de Juillet pour savoir à quoi nous en tenir pour la paix ou la guerre."

Baron Bourqueney told me he had made the proposition to Count Buol "pour éviter de faire naufrage dans le port," but that he had not thought it advisable to enter with him any further upon the subject, or to refer more particularly to the secret instruction under which he was acting, and of which your Lordship is informed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 383.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 90.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 5, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to report to you that Lord John Russell arrived here last night, and I had the pleasure of waiting upon him in the course of the evening. In accordance with an arrangement which I then made with him, I accompanied him this day to Count Buol, by whom he was most cordially received and welcomed. I stated to Count Buol that Lord John was furnished with Her Majesty's credentials for His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, and I begged his Excellency to ascertain and to communicate to Lord John when it would be agreeable to His Majesty to receive his Lordship. I then withdrew, and left Lord John and Count Buol together, and I have since had the pleasure of learning from his Lordship that the conversation which ensued was of the most satisfactory nature, a report of which will doubtless be addressed to your Lordship by Lord John.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 384.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 86.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 8, 1855.*

I INCLOSE a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, relative to a statement made by Baron Koller to M. Benedetti at Constantinople, to the effect that England and France must give up all idea of diminishing Russian power in the Black Sea; and I have to instruct your Lordship to ask Count Buol whether Baron Koller's language is in accordance with his instructions.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 392.

No. 385.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 87.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 8, 1855.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has this day read to me a despatch from Count Buol, suggesting that Agents should be sent from Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, to Vienna, for the purpose of furnishing information upon local questions, and aiding the Conference in their decision with respect to the future administration of the Principalities.

I told Count Colloredo that this measure appeared to be of a doubtful usefulness and expediency, and I asked how and by whom the agents were to be selected; if by the Hospodars, they would be the advocates of misgovernment and abuse, and if by the foreign Agents in the Principalities, there would be little chance of agreement with the Austrian authorities, who unfortunately had shown no favour to persons desirous and capable of introducing reforms.

Moreover, I thought that the presence of such Agents at Vienna might be a cause of embarrassment, as they might in various ways use their local knowledge to obstruct the general and comprehensive views which, it was to be hoped, the Conference would take of the system of government to be established in the Principalities.

At all events, I added, Her Majesty's Government could not assent to the proposal of Count Buol, without previous communication with the Porte, as it was alike the duty and the interest of the Sultan's allies to uphold his authority throughout the Ottoman Empire.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 386.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 89.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 8, 1855.*

I INCLOSE a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, stating that M. de Bourqueney has applied to his Government for instructions in regard to a proposition of Count Buol, that four Sub-Committees of members of the Conference should be appointed to examine and report upon the four points.

No such proposition has yet been made to Her Majesty's Government through your Lordship, but Her Majesty's Government entirely concur with M. Drouyn de Lhuys that such a proposition would be inadmissible.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 387.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 82. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 6, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Emperor Nicholas had scarcely ceased to breathe, when the Empress directed a message to the following effect to be sent by telegraph to the King of Prussia:—"A midi dix minutes, l'Empereur a exhalé sa noble âme. Avant de mourir il m'a prié demander à son cher Fritz de rester l'ami de la Russie et fidèle aux dernières paroles de Papa."

The last words of the late King of Prussia above alluded to, were an injunction to maintain under all contingencies the principles of the Holy Alliance; and your Lordship can easily understand that this Imperial message

* No. 393.

was well calculated to produce an important effect on the King at such a moment, and to shake any inclination he might have of drawing his policy nearer to the Western Powers.

It has succeeded in so far that all public business is suspended. The King has scarcely seen his Ministers since the 2nd instant, and his mind is overwhelmed by thoughts of this unexpected event.

Latterly, little cordiality of feeling existed between the brothers-in-law; the Emperor despised the King, and the King dreaded the Emperor. However, notwithstanding the dissimilarity of character of the two Sovereigns, and an occasional difference in their opinions, the tendency of their foreign policy has generally been the same. This last message will undoubtedly serve to keep the King away from the Western Powers, but still it cannot be expected that the Emperor Alexander of Russia will ever exercise such an ascendency over the King as that which has lasted so many years; and though at first His Majesty may be carried away by sentiment, and may allow nothing to interfere with his present train of melancholy feelings, they will gradually subside; and it is not improbable that in time he may rejoice to have got rid of a weight which pressed heavily on him, and may not object to give a new direction to the political affairs of his country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 388.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 83.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March 6, 1855.*

NO written despatches having reached the Prussian Government since the death of the Emperor Nicholas, we are indebted to the telegraph for the few details which have arrived connected with this event, and which I have already forwarded to your Lordship. The effect of the intelligence on the King of Prussia, the Royal Family, and the Court, is desponding; they feel that they have lost a friend who possessed the means of assisting them in case of need: a portion of the public partake also of this feeling, but it is only partial, for many rejoice that Germany has been relieved from the oppressive influence which has been exercised over the country for so many years past.

To mark the event to the Prussian army, with whom the Emperor was very popular, a mourning of four weeks has been ordered, and this is the more remarkable as it is not usual for so long a mourning to be worn except for a King of Prussia, three days being the period for which it is worn for one of the Princes of the blood, or a Field-Marshal.

As a token of reminiscence to the Prussian regiment of which he was Colonel, the Emperor Nicholas has directed in his will that his Prussian uniform should be deposited with his regiment, and I believe that this intention has been well received.

I have thought it right to mention the foregoing in order that Her Majesty's Government may be aware of the influences which are now at work at Berlin to keep alive the spirit which has directed the policy of this country for so many years past.

The great theatres at Berlin have been closed for three nights, but all other places of amusement have been more than usually crowded, which shows the little feeling really entertained by the public on the occasion.

I have, &c.
(Signed BLOOMFIELD.

No. 389.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 84.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March 6, 1855.*

I HAVE had the honour to inform your Lordship by telegraph that Prince Menchikoff had been recalled from his command in the Crimea. This intelligence reached me last night in the form in which I reported it to your Lordship; but I have since heard that it was the act of the late Emperor, and the result of the Prince's request to be relieved from his duties on account of the state of his health. I understand that Baron Osten-Sacken is to command the Russian troops in the Crimea, General Lüders on the Pruth, and General Prince Gortchakoff to be invested with the supreme command over the whole.

Count Münster reports from St. Petersburgh that the Russian army in the Crimea is in a tolerable condition at this moment; but that they have lost 46,000 men since the commencement of the campaign.

He alludes, I hear, to the fear of plague and pestilence as likely to arise on the approach of warm weather from the numbers of interments, and from the putridity of the soil around Sebastopol, and expresses this opinion of the Russian Generals in such strong terms that I am induced to mention the subject.

I am informed that General Rüdiger is to command the corps of Russian Guards.

General Grünwald is shortly expected here with the notification of the accession of the Emperor Alexander II, and General Baron Lieven is to proceed to Vienna on a like mission.

Everything, as far as it is known, has proceeded at St. Petersburgh according to the forms observed on the accessions of former Sovereigns, and the succession has apparently passed off without the occurrence of any incident deserving of notice.

The Emperor Alexander is said to have ratified all his father's acts, and to have directed that Prince Gortchakoff shall be immediately empowered to attend the Conferences at Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 390.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 8.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, March 8, 1855.*

THE Prussian Government has not yet received a copy of the Emperor of Russia's manifesto of the 2nd instant; but there seems to be no doubt that His Imperial Majesty declares in this document his resolution to carry out the unceasing desires and intentions of Peter the Great, the Empress Catherine, the Emperor Alexander, and the late Emperor.

No. 391.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 84.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 8, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government have received information, upon which they entirely rely, that in the course of last month the Prussian Government sold and sent to the Russian Government 40,000 muskets from their stores at Cologne.

Your Lordship will lose no time in making inquiry of Baron Manteuffel relative to this matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 392.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 274.)
My Lord, *Paris, March 7, 1855.*

M. BENEDETTI reports, under date of the 22nd ultimo, that the new Austrian Internuncio, Baron Koller, exhorts the Porte to peace. Baron Koller had also told M. Benedetti that it was impossible to suppose that Russia would ever enter into any conditions respecting Sebastopol, or the diminution of their fleet in the Black Sea; and that if the maritime Powers really intended to negotiate for peace, they must give up their pretensions on those two points.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 393.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 275.)
My Lord, *Paris, March 7, 1855.*

M. DE BOURQUENEY has requested instructions for his guidance after the Conferences shall have been opened.

Count Buol appears to think that the decision of the different questions to be examined, might be accelerated by the division of the members of the Conference into four Sub-Committees, each of which should be charged to examine and report upon one of the four points.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys does not seem inclined to favour this suggestion. He observes how ridiculous it would be if, for instance, it fell to an Austrian or to a Russian Plenipotentiary to report upon the third point. He has, however, for the moment, simply replied to M. de Bourqueney that he does not understand Count Buol's plan, and therefore can say nothing upon it.

He gives us general instructions to M. de Bourqueney, when the third point comes to be discussed, to enumerate the guarantees by which the allied Powers consider the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea can be put an end to, and to endeavour to obtain the adherence of Austria to as many of them as possible, leaving the others to be dealt with as put forward under the right which the belligerent Powers have reserved to themselves, of asking other conditions than those agreed to by the three Powers in common.

M. de Hübner has pressed for an answer to Count Buol's suggestion, that Agents should be sent to the Conference from the Principalities. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has replied, that it is a question which, in his opinion, must be submitted to the decision of the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 394.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 253.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 8, 1855.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that I entirely concur in the views expressed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as reported in your despatch No. 275 of the 7th instant, with regard to Count Buol's proposition of dividing the members of the Vienna Conference into Sub-Committees.

No such proposition has yet been made to Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 395.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 24.)
My Lord, *Stuttgardt, March 4, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Marquis de Ferrière has read me a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, dated the 23rd ultimo, stating various reasons why the French Government could not undertake to abstain from sending troops across any part of the territory of the Confederation during the present war, in case the Prussian Government should invite them to do so; and which reasons address themselves to the consideration that the passage of foreign troops across the said territory must be either permitted, forbidden, or left in doubt, by the laws of the Diet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 396.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Bligh.

(No. 25.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 8, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government approve of your proceedings reported in your despatch No. 45 of the 3rd instant, in making M. de Lenthe acquainted with the tenour of your communications with me on the policy of England with regard to the Germanic Confederation, and they approve also of the language which you held to his Excellency in reply to his observations on the intentions of France.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 397.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Malet.

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 8, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which you state, in your despatch No. 36 of the 2nd instant, that you held to M. de Prokesch and M. de Bismark, in regard to the expressions attributed to M. d'Usedom with respect to the pacific policy of England towards Prussia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 398.

Mr. Hudson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 39.)

Turin, March 4, 1855.

My Lord,

THE Emperor of Russia having thought proper to publish a circular (copy of which is inclosed herewith), setting forth the reasons for which he has declared war against Sardinia, the Sardinian Government have this day issued a manifesto in reply, by which His Sardinian Majesty announces that his forces, both military and naval, are at war with the Russian Empire.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy and translation of that declaration of war.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES HUDSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 398.

Russian Circular Despatch declaring War against Sardinia.

LA Corte di approverà senza dubbio il giudizio dell' Imperatore sulla politica di Sua Maestà il Re de Sardegna, che senza fondato motivo, senza ogni apparenza della minima offesa fatta al suo paese, ha or ora messo a disposizione dell' Inghilterra un corpo di truppe di 15,000 uomini per invadere la Crimea.

Prendendo questa determinazione, il Governo Sardo sembra che abbia lasciato ai pubblici fogli la cura di renderci avvertiti di un'aggressione, che esso non si curò di giustificare mediante una dichiarazione di guerra.

Noi comprendiamo la ragione di questo silenzio.

Alla Corte di Torino, noi lo concediamo, sarebbe stato difficile il conciliare la sua politica col sentimento nazionale del suo paese; uguale difficoltà avrebbe provato nello accordare la sua condotta presente colle antiche rimembranze della Casa di Savoia.

Consultando gli annali della sua storia, la Corte di Torino potrebbe citare l'esempio di un esercito Russo, che passò le Alpi, ma per difendre il Piemonte, non per invaderlo.

Nei consigli del Gabinetti dell' Europa, sotto il regno dell' Imperatore Alessandro, di gloriosa memoria, la Russia fu ancora che prestò il suo fedele appoggio all' indipendenza del Piemonte quando venne restaurata la Casa di Savoia sul Trono de' suoi antenati.

Convien forse qui ricordare, come nello stesso tempo, se Genova fu riunita al Regno di Sardegna, egli fu perchè il Gabinetto Imperiale riconosceva la necessità di assicurare in pari tempo la prosperità commerciale e la grandezza del paese, che le armi della Russia avevano contribuito a liberare da un estero dominio?

Ora, dimenticando le lezioni del passato, la Corte di Torino si apparecchia a muovere contro di noi, da quel medesimo porto di Genova, un'impresa ostile, che la Russia ha la coscienza di non avere provocata.

Il contegno assunto dal Governo Sardo, senza formale dichiarazione di guerra, ci lascierebbe perfino nel dubbio quanto al nome che converrebbe dare ai soldati ausiliari destinati ad invadere le nostre frontiere, sotto le bandiere di un paese con cui continuammo finora a vivere in pace.

Tuttavia se la Corte di Torino pone in obblio le massime e gli usi consecrati dal diritto delle genti, come regola invariabile dei rapporti internazionali degli Stati, l'Imperatore, per parte sua, vuole osservarli.

In questa sua intenzione, Sua Maestà crede dover dichiarare la pace come rotta di diritto e di fatto dall'atto di ostilità flagrante, il cui torto ricade sul Governo Sardo.

Noi gliene lasceremo il carico dinanzi all'opinione del suo paese, ed in faccia a tutta l'Europa.

Alle Potenze alleate sovratutto spetterà lo apprezzare la condotta della Corte di Sardegna per avere questa giudicato opportuno e leale il volgere le sue armi contro di noi, nel momento stesso in cui il Gabinetto Imperiale entrava a far parte in Vienna di una deliberazione destinata ad aprire la via al ritorno della pace.

I voti che tendono all'adempimento di tale opera di pacificazione pare che siano stati singolarmente tenuti in non cale dal Gabinetto di Torino. Infatti, mentre i Governi dell'Europa Centrale interponevano saggiamente la loro legittima autorità per impedire che una delle Potenze belligeranti reclutasse le sue legioni negli Stati che hanno di vedere rispettata la loro neutralità e perfetta indipendenza, il Governo Sardo invece, meno avaro del sangue d'Italia, consente a versarlo per una causa estranea agli interessi politici e religiosi della sua nazione.

Perchè, di buona fede, non si pretenderà che, piegando la propria bandiera accanto a quella della mezzaluna, la Casa di Savoia si onori di servire la causa della Cristianità. Nè si affermerà che le stia a cuore il difendere il debole contro il forte, quando la Casa di Savoia riunisce le sue armi a quelle della Francia e dell' Inghilterra. Se le nostre informazioni sono esatte, quest'ultima Potenza è quella che prende sotto il suo comando le truppe Piemontesi; non diremo al suo soldo, perchè ci asterremo dall'offendere il sentimento nazionale d'un popolo, con cui a nostro rammarico ci troviamo in guerra.

Non ostante questa necessità, l'Imperatore saprà tutelare ancora gl' interessi privati de' nazionali Piemontesi, che conservano relazioni commerciali colla Russia. Il fallo del loro Governo non ricadrà sopra di loro. Le loro proprietà saranno rispettate. Essi potranno rimanere nell'impero pienamente sicuri, sotto la protezione delle nostre leggi, finchè vi si conformeranno.

Ma la bandiera Sarda cesserà dal godere le prerogative che appartengono unicamente alla marina mercantile delle Potenze neutrali.

Verrà prefisso un termine alla partenza delle navi Sarde, che ora si trovassero nei porti dell' impero. Fin d'ora sarà tolto "l'exequatur" ai Consoli Sardi in Russia. Gli agenti Russi, residenti a Genova e Nizza, ricevono parimenti l'ordine di sospendere l'esercizio delle loro funzioni, essendosi rotta la pace fra i due paesi dalla Corte di Sardegna, dal momento in cui questa aderì alla lega conchiusa il 10 Aprile, 1854, fra la Gran Bretagna e la Francia.

L' Imperatore si degnò ordinarmi di comunicare queste determinazioni a tutte le Potenze amiche.

(Firmado) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 398.

Manifesto of the Government of His Sardinian Majesty, relative to the Accession of His Majesty to the Treaty of April 10, 1854, *between France and England.*

DA gran tempo l'Europa guarda con giusto e geloso sospetto nel continuo ingrandirsi della Russia in Oriente la progressiva applicazione di quel sistema che, inaugurato da Pietro il Grande, maturato nella nazione più forse ancora che ne' Sovrani Moscoviti, tende con tutte le forze ed occulte e palesi alla conquista di Costantinopoli, non come a scopo finale, ma come a principio e scala di nuove e più smisurate ambizioni.

Questi progetti della Russia sovversivi dell' equilibrio Europeo, minacciosi per la libertà de' popoli e per l'indipendenza delle nazioni, non si rivelarono forse mai con tanta evidenza quanto nell' ingiusta invasione de' Principati Danubiani, e negli atti diplomatici che la precedettero e seguitarono. Ond' è che a buon diritto la Francia e l'Inghilterra, dopo un lungo ed inutile esperimento de' mezzi di conciliazione, ricorsero alle armi, e pigliarono a sostenere l'Impero Ottomanno contro l'aggressione del suo prepotente vicino.

Dalla risoluzione della questione d'Oriente pendono i destini, non immediati, ma prevedibili d'Europa e d'Asia, e più direttamente e prossimamente quelli degli Stati conterminii al Mare Mediterraneo, i quali perciò non possono rimanersi spettatori indifferenti di una lotta in cui s'agitano i loro più vitali interessi, in cui si contende per sapere se rimarranno liberi e indipendenti, oppure Vassalli, se non di nome almeno di fatto, del colossale Impero Russo.

La giustizia della causa propugnata dai generosi difensori della Sublime Porta, le considerazioni sì potenti sempre sul cuore del Re, della dignità e dell' indipendenza nazionale, hanno determinato Sua Maestà il Re di Sardegna, dopo il formale invito che ne ha ricevuto dalle due Grandi Potenze Occidentali, ad accedere, per atto del 12 dello scorso Gennaio, al Trattato di Alleanza Offensiva e Difensiva, stipulato il 10 d' Aprile del 1854, tra le loro Maeste l' Imperatore de' Francesi e la Regina del Regno Unito della Gran Brettagna ed Irlanda. Ma assai prima che tal atto ricevesse l' indispensabile suo legal compimento mercè il cambio delle ratifiche, prima perciò che potesse avere un principio qualunque d' esecuzione, l' Imperatore Nicolò, lagnandosi con linguaggio non scevro d' amarezza che da noi sia stato violato il diritto delle genti, nell' essersi (come egli suppone) senza previa dichiarazione di guerra, inviata una spedizione contro la Crimea, accusando inoltre il Re d' ingratitudine per aver dimenticate antiche prove d' amicizia e di simpatia date dalla Russia alla Sardegna, s' affrettava a dichiararci egli stesso la guerra.

Senza arrestarci alla supposta violazione del diritto delle genti che non può essere che un errore di cancelleria, osserveremo che nelle antiche memorie d' amichevoli corrispondenze passate tra i predecessori di Sua Maestà Imperiale e quelli di Sua Maestà Sarda, l' Imperatore avrebbe potuto contrapporre altre memorie più recenti e personali sul contegno che egli tenne da otto anni in qua verso i Re Carlo Alberto e Vittorio Emanuele II. Ma prima di tutto avrebbe dovuto persuadersi che Sua Maestà si è accostata a questa alleanza non per dimenticanza di antiche amicizie, nè per risentimento di recenti offese, ma per ferma convinzione di esservi spinta imperiosamente e dagli interessi generali d'Europa, e dai particolari della nazione di cui la Divina Provvidenza le ha affidato i destini. Ed è perciò che nel pigliar parte ad una gravissima guerra il Re punto non dubita che rispondano al suo appello coll' antica fede gli amati suoi popoli, i prodi suoi soldati, confidando, come egli confida, nella protezione di quel Dio che nel corso di oltre otto secoli ha tante volte sorretto fra duri cimenti, e guidato a gloriosi successi la Monarchia di Savoia.

Sua Maestà è sicura nella coscienza d' aver adempiuto un dovere. Nè per quanto lo travaglino crudeli afflizioni sarà meno risoluto e costante nel difendere con tutte le sue forze contro qualunque aggressione i sacri interessi de' popoli, i diritti imprescrittibili della Corona.

Mentre il Re fa voti perchè si rendano fruttuose le trattative di pace pur testè iniziate nella città di Vienna, adempiendo intanto gli obblighi contratti verso la Francia, l' Inghilterra, e la Turchia, ha ordinato al Ministro sottoscritto di dichiarare come in virtù dell' Atto d' Accessione prementovato le sue forze di terra e di mare sono in istato di guerra coll' Impero Russo.

Il Sottoscritto dichiara inoltre d' ordine di Sua Maestà che " l' exequatur " accordato ai Consoli Russi ne' Regii Stati è rivocato: che le proprietà e le persone dei sudditi Russi saranno nondimeno scrupolosamente rispettate, e che si concederà alle navi Russe un termine competente per abbandonare gli Stati Sardi.

Torino, il 4 Marzo, 1855.

Il Presidente del Consiglio Ministro degli Affari Esteri,
(Firmato) C. CAVOUR.

(Translation.)

IN the constant aggrandizement of Russia in the East, Europe has long seen with great and jealous distrust the progressive application of the system inaugurated by Peter the Great, and naturalized in the Muscovite nation, more even than in its Sovereigns, tending with its whole occult and avowed force towards the conquest of Constantinople, not as to a final object, but as to the first step on the ladder of great and unmeasured ambition.

These projects on the part of Russia, subversive of the balance of power in Europe, menacing to the liberty of peoples and to the independence of nations, were perhaps never revealed with the same evidence as in the unjust invasion of the Danubian Principalities, and in the diplomatic acts by which it was preceded and followed.

Wherefore France and England very properly, after a long and useless trial of conciliatory measures, had recourse to arms, and proceeded to support the Ottoman Empire against the aggression of its overbearing neighbour.

Upon the solution of the Eastern question depend the destinies, if not immediate, at least to be foreseen, of Europe and Asia, and more directly and proximately those of the States bordering on the Mediterranean Sea, which States, therefore, cannot remain indifferent spectators of a conflict in which their most vital interests are at stake, in which the result of the contest will decide whether they are to remain free and independent, or vassals in fact, if not in name, of the colossal Russian Empire.

The justice of the cause espoused by the generous defenders of the Sublime Porte, the consideration of the national dignity and independence, always of such weight on the King's heart, have determined His Majesty the King of Sardinia, in consequence of a formal invitation which he has received from the two great Western Powers, by an Act dated the 12th of January last, to accede to the Treaty of Alliance, offensive and defensive, concluded on the 10th of April, 1854, between their Majesties the Emperor of the French and the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. But some time before that Act could receive its legal fulfilment by the exchange of the ratifications, before, therefore, it could have even a commencement of execution, the Emperor Nicholas, complaining of us in language not exempt from bitterness, that we had committed a breach of public law, in having (as he assumes) without a previous declaration of war, sent an expedition to the Crimea, and, moreover, accusing the King of ingratitude, for having overlooked the ancient proofs of friendship and sympathy given by Russia to Sardinia, hastened on his part to declare war against us.

Without stopping to comment on the supposed violation of the Law of Nations, which can only be an error of officials, we will observe, that to the ancient recollections of friendly correspondence between the predecessors of His Imperial Majesty and those of His Sardinian Majesty, the Emperor might have contrasted more recent ones, and personal ones, on the conduct which he has pursued for the last eight years towards the Kings Carlo Alberto and Victor Emanuel II.

But, first of all, he ought to have convinced himself that His Majesty took part in this alliance, not from forgetfulness of old friendships, nor from a sense of recent injuries, but from the firm conviction of being urgently impelled to it by the general interests of Europe, and by the particular ones of that nation whose welfare Providence has committed to his charge.

It is on that account that the King, in taking part in an arduous war, does not in the least doubt that his beloved people and brave soldiers respond to his call with their old fidelity, trusting, as he also trusts, in the protection of that God, who, in the course of more than eight centuries, has so often sustained them in great dangers, and guided the House of Savoy to glorious successes.

His Majesty is tranquil in the conviction of having fulfilled a duty. Nor, though overwhelmed by so great domestic afflictions, will he be less resolute and firm in defending with all his power, against every aggression, the sacred interests of his people and the imprescriptible rights of the Crown.

While the King offers up prayers to God for the success of the negotiations for peace, already begun at Vienna, fulfilling the obligations contracted by him towards France, England and Turkey, he has ordered the undersigned Minister to declare, that by virtue of the Act of Accession previously mentioned, his land and marine forces are at war with Russia.

The Undersigned declares, besides, by order of His Majesty, that the "exequatur" accorded to the Russian Consuls in the Sardinian States is revoked; that the property and persons of Russian subjects will be nevertheless scrupulously respected, and that a sufficient interval of time will be conceded to Russian vessels to allow of their leaving the Sardinian States.

Turin, March 4, 1855.

(Signed) C. CAVOUR,
President of the Council.

No. 399.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 10.)

(No. 11.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 6, 1855.

I HAVE had this morning, at 11 o'clock, the honour of an audience of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria. His Imperial Majesty was exceedingly gracious. I presented to His Majesty my credentials and a letter of the Queen; and I took the liberty of congratulating His Majesty on the event of yesterday, and of assuring His Majesty of the interest which the Queen took in the welfare of the Emperor and Empress. The Emperor acknowledged the Queen's friendly feelings, and said that Count Colloredo had informed him of the concern Her Majesty had shown for the health and welfare of the Empress.

His Imperial Majesty was pleased to express his hope that my mission might be conducive to peace. He said that the desire for peace was general throughout the nations of Europe. I stated my expectation that we should find the disposition of the present Emperor of Russia pacific. The Emperor said the Emperor of Russia might find more difficulty in making peace than the late Emperor; that the death of the Emperor Nicholas was a misfortune for Europe; that he had been wrong in his policy towards Turkey; but that he had latterly perceived his error, and was sincerely desirous of peace; that by his strong will he would have constrained others to adopt his pacific policy. His successor would have less power to control the warlike inclinations of his subjects. But he believed the desire for peace was strong also in Russia. I said that I could not but believe the Emperor of Russia, if he pursued a pacific policy, would find great support from his subjects.

The Emperor said the task of making peace was a very difficult one. I entirely concurred, and observed that it was so much the more difficult as the Powers had never before consulted together on the means of arresting the encroachments of Russia upon Turkey; that His Majesty would not be surprised to learn that England, having gone to war and made great sacrifices for a great object, would not be satisfied with anything less than a solid peace; I believed the same feeling to prevail in France.

The Emperor replied that the difficulty consisted in determining what would make the peace a solid one. I did not, however, deem it proper to enter into this discussion.

His Imperial Majesty expressed great uneasiness at the prospect of the Emperor Napoleon's going to the Crimea, which he said must disturb and embarrass the negotiations for peace. He said also that his life was precious to France; that he would leave no one equal to succeed him; and that he should look upon the Emperor Napoleon's departure for the Crimea as a serious misfortune. He made some inquiries from me as to what I had heard from the Emperor of the French on this subject. I endeavoured to satisfy his curiosity.

The Emperor of Austria's manner is singularly agreeable; his countenance open and prepossessing. Without being one of those men who at once prove themselves qualified to hold the rudder, and guide the ship through a dangerous navigation, he seems to show an intelligence, and a firmness of purpose, which may enable him to rule this great Empire with ability and success.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 400.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 10.)

(No. 12.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 7, 1855.

I WENT to-day, according to appointment with Lord Westmorland, to wait upon Count Buol. We met M. de Bourqueney, with whom I had had a conversation previously on the points likely to be discussed.

Our interview with Count Buol lasted from 1 till 3 o'clock. Baron

Prokesch, who is named to assist at the Conferences, was present, and was of great use from his long experience of Eastern affairs, and the judgment he exhibited.

Count Buol informed us that Prince Gortchakoff had received notice that his full powers from the Emperor Alexander were already on their way. He wished to know our opinion, whether we would meet Prince Gortchakoff, and M. Titoff before the full powers came, or wait for their arrival. We were of opinion, that in order to prevent any cavil in point of form, it was best to wait for the full powers. This was assented to.

Count Buol then said that he had summoned us in order that we might confer together on the principal points of the negotiations, and endeavour to come to an agreement before we should meet the Russian Plenipotentiaries.

Proceeding at once to the matter of the interview, he said he should propose at the first meeting to state shortly the object of the Conference, and ask the Ministers present to discuss, Article by Article, the four points.

Baron Bourqueney, Lord Westmorland, and I, thought this course would not be satisfactory unless the bases were stated, as well for the information of the Plenipotentiaries not before present as for the prevention of future misunderstandings. We thought these bases should be recorded in a Protocol, with our respective signatures.

Count Buol seemed to fear that some exception would be taken by Prince Gortchakoff to the terms of the bases, but as they had been, in fact, already accepted by Russia, he did not persist in his objection.

It is understood, therefore, that unless we obtain the Protocol thus sanctioning the bases upon which we are to negotiate, the English and French Ministers will decline any further proceeding, and refer to their respective Governments.

This preliminary question being settled, we proceeded to the four points.

On the first point Count Buol said it must be made quite clear that Russia abandoned the protectorate over the Principalities hitherto exercised by her. Baron Prokesch observed that these were privileges derived from the grant of the Sultan purely; privileges derived from the Sultan but obtained by Russia; and other privileges which seemed to belong from the time of the Turkish conquest, to the inhabitants of Wallachia and Moldavia.

It was agreed that these provisions must be carefully looked into.

I asked Count Buol whether he considered that the restoration of peace and amity between the Emperor of Russia and the Sultan would revive all those parts of former Treaties which were not expressly abrogated.

Count Buol thought that the best course would be to arrange the terms of Treaty, and then at the end to provide for the renewal of so much of former Treaties as should not be inconsistent with the provisions of the new Treaty.

Baron Prokesch observed that it would be necessary to have a general Treaty, and also a separate Treaty between Russia and Turkey; a course adopted in similar cases at the Congress of Vienna.

Count Buol on this occasion stated that he should propose that each point, after a general discussion in the Conference, should be considered in detail by a Commission.

These Commissions, I understand, are to be formed of members of the Conference.

With respect to the first point, Count Buol stated at a subsequent stage of our discussion, that military men were of opinion that the Principalities, and especially Moldavia, should be defended by fortresses.

I have heard from another source that Austria has it in contemplation to propose that these new fortresses should be occupied by mixed Austrian and Turkish garrisons.

This scheme is probably part of a large plan of assistance to Turkey.

On the second point Count Buol and Baron Prokesch dilated with evident interest; indeed, Baron Prokesch stated that if the navigation of the Danube were not impeded as it had hitherto been by Russia, Hungarian produce, as well as Wallachian, would compete successfully with Russian exports from Odessa.

Count Buol is of opinion, that while no territorial cession is required from Russia, she may be asked to surrender her territorial jurisdiction on the left bank of the Danube, as Turkey has been forced to leave desert and unoccupied her territory on the right bank within a certain distance of the river.

The Syndicate would then secure the freedom of the navigation, and the Austrian Plenipotentiaries appeared to have no doubt that private companies would deepen and widen the channel for the advantage of their own trade.

I observed that the object was one of European interest, and must be secured by efficient provisions. It would be desirable to have a French and English member of the Syndicate.

Count Buol that was a matter of arrangement for our own consideration when the Syndicate was to be named.

Turkey as well as Russia must be required to concur in measures necessary for the freedom of navigation of the Danube.

Passing to the third point we naturally found our course beset with difficulties.

Baron Bourqueney, Lord Westmorland, and I, looking to the object of "putting an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea," thought that the most simple and direct way of doing this was to limit the maritime force of Russia in that sea.

Baron Bourqueney said, that as the point was avowedly to be regulated by the events of war, it was premature to settle anything until we arrived at the period of making peace.

Count Buol observed that we were now arrived at that period: that he believed we were all negotiating in good faith, and that we had better now discuss together what we should require.

I remarked that the events of war must so far influence our course, that if Sebastopol were now in our hands, it would be easier to restore it on condition it should be razed, than to make a similar condition with regard to a fortress which had successfully stood a siege.

I said that I thought the objection of Russia to any interference with her rights of sovereignty at home was untenable; that Russia had no right during peace to assemble 100,000 men on the Pruth with provisions and means of transport for a march; that such an assemblage of force would be a menace to her neighbour; that the naval force collected at Sebastopol, with a large garrison at hand, was a perpetual menace to Turkey.

Baron Bourqueney observed, we had a right to say to Russia, "Explain your armament, or diminish it."

Count Buol differed from this view. He thought other securities might be more effective. He thought we might provide that if Russia increased her force in the Black Sea, say beyond fifteen ships, the Sultan might call his allies to the Bosphorus to his assistance; that we might have ports in the Black Sea, and a brig or two of war at the mouth of the Danube, which might watch the proceedings of Russia. Above all he relied on a proposal he should make that the integrity of Turkey should be guaranteed by the four Powers. He thought such a guarantee would be more valuable to Turkey than a Treaty suggested by me, by which the three Powers, Austria, France, and Great Britain, should promise Turkey to come to her assistance with stipulated forces in case of her being attacked by Russia.

I said that when we were establishing peace we should take care that what we establish was really a state of peace; that the presence of forces counterbalancing each other in the Black Sea would look too like an armed truce. That with respect to the proposed guarantee unless we were all bound to act on a given occasion, the three Powers might differ widely as to the moment of interference. That with regard to the aggression of Russia, which had brought us together, France had sent her fleet from Toulon to the waters of Greece at an early period, England somewhat later; and Austria, although she had made great preparations, was not yet in the field as a belligerent. It was therefore essential, in my opinion, that we should be bound together by positive stipulations to resist an aggression of Russia upon Turkey; that, however, the best security would be the limitation of the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea, and I asked Count Buol whether he had a conviction that Russia would not agree to such limitation.

He said he could not speak positively, but he thought Russia would object to such a restriction if imposed upon her by other Powers. I said I thought the form might be made easy to Russia, and I suggested an Article of Treaty, of which I have given a rough sketch in a paper inclosed in this despatch. I did not, however, state the particular number of ships of war to be admitted to the

Black Sea. Baron Prokesch appeared to approve of this suggestion, but some discussion arose as to the reciprocity which Russia might claim for the purpose of sending her ships of war from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, or from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In conclusion, Count Buol said that he was ready to propose the limitation of the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea, as the best and most simple arrangement, but that if the Russian Ministers positively declined to accede to such a condition, he should be ready to discuss other means of carrying the third point into effect. It might be, he continued, that those other means would be so distasteful to Russia that she would prefer the limitation of her ships as the least onerous obligation.

I expressed myself ready to concur in the proposed course, but thought it necessary to reserve for my Government the power of declaring that on examination they found the proposed alternatives would not attain the proposed end. Baron Bourqueney made a similar reserve; and Count Buol readily agreed that in this respect we should all be free.

A considerable time having been employed in this discussion, we scarcely entered upon the fourth point, which, however, we considered to be one of the highest importance as well as considerable difficulty. Baron Prokesch considered it as the germ of a complete change in the state of the Turkish Empire; and as opening to the Christian subjects of the Porte a greater freedom from oppression and vexation than they had ever obtained from Russian protection.

In concluding this report I cannot omit to state the impression I have received of the earnest desire of Count Buol and his colleague to ward off the dangers which hang over Europe from Russian preponderance. Indeed it is not to be wondered at that Austrian statesmen should feel peculiar anxiety on this head; the cloud that would burst over Turkey would involve Austria in the ravages of the storm. It might happen, as I hinted to Count Buol, that on the next occasion, while Austria was directing her army to impede the Russian march to the Balkan, France and England might for various reasons, unless bound by positive Treaty, be slow to come to her assistance. Two years ago indeed, Austria might have abandoned the cause of Europe, and have contented herself with such share of the spoils of Turkey as the Russian Emperor might have vouchsafed to her; but that moment is past—the relations of Austria and Russia have passed from intimacy and confidence to estrangement and suspicion.

Every day adds to the proofs of the deep-laid designs of Russia: the subserviency of German Courts; the Russian interest pervading and corrupting the officers of German armies as well as the Cabinets of German Sovereigns; the pains taken by the late Emperor Nicholas to undermine all national feeling in Germany; the intrigues in Bulgaria, and the meditated fortifications at Bonarsund, all tend to show that Austria, having disdained the part of a vassal and an accomplice, must be prepared to be among the foremost in defence of the barriers of European independence. If she can secure these barriers by military preparation and successful diplomacy alone, she will greatly prefer the construction of a Treaty to the hazard of a war. But she cannot retire from the position she has assumed without suffering from the vengeance, the insolence, and the devouring ambition of Russia.

It will be for Her Majesty and Her Majesty's Ministers to consider how far they will abandon or modify preconceived opinions to meet the views of Austria. The question is a very serious one, and the time is not yet arrived for its positive solution; but I shall be glad to learn for my guidance the general views of Her Majesty's Government upon a subject so important to the future safety of Europe.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 400.

Proposed Article of Treaty.

THE Sultan, at the request of his allies, consents to the passage of men-of-war from the Dardanelles to the Black Sea, and on their return; provided that no more than ships of war of the same nation should be in the Black

Sea at the same time. The Sultan declares his own intention not to exceed that number.

The Emperor of Russia, willing to consult the interests of Europe and desirous of the maintenance of the balance of power, declares, for his own part, that he does not intend to keep more than ships of war in the Black Sea.

These declarations shall form part of the present Treaty.

No. 401.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 99.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 7, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that a preliminary meeting, at which were present Count Buol, Baron Prokesch, Baron Bourqueney, Lord John Russell, and myself, took place this day at the Imperial Chancery of State, when the plan of proceedings for the opening of the negotiations was discussed, and a general arrangement with regard to it was adopted. As Lord John Russell has undertaken to give your Lordship a detailed account of what passed on this occasion, I feel it unnecessary to extend my report of this meeting, except to say that Lord John and myself considered its results as generally satisfactory. It was arranged that another preliminary meeting should take place before the assembly of the general Conference, which will meet only three or four days hence, by which time it is expected that Prince Gortchakoff will have received from his Government the official authorization to take part in the negotiations for peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 402.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 10.)

(No 87.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 8, 1855.*

GENERAL WEDEL returned to Paris this day.

Baron Manteuffel has just informed me that the General is directed to announce to the French Government that the King of Prussia agrees to the Protocol which was proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, a copy of which was, I believe, communicated to your Lordship about a month ago, and that His Majesty will not consent to anything else at the present moment; but, he added, that he is not without expectation that a Treaty may be agreed to at a later period. I told his Excellency that this announcement would be far from satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government; that this half measure would be ill received; and that of course he did not expect that it would facilitate the admission of Prussia to the Vienna Conferences. He replied that the King appeared now to have made up his mind on the subject, and would wait to put forward his claims at a more favourable moment.

M. d'Usedom will receive instructions of the same nature as those which have been delivered to General Wedel, and your Lordship will no doubt hear of this resolution from the Prussian Envoy soon after this despatch reaches your Lordship's hands.

In making this communication Baron Manteuffel seemed distressed that he had not been able to obtain a better result to these negotiations; but he assured me at the same time that he hoped matters would improve, and that we should at all events consider this as a step in advance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 403.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 289.)

My Lord, *Paris, March 9, 1855.*

YOUR Lordship will have learnt by my despatches No. 259 of the 5th and No. 275 of the 7th instant, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys entirely agrees with the opinion stated in your Lordship's despatch No. 248 of the 7th instant, that if Agents are sent from the Principalities to attend the Conferences at Vienna, those Agents should be named by the Porte and not by the Hospodars.

It may well be doubted whether the intention of Austria in making this proposition, is not to obtain some sort of recognition by the Conference of the institutions existing in the Principalities previous to the late war, and provisionally re-established since; and it is certain that persons named by the Hospodars are not likely to be unbiassed advisers as to the political and material wants of the Principalities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 404.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Hudson.

(No. 33.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 10, 1855.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 39 of the 4th instant, inclosing a copy of the declaration of war by Sardinia against Russia; and I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government have read with sincere satisfaction, that temperate and dignified document.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 405.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 12, 1855.*

MESSENGER was sent to you on Sunday, and should arrive in London to-morrow; and the first Conference with the Russian Ministers is fixed for Thursday next, at 1 o'clock.

I have a messenger to Lord Raglan with news that French Emperor intends to set out for the Crimea.

We want another messenger.

No. 406.

Lords John Russell and Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 12, 12·35 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 11, 1855.*

INTERVIEW to-day with Count Buol and Baron Bourqueney. Count Buol stated he should open the Conference by a speech he read to us. Speech contains the four points, thus:

1st. The Protectorate exercised by Russia over Moldavia and Wallachia shall cease; and privileges conferred ("reconnus") by the Sultans on those Principalities, as well as on Servia, shall henceforth be placed under the collective guarantee of the Contracting Powers.

2nd. The freedom of the navigation of the Danube shall be completely secured by effectual means, and under the control of a permanent Syndical authority.

3rd. The Treaty of July 13, 1841, shall be revised, with the two-fold object of more completely connecting the existence of the Ottoman Empire with the balance of power in Europe, and of putting an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea.

4th. Russia abandons the principle of covering with an official protection the Christian subjects of the Sultan of the Oriental ritual; but the Christian Powers will mutually cooperate with each other in order to obtain from the initiative of the Ottoman Government the consecration and the observance of the religious rights of the Christian communities subject to the Porte, without distinction of ritual.

The development of the principles will form the object of our negotiations.

We and Baron Bourquency think a Protocol containing the bases stated in these terms should be accepted at once, as ground to proceed with the negotiation.

Count Buol's speech otherwise satisfactory and cordial to the allies.

Shall we proceed? Immediate answer requested.

No. 407.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 12, 1855.

I WILL communicate with the French Government, and answer your telegraphic despatches as soon as possible.

No. 408.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March* 11, 1855.

THE French Ambassador has communicated to me his French telegraph to Paris of this day, in which after giving Count Buol's proposed speech, he says:

"Lord John thinks, and I share his opinion, that to insist on inserting textually in the Protocol the Memorandum given to Prince Gortchakoff, would be to peril the relations of the allies with Austria without sufficient cause."

No. 409.

Mr. Hudson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 41.)

My Lord, *Turin, March* 7, 1855.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 39 of the 4th instant, inclosing copies of the declaration of war by Sardinia against the Russian Empire, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the copy of a circular which has been addressed by the Sardinian Government to its Agents abroad, explanatory of the reasons which have induced His Sardinian Majesty to take that step.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES HUDSON

Inclosure in No. 409.

Circular Despatch addressed by the Sardinian Government to its Agents abroad.

Monsieur, *Turin, le* 4 *Mars*, 1855.

J'AI l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-joint quelques exemplaires du Manifeste par lequel le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne déclare, au nom du Roi, la guerre à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie.

Lorsque le Traité d'Alliance du 10 Avril, 1854, entre la France et l'Angleterre, a été communiqué officiellement à la Sardaigne, le Gouvernement du Roi, tout en reconnissant le droit et le devoir qu'avaient les Grandes Puissances Occidentales de s'opposer aux envahissements de la Russie et de défendre l'Empire Ottoman contre une injuste agression, tout en déclarant hautement que ses plus vives sympathies étaient acquises à la cause dont la France et l'Angleterre avaient généreusement embrassé la défense, a cru néanmoins devoir s'abstenir pour le moment de se prévaloir de la réserve stipulée dans l'Article V du Traité.

Maintenant la guerre a pris des proportions considérables en Orient et dans la Baltique, et tout le monde a pu se convaincre que la question qui s'agite en Orient est une question Européenne; tous s'accordent à reconnaître que si les Grandes Puissances y ont un intérêt plus direct, les Etats de second ordre n'en sont pas moins menacés dans leur commerce et, ce qui plus est, dans leur indépendance par les projets ambitieux de la Russie.

Le moment est donc venu d'opposer aux vastes moyens d'action dont-elle dispose et aux avantages énormes de sa position géographique les efforts réunis des Puissances qui, dégagées de toute pensée ambitieuse, n'aspirent qu'à éloigner des périls que plus tard il ne serait plus temps de conjurer, et à assurer le triomphe des principes éternels de la justice et de l'équité.

Ces considérations ont déterminé Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne à accueillir l'invitation qui lui a été adressé par leurs Majestés l'Empereur des Français et la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande d'accéder au Traité du 10 Avril, 1854. L'Acte d'Accession, ainsi que deux Conventions qui s'y réfèrent, ayant été signés le 26 Janvier dernier, et ratifiés aujourd'hui même, Sa Majesté, en conséquence des stipulations y contenus, vient de déclarer la guerre à la Russie.

Sa Majesté n'a pas vu sans une pénible surprise que, pendant que l'Acte d'Accession, non ratifié, n'avait pas encore une valeur légale absolue, et n'était nullement exécutoire, l'Empereur Nicolas, par une note du Comte de Nesselrode et dans un langage rempli d'amertume, prenant l'initiative des hostilités, ait pu l'accuser d'avoir violé le Droit des Gens en envoyant une expédition en Crimée sans déclaration de guerre préalable, et lui reprocher l'oubli des marques d'amitié données en d'autres temps par la Russie à la Sardaigne.

En ce qui concerne la prétendue violation du Droit des Gens, il suffit de rapprocher la date de la circulaire du Comte de Nesselrode (5, Février dernier) avec celle de la ratification de l'Acte d'Accession (4 Mars) pour se convaincre de l'étonnante légèreté avec laquelle le Chancelier de l'Empire Russe a avancé une accusation si grave et qui convient si peu aux Princes de Savoie, et surtout à un Monarque auquel la voix de tout un peuple a décerné le titre de loyal.

Quant au reproche d'ingratitude, l'Empereur Nicolas, au lieu de rappeler les marques d'amitié que deux de ses prédécesseurs ont donné anciennement à la Sardaigne, aurait dû se souvenir qu'en 1848, sans aucun motif qui lui fût personnel; il retira son Ministre près la Cour de Turin et envoya brusquement les passeports au Représentant de la Sardaigne à St. Pétersbourg; qu'en 1849, il refusa de recevoir la lettre de notification de l'avénement au trône du Roi Victor Emmanuel II—refus hautement injurieux, qui offre peu de précédents dans l'histoire de la diplomatie, et qui paraissait indiquer de la part du Czar l'étrange prétention de s'immiscer dans nos affaires intérieures, affectant de ne pas reconnaître la transformation, non révolutionnaire mais légale, qui s'était opéré dans nos institutions politiques.

Après avoir ajouté ces courtes explications afin de placer sous son véritable jour la conduite du Roi notre auguste Souverain, et en me référant aux motifs

développés dans le Manifeste ci-joint, je vous engage à remettre copie de la présent dépêche à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité ; et je vous prie, &c.

(Signé) C. CAVOUR.

No. 410.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 13.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 10, 1855.*

I AM sorry to be obliged to state to your Lordship that considerable difficulties have arisen in the preliminary discussions relative to the insertion in the Protocol of the interpretation of the four points.

Finding from Baron Bourqueney that Count Buol felt great repugnance to asking the consent of Prince Gortchakoff to the insertion of the memorandum containing the interpretation of the four points in the Protocol, I met Baron Bourqueney yesterday morning at Lord Westmorland's.

We endeavoured at first to see whether any abstract of the memorandum could be given, containing the substance of that document. But we soon found that it was impossible to omit certain parts of the document, without at once departing from the instructions of our respective Governments, and weakening our position during the negotiations.

It was agreed that I should go to Count Buol, and state to him our difficulty. He informed me that it was his wish to state briefly to the Conference the situation in which we assembled, to refer to the bases as known, and to leave to the Plenipotentiaries of France and Great Britain any further preliminary.

Impressed with the importance of this first step; the danger of showing, on the one side, any disagreement with Austria in the commencement of negotiations, or on the other, of giving up the advantage already gained, I went to Count Buol at 1 o'clock this day with Lord Westmorland, having previously settled with Baron Bourqueney that he should be there at the same hour.

Count Buol was fully prepared to argue the question with us. He told us he had received an intimation from Prince Gortchakoff that he expected his full powers this evening, so that the Conferences may be opened immediately.

He proposed to open the Conference very briefly, stating either that the Powers had already agreed to negotiate, or giving, in very few words, an abstract of the four points agreed upon as bases of negotiation.

He proposed, in the next place, to take the first Article of the interpretation, and so continue, Article by Article, till the four were discussed.

Lord Westmorland and I observed that if Count Buol was prepared to state the four points singly, as they had been agreed upon between us, he could hardly object to state the four together as the foundation of a Protocol.

Count Buol took exception to this reasoning. He thought the proposal to record in a Protocol the four bases might naturally be objected to by the Russian Plenipotentiaries. Prince Gortchakoff had already, in a former meeting, agreed to accept those bases, and to go back on that former meeting would be in some sort to call in doubt his word. He (Prince Gortchakoff) would say that the preliminary stage was passed: that he was there ready to negotiate, and would either break off, or refer to his Court for instructions.

Count Buol thought either a rupture or a delay of negotiations would be very unfortunate; that the demur being on a point of form, those who raised the point of form would be accounted responsible by the opinion of Europe; that, on the part of Austria, he was not ready to accept such responsibility; that, after he had made his statement, it was open to us to say that we wished the four points more extensively developed, and to ask for the insertion in the Protocol of the memorandum.

Count Buol declared he did not know the course which Prince Gortchakoff would pursue in that case; but he might absolutely refuse to go back on the past, or he might again refer to his own reserves.

We discussed the matter at considerable length. I stated the impression

which Baron Manteuffel told me was prevalent in Germany, that Prince Gortchakoff had not accepted the interpretation of the three Powers.

Count Buol replied that Lord Westmorland, Baron Bourqueney, and he, were all witnesses of the acceptance by Prince Gortchakoff. He had not thought it advisable to have a *procès-verbal*, but he should be ready, if any doubt should arise in the course of the negotiation, to maintain the fact of the acceptance.

There cannot be any doubt that Count Buol's fears are founded, not so much on the point of form as on the presumed repugnance of Russia to give a more formal and definite adherence to the interpretation of the three Courts.

The declarations of Count Buol have entirely altered the position of the belligerent Powers. When I left London it was supposed that the Austrian Minister would give his willing assent to the insertion of the memorandum in the first Protocol. It was imagined, therefore, that if we should break upon this question, we should break off in union with Austria.

It now appears that the Austrian Government will refuse to concur with us, and will throw upon us the responsibility of breaking off upon what she will allege is a point of form.

There are evidently only two courses to pursue.

The one is to rest satisfied with the abstract of the four points, to be stated by Count Buol, and the assurance of Prince Gortchakoff that he abides by his declarations of the 7th of January

If we take this course we may possibly induce Count Buol to make his statement somewhat fuller than he had intended. At all events this will be desirable.

The other course is to insist on the acceptance of the memorandum as the basis of negotiation, and to require its insertion in the Protocol.

This last course is most in accordance with your Lordship's instructions which were communicated to me before I left London, and with the intentions of the French Government.

At the same time, the positive divergence of Austria from this line of conduct seems to me to make such a course of doubtful expediency.

We might, indeed, throw upon Russia the reproach of insincerity and bad faith. But the language of the Austrian Minister would weaken, very materially, the impressions against Russia, which would otherwise be produced.

The real question is, whether there is any hope of peace from these negotiations. I believe there is such hope. Such being my belief, I am inclined to think that, although the thread may snap hereafter, at some part of the line, it would be right to proceed so long as no essential security to Turkey and Europe is refused by Russia.

Having seen Lord Westmorland since the foregoing parts of this despatch were written, I find he concurs both in the correctness of the relation which I have given, and the conclusion at which I have arrived.

I shall, however, be better able to form a judgment after the meeting of to-morrow.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 411.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 102.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 10, 1855.*

SINCE I had the honour of addressing you by my despatch No. 99 of the 7th instant, Baron Bourqueney has communicated to Lord John Russell and myself a conversation he had held with Count Buol, from which he understood that the mode in which he (Count Buol) proposed to open the negotiations was not identical with that contemplated by our Government. He said that Count Buol proposed to draw up and submit to us three the speech he would make to the Plenipotentiaries on opening the negotiation, in which he would declare the basis on which that negotiation was to be founded, namely, the interpretation of the four conditions of peace which had been submitted to the Russian Government after they had been communicated to Prince Gortchakoff

on the 28th December, and to which, after receiving the orders of his Court, Prince Gortchakoff had adhered on the 7th January, as embodying the principles upon which the negotiation was to be founded. Count Buol in stating this in his speech would recapitulate the general declarations contained in the interpretation, Article by Article, and would follow his *résumé* of those Articles by stating, that upon their accepted interpretation he considered the negotiation might be commenced.

Count Buol's speech would be embodied in the Protocol of the Conference, which would be signed by all the Representatives.

Baron Bourqueney and Lord John proposed that the whole document containing the interpretation, should be laid before the Representatives, as the one to which adhesion had been given on the 7th January.

Count Buol did not contest the right of each Plenipotentiary to propose what he chose, but he did not see the advantage of this proceeding: if Prince Gortchakoff did not object to Count Buol's statement, "that he (Prince Gortchakoff) had consented to the interpretation of the bases," it would be asking him for another acceptation of the interpretation, by requiring his signature to the Protocol in which these four conditions were textually to be recorded; and as one reason against it, he stated that both in Articles II and IV there were passages to which both Lord John and Baron Bourqueney acknowledged that Prince Gortchakoff could not give the sanction of his approval. It would be difficult to get rid of these passages, or to explain their erasure; and it would certainly bring on a discussion, which would probably end by Prince Gortchakoff making objections to one alteration unless all the points to which he might demur were made subject to revision.

Count Buol also thought that it was not fitting, when three Ministers, invested with the character of Representatives of their respective Governments, asserted that the interpretation had been accepted, and when that assertion was not disputed by the other party, to require him, for the satisfaction of the Governments represented by those Plenipotentiaries, to have their report confirmed by asking him for a second acceptation of the same interpretation.

Under these explanations, it was agreed that Count Buol, Lord John, Baron Bourqueney, and myself, should meet to-morrow to examine the draft of the speech with which Count Buol would open the negotiation, and he (Count Buol) stated, that if any additional specification of the four points than that which he proposed to introduce into his speech, was required, he would readily take it into consideration, and (subject to his own opinion as to what he thought would conduce to the progress of the negotiations) he would give it his most favourable attention.

As up to the present time I have received no instructions from your Lordship as to the line I am to pursue in the course of the negotiation, I stated to Lord John Russell, that considering him as entirely informed of the views of Her Majesty's Government, I should give my best support to the decisions he might think it advisable to adopt.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 412.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 103.)
My Lord, *Vienna, March* 10, 1855.

MY attention has been called to a sentence in my despatch No. 10 to your Lordship of the 8th of January, which states that the document read by Prince Gortchakoff at the Conference of the 7th contained the embodiment of instructions from his Government; and I notice that in the general instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 5 of the 22nd of February to Lord John Russell, you speak of the document read by Prince Gortchakoff as "purporting to be the substance of the instructions which he had received from his Court."

I beg to state to your Lordship that this impression, which is entirely

erroneous, I endeavoured to correct in my despatch to your Lordship No. 53 of the 31st of January, in which I stated that the document read by Prince Gortchakoff was not said to be "the embodiment of instructions received from his Government;" but I fear that the original impression was made by the sentence already alluded to in my despatch No. 10, and which was certainly calculated to give an erroneous idea on the subject. In explanation of that sentence, I have to state to your Lordship that the despatch in which it is contained was written at a time when I was still suffering from severe indisposition, and the result, I fear, was that the expression used escaped from me through inadvertence. What I should have reported was, that Prince Gortchakoff stated that the document he read contained only notes which he had drawn up to assist his memory; and in begging your Lordship to accept these words as a true description of the document in question, I must once more apologize for having conveyed to your Lordship by a hasty expression an inaccurate idea on this subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—12 o'clock, P.M. The foregoing despatch has been written after I had received from Lord John Russell, late at night, your Lordship's despatch to him No. 5, and after my despatch to your Lordship No. 102 of this day, in which I state that I had received no instructions from your Lordship, had been closed and delivered to the messenger.

W.

No. 413.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 11.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1855.

HER Majesty's Government entirely concur with your Lordship, for the reasons stated in your despatch No. 9 of the 5th instant, that it would have been inexpedient to present your credentials at Berlin.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 414.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 12.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1855.

I HAVE the satisfaction of conveying to your Lordship on the part of Her Majesty's Government their entire concurrence in the opinions expressed in your despatches Nos. 10 and 12 of the 5th and 7th instant, and their entire approval of the language held by your Lordship to Count Buol on the Eastern question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 415.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1855.

WE learn with surprise and regret that the textual insertion in the Protocol of the memorandum given to Prince Gortchakoff would endanger the relations of the allies with Austria. Lord Westmorland's correspondence did not lead us to anticipate any such obstacle to the proper course of proceeding. You may, however, proceed in the manner proposed in your despatch of the 11th; the guarantee should not apply to the existing institutions of the Principalities, but to those improved constitutions which the Sultan may hereafter confer on them.

Count Buol's speech should reserve the right to make conditions over and above the four bases.

No. 416.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 93.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1855.

COUNT COLLOREDO has communicated to me a circular despatch from Count Buol to the Austrian Ministers at the German Courts, on the recent proceedings in the Diet.

Count Buol commences by stating that Baron Prokesch had laid before the Diet a report of the Austrian army under the command of General Hess, in fulfilment of the resolution of the Diet of the 8th of February. The Prussian Plenipotentiary had proposed in the Military Commission that the preparation of the Federal contingents should take place within the territory of the Confederation.

This proposal was not adopted, but the Austrian Government points out that the present question cannot be considered merely as a Federal question; the Confederation is called upon in pursuance of the Treaty of the 20th of April, and of the resolution of the 9th of December, not only to defend the Federal territory, but to uphold the four points as bases of peace, and to repel every attack upon the Austrian territory and also upon the Austrian troops in the Principalities.

When, however, Baron Prokesch submitted the report of the Austrian army to the Diet, the Prussian Plenipotentiary distinctly denied that the resolution of the 8th of February was founded on those of the 24th of July and 9th of December.

M. de Bismark maintained that united resistance to an attack on the Austrian Empire, or the Principalities, was altogether out of the question, and that the resolution of the 8th of February was based on entirely new grounds, namely, on the necessity, in the present state of Europe, of maintaining an armed force ready to be employed in any direction.

In a conversation with Baron Prokesch, M. de Bismark had mentioned the intention of the Prussian Government to propose that the garrisons of the Federal fortresses of Rastadt, Mayence, Landau, and Luxemburgh, should be placed on the war footing.

It is difficult, Count Buol observes, to reconcile these views, which imply an armed neutrality, with the missions of Baron Usedom and General Wedel to London and Paris.

The Austrian Government thinks it right to call the serious attention of the Confederates to the danger of giving any other meaning to their present attitude than that of preparation to carry out the resolution of the Diet last year.

Hitherto Austria had not considered it necessary to make any specific

declaration respecting the purpose of the military measures of the Diet; the engagements entered into by the Confederation, the policy of Austria, and of those German States who agree with her, rendered such a declaration superfluous; but it would be otherwise if at the moment when Germany is arming, and when it must shortly be decided whether or not peace is to be restored to Europe, the Confederation should by its declarations and measures follow that tendency towards an expectant neutrality, free from all specific obligations, which has already been but too plainly indicated. Against such measures and declarations the Austrian Government would regard it as an imperative duty emphatically to protest, and to decline all responsibility as to the consequences which might ensue: they would especially consider a demand for the withdrawal of the Austrian Contingent to German territory as an indirect abandonment of the engagements entered into by the Diet in the true interest of Germany, and they would denounce as an uncalled-for provocation the proposal to place on the war-footing the garrisons on the frontier of France.

The Imperial Plenipotentiary has been instructed to urge these considerations in the Committees of the Diet.

The Austrian Government trust that they will meet with the same convictions among the Representatives of their Federal allies; and that the Germanic Confederation, while, in conjunction with Austria, it develops its power, will not, in case the negotiations for peace should fail, give any of its members, or any of the European Cabinets, any reason to doubt the object of its armament.

I thanked Count Colloredo for this communication, which was satisfactory, and said that the tone of Count Buol's despatch seemed well adapted to the occasion, as it would have been impossible to have met in a less decided manner the proposal of M. de Bismark, which was a fresh proof of the determination of Prussia to create embarrassments for Austria, and to induce the German Powers to share the suspicious and unfriendly feelings with which England and France are regarded by the Cabinet of Berlin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 417.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 89.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March* 10, 1855.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 72 of the 2nd instant, in which I reported the intention of the Russian Legation at this Court to establish a French journal, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Prussian police have refused to grant "permis de séjour" to the different Belgians and Frenchmen who had been engaged to write in this newspaper, and who have arrived here within the last few days.

Baron Manteuffel apprehended that a journal under the protection of Russia would infallibly prove a source of continual trouble to him; and on his representing the matter to the King, His Majesty at once signed an order to the Director-General of Police to put an end to the speculation by all the legal means at his disposal.

The writers for this journal have now been ordered to leave Berlin, and the plan has so far failed; but it is not impossible that the project may be attempted at Hamburgh or Dresden, or at some other place out of reach of the Prussian police.

This proceeding of Baron Manteuffel's must not be considered as directed against the principles which would have pervaded the "Journal du Nord," for nothing could be more Russian than the "Kreuz Zeitung," which is seldom or never interfered with, but to have been decided on in consequence of the special protection given to it by a foreign Legation, by which it would have been screened and protected in the event of the interference of the police being at any time necessary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 418.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 91.)

Berlin, March 10, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith, in translation, an article which has appeared in a Berlin Liberal journal, giving an interesting statistical account of the Russian finances, taken from the latest publication of the Russian Calendar by the Imperial Academy of Sciences at St. Petersburgh.

From this paper it appears that the debt of the Empire at the commencement of the year 1853, amounted to 401,552,111 silver roubles (63,579,084*l.*), whereas it had increased at the beginning of the year 1854 to 417,746,245 silver roubles (66,143,155*l.*), making thereby an increase to the Russian public debt of 16,194,134 silver roubles (2,564,071*l.*)

It further appears, that up to the 3rd of January, 1855, the amount of gold and silver coin, of bullion, and of other public securities (purchased on the 31st of March, 1847), amounted to 151,790,985 silver roubles (24,033,572*l.*), whereas the paper notes in circulation amounted to 556,377,021 silver roubles (87,259,694*l.*), at the same period, and consequently that there were in paper circulation at the commencement of 1855, 244,961,440 silver roubles (38,785,561*l.*) more than at the commencement of 1853, during which period, however, the capital as security for the paper money, had only increased by 4,966,137 silver roubles (79,105*l.*).

I would also beg leave to draw your Lordship's attention to the large advances and loans for private purposes made by the different monied establishments herein referred to, which exceed the amount of sterling capital which those establishments represent, although these advances are covered by extensive mortgages on landed property.

This article terminates with an interesting extract from the work of Baron Von Reden, (entitled "Russia's Elements of Strength and Means of Influence," published at the close of last year), who is considered to be a high authority for statistical information respecting the Russian Empire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 418.

Official Data elucidative of the Russian Public Debt.

(Translation.)

IN the latest annual publications of the Russian Calendar by the Imperial Academy of Sciences at St. Petersburgh, which may deservedly be looked upon as a rich mine for statistical information concerning the Russian Empire, we find a series of articles elucidative of the nature of the Credit Institutions of the Empire that are highly interesting, and at the present time doubly important, and for the publication of which we are indebted to the Director of the Russian Ministry of Finances.

According to these communications, proceeding from the most authentic sources, the Russian Public Funded Debt consisted in part of debts liable to be paid off, which again were divided into foreign debts (in Dutch florins), and home debts (in silver roubles), partly of debts not liable to be paid off, which were of a mixed nature, as they were based partly on silver roubles partly on pounds sterling. The accounts furnished by the Imperial Board of Commissioners of the Sinking Fund showed the following figures for the years 1844 to 1853 (with the exception of the year 1848, for which no account lies before us).

On the 1st January of the Year	Debts liable to be paid off.		Debts not liable to be paid off.
	Foreign.	Home.	
	Dutch florins.	Silver Roubles.	Silver Roubles.
1844 ..	71,014,000	42,586,796	216,800,156
1845 ..	69,665,000	46,709,580	227,996,840
1846 ..	68,273,000	50,388,680	226,408,230
1847 ..	68,836,000	52,497,760	224,489,900
1849 ..	63,821,000	65,979,029	231,318,854
1850 ..	62,237,000	68,978,246	231,766,157
1851 ..	60,596,000	86,937,243	229,155,914 and 5,500,000*l.*
1852 ..	58,904,000	5,631,264	226,499,093 and 5,390,000*l.*
1853 ..	57,149,000	110,867,053	223,831,476 and 5,280,309*l.*

Together, in silver roubles:

On the 1st January of the year	1844		299,865,232
„ „	1845		314,415,470
„ „	1846		315,712,500
„ „	1847		315,084,200
„ „	1849		326,675,853
„ „	1850		336,219,403
„ „	1851		386,309,693
„ „	1852		400,667,799
„ „	1853		401,552,111

Further, the amount of paper money in circulation on the 1st of January of the years specified hereafter, was—

	Assignats.	Deposit Notes.	Notes of Credit of the State, with 4½ per Cent. Interest.
	Banco Roubles.	Silver Roubles.	Silver Roubles.
1844 ..	562,356,310	31,493,257	46,591,221
1845 ..	321,955,160	17,813,354	121,807,114
1846 ..	187,884,040	8,592,700	189,415,576
1847 ..	117,121,220	4,979,671	226,167,589
1849 ..	14,931,630	280,438	306,628,572
1850 ..	..	..	300,307,244
1851 ..	..	..	301,579,170
1852 ..	..	..	303,797,128
1853 ..	.. *	.. *	311,375,581

* On the 1st January, 1853, the residue of this debt not paying interest was reduced to the small sum of 252,000 silver roubles; while the same on the 1st January, 1849, had amounted to 4,536,038 silver roubles. (14,931,630 roubles banco equal to 4,253,600 silver roubles.)

EXCHANGING FUND.

	In Coin and Bullion.	Public Securities.	Total Amount of Cash Capital.
	Silver Roubles.	Silver Roubles.	Silver Roubles.
1844 ..	..	..	35,016,112
1845 ..	..	..	59,404,709
1846 ..	..	..	86,812,362
1847 ..	..	..	101,287,478
1849 ..	117,079,477	29,759,432	146,838,909
1850 ..	107,333,127	29,636,612	136,969,739
1851 ..	108,253,368	28,979,973	137,233,341
1852 .	111,320,732	28,110,928	139,431,660
1853 ..	123,707,380	23,087,468	146,794,848

As concerns the Loan Bank of the State, the capital of the same on the 1st January, 1852, amounted to 12,472,619 silver roubles, wherein was a reserve capital of 6,722,909 silver rubles. The deposits up to 1853, amounted to 132,653,425 silver roubles. The Credit Bank had out on loan 326,456,474 silver roubles, for which it held on mortgage a large number of landed estates with 634,651 souls, 968 houses, and 79 manufactories, works and fisheries. The profits of the year 1852 were 2,604,222 silver roubles.

Further the Commercial Bank of the State had a capital of its own of 8,571,428 silver roubles, and a reserve capital of 2,442,855 silver roubles. The deposits, up to 1853, amounted to 186,471,330 silver roubles. So much was laid out in discount of bills, on pledges of goods, obligations, agricultural productions, advances on mortgage of landed property (of the Kijew Bank) in metal (of the Jekaterinburg Bank), as also in receipts of the administration of the Altai and Ural mines, that up to 1853 there was a residue of 20,021,714 silver roubles. The profits of the year 1852 amounted to 1,330,962 silver roubles.

With regard to the so-called Deposit (Trust) Fund, the capital belonging to the institutions for education amounted to 55,114,196 silver roubles. The deposits, up to 1853, reached the height of 115,843,179 silver roubles. On the other side, 461,573,192 silver roubles were paid out in loans for authorities and persons. The profits of the year 1852 amounted to 376,271 silver roubles. The loans were secured by mortgages of landed property, with 5,202,114 souls, and 372 stone houses. In the Savings' Banks there remained in circulation in capital and interest 1,892,507 silver roubles, and the aggregate number of books delivered to the depositors amounted to 44,505.

Lastly, the Boards of General Providence possessed a capital of their own which on 1st January, 1852, amounted to 1,343,460 silver roubles; up to 1853, there remained in circulation 69,222,492 silver roubles. The total amount of the sums advanced as loans appeared to be 82,181,580 silver roubles, and the profits of the year 1852, 396,278 silver roubles.

The capital exclusively belonging to all the abovenamed institutions amounted consequently—

	Silver Roubles.
For the year 1852 to	91,944,564
Up to the year 1853 there remained in Deposits . ..	806,083,293
In Loans (inclusive of the Discounts on Bills and Merchandize), were laid out	893,152,960
In all the Deposits in the year 1853 (inclusive of the interest for Capital not reclaimed) amounted to	902,692,085
There were reclaimed	198,596 328
Consequently in 1852 there was an increase in the Receipts of	4,095,757

As regards the monetary circulation during the year 1853, and the clear amount to the year 1854, the Russian Minister of Finances, in one of the late sittings of the Council of Administration for the Credit Institution of the Empire, made the following communications, that show an immediate connection with the concluding figures of the statements above given for the year 1852.

According to them, credit notes for 333,443,008 silver roubles were in circulation during 1853. In cash and in bullion or bars 131,481,856 silver roubles were in circulation. A capital of 428,798,515 silver roubles was entrusted to the Deposit Banks. The Debt and Pledge Banks had an outstanding capital of 984,761,874 silver roubles. The payments into the Deposit Bank, the Loan and Commercial Banks of the Empire, amounted together to 848,420,459 silver roubles. Out on loan by the above-named institutions were 943,142,258 silver roubles. The debt of the Empire at the commencement of the year 1854 amounted to 417,746,245 silver roubles, while at the beginning of the year 1853 it was only 401,552,111 silver roubles; so that according to this, in the course of the year 1853, there was an increase in the Russian Public Debt of 16,194,134 silver roubles.

Lastly, we also lay before our readers what the Russian Minister of Finances communicated in one of the latest publications made in the "Commercial Journal of St. Petersburgh," respecting the Exchanging Fund and the credit notes of the Empire.

According to this, the amount of the deposited exchanging capital appeared to be, up to the 3rd of January of the current year 1855, as follows:—

	Silver Roubles.
Gold coin	58,485,041
Silver	53,648,951
Bars of gold containing silver, and silver bars	11,063,561
Public securities bought as advised by the Council of the Empire, and approved by the Emperor, March 31, 1847	28,630,432
In all	151,790,985

Credit notes of the Empire, on the other side, to the value of 556,337,021 silver roubles, were in circulation at the commencement of this year.

Consequently there were in circulation within the confines of Russia at the commencement of the year 1855, 244,961,480 silver roubles more than at the commencement of 1853, when, as we have seen above, the amount of the same had only reached 311,375,581 silver roubles, while the capital to secure the paper money at the same time, had only increased by 4,196,137 silver roubles, it having on 1st January, 1853, amounted to 146,794,848 silver roubles, and at the commencement of the present year, according to the latest publication of the Minister of Finances, only amounted to 151,790,985 silver roubles.

There is no doubt that in the figures above furnished the effects of the present war already speak for themselves. But the complications for Russia may be incalculable, if this war, so inconsiderately undertaken and so perniciously carried on by it, should be a protracted one.

On this head we recall to mind the memorable words made use of by a scholar of high standing as a writer on statistics, we mean, Baron Dr. Fr. Wilhelm von Reden, in his work, entitled "Russia's Elements of Strength and Means of Influence,"* a work based upon official information, often obtained with unspeakable labour, and written without partiality and polemics.

Concerning the financial position of Russia, and especially considering the circumstances, that the expenses for the land army and the navy on the present war footing amount to about 20,000,000 of silver roubles a-month, which nearly comes up to the annual amount of the whole net income of the State, he writes in page 368, "A continuance of such a state of things must necessarily lead to a national bankruptcy, and previously awaken suspicion abroad respecting the solvency of the Russian Government, although it has always been just to its foreign creditors, and besides the contributions to the foreign debt are comparatively inconsiderable. In the interior of the Empire, the extraordinary measures

* Published by Völcker, at Frankfort a/M, at the end of last year.

hitherto adopted, or that may still become necessary, will not succeed in procuring much of the token of the value of coin; for the amount of the precious metals of all the institutions and banks appears long ago to have been exchanged for the token of the value of paper. On this account, the compulsory circulation of Russian paper-money in the Principalities of the Danube formerly occupied by the Russians, and the prohibited export of the precious metals, are measures to which the Government was forced to have recourse by the state of the circulation of money. Such a state might, with the prevailing rigid system of prohibition, continue to linger on for many years in times of peace. But a protracted war must deal this financial system a death-blow; even if we set aside the circumstance of its prejudicing in the highest degree, the most important revenues of the public treasury, and the ability of the population to pay taxes (in consequence of the interruption in the commercial intercourse with foreign countries). These and many other circumstances make it very likely that the Russian Government, from financial considerations alone, will not be able to carry on a European war much longer, without irreparably injuring the property and commerce of its subjects."

The choice between this evil and the disadvantages arising to Russia by yielding to her enemies, is certainly very difficult, and might retard the conclusion of a peace longer than otherwise might be the case.

No. 419.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 94.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March* 10, 1855.

UPON the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 84 of the 8th instant, I immediately called upon Baron Manteuffel, and informed him that intelligence had reached Her Majesty's Government that 40,000 muskets from the Prussian stores at Cologne had been lately sold to the Russian Government, and that I was directed to request an explanation of a proceeding which amounted to an act of hostility against England and France.

His Excellency replied that it was impossible that this could have taken place, and that he believed the amount of arms I had stated would not be found in any of the stores on the Rhine. I rejoined that it was not probable that this story could be altogether without foundation, though there might be an error in the quantity of arms stated. He replied that he should make inquiries of the Minister of War, and enable me to give a formal answer to your Lordship; and that he could only account for the rumour as originating in the periodical sales of old worn-out muskets, which take place once or twice a-year; that new arms were being served out for the Infantry, and that those persons who became possessed of the old ones would probably have a bad bargain if they expected to get any service out of the muskets.

Baron Manteuffel said further, that the only large depôt of arms was at Spandau, about ten English miles from Berlin.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 420.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 95.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March* 10, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that General Grünwald arrived here yesterday from St. Petersburgh with the usual letters, announcing the accession of the Emperor Alexander II to the Throne of Russia. This

officer was received immediately by the King of Prussia, and delivered to His Majesty, among other things, a private letter from the Emperor. Baron Manteuffel has mentioned to me that he has seen this letter, and that it contains nothing but common-place expressions of the desire of the Emperor of Russia to maintain the best relations with Prussia, and to keep up that friendly intercourse which has so long existed between the two Crowns.

General Grünwald called to-day on Baron Manteuffel, and I have endeavoured to learn the impression made on his Excellency by this mission. He said that the General replied to his inquiry as to the future policy of Russia, that the Emperor had told him, before leaving St. Petersburgh, that it was his intention to ratify and follow up all his father's acts, and that with regard to the approaching negotiation at Vienna, he should make all reasonable concessions "sauf l'honneur." He added that the Emperor Nicholas had said to his son, some days previous to his death, in alluding to the war and to the state of the Eastern question, that the present policy of Russia with regard to Turkey, should be to desist from all attempts to mix herself up in her affairs; that Turkey should be now left alone, and that she would then soon find the dangers to which her existence would be exposed by other Powers, and would be glad again to appeal to Russia for assistance.

This, Baron Manteuffel said, was the only thing of interest said by General Grünwald, who added that he was no politician, and troubled himself little about such matters.

The General, I believe, proceeds from here to Weimar, with the letters of notification for that Court.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 421.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 93.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March* 10, 1855.

I HAD the honour to forward to your Lordship yesterday in my despatch No. 88, a translation of the manifesto published by the Emperor of Russia on his accession.

I have since had some conversation with Baron Manteuffel respecting this document, and endeavoured to discover the interpretation which the King of Prussia and his Government were disposed to put on the passage which states that the views and intentions of Peter, Catherine, Alexander, and Nicholas, will be carried into execution.

Baron Manteuffel said that the King spoke of the manifesto last night as being moderate in its tone, and that it was not intended for foreign countries, but for Russia.

I answered that I could by no means view it in this light, and that the allusions to the policy of his predecessors and to his intention to place Russia in the highest pinnacle of glory, was not calculated to satisfy England and France that the Emperor of Russia was disposed to desist from attempts at future spoliation of Turkey, and was much to be regretted, particularly at a moment when Conferences for peace were about to be opened at Vienna; and further that these allusions were likely to be considered as throwing down the gauntlet to Europe.

Baron Manteuffel replied that the King had observed to him on this passage of the manifesto that something of the same kind would be found in that published by the Emperor Nicholas on his accession; and that His Majesty had desired a copy of this document to be brought to him that he might compare them.

I rejoined that I begged him to speak to the King on the objectionable passages, and urge His Majesty to lose no time in requiring an explanation of them from St. Petersburgh, for it appeared to me impossible that an impartial

reader could view them otherwise than as hostile to Europe, and especially to the Western Powers.

Baron Manteuffel said he was to see the King this evening, and would convey to His Majesty the remarks I had made.

Since writing the foregoing I have read over the manifesto of the Emperor Nicholas, and find therein no allusions of the kind supposed by the King of Prussia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 422.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 99.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March* 10, 1855.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 73 of the 6th instant, inclosing copy of Lord Cowley's No. 279 of the 2nd instant, stating that the United States have proposed to Russia to associate herself with them to obtain an abolition of the Sound dues, and that the Russian Government had declined doing so, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I alluded to the subject this day in the course of conversation with Baron Manteuffel, and learnt from his Excellency that similar communications had been made to the Prussian Government.

He said that though all commercial countries were interested in this question, he felt the inopportunity of taking any step in the matter at this moment, and that it could not reasonably be brought forward at a time when there was war in Europe, and that, moreover, the Prussian Government had no thought of proposing an abolition of the Sound dues without ensuring an equivalent to Denmark, which he considered might be done by capitalising the average revenue derived from them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 423.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 100. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March* 10, 1855.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 85 of the 8th instant, respecting the signature by the King of Prussia of an Ordinance prohibiting the exportation of arms and munitions of war, I remarked this day to Baron Manteuffel that I had not yet seen it in the official "Gazette."

His Excellency replied that M. de Bodelschwingh had again made difficulties on the subject, and had brought forward a proposal that a paragraph should be inserted in the Ordinance allowing those arms now on their way to pass without hindrance; that, however, his suggestion would not be attended to, and that it would immediately be carried into effect.

I answered that the obstacles that were being perpetually raised to any measure intended to show a disposition to favour us, and to follow out a policy of justice between belligerents, were calculated to increase our doubts as to the sincerity of the Prussian Government, and that Her Majesty's Government would learn with great dissatisfaction this fresh attempt of the Russian party to serve the objects of our enemy.

Baron Manteuffel rejoined that the matter was now closed, and the Ordinance would be published immediately, in the form in which he had described it to me two days ago.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 424.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 101. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March* 10, 1855.

I LEARN, from a private and confidential source, that, in his reports from St. Petersburgh, Count Münster states that, in the opinion of the highest military authorities, entire confidence may be placed in the sufficiency of the defensive measures adopted by Russia on her line of frontier from the northern part of Finland to the extreme limit of her Asiatic provinces, with the exception of the line extending from Riga to the Vistula and the Pruth, for the defence of which she has less reason to care, so long as Prussia (on whom she counts with perfect reliance) maintains her present system.

In stating that this quarter is regarded by the Russian Government as the most vulnerable for attack, and the least guarded, Count Münster expresses his opinion that, in the event of any attack on the part of Austria, a sufficient force could be concentrated to act on the defensive, but he does not seem to consider any offensive operations as in any way premeditated on the part of Russia.

Previous to his death, the late Emperor had concerted a new defensive organisation, by which fresh corps of the reserves would be formed into divisions, and placed in support of the first line of the army. These would be again supported by a third line composed of the militia lately called into vigour, to which a Cavalry force of Cossacks and Irregulars would be attached. Thus three lines of military defence would be established in like manner with the three lines of fortresses which now form the bulwark of the Russian Empire on the Polish frontier.

I am also informed that the late Emperor had decided to abolish the present helmet used by the army (in imitation of those worn by the Prussian army), and to substitute for them the fur cap now worn by the Caucasian troops, which is both light, warm, and ornamental.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 425.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 102.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March* 10, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, in translation, an article inserted in the unofficial portion of the Prussian "Moniteur" ("Staats Anzeiger"), giving certain details of the illness and last moments of the Emperor Nicholas.

Although the article is headed "Non-official," still the journal is the official gazette of the State; and the insertion of the dying exhortation of the late Emperor to the King of Prussia is, doubtless, intended by the Russian party at Court to stimulate popular opinion, and to create a reaction in favour of Russian sympathy.

On expressing my surprise to Baron Manteuffel that this phrase had been so injudiciously and unnecessarily reproduced in a semi-official form, he replied that it had been done without his knowledge, and that he disapproved of its insertion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 425.

Extract from the Un-official part of the "Staats Anzeiger."

(Translation.)

Berlin, March 9.—WE have received details from St. Petersburgh, dated March 3, respecting the illness and death of His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas.

For some time back His Majesty, as now appears, suffered very severely from grippe. About the 16th February, the physician in ordinary, Dr. Mandt, requested permission to consult other medical men. The Emperor received this lightly, and allowed the physician in ordinary, Dr. Karell, to be called in. The state of the Emperor became gradually worse in consequence of sleeplessness and increased cough, with great secretion, so much so, that the physicians on the 10th February, requested His Majesty not to leave his apartment.

The Emperor would not hear of it, upon which one of the physicians said: "No surgeon in the whole army would permit a soldier who was as ill as your Majesty, to leave the hospital, because the patient would be certain to return to it in a worse state." The Emperor replied: "Gentlemen, you have now done your duty; I thank you: I will do mine." In rather a cold day he got into his sledge and drove to the *manège*, for the purpose of inspecting some men of the Infantry of the Guard, who were under orders for Lithuania, to fill up the regiments.

During this inspection, which was his last appearance in public, the Emperor was very fatigued, coughed much, spat a great deal, and said, in going away, "I am as if I came out of a bath," though it was anything but warm in the *manège*. In this state the Emperor went to the Minister of War (Prince Dolgorucki), who was unwell, told him not to go out too soon, and returned to the Winter Palace. In the evening he attended the prayers for the first week in Lent, then remained with the Empress, but complained of cold, and kept his cloak on in the room.

From that evening the Emperor left his small study no more. He there received the Colonel and Aide-de-camp von Tettenborn on the 24 of February, lying on his sofa, covered with a cloak, and dispatched him to Sebastopol. His Majesty afterwards gave up the management of business to the Grand Duke Hereditary.

From the 24th-27th of February, nothing further was answered to questions, than the Emperor keeps his bed because he is "feverish; the cough is becoming loose, &c."

During the whole illness, the Emperor lay on his camp-bed, that is, a leather sack filled with hay, and a pillow of the same sort, covered with a blanket and a cloak.

It was only on the 28th of February that his state was considered as decidedly serious. During the night of the 1st of March he became rapidly worse. The physicians feared a paralysis of the lungs. On the evening of the 1st of March, all hopes for the Emperor were given up. The Empress and the Grand Duke Hereditary, at the desire of the physicians, requested him to receive the sacrament.

On this occasion the Emperor appears for the first time to have perceived the danger of his state. But hardly any impression appears to have been perceptible.

During the night (from 1st-2nd of March), Dr. Mandt told the Emperor that he was dangerously ill, and that his lungs were dangerously affected. The Emperor said very quietly, "Then, perhaps, I am in danger of a paralysis of the lungs." Dr. Mandt replied, "It is very possible."

The Emperor thereupon received the sacrament very calmly and collectedly, took leave of the Empress, the Imperial children and grand-children, blessed and embraced each of them, giving the blessing with a firm voice, and kept only the Empress and the Grand Duke Hereditary with him.

This took place about 4 o'clock in the morning.

Later the Emperor said to the Empress, "Now go and repose yourself a little, I pray you." She replied, "Let me stay with you; I should like to depart with you, if it were possible." Upon which he said, "No, you must still remain here below; take care of your health, that you may become the

centre of the whole family; go, I will have you called when the moment approaches." The Empress obeyed this wish so decidedly pronounced, and went.

Then the Emperor caused Count Orloff, Count Adlerberg, and Prince Dolgorucki to enter; thanked them for their fidelity, and took leave of them. Later he called in his own servants, thanked them for their services, blessed them, and took leave of them, during which the Emperor himself is said to have been much affected. At last the woman of the bedchamber, Von Rohrbeck, was for. The Emperor thanked her also for the fidelity she had always shown towards the Empress, for the care with which she had always tended her during her illnesses, and even lately; requested her not to forsake the Empress, and finally added: "And salute my dear Peterhof for me." The Emperor also took the hand of Dr. Karell, and said, "It is not your fault."

When the confessor, Bajanoff, spoke to the Emperor, he took the Empress' hand and placed it in that of the priest, as if confiding the Empress to the clergyman.

After this the Emperor for a time lost the power of speech, during which he crossed himself often, and prayed silently. Later the Emperor regained his speech, and spoke occasionally till his death, which took place in presence of the whole family on the 2nd March, at 10 minutes past 12 o'clock at noon.

Almost the last distinct words the Emperor uttered were: "Dites à Fritz de rester toujours le même pour la Russie, et de ne pas oublier les paroles de Papa."

The Emperor suffered the agonies of death with a calmness of soul, a Christian resignation and a manly fortitude, which was truly sublime. Only a man of a pure conscience, and with the firm conviction of having always desired what was right, and having acted accordingly, could die thus. God will be merciful to the Emperor! It is truly superhuman what that Sovereign personally in the course of the last years has morally suffered and struggled with; how every wounded soldier was a pang to his heart.

The corpse at first became much altered. Towards the evening the fine features had become more imposing than ever in their calmness and regularity.

Until now Her Majesty the Empress has withstood this unexpected and terrible blow with a wonderful fortitude. Yesterday evening she passed a whole hour alone with the body.

The state of stupefaction into which the suddenness of this terrible blow had placed everybody, is gradually giving way to the feeling of grief.

No. 426.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 92.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1855.

HER Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction from your Lordship's despatch No. 85 of the 8th instant, that an Ordinance has been signed by the King of Prussia, prohibiting the exportation of arms and munitions of war; and they trust that effectual measures will be taken for observing the Ordinance.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON

No. 427.

Count Bernstorff to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March 13.*)

Ce 13 Mars, 1855.

M. le Comte,

CI-JOINT j'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer copie des pièces dont je vous ai fait hier la lecture. Je vous prie instamment de ne pas attacher trop peu de valeur à l'effort du Roi. Car, bien que la Russie ait déjà accepté, comme vous dites, le Protocole, je crois pourtant qu'il peut y avoir des éventualités où il serait d'une grande valeur pour les Puissances alliées que nous l'eussions signé.

Comme il y a demain levée de la Reine, je tâcherai de vous trouver après-demain, après midi, chez vous, si cela vous convient.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) BERNSTORFF.

Inclosure 1 in No. 427.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Bernstorff.

Berlin, ce 6 Mars, 1855.

M. le Comte,

D'ORDRE du Roi notre auguste Maître, j'ai adressé hier la dépêche ci-jointe en copie au Comte de Hatzfeldt à Paris. Le projet de Protocole qui y est mentionné, se trouve également sous ce pli. Veuillez, M. le Comte, donner connaissance des deux annexes au Cabinet de Londres, pour l'informer que le Roi adhère au Protocole signé le 28 Décembre par les Représentants de l'Angleterre, de la France, et de l'Autriche, et accepté plus tard par le Prince Gortchakoff, et que Sa Majesté, si les Cabinets signataires lui en exprimaient le désir, serait prête à donner à cette adhésion sa sanction personnelle.

Votre Excellence, après s'être faite, dans cette occasion, l'organe des hautes intentions du Roi, telles qu'elles se trouvent consignées dans la dépêche au Comte de Hatzfeldt, voudra bien nous informer de l'accueil qu'elles auront rencontré près du Cabinet de Londres.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 427.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Hatzfeldt.

Berlin, ce 5 Mars, 1855.

M. le Comte,

IL serait superflu de dépeindre à votre Excellence la sincère et profonde douleur dans laquelle le Roi notre auguste Maître, et toute la Maison Royale, sont plongés par la nouvelle de la mort de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas. L'amitié qui unissait les deux augustes Souverains, se fondait sur les souvenirs les plus chers et sur les liens les plus sacrés. Mais ce n'est pas seulement le cœur du Roi qui vient d'être frappé par cette perte irréparable. La mort subite d'un si grand Monarque laisse une vaste lacune dans les combinaisons politiques du moment, et Dieu, en rappelant de la terre ce puissant Souverain, impose en quelque sorte à l'Europe entière un recueillement salutaire, en dirigeant tous les yeux vers le lit de mort de l'auguste défunt, auquel les derniers honneurs ne sont pas encore rendus, et dont le successeur, accablé d'une juste douleur, n'a point encore énoncé envers les Gouvernements étrangers les principes qui vont le guider dans les graves complications à la solution desquelles il vient d'être appelé. Mais malgré les voiles qui, sous ce rapport, couvrent l'avenir, les

espérances de paix se font valoir presque instinctivement, et la conscience publique se pénètre de plus en plus du besoin d'entente et de conciliation. L'Empereur Alexandre II, le Roi n'en doute pas, reconnaîtra que la voie d'une haute modération et d'un sincère bon vouloir est le seul qui ouvre la perspective d'un arrangement. Notre auguste Maître, dans sa qualité d'ancien ami et de proche parent, ne cessera pas de donner ses conseils dans ce sens à St. Pétersbourg, et de concourir par un langage à la fois ferme et amical, au rétablissement de cette paix que les Gouvernements et les peuples appellent également de tous leurs vœux.

Votre Excellence ne méconnaîtra pas l'influence naturelle de cette situation sur l'échange d'idées qui en dernier lieu s'est poursuivi avec les Puissances Occidentales, et principalement avec le Cabinet des Tuileries; mais si une interruption momentanée de ces pourparlers confidentiels est non seulement dictée par le sentiment personnel du Roi, mais par la nature même des circonstances imprévues dans lesquelles nous nous trouvons, Sa Majesté attache pourtant le plus grand prix à ce que Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français et son Gouvernement en apprécient bien les motifs, et se tiennent pour bien-assurés que rien n'est plus éloigné de la pensée du Roi que de préjuger par là le résultat de la négociation même, en tant que celle-ci ne le serait pas par la conclusion de la paix.

Pour ne pas laisser de doute sur ses véritables intentions à ce sujet, Sa Majesté, après avoir pris une connaissance détaillée de l'objet des entretiens confidentiels qui ont eu lieu jusqu'à présent et des pièces qui leur ont servi de base, spécialement du projet de Protocole présenté par le Gouvernement Français, déclare adhérer à ce document sans modification. Le Cabinet du Roi, n'ayant pas été complétement et officiellement informé de ce qui s'est passé dans les réunions confidentielles qui ont eu lieu, le 28 Décembre et le 7 Janvier derniers, parmi les Plénipotentiaires de France, d'Angleterre, d'Autriche, et de Russie, a cru et devait croire, que quelques modifications apportées à ce projet le rendraient plus propre à constater le véritable accord des Puissances intéressées; toutefois, après l'assurance donnée par les organes du Gouvernement Français, que le projet qu'il nous a présenté en dernier lieu, est non seulement littéralement conforme au Protocole signé le 28 Décembre comme expression de l'accord entre la France, l'Angleterre, et l'Autriche, mais que cette même rédaction a été acceptée par le Prince de Gortchakoff dans la réunion de 7 Janvier, le Roi, désirant donner à Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français une preuve de confiance, et n'ayant en vue que d'augmenter les chances d'une entente réelle et durable, renonce aux modifications que, mû par le même désir, il avait cru devoir proposer, et accepte, comme je viens de le dire plus haut, le projet de Protocole tel que la France nous l'a présenté.

Notre auguste Maître, péniblement impressionné, je ne vous la cache pas, M. le Comte, par l'accueil marqué au coin d'une certaine méfiance, qu'ont trouvé, lors des derniers pourparlers, ses désirs et ses propositions, croit devoir s'abstenir de toute initiative ultérieure qui pourrait se rattacher au Protocole susmentionné. Si toutefois les Puissances qui l'ont signé le 28 Décembre lui en exprimaient le désir, Sa Majesté ne se refuserait pas à donner à l'Acte par lequel son Gouvernement y accéderait, une forme qui la mettrait dans le cas de le ratifier personnellement.

D'ordre du Roi, M. le Comte, je vous invite à porter les observations qui précèdent à la connaissance du Gouvernement Français et à exprimer à M. Drouyn de Lhuys, dans les conversations que vous aurez à ce sujet avec M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France, notre entière confiance de voir assurée à la présente communication un accueil conforme aux sentiments qui l'ont dictée.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 427.

Projet de Protocole.

LES Plénipotentiaires de la France, de la Grande Bretagne, et de la Prusse, dûment autorisés à cet effet, s'étant réunis en Conférence pour délibérer sur la nature des garanties les plus propres à assurer pour l'avenir le repos de

l'Europe, et à protéger efficacement l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, ont déclaré:

1. Que leurs Gouvernements jugent d'un commun accord qu'il est nécessaire d'abolir le protectorat exclusif exercé jusqu'à la guerre actuelle par la Russie sur la Moldavie et la Valachie, et de placer dorénavant sous la garantie collective des cinq Grandes Puissances les priviléges reconnus par les Sultans à ces Principautés et à la Principauté de Servie, dépendantes de leur Empire, de façon à ce qu'aucune des stipulations des anciens Traités de la Russie avec la Porte, concernant les dites Provinces, ne puisse être remise en vigueur à la paix, et que les arrangements à conclure à leur sujet donnent une pleine et entière satisfaction aux droits de la Puissance Suzeraine, à ceux des trois Principautés et aux intérêts généraux de l'Europe.

2. Que pour donner à la liberté de la navigation du Danube tout le développement dont elle est susceptible, il conviendrait que le cours du Bas Danube, à partir du point où il devient commun aux deux Etats riverains, fût soustrait à la juridiction territoriale existante en vertu de l'Article III du Traité d'Andrinople. Qu'en tout cas, la libre navigation du Danube ne saurait être assurée, si elle n'est pas placée sous le contrôle d'une autorité syndicale investie des pouvoirs nécessaires pour détruire les obstacles existants à l'embouchure de ce fleuve, ou qui s'y formeraient plus tard.

3. Que la révision du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, doit avoir pour objet de rattacher plus complétement l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre Européen et de mettre fin à la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire.

4. Que la Russie, en renonçant à la prétention de couvrir d'un protectorat officiel les sujets Chrétiens du Sultan du rit Oriental, doit renoncer également, par voie de conséquence naturelle, à faire revivre aucun des Articles de ses Traités antérieurs, et notamment du Traité de Kutchuk-Kainardji, dont l'interprétation a été la cause principale de la guerre. Les cinq Puissances, en se prêtant à l'avenir leur mutuel concours pour obtenir de l'initiative du Gouvernement Ottoman la consécration et l'observance des priviléges religieux des diverses communautés Chrétiennes, sans distinction de culte, et en mettant ensemble à profit, dans l'intérêt des dites communautés, les généreuses intentions manifestées à leur égard par Sa Hautesse le Sultan, attacheront le plus grand soin à préserver de toute atteinte la dignité de Sa Hautesse et l'indépendance de sa Couronne.

No. 428.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 298. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, March 12, 1855.*

GENERAL WEDEL returned to Paris the night before last. Count Hatzfeldt told me in confidence this morning, that it was not intended to resume the negotiations for a Treaty between Prussia and France; that the King pretexted the impossibility, at this moment, of taking any step which might be construed into an act of hostility to the new Emperor of Russia, but that he hoped that after a time the negotiations thus interrupted might be renewed. His Majesty announced, however, as a proof of his good intentions, that he adhered to the Protocol of the 28th of December.

I remarked to Count Hatzfeldt, that I supposed that what the King really intended and hoped was, that this adhesion would be accepted as sufficient to enable a Prussian Plenipotentiary to take part in the Vienna Conferences. Count Hatzfeldt replied, again appealing to my discretion not to cite him as my authority, that no doubt such was the case; that he believed that a communication in that sense had been, or was to be, made to Her Majesty's Government, but that the King was nevertheless prepared to renounce the Conferences altogether rather than to take any other step to procure his re-admission to them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 429.

Mr. Bligh to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 52. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Hanover, March 11, 1855.*

I HAVE thought it expedient to communicate to M. de Lenthe the reasons given by Lord Cowley in his despatch (of which a copy was inclosed in your Lordship's despatch to me No. 23 of the 6th instant), for supposing that the French Government does not entertain those views respecting the Germanic Confederation, which, as I have reported, M. de Lenthe attributes to them.

His Excellency, however, still maintains that he has grounds for considering them not to be in reality friendly to that institution; and in confirmation of this he read to me, in strict confidence, part of a despatch from the Hanoverian Minister at Paris, in which Count Platen, in a general way, adverts to the opinions of M. Drouyn de Lhuys as being unfavourably disposed to the Confederation, and quotes the expressions made use of to one of his German colleagues by Prince Napoleon, pretty much as follows:—"That the Germanic Confederation is *effete*; that the events of 1848, and the circumstances of the present crisis, had shown it to be incapable of fulfilling its mission; and that it must be replaced by something else more calculated for effective operation." His Excellency said, that he had been struck by the analogy of these remarks with what he had heard on more than one occasion from Count Reculot.

I reminded his Excellency that there had been enough of procrastination and vacillation in the proceedings of the Diet in latter times to irritate those who were occupied in public affairs; and who, feeling how important prompt decision was, might express themselves in derogatory terms of the institution, without really wishing for its downfall; and that if I had not expressed so much, I had at any rate felt it.

I was somewhat surprised to hear from his Excellency that he should be sorry if anything he should have said on this matter should tend in any way to diminish confidence between the English and French Governments, which he considered it to be useful to maintain at the present crisis.

Count Ingelheim, lately Austrian Minister at Cassel, has presented his credentials here in that capacity, replacing Baron Koller transferred to Constantinople.

The latter has, of course, been decorated with the orders of the three Courts—Hanover, Oldenburg, and Brunswick, at which he represented his Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. D. BLIGH.

No. 430.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 299.)

My Lord, *Paris, March 12, 1855.*

THE telegraphic despatches to your Lordship from Her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries at Vienna were communicated to me in copy this morning. Upon the receipt of them, I proceeded to the residence of M. Drouyn de Lhuys to inquire whether he had received despatches of a similar nature from M. de Bourqueney, and, if so, what impression they had made upon him.

His Excellency stated that he had no very late news from M. de Bourqueney; but a telegraphic despatch of yesterday's date from that Minister was brought to him while I was with him. It contained the substance of the speech which Count Buol proposed making on opening the Conferences, the text of the four points being word for word the same as that contained in the despatch addressed by the British Plenipotentiaries to your Lordship. It stated somewhat more distinctly the proceedings which Count Buol proposed should be followed at the first meeting, as also the engagement of Austria to persist in obtaining of Russia the develop-

ment of the four points, as laid down in his speech; and M. de Bourqueney added that he coincided in Lord John Russell's opinion that to insist on inserting textually in the Protocol the memorandum given to Prince Gortchakoff would be to peril the relations of the allies with Austria without sufficient cause.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys appeared to me to object to any further changes being made in the mode of proceeding already agreed to by the two Governments, but he would give me no positive opinion as to the answer which should be made to Count Buol's proposal until he had taken the Emperor's orders, and it was agreed that he should proceed immediately to the Tuileries to seek an audience of His Majesty, and that I should return at 5 o'clock in order to hear the Emperor's opinion, so that I might forward it to your Lordship by to-night's mail.

I begged him, however, not to take any final decision, still less to communicate it at Vienna, until he was made acquainted with the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government. His Excellency replied that he should inform M. de Bourqueney that his despatch should be answered by messenger, the question being too serious to treat by the telegraph.

On returning to M. Drouyn de Lhuys this evening, he said that the Emperor had been at once struck with the grave responsibility which the two Governments would incur by refusing to sanction a course recommended by their Representatives, who, being upon the spot, must have better information of whatever was necessary and expedient to be done; that, moreover, he saw nothing objectionable in the wording proposed by Count Buol. M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that he should convey this opinion through Count Walewski to your Lordship, and that he should, at the same time, propose some slight modifications of Count Buol's text, the object of which would be to show that all former Treaties between Russia and the Porte were abrogated, and to restore the word "prétention" in Article IV, in the place of the word "principe" introduced by Count Buol.

I told M. Drouyn de Lhuys that I should also report to your Lordship what he had stated to me; that I was certain Her Majesty's Government would be most anxious to pay every deference to Lord John Russell's recommendation, but that there might be difficulties to Her Majesty's Government following the course now proposed, which could not be felt by the French Government. That we had declared we would not enter into Conference without first obtaining Prince Gortchakoff's written consent to our interpretation of the four Articles without any modification whatever. That Count Buol's interpretation was not our interpretation, and that if the papers relating to this negotiation were ever laid before Parliament, the Government might be accused of not keeping to their resolution; but that, if these difficulties were not felt in England, I yet thought that we should have great trouble in inducing the Porte to consent to any Treaty of Peace which did not free her, in precise and formal terms, from her obligations to Russia.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that, no doubt, the two Governments would be perfectly justified in not continuing the Conferences if they were so minded; but the question they had to consider was, whether it was more expedient to come at once to an open rupture with Austria, or to tie the hands of that Power as long as they could. It was to be remembered that the third point—that which most interested the maritime Powers, was still preserved in all its force in M. de Buol's proposition, and that in the other three points the alterations proposed did not really impair the efficiency of them, but only made them less offensive to the Russian Plenipotentiary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 431.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 308.)

My Lord, *Paris, March 13, 1855.*

COUNT HATZFELDT made yesterday afternoon to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the communication with which, as I had the honour to inform your Lordship in my despatch No. 298 of yesterday's date, he was charged, in reference to the non-renewal by Prussia of the negotiations for a Treaty of Alliance with France.

The communication appears to have been made in much the same terms as I had the honour to state; only, with respect to the King of Prussia's adherence to the Protocol of the 28th December, M. Drouyn de Lhuys was informed that it would be given if the King was again requested to give it.

His Excellency informed me that he had replied in courteous terms to Count Hatzfeldt, that he regretted that the King of Prussia's grief should be an obstacle to his continuing negotiations of such importance; that he was not astonished that His Majesty should wish to adhere to a Protocol which contained principles to which he had always assented; but that France could give him no invitation to adhere to it; and that he recommended that Count Hatzfeldt should be authorised to announce officially the adherence of the King, if it was to be taken any notice of.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys gave M. de Hatzfeldt to understand, at the same time, that the determination not to admit Prussia to the Conferences at Vienna, until she had signed engagements with the Western Powers, after the same manner as Austria, would be persisted in.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 432.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 104.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 12, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose a translation of the Royal Ordinance referred to in my despatch No. 85 of the 8th instant, prohibiting the exportation across the Prussian frontier of arms and munitions of war that are not the produce of the States of the Zollverein.

This Ordinance has not been published in the newspapers, but Baron Manteuffel informs me that it has been communicated to the different custom-houses, and that he has himself specially directed the attention of the authorities to it.

I inquired of his Excellency if the twenty cases of revolvers, of which I had given him notice, had been stopped; he replied that at this moment he could only say that the information I had forwarded on the subject was perfectly correct, and that he was not without hopes that they might be discovered. He added that he had already written to Count Eulenburg, the Prussian Consul-General at Antwerp, to apprise the commerce of Belgium that foreign arms would no longer be permitted to pass; and he observed further that we might be satisfied that the Ordinance would be faithfully executed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 432.

Royal Ordinance.

Bellevue, ce 8 Mars, 1855.

Au Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, et aux Ministres du Commerce et des Finances.

SUR votre rapport du 3 de ce mois et d'après les dispositions du paragraphe 7 de la Loi Douanière du 28 Janvier, 1838,—

Je défends jusqu'à nouvel ordre de laisser passer des frontières de mes Etats, de quelque côté que ce soit, dans un Etat qui ne ferait pas partie de la Confédération, des armes, munitions de guerre de toutes espèces, et particulièrement des balles, poudres, capsules, fusils, et également du plomb, soufre, et salpetre, en tant qu'il ne sera pas prouvé que chacun de ces articles susnommés est originaire d'un Etat faisant partie de l'Association Douanière.

Vous, Ministre des Finances, avez à prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour l'exécution de cette Ordonnance.

Regiâ manû,
(Signé) FREDERICK-WILLIAM.

No. 433.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 105.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 12, 1855.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 84 of the 8th instant, and to my No. 94 of the 10th instant, respecting some muskets said to have been sold out of the Royal stores at Cologne to the Russian Government, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Baron Manteuffel has stated to me this evening that the King was indignant at the nature of the inquiry which I had been directed to make, and had desired him to say that he had not sold and would not sell a musket to any foreign Power; that he felt his honour was impeached by the suspicion; and that Baron Manteuffel was not to make any official inquiries, as he had proposed to do, to the Minister of War, and to give me the foregoing answer.

His Excellency, however, told me he had spoken to General Waldersee, who confirmed what the King had stated, and had assured him that there was not a word of truth in the report.

I told Baron Manteuffel that I hoped these assurances would be satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government, and that I should lose not a moment in forwarding them to your Lordship.

He then inquired if I knew whence this story had reached Her Majesty's Government; and on my replying that I was quite uninformed on this point, he said that he hoped to discover the person who had made this unwarrantable communication.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 434.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 106.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 12, 1855.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 93 of the 10th instant, in which I reported my observations to Baron Manteuffel on a passage in the Russian manifesto of the 2nd instant, and the suggestion which I had made that explanations ought to be demanded at St. Petersburgh, as to the allusions to the views and intentions of the predecessors of the Emperor Alexander II, I have just been informed by his Excellency, that he has spoken to the King on the subject, and that His Majesty would not admit that the Emperor of Russia could be considered as addressing these words to Europe, but to his own people. He had, nevertheless, directed him to make an inquiry on the subject, and he had accordingly sent off a despatch to Baron Werther.

It resulted from my request to be informed as to the tone in which his Excellency had written to St. Petersburgh, that the King of Prussia is far from pretending to doubt the honest intentions of the Emperor Alexander, and has merely written with a view to induce the Russian Government to explain the passage in a manner which shall put an end to any further demand of explanation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 435.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 107.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 12, 1855.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL has just informed me, that in consequence of conversations which he has lately held with me, and of a communication from Count Bernstorff, reporting your Lordship's observations to him on certain proceedings of M. de Bismark at Frankfort, in which it is stated that that Minister had made propositions in a spirit of hostility to the Western Powers, he had written to him by order of the King disapproving of such proceedings, and further, that he had addressed a circular to the Representatives of Prussia, stating that M. de Bismark had acted without instructions, and that His Majesty disapproved of his conduct.

I told Baron Manteuffel that I hoped this reproof would serve not only as a lesson to M. de Bismark, but that the King's other Diplomatic servants would profit by it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 436.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 108.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 12, 1855.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL is anxiously awaiting the result of the last communication conveyed by General Wedel to Paris, and is in hourly expectation of hearing from him on the subject.

His Excellency has just told me that he had informed the Cabinet of Vienna of the step which had been taken, and that it had given satisfaction to the Imperial Court.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 437.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 93.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1855.

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which your Lordship reports, in your despatch No. 98 of the 10th instant, that you held to Baron Manteuffel on the manifesto published by the Emperor Alexander II.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 438.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 100.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1855.

HER Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction from your Lordship's despatch No. 107 of the 12th instant, that M. de Bismark's proceedings at Frankfort have been disapproved by the Prussian Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 439.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 101.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1855.

THE assurance given by the Prussian Government, as reported in your Lordship's despatch No. 105 of the 12th instant, that no arms had been sold to Russia, is highly satisfactory. Her Majesty's Government could not believe the report, but having heard it from what appeared good authority, they thought it right to instruct you to make a communication thereon to Baron Manteuffel.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 440.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 102.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1855.

IN reply to your Lordship's despatch No. 104 of the 12th instant, inclosing an Ordinance issued by the Prussian Government, prohibiting the exportation across the frontier of arms and munitions of war not the produce of the States of the Zollverein, and conveying the assurances of Baron Manteuffel that the Ordinance should be faithfully carried into execution, and that his Excellency had taken steps to prevent the passage of arms from Belgium, I have to instruct you to express to Baron Manteuffel the satisfaction and thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the adoption of these measures.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 441.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 14.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1855.

YOUR Lordship's despatches Nos. 11 and 12 have been received, and laid before the Queen.

Her Majesty's Government have read with particular interest your Lordship's able and important despatch No. 12 of the 7th instant, and I shall now briefly state to your Lordship their opinion upon the different subjects to which that despatch relates.

Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of the determination of your Lordship and of Lord Westmorland, not to meet the Russian Plenipotentiaries until their full powers were received.

They approve of your intention to record in a Protocol, at the first Conference, the bases of negotiation that were agreed to on January 7th; and they had every reason to believe that Count Buol was virtually pledged to that course of proceeding which is essential to the prevention of future misunderstanding. Her Majesty's Government have relinquished it with regret, in consequence of your Lordship's subsequent communications, and have agreed to the mode of proceeding insisted upon by Count Buol, feeling, as did the French Government, that to refuse to enter upon negotiations, and to risk a rupture with Austria upon a point of form, however important, would not have been justifiable. It is right, I should add, that the objections to complying with Count Buol's demand were diminished by the entire reliance of Her Majesty's Government upon the firmness with which your Lordship will resist any attempts to impair the substance of those conditions upon which we are bound to insist.

Her Majesty's Government consider it indispensable that no doubt should exist with respect to all Protectorate over the Principalities being abandoned by Russia; and that the suggestion for the revival of so much of the ancient Treaties between Russia and Turkey as may not be inconsistent with the new Treaty, should be resisted.

Those ancient Treaties are objectionable in form as well as in substance, and are so many records of Russian aggression and of Turkish humiliation and defeat.

We should insist, rather, that as all former Treaties have been abrogated by the war, one new Treaty should contain every stipulation necessary for regulating the relations between Russia and Turkey.

Her Majesty's Government strongly object to the proposal of Count Buol that the Conference should be divided into Committees. Such a course might have been useful at the Congress of Vienna, where there were a greater number of Plenipotentiaries, and where a vast amount of business was to be transacted, and questions distinct in their character were to be discussed; but in the present instance, the business, if conducted in a proper spirit by the Russian Plenipotentiaries, should lie in a comparatively small compass; the questions at issue all hinge upon each other; their discussion by Committees would be unsatisfactory to those members of the Conference who did not form part of such Committees; they would necessarily be rediscussed: and a loss, instead of an economy of time, would be the result.

The Principalities should unquestionably be defended by frontier fortresses, but there can be no good reason why those fortresses should be occupied by mixed Austrian and Turkish garrisons. Such a proposal can only mean to prepare the way for Austrian domination in the Principalities, which would not be preferable to that of Russia. Indeed the conduct of the Austrian troops in the Principalities, and their harsh and arbitrary treatment of the people, have rendered their occupation more hateful than the Russian; and a system of mixed garrisons could not fail to produce the most unfriendly relations between Austria and the Porte.

Her Majesty's Government concur with Count Buol that Russia should be required to surrender her territorial jurisdiction on the left bank of the Danube. This should be secured by binding provisions: and it is not only desirable, but

necessary, that there should be an English and a French member of the Syndicate for regulating the navigation of the Danube.

Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language held by your Lordship with respect to the third basis. So long as Russia maintains an imposing force at Sebastopol, with the means of transporting that force wherever she pleases, the Ottoman Empire is menaced by a standing danger, and the peace and the equilibrium of Europe are insecure.

Count Buol's reply to your Lordship can hardly have been sincere, for his Excellency must well know that long before the Sultan could call his allies to his aid, a Russian army might be in possession of Constantinople.

Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to consider any proposition that Count Buol may desire to bring forward on this subject; but it is proper that his Excellency should be warned that they do not see the probability of assenting to any scheme that failed to secure the effectual limitation of the Russian naval force in the Black Sea, because it appears impossible in any other way to provide for the safety of the Ottoman Empire, which is the object of the war, and must therefore be the condition of peace.

Austria, has, no doubt, as your Lordship says, a real and deep interest in preventing Russian aggression on Turkey, but her established system is to temporize. She thinks the immediate danger to Turkey gone by, and balancing the evil to herself of future danger to Turkey from Russian aggression against the immediate evil to herself of the prolongation of a war into which she may be drawn as a party, she fears the present more than the future, and she would patch up matters any how for the present, and take her chance for the future. But the condition of England and France is different; we have made war, we have made immense exertions and enormous sacrifices of all kinds, and we cannot consent to patch up the matter by an insufficient Treaty, as Count Buol appears to suppose, for such a course would be both dangerous and disgraceful. Russia, it is true, may say that we have not taken Sebastopol, nor destroyed her Black Sea fleet, and that we are therefore not entitled to demand a limitation of Russian naval power in the Black Sea, nor to stipulate with respect to the fortress of Sebastopol; but to that our reply must be, not that we will abandon conditions without which no peace can give future safety, but that we will with all the resources of England and France continue the war until we place ourselves in the position in which, according to the assumed Russian objection, we should be entitled to put forward those necessary demands.

It is with great satisfaction, however, that Her Majesty's Government learn that Count Buol and his colleague are in your Lordship's opinion earnestly desirous to ward off from Europe the dangers of Russian preponderance, and, indeed, it could hardly be otherwise, if those statesmen take a clear and comprehensive view of the position of Austria, and admit that the gratification of Russian ambition in regard to Turkey must be attended with consequences most disastrous to Austria; for the possession of Constantinople involves the immediate possession of the Danubian Principalities and the European provinces of Turkey, and at once brings Russia, in overwhelming and surrounding force and power, to the very threshold of the Austrian dominions. It was more fortunate for Austria than for any other Power, that the mine which Russia was preparing for Europe has been prematurely exploded, and that her vast designs of aggression have been brought to light and frustrated. Most fortunate it is for Austria that this should not have occurred at a time when, according to the words of the Emperor Nicholas, Austria was bound to adopt the policy of Russia, but that it should have taken place at a moment when Austria is alive to the reality and the imminence of her danger, and when she finds England and France, closely united in policy and in arms, ready to cooperate with her, and determined to maintain the independence of Europe. But most unfortunate it will be for Austria, if she fails to turn to her own account this favourable conjuncture of circumstances, which may never return, if she adopts a temporizing policy, and contents herself with the minimum of security that she can ascertain that Russia will be disposed to grant, instead of assuming an attitude befitting the magnitude of the occasion, and preparing herself in earnest for a struggle, success in which will be worth all the sacrifices it may entail.

Her Majesty's Government are deeply sensible of the value of the Austrian alliance, not alone as an aid in the present war, but also as the most effectual means of maintaining peace hereafter, and although in order to secure and cement

that alliance, they are prepared to sacrifice such preconceived opinions as may with safety be abandoned, yet, after all the exertions and all the sacrifices that this country has cheerfully made, and is still prepared to make, they cannot give up any point on which they conscientiously believe that the future safety of Europe depends. Our national honour, and a due regard to the true interests of the country forbid us to agree to any inadequate arrangement, or to consent to any terms of peace that will not be ratified by public opinion in England.

Your Lordship will have the goodness to communicate this despatch to Lord Westmorland.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 442.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 280.)

Foreign Office, March 15, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 299 of the 12th instant, reporting the opinion of the French Government with regard to Count Buol's proposal as to the course to be pursued in opening the Conferences at Vienna; and I have to state to your Excellency in reply, that Her Majesty's Government think that Count Buol has departed from his engagement by endeavouring to substitute his own interpretation of the bases, which is in fact Prince Gortchakoff's, for that of England and France, and that the English and French Plenipotentiaries would therefore have been entitled to refuse their assent to the proposal of the Austrian Plenipotentiary, and to suspend all further proceedings: but Her Majesty's Government concur with that of the Emperor of the French, that in the eyes of the world they would not have been justified in running the risk of a rupture with Austria, by declining to enter upon negotiations when a point of form alone, as it might be represented to have been, was in question, and it was upon this ground, and in order that not the slightest doubt should attach to the sincerity of their intentions, that they have authorized the British Plenipotentiary to proceed in the manner proposed by Count Buol.

But Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that however friendly the communication of Count Buol may be, and however sincere his desire to put a check on Russian ambition, yet his apparent determination to resist the demands of the Western Powers that are not likely to meet the approval of the Russian Plenipotentiaries, even before the negotiations commence, almost forbid the hope that these negotiations can be brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 443.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 283.)

Foreign Office, March 15, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur in the language held by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Hatzfeldt, with regard to the admission of Prussia to the Conferences at Vienna, as reported in your despatch No. 308 of the 13th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 444.

Lords John Russell and Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 16, 10·15 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 15, 1855.*

THE first Conference is just over. The Austrian Minister read his address, and the four points, as stated. The French Minister accepted them, and reserved the right to make conditions over and above the four bases. The English Plenipotentiaries did the same. The Russian Minister accepted the bases—said he wished to bring about peace; he did not bind himself to the text of former communications, but to their principles. In discussing the Articles he would oppose proposals injurious to Russia. Upon some discussion, Lord John asked him to repeat his declaration. He did so, leaving out the last words. The Russian Minister wished to exclude Austria from the resettlement; the Austrian Minister refused to be excluded.

Long discussion on the first Article: all agreed in principle.

Next Conference on Saturday, when Protocol will be signed.

No. 445.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 16.)

(No. 317. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, March 15, 1855.*

DURING an interview with which I was yesterday honoured by the Emperor, His Majesty informed me that the Austrian Government had at length made overtures for the signature of a Military Convention with France. These overtures appear to have been addressed directly to the Emperor, as I understood His Majesty to say that he had only yesterday morning apprized M. Drouyn de Lhuys of their import. I presume that they were made to His Majesty on Monday afternoon, when I know that M. de Hübner had an audience of him.

The Emperor stated to me, in general terms, the nature of the Austrian propositions. They are based upon the supposition that to contend effectually with Russia, the allies must bring 1,200,000 men into the field, of which 800,000 should form the first line of operations, and the remaining 400,000 the second. The Austrian calculations for producing this force are twofold, namely, with and without the effective assistance of Prussia; but in both contingencies the cooperation of Sweden is reckoned upon.

Supposing Prussia to enter the field against the aggressor, Austria requires of France 50,000 men in Gallicia, and 50,000 more to aid the Swedes in the north, besides the army engaged in the Crimea; and she calculates the forces of the allies as follows:

Austria	300,000
Prussia	150,000
Germany	100,000
Anglo-French army in the Crimea ...	150,000
Franco-Swedish army in Baltic ...	100,000
French Contingent in Gallicia ...	50,000
	850,000

The reserves of these armies, together with the Sardinian and Turkish contingents, would make up the amount required of 1,200,000 men.

On the other hand, should Prussia persist in her present isolation, France would be required to make larger sacrifices, and to produce an effective force of 300,000 men, exclusive of the army engaged in the Crimea. Austria would, under these circumstances, require 100,000 French soldiers in Gallicia, and 50,000 more ready to march for the same destination at a moment's notice. She would also require the presence of a French army on the Rhine, to hold the Prussians in check.

After giving me these details, the Emperor said that of course he could have no difficulty in entering into the first of these combinations, and that he found, upon inquiry, he could take upon himself the engagements implied by the second; but he should object, in any way, and under any circumstances, to sending troops to the Baltic, as he had no means of transporting them. The Swedish army, however, might be augmented, if Sweden was furnished with a subsidy, which might be easily arranged. His Majesty regretted, therefore, that he had not at once declared his readiness to enter into the obligations required of him; and upon His Majesty deigning to inquire of me whether I did not think that the Convention should be agreed to, I replied that the signature of any instrument which bound Austria more closely to the allied Powers would be a gain, and that this Convention, as having that effect, might, in my humble opinion, be concluded with advantage.

I have, however, since reflected, that this Convention would be concluded in virtue of the Secret Article of the Treaty of the 2nd of December; and I thought it right, therefore, in informing M. Drouyn de Lhuys this morning of what the Emperor had confided to me, to remark that that Article provided for a common concert between the three Powers, and that although there was nothing which had passed at present between France and Austria, which could be objected to on the part of Her Majesty's Government, I deemed it my duty to call his attention to the propriety of abiding strictly by the obligations contracted between the three Governments.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said, that he should, of course, communicate immediately with Her Majesty's Government upon the subject; that the overtures were as yet only of a confidential nature; that nothing had been settled; and that it was only yesterday morning that the Emperor had placed the Austrian statement in his hands. He would, however, send a copy of it to-night to Count Walewski, for your Lordship's information.

I should add, that the numbers and disposition of the troops, as mentioned generally to me by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, differed, though not very essentially, from those given to me by the Emperor.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 446.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 16.)

(No. 30. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Stuttgardt, March 12, 1855.*

THE Marquis de Ferrière le Vayer had lately an interview with the King, to take leave on his going to France for a few weeks, and he has informed me that His Majesty, in speaking of the Emperor Nicholas, demurred to his having been a great man, contending that he had given proof of his being neither a great general nor a great politician, and that his chief claim to distinction was the energy and determination of his character.

I may perhaps take the liberty of observing that this appreciation exactly coincides with the opinion I have always entertained of the Emperor Nicholas; and it may possibly be said of him, as it has been of Louis XIV, that he was a great Sovereign but not a great man.

The King criticized with some severity the late Emperor's conversations with Sir Hamilton Seymour.

His Majesty insinuated that perhaps now the Western Powers might abandon the siege of Sebastopol, and that no reliance was to be placed on the active cooperation of Austria; the replies to both of which observations were naturally more guarded than acquiescent.

I may add, that disbelief in the possibility of Austrian hostilities against Russia seems rather prevalent here.

In speaking of the Grand Duke Constantine, the King stated that he had reason to believe in His Imperial Highness's having lately adopted more moderate and peaceful views.

His Majesty mentioned a report that Lord John Russell, while at Berlin,

had said that England wished for peace, but that France did not. I told M. de Ferrière that he might safely regard that report as a clumsy falsehood, in which he readily concurred. I added, that its origin might very possibly be the *effete* hope of sowing dissension between the two countries, in which he also concurred.

The King expressed annoyance at the late vote of the Chamber of Deputies in favour of the policy of Austria.

Considering His Majesty's advanced age and high military reputation, it may be that much of his evident Austrian aversion springs from the youth and military tendencies of the Emperor Francis-Joseph.

As to the King's precise sentiments upon the Eastern question, it may perhaps be said, that neither success nor failure on either side would either elate or depress him, provided Russia were not to increase her former power, but that he would look with pleasure on any event which might safely tend to expel the Turks from Europe.

His Majesty's remarks to the Marquis de Ferrière may possibly serve to show that Russian influence in Germany has been in great part the personal influence of the Emperor Nicholas.

On the other hand, it is to be recollected that the recent debate in the Second Chamber, about putting the contingent on a war footing, during which Russia was frequently and virulently attacked, but never once defended, took place before the news of the Emperor's death.

While considering that event, it seems natural to reflect how much depends on when a person dies. Had the Emperor Nicholas died two years ago, Europe might have deplored his loss. She now feels that loss to be a benefit.

Perhaps hardly more difference would have been made in the world's opinion of Napoleon, had he died after the Peace of Tilsit.

It may be no exaggeration to say, that the Emperor Nicholas has lost his life in sacrificing the best position for the worst—in exchanging the applause of Europe for her condemnation—in converting associated sympathy into confederated enmity.

I feel that I may owe some apology to your Lordship for venturing on the above observations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 447.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Hudson.

(No. 40.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 16, 1855.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 38 of the 4th instant, forwarding the ratifications of the Act of Accession by Sardinia to the Treaty between England and France of the 10th of April, 1854, and of the other Conventions having reference thereto; and I have great pleasure in conveying to you the entire approval by Her Majesty's Government of the manner in which you have carried out the instructions which have been addressed to you, and conducted the negotiations on the part of Her Majesty's Government in this matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 448.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 17, 2·20 *at night.)*

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March* 10, 1855.

THE return of an express to Bucharest determines me to send what follows by telegraph.

The Porte was apprized to-day by M. Benedetti, who took with him the first Préfet of the Emperor's Palace arrived this morning from France, that

Louis Napoleon intends to visit Constantinople on his way to the Crimea; that the Empress will accompany him hither; and that the army of reserve of 400,000 men is to be established in this neighbourhood: 10,000, exclusive of 6,000 or 8,000 invalids, are already here. To-morrow the officer is to wait upon the Sultan, previous to inspecting his Palace of Begler Bey, with a view to the Emperor's accommodation there. The whole programme appears to be very distasteful to the Turkish Government.

No. 449.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 149.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 27, 1855.

I HAVE this moment received information that the French Emperor's Préfet du Palais, M. Merle, arrived here yesterday, and continued his voyage to the Crimea in the course of the afternoon. I am assured that he availed himself of a credit on the French house of Allion to take up the sum of 100,000 francs.

It is whispered since yesterday that the Emperor Louis Napoleon entertains the idea of proceeding in person to the Crimea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

No. 450.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 151.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 1, 1855.

INCLOSED herewith is the project of a Convention proposed by the Sardinian Minister to the Porte for the reception into this country, and treatment while here, of the Sardinian contingent, which forms the subject of a formal agreement between the Courts of Turin, Paris, and London.

I received the communication from Aali Pasha. It is substantially similar in its leading points to the Convention signed last year for a similar purpose between the Porte, the French Ambassador, and myself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 450.

Project of Convention.

SA Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne, animé des sentiments de la plus vive et sincère amitié envers Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, et partageant les principes politiques qui ont déterminé Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, et Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, à conclure avec la Sublime Porte Ottomane le Traité d'Alliance de Constantinople du 12 Mars, 1854, ayant en conséquence, par l'Acte d'Accession au Traité conclu à Londres, entre la France et l'Angleterre, le 10 Avril, 1854, et par la Convention Militaire avec ces deux Puissances, signés à Turin le 26 Janvier de cette année, voulu associer ses efforts à ceux des augustes alliés de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, dans le but de garantir l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman contre l'agression de la Russie;

Et d'un autre côté, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans, reconnaissant dans ces actes une nouvelle et éclatante preuve d'amitié et d'intérêt de la part de Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne, et voulant assurer à Sa Majesté pour les forces armées au moyen desquelles elle s'est engagée à concourir au succès de la

guerre actuelle contre la Russie, une entière participation aux stipulations convenues par le dit Traité du 12 Mars, en faveur des troupes envoyées par les Gouvernements de France et d'Angleterre pour combattre avec celles de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan dans le but d'amener le rétablissement de la paix et de rasseoir l'équilibre de l'Europe ;

Ont résolu de conclure entr'eux une Convention spéciale à l'effet de déclarer formellement leurs intentions à cet égard ; et elles ont en conséquence nommé pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne,

Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan,

Lesquels, après s'être réciproquement communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des Articles suivants :

ARTICLE I.

Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne déclare adhérer pour sa part au Traité d'Alliance conclu à Constantinople le 12 Mars, 1854, entre la Sublime Porte Ottomane, l'Empire Français, et le Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne, destiné à garantir l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, et s'engage envers Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan à concourir au but que ses augustes alliés se sont proposé par le dit Traité, moyennant l'envoi de troupes Sardes sur le théâtre de la guerre, suivant ce qui a été arrêté par la Convention Militaire, signée à Turin le 26 Janvier de la présente année, entre Sa dite Majesté et Leurs Majestés l'Empereur des Français et la Reine de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande.

ARTICLE II.

Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan acceptant avec empressement cette adhésion du Roi de Sardaigne à son alliance avec la France et l'Angleterre, s'engage à son tour à accorder aux troupes Sardes qui seront expédiées dans le territoire Ottoman ou ailleurs sur le théâtre de la guerre, un traitement parfaitement identique sous tous les rapports à celui qui a été stipulé par le Traité du 12 Mars, 1854, en faveur des troupes auxiliaires de France et d'Angleterre ; et cela à charge pour les troupes Sardes des mêmes obligations que le Traité impose à celles de ces deux Puissances alliés.

ARTICLE III.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan donnera en conséquence aux autorités Ottomanes les ordres nécessaires pour que les troupes de Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne qui iront prendre part à la guerre soient traitées dans le territoire de l'Empire Ottoman sur un pied de parfaite égalité avec les troupes auxiliaires de France et d'Angleterre pour tout ce qui concerne les besoins du service.

ARTICLE IV.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée, et les ratifications en seront échangées à Constantinople, dans l'espace de six semaines à partir du jour de sa signature, ou plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signée, et y ont apposé le cachet de leurs armes.

No. 451.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 17.)

(No. 153.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 1, 1855.

INCLOSED herewith in copy for your Lordship's information, is the latest despatch which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul at Varna. It bears the date of yesterday ; and I have to add, on Colonel Neale's authority, that the intelligence of a Russian force having again crossed into the Dobrudscha is not confirmed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 451.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, February* 28, 1855.

IN continuation of my report to your Excellency of the 19th instant, I have the honour to state, that the embarkation of the Turkish troops for Eupatoria from Varna, Baltchik and Bourghas has been continued with much activity. In Varna there remain at present to be embarked about 200 men. Yesterday the number remaining at Baltchik was 4000 Infantry, and 700 Artillery horses. From Bourghas, Sizopoli, at the same date, 1,200 Cavalry horses had already been embarked, and some large steamers were in port. The whole of the Turkish troops, horses and stores now in Eupatoria from the three ports referred to, with exception of about 600 or 1,000 men, have been conveyed in British transports.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

No. 452.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 18.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 12, 1855.

IN consequence of what had passed at our former interviews, it was agreed that another meeting should be held yesterday. As I was slightly indisposed, Count Buol, Baron Bourqueney, and Lord Westmorland did me the favour to come to my hotel.

Count Buol read to us his proposed address to the Conference. I hope to have a copy of this address hereafter, and therefore I will only say that Count Buol refers in it to the engagements taken with the Emperor's allies—engagements by which Austria, at any sacrifice, is prepared to abide.

He then read the four points, as he proposes to give their substance in the following words :

"1. Le Protectorat exercé par la Russie sur la Moldavie et la Valachie cessera, et les privilèges reconnus par les Sultans à ces Principautés, ainsi qu'à la Servie, seront dorénavant placés sous la garantie collective des Puissances Contractantes.

"2. La liberté de la navigation du Danube sera complétement assurée par les moyens efficaces et sous le contrôle d'une autorité syndicale permanente.

"3. Le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, sera révisé dans le double but de rattacher plus complétement l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre Européen et de mettre fin à la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire.

"4. La Russie abandonne le principe de couvrir d'un protectorat officiel les

sujets Chrétiens du Sultan du rit Oriental; mais les Puissances Chrétiennes se prêteront leur mutuel concours pour obtenir de l'initiative du Gouvernement Ottoman la consécration et l'observance des droits religieux des communautés Chrétiennes, sujets de la Porte, sans distinction du rit.

"C'est le développement de ces principes qui formera l'objet de nos négociations."

When he had finished reading, I remarked on the omission of all reference to the Treaties of Russia with Turkey, the non-renewal of which was put so prominently forward in the memorandum.

Count Buol replied that the abolition of the protectorate of Russia over Wallachia and Moldavia, and of the right of protection over the Christian subjects of the Sultan, would necessarily lead to the non-renewal of those Treaties by which these protectorates were sanctioned. But these were not material points of the four points; they were only consequences to be deduced from them.

Baron Bourqueney said he was convinced Prince Gortchakoff would make no difficulty on this point; he had admitted these consequences as flowing necessarily from the first and fourth points of the memorandum. With respect to the second point the memorandum states the alteration of the Treaty of Adrianople as an alternative: and while it is declared that "in any case" there must be a syndicate to secure the free navigation of the Danube, it is only said to be desirable ("il conviendrait") to alter the IIIrd Article of the Treaty of Adrianople. It would be impossible, therefore, to bind Prince Gortchakoff to an alteration of Treaty, of the necessity of which the allies do not appear to be quite convinced.

Count Buol had no objection to my stating to Prince Gortchakoff the non-renewal of the Treaties affecting the Protectorate of Wallachia and Moldavia, and of Christians generally, as a necessary consequence of the bases proposed.

Baron Prokesch observed, that although the Treaties could not be wholly renewed, there might be some parts of them which were essential to the restoration of friendly relations between Russia and Turkey. I said in such a case it would be better to insert those Articles in a new Treaty, than to renew the old Treaties.

I then raised the point of our instructions which prescribed positively the signature of a Protocol containing the memorandum delivered to Prince Gortchakoff on the 28th of December.

Count Buol said he could only have consented to the communication of that memorandum as a non-official document. He held it to be an agreement binding on Austria, France, and Great Britain, but not on Russia.

Prince Gortchakoff had assented to it in principle, and therefore the three Powers had declared themselves ready to enter into negotiations. That he was not prepared to require the renewed assent of Russia to the memorandum.

Prince Gortchakoff might fairly say, "I assented to your terms; you declared you were ready to negotiate; I do not depart from what I have said; well, let us negotiate." We know of no fair answer to such a statement, if made by Prince Gortchakoff; and for his own part he was not ready, on the part of Austria, to require the signature of a Protocol containing the memorandum.

Indeed he should protest strongly against it, and leave all the responsibility on the maritime Powers, who would be blamed by the public opinion of Europe for thus defeating the hopes of peace on a point of form. Russia, since she accepted the four points, had been blameless, and if we now refused to negotiate, we should commit the fault of which she on former occasions had been guilty.

It would not have been difficult to answer this reasoning of Count Buol; indeed it seems to me that the refusal to make the memorandum official, and yet to found upon Prince Gortchakoff's acceptance of it so solemn a proceeding as the opening of negotiations for peace, involves a singular contradiction.

The question was not, however, how to confute the logical positions of Count Buol, but how to obtain the objects of the war as declared in the four points.

With this view the important matter to consider was, whether the statement to be made by Count Buol contained a sufficiently satisfactory statement of the four points as to justify us in opening the negotiation; whether the bases so stated, with Austria on our side, would not be far better than an absolute refusal

to negotiate unless the memorandum were accepted by Prince Gortchakoff, at the risk, nay with the certainty, of a separation from Austria.

When we placed before our eyes the colour which might be given to this transaction in Europe, and especially in Germany,—when we considered that the four points, so long insisted upon, might be said to be adopted by Austria with energy, and accepted by Russia without reserve, but rejected on a point of form by the very Powers who had first prepared them, we could not but feel it was right to request our Governments to sanction the opening of the Conference on the terms proposed by Austria.

Indeed, my Lord, when I reflect on the long and vexatious discussions which took place last year between Petersburgh, Constantinople, and Vienna on the placing of parentheses and the collocation of adverbs,—when I consider that those discussions were merely the approaches of war, but that at the present moment all the horrors of war are raging, to the destruction of so many lives, and with the prospect of further bloodshed, I could not think we should be justified in refusing to commence negotiations for the sake of some phrases not so much omitted as left to be implied.

Such was the view which presented itself to us in the contemplation of a possible peace.

It is very probable, however, that in the course of the negotiations, perhaps very early, some question may arise upon which a rupture must ensue. But in that case we shall break upon some security refused, or some material stipulation omitted.

The cause would appear to all the world a valid ground of difference, and those most desirous of peace would at all events be convinced that no light cause had led to the rupture of the negotiations.

The Conferences would then have brought to light the real ground for the continuance of war. It is to be hoped that the point would be one which Austria would view in the same light with ourselves. In that case we should have an advantage which in the present we should lose. It is my opinion, confirmed by that of others, that if Russia refuses concessions which Austria, as well as Great Britain, think reasonable, Austria must hereafter take part in the war. She will of course be very wary in committing herself upon points on which Russia is likely to resist; but she will not refuse to concur in asking for guarantees, which, in her opinion, will form a sufficient barrier to Russian ambition.

It is in order to keep alive this hope that I have asked your Lordship to sanction the course which Lord Westmorland and I wish to take. It appears to us to be consistent with the steps hitherto taken by the allies, clear and direct in itself, and calculated to reflect honour on the Powers which adopt it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 453.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 17.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 14, 1855.*

I RECEIVED this morning your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of yesterday evening, and, after conferring with Lord Westmorland and Baron Bourqueney, I waited upon Count Buol.

At my request Count Buol read to me again his proposed address to the Conference.

In that address he proposes to state firmly that Austria adheres, and will adhere, to the course of policy she has adopted, and to her engagements to her allies, whatever sacrifices it may cost her.

He will declare that, the bases of pacification having been agreed upon between Austria, France, and Great Britain, have been communicated to the Russian Plenipotentiary, and were agreed to, in principle, by him.

He will then state the bases, as I have already enumerated them to your Lordship.

Upon listening to this enumeration, it appeared to me that the word "reconnus par les Sultans" applied as well to any improved Constitutions which the Sultans might confer upon the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia as upon their existing institutions. On my inquiry, Count Buol confirmed this interpretation. Indeed all our discussions have proceeded on the supposition that the present Constitution of the Principalities will be modified to the advantage of the inhabitants, as well as for the security of the Sovereign.

I then proposed to Count Buol to insert words to the following effect in his address:

"Nos Gouvernements se réservent, comme ils l'ont toujours fait, la faculté de poser telles conditions particulières qui leur paraîtraient exigées en sus des quatre garanties, par l'intérêt général de l'Europe, pour prévenir le retour des dernières complications."

Count Buol said he thought such words would come better from me as representing one of the belligerent Powers than from him; that if I would express my assent to the bases as laid down by him, and would conclude by making the reserve I proposed, he would not hesitate to give me his support.

I said I would consult M. de Bourquency, and endeavour with him to frame a suitable declaration.

I have since heard that some doubts are entertained as to the propriety of making this reserve immediately after Count Buol's address; but it seems to me, I confess, both the right moment and that which is most in accordance with the instructions I have received.

I had afterwards a good deal of conversation with Count Buol with respect to the reserve made by Prince Gortchakoff on the third point, of the sovereign rights of his master.

Count Buol observed very justly that if these rights were for the Sovereign to withhold, they were likewise his to concede. That no one would doubt the right of the Sovereign Power to regulate duties of entry in the ports subject to it; but no one could doubt either that the Sovereign Power could make Treaties by which the duties of customs could be fixed at a specified amount.

I mentioned an argument I had heard from high authority, that, although the right of the Emperor of Russia could not be questioned, yet the interest of Europe required a different arrangement, and Europe would be justified in making war on a point of European interest. I added that it seemed to me that the interest of Europe would best be consulted by a diminution of the Russian fleet, which was a perpetual menace to Turkey.

Count Buol is quite prepared to propose the reduction of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea as the best mode of carrying into effect the third basis; but I cannot assert that he will persist in urging the mode on the Plenipotentiary of Russia.

I have, however, considered it a great advantage that the Foreign Minister of Austria should give his sanction to the proposal of France and Great Britain, as the most expedient and most reasonable course.

Should negotiations unhappily break off on this point, it will be impossible for him afterwards to allege that the belligerents insisted on terms unreasonable in themselves, and unnecessarily humiliating to Russia.

What he may say is, that other securities might have been found equally efficient, and less unpalateable to the Autocrat, whose pretensions have been so lofty, and whose proclamations have so recently announced the continuance of the policy of Peter and of Catherine.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 454.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 18.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 15, 1855.*

IN my interview yesterday with Count Buol, I spoke to him of the complaints which were made of the Austrian army of occupation in the Principalities, and urged him to put a stop to such complaints by adequate and efficient remedies.

He replied, that there was much exaggeration in these complaints. He did not deny that in many instances the Austrian army had behaved with culpable disregard of the respect due to a friendly people. That at first the soldiery thought they were occupying an enemy's country; that many of the officers had sympathies in which the Government did not participate; that strict orders had been given to repress such disorders, and that I might rely on every effort being made to put an end to vexations and severities as repugnant to the desires of the Emperor as they were impolitic and unjustifiable.

Count Buol went on to speak of the state of parties in the Principalities: the native party, looking to independence; the faction of the rivals of the ruling Princes; and lastly, the Russian party, formidable from its connexion with foreign agents.

He thought it might be possible to give a character of neutrality to these Provinces, and also to the Dobrudscha, so as to prevent any contact between Russia and Turkey.

I did not think the time was arrived for this discussion, and I did not pursue it.

It may be desirable that the future Princes should be appointed by the Sultan, and not from the class of Boyards. The prospect of succession is a constant source of native and foreign intrigue.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 455.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 104.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 12, 1855.*

COUNT BUOL called a preliminary Conference this day, at which were present Lord John Russell, Baron Bourqueney, the Turkish Ambassador, accompanied by the official interpreter of his Embassy, Baron Prokesch, and myself. On being assembled, Count Buol said that he had called us together for the purpose of announcing that he had received a communication from Prince Gortchakoff, which stated that M. de Titoff having arrived with the necessary full powers for the Russian negotiators, he was ready to commence the Conferences.

Count Buol therefore proposed that the first general Conference should assemble on Wednesday next, the 14th instant; but on Lord John Russell stating that he had referred to his Government for instructions which it would be necessary for him to receive before he proceeded to attend the opening of the Conferences, and that he scarcely hoped that the reply which he expected from his Government could reach Vienna before Wednesday next; Count Buol said that, however anxious he might be that the negotiations should not suffer any further postponement, he would not dissent from any wish of Lord John Russell, and consented, therefore, to defer the meeting of the general Conference to Thursday, the 15th instant.

Count Buol took this occasion of submitting to the Turkish Ambassador the plan of proceedings at the opening of the negotiations, and informed him, that instead of delaying him by reading the interpretation of the four bases, which he would recapitulate in his speech, and which, as part of that speech, would be inserted in the Protocol, he would forthwith send him a copy of that

document in order that he might retain it, and transmit it, should he judge proper, to his Government. The Ambassador stated that he would prefer this plan, and thanked Count Buol for the communication he had made to him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 456.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 20.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 15, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the first Conference for the purpose of negotiating peace took place this day.

The Conference began with the production of full powers on the part of the Representatives.

As soon as this ceremony was over, Prince Gortchakoff took the opportunity of saying that he only wished that every word uttered by members of the Conference should be correctly taken down. This observation was apparently made on the appointment of M. Meysenberg to draw up the Protocol of the Conference.

Count Buol then read his address to the members of the Conference. The address was chiefly remarkable for the pointed and distinct manner in which Count Buol stated that Austria was prepared to encounter any sacrifices in order to fulfil her engagements; thereby clearly implying that Austria was ready to go to war.

The four points were laid down as I have already stated them to your Lordship in a telegraphic despatch, and in my despatch No. 16 of the 12th instant.

The Baron Bourqueney declared his agreement in the sentiments of Count Buol, and his adherence to the four points as laid down by him. He reserved the right of the belligerent Powers to add other stipulations over and above the four points, should the interests of Europe require it.

I followed, and stated my agreement with Baron Bourqueney and the reserve nearly in the terms of the memorandum. Lord Westmorland agreed with me.

Prince Gortchakoff then addressed the members of the Conference. He declared his adherence to the statement of the bases of peace laid down by the Minister of Foreign Affairs; put in a few words to show that he was bound not to the text, but to the principles of the memorandum inclosed in Lord Westmorland's despatch No. 501 of the 28th of December; declared his earnest desire for peace; but that, in the discussion of the Articles, he should object to any proposition which would be injurious to the dignity of the Emperor of Russia. He said he comprehended the reserve made by the belligerent Powers; but that as Austria was not a belligerent, she could not be a party to the reserve.

Count Buol speedily undeceived him. He said that although he thought it unnecessary to make such a reserve on his own part, he held himself at liberty to put forward or support any further propositions which the interests of Europe might seem to require.

Baron Bourqueney wished the allusion to the dignity of the Emperor of Russia to be omitted in the remarks of Prince Gortchakoff. He thought the reserve unnecessary, and that it might give rise to misconstruction.

I requested Prince Gortchakoff to repeat his declaration.

He did so, but in a much milder form. He expressed his wish to bring about agreement, and thought that was not to be done by disputing about words, but by considering in practical Articles how peace might be attained.

There did not seem now any sufficient objection to the discussion of the Articles.

The Turkish Ambassador made a reserve of the dignity of his Sovereign, and we then agreed that we might proceed to the discussion of the Articles.

Your Lordship will observe that the four points in their integrity are thus accepted as a point of departure. The importance of this step is so great that

your Lordship will not fail to perceive its whole bearing. The right of protection assumed by Russia over the Christians in every part of the Turkish Empire, is at once given up, and Russia, owning frankly the extent of her sacrifice, is prepared to adopt the policy which Europe determines to establish. What may be the calculations of Russian statesmen as to the future I do not attempt to divine; but I think I see clearly that so long as Austria, France, and Great Britain keep together, they will yield. Their hopes are founded not on their powers of resistance to the combined Powers, but on their hopes of disunion.

A long discussion now took place on the first Article.

Count Buol proposed that as soon as the substance of each Article should be agreed upon, the Article should be referred to a Commission chosen from among the members of the Conference, for the purpose of collecting information, and bringing details into a manageable shape. To this there could be no objection.

On the first Article Prince Gortchakoff raised a discussion on the term "Protectorate," which he affirmed not to be contained in any of the Treaties between Russia and the Porte. It was in vain answered that many official documents contained the word "Protectorate," and that the thing which Europe wished to guard against was sufficiently expressed by that term.

At length Baron Bourqueney suggested the word "protection," and it was agreed that no exclusive protection over the Principalities and Servia should hereafter be exercised.

Baron Prokesch had prepared with great care, and with a knowledge of the constitution of the Principalities which experience had afforded him, several heads for the future government of those Provinces.

These were discussed one by one, and did not meet with much opposition; but it was to be remarked that the Russian Plenipotentiary, when a defensive system for the Principalities was stated by Baron Prokesch as one of the securities to be desired, evinced much anxiety for the contentment of the subjects of the Porte, and calling the attention of the Turkish Ambassador to the danger of exciting disaffection, protested against the imposition of burdensome obligations on the Provinces. At the same time he took care to put himself in the place of an advocate of the Principalities, and declared that of all the privileges belonging to them none was more valuable or more appreciated than immunity from Turkish fortresses and Turkish garrisons.

It was obvious that, while apparently pleading the cause of Wallachia and Moldavia, the Russian Minister meant to leave them open to Russian invasion.

But Baron Prokesch parried this thrust by proposing that native forces alone should garrison the proposed fortresses, and it was justly observed that the resources of two Provinces naturally so rich, would easily enable them to maintain all the troops necessary for their defence.

After some further discussion it was resolved that the propositions of Baron Prokesch should be revised and brought before the Conference at a subsequent meeting, in order to be referred afterwards to a Commission.

The Russian Plenipotentiary now suggested that, as time was precious, it would be advisable to proceed at our next meeting to the consideration of the second point. The only remark made on this suggestion was, that Baron Prokesch's proposals might be in such a state of forwardness as not to require much further time for their discussion.

It was agreed to meet again on Saturday, the day after to-morrow. Before the Conference separated, however, another circumstance showed how little the Austrian Minister is disposed to yield to the influence of Russia.

Prince Gortchakoff proposed that the Ministers at the Conference should sign in a single column, according to the ranks of their respective countries. M. de Bourqueney observed, very justly, that it would not be desirable to mix pell-mell belligerents on opposite sides.

Prince Gortchakoff then suggested that there might be three columns, as Austria was not a belligerent, but Count Buol in the frankest manner declined this proposal. He said he was ready to adopt the suggestion of a single column; but if there were more than one, he must join his signature to that of the allies of the Emperor his master.

This is another proof of the firmness with which the Austrian Government is disposed to carry into effect its engagements with France and Great Britain.

Upon the whole I submit to your Lordship that the results of this first Conference have been very satisfactory. Russia has openly, by a formal document, renounced pretensions which for a century have been sedulously nourished and pertinaciously advanced. It remains to be seen whether the allied Powers are able to raise barriers of sufficient solidity against renewed attempts to overpower and subdue Turkey. But the concession of the four points, and especially the agreement to put an end to Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, is an advantage which can hardly be exaggerated. To have obtained such a concession at the end of a single year of war, is a success upon which we could hardly have ventured to reckon. Even if negotiations were to break off, the moral effect upon Russia, and upon Europe, will be very great.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 457.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 106.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 14, 1855.

THE Marquis Cantono has informed me, that on receiving the Manifesto of the Sardinian Government in reply to the Russian declaration of war, he communicated that document, by order of Count Cavour, to Count Buol, who had entirely approved it, and desired him to convey the expression of his satisfaction to the Government at Turin.

The Marquis Cantono remarked to me, that he had been much pleased with the friendly tone of Count Buol's communication, and had expressed himself in this sense in reporting it to his Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 458.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 110.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 15, 1855.

I COMMUNICATED to Count Buol the substance of your Lordship's despatch No. 69 of the 3rd March, which refers to the language reported by Mr. Fonblanque to have been held by the Austrian Agent at Belgrade, but that Her Majesty's Government did not believe that Colonel Radowitch had made use of such language by order of his Government.

Count Buol stated that he was much satisfied that your Lordship expressed such an opinion, for the language reported to have been used was in contradiction with every principle declared by the Austrian Government and all the engagements it had taken with its allies.

Count Buol stated that he was aware there had been changes in the administration in Servia, and although he did not believe it had been an advantageous one, he had in no way directed any interference with regard to it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 459.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 114.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 15, 1855.

IN the telegraphic despatch addressed to Lord John Russell and myself by your Lordship on Tuesday, the 13th instant, you remark that the correspondence of Lord Westmorland would not have led you to anticipate such an obstacle as the objection on the part of Austria to the textual insertion of the memorandum given to Prince Gortchakoff in the Protocol of the Conference. I beg to state that in my despatch No. 61 of the 7th of February, I announced to your Lordship that Count Buol was prepared, in conjunction with Baron Bourqueney and myself, at the first meeting of the Plenipotentiaries, to state that the negotiation must be based upon the acknowledged acceptation by Prince Gortchakoff of the principles set forth in the interpretation of the four conditions which had been submitted to him at the meeting of the 28th December last, and had been accepted by him at the meeting of the 7th January; and in my despatch No. 88 of the 4th March, I stated that Count Buol proposed that Lord John Russell, Baron Bourqueney, and myself, should meet together to inquire into the four Articles of the bases, and to come to some settled arrangement with regard to the form and extent of the propositions we should submit to the Russian Plenipotentiary.

It was in pursuance of the plan thus proposed, that at the meeting between Lord John Russell, Baron Bourqueney, and myself, with Count Buol, on the 10th of March, as detailed in my despatch No. 102 of the 10th March, Count Buol proposed that in his speech at the opening of the Conferences he should declare the basis on which the negotiation was to be founded, namely, the interpretation of the conditions of peace which had been submitted to the Russian Government after they had been communicated to Prince Gortchakoff on the 28th December, and to which, after receiving the orders of his Court, Prince Gortchakoff had adhered on the 7th January, as embodying the principles upon which the negotiation was to be founded.

The reasons for not inserting the whole of the document containing the interpretation are stated in that despatch (No. 102), as well as in Lord John Russell's of the same day; and the proposal of Count Buol, to which your Lordship's telegraphic despatch has reference, appears to be in accordance with the views which he has previously expressed, and which I have had the honour of reporting in the despatches above cited.

Your Lordship will observe that in no despatch of mine did I ever report that Count Buol would desire to insert textually in the Protocol the memorandum given to Prince Gortchakoff, and I beg to submit to your Lordship that the speech of Count Buol at the opening of the Conferences, in which he states the acceptation by Prince Gortchakoff of the interpretation of the four bases, and afterwards recapitulates the principal points contained in it, is strictly in accordance with what in my several despatches I announced as the plan of proceedings he proposed to pursue at the opening of the negotiations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 460.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 115.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 15, 1855.

YOUR Lordship will be aware, by the joint telegraphic message of Lord John Russell and myself of this day, that the Conference for the opening of the negotiations for peace took place this morning under the presidency of Count Buol.

The Representatives present were, for Austria Count Buol, and conjoined

with him Baron Prokesch; for France, Baron Bourqueney; for Russia, Prince Gortchakoff and the Chevalier Titoff; for Turkey, the Turkish Ambassador and the two interpreters, Riza Bey and Baron Hammer, the Austrian official interpreter; and for England, Lord John Russell and myself.

After the exchange and examination of the full powers, which were found to be correct, Count Buol commenced the proceedings by a speech in which he detailed the objects for which we were assembled, specifying our general acceptation of the interpretation of the four Articles as the basis upon which the negotiations were to be founded, and expressing the hope that by our common desire to contribute to the reestablishment of peace, a favourable termination of our labours might be arrived at.

I merely give your Lordship this general sketch of the speech of Count Buol; it will appear *in extenso* in the Protocol which will be submitted to the Plenipotentiaries for their signature on Saturday, the day fixed for our next meeting.

I will leave to Lord John Russell the general detail of the proceedings which took place at this Conference. Each Plenipotentiary expressed his adhesion to the declaration contained in Count Buol's speech, accompanying it by some remarks; but I will confine myself to the statement made by Lord John Russell, a copy of which I inclose, and to which are added the few words in which I gave my entire adhesion to his declaration.

A similar statement to that of Lord John Russell was made by the French Plenipotentiary and by the Turkish Ambassador.

The Russian Representatives, after some observations, the nature of which was stated in our telegraphic message of this day, and which will be more fully developed in Lord John Russell's report to your Lordship, accepted these declarations. Count Buol then announced that the preliminary proceedings having been agreed to, he conceived we might proceed to the consideration of the four bases; and upon his proposal that they should be discussed in the order in which they stood, which was unanimously acceded to, the Representatives proceeded to deliberate upon the first Article of the interpretation, by which the future position which will be occupied by the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, as well as by that of Servia, under the guarantee of the Five Powers, is defined.

A detailed discussion took place on this first Article, after which a provisional agreement was come to with regard to it, according to which Baron Prokesch was charged to put it into an official form, which is to be submitted to us at the next Conference, and if approved after mature deliberation, will be made over to a Sub-Committee to make the necessary examination of Treaties and existing regulations for the final drawing up of the document.

I cannot close this despatch without remarking to your Lordship that throughout the discussions which took place at this Conference, Count Buol united himself entirely with the sentiments expressed by the Representatives of the allied Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 460.

Declarations made by Lord John Russell and Lord Westmorland at the Conference of March 15, 1855.

"JE m'associe aux sentiments exprimés par M. le Plénipotentiaire Autrichien, et je vois avec satisfaction la définition des quatre bases que M. le Comte de Buol nous a énumérés.

"Mais comme Représentant d'une Puissance belligérante, je dois déclarer que nos Gouvernements se réservent, comme ils l'ont toujours fait, la faculté de poser telles conditions particulières qui leur paraîtraient exigées en sus des quatre garanties par l'intérêt général de l'Europe pour prévenir le retour des dernières complications."

After the above had been read by Lord John Russell, Lord Westmorland

said, that as the language which had been employed by Lord John perfectly expressed his own sentiments, he would only state that he gave his entire adhesion to the declaration which his Lordship had just made.

No. 461.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 18.)

(No. 117.)
My Lord, *Vienna, March* 15, 1855.

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 83 of the 8th instant, I communicated to Count Buol the despatch which it inclosed from Sir J. Milbanke respecting the influence of Russia in Germany, and at his request I left it with him.

In thanking me for so doing he begged that I would express to your Lordship his obligations for the instruction which directed me to communicate to him that despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 462.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 18.)

(No. 118.)
My Lord, *Vienna, March* 15, 1855.

I COMMUNICATED to Count Buol your Lordship's remarks upon the communication from Mr. Gardner, in which you state your opinion that if the Ionian subjects were expelled from Bessarabia by the Russian Government, the Russians in Moldavia ought to be treated in a similar manner, and be expelled from that province. Count Buol said he could have no reason to object to such a course, but that he had received no information upon the subject, and therefore was not in a position to give any directions with regard to it. He was aware that the Government of the Sultan had issued very stringent orders as to the removal of Russian subjects from the Principalities, some of which he had understood had since been modified, but that the carrying out these orders appertained exclusively to the Government of the Hospodar and the local authorities, and he had received no complaint as to the manner in which they had fulfilled the duties imposed upon them. Count Buol remarked that he had learnt that there had been some discussion as to the delivery of passes to individuals crossing the frontier between Galatz and Reni, but he believed all the questions relating to this discussion had been settled by an order from the Government at Jassy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 463.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 18.)

(No. 120.)
My Lord, *Vienna, March* 15, 1855.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 86 of the 8th instant, I asked Count Buol if he had any idea that Baron Kotler had used such language as was stated in M. Benedetti's despatch. He said, "If so, it was in direct opposition to the declaration which I have this day made at the opening of the

Conference, that Austria maintains the principle of the third basis of the interpretation, as set forth in the 'Protocole Réservé' to which she is a party."

I asked Baron Bourqueney if he had received any communication from his Government, reporting the language stated to have been held by Baron Koller to M. Benedetti, and he said he had received no such communication.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 464.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 18.)

(No. 113.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March* 16, 1855.

SHORTLY after the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 61 of the 24th instant, respecting the expulsion of the English missionaries from Poland, I read, in fulfilment of your instructions, the above despatch to Baron Manteuffel.

His Excellency subsequently informed me that he had spoken to the King on the subject, who expressed his readiness to endeavour to obtain the restoration of the comfort of Divine worship according to the rites of the Church of England for the British residents at Warsaw, and he requested me to give him a memorandum, embodying the wishes of Her Majesty's Government. As I thought there could be no objection to drawing up a statement from your Lordship's despatch No. 61, which I had read to Baron Manteuffel, I have delivered to his Excellency the paper of which the inclosed is a copy, and trust that your Lordship will not disapprove of my having done so.

The Rev. Mr. West, late Minister of the English Episcopal Church at Warsaw, and chief of the missionaries to the Jews, passed through Berlin lately, on his way to Altona. He informed me that, before leaving Poland, he had promised his congregation that he would endeavour to pay them periodical visits. He added, that the expense of a visit to Poland would be about 20*l.* to 30*l.*

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 464.

Memorial.

Berlin, ce 5 Mars, 1855.

LE Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a appris avec profond regret la mesure arbitraire du Gouvernement Russe ordonnant l'expulsion des missionnaires Anglais du Royaume de Pologne. Plusieurs de ces dignes hommes ont résidé en Pologne pendant trente ans, ayant reçu cette autorisation spéciale des Empereurs Alexandre et Nicolas, et ont poursuivi leur sainte carrière sans reproche et sans encourir la moindre accusation.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique avait d'autant plus raison d'être peiné par une mesure aussi sévère qu'injuste qu'il venait de recevoir une communication du Cabinet de Copenhagen rapportant, sur l'autorité du Baron de Plessen, Envoyé de Danemarc à St. Pétersbourg, "que le Gouvernement Russe envisageait la situation des sujets Britanniques résidant en Russie comme n'étant pas changée par suite de l'état de guerre qui existe entre la Grande Bretagne et la Russie; mais qu'à ceux des sujets Anglais qui quitteraient la Russie ou qui l'auraient quitté, la rentrée dans l'Empire ne serait pas permise tant que la guerre actuelle durerait." M. de Seniavine, d'après le rapport du Baron de Plessen en date du Janvier $\frac{11}{23}$, 1855, regardait cette mesure comme la seule exception aux rapports existants pour eux en tems de paix.

La mesure d'expulsion ordonnée et actuellement mise en exécution contre les missionnaires Anglais résidant en Pologne doit nécessairement ébranler toute confiance dans les assurances du Ministre Russe. L'expulsion de ces hommes

paroux a eu pour suite de priver les Anglais résidant à Varsovie des moyens de faire célébrer le service de leur Eglise, et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, tenant à cœur que cette inestimable consolation leur soit restituée, sera très reconnissant à Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse pour toute démarche que Sa Majesté le jugera convenable à faire dans le but de leur procurer le restitution de ce privilége.

Il est peut-être inutile d'ajouter que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique ne réclame rien à cet égard qu'ils n'ont eux-mêmes accordé. Ils se sont engagés au commencement de la guerre à faire respecter et les personnes et les propriétés des sujets Russes, et par conséquent il n'y a pas eu de sujet Russe renvoyé du pays ni incommodé d'aucune manière.

A la demande du Gouvernement Russe la permission a été immédiatement accordée au Chapelain de la Mission Russe de continuer sa résidence à Londres et de célébrer le service de son Eglise dans la chapelle de sa Mission. Ce Chapelain n'a point cessé de faire ses fonctions, et même après avoir été découvert en correspondance avec des prisonniers Russes, il fut seulement averti qu'en cas de persistance il ne lui serait plus permis de communiquer avec eux.

Le Gouvernement Russe a également pris de pareils engagements, mais sa conduite envers les missionnaires en Pologne prouve comme ses promesses ont été observées.

No. 465.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 18.)

(No. 114.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March* 16, 1855.

COUNT ESTERHAZY has this day communicated to Baron Manteuffel a despatch addressed to him by Count Buol, in which the opening of the Conference at Vienna is announced as having been delayed in consequence of the necessity of new instructions and credentials being obtained from St. Petersburgh, but that they would now shortly commence, and that the Austrian Government deeply regrets that they will not be attended by a Prussian Plenipotentiary.

After making this communication, Count Esterhazy read to Baron Manteuffel a further circular to the German Courts, stating the object of the Vienna Conferences, the regret that Prussia should not be represented there, and conveying the expectation that the Plenipotentiaries appear animated with the best intentions, and that the Austrian Cabinet hopes the result of the Conferences will be an honourable and lasting peace, which will ensure the further happiness of Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 466.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 18.)

(No. 115. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March* 16, 1855.

CONSIDERABLE importance has been attached here to a private letter, which has been lately received by the King of Prussia from the Emperor Alexander. I have endeavoured to learn the contents of this letter, and have heard from a confidential source, that expressions to the following purport are to be found in it:

His Imperial Majesty offers his thanks for the good counsel offered in the King's first letter, and for the conduct pursued by Prussia since the beginning of the war. He declares his intention of following up the policy of his father, his readiness for peace, his willingness to negotiate on the same bases as those which had been accepted by his father. He declared further, that he was persuaded of the justice of his cause; that he knew he should be supported by his people; but

that, nevertheless, to obtain the restoration of the blessings of peace, he would make every reasonable concession that was compatible with the honour of the Empire and of his army; that he was prepared for all events, and if the whole of Europe were united against him he should not even then yield on any points that were not honourable to him and to his country, and that he relied in God and the justice of his cause for success.

It is said that the tone of the latter part of this letter has alarmed the King of Prussia, and made him less confident in his calculations as to the result of the Vienna Conferences, whilst the Emperor's words are well designed to confirm the King in his early impressions at the breaking out of the war, that Russia would sooner resist the whole of Europe combined against her than agree to a peace that would be derogatory to her honour or her dignity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 467.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 18.)

(No. 116.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March* 16, 1855.

RUMOURS having reached me that an allocution had been pronounced by the Emperor of Russia to the heads of the Diplomatic body, I have endeavoured to learn from Baron Manteuffel the nature of this allocution, but his Excellency evaded giving an explanation on the subject, and said merely that there were allusions to the regret of the Emperor at the principles of the Holy Alliance being in danger, and that His Imperial Majesty had addressed himself chiefly to the Austrian and Prussian Ministers.

With reference to this subject, I have since heard on good authority that on leaving the Winter Palace after the circle, Count Valentine Esterhazy and Baron Werther sought interviews with Count Nesselrode, and having represented to his Excellency that such serious importance might be attached to the Emperor's words, and so many versions be given of their meaning, that it would be advisable to place on record what His Imperial Majesty had said.

This, I understand, was subsequently done, and though I am unable to obtain a copy of the document, I believe the substance of it to be as follows:

The Emperor Alexander will strictly adhere to the policy of his father and uncle. His desire is to see the Holy Alliance re-established; and that, happen what may in Europe, no blame should be attached to the late Emperor for the momentary suspension or disrupture of an alliance which it had always been his ardent desire to maintain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 468.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 18.)

(No. 117. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March* 16, 1855.

BARON MANTEUFFEL has communicated to me confidentially a circular addressed by Count Nesselrode to the Diplomatic Agents of Russia, dated St. Petersburgh, $\frac{\text{February 26}}{\text{March 10}}$, and I have the honour to forward a copy of this despatch for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

The chief points of interest in this paper are the allusions to the approaching Conferences, the hope that peace may result from them, and the general terms on which Russia is prepared to enter upon the negotiations.

The recognized good faith of Russia in all her transactions is appealed to as security to Europe, and a fervent hope is expressed that the reign of the Emperor Alexander may open with the restoration of peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 468.

Circular addressed to Russian Agents abroad.

St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{\text{26 Février}}{\text{10 Mars}}$, 1855.

MA dépêche du 18 Février vous a annoncé l'avénement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Alexandre II. J'ai eu l'honneur de vous transmettre en même temps le Manifeste Impérial émané le premier jour du règne de notre auguste Maître. Cet Acte exprime la conviction profonde avec laquelle Sa Majesté reconnaît l'importance des devoirs qu'elle est appelée à remplir. La Providence Divine lui impose ces devoirs au milieu d'une grave épreuve. En montant sur le trône de ses ancêtres, l'Empereur voit la Russie engagée dans une lutte dont les annales de l'histoire n'offrent pas d'exemples au commencement d'un nouveau règne.

Notre auguste Maître accepte cette épreuve avec confiance en Dieu; avec le sentiment de sécurité que lui inspire le dévouement inébranlable de ses peuples; avec un religieux respect pour la mémoire de son père bien aimé.

Il recueille de son héritage, avec piété filiale, deux obligations également sacrées pour lui.

La première réclame de Sa Majesté le déploiement de toute la puissance que la volonté de Dieu a placée entre ses mains pour la défense de l'intégrité et de l'honneur de la Russie.

La seconde impose à Sa Majesté le devoir de persévérer à vouer sa sollicitude à l'accomplissement de l'œuvre de paix dont l'Empereur Nicolas avait déjà sanctionnée lui-même les bases.

Fidèle à la pensée qui a présidé aux derniers actes de son auguste père, l'Empereur vient de renouveller les pouvoirs et de confirmer les instructions dont les Plénipotentiaires de Russie avaient été munis dès le mois de Décembre, à l'époque où les négociations de Vienne allaient s'ouvrir.

Les instructions de l'Empereur Nicolas seront ainsi religieusement observées.

Elles ont eu pour objet de rendre à la Russie et à l'Europe le bienfait de la paix; de consolider la liberté du culte et le bien-être des populations en Orient, sans distinction du rit qu'elles professent; de placer les immunités des Principautés sous une garantie collective; d'assurer la libre navigation du Danube en faveur du commerce de toutes les nations; de faire cesser dans le Levant les rivalités des Grandes Puissances, pour prévenir le retour de nouvelles complications; enfin, de s'entendre avec elles sur la révision du Traité par lequel elles ont reconnu le principe de la fermeture des Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, et d'arriver par là à une transaction mutuellement honorable.

Une pacification fondée sur ces bases, en mettant fin aux calamités de la guerre, appelerait sur le nouveau règne les bénédictions de toutes les nations. Mais la Russie sent profondément, et l'Europe devra reconnaître tout entière, que l'espoir du rétablissement de la paix resterait stérile, si les termes de la transaction à conclure, dépassaient la juste limite que trace irrévocablement aux déterminations de notre auguste Maître le sentiment de la dignité de sa Couronne.

L'Empereur attendra avec calme la manifestation des vues qui dirigeront la politique les Cabinets appelés, de concert avec la Russie, à resoudre cette question d'intérêt général pour toute la Chrétienté.

Notre auguste Maître apportera à cette grave délibération un sincère esprit de concorde.

Telle est la pensée que Sa Majesté m'ordonne de vous exprimer en son nom.

Les instructions générales dont vous êtes muni, vous préscrivent la marche que vous continuerez à suivre, quant aux rapports directs que vous êtes chargé d'entretenir avec le Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité.

En vous confirmant aujourd'hui dans le poste que vous tenez de la bienveillance de son auguste père, l'Empereur se plaît à compter sur votre fidélité et sur votre zèle.

Son intention est, qu'en toute occasion, vous attestiez par votre conduite et par votre langage la loyauté avec laquelle la Russie remplit les engagements qui reposent sur la foi des Traités; son constant désir de vivre en bonne intelligence avec toutes les Puissances alliées et amies; enfin, le respect qu'elle porte à l'inviolabilité des droits de chaque Etat, de même que sa ferme résolution de maintenir et de faire respecter ceux que la Providence Divine a confiés à l'Empereur en le rendant le dépositaire et le gardien de l'honneur national de son pays.

Vous êtes invité à porter la présente à la connaissance de la Cour auprès de laquelle vous avez eu l'honneur de représenter l'Empereur Nicolas, de glorieuse et de bien aimée mémoire.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

No. 469.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 18.)

(No. 120.)

Berlin, March 16, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT THUN, the Austrian Envoy at this Court, whose duties have been lately discharged by Count George Esterhazy, who arrived here on a special mission about eight months ago, came to Berlin last week to deliver his letters of recall, and has had an audience of the King of Prussia for that purpose.

Count Thun has been remarkably well received here, as his Russian predilections are well known, and I hear that he has had a conversation with the King, which lasted one hour and a half.

I am unable to learn the substance of this interview, but I understand that His Prussian Majesty availed himself of the opportunity to express his dissatisfaction at the conduct of the Emperor Francis-Joseph and Count Buol with respect to the alliance of Austria with the Western Powers, and added that an unfair advantage had been taken of Count Alvensleben's mission last summer at Vienna to drive him from the Conference, at which His Majesty maintained he had a right to assist as a great Power.

Count Thun appears to have replied that Austria had also a right to complain of the conduct of Prussia, and that her defection had contributed to the "rapprochement" of Austria with the Western Powers, and the consequent blow which had been struck to the Holy Alliance.

I understand further that the King mentioned his readiness to agree to the Protocol of the 28th of December, but said that he was not disposed to go further, or enter into any alliance with the Western Powers which would bind him to the eventuality of a war with Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 470.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 18.)

(No. 121. Confidential)

Berlin, March 16, 1855.

My Lord,

WHEN I was with Baron Manteuffel to-day, his Excellency said that he had received a telegraphic despatch from Count Bernstorff, requesting to be informed whether the King considers that Prussia was to be re-admitted to the Conferences at Vienna, on the signature of the Protocol; and that he had replied that no condition was attached to the engagement made by the Protocol, that the King maintained that, as one of the Great Powers and a party to the Treaty of 1841, no revision of that Treaty would be complete without him.

Baron Manteuffel added that, if invited to attend the Conference, he should do so, and that he believed that the King would in that case agree to the Treaty that had been proposed, but that he could not undertake any responsibility on the subject.

I asked Baron Manteuffel the state of the negotiations in London, and he answered that he knew nothing more than he had told me above, and our conversation on the matter closed.

Shortly after the interview M. de Moustier called upon me and read to me a despatch of the 13th instant, which he had just received by the post from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, stating that Count Hatzfeldt had made a communication to the French Government, to the effect that although the King of Prussia was ready to agree to the Protocol, His Majesty expected to be invited to sign the document in question, and that as the French Government declined taking the initiative, the negotiations appeared for the moment to be dropped.

M. de Moustier said that he was not instructed to communicate this despatch to Baron Manteuffel, and should not do so, nor take any step in the matter, more particularly as he expected to hear further from his Government by a messenger who was on his way hither from Paris.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 471.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 20.)

(No. 125.)

Berlin, March 17, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 116 of yesterday, I have the honour to inclose a copy of the speech addressed by the Emperor Alexander to the Diplomatic body on the [illegible] March.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 471.

Speech of the Emperor Alexander II to the Corps Diplomatique.

JE suis persuadé, Messieurs, de la part sincère que toutes vos Cours ont prise au malheur qui vient de nous frapper. J'en ai déjà reçu des témoignages de plusieurs côtés qui m'ont très vivement touché, et j'ai dit hier aux Ministres de Prusse et d'Autriche combien j'y étais sensible. Je déclare ici solennellement devant vous, Messieurs, que je reste fidèle à tous les sentiments de mon père et que je persévérerai dans la ligne des principes politiques qui ont servi de règle à mon oncle l'Empereur Alexandre et à mon père.

Ces principes sont ceux de la Sainte Alliance; mais si cette alliance n'existe plus, ce n'est certainement pas la faute de mon père: ses intentions sont toujours restées droites et loyales, et si en dernier lieu elles ont été méconnues par quelques-uns je n'ai pas de doute que Dieu et l'histoire ne lui rendent justice. Je suis prêt à tendre franchement la main à une entente sur les conditions qu'il avait acceptées; comme lui je veux la paix et voir se terminer les maux de la guerre: mais si les Conférences qui vont s'ouvrir à Vienne, n'aboutissaient pas à un résultat honorable pour nous, alors, Messieurs, je combattrais avec ma fidèle Russie, et je périrais plutôt que de céder. Quant à mes sentiments personnels pour vos Souverains ils n'ont pas varié; et (s'adressant au Baron de Werther) je n'ai jamais douté de l'affection fraternelle et amicale que Sa Majesté le Roi a toujours eue pour mon père et je vous ai dit hier à quel point je lui en suis reconnaissant. (Et puis tournant vers le Comte Esterhazy.) Je suis profondément sensible aux bonnes paroles que l'Empereur m'a fait transmettre. Sa Majesté ne peut douter de la sincère affection que mon père lui avait vouée à une époque qu'elle même vient de rappeler par l'ordre du jour que l'Empereur a adressé à son armée.

Veuillez, Messieurs, communiquer mes paroles à vos Cours respectives.

No. 472.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 15.)

Foreign Office, March 20, 1855.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which you held at the meeting reported in your despatch No. 16 of the 12th instant, upon the non-renewal of ancient Treaties between Russia and Turkey; and they are anxious that no misunderstanding should take place on this subject, being strongly of opinion that the future relations between the two countries should be settled by a new Treaty.

Count Buol's reasons for refusing to make official the memorandum upon the acceptance of which by Prince Gortchakoff negotiations for peace were to be opened, are fallacious and contradictory; but the powerful arguments by which your Lordship supports the course of proceeding recommended by yourself and Lord Westmorland, are the cause of increased satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government for having acceded to that recommendation.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 473.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 16.)

Foreign Office, March 20, 1855.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government have read with much interest the report made by your Lordship in your despatch No. 17 of the 14th instant, of your interview with Count Buol on the subject of the proposed proceedings at the Conference.

It would seem that the words "reconnus par les Sultans" apply to privileges granted to the Principalities in past times, rather than to those which may hereafter be bestowed; but, as Count Buol agreed with your Lordship in adopting the latter interpretation, Her Majesty's Government have only to suggest that care be taken to secure the concurrence of the Russian Plenipotentiaries in the intention to modify the present Constitution of the Principalities for the advantage of the inhabitants, as well as for the security of the Sovereign.

With regard to the reserve proposed by your Lordship to Count Buol, respecting the conditions over and above the four bases, Her Majesty's Government deem it indispensable that that reserve should be made, and they concur with your Lordship in thinking that the proper moment for this is at the conclusion of Count Buol's address.

Lastly, I have to remark, that if Count Buol is prepared to admit that the Russian fleet in the Black Sea is a perpetual menace to Turkey, and if he is prepared to propose its reduction in the interest of Europe, and as the best mode of carrying into effect the third basis, and yet would hesitate to urge this mode on the Russian Plenipotentiaries, it would seem to be incumbent on his Excellency to point out some other mode that will be equally effectual, and that will be considered by England and France as equally effectual, for the protection of Turkey, and for securing the European objects of the third basis.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 474.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 17.)

Foreign Office, March 20, 1855.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government approve of your having brought to the notice of Count Buol, at the interview reported in your despatch No. 18 of the 15th instant, the complaints made against the army of occupation in the Principalities.

Her Majesty's Government have no reason to think that these complaints have been exaggerated, and have much reason to fear that grounds for similar complaints still exist, as it does not appear that the wrongs of the inhabitants have been redressed, or that their oppressors have been punished.

With respect to the future Government of the Principalities, past experience proves the impolicy of selecting the Princes from the class of Boyards.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 475.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 18.)

Foreign Office, March 20, 1855.

My Lord

I HAVE the satisfaction of conveying to you the approval of Her Majesty's Government of the language held by your Lordship at the Conference of the 15th instant, and of the proceedings of yourself and Lord Westmorland, as reported in your despatch No. 20 of that date.

Her Majesty's Government concur with you in thinking that the result of the first Conference has been satisfactory, and that the moral effect of the concessions made by Russia will be considerable. It must, however, be borne in mind that they have only been made in principle; that they have not yet been realized, and that later, if Russia refuses to carry out these concessions to their legitimate consequences, and to adopt the interpretation of them that we think indispensable, we may find that this moderation has only been assumed at first for the purpose of disuniting the allies, and of depriving Austria of the support that she might reasonably expect from Germany if she declared war on finding that the maintenance of pretensions dangerous to Europe was resolutely persisted in by Russia.

With regard to the observations made at the Conference as to garrisoning the frontier fortresses of Moldavia, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would be desirable to garrison them with Turks, who would be much more to be depended upon than Moldavians for resisting a Russian attack.

The subject of the protection to be given to the five Powers over the Principalities will require your Lordship's vigilant attention, because a right of protection given to the five might speedily degenerate into a practical interference by Austria and Russia in the internal affairs of the Principalities, and that interference would always tend to restrict their liberties and to detach them from the Porte.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 476.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 104.)

Foreign Office, March 20, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO has communicated to me a further circular addressed by Count Buol to the Austrian Ministers at the German Courts, dated Vienna, March 5, on the proceedings in the Diet.

Count Buol observes that it was still doubtful, when he wrote the former circular (referred to in my despatch No. 99 of the 13th instant), whether the objections made verbally by the Prussian Plenipotentiary to the Austrian communication to the Diet on the 22nd ultimo would be recorded in writing. M. de Bismark has, however, since made a declaration in writing, which has been recorded in the Protocol of the sitting.

Baron Prokesch immediately put in a rejoinder, which has been entirely approved by the Austrian Government; and Count Rechberg has been instructed not to allow any doubt to exist, in the discussions of the Federal Committees, that, if the communication which has been made of the "state" of the Austrian army should be objected to in the sense of the Prussian declaration, or if in any other way practical effect should be given to that declaration, the Austrian Government will be compelled to enter a protest against it, both as to its form and substance.

Count Buol expresses his hope that the reasons will be fully appreciated which have induced the Austrian Government to define, in the most unmistakeable manner, the position of Austria as contradistinguished from that now assumed by Prussia.

Copies of the Prussian declaration, and of the answer of Baron Prokesch, are annexed to the despatch.

The former is to the effect that the declaration made by the Austrian Minister rests upon the supposition that the contingents, which are to be placed in a state of preparation in accordance with the resolutions of the 8th of February, are destined to defend the territories which have been placed under the common safeguard by the resolutions of the 24th of July and the 9th of December last; that in the opinion of the Prussian Plenipotentiary this supposition is not well founded; and that if a further interpretation of the resolution of the 8th is necessary, and this interpretation is sought in the motives which led to the adoption of the proposals of the Committee, it will be seen that the necessity for proceeding to the execution of the defensive obligations contracted by the resolution of the 9th of December has not yet arisen; but that the present preparations are made by the Diet in order to meet the obligation imposed upon it by the second Article of the Federal Pact to provide for the external and internal security of Germany, and the independence and inviolability of the German States: lastly, that the Federal forces so prepared should be considered as available in every direction.

To this the Austrian Plenipotentiary replied, that the Austrian Government undoubtedly considered the resolution of the 8th of February as a further development of the resolutions of the 24th of July and the 9th of December. The Confederation must decide which is the correct view, the Austrian or Prussian.

Baron Prokesch further observes that it is not the motives which led to the report of the Committee which are the matter in debate, but the proposals made by that Committee; and that acquiescence in the proposals themselves by no means implies acquiescence in the motives which led to them. Austria accompanied her acquiescence by the declaration that she in no manner accepted as her own the motives of the reports.

It cannot, moreover, be argued, from the assertion in the report that the necessity of proceeding to the execution of the defensive obligations consequent upon the resolutions of the 9th of December has not been proved, that it therefore does not exist; since the Committees declared themselves not in a position to pronounce an opinion whether the pending negotiations offer a prospect of the restoration of general peace or not.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 477.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland

No. 106.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 20, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction, from your Lordship's despatch No. 110 of the 15th instant, that the Austrian Agent at Belgrade had no authority to use the language to which I alluded in my despatch to you No. 69 of the 3rd instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 478.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 108.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 20, 1855.*

I APPROVE of the report made in your Lordship's despatch No. 104 of the 12th instant, and of your proceedings at the preliminary Conference summoned by Count Buol on that day.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 479.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 112.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 20, 1855.*

I HAVE the satisfaction of informing your Lordship, in reply to your despatch No. 115 of the 15th instant, that Her Majesty's Government approve of your proceedings at the Conference of that date.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 480.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 105.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 20, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government approve the memorandum which you prepared for presentation through Baron Manteuffel to the King of Prussia, respecting the expulsion of English missionaries from Poland, and of which a copy was inclosed in your despatch No. 113 of the 16th instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 481.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 109.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 20, 1855.*

I INCLOSE for your Lordship's information, a copy of a note* from Count Bernstorff inclosing copies of despatches from Baron Manteuffel to Counts Bernstorff and Hatzfeldt, respecting the adhesion of Prussia to the Protocol of the 20th December.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 427.

No. 482.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 21.)

Vienna, March 16, 1855.

My Lord,

THE Turkish Ambassador called upon me the day before yesterday, and stated that he felt embarrassed by the absence of detailed instructions from his Court for the guidance of his conduct in the discussions about to be commenced. He said that he felt so more particularly in regard to the question of the Principalities, which stood first for consideration, and which was looked upon with especial interest by the Sultan's Government; and he seemed anxious to ascertain my opinion how far he could take part in the discussions without compromising himself, or pledging his Government to the adoption of a course which might turn out to be at variance with their intentions and wishes.

I explained to his Excellency that there could be no possible objection to his taking part in a conference on this point, as no final arrangement could be made in the first meeting; that it would, of course, be open to him to contest any statements or suggestions made in the Conference, which, from his general knowledge of the policy of his Government, he might consider likely to prove unpalateable to the Porte; and that he would, at all events, be free to refer to Constantinople for specific instructions on any points of a doubtful character.

I recommended him, however, to lose no time in writing to his Government for such detailed information as to the views of the Sultan in regard to the several matters appointed to be brought under the consideration of the Conference, as might enable him to take part in the discussions with more confidence than he could do at present. This he promised to do, by telegraphic message, without delay; and I have little doubt, from a communication which I have had with him to-day, that the progress which was made at the meeting of yesterday in the matter to which the Turkish Ambassador's application to me more specifically referred, will not only ensure the exact fulfilment of his promise to apply immediately for full instructions, but will also show the Turkish Government the necessity of bestirring themselves if they wish to have a voice in the deliberations of the Conference before those deliberations have resulted in a definite and tangible proposition.

At all events, I think your Lordship should be aware of the possibility of embarrassment arriving hereafter from the remissness of the Porte to put the Sultan's representative in the Conference in possession of its views and intentions. The Porte might indeed leave with safety to its allies to watch over the interests of Turkey at this momentous crisis, for it should not doubt, after all that has passed, that the allies look upon those interests as identical with their own. But it appears to me that the Porte cannot be too soon undeceived, if it entertains and is prepared to act upon the opinion that it is at liberty to protract the negotiations at Vienna as may best suit either its habitual indolence, or any ulterior objects which it may have in view.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 483.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 22.)

Vienna, March 17, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that the second Conference was held this day.

Before the hour of the Conference, Baron Bourqueney met Lord Westmorland and myself. Upon looking at the terms of the proposed Protocol, of which an extract had been taken the evening before, we were struck with the following terms in the address of Prince Gortchakoff:

"Dans cet accord il ne peut s'agir de texte.

"Il n'y en a point qui nous lie tous collectivement. Aucun texte n'a été formulé dans la réunion du 7 Janvier."

Baron Bourqueney was of opinion these words had not been pronounced, and that the phrase used was "texts are only generalities." He observed very justly, that they were a contradiction of what Lord Westmorland and he had always said regarding the meeting of the 7th of January.

On repairing to the Foreign Office, Count Buol told us, that although he agreed with Prince Gortchakoff as to the fact, he blamed the insertion of words calculated to revive a dispute that was past.

The Conference opened with the reading of the Protocol, and Baron Bourqueney immediately requested Prince Gortchakoff to withdraw the obnoxious words, saying he had not heard them at the time. Prince Gortchakoff affirmed that he had used those very words, so that, on the matter of fact, no more could be said. Prince Gortchakoff strongly defended the words, saying he was not bound by the text, but by a "pensée commune."

It is evident that attention having been called to the words, our position would have been greatly weakened had it been admitted that we were not bound by the text of the four bases, which had been modified in expression, on purpose to avoid giving offence. At length, Count Buol joining us in the request, Prince Gortchakoff consented to omit the words from the Protocol.

The full consent of the Conference to the bases, or rather their interpretation, as laid down by Count Buol, was thereby obtained.

Upon resuming the question of the mode of signature in one column or two, Prince Gortchakoff appealed to me as being favourable to the signature in one column in alphabetical order. I disclaimed any such meaning, and supported the proposal of Baron Bourqueney.

The point did not seem very important, but it was evident that Prince Gortchakoff attached more consequence to it than he was willing to avow. At length it was determined that Count Buol should should sign separately as President of the Conference; Baron Prokesch in the same column with the allies, and the Russian Plenipotentiaries in a separate column. A single Protocol is to be signed, and the allies and Russia are to have alternately the place of honour, which it appears is to the left of the paper.

The Conference then proceeded to consider the project respecting the Principalities drawn up by Baron Prokesch.

The first, second, and third Articles of the project having been corrected according to previous agreement, we finally agreed upon them as sufficiently mature to be sent to a Commission.

It is clear that the denial of any exclusive protection, and the guarantee of the Five Powers, puts an end to all those minute stipulations of the Treaties between Russia and Turkey, by which Russia obtained and exercised a perpetual right of interference in the Government of the Principalities. I subjoin to this despatch a summary of these stipulations, which has been drawn up by Mr. Hammond. Her Majesty's Government will thereby see at once how fine were the meshes of the net which Russia had thrown over the Principalities. The Ministers of the Porte have had to complain that, in the exercise of rights thus acquired, the agents of Russia were accustomed not to appeal to the Sultan against infractions of Treaty, but to give orders directly, as if the sovereignty itself had been transferred to Russia.

The principles of liberty of worship, liberty of trade, and a national administration, are to be sanctioned by these Articles, and a new Hatt is to combine in one document the various existing privileges.

I proposed, in conformity to your Lordship's instructions, that the new statute should contain all the improvements which might be agreed upon between the Sultan and the Provinces and the allied Powers. Prince Gortchakoff showed a great desire to have none of the old privileges altered or diminished, and no new privileges established, without the consent of the Principalities legally ascertained.

In these discussions, Prince Gortchakoff has shown himself very desirous to maintain and improve the privileges of the Christian inhabitants of the Sultan, on the double plea of providing for the welfare of Christians, and of consolidating the throne of the Sultan; declaring to the Turkish Ambassador that the Sultan, for whose welfare and permanent power he was most desirous, could only maintain his power by gaining and preserving the affections of his subjects.

Your Lordship will be able to divine the motives of this language. I only

note it as showing the part which Russia wishes to play in Eastern affairs. With respect to ourselves, its effect can only be to induce us to guard, with the same jealousy we have hitherto done, those great principles of good government of which we have been the constant defenders.

M. de Bourqueney remarked to me that when he was at Constantinople the policy of Russia, in reference to the Christian subjects of the Sublime Porte, differed widely from that which is now put forth.

I will spare your Lordship the discussion which took place on the words of the Articles of Baron Prokesch's proposals. When the whole plan is ripe for the Commission, I shall have to make a further and more general report.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 483.

Abstract of Treaties, &c., respecting Wallachia, Moldávia, and Servia, from the Treaty of Kainardji of 1774 *to the Act of Balta Liman of* 1849.

N.B.—The several Treaties are specified in the Margin.

Treaty of Kainardji, July 21 1774, Art. XVI.

PROVIDES for restitution to the Porte of Wallachia and Moldavia, the Porte engaging for a complete pardon and amnesty of all past offences of a political nature, committed by the inhabitants thereof; to offer no obstacle to the free exercise of the Christian religion, to the building of new churches and the repair of old; to restore to convents and individuals, lands and possessions of which they had been unjustly deprived; to respect the clergy; to allow persons wishing to emigrate to do so without hindrance; to renounce the exaction of arrear accounts; not to enforce arrears of taxes, but even to remit the taxes for two years, to levy thereafter only a moderate rate of taxation to be paid every two years by deputies sent for the purpose, and to secure the provinces from further exactions on the part of Governors and others, and in the enjoyment of all advantages previously enjoyed; to sanction the appointment by each of the Princes of the Provinces of a Chargé d'Affaires to reside at Constantinople, selected from among the Greek Christians; and lastly, that in case the circumstances of the Provinces should require it, the Russian Representatives at the Porte should intercede in their favour, and should be listened to with the attention due to a friendly and respected Power.

Explanatory Convention of Constantinople, March 10, 1779.

The VIIth Article of the Explanatory Convention of 1779 renews, with some variety of expression, the stipulations of the previous Article of 1774.

It provides against obstacles to the confession and exercise of the Christian religion; for the construction of new and repair of old churches; for the restitution to convents and individuals of certain specified districts; and for compliance with the intercession of the Court of Russia, in order that certain persons may be allowed to retain peaceable and perpetual enjoyment of the estates of their ancestors, which during the time that the Russians were established in the Principalities had been proved to belong to them; for the recognition and honourable treatment of the Christian clergy; for a moderate and fixed rate of tribute, to be conveyed every two years to Constantinople by deputies, beyond which nothing should be exacted; and also for the strict observance of the hatti-sherifs issued when the Sultan regained possession of the Principalities; and for the residence and good treatment of provincial Chargés d'Affaires at Constantinople.

On the other hand, Russia stipulated that she would only intercede in favour of the Principalities in so far as was required to maintain inviolate the conditions specified in the Article.

An Edict of the Grand Vizier of the 28th of December, 1783, referred to in the Treaty of Jassy, as containing privileges for the Principalities. (Where is it?)

Treaty of Jassy, January 9, 1792, Article IV.

Provides for the restitution of Moldavia to the Porte, on condition that the Porte shall observe the preceding Acts and stipulations, dating from 1774, in favour of the two Provinces: for their exemption from outstanding debts; from tribute accruing during the war; and from any payment whatever for two years after the exchange of the ratification; for facilities for emigration during a space of fourteen months.

Hatti-sherifs of 1802, guaranteeing the privileges of the Principalities. (Where are they?)

Provides for the evacuation by the Russians of the two Provinces, as well as of other provinces, fortresses, and countries occupied by them during the war; leaving in the fortresses all property, guns, and military stores, to be made over to Turkish Commissioners; for the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the two Provinces, leaving only in Ismail, Brailow, and Giurgevo garrisons sufficient to hold them; neither party to interfere in the administration of the two Provinces until the arrival of the Plenipotentiaries commissioned to treat for peace, until the conclusion of which, Turkish troops are not to occupy any of the fortresses evacuated by the Russians, the inhabitants only being free to enter them.

Treaty of Armistice, Slobosia, August 24, 1807, Article III.

Confirms pre-existing Acts and stipulations respecting the Principalities, and specifically the IVth Article of the Treaty of Jassy, as regards debts and tribute, and prolongs for four months the term assigned for emigration; and provides that the tribute to be paid by Moldavia should be in proportion to the extent of its actual territory.

Treaty of Bucharest, March 1812, Article IV.

Contains the first stipulations in favour of Servia; amnesty for the past; destruction of fortresses raised by the Servians during the war; the reinstatement of the Porte in the ancient fortresses to be garrisoned thereafter as the Porte may judge proper. Precautions, however, are to be taken to prevent the garrisons from vexing the Servians; the administration of their internal affairs is to be granted to the Servians; the tribute to be taken in one sum; and all details to be settled by the Porte, in concert with the Servian nation.

Treaty of Bucharest, Article VIII

Explanatory Convention of Ackermann, October 7, 1826, Article III.

The Porte engages to observe the privileges, treaties, and acts of previous date, and to renew the hatti-sherifs of 1802, by which those privileges were guaranteed.

Moreover, seeing the calamities to which the Provinces have recently been exposed, the nomination from among the Boyars of Hospodars, and the assent given by Russia to such nomination, the Porte and Russia deemed it necessary to complete the aforesaid hatti-sherifs by the adoption of the stipulations contained in a Separate Act annexed to the Treaty, namely:

That the Hospodars shall be elected by the Boyars, with the consent of the Porte, by the General Assembly of the Divan, in conformity with the ancient usage of the country; that they shall be taken from the most ancient and capable of the Boyars, and on being elected shall be presented to the Porte, and if accepted, shall receive investiture. If the Porte should object to the candidate, and its objections be considered valid by the two Courts, the Boyars to be recommended to proceed to a fresh election.

The Hospodars to hold office for seven years, and not to be deprived before that time expires; but if they should be guilty of any fault, the Porte may inform the Russian Minister, and the charge being proved to the satisfaction of both parties, in that case alone the Hospodars may be deprived.

The Hospodars having completed the first term of seven years without giving any cause of complaint, shall be reappointed for the same period, if the Provinces shall request, and the general consent of the inhabitants is given to their reappointment.

If the Hospodars should on any ground wish to abdicate, the Porte will apprize the Court of Russia, and the abdication may take effect by agreement between the two Powers.

A Hospodar who has been deprived or abdicated, loses his title, may return to the class of Boyars, but cannot again become a Member of the Divan, or be reelected Hospodar, or fill any public office, but his descendants may do so.

On a vacancy occurring, for whatever reason, in the office of Hospodar, the Principality shall be governed by Caimacams named by the Divans of the Province.

The Hospodars, in conjunction with the Boyars of the respective Provinces, shall fix the amount of duties to be levied, on the basis of the regulation established in consequence of the hatti-sherif of 1802, by which impositions levied since 1783 were abolished. The Hospodars shall attend to the representations of the Russian Minister, or of the Consuls acting under his orders, as well in regard to this point as in regard to the maintenance of the privileges of the country.

The number of Besciklis* in each Province shall be fixed by the Hospodars and the Divan, according to what existed previously to the troubles of 1821; the number not to be increased; their organization and employment to remain unaltered.

Provision is then made for the restitution of certain lands to their owners, for the readmission of emigrants, and for exemption from tribute for two years, at the expiration of which period the amount thereof shall be fixed according to the scale of the hatti-sherif of 1802.

The Porte grants full liberty of commerce in the productions of the soil and industry, to the inhabitants of the country, subject to the supplies which the Provinces are bound to furnish to the Porte, and which are required for the consumption of the Provinces themselves, in accordance with the provisions of the hatti-sherif of 1802.

The Act further provides for the submission of the Boyars to the Hospodars, for clemency on the part of the latter towards the former, who cannot be punished except in conformity with the laws and usages of the country.

The Hospodars and their Divans are immediately to set about the formation of a "Règlement" for reducing to order the various branches of internal administration which have lately fallen into confusion.

All previous privileges which are not modified by the present Act, are to remain in force.

The Porte engages forthwith to carry into execution the stipulations of the VIIIth Article of the Treaty of Bucharest regarding Servia, and to

Explanatory Convention of Akerman, October 7, 1826, Article V.

* Query. Militia.

that end to concert with Servian deputies the measures calculated to ensure the benefits stipulated for in behalf of the Servian nation, such measures to be settled within eighteen months in communication with the Servian deputation and Constantinople, and promulgated in a hatti-sherif to be communicated to the Court of Russia, and thenceforth considered an integral part of the Treaty.

In a separate Act the points to be settled with the Servian nation are stated to comprise: religious liberty, election of their rulers, the independence of internal administration, the restoration of the six separated districts, the amalgamation of duties, the administration of Mussulman properties by the Servians, the latter accounting for the revenues thereof when they paid their tribute, freedom of commerce, liberty of travelling in the Ottoman dominions with their own passports, the maintenance of hospitals, schools, and printing presses, and the prohibition to Mussulmans, except those belonging to the garrisons, to establish themselves in Servia.

These and other points which may be submitted by the Servian deputies, and which may not be incompatible with their character of Turkish subjects, the Porte engages to settle with the deputies, and further engages to inform the Court of Russia of the manner in which effect may be given to the VIIIth Article of the Treaty of Bucharest, and to communicate to that Court the hatti-sherif issued to that end.

Treaty of Adrianople, September 14, 1829, Article V.

The Principalities being placed under the sovereignty of the Porte, and Russia having guaranteed their prosperity, they shall retain all the privileges and immunities which have been granted to them, whether by capitulations or by Treaties concluded between Russia and Turkey, or by hatti-sherifs issued at various times. Accordingly they shall enjoy the free exercise of their religion, entire security, an independent national administration, and full liberty of commerce.

In the Separate Article annexed to the Treaty, it is provided that the Hospodars shall hold office for life, unless they abdicate or are deprived for offences; that they shall freely, on consultation

with their respective Divans, regulate the internal affairs of the Provinces, without prejudicing, however, the rights guaranteed to the Provinces by Treaties or hatti-sherifs, and shall not be disturbed in their administration of affairs by any orders inconsistent with those rights. The Porte will take care that the privileges accorded to the Provinces are not infringed, that its commanders shall not interfere in the Principalities, and that their territory shall be secured from the incursions of the tribes being authorized; and, more effectually to insure the inviolability of the Moldavian and Wallachian territory, the Porte will not retain on the left bank of the Danube any fortified port, or allow any Mussulmans to be established. No Mussulman, therefore, can hereafter have his domicile in the Principalities, and admission is only allowed to merchants coming to purchase on their own account the produce of the Principalities for the consumption of Constantinople, or other articles. The Turkish towns and districts on the left bank of the Danube shall be restored to Wallachia, and the fortifications formerly existing on that bank shall not be restored; and Mussulman proprietors must dispose of their properties.

The Government of the Provinces may establish quarantines (being independent as regards internal administration); for the purposes of which, as also for providing for the security of the frontiers, for the maintenance of order, and the execution of the laws, the requisite numbers of armed guards may be kept on foot, the amount and maintenance of which would be settled by the Hospodars with their respective Divans, as in former times.

The Porte relieves the Provinces from the obligations previously existing to supply provisions and labour for the fortresses on the Danube, but in lieu thereof, the Provinces will make a money payment to the Porte, of an amount to be thereafter settled, over and independently of the tribute according to the hatti-sherif of 1802. Moreover, one year's tribute is to be paid on the appointment of a new Hospodar; and the aforesaid payments are all that the Provinces shall be held liable to under any denomination whatever.

The inhabitants of the two Provinces shall have unrestricted liberty of commerce, may trade with

other parts of the Ottoman Empire without molestation, and may navigate the Danube with passports granted by the provincial authorities.

Moreover the Provinces shall enjoy an exemption from tribute for two years.

Finally, the Porte engages to confirm the regulations for the administration of the Provinces which during the occupation of the Russian armies were established by the National Assemblies, and which are to form the basis of the future administration of the Provinces, with the understanding, however, that such regulations do not prejudice the Porte's right of sovereignty.

In a further Separate Article, provision is made for the withdrawal of the Turkish troops and inhabitants from Giurgevo to Rutschuk, and the demolition of the fortifications of the former place.

Treaty of Adrianople, September 14, 1829, Article V.

The Porte engages forthwith to carry into effect the provisions of the Treaty of Ackermann in regard to Servia, and to communicate officially to the Court of Russia the firman issued for that purpose.

Treaty of St. Petersburgh, January 29, 1834, Article II.

The Porte finding nothing in the Articles of the Constitution established by the inhabitants of the Principalities during the occupation thereof by the Russians previously to the Treaty of Adrianople, which prejudices its sovereign rights, formally recognizes that Constitution, will publish a hatti-sherif to that effect, and give a copy thereof to the Russian Mission at Constantinople. Upon this the Hospodars shall be named (but only for this time and as an exceptional case) according to the manner* some time since agreed upon between Russia and the Porte, and they shall enter upon the administration of the Provinces as prescribed by the Constitution.

And in return for the benefits conferred by the Porte upon the two provinces, the annual tribute

* Where is this to be found?

which they are to pay under the Treaties is fixed, for the future, at 6,000 purses.*

Moreover, the two Courts agree that the number of troops henceforth to be maintained as garrisons in the interior of the Provinces shall be fixed invariably, and at the pleasure of the Sublime Porte, which shall also give the colours for the garrison and the provincial merchant flag.

Agreement of Balta-Liman, May 1, 1849.

The basis of the Agreement is to protect, by extraordinary and effectual measures, the immunities and privileges heretofore granted to the Provinces, not only against revolutionary and anarchical movements, but also against the abuse of power which paralyzed the execution of the laws, and deprived the peaceable inhabitants of the benefits secured to them by the Treaties.

The mode of election established by the "Règlement" of 1831 by an Extraordinary General Assembly composed of persons appertaining to the classes of Clergy Boyars, and other Deputies, is for this time set aside, and the Hospodars are to be named by the Porte on an understanding with Russia, and for this time also only for seven years, the two Courts reserving to themselves before the expiration of that period to take into consideration the internal circumstances of the Principalities, and the services which the Hospodars may have performed, whereupon further determination will be taken by common accord.

The "Règlement" of 1831 is to continue in force generally; but as the composition and election of the Assembly of Boyars had given occasion for conflicts and insubordination, the convocation of it is to be suspended for future arrangements to be made by the two Courts; and in the meanwhile Councils, composed of Boyars and of the high clergy, are to be convened, whose principal duties are to be the settlement of taxes and the examination of the yearly budget.

Commissions are to be appointed to consider of the amendments in the "Règlement Organique"

* One Purse = £5.

which may be required by the actual situation of the Principalities, and the administrative abuses, who are to make their report to the Porte; and the Porte having come to an understanding thereon with the Court of Russia, and both Courts approving the modifications which the Commission may recommend, shall be published by hatti-sherif.

The Agreement then provides for the temporary occupation of the Provinces, and for the immediate reorganisation of the native militia, that, by its discipline and effective force, it may offer a sufficient guarantee for the maintenance of order. During the occupation an extraordinary Commissioner on the part of each Power shall reside there for certain specified purposes.

The Agreement is to be in force for seven years, at the expiration of which period the two Courts will consider the then situation of the Principalities, and decide on the measures to be adopted for their future prosperity and tranquillity; but the Agreement, being based on exceptional circumstances, and concluded for a limited time, is in no way to impair the existing Treaties in regard to the Principalities, which retain their full effect.

Inclosure 2 in No. 483.

Articles I, II, and III of M. Prokesch's amended Project.

1. LES Principautés Danubiennes de Moldavie, de Valachie, et de Servie continueront à relever de la Sublime Porte conformément aux anciennes capitulations et aux Hatts Impériaux qui fixent et déterminent les droits et immunités dont elles jouissent.

Aucune protection exclusive ne sera dorénavant exercée sur ces Provinces.

2. La Sublime Porte, dans la plénitude de son pouvoir suzerain, conservera aux dites Principautés leur territoire, ainsi que leur administration indépendante et nationale, et par conséquent la pleine liberté de culte, de législation, de commerce et de navigation. Toutes les clauses qui ont pour objet leur prospérité contenues dans les Hatts Impériaux sont maintenues et seront soigneusement développées selon les circonstances et les besoins légalement constitués du pays.

3. La Sublime Porte, considérant dans sa sagesse que la position politique des trois Principautés dont il s'agit touche de très près les intérêts généraux de l'Europe, s'entendra dans la voie la plus amicale avec les Puissances Contractantes soit pour le maintien des règlements en vigueur dans ces Provinces, soit pour les modifications à y apporter. A cet effet, elle consultera tout d'abord les vœux du pays et consignera dans un hatti-schérif solennel, séparément pour chacune des trois Provinces, l'ensemble des dispositions relatives aux droits et immunités des dites Principautés. Avant de le promulguer elle fera communication de cet Acte aux Puissances, qui, de leur côté, après examen, en assumeront la garantie.

No. 484.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 21.)

(No. 23.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 17, 1855.

BEFORE the opening of the Conference, Prince Gortchakoff read to us a despatch which he had just received from St. Petersburgh.

It contained assurances of the desire of the Emperor Alexander for peace, on terms compatible with the honour of Russia. At the same time, the Emperor declared his determination to carry on the war with the utmost vigour. There is nothing in this despatch which indicates any change of policy.

Indeed it would be nearly impossible for the Emperor Alexander to depart at this moment from the line prescribed by his father. But if in the course of the negotiations a doubtful point should arise, it will be seen whether he has the courage to incline the balance towards peace. I cannot doubt that if he should do so, his power would be strengthened, and his hold over his vast Empire confirmed. The curb has been held too tight, and a somewhat lighter hand will give a securer seat to the rider, as well as ease to the horse. Such at least is my conjecture.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 485.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 21.)

(No. 24.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 18, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Protocol was signed this day at 3 o'clock at Count Buol's office. All the members of the Conference were present.

I have the honour to lay before your Lordship a copy of the Protocol.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 485.

Protocol (*No.* 1) *of a Conference held at Vienna, March* 15, 1855.

Présens :

Pour l'Autriche—
M. le Comte Buol-Schauenstein, et
M. le Baron de Prokesch-Osten ;

Pour la France—
M. le Baron de Bourqueney ;

Pour la Grande Bretagne—
Lord John Russell, et
M. le Comte de Westmorland ;

Pour la Russie—
M. le Prince Gortchakoff, et
M. de Titoff ;

Pour la Turquie—
Arif Effendi.

MM. LES Plénipotentiaires de l'Autriche, de la France, de la Grande Bretagne, de la Russie, et de la Turquie, s'étant réunis aujourd'hui en Conférence à l'Hôtel du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, sont convenues d'adopter pour leur négociation la forme de séance à Protocole.

Il a été résolu de confier la présidence des Conférences à M. le Comte Buol-Schauenstein, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique, et le soin de la rédaction des Protocoles au Baron de Meysenburg, Conseiller Aulique au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche.

MM. les Plénipotentiaires ont produit ensuite leurs pleins pouvoirs respectifs, lesquels, après avoir été examinés et mutuellement acceptés, ont été déposés aux Actes de la Conférence.

M. le Comte de Buol-Schauenstein a pris la parole, en s'exprimant ainsi qu'il suit :

"Messieurs,—Un but commun nous réunit dans cette enceinte, celui de parvenir à une loyale entente pour rendre à l'Europe cette paix dont elle a si grand besoin. Minutes difficultés se présenteront sans doute dans le cours de nos pourparlers ; des opinions divergentes se produiront ; des intérêts en apparence contradictoires se présenteront ; le souvenir des sacrifices cruels que la guerre a déjà exigés, viendra se mêler à ces difficultés. Mais moins nous nous dissimulons la gravité de ces obstacles, et plus nous apporterons tous, j'en exprime ici la pleine conviction, tout l'esprit de conciliation compatible avec nos devoirs et avec les pleins pouvoirs dont nous sommes munis pour ne pas faire avorter le noble but qui nous réunit.

"Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, ses Plénipotentiaires ont l'ordre de le déclarer, a fixé ses idées sur les conditions indispensables sur lesquelles l'œuvre de paix devra reposer. L'Empereur s'est franchement entendu avec ses alliés sur les bases qui semblent seules pouvoir assurer un état de choses qui puisse nous garantir du retour d'une complication qui a porté une si profonde atteinte aux rapports internationaux et aux intérêts de tous les peuples. Sa Majesté, pour sa part, est décidée à poursuivre invariablement la route qu'elle s'est tracée, et rien, même les conséquences les plus graves, ne l'arrêterait de maintenir scrupuleusement les engagements qu'elle a contractés à cet égard vis-à-vis de ses alliés.

"Le chemin que nous avons à poursuivre se trouve déjà tracé. Les bases de paix qui ont été jugées indispensables pour donner à l'avenir des gages de sécurité et pour mettre fin à une situation qui a placé la Russie en désaccord avec la majeure partie de l'Europe, sont posées. Ces bases ont déjà au préalable été communiquées à M. l'Envoyé de Russie. Il en a pris connaissance, et a déclaré qu'il était autorisé d'adhérer à tous les principes établis et prêt à les prendre comme point de départ des négociations.

"En conséquence—

"1. Le Protectorat exercé par la Russie sur la Moldavie et la Valachie cessera, et les privilèges reconnus par les Sultans à ces Principautés, ainsi qu'à la Servie, seront dorénavant placés sous la garantie collective des Puissances Contractantes ;

"2. La liberté de la navigation du Danube sera complétement assurée par des moyens efficaces et sous le contrôle d'une autorité syndicale permanente ;

"3. Le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, sera révisé dans le double but de rattacher plus complétement l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre Européen et de mettre fin à la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire ;

"4. La Russie abandonne le principe de couvrir d'un Protectorat officiel les sujets Chrétiens du Sultan du rit Oriental ; mais les Puissances Chrétiennes se prêteront leur mutuel concours pour obtenir de l'initiative du Gouvernement Ottoman la consécration et l'observance des droits religieux des communautés Chrétiennes sujets de la Porte, sans distinction du rit.

"C'est le développement de ces principes qui formera l'objet de nos négociations.

"Mettons la main à l'œuvre avec la ferme volonté de réussir, et espérons que le succès couronnera nos efforts.

"L'importance de nos travaux et l'immense gravité des intérêts qui s'y rattachent, sont de nature à justifier le désir que la marche de nos négociations ne tombe pas prématurément dans le domaine de la publicité, en devenant ainsi l'objet d'une polémique qui pourrait porter préjudice à nos efforts conciliants. Je pense que MM. les Plénipotentiaires seront unanimes à vouloir obvier à cet inconvénient mutuel qu'il dépend d'eux, en se donnant mutuellement la parole de garder personnellement le secret sur tout ce qui sera discuté entr'eux.

"En commençant nos travaux, n'oublions point de les placer avant tout sous les auspices de la Divine Providence. Puisse le Ciel, en nous éclairant tous, faire en sorte que l'union de l'Europe, si nécessaire aux progrès de la civilisation, ressorte plus consolidée que jamais de ces négociations."

M. le Baron de Bourqueney s'est associé aux sentiments exprimés par M. le Plénipotentiaire Autrichien—sentiments qui ne peuvent trouver qu'un écho fidèle aux tous les membres de la Conférence. Mais il s'est hâté en même tems de constater, après et avec M. le Comte Buol, que le rétablissement de la paix ne saurait être poursuivi en dehors des quatre principes énumérés par M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Autriche et désormais hors de discussion. La négociation ne s'ouvre que sur leur application. C'est au nom des intérêts Européens que son Gouvernement a entrepris de faire prévaloir ces principes et il ne s'arrêtera dans la carrière de ses sacrifices que lorsqu'ils auront pris place avec toutes leurs conséquences dans le droit public de l'Europe. Représentant d'une Puissance belligérante il a rappelé et constaté la faculté que son Gouvernement s'est réservée dans tous les documents antérieurs, de poser, en sus des quatre garanties, telle condition particulière qui lui paraîtrait exigée par l'intérêt général de l'Europe.

Lord John Russell, en s'associant également aux sentiments exprimés par M. le Plénipotentiaire Autrichien, a déclaré voir avec satisfaction la définition des quatre bases énumérés par le Comte de Buol. Comme Représentant d'une Puissance belligérante il a déclaré en outre que son Gouvernement se réserve, ainsi qu'il la toujours fait, la faculté de poser telles conditions particulières qui lui paraîtraient exigées en sus des quatre garanties par l'intérêt général de l'Europe, pour prévenir le retour des complications actuelles.

Le Comte Westmorland a adhéré en tout point à la déclaration précédente de Lord John Russell, qui répond parfaitement à ses propres sentiments.

Le Prince Gortchakoff a pris la parole en s'exprimant ainsi qu'il suit :

"Je sais gré à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche d'avoir constaté dès le début de nos conférences l'accord établi entre nos pensées par les explications verbales échangées dans la réunion du 7 Janvier. De mon côté, et après lui, je tiens à constater l'accord d'une pensée commune. Nous sommes ici des hommes sérieux, réunis pour travailler à une œuvre sérieuse, la plus ardue qui se soit présentée de nos temps, et il doit nous tenir à cœur à tous de sortir des généralités pour arriver à l'application pratique des principes que nous avons adoptés, et par conséquent d'aborder sans autre retard le développement des détails de chaque question. Ce n'est qu'alors qu'il sera mis en évidence si nous pouvons, ou non, nous entendre. Nous avons donc tous un point de départ commun ; j'espère que nous avons également un but commun, celui d'arriver à la paix générale, une paix qui ne saurait être solide et de valeur pratique qu'en étant honorable pour les deux parties. Si, de quelque part que ce soit, on voulait faire à la Russie pour cette paix des conditions qui ne seraient pas compatibles avec son honneur, la Russie n'y consentirait jamais, quelque graves que puissent être les conséquences."

M. de Titoff a adhéré à la déclaration du Prince Gortchakoff.

Arif Effendi, en s'associant aux sentiments exprimés par M. le Comte de Buol et par MM. les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne, a réservé à la Sublime Porte la faculté de poser telles conditions particulières qui lui paraîtraient exigées en sus des quatre garanties, par ses propres intérêts, pour la conservation des droits de son indépendance et de son intégrité.

Relativement aux réserves faites par MM. les Plénipotentiaires de la France, de l'Angleterre, et de la Porte Ottomane, M. le Prince Gortchakoff a déclaré ne point vouloir contester aux Puissances belligérantes le droit d'ajouter, selon les chances de la guerre, de nouvelles demandes aux quatre points ; mais il a observé à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche qu'il le considérait pour sa part et en vertu des déclarations explicites de sa Cour, comme étant dans l'obligation de se renfermer dans les limites des quatre points.

M. le Comte de Buol a répondu que l'Autriche, dans la phase actuelle, n'entendait point dépasser ces limites ; qu'il devait cependant, comme il l'avait toujours fait, réserver à sa Cour une pleine et entière liberté d'appréciation quant aux conditions qui, selon les circonstances et dans l'intérêt Européen, pourraient être posées par les belligérants en sus des quatre points.

La proposition faite par M. le Comte Buol d'entrer sans retard ultérieure dans le fond des quatre points, par ordre chronologique, et d'en faire préparer le

développement par des Commissions qui auraient à soumettre leur travail à la Conférence plénière, a été adoptée.

M. le Baron Prokesch a donné lecture d'un aperçu destiné à fixer à la Commission qui aura à s'occuper du premier point, relatif aux Principautés Danubiennes, les points de départ de son travail.

Dans la discussion soulevée par cette lecture, MM. les Plénipotentiaires Russes ont objecté à l'emploi du mot "protectorat" appliqué aux rapports de la Russie avec les Principautés, puisque ce mot ne se trouvait dans aucun Traité de la Russie avec la Sublime Porte.

Il a été constaté, d'autre part, que le mot "protectorat" ne s'en rencontrait pas moins dans le Statut Organique, ainsi que dans de nombreux documents émanés des Chancelleries Russes.

M. le Baron Bourqueney, tout en proposant de substituer au mot "protectorat" celui de "protection," a établi que c'était un principe incontesté de droit international que la guerre entre deux Puissances annule tous leurs Traités antérieurs ; que dans les arrangements nouveaux, à la recherche desquels la Conférence allait se livrer, dans les questions d'organisation qu'elle aurait à débattre, et notamment dans l'application et le développement de la première, il était entendu par conséquent qu'aucune des stipulations des anciens Traités de la Russie avec la Sublime Porte ne saurait être invoquée comme un droit ou opposée comme un obstacle.

M. le Prince de Gortchakoff a reconnu que les stipulations des Traités de la Russie avec la Sublime Porte relatives aux rapports entre la Russie et les Principautés, seraient abolies à la paix ; mais il a en même tems posé en principe que le nouvel ordre de choses ne devrait priver ces Provinces d'aucun des avantages dont elles avaient joui jusqu'ici sous les rapports administratif, financier et commercial.

MM. les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne ont déclaré que le but de leurs Gouvernements n'était point de détériorer la position des Principautés, mais de l'améliorer, en combinant les nouveaux arrangements à conclure à leur sujet de façon à donner une pleine et entière satisfaction aux droits de la Puissance suzeraine, à ceux des trois Principautés, et aux intérêts généraux de l'Europe.

Par suite de ces diverses observations quelques changements préalables ont été apportés au travail de M. le Baron Prokesch. Il a été décidé que cette pièce ainsi amendée, et dont copie est jointe au Protocole, formerait dans la prochaine séance l'objet d'une nouvelle discussion.

Pour le cas où MM. les Plénipotentiaires ne seraient pas préparés à reprendre cette discussion à la prochaine séance fixée à après demain, M. le Prince Gortchakoff a énoncé le désir qu'on passe de suite à la prise en délibération de la seconde garantie, pour accélérer autant que possible la marche des négociations qui doivent conduire à la paix, objet de ses vœux.

(Suivent les signatures.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 485.

Annex to Protocol No. 1.

DÉVELOPPEMENT DU PREMIER POINT.

1. LES Principautés Danubiennes de Moldavie, Valachie, et Servie continueront à relever de la Sublime Porte en vertu des anciennes capitulations et Hatts Impériaux en vigueur. Aucune protection exclusive ne sera exercée dorénavant sur ces Provinces.

2. La Sublime Porte, dans la plénitude de son pouvoir suzerain, conservera intacte aux dites Principautés leur administration indépendante et nationale, et par conséquent la pleine liberté de culte, de législation, de commerce, et de navigation. Toutes les clauses qui ont pour objet la prospérité du pays, contenues dans les Hatts Impériaux, sont maintenues et seront, selon les circonstances, soigneusement développées.

3. La Sublime Porte, considérant dans sa sagesse que la position politique

des trois Principautés touche de très près les intérêts généraux de l'Europe, s'entendra dans la voie la plus amicale avec les Puissances ses amies, sur le contenu d'un Hatt solennel, comprenant l'ensemble des stipulations relatives aux droits et immunités des dites Principautés; elle en fera communication aux Puissances Contractantes, qui de leur côté, après examen, assumeront la garantie.

4. Il y aura une force armée nationale, organisée à l'objet de maintenir la sûreté de l'intérieur et d'assurer celle des frontières. Dans l'intérêt commun de la Sublime Porte, des Principautés et de l'Europe, les conditions d'un système défensif seront prises en considération.

5. Dans le cas où des doutes dussent être soulevés sur l'interprétation du Hatt constitutif, les Représentants des Puissances Contractantes examineront en Conférence le fond de ces réclamations. Cette Conférence fera, le cas échéant, valoir ses bons offices tant auprès de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, qu'auprès des autorités locales.

6. Lorsque le repos intérieur des dites Principautés se trouverait menacé ou compromis, les Puissances garantes s'entendront sur les représentations à faire soit à la Puissance suzeraine, soit aux Gouvernements locaux. Une intervention armée ne saurait avoir lieu de la part de la Sublime Porte sans intervention égale au nom de l'Europe.

7. Les Cours s'engagent à ne point accorder de protection spéciale dans les Principautés à des étrangers dont les menées pourraient être préjudiciables soit à la tranquillité de ces pays, soit aux intérêts des Etats voisins. Elles s'engagent de même réciproquement à ne pas tolérer de la part de leurs propres sujets de pareilles manœuvres et à prendre en sérieuse considération les réclamations qui pourraient être soulevées à ce sujet par les Puissances limitrophes, où même par les autorités locales. Par contre, la Sublime Porte enjoindra aux Principautés de ne pas tolérer sur leur sol des étrangers tels qu'on les a désignés plus haut, ni de permettre aux indigènes de tremper dans des menées dangéreuses pour leur propre pays, ou pour la tranquillité des Etats voisins.

No. 486.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 21.)

(No. 122.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 17, 1855.

ACCORDING to the arrangement announced to your Lordship in my despatch No. 115 of the 15th instant, the general Conference re-assembled this day at the Imperial Chancery of State.

After some preliminary conversation, Prince Gortchakoff took occasion to announce that having received a despatch from St. Petersburgh, which he was directed to communicate to Count Buol, and believing that its contents (as matter of information, but wholly unconnected with the business of the Conference) would be of some interest to the Ministers now assembled, he would read it, and more particularly as it contained the expression of the desire of the Emperor Alexander, that the negotiations he had now authorized his Plenipotentiaries to enter upon might lead to the establishment of peace.

No remark was made upon this communication after it had been read, it being considered as irrelevant to the business for which we were assembled, and Count Buol received the document presented to him in his character as the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs.

After this incident Count Buol called upon M. de Meysenburg, who had been appointed at the last Conference as "Rédacteur" of the minutes of the negotiation, to read the Protocol of that meeting.

I have the honour of inclosing a lithographic copy of this Protocol as it was finally agreed to, and as it will be signed by all the members of the Conference. In this document, as it was first read to us, there appeared to be some sentences purporting to have been pronounced by Prince Gortchakoff which were not in the recollection of the members of the Conference, and to which Lord John Russell, Baron Bourqueney, and myself, expressed our objection.

After considerable discussion, the details of which will be given to your

Lordship in Lord John Russell's report, Prince Gortchakoff consented to erase them.

I inclose a copy of those sentences, with a reference to the place at which they were inserted.

At the close of the last Conference a discussion had taken place upon a proposal of Baron Bourqueney, that the Protocol should not be signed by the Plenipotentiaries of the Powers at war with each other in the same column, upon which Prince Gortchakoff remarked that there should be three columns, one for the allies who were belligerents, a centre one for Austria as a neutral Power, and the other for the Russian Plenipotentiaries. Count Buol objected to this proposal, as he declined to separate himself from the allies of the Emperor his Sovereign. Prince Gortchakoff asked upon what ground he could associate his signature with those of the belligerents, and Count Buol answered, upon the ground of the engagements taken by his Government by the Treaty of the 2nd December. The discussion of this question having been adjourned at the last Conference to the meeting fixed to be held this day, it was accordingly resumed (after the terms of the Protocol had been agreed to), and after much opposition from Count Buol to separate himself from the allies, it was agreed that the Austrian Minister, as President of the Conference, should sign alone at the head and between the two columns in one of which the Representatives of the allied Powers and the second Austrian Plenipotentiary, Baron Prokesch, will sign, and in the other the Russian Plenipotentiaries; and to avoid all question of precedence, it was agreed that the allied Representatives should sign the Protocol of one Conference, in one of the columns, and the Russian Plenipotentiaries should take that position in the Protocol of the next, and so on alternately for each Conference.

After these questions had been decided, a lengthened discussion took place upon the 1st Article of the bases, which had partly been entered upon, as reported to your Lordship, at the first Conference. Prince Gortchakoff produced two documents, which he conceived might be of interest in recording the state of the arrangements which had hitherto existed in the Principalities and in Servia, as well as the general improvement which, originating with the Sultan, might be established under the guarantee of the Contracting Powers.

Prince Gortchakoff proposed these documents only as supplementary to the one which had been produced at the last Conference by Baron Prokesch, and in the belief that the details they contained might facilitate the drawing up the Article of the Treaty, in a more extended form than had at first been contemplated.

With this view, it was agreed that these documents, together with the one of Baron Prokesch, should be placed upon the Protocol, and that before the next meeting, which was fixed for Monday, Baron Prokesch should draw up from them an Article to be submitted for the approbation of the Plenipotentiaries before it was placed in the hands of a Commission for final examination.

Upon a question as to the words "les cinq Puissances," which had been made use of in the supposition that Prussia would be joined in the Conference, and which must now be discontinued, Prince Gortchakoff made a statement which he begged might be inserted in the Protocol, that he regretted the absence of a Prussian Representative, as he thought a great European settlement, such as he hoped the present negotiation might lead to, would not be complete without the participation of Prussia as one of the great European Powers. He said, if he did not put forward the demand of Prussia to enter the Conference as a right, yet he considered that Government as having an implied claim to do so as one of the parties to the Treaty of 1841; and he therefore expressed his wish that she should join the Conference, and he supposed that at any rate it would be the intention of all the Powers that at the close of their labours the acts which might emanate from them should be submitted to the Prussian Government, and their adhesion be proposed.

Count Buol, Baron de Bourqueney, Lord John Russell, as well as myself, stated that our Governments, equally with Prince Gortchakoff, had desired the cooperation of the Prussian Government, and had made every effort to obtain it, and that with this declaration we did not object to the insertion in the Protocol of all which had been said upon this subject.

I have thus given your Lordship a general sketch of what took place at the Conference of this day. The more complete details, and the impressions resulting from them, will be contained in the report which Lord John Russell will address

to you; and I will only add, that at the commencement of the Conference, Count Buol announced that he had received a telegraphic despatch, according to which it appeared that the Government of the Sultan had decided upon sending Aali Pasha, the present Minister for Foreign Affairs, as the Turkish Representative at the Conference, and that his departure from Constantinople was only delayed until it was known whether the death of the Emperor Nicholas had made any alteration in the decision of the allied Governments to commence the negotiations as determined upon before that event had taken place.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

March 18.

P.S.—The Plenipotentiaries met this day at 3 o'clock and signed the Protocol as it is inclosed in the present despatch.

Annexed to the Protocol, your Lordship will find the document drawn up by Baron Prokesch, upon the development to be given to the first Article. This document contains, however, only the first ideas of Baron Prokesch relative to the Principalities, which will be revised and reconsidered by the general Conference at their meeting to-morrow.

I have also to add to the present despatch a paper showing the order in which the Protocol was signed by the Plenipotentiaries.

W.

Inclosure 1 in No. 486.

Protocol (No. 1) of a Conference held at Vienna, March 15, 1855.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 485.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 486.

Annex to Protocol No. 1.

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 485.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 486.

Memorandum.

THE Protocol of the 15th of March, 1855, was signed by the Plenipotentiaries in the following order:

President:

Count Buol-Schauenstein.

Prince Gortchakoff.	Baron Prokesch.
Chevalier de Titoff.	Baron Bourqueney.
	Lord John Russell.
	Lord Westmorland.
	Arif Effendi.

Inclosure 4 in No. 486.

Words erased from the Speech of Prince Gortchakoff in the original Protocol.

IN the original wording of the Protocol, in the speech of Prince Gortchakoff, appear after the words "l'accord d'une pensée commune," the following words which have been erased:

"Dans cet accord, il ne peut s'agir de texte. Il n'y en a point qui nous lie tous collectivement. Aucun texte n'a été formulé dans la réunion du 7 Janvier."

No. 487.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 160.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March 5, 1855.*

THE day before yesterday I received from M. Pisani the official report, of which a copy is inclosed herewith. It states, as your Lordship will perceive, the substance of a communication made in person by Baron Koller to the Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha.

In consequence of the desire expressed by the Austrian Envoy that a special Plenipotentiary should be sent to Vienna by the Porte, Reshid Pasha, and his colleague, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, requested that I would let them know my opinion on that point.

My reply was conveyed to them in the following terms: The natural and proper thing for the Porte to do, is to follow such course as the Western Powers engaged with her in the war may propose. Hitherto they have not suggested the expediency of sending a second Turkish Plenipotentiary, but they have recommended the transmission of full powers and clear instructions, and placing the Turkish Plenipotentiary, whoever he may be, on the same ground as their own. If the Porte has not yet complied in the fullest manner with this desire, she ought not to lose a moment in doing so.

At a later hour of the day I learnt from M. Benedetti, that his opinion was unfavourable to Baron Koller's suggestion; and the Porte is now in possession of our joint opinions to that effect.

Another question, however, remains to be considered. The Turkish Ambassador at Vienna has written to request on personal grounds that he may be relieved from the responsibility of assisting at the Conferences alone; and the Porte has, therefore, to consider whether it will be best to give him a successor, or an assessor. In deliberating on this question, the Sultan will probably have to consider whom of his Ministers can be most easily spared, and the names of Reshid Pasha and Aali Pasha will naturally suggest themselves. It is to be hoped, however, that some one worthy of confidence, but less likely to be wanted here, will, if necessary, be finally selected.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 487.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, March 3, 1855.*

AALI PASHA and the Grand Vizier desired me to inform your Excellency that Baron Koller called to-day on their Highnesses respectively, to communicate to Count Buol, stating that he thinks it advisable for the Porte to send a special Plenipotentiary to take part in the negotiations which are about to commence at Vienna. He urges the necessity for the Ottoman Government to avoid creating obstacles and delays, and advises them to show every readiness to place

confidence in the allies. He further adds that the British and Austrian Governments having appointed Plenipotentiaries *ad hoc* to assist at the Conferences, it is essential for the Porte, as the Power most immediately interested in the matter, that it should follow their example without hesitation.

In requesting me to acquaint your Excellency with the above, their Highnesses expressed a wish to be favoured with your opinion on the subject, at your earliest convenience, having promised Baron Koller to let him have an answer by Monday.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 488.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 161.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March 5, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship by the present opportunity a printed series of very important Turkish enactments, prepared for publication in the Porte's official Gazette, of which I have been courteously allowed by Aali Pasha to obtain an early copy.

As I did not receive the paper in question till yesterday, it has been impossible for me to have it completely translated. But a translation, inclosed herewith, of the introductory paragraph, followed by an enumeration of several legislative acts, will acquaint your Lordship with the character and object of the whole communication.

The Porte, as I am assured, intends to publish a full translation of the new judicial measures thus in course of promulgation, and to communicate it, when prepared, to the Diplomatic body residing here.

That portion of the new law which is directed against venality and peculation, was privately placed in my hands about four months ago; and, after carefully examining its contents with such professional assistance as happened to be within reach, I returned it to Aali Pasha, with the suggestion of certain amendments, which, as I was informed by him, were subsequently adopted.

I have never indeed ceased to recommend the prompt completion, promulgation and enforcement of all those reforms which have been so frequently promised by the Sultan and his Ministers. The language which I have held as well to His Majesty as to the leading members of his Government, may be summed up, essentially, in very few words: Your present administrative system, I have said, is only leading you to destruction. It is anti-social; that of self, opposed to public interest. You cannot revert to the period of energetic fanaticism. That fire, in a national sense, has burnt itself out. You must open other sources of prosperity and strength, and they are to be found in a system of administration which secures justice to all, removes inequality of civil rights, encourages knowledge and industry, protects property, develops wealth, and extends the means of defence. You must also take measures to bring your revenue, unpilfered, into the coffers of the State; to welcome science, capital and enterprize, from whatever quarters they come; and, above all, you must lay the axe without reserve or compromise to the roots of that corruption which spreads its poison throughout the Empire, and casts a fatal shade on every germ of vegetation and every principle of life.

Many years have passed during which I have never ceased to inculcate these ideas, and to urge the enforcement of measures required to give them effect.

Since the storm has burst over this Empire and shown to demonstration the consequences of neglecting such repeated admonitions, I have represented the importance of awakening, while there is yet time, to a sense of impending danger, and applying in earnest, even at the eleventh hour, those principles of improvement which afford the only chance of escape.

I venture to hope that the new enactments, herein communicated, may prove the beginning of a serious reform, and that the Porte may be spared the pain and discredit of having the measures which it might have adopted spontaneously, extorted from its Plenipotentiaries by the united voice of Christendom.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 488.

Substance of an Article in the Turkish Official "Gazette" of March 3, 1855.

(Translation.)

A HIGH Council of Reform having entered upon its functions for correcting, enforcing, and enacting new administrative laws and regulations, separate regulations have been drawn up respecting its duties and new internal organization, respecting the organization of the General Council for revising the work of the Council of Reform, and the manner of the discussions to be held therein. The Imperial Criminal Code is now under discussion, and that part of it respecting corruption is revised by the General Council, sanctioned by His Imperial Majesty, and hereby promulgated together with the other several regulations as follows:

1. Regulations on the duties of the Council of Reform.
2. Regulations on the internal organization of the Council of Reform.
3. Regulations on the organization and duties of the General Council.
4. Regulation respecting the drawing up of all general regulations to be hereafter framed.
5. Statement of the Penal Code against corruption.

No. 489.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 164.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March 5, 1855.*

INCLOSED herewith are copies of despatches from Moossul and Diarbekir relating to the revolt in Koordistan. I have received no later advices.

Two battalions of regular troops, destined for the disturbed district, were embarked here five days ago for Alexandretta. They amount in number to 1,400 men.

It has been deemed inexpedient to remove any troops from Epirus or Thessaly under present appearances.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE. REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 489.

Consul Holmes to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Diarbekir, February 5, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that Hamely Pasha has received letters from his agent at the Porte, to the effect that orders will be transmitted to Erzeroom that a couple of Regiments of Nizam be directed to march to Diarbekir as soon as practicable; orders also have been sent to Sivas for the same purpose: a few Regulars are also on their way from Aleppo, and as soon as they arrive the Pasha intends proceeding in person against Sheer Bey. This Chief has left Sert, and is now directing all his energies against the district of Mediat. He deceives the ignorant people by asserting that he has been invested with the government of these districts by the Porte, and Hamely Pasha is alone opposing the orders of the Government; were it otherwise, he says, the

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Pasha would long since have had troops at his disposal. The inhabitants seeing no regular soldiers, believe in a great measure what he tells them.

Some Regulars were to have marched from Moossul against Jezireh, but no post having arrived from Moossul or Bagdad for the last fortnight, their movements are not known.

Kennan Pasha, Caimacam of Sert, who was awaiting events at Bisnil, has returned to Diarbekir, and will probably remain here until the Pasha leaves this with the troops expected from Aleppo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. W. HOLMES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 489.

Vice-Consul Rassam to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Moossul, January 29, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that since the date of my last despatch No. 1, news has reached this that Yezdasheer Bey has taken the town of Gharzan and committed fresh acts of barbarity at Sert; one of the persons who fell a victim to his rage is Haggi Mohammed Aga ibn Tahur Aga, the Mutsellim of Bahtan, a man of much influence and wealth; he was publicly executed in Sert, and all his property confiscated. A Chaldean bishop named Mar Michael was put to the torture until he paid the sum of 25,000 piastres; being very poor his community collected the amount and rescued their bishop from the hands of his tormentors.

The rebel Yezdasheer Bey has also exacted the following sums from individuals by torture. From Mullah Mustapha, the Mufti of Sert, 25,000 piastres; Yusseen Rassar, a Mahommedan, 18,500 piastres; Shemmus Tomu, a Christian, 25,000 piastres; in fact, all respectable persons who will not join his cause are either executed or put to the torture until they consent to pay him large sums of money which he must have in order to pay his soldiers.

When Yezdasheer Bey first grasped the reins of Government at Jezireh and Sert, he wrote to the Commander-in-chief at Kars that Osman Pasha and Hajji Suleiman Aga were the cause of his taking the course he had chosen; however he was still faithful to his Sultan, and hoped he would not be considered rebellious, as he intended to march early in the spring at the head of 8,000 men to fight the Russians. The Commander-in-chief not suspecting his candour for a moment, sent a Caimicam to Sert to assist Yezdasheer Bey in raising troops; no sooner, however, did he arrive, than the Bey put him under arrest, or rather surrounded him with a guard, and would not allow him the least liberty, and finally sent him to Diaberkir under under a strong escort.

The rebels are busily engaged in repairing the castles formerly occupied by Bedr Khan Bey in the mountain fastnesses, and storing them with provisions, arms, and ammunition, that in case of emergency they will shut themselves up there, and defy the Turkish arms.

Maussoor Bey has gone among the Go-erye, a powerful Koordish tribe, to draw them over to their alliance.

Yesterday Tahar Bey, with about 1,000 Nizam and 400 Agail, entered Moossul from Bagdad; also Mohammed Pasha, a Commander of Artillery, with six cannon. On the 25th instant Helmy Pasha received a despatch from Hamely Pasha of Diabekir, informing him that Azmay Pasha of Aleppo had dispatched one battalion of Nizam, with several pieces of Artillery. A detachment of Nizam had also left Kharpoot for Diarbekir, and when the whole force arrived in that town they, with 300 Bashi-Bozouks, would march against the rebels. It is also reported that two battalions of Nizam has left Sulimaniah on their way to join Tahar Bey's Division, and about 1,000 Bashi-Bozouks from Kerkook. With such a strong force I hope the rebels ere long will be subdued, and peace once more restored in the mountains of Bahtan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. A. RASSAM.

No. 490.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 22.)

(No. 165.)

Constantinople, March 5, 1855.

My Lord,

I DIRECTED M. Pisani to read and explain to the Grand Vizier and to Aali Pasha your Lordship's instructions to me No. 124 of the 12th ultimo; and having performed that duty, he was assured in positive terms by their Highnesses that the Council of Reform was actually engaged in considering the best means of carrying solidly into effect a plan for securing the perfect equality of civil rights to all classes of the Sultan's subjects. They added, according to M. Pisani's report, that the Council had already made considerable progress, and that no length of time would elapse before I should be made acquainted with the results of its labours, comprising a solution of this important question.

I inquired of M. Pisani whether he understood that the abolition of the "haratch" was included in the expected result, and he assured me that such was his undoubted impression and belief.

Your Lordship may remember that the Sultan himself gave me a distinct promise of this measure several months ago; and that when, at a later period, I reminded His Majesty of his promise, he said that he would direct the Grand Vizier to communicate upon the subject with the Sheik-ul-Islam.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 491.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 22.)

(No. 170.)

Constantinople, March 8, 1855.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith in copy is the last despatch which I have received from Moossul respecting the progress of revolt in Koordistan. It may be hoped that the troops detached against Yezdasheer Bey by the Pasha of Bagdad will have better fortune than those which preceded them. Humanity and policy alike require a speedy suppression of the disorder, and I have repeatedly urged the Porte to adopt the necessary measures with promptitude and vigour. Whatever has been wanting in these respects is not attributable to want of will, but of means. Had the Government and Empire been reduced to a state of less deplorable weakness, the assistance of their allies would not have been required, and their independence might have been maintained, together with their internal tranquillity, at a less amount of sacrifice to Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 491.

Vice-Consul Rassam to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Moossul, February 12, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that on the 10th instant, Mohammed Pasha, Commander of the Bagdad Artillery, marched from this with his army for Jezireh, accompanied by three Colonels, Tahir Bey, Arif Bey, and Mustapha Bey.

Mohammed Pasha has acted with much consideration in taking the desert route, which is shorter, no rivers to cross, and the villagers will be relieved of the annoyances of the soldiers. The energy displayed by Mohammed Pasha and his officers, gives me some hope that they will soon reduce the rebels, and restore tranquillity to the country.

A few days ago I dispatched a messenger to Yezdasheer Bey, respecting a sum of money owed by him to a Jacobite Christian; my chief object, however, was to get a good idea of his strength and influence among the Koords. The messenger returned yesterday with the Bey's reply, which is full of complaints against Helmy Pasha for keeping his helpless family under arrest. The messenger informed me that Yezdasheer Bey has about 20,000 Koordish soldiers, and the enthusiasm displayed by all the Koords for their Ameer is great. His brother Munsoor Bey was absent at Mediat, near Diarbekir, with a body of troops.

While my messenger was at Sert, Yezdasheer Bey executed three Yezedees who were forced to embrace Islamism in the time of Bedr-khan Bey, and when the Turkish authority was established in that country, returned to their former creed; and two Mohammedans were executed at the same time for some murder committed by them long since.

Yezdasheer Bey may have executed the Yezedees from fanatical motives, or it may be revenge, because he must know that Hussein Bey, the Ameer of the Yezedees, has marched with about 2,000 Yezedee horsemen and musketeers to Zukho, under the command of Helmy Pasha's Rayah.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. A. RASSAM.

No. 492.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 326.)
My Lord, *Paris, March 18, 1855.*

THE columns of the "Moniteur" of yesterday's date contained the inclosed article on the subject of the demand made by M. de Bismark of the Diet to arm the Federal fortresses.

Count Hatzfeldt, however, tells me that he has received a despatch from Baron Manteuffel, for communication to the French Government, written with some vivacity of tone, denying the right of any foreign State to take cognizance of what took place in the deliberations of the Diet. The Prussian Government maintains that it is only the resolutions of the Diet which are liable to be questioned or protested against, as emanating from a recognised European Power.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 492.

Extract from the "Moniteur" of March 17, 1855.

Francfort, le 14 Mars.

DANS une des dernières séances de la Diète, M. de Bismark, répondant aux communications du Plénipotentiaire d'Autriche relativement à l'état de l'effectif militaire de cette Puissance, avait prononcé des paroles qui semblaient révéler des dispositions peu favorables pour la politique des Cabinets alliés.

M. de Bismark a été désavoué et blâmé par son Gouvernement.

La Prusse déclare, en outre, qu'elle ne demande nullement que le contingent Autrichien reste sur le territoire fédéral, et qu'elle ne songe pas à l'armement des forteresses de Luxembourg et de Mayence.

No. 493.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 329. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, March 18, 1855.*

COUNT HATZFELDT stated to me yesterday that he had had the previous day an audience, with General Wedel, of the Emperor, during which the General had read to His Majesty the confidential memorandum with which your Lordship has also been made acquainted by M. Usedom, giving in general terms the propositions of the King of Prussia for accepting the Protocol of the 28th of December, and signing an eventual Treaty with the Western Powers. Count Hatzfeldt added that the Emperor had expressed himself to be satisfied with this communication, and that His Majesty thought that an understanding might be arrived at on the bases therein indicated.

I had the honour of dining yesterday at the Tuileries, and I took an opportunity of ascertaining how far Count Hatzfeldt's appreciation of the Emperor's sentiments was correct. I certainly found His Majesty under the impression that there was now a greater chance of coming to an understanding with Prussia than there had been. He seemed, however, to conceive, what does not appear to be the case, that the King of Prussia had offered to sign with the Western Powers a Treaty analogous to that signed between those Powers and Austria; but the Emperor still maintained the opinion that until that Treaty was reduced to a shape acceptable to all parties, and that the word of the King of Prussia had been solemnly pledged to sign it, a Prussian Plenipotentiary could not be readmitted to the Vienna Conferences. In fact, the only change that I saw in the Emperor's language was, that whereas he had formerly made the signature of a Treaty a *sine qua non* to Prussia's taking a part in the Conferences, His Majesty now seemed disposed to save the King of Prussia's *amour propre* by inviting him to join the allies, provided the latter pledged his word to the signature of a Treaty, the tenour of which should be previously agreed to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 494.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 330.)
My Lord, *Paris, March 18, 1855.*

I SHOULD hardly fulfil my duty towards Her Majesty's Government did I not call your Lordship's serious attention to the general desire for peace which manifests itself in this capital. Your Lordship is aware, that as far as my observation went, the war in which France is engaged was never popular: nevertheless, there was a certain class which always proclaimed its necessity, and predicted its success. I allude more particularly to those who, so to say, take their cue from the precincts of the Tuileries, that is, the Ministers of the Empire, and the more immediate attendants of the Emperor. Now, however, I look in vain for this limited approbation. With the exception of the Emperor himself, and a few of the younger military members of his household, I know not one who does not at the bottom of his heart respond to the cry of "La paix à tout prix."

This condemnation (for such it is in my eyes) your Lordship will say is sweeping. The fact is nevertheless true. I do not take upon myself to say that this will be lasting, for the very versatility of French character, which has partly produced it, may produce as suddenly feelings of an opposite tendency.

Your Lordship will naturally inquire what has led to this state of public opinion.

I need not repeat the reasons, to which I have had more than one occasion to allude, why this war has not met with the sympathy of the French nation at large; but I have no doubt that that which has excited this sudden alarm and

desire for peace, is the intention manifested by the Emperor of going in person to the Crimea. It is almost impossible to overrate the feelings of apprehension to which this determination has given rise; and the consequence is, that as there never is, never has been, and never will be, any political consistency in France, those who have been most clamorous for the war are the most anxious for peace, or I should rather say anxious for the recall of the French army from the Crimea, so that no excuse may be left to the Emperor to go there. But as this recall can only be one of the results of peace, it follows that they are anxious for peace on any terms.

I have not, however, observed as yet any symptoms of wavering on the part of the Emperor himself. Although His Majesty is not satisfied with the last reports from the seat of war, and is, I think, at length persuaded that Sebastopol cannot be taken as at present attacked, he does not despair of eventual success, nor would he willingly abandon the game. Those who know him best think, however, that he has given up the idea of going in person to the Crimea. My own persuasion is, that the intention is rather adjourned than renounced; and although events may happen which will incline His Majesty to abandon the idea altogether, such is not the present state of the question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 495.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 36.)

Copenhagen, March 7, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 364 of the 13th of December, respecting the cruelties committed at the battle of Inkermann on British wounded soldiers by the Russian army, I have the honour to inclose herewith the copy of a note which I received last night from M. de Scheel, inclosing the original of a note from M. de Séniavine to Baron Plessen, from which your Lordship will be glad to perceive that Prince Menchikoff's serious attention has been called to this subject, and that his Highness has been directed to use every effort to conduct, with a proper character of moderation, the war in which the Russian Government are engaged with Great Britain, and which they would be happy, if met in a conciliatory spirit by Her Majesty's Government, to be enabled to bring to an end.

As M. de Séniavine, however, has at the same time endeavoured to attribute the excesses of the Russian troops at Inkermann to the very improbable circumstance of British soldiers left as wounded in their rear by Russian advancing columns, having subsequently fired on them, and also to the death of a Russian non-commissioned officer alleged to have been treacherously shot by an English officer who had surrendered to him, I have thought it right to address a few lines to M. de Scheel, of which I inclose a copy herewith to your Lordship, in reply to his note, pointing out the improbability of the first statement, and stating that M. de Séniavine may be assured that the conduct complained of in the second, if it actually took place, will most certainly meet with the severe reprehension of Field-Marshal Lord Raglan and of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 495.

M. de Scheel to Mr. Buchanan.

Copenhagen, le 6 Mars, 1855.

Monsieur,

J'AI me suis empressé de faire part en son temps au Ministre du Roi à St. Pétersbourg du contenu de la note que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 20 Décembre dernier par ordre de votre Gouvernement, et à la suite des

instructions que j'ai en même temps fait parvenir à ce Ministre, il a transmis le $\frac{4\text{ Janvier}}{23\text{ Décembre}}$ dernier au Gouvernement Russe les pièces qui avaient été annexées à votre susdite note, en exprimant au Gouvernement Impérial la conviction de celui de Sa Majesté Britannique que des actes comme ceux mentionnés au procès-verbal (une des pièces transmises au Ministère Impérial) seraient reprouvés comme ils le méritaient par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale, et que des ordres seraient donnés à l'effet de prévenir la répétition d'actes semblables.

En réponse à cette communication M. de Séniavine a adressé au Baron de Plessen la lettre ci-jointe en original et portant la date du 9 Février v. s. Le Baron de Plessen suppose que cette réponse s'est fait attendre si longtemps par la raison que le Ministère Impérial aurait fait de la communication l'objet d'une correspondance avec le Prince Menchikoff en Crimée.

Le Baron Plessen observe que l'exemple cité dans la lettre de M. de Séniavine d'un officier Anglais qui, après avoir rendu son épée à un sous-officier Russe, doit avoir rabattu ce dernier d'un coup de pistolet, a dans le temps fait beaucoup parler à St. Pétersbourg. Ce fait se serait passé dans une des sorties des Russes pendant la nuit, et des officiers venant de la Crimée auraient raconté que l'officier Anglais fait prisonnier avait marché à côté du sous-officier Russe lui donnant le bras, et qu'il avait pris de sa poche un "revolver" avec lequel il l'avait étendu roide-mort. En ajoutant que le Baron de Plessen a tout particulièrement appelé mon attention sur la conclusion de la lettre ci-annexée, qui témoigne du désir du Gouvernement Russe de mettre un terme à la lutte éclatée entre la Grande Bretagne et la Russie, je vous prie, &c.

(Signé) SCHEEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 495.

M. de Séniavine to Baron de Plessen.

M. le Baron,

St. Pétersbourg, le 9 Février, 1855.

AVANT la réception de la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser sous la date du 4 Janvier, M. le Prince Menchikoff avait déjà porté à la connaissance du Cabinet Impérial la démarche collectivement faite par Lord Raglan et par le Général Canrobert, après la bataille d'Inkermann.

En réponse à cette communication, M. le Commandant-en-chef Prince Menchikoff a déclaré "qu'un ennemi sans défense est et sera toujours sous la protection du drapeau Russe."

Ce principe n'a besoin ni de commentaire ni de confirmation. En m'y référant, M. le Baron, je crois devoir vous faire observer toutefois que si malheureusement des soldats ennemis, sur le champ de bataille, ont pu devenir la victime de quelques actes isolés de violence, des renseignements qui nous sont parvenus depuis, nous ont révélé une circonstance grave qu'il importe de constater.

Nous avons appris qu'en effet, dans la journée d'Inkermann, des soldats Anglais qu'on croyait blessés et mis hors de combat, se sont relevés pour faire feu sur nos troupes, lorsqu'elles les eurent dépassés, au pas de charge, marchant à la poursuite de l'ennemi.

Atteints par les balles qui partaient d'une main qu'on croyait désarmée, nos soldats, dans la chaleur de l'action, ont pu se porter alors à de sanglantes représailles. L'humanité les reprouve hautement, mais n'ont-elles pas été provoquées, en quelque sorte, par un ennemi qu'on ne pouvait assurément pas regarder comme sans défense, lorsqu'il continuait encore à faire de ses armes un usage meurtrier?

Le sort de la guerre est soumis à des lois qu'il faut savoir respecter. Il en est une surtout qu'il est juste de rappeler encore ici. C'est que l'ennemi au moment où il rend les armes, ne doit pas s'en servir pour donner la mort à quiconque lui fait quartier. Or, nous avons entendu citer à regret l'exemple d'un officier Anglais qui, après avoir remis d'une main son épée à un sous-officier Russe, l'a renversé de l'autre, roide mort, d'un coup de pistolet tiré à bout-portant.

Si de pareils actes caractérisent l'acharnement de la lutte, ils suffisent pour expliquer les conséquences déplorables qu'elle entraîne à sa suite.

En relisant attentivement le procès-verbal joint à votre lettre du 4 Janvier, vous y remarquerez que, dans la plupart des cas y mentionnés, la retribution exercée par les soldats Anglais a été sanglante. Loin de tout désir de controverse et de récrimination, nous nous bornerons à en conclure qu'il serait mutuellement désirable pour les deux armées de ramener les esprits à une observation plus stricte des lois de l'humanité sur le champ de bataille.

Pour sa part M. le Prince Menchikoff n'est pas resté en retard pour remplir à cet égard les obligations que lui impose et l'autorité de son commandement et la volonté expresse de Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

Nous comptons avec une égale confiance sur les sentiments honorables du chef de l'armée Anglaise.

Je n'hésite point à exprimer cette confiance en vous restituant, M. le Baron, les documents que vous avez bien voulu me communiquer. Je n'ai pas manqué de les porter à la connaissance de M. le Prince Menchikoff, en l'invitant à prendre les informations y contenues dans sa considération la plus sérieuse, afin de contribuer de tous ses efforts à imprimer à la lutte actuelle ce caractère de modération dont ne devraient jamais se départir deux nations qui se respectent, bien qu'elles soient engagées dans un conflit auquel nous serions heureux de pouvoir mettre promptement un terme, si les intentions conciliantes du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique répondaient aux nôtres.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) LEON SENIAVINE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 495.

Mr. Buchanan to M. de Scheel.

Copenhagen, March 7, 1855.

Sir,

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's note of yesterday's date, communicating to me in original a note from M. de Séniavine to Baron Plessen, in reply to the representations which that Minister addressed to the Russian Government in January last, in conformity with instructions which your Excellency forwarded to him at my request, respecting certain acts of violence and cruelty committed on wounded British soldiers at the battle of Inkermann, while the Russian army temporarily occupied the ground on which they had fallen.

I shall lose no time in transmitting your Excellency's communication to Her Majesty's Government, who, I feel assured, will learn with much satisfaction that Prince Menchikoff's serious attention has been called to this subject, and that his Highness has been directed to use every effort to prevent a recurrence on the part of the troops under his command of acts such as those which it has been my duty to bring before the consideration of your Excellency. I cannot refrain, however, in the meanwhile from observing that the cause to which M. de Séniavine seems disposed to attribute the cruelties complained of, namely, that British soldiers supposed to have been wounded, and left in their rear by Russian advancing columns, had subsequently fired upon them, would argue the existence of a most extraordinary and infatuated determination on the part of these men to court their own certain destruction.

With regard to the allegation mentioned in your Excellency's note, that a British officer treacherously shot a Russian non-commissioned officer to whom he had surrendered, I can only say that if, on inquiry, it shall be found that such an occurrence took place under the circumstances described by Baron Plessen, M. de Séniavine may feel assured that it will meet with the severe reprehension of Field-Marshal Lord Raglan and of Her Majesty's Government.

In requesting your Excellency to communicate this note to Baron Plessen, I avail, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 496.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 42.)

My Lord, *Copenhagen, March* 12, 1855.

PRINCE CHRISTIAN of Denmark left Copenhagen last night on a mission of condolence from the King to the Russian Imperial family on the occasion of the death of the Emperor Nicholas.

I understand that it was with some difficulty the King was brought to consent to his Highness's wish to be employed on this service, and it is even said that His Majesty, on being first spoken to on the subject, objected to any mission at all taking place unless the Emperor Alexander should, in the first instance, send an officer to Copenhagen to announce his accession to the Russian throne.

With reference to this subject, I may mention another circumstance which has occasioned much criticism here; namely, that on the 5th instant a verbal message was conveyed by a footman to all persons belonging to the two first classes of society and to the diplomatic body, intimating a wish on the part of the King that they should immediately wear mourning for the late Emperor of Russia. This extraordinary proceeding, however, is to be attributed entirely, I am assured, to an undignified desire on the part of the Grand Marshal, M. de Levetzau, to ingratiate himself with the Russian Legation here and with the Imperial family at St. Petersburgh. I am positively assured that on the King's orders being taken on the subject, and on its being represented to him that a "deuil de chambre," or simple household mourning, had been worn by the Court for the late King of Sweden before the official notification of his death was received, His Majesty merely authorised a similar course to be followed on the present occasion; and that the Grand Marshal, who was a candidate for the mission to St. Petersburgh, took upon himself, on the authority of an obsolete work on etiquette, to give a more extended character to this kind of mourning than is usual at the Court of Denmark.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 497.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 334. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, March* 19, 1855.

I HAVE inquired of M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether any progress has been made in the Military Convention under discussion between the French and Austrian Governments.

His Excellency said that he had inquired of Count Crenneville whether he was prepared to sign it, but that the Count had replied that the conclusion of the Treaty was only contemplated by his Government in case the present negotiations for peace were broken off. M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that he was quite of the opinion conveyed from your Lordship through Count Walewski, that the immediate signature was desirable, as likely to have a favourable effect on the Vienna Conferences, and that he should advise the Emperor to send for Count Crenneville, and express a desire for its immediate conclusion.

I did not fail to hint to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that if the Austrian Government refused, the Emperor would do well to let them understand that he did not intend to be trifled with in matters of such importance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 498.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 302.) *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 329 of the 18th instant, in which you state that the Emperor maintains his opinion that a Prussian Plenipotentiary cannot be re-admitted to the Vienna Conferences until the King has pledged himself to sign a Treaty with the Western Powers analogous to that signed between those Powers and Austria, and in a shape acceptable to all parties; and I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government learn with much satisfaction that the Emperor's views on this matter are not changed, for it appears to them impossible that a Prussian Representative should be admitted to take part in the negotiations until Prussia has entered into engagements with France and England, or has bound herself to do so immediately after her readmission to the Conference.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 499.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 305.) *Foreign Office, March* 21, 1855.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a note* from Count Bernstorff, inclosing copies of despatches from Baron Manteuffel to Counts Bernstorff and Platzfeldt, respecting the adhesion of Prussia to the Protocol of the 28th December.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 500.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 127.) *Berlin, March* 19, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, in translation, copy of a circular despatch addressed by Baron Manteuffel to the Prussian Representatives at the German Courts, dated March 8th, with the object of counteracting the impression which had been produced by certain propositions submitted to the Diet by M. de Bismarck-Schönhausen, as well as by the language which had been attributed to him.

This very lame and inconclusive defence of M. de Bismarck's conduct has been apparently published in the Berlin journals, as a reply to the article in the "Moniteur," reporting the disavowal of M. de Bismarck's conduct, which was telegraphed from Paris, and appeared in the evening papers of the 17th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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* See No. 427.

Inclosure in No. 500.

Circular addressed to the Prussian Representatives at the German Courts.

(Translation.) *Berlin, March* 8, 1855.

YOU will find inclosed a copy of a confidential despatch which I addressed to the Royal Minister at Paris on the 2nd instant. You will perceive that I have been induced to do so, in consequence of the conduct of the Royal Minister at a sitting in the Diet having been subjected to a criticism on the part of a foreign Government, which the Royal Government considers to be incompatible with the dignity and independence of Germany. For this very reason I have not entered into the matter itself with the French Government, and I further believe that I can here likewise confine myself to a few remarks in defence of the point of view of the Royal Government against misrepresentations, which have been entered against us in several cases.

The motives of the Decree of the Diet of the 8th of February are clear and distinct. If, therefore, it has been attempted later not to ignore them, but to convert them into the contrary; in other words, if a measure which had for its object the internal and external strengthening of Germany, without at the moment combining with it the smallest demonstration, was afterwards to be stamped as a demonstration against one side, the right of such an endeavour must be denied on principle. This has been done by the Royal Minister at the Diet. Is a demonstration against the other side therein contained? Not in the least. Germany would indeed be far gone, if the reference to the security and independence of the Germanic Confederation consequent on the menacing situation of Europe, was to be interpreted and taken amiss as a provocation towards a foreign country. We at least are of opinion that this reference is by far too much in consonance with the dignity of Germany to require a corrective at all, not to say one that originates in Treaties in which the Confederation had no part, and the practical range of which it does not even clearly see at the present moment. We have reason to suppose that many of our German allies partake of this view; otherwise the motives for the Decree of the 8th of February would not have been accepted in the Committees, as well as in the assembly of the Diet, with a majority bordering on unanimity. Had not an interpretation been at a later period put upon these motives which was foreign to them, the Royal Envoy at the Diet would not have found himself obliged to re-establish them in their original and general form, which contains no demonstration against any side; but as it was, the consequences of the principle had to be pointed out with precision and exactness.

It might have been hoped that this, chiefly a confidential exchange of ideas, would not have lost its original character by a premature and incorrect publicity. But also since this has unfortunately been done—an experience which Prussia is accustomed to by the pointed communications of the German as well as of the foreign press, by which, however, at the risk of being misunderstood and suspected, she will not suffer herself to be misled—it would have been easy to separate the truth from the exaggeration. All sorts of proposals have been talked of, which Prussia had made or was going to make; as, for example, that the full Federal contingents should on all sides be placed in position on the territory of the Germanic Confederation; that the Federal fortresses were to be armed, &c. We have indeed been surprised at this activity developed in our name. We have particularly perceived from our diplomatic reports, that a series of Austrian circulars treats this matter, and as it were canvasses for votes against proposals which we were going to make to the Diet. Several German Governments started with the decided supposition that these circulars had also been communicated to us; but this is not the case. If the Cabinet of Vienna had mooted the matter with us, it would soon have been proved that the views attributed to us did not exist; the majority of those circulars would thus have become without an object, and might perhaps have been suppressed. I will not discuss at present whether the true interests of Germany, who in this great European crisis longs for really independent unity and vigour, arising from a consciousness of her strength and the aims she has

in view, but not for an artificial exertion of her energies, derived from foreign impulses, would have gained or lost by it.

The position of the Royal Government towards the decree of the Diet is as simple as it is clear. As a Power of the Germanic Confederation they will stand by its "motives" as long as the Diet does not give them a more decided tendency by fresh decrees. Whether and in what sense the Diet will do this, is a question of futurity which indeed stands on the threshold of the present. Prussia does not mistake the gravity of the moment, and will not desert the German fatherland. But exactly because she does not mistake it, she will not permit her free sight to be veiled by interpretations forced upon her. With this view Prussia is however conscious that she is free not only from every intention of demonstration, but also from any hidden thoughts or irritated spirit against the Western Powers.

You will express yourself in the sense of the above remarks to the Government to whom you have the honour of being accredited, as also confidentially whenever you have reason to suppose that opinions are gaining ground as to our point of view, which are only based on a misrepresentation of facts.

(Signed) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 501.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 341.)

Paris, March 21, 1855.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS mentioned to me this afternoon that Count Walewski had informed him that although it was your Lordship's opinion that the French Government should accept the proposition of Austria for the conclusion of a Military Treaty, you reserved to yourself to consult the Cabinet before you gave a definitive answer. His Excellency requested me to call the matter to your Lordship's recollection, and to request you to let him know the decision of the Cabinet.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 502.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 342.)

Paris, March 21, 1855.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received M. de Bourqueney's despatches, giving an account of the Conferences held at Vienna on the 17th and 18th instant, together with a copy of the Protocol signed on the latter day. Your Lordship will have received similar reports from Her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries, and I need not refer more in detail to what passed on those occasions.

M. de Bourqueney speaks in high terms of the perfect understanding which exists between himself and Lord John Russell—not the shadow of a difference of opinion had as yet shown itself between them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 503.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 33.)

Foreign Office, March 22, 1855.

Sir,

I APPROVE the reply which you gave to M. de Scheel, on the subject of M. de Séniavine's explanation of Russian cruelties in the Crimea, and of which a copy was inclosed in your despatch No. 36 of the 7th instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 504.

Baron Usedom to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 22.)

Londres, le 16 Mars, 1855.

My Lord,

LES négociations relatives au Traité analogue à celui du 2 Décembre dernier ayant rencontré quelques difficultés, je me permets en attendant de soumettre à l'attention de votre Excellence le projet ci-joint d'une déclaration qui, selon l'opinion du Roi mon auguste Maître, pourrait servir à préciser la position de la Prusse dans le conflit actuel, ainsi que dans les négociations de paix destinées à le terminer. La Prusse réclame son droit de participer aux Conférences de Vienne avant que la négociation officielle du "Traité analogue" soit ouverte, et il est bien entendu que même le présent projet de déclaration devrait rester sans effet, si l'invitation à la dite Conférence était différée plus longtemps.

Je puis cependant assurer à votre Excellence que les bonnes dispositions du Roi pour la conclusion du "Traité analogue" sont invariables et que les négociations y relatives seront reprises aussitôt que le court délai demandé par Sa Majesté sera expiré.

J'ai, &c.

(Signé) USEDOM.

Inclosure in No. 504.

Draft of Declaration.

1. PAR suite de graves événements survenus, la Prusse demande une suspension momentanée des négociations avec l'Angleterre et la France.

2. Elle accède cependant sans réserve au Protocole du 28 Décembre dernier, déjà accepté par la Russie, et se déclare prête à le signer.

3. Elle donne l'assurance qu'en aucun cas elle ne se rangera du côté de la Russie dans le conflit actuel, mais qu'elle continuera à se regarder comme placée du côté des Puissances Occidentales, pourvu que les procédés de celles-ci envers elle ne prennent un caractère qui blesserait sa dignité ou menacerait ses intérêts.

4. Enfin la Prusse se déclare prête d'avance à prendre éventuellement part d'une manière active à une alliance Occidentale, ayant pour but de repousser par la force des armes toute agression future de la Russie contre l'Empire Ottoman.

No. 505.

Count Bernstorff to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 24.)

Le 17 Mars, 1855.

M. le Comte

POUR le cas où je ne vous trouverais pas chez vous, j'ai fait écrire sur la feuille ci-jointe une déclaration que je voulais vous faire de vive voix. Veuillez la regarder comme faite de cette manière et d'ordre de mon Gouvernement. J'ai l'honneur d'ajouter, en réponse à la question que vous m'avez faite l'autre jour, que le Roi a adhéré au Protocole du 28 Décembre et s'est seulement la ratification personnelle si les Puissances alliées la désiraient.

Comme j'aurais l'honneur de dîner chez vous au soir, j'aurais l'occasion d'apprendre ce que vous aurez résolu.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) BERNSTORFF.

Inclosure in No. 505.

Declaration.

LE Roi réclame sa participation aux Conférences de Vienne comme un droit appartenant à la Prusse en sa triple qualité de Grande Puissance Européenne, de co-signataire du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, et de co-signataire des Protocoles antérieurs concernant la question d'Orient, et Sa Majesté ne veut pas acheter ce droit.

Si l'invitation de prendre part aux Conférences lui est adressée, la Prusse remplira consciencieusement ses obligations résultant des Protocoles et ne reculera devant aucune conséquence qui en dérivera. Dans le cas contraire le Gouvernement du Roi supposera qu'on ne veut pas faire usage des obligations de la Prusse et de sa loyale coopération, et se réservera ses résolutions ultérieures.

No. 506.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 345. Confidential.)

Paris, March 22, 1855.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS sends Count Walewski by to-night's mail a memorandum on the possibility of terminating the question of Russian supremacy in the Black Sea, by shutting that sea to all vessels of war, Russian and Turkish included. It is not impossible that a scheme of this nature might find greater favour with the Russian Plenipotentiaries than a plan of limitation which would admit of the presence of foreign pennants in the Black Sea. If the project is feasible, it would be the simplest of any, and would least interfere with the Treaty of 1841.

I thought it, however, right to remark to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that great precautions would be necessary in framing any Treaty on this basis, for unless some security was taken against the assembling of large military forces on the coasts of Russia, and against the construction of large steam-transports, which might be easily and suddenly converted into ships of war, there could be no permanent safety for Turkey. We might be sure that as soon as the return of peace permitted it, railroads would be established throughout Russia, as well as electric telegraphs communicating between all important stations. We should never again, therefore, have the same chance of curbing the ambition of Russia as at the present moment. If the difficulties we had met with now were great, how much greater would they become when Russia had ascertained where her weakness lay, and how it was to be remedied?

It could not be said that, because France and England had not done all they wished to do during the first year of the war, they were to abandon all hope

of success hereafter, nor should they on that account accept an unsatisfactory peace.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that he agreed in this opinion, and that he felt with me that if the system of "the neutrality of the Black Sea" (as he called it) was to prevail, as the basis upon which the third point should be discussed, considerable care would be required in framing the provisions which declared that neutrality. All he desired for the present was to submit the idea to your Lordship's consideration. He should send his memorandum on the subject at the same time to M. de Bourqueney, but with instructions not to make use of it unless the British Plenipotentiaries received orders to adopt the idea.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys argues that, if Russia admits the principle of the exclusion of all ships of war, it will follow as a corollary that none but commercial ports are wanted in the Black Sea, and that where there are commercial ports, there must be foreign Consuls. Thus the three main objects of the notes exchanged between the English and French Governments, as those to be insisted on in discussing the third point, would find their solution: limitation, or rather disappearance of Russian vessels from the Black Sea; annihilation of military ports; introduction of Consular Agents. He observed further, that these regulations must of course be extended to the Sea of Azof.

As I remarked before, the question is, Can this scheme be realized? M. Drouyn de Lhuys said, that when he mentioned it to the Emperor, His Majesty was much taken by it.

I think, on the whole, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys' language has been more firm these last two or three days. He probably sees the impossibility of inducing the Emperor to agree to terms which would not effectually secure the objects for which the allies went to war. Nevertheless I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that his Excellency is not to be depended upon. The alliance with Austria having been one of the great objects of his policy, he would make peace, if it depended upon him, sooner than admit that he had failed in bringing Austria into the field, having always asserted that she would eventually join the allies. Any danger, therefore, of the retraction of Austria, or any hope of preventing the Emperor going to the Crimea, would make him ready to accept terms which I venture to think could not be agreed to by Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 507.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 231.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 23*, 1855.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 160 of the 5th of March.

Your Excellency will see by Lord John Russell's despatch to me No. 21, of which a copy has been sent to you from Vienna, that the Turkish Ambassador there has not received full powers. It appears also that the Ambassador requires to be accompanied by an interpreter, and cannot, therefore, take a proper part in the Conferences.

Her Majesty's Government regret to observe, that with respect to the Conferences and negotiations for peace now opened at Vienna, the Porte exhibits a neglect of its own interests and of the wishes of Her Majesty's Government.

I have to instruct your Excellency to communicate this despatch to the Grand Vizier.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 508.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 237.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 23, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government approves of your Excellency's language to the Turkish Government, as reported in your despatch No. 161 of the 5th of March, and it is hardly necessary to say that your views respecting the condition of the Turkish Empire and the necessity of reform, meet with the entire concurrence of Her Majesty's Government; but past experience is destructive of confidence in the sincerity of the intentions now professed by the Porte, that corruption and abuses shall be no longer tolerated.

The information received by Her Majesty's Government from various quarters in the Ottoman dominions prove, that in places distant from the capital the decrees promulgated some months ago have not been published, and their existence is not even acknowledged by some of the Turkish authorities.

The same abuses continue; corruption is as great as ever, and its consequences as fatal; no improvement in the condition of Christians has been effected, and the same signs of dissolution are manifest throughout the social system of Turkey.

If the Turkish Government is honest in its intentions and alive to its danger, it would find the means of enforcing obedience to its decrees; otherwise the mere publication of such decrees at Constantinople can only be regarded as a snare and a delusion.

Her Majesty's Government, relying upon your Excellency's experience, are willing to hope, with you, that the new enactments may prove the beginning of a serious reform; but they, at the same time, entirely concur with you, and you cannot too often or too earnestly impress it on the Turkish Ministers, that the day is not distant when the united voice of Christendom will extort those measures from the Porte which, with honour and advantage to itself, it might spontaneously have adopted.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 509.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 314.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 24, 1855.*

IN reply to your Excellency's despatch No. 341 of the 21st instant, I have to instruct you to acquaint M. Drouyn de Lhuys that it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that it would be advisable for France to sign the Military Convention with Austria.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 510.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 318.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 24, 1855.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of communications * which I have received from Baron von Usedom and from Count Bernstorff, on the present position of Prussia with regard to the negotiations now going on at Vienna.

I also inclose copies of the answers † which I have returned to Baron von Usedom and Count Bernstorff.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* Nos. 504 and 505. † Nos. 511 and 512.

No. 511.

The Earl of Clarendon to Baron von Usedom.

M. le Baron, *Foreign Office, March 24, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 16th instant, together with its inclosures.

Her Majesty's Government have carefully considered the project of declaration which, in the opinion of the King of Prussia, will serve to define the position of Prussia in the present conflict as well as in the negotiations for peace, and it is with sincere regret I have to inform you, M. le Baron, that Her Majesty's Government, so far from considering that the position of Prussia is defined by the proposed declaration, can discover in it nothing beyond a conditional neutrality. Prussia agrees to sign the Treaty of 28th December, but implies that she does so, as it has already been accepted by Russia. She will give an assurance not to take part with Russia in the present conflict and will continue to consider herself placed on the side of the Western Powers, provided that their proceedings towards her do not assume a character that would wound her dignity or threaten her interests.

Permit me to observe, M. le Baron, that the value of this assurance is greatly diminished by the vagueness of the condition on which it is made to depend. So long as England and France are in alliance with Prussia, it can never be their intention to wound her dignity or menace her interests; but it would seem that if any act of theirs should have that construction put upon it in the course of a war that may embrace the whole continent of Europe, they must then no longer reckon on Prussia considering herself as placed on their side. Prussia further declares her readiness eventually to take an active part in a western alliance having for its object to repel by force of arms all future aggression on the part of Russia against the Ottoman Empire. Upon this I will only observe that such an alliance is not at present in contemplation; but should it hereafter be formed, the accession to it by Prussia will be regarded by Her Majesty's Government as an event of great importance.

You state, M. le Baron, that Prussia insists upon her right to take part in the Conferences before the official negotiation of the analogous Treaty is opened, and it is to be well understood that the project of declaration is not to take effect if the invitation to the said Conferences is longer deferred.

The rights of Prussia as a great European Power will always be readily acknowledged and faithfully observed by Her Majesty's Government, and if the position of Prussia as a great European Power had alone entitled her to take part in the Conferences, the invitation to attend them would long since have been conveyed to Berlin; but of the five Powers which take part in those Conferences four are actually belligerents, and the fifth is bound by a solemn engagement to become a belligerent, if certain conditions are not agreed to by Russia.

Austria does not take part in the Conferences simply as a great European Power, but in virtue of the engagement into which she has entered with England and France. The Treaty of December 2nd is the condition on which the Western Powers entered with Austria upon negotiations with Russia. If that Treaty had not been signed, Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French would not have assented to the Conference, and none would have been held at Vienna.

It is clear, therefore, that in inviting Prussia to enter upon a similar engagement, England and France both recognised her position as a great European Power, and manifested their desire to place themselves on the same footing with her as with Austria. Prussia, however, has declined to contract any engagement, immediate or eventual, but still claims to occupy a place in the Conference, which would be anomalous, undefined, and altogether distinct from that of the other five Powers.

The dignity and the interests of England and France forbid the admission of this claim; but no right of Prussia as a great European Power is thereby called in question or disregarded. Her Majesty's Government deeply regrets that in this great crisis of European affairs, England and Prussia should not be found in close alliance together. They do not abandon the hope that a common interest

may yet lead to united counsels and action, and they will welcome any overture towards a better understanding that Prussia may think consistent with her honour and her interests.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 512.

The Earl of Clarendon to Count Bernstorff.

M. le Comte, *Foreign Office, March* 24, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the declaration which you transmitted to me on the 17th instant, in a private letter requesting that I would consider it as a verbal communication.

The desire of Her Majesty's Government to promote a good understanding with Prussia is so sincere that I abstain from offering the remarks that this declaration invites; and I have the honour, M. le Comte, to transmit to you the copy of a note* which I have addressed to Baron von Usedom upon another declaration that he was instructed to communicate to me.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 513.

Lords John Russell and Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 24, 6·15 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, Saturday, March* 24, 1 P.M.

YOU will receive the 3rd Protocol by the messenger sent to-morrow. It contains the agreement on first point; provides for the Provinces being consulted before final settlement of their future Government; leaves an opening for adoption of a defensive system, for mediation between the Provinces and the Sultan at any future time on the part of the guaranteeing Powers, and for the exclusion from the Provinces of disturbers of peace, and of persons whose designs may injure neighbouring Powers.

Two Conferences on the second point have been since held, but the Protocols are not yet signed. I think they will give a survey of all channels of the Danube, and in a Superior European Commission, the presence of an English Commissioner. Russian Minister objected to ships of war at mouth of Danube.

The third point to be discussed on Monday. I have conversed with Count Buol upon it, but can only agree with him as far as regards accepting in lieu of a specified diminution of the Russian fleet, the state of the fleet at the signature of the preliminaries. He does not say that if we abate our original demands, and Russia still refuses, Austria would consider that refusal a cause for war.

No. 514.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 25.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 20, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's despatch No. 14 of the 15th instant, and I will take this opportunity of adverting to several points of that despatch.

With respect to the Protectorate hitherto exercised by Russia over the Principalities, I conceive no doubt can exist. All exclusive protection over the Principalities is expressly renounced in the first Article. Baron Bourqueney in

* No. 511.

explicit terms required that the ancient Treaties between Russia and the Porte having ceased by the war, could not be claimed as a right, nor interposed as an obstacle.

Count Buol was of opinion that when the general stipulations of the four points were gone through, the several Treaties might be examined with a view to see whether any part of them should be revived.

Prince Gortchakoff does not make any difficulty on this head. Nor do I imagine there will be found any objection to your Lordship's suggestion that "one new Treaty should contain every stipulation necessary for regulating the relations between Russia and Turkey."

I suppose some of the stipulations relating to the boundaries of the two Empires may be necessary.

With respect to Count Buol's proposal to divide the Conference into Committees, I think it has been misunderstood; the intention was that, after each Article had been thoroughly sifted, it should be referred to some members of the Conference for its details.

When, however, the Conference had completed the discussion on the first Article, it was observed by Prince Gortchakoff that we had in fact done the work of the Commission; that the Articles we had agreed to were sufficiently broad and comprehensive to be inserted in the preliminaries of peace, and that the work of detail must be left to the Sultan, the Principalities, and the allied Powers, in the manner already agreed upon.

These observations were generally approved, and no Commission was appointed. For the other three points a Commission will be still less necessary, and your Lordship's remarks will be found still more applicable.

With respect to frontier fortresses, my intimation that it might be proposed to garrison these fortresses by a mixed garrison of Austrians and Turks, originated in no official source. I have reason to believe that the suggestion came from some of the Austrian military, and has not been adopted by the Government.

So far as the Conference is concerned, the only proposition before us was to have native troops maintained and increased in numbers for the purpose of a system of defence.

I may here remark that, for the present moment at least, the jealousy of Russia seems to be directed against Austria. The proposal (a very objectionable one) to refer Wallachian and Turkish disputes to a permanent Conference at Vienna, presided over by Austria, was instantly resisted by Prince Gortchakoff on the grounds of Turkish independence, and the danger of perpetual interference; so that at the present time Russia, having given up her Protectorate in form, seems determined that no other Power shall seize the inheritance.

Some advantage to the world may be derived from this disposition. I found that when I suggested a Representative Council for the two Provinces, although nothing formal was done upon it, the proposal was cordially approved by the Plenipotentiary of Russia.

With respect to the third point the matter is so important that I must address your Lordship in a separate despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 515.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 26.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 20, 1855.

THE discussion on the development of the first Article of the four points was resumed and concluded in the Conference of Monday last.

The Russian Plenipotentiary having put in modified propositions, it was thought right to begin again with the first Article.

But Prince Gortchakoff made no objection, either to the declaration against any exclusive protection, nor to the inference that the Turkish Treaties with Russia must not be renewed. He only requested that the new system might be adopted before the old was discarded.

The Articles which were approved underwent a good deal of correction in point of language, but very little in substance.

I was somewhat apprehensive of the support I might receive from the Russian Plenipotentiary if I urged too far a change in the form of naming the Prince, the duration of his power, and the introduction of representative institutions. But it was understood that all these propositions would be considered before the Sultan finally submitted to the Provinces the new Organic or Constitutive Statute.

The Provinces will in any case have a separate and national administration, complete freedom of religious worship and of trade, or, in other words, religious and commercial liberty.

The danger to be feared is, that the guaranteeing Powers will be inclined to interfere too often and too much. But as England and France will always have a voice, they may use it to check the over-meddling to which Austria and Russia are prone.

If these fine Provinces can be well governed by a Prince, not a native, and appointed for life, they will be prosperous in themselves, and a bulwark for the Turkish Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 516.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 27.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 20, 1855.*

IN considering the negotiations for peace, it is necessary to take into view our prospects should they be broken off.

We blockade all the Russian ports in the Black Sea, and all the Russian ports in the Baltic during the time that sea is free from ice.

Our policy with regard to neutrals, however, deprives us of one great means of crippling an enemy's trade, and Russian produce comes in large quantities into England.

We have a considerable force of French and English in the Crimea. But the enemy, with an equal or superior force, is strongly intrenched both in the town of Sebastopol and outside its walls.

Should the negotiation break off, leaving Austria neutral, the Russian army in the Crimea will be reinforced, and the French and English troops, however superior in quality, can hardly be expected to advance far beyond their present positions. Even if Sebastopol were to fall, however gratifying the triumph, this state of things would not be greatly altered.

It seems therefore most desirable, in order to strike an effective blow at Russia, that Austria should come into the field.

She might not only make a diversion to our attack on the Crimea, but she might invade and possess herself of Bessarabia, an ancient part of Moldavia, and perhaps make a successful attack on the Polish provinces of Russia.

The present Emperor will hardly have that sway over his Generals and armies which his father exercised with such vigour and authority.

It is therefore a great object to obtain the assistance of Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 517.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 28.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 21, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the second of the four points was discussed to-day in Conference.

The proposals put forward in detail by Baron Prokesch for the free navigation of the Danube embraced provisions for constituting a syndicate or commission for framing regulations, and a permanent Commission to guard and put in execution the regulations thus laid down.

As I shall have the proposals in writing to-morrow, I will defer addressing your Lordship in more detail upon them to-day.

Our next meeting is fixed for the 23rd, when the third point will be discussed.

The present state of the question appears to be this: Count Buol has adopted, and the Conference have sanctioned, the wording of the third point as contained in the memorandum of the 28th of December.

Count Buol will probably state to the Conference that there are two ways of attaching Turkey more completely to the balance of power and putting an end to Russian preponderance in the Black Sea: the one by weakening the naval force of Russia, the other by strengthening the naval and military defences of Turkey and her allies.

Count Buol will probably propose the former of these courses, as the most direct, the most simple, the most economical, and the most pacific.

The Russian Plenipotentiary may be expected to declare that the honour of Russia will not allow him to consent to any limitation of the naval force of Russia in her own ports. He may perhaps say, that innocent of any design of attacking Constantinople, Russia is yet fully determined not to let any other Great Power hold it. That the Western Powers have declared, by words and deeds, their jealousy of her; she must now, in her turn, evince her jealousy of them.

Propositions may be made, with the view of raising Turkey and her allies to something like equality with Russia in the Black Sea.

I do not consider that Her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries will be called upon to discuss very seriously these propositions. The utmost they can be expected to do is to state the reasons for the course which they prefer, and if they fail in obtaining the consent of Russia, to lay the whole case before Her Majesty's Government.

Supposing the most unfavourable view to be the truth, namely, that Russia will not consent to limit her naval forces, the whole position will, no doubt, be carefully considered by the Governments of France and England.

For this purpose Her Majesty's Government will take into consideration the posture of affairs before the war; the present state of negotiations and of the war; and lastly, the prospects of the war.

The posture of affairs before the war may be very soon described. From the time of Catherine II to 1853, during a period of a century, Russia had been gradually encroaching upon Turkey. In territory she had gained Bessarabia, the Crimea, and other provinces; in influence, a preponderating voice in the affairs of the Principalities, and an official protection of all the Christian subjects of the Porte.

From the Treaty of Kainardji in 1774 to that of Adrianople in 1829, every compact had borne evidence of the advancing power of Russia and the increased weakness of Turkey. Before the breaking out of the present war, Russia dictated a note which she required to be signed by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, recording further subjection and still greater humiliation.

At the present time Russia consents to substitute for her Treaties regarding the Principalities a general guarantee of the Contracting Powers, and to relinquish to the same Powers the general securities for the observance of the privileges granted to the Christians by the Porte. These are immense concessions; but, according to supposition, she will propose to retain a great naval force in Sebastopol, and an army on land ready to be embarked on an expedition against Constantinople.

The question is, how, in the case of the continuance of war, we can deprive her of this power of perpetual menace. Supposing Sebastopol taken, I doubt whether she will grant then what she refuses now.

The Anglo-French army in the Crimea will hardly suffice to impose harder conditions, if it is to be opposed by all the disposable forces of Russia.

The finances and trade of Russia are far from being so crippled as to force her to yield. Her national spirit is high, and her young Emperor can hardly venture to offend the Muscovite party.

I arrive, therefore, at the conclusion that we shall have no early prospect of peace unless we can incline Austria to take part on our side. For the sake of Europe, and her own interest in the effectual restraint of Russian ambition, Austria ought now to take this decided part.

I have agreed with Count Buol that he is to receive M. Bourqueney, Lord Westmorland, and me to-morrow, in order to endeavour to act in concert together on the following day.

Upon the result of this interview, the most important consequences may depend. Feeling deeply my own responsibility, I must trust to the indulgence of Her Majesty to excuse the errors which, in this difficult crisis, I may commit.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 518.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 24.)

(Separate and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 21, 1855.*

DURING an interval of the sitting of the Conference on the 19th instant, and in the absence of the other members, I took an opportunity to say to Prince Gortchakoff, that I hoped he would write to Count Nesselrode to be very cautious in his instructions on the third Article of the bases of negotiation.

Prince Gortchakoff at once replied that his instructions never varied; that they were such as, if a Russian, I should have given myself. Russia, he said, could not consent to limit the number of her ships: if she did so she would forfeit honour; she would be no more Russia. I might ask, he continued, why she wanted a force in the Black Sea? He would tell me plainly. They did not want to possess Turkey; they would be glad to maintain the Sultan, but they knew it was impossible; he must perish. They were resolved not to let any other Power have Constantinople. They must not have that door to their dominions in the hands of a formidable European Power.

Here, then, is an avowal on the part of Russia that she means not only to maintain a fleet in the Black Sea, but a strong fleet. At any moment when a French or English fleet might happen to be in the Levant, she might believe, or pretend to believe, that we or the French were going to dethrone the Sultan, and try to get before us.

This is a real danger to Europe, by Russia's own showing.

On the other hand, Count Buol is getting more and more uneasy. He sees how humiliating would be the position of Austria if, our proposals being reasonable, we were left at war, and Austria, after all her warlike preparations, were to yield to the policy of Prussia. Her position in Germany would be gone; her weight in Europe greatly diminished.

I informed Count Buol, in a conversation I had with him yesterday, that I had received a despatch from your Lordship (No. 14 of March 15), and that although Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider the measures he might propose on the second alternative, namely, that of establishing a counterpoise, instead of prescribing a limit to the Russian force in the Black Sea, they could not hold out hopes that such a plan would be found satisfactory.

Count Buol was very anxious that we should keep together in our proposals. With this view he suggested that we might propose that Russia should not maintain a greater naval force in the Black Sea than she has at the present time. Although this is short of what we proposed to demand, yet if Count Buol will stand by it, I strongly advise your Lordship and Her Majesty's Government to accept and support it.

I do not believe Russia would agree to any limitation of her fleet, but her evident hope is to divide us from Austria, to give to Austria and to Germany all that Austria and Germany may be supposed to be anxious for, to insist on the guarantees for the fourth point, and to refuse haughtily any limitation of her naval force in the Black Sea.

The more I examine the plan of counterpoise as opposed to limitation, the

more I am convinced it would break down. Arsenals and fleets in the hands of Turkey would be neglected and inefficient; constructed and maintained by France and England they would be found very costly, and as soon as the danger was removed a little way off by time they would be reduced or abandoned.

A Treaty of Alliance between Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, for the defence of Turkey if attacked, would be a security, but it should be an additional security.

My opinion is, therefore, that we should endeavour to combine with Count Buol a joint plan of action before we discuss the third point in Conference. Baron Bourqueney is entirely of this opinion.

It is said that the Russian Plenipotentiary was greatly disappointed at our union in the opening Conference. If we can maintain the same union on the third point, either Russia will yield, or Austria will join us in the war.

For this purpose it is essential that our proposals should be as moderate as we can make them, consistently with the safety of Europe.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 519.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 29.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 21, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship two copies of the Protocol (No. 2) of the second Conference which was held on the 17th instant, and I take this opportunity to explain to your Lordship that the paper which I inclosed in my despatch No. 22 of the 17th instant, would have been more accurately described as containing the first three Articles of Baron Prokesch's original project, in the form in which M. Titoff proposed they should stand. This you will perceive on comparing them with the first three Articles of the Annex C to the Protocol, now inclosed, with which they are identical.

In the Conference of the 19th instant, the Protocol of which was signed to-day, the several points specified in Annex C and in M. Prokesch's paper were successively discussed, and, as I have stated in my despatch No. 25 of the 20th instant, so far reduced into shape as to render it unnecessary, in the opinion of the Plenipotentiaries, to have recourse to a Commission for their further revision.

The form in which the several points passed the Conference will appear in an Annex to the Protocol, which I shall have the honour of forwarding to your Lordship as soon as possible after I shall have received it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 519.

Protocol (No. 2) of a Conference held at Vienna, March 17, 1855.

Présens:

Pour l'Autriche—
M. le Comte de Buol-Schauenstein, et
M. le Baron de Prokesch-Osten;

Pour la France—
M. le Baron de Bourqueney;

Pour la Grande Bretagne—
Lord John Russell, et
M. le Comte de Westmorland;

Pour la Russie—
M. le Prince Gortchakoff, et
M. de Titoff;

Pour la Turquie—
Aarif Effendi.

MM. LES Plénipotentiaires ont repris la discussion sur le développement à donner à la première des quatre garanties.

M. le Prince de Gortchakoff a établi que le but commun des Puissances était d'apporter à la situation des Principautés Danubiennes toutes les améliorations dont elle pourrait être susceptible. Il pense donc que ce serait simplifier la question que de constater d'abord le *statu quo* de leurs privilèges qui devraient être conservés et d'examiner ensuite ce qui pourrait y être ajouté, afin de développer, autant que possible, le bien-être de ces pays. Ce mode de procéder serait, selon lui, éminemment fait pour rassurer les esprits dans les Principautés elles-mêmes.

Pour expliquer davantage sa pensée il a donné lecture de la pièce ci-annexée en copie sous Litt. A.

Passant à la Serbie, il a fait observer que sa position était différent de celle de la Moldavie et de la Valachie.

En donnant également lecture de la pièce annexée sous Litt. B, qui résume les privilèges dont la Serbie est actuellement en possession, il a déclaré que la Russie ne consentira pas à ce qu'ils soient amoindris.

Ayant dans les conclusions de l'aperçu sur la Moldavie et la Valachie fait mention de la garantie des Cinq Puissances sous laquelle devraient à l'avenir être placés les privilèges des Principautés, il en a pris texte pour faire consigner au Protocole les profonds regrets qu'il éprouve de ne pas voir la Prusse représentée dans la Conférence. Il a fait ressortir les graves inconvénients que pourrait entraîner l'absence de cette Puissance d'une réunion qui doit régler des questions d'équilibre général et s'occuper de la révision d'un Traité Européen auquel la Prusse a été Partie Contractante. Partant du point de vue que les Plénipotentiaires réunis ici ont pour but commun de fonder un nouvel ordre de choses sur la base des quatre principes connus, il a émis l'opinion que du moment que la Prusse adhère à ces principes, rien ne devrait s'opposer à sa participation aux délibérations qui ont pour objet leur développement.

M. le Comte Buol a fait observer que l'Autriche s'associait on ne peut plus sincèrement aux regrets exprimés par M. le Prince Gortchakoff; que le Cabinet de Vienne pouvait se rendre le témoignage d'avoir fait tout ce qui avait dépendu de lui pour faciliter la participation de la Prusse aux délibérations de la Conférence; que toutefois l'œuvre de la paix ne devrait point être arrêtée par l'abstention du Cabinet de Berlin; et que pour ce motif il désirait que le second des principes généraux que M. le Prince Gortchakoff proposait de consacrer par le Traité de Paix, fût formulé par les termes, "accord des Puissances Contractantes," au lieu de dire, "accord des Cinq Puissances."

Les Cabinets représentés ici n'auraient certes pas le droit de stipuler au nom de la Prusse; mais rien ne les empêcherait de s'entendre sur les moyens de ménager à cette Puissance la faculté d'accéder, sous une forme ou sous l'autre, au résultat de leurs négociations.

Le Prince Gortchakoff a dit qu'il n'était point entré dans ses intentions de subordonner la marche ultérieure des négociations de paix à la participation de la Prusse, mais qu'il avait parlé de la garantie collective des Cinq Puissances, puisque le même terme avait été employé dans des documents antérieurs signés par les trois Cabinets, et qu'il avait le désir, autant que l'espoir, de voir la Prusse concourir aux arrangements à conclure, soit en intervenant encore dans les négociations pendantes, soit en accédant pour le moins à leurs résultats.

Le Baron de Bourqueney a posé en fait que son Gouvernement avait non seulement désiré voir la Prusse prendre part aux Conférences de Paix, mais qu'il avait fait dans ce but des efforts aussi sincères que constants malheureusement restés sans succès.

Lord John Russell a dit que rien n'attestait mieux le désir de son Gouvernement de voir la Prusse prendre part aux Conférences que la mission qu'il avait naguère eu remplir à Berlin dans ce but.

Quant à l'idée mise en avant par M. le Prince Gortchakoff de statuer d'abord dans le Traité de Paix certain principes généraux, sa valeur pratique a été appréciée par MM. les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche, de France, et de Grande Bretagne. Ils ont à ce propos fait observer qu'avant de consacrer indistinctement toutes les immunités des Principautés, il faudrait examiner si dans le nombre il n'y en avait pas quelques-unes qui avaient été imposées à la Puissance Suzeraine à la suite de guerres malheureuses dans un but exclusivement politique, et qui par conséquent ne seraient plus en harmonie avec la système nouveau qu'il s'agit de fonder. Ils ont reconnu en fin qu'il conviendrait de ne pas procéder à la modification du Règlement Constitutif sans avoir laissé à la Puissance Suzeraine le temps de faire suffisamment connaître ses intentions.

M. de Titoff a commencé à donner lecture d'un travail ci-joint en copie sous Litt. C, destiné à compléter celui dont la Conférence s'était occupée dans sa première séance.

En se livrant à l'examen comparé des premiers paragraphes des deux textes, mi a apporté quelques changements à la réduction primitive du Baron Prokesch.

Au second paragraphe M. le Plénipotentiaire de France a voté pour la suppression du mot "territoire," ne voulant pas exclure la possibilité de réunir un jour les territoires des deux Principautés en un seul, si jamais cette réunion était jugée de nature à faciliter leur administration et à favoriser leurs intérêts bien entendus.

En réponse à une question de M. le Prince Gortchakoff, M. le Baron de Bourqueney a établi que son observation n'impliquait nullement la possibilité de diminuer la totalité du territoire actuel des deux Principautés.

La continuation de l'examen comparé des deux versions a été ajournée à la prochaine séance.

(Suivent les signatures.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 519.

Annex A to Protocol No. 2.

PRINCIPAUTES DE MOLDAVIE ET DE VALACHIE.

LES immunités dont jouissent ces Provinces, et qui leur sont assurées par des hatti-schérifs formels, peuvent se résumer en ces termes:

Liberté de culte.

Administration nationale indépendante, régie selon les institutions du pays légalement établies.

Liberté entière du commerce; abolition des restrictions et des mesures vexatoires autrefois usitées.

Election des Hospodars par l'Assemblée des Divans.

Fixation du tribut déterminé une fois pour toutes.

Autorisation de former des établissements de quarantine et d'entretenir un nombre de gardes armées strictement nécessaire pour le maintien du bon ordre.

Maintien de l'engagement pris par les Mussulmans de ne point fixer leur domicile sur territoire Moldave et Valaque, et de ne pas rétablir de places fortes sur la rive gauche du Danube.

Cette situation a été assurée aux Principautés par des hatti-schérifs émanés de l'autorité suzeraine.

Par une garantie collective des Cinq Puissances, ces immunités acquéreraient le caractère universel du droit public Européen.

Pour arriver à ce résultat, il s'agirait sans nul doute de régulariser quelques points de détail, et dans l'examen de ces questions le Statut Organique qui régit aujourd'hui les Principautés pourra devenir matière à délibération.

Sous ce rapport, je pourrais pour le moment me borner à faire deux observations:

1. Le Statut a été le résultat de délibérations sérieuses, où les vœux et l'opinion et l'expérience locale des notables des pays ont été dûment pris en considération. S'il s'agit d'y apporter des modifications de manière à ne point compromettre les intérêts réels du pays, il conviendra de procéder à cette révision avec maturité et avec le concours légal d'organes choisis dans son sein.

2. Nul doute que ce travail, par sa nature, ne soit compliqué. Il exigera du temps. Les Plénipotentiaires des Cinq Puissances pourront y apporter des vues divergentes. Vouloir achever cette œuvre dans les Conférences actuelles serait ou lui imprimer une hâte qui la rendrait incomplète, ou prolonger la durée de ces Conférences outre mesure, au détriment du but élevé qu'il s'agit d'atteindre.

Ne pourrait-il pas suffire de réserver ces difficultés à un examen subséquent et de commencer par statuer dans le Traité de Paix certains principes généraux:

1. Conservation des priviléges assurés aux Principautés par les hatti-schérifs existant par rapport à la liberté du culte, l'indépendance de l'administration nationale, la liberté entière du commerce, &c.

2. Accord des Cinq Puissances de garantir en commun l'existence de cet état de choses dans un intérêt général d'ordre public et de civilisation.

3. Détermination arrêtée de commun accord de consulter les vœux du pays quant au maintien ou à la modification du Règlement qui constitue la base de son organisation intérieure. Enfin,

4. Ajournement de ce travail à une époque convenue de concert avec le Gouvernement Ottoman.

Inclosure 3 in No. 519.

Annex B to Protocol No. 2.

SERBIE.

LES prérogatives dont jouit la Serbie sont:

La liberté du culte.

Le choix des chefs du pays.

L'indépendance de son administration intérieure.

La réunion des districts détachés de la Serbie.

La réunion des différents impôts en un seul.

L'abandon aux Serbiens de la régie des biens appartenant à des Mussulmans à charge d'en payer le revenu ensemble avec le tribut.

La liberté du commerce.

La permission aux négociants Serbiens de voyager dans les Etats Ottomans avec leurs propres passeports.

L'établissement d'hôpitaux, écoles et imprimeries. Et enfin,

La défense aux Mussulmans autres que ceux appartenant aux garnisons de s'établir en Serbie.

Inclosure 4 in No. 519.

Annex C to Protocol No. 2.

DEVELOPPEMENT DU PREMIER POINT.

1. LES Principautés Danubiennes de Moldavie, de Valachie, et de Serbie continueront à relever de la Sublime Porte, conformément aux anciennes capitulations et aux Hats Impériaux qui fixent et déterminent les droits et immunités dont elles jouissent.

Aucune protection exclusive ne sera dorénavant exercée sur ces Provinces.

2. La Sublime Porte, dans la plénitude de son pouvoir suzerain, conservera intacts aux dites Principautés leur territoire, ainsi que leur administration indépendante et nationale, et par conséquent la pleine liberté de culte, de législation, de commerce, et de navigation. Toutes les clauses qui ont pour objet leur prospérité, contenues dans les Hats Impériaux, sont maintenues et seront soigneusement développées, selon les circonstances et les besoins légalement constatés du pays.

3. La Sublime Porte, considérant dans sa sagesse que la position politique des trois Principautés, dont il s'agit, touche de très près les intérêts généraux de l'Europe, s'entendra, dans la voie la plus amicale, avec les Puissances Contractantes, soit pour le maintien des règlements en vigueur dans ces Provinces, soit pour les modifications à y apporter. A cet effet elle consultera tout d'abord les vœux du pays et consignera dans un hatti-schérif solennel, séparément pour chacune des trois Provinces, l'ensemble des dispositions relatives aux droits et immunités des dites Principautés. Avant de le promulguer elle fera communication de cet Acte aux Puissances, qui de leur côté, après examen, en assumeront la garantie.

4. La force armée nationale existant dans les Principautés pour veiller à la sûreté de l'intérieur et garantir celle des frontières, sera maintenue dans l'intérêt commun de la Sublime Porte, des Principautés et de l'Europe. Son augmentation, en cas d'urgence, sera déterminée d'un commun accord entre la Puissance Suzeraine et les Etats limitrophes, et le résultat en sera communiqué aux Puissances Contractantes. Toutefois cette augmentation ne devra jamais être exagérée au point de devenir un fardeau excessif pour les Principautés.

5. Dans le cas où des doutes viendraient à être soulevés sur l'interprétation du hatti-schérif constitutif, les Représentants des Puissances Contractantes en examineront le fond et la portée. Ils emploieront, le cas échéant, leurs bons offices, soit auprès de la Sublime Porte, soit auprès des autorités locales, pour amener une entente.

6. Lorsque le repos intérieur des dites Principautés se trouverait menacé ou compromis, les Puissances garantes s'entendront, selon la gravité du cas, sur les mesures réclamées et sur les représentations à faire, soit à la Puissance Suzeraine, soit aux Gouvernements locaux. Une intervention armée ne saurait avoir lieu de la part de la Porte, sans entente préalable et sans intervention égale au nom de l'Europe.

7. Les Cours s'engagent à ne point accorder de protection dans les Principautés à des étrangers dont les menées pourraient être préjudiciables soit à la tranquillité de ces pays, soit aux intérêts des Etats voisins. Elles s'engagent de même réciproquement, à ne pas tolérer de la part de leurs propres sujets de pareilles manœuvres, et à prendre en sérieuse considération les réclamations qui pourraient être soulevées à ce sujet par les Puissances limitrophes, ou même par les autorités locales. Par contre, la Sublime Porte enjoindra aux Principautés de ne pas tolérer sur leur sol des étrangers tels qu'on les a désignés plus haut, ni de permettre aux indigènes de tremper dans des menées dangereuses pour la tranquillité de leur propre pays ou des Etats voisins.

No. 520.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March 24.*)

(No. 125.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 20, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour of inclosing herewith to your Lordship a lithographed copy of the Protocol of the second Conference of the 17th, together with its three Annexes, which has been signed this day in the order settled at the first Conference; Count Buol signing as President in the centre, the Representatives of the allied Powers in the right column, which in the preceding Protocol was occupied by the Representatives of Russia, and these latter in the left column, in which the allied Representatives had signed the last Protocol.

After this Protocol had been read and agreed to by the Conference, the discussion of the first Article of the bases, which had been commenced at the previous Conference, was resumed.

After due examination of the papers drawn up by Baron Prokesch and by the Russian Representatives, which I mentioned to your Lordship in my despatch No. 132 of the 17th instant, the general agreement come to with respect to the rights of the Principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia, was, that all the privileges enjoyed by them up to the present time, from whatever source they emanated, were to be maintained in full force; that every improvement suggested by the Sultan or the allied Powers, which should be agreed to between them, should be carried out, and that no curtailment of the privileges nor of the territory of those Principalities should be tolerated. It was then determined that a record of what had passed on this subject should be attached to the Protocol in the form of annexes.

Your Lordship will observe that these annexes are three in number. Those marked A and B are the papers drawn up by Prince Gortchakoff and M. de Titoff in explanation of the privileges and prerogatives possessed by the Danubian Principalities and by Servia, with suggestions for ameliorations in the Government of those Provinces to be submitted for the consideration of the Sultan and his allies, and to serve in developing and arranging the ideas originally thrown out by Baron Prokesch, and embodied in the Annex to the Protocol of the 15th of March.

That marked C records the first general results arrived at after examination of the above-mentioned papers, and after a prolonged discussion, in which the several members of the Conference suggested alterations to be made in the proposals before them, and threw out fresh ideas for consideration.

A lengthened debate took place respecting Article 4 (in the Annex C), which relates to the armed force of the country, respecting which the words as they now stand were substituted for those originally proposed by M. de Titoff, and according to which that force was to be developed "dans la mesure des ressources du pays."

In Article 5 several changes were made in the original proposals, with a view of regulating, in conjunction with the Porte, any discussions which might arise in the Principalities relative to hatti-sherifs promulgated by the Sultan.

In Article 6 it was established that no intervention whatever in the Principalities was to take place, "sans entente préalable et sans intervention égale au nom de l'Europe."

Upon Article 7 Lord John Russell and myself both objected to the engagement to be taken reciprocally by the Contracting Powers not to allow any attempt at creating disturbances in the Provinces by their own subjects, and we did so on the grounds that no case of such a nature was likely to occur, nor to be of any effect except from the countries bordering upon those Provinces, which by the previous Articles had been sufficiently guarded against, and we agreed that this stipulation was therefore not required. It was then agreed that Article 7 should be altered in accordance with this suggestion, and I beg therefore to point out to your Lordship that this Article does not appear in its final shape in the Annex C to the present Protocol; but it will appear in its corrected form, together with other changes which have been introduced into the paper, in the Annex to the Protocol No. 3, which will be signed at the Conference to-morrow, and which will be forwarded to your Lordship as soon as it has been lithographed and distributed to the members of the Conference.

I have thus given to your Lordship a sketch of some of the changes introduced into the development of the first point in the course of discussion; and I doubt not that they will be detailed to your Lordship by Lord John Russell, in entire concurrence with whom I have acted upon this occasion, as upon every other which has presented itself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosures 1, 2, 3, and 4 in No. 520.

Protocol (No. 2) of a Conference held at Vienna, March 17, 1855, and Annexes.

[See Inclosures 1, 2, 3, and 4 in No. 519.]

No. 521.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March 24.*)

(No. 131.)
My Lord, *Vienna, March 21, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith to your Lordship a despatch* which I have received under flying-seal from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bucharest, respecting recent differences which have occurred between the Austrians and Wallachians at Krajova.

On the receipt of this despatch I was most anxious to represent to General Hess the information it contained, and as I was myself very much engaged with the affairs of the Conference, I directed Mr. Fane to call on the General, and to bring the contents of the despatch before him in my name.

From the report made to me by Mr. Fane of the conversation which passed, it appears that General Hess had already been informed of the differences at Krajova by General Coronini, and although he had not yet received all the details, he was in possession of sufficient information to be sure that the death of the woman who had been killed in the unfortunate "rixe" which had taken place there, was in no manner attributable to any of the garrison. General Coronini, he said, had already ordered a fresh battalion to proceed to Krajova, and it was his intention to cause the garrison to be immediately changed if it could be proved that any part of it had in any way misconducted itself.

With reference to Mr. Colquhoun's expression of regret that the conduct of the Austrian military authorities was not everywhere as satisfactory as at Bucharest, General Hess remarked that it was his most earnest desire that the occupation of the country by the Imperial troops should everywhere proceed peacefully and with mutual satisfaction, and that the orders which he had issued to General Coronini respecting the differences at Krajova had been inspired by a desire to promote these objects. He was glad, he said, that Mr. Colquhoun had noticed and acknowledged the improved conduct of the Austrian troops about Bucharest, and it was his sincere wish that they should everywhere conduct themselves as satisfactorily as they appeared to do there.

General Hess concluded by saying that he had sent orders to General Coronini to cause the strictest investigation to be instituted into the differences which had occurred at Krajova, and that it was his firm determination to visit with the greatest severity any infractions of duty and of discipline, if they should be proved to have taken place.

I have &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 522.

Consul-General Colquhoun to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March 24.*)

(No. 17.)
My Lord, *Bucharest, March 10, 1855.*

INTELLIGENCE reached me last evening of some unpleasant differences having arisen at Krajova, in Little Wallachia, between the Wallachians and the Austrians.

The seeds of dislike were sown some weeks ago, when a "rixe" occurred in which the life of a woman was sacrificed, and her husband severely wounded.

The Under-Secretary of State, describing the recent case, says "that, in

* No. 522.

consequence of repeated differences between the inhabitants of Krajova and the Austrian soldiery, several shopkeepers had refused to open their warehouses, and had memorialized the Administrator, who had addressed, in consequence, a strong remonstrance to General Machios, commanding the forces there. This remonstrance appears to have angered the General, who has sent it to General Coronini, by whom it has been submitted to the Hospodar. The result has been, that the Austrians have sent off General Allemand, and the Wallachians M. Rossetti, to Krajova, to inquire and report on the matter."

I sincerely regret this, for I had hoped that the increased vigilance on the part of the Austrian Chiefs would have insured a better conduct on the part of the inferiors. Such has decidedly been the case here, where the soldiery are now better conducted, but it would appear not to be so in the districts, for both from Foxchani and Krajova I have constant complaints.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

No. 523.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 176. Most Secret.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March 10, 1855.*

I FORWARD this evening to Mr. Colquhoun for transmission to your Lordship by telegraph a message in the following words:—

"The return of an express to Bucharest determines me to forward what follows by telegraph. The Porte was apprized to-day by M. Benedetti, who took with him the first Préfet of the Emperor's palace, arrived this morning from France, that Louis Napoleon intends to visit Constantinople on his way to the Crimea; that the Empress will accompany him hither; and that an army of reserve of 40,000 men is to be established in this neighbourhood. Ten thousand men, exclusive of 6,000 or 8,000 invalids, are already here. To-morrow the officer is to wait upon the Sultan, previous to inspecting the palace of Beylerbey with a view to the French Emperor's accommodation there. The whole programme appears to be very distasteful to the Turkish Government."

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 524.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 179.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March 12, 1855.*

THERE seems to be little or no doubt of the French Emperor's intention to visit Constantinople on his way to the Crimea. The French Chargé d'Affaires has introduced to Aali Pasha, with reference to that intention, the first Préfet of the Imperial Palace, who saw the Sultan yesterday, and, with His Majesty's permission, visited two palaces which were considered likely to afford suitable accommodation for the Emperor Louis Napoleon and the Empress, who, it seems, is to accompany him. The Préfet, Colonel Bevill, hesitates between a smaller palace, appropriated to the Sultan's married daughter, on the European side of the Bosphorus, and a much larger palace, belonging to the Sultan himself, on the Asiatic side.

A French army of reserve to the amount of 40,000 men is to be established in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital. This force, when added to about 10,000 men of the same nation already here, and 7,000 or 8,000 invalids, will form a considerable mass of troops.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 525.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 132. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 22, 1855.*

COUNT ESTERHAZY has had an audience of the King of Prussia for the purpose of delivering to His Majesty a letter from the Emperor of Austria announcing the accouchement of the Empress, and the birth of an Archduchess.

The Austrian Minister has stated to me that he found the King most gracious and affable. He described His Majesty as ready to enter into conversation on general topics, but desirous to avoid a political discussion. He, however, brought His Majesty to speak on the negotiations in London and Paris. He endeavoured to extract His Majesty's opinions as to the result to which they might lead, and informed me that the King did not express himself pointedly, but has left him the impression that though he would willingly come to an understanding with England and France as to the position to be occupied by Prussia in the present crisis, he is resolved to decline entering into any engagement which will involve him in war with Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 526.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 26, 1855.*

WE approve of the project sent to M. de Bourqueney for the neutralization of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof, but not extending it to the Straits and the Sea of Marmora, which, however, should remain closed against foreign ships of war, as by the Treaty of 1841.

If the Russian Plenipotentiaries adopt the principle of neutralization, you will refer home for approval of the means that may be suggested for giving effect to the principle.

No. 527

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 360. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, March 26, 1855.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS having been very unwell, I have hardly been able to see him upon business during the last two or three days. I found him, however, convalescent this morning, and had some conversation with him on the state of negotiations at Vienna. I found his Excellency exceedingly dissatisfied with his last reports from that city, as also with a communication made to him yesterday by Baron Hübner.

He said that the tone assumed by the Russian Plenipotentiaries at the second and third Conferences was most haughty; that they put themselves forward as defenders of the privileges of the Principalities and of Servia, as if these privileges had ever been menaced—quite forgetting that the object of the first point was to emancipate the Principalities from the protection of Russia, and to reinforce, though within proper limits, the authority of the Sultan. The object of Russia was, no doubt, to put herself in a good position, should the Conferences be broken off; but he had no intention that this should be effected at the expense of France, and he had, consequently, desired M. de Bourqueney, by telegraph, to profit by the first Conference to re-establish the true scope and meaning of the first point. He then observed that there were, in his opinion, some very objectionable points in Baron Prokesch's memorandum, which appeared to have received the sanction of the Plenipotentiaries. He alluded in

particular to the possibility of foreign troops entering the Provinces subject only to an understanding upon the matter afterwards—a stipulation which, if agreed to, would place the Porte in a less favourable position than she had been in before the war, when she had at all events had an equal right of occupation in the Principalities with Russia.

Passing to the communication which had been made to him yesterday by M. de Hübner, and which related to the development of the third point, M. Drouyn de Lhuys did not conceal the vexation which the position taken up by Austria caused him. Your Lordship will have received a similar communication from Count Colloredo, and I need not, consequently, go into its details; but I lose no time in informing your Lordship that M. Drouyn de Lhuys writes to-night to M. de Bourqueney, to express the astonishment and regret of the Emperor and his Government at the attitude assumed by Count Buol. M. Drouyn de Lhuys observes that there is not one of the three propositions submitted by Austria which is admissible. The direct limitation of the naval power of Russia in the way proposed by Austria would be of no value, because there would be no guarantee for its observance. Its indirect limitation by means of keeping an equivalent Turkish force in the same waters, with, perhaps, the addition of one or two foreign ships of war, would be risking a continual conflict to the advantage of Russia; while the third proposition, namely, that of permitting the Porte to call for the presence of the allied fleets whenever she thought herself menaced, was reverting to the state of things before the war, with the further objection, either that the allied fleets might be constantly called upon to act on needless alarms or apprehensions, or that if there was really occasion for their presence, they would probably arrive when they could no longer prevent the attack to ward off which they had been summoned.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys says, that he shall appeal to the loyalty of M. de Buol to answer whether, when the Austrian Government themselves admit that the real check to Russia in the Black Sea will be a limitation of her fleet, they are fairly acting up to the engagements which they have contracted with England and France, in refusing to make the non-acceptance of that limitation by Russia a *casus belli* for Austria. He will remark (an argument which I have often endeavoured to prevail on him to employ towards Count Buol) that Austria forgets that England and France have actually effected that which they are determined to have recognised by Russia if they make peace, namely, the cessation of Russian preponderance in the Black Sea. Austria should remember that this state of things can be continued whether the armies are, or are not, successful in the Crimea, and, if these armies are brought away, at a comparatively small expense. Austria, moreover, must be aware that the consent of Russia is not required to any arrangement which the allies may make with the Porte, for the better defence of the territory of the latter; nor can Russia now prevent the signature of a Treaty between the maritime Powers and the Porte, if they are so disposed, giving France and England the right of passing the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, to the exclusion of the ships of Russia hereafter. The best that Austria offers is a bad peace now, with the constant chance of war hereafter.

Such is the tenour of the nstructions which M. Drouyn de Lhuys proposes sending to M. de Bourqueney. A copy will be transmitted to Count Walewski for your Lordship's information.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys still hopes that the plan for neutralising the Black Sea, which could only have reached Vienna last night, may find favour with the Conference; and, failing that, he seemed disposed to think that some arrangement might be made on the basis of an indirect limitation of Russian power in the Black Sea, with the opening of the Dardanelles whenever Turkey thought herself menaced. I have ventured to express my conviction that the two Governments have but one chance—small as that is in my humble opinion—of obtaining the military cooperation of Austria; and that is, agreeing on the ultimatum they intend to adopt in regard to the third point, and telling Austria it is their firm determination to continue the war until they obtain it. As long as Austria sees wavering and uncertain counsels in the camp of the allies, so long will she waver and remain inactive herself. Whether greater decision in that camp will produce better results at Vienna is a problem at all events worth while solving.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 528.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 27, 1855.*

WE cannot agree to Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7, in Annex C in your despatch No. 29. The reasons shall be sent to you by messenger to-morrow.

No. 529.

Lords John Russell and Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 26, 1855, 9 P.M.*

WE had a meeting at Count Buol's before the Conference. The French Minister read his instructions. The Austrian Minister did not like the plan; he opened the Conference by suggesting that Russian and Turkish Plenipotentiaries should propose a mode of carrying into effect the third point. The French Plenipotentiary and we concurred, and we expressed our desire that means should be found compatible with the honour of Russia and the safety of Europe. The Russian Plenipotentiary said he had instructions to discuss the propositions, but not to propose any; he would however undertake to write to his Court.

The Conference was then suspended, and the French Plenipotentiary mentioned in conversation and supported the plan we received last night. The Russian Minister at once said that it was impossible Russia should accept it. Austria did not and will not support it. Further discussion was reserved till the answer from Russia should arrive. We advised the French Plenipotentiary not to press for a formal decision to-day. The hope of peace is thus kept alive. More by the messenger.

No. 530.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, Tuesday, March 27, 1855, 11 A.M.*

THE Annex C was M. Titoff's counterproject. It is fully understood that the Conference is not bound by any paper not "paraphé." The Annex to Protocol No. 3 was "paraphé." I yesterday reserved the right to propose an hereditary Prince, or appointment for life by the Sultan, with representative Constitution, and union of Provinces, if thought desirable.

Aali Pasha's presence much required; he is expected.

The fourth point will be discussed in Conference on Thursday.

No. 531.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 30.) *Vienna, March 23, 1855.*

My Lord,

IN pursuance of an appointment made the day before, Count Buol received Baron Bourqueney, Lord Westmorland, and me, yesterday, and we had a long consultation on the second and third points.

With regard to the second point, Count Buol is ready to maintain the proposals in Baron Prokesch's memorandum, and to urge both the stationing of English and French ships of war at the mouth of the Danube, and the neutrality of the islands. He opposed the appointment of an English and French member of the permanent Syndicate or Commission.

I shall nevertheless think it my duty to renew the proposition in the Conference.

The discussion on the third point was of more importance.

Count Buol read to us his despatch to Count Colloredo. I have already stated that I think the proposal to limit the Emperor of Russia's fleet in the Black Sea to the number he may have at the time of signing the preliminaries, is a good proposition, in so far as it would effectually restrain the maritime force of Russia in the Black Sea, without the humiliation of dismantling ships at present fit for sea.

Beyond this I cannot concur in Count Buol's despatch.

The counterpoise proposed consists in: 1st. A small vessel-of-war to cruize at the mouth of the Danube. 2nd. The right of the Sultan to call up the fleet of his allies in case of menace, and to consider the augmentation of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea beyond twelve as such menace. 3rd. A general guarantee of the integrity of Turkey.

It is needless that I should point out to your Lordship the imperfections of this plan.

Count Buol holds cheap the danger of a *coup de main* on Constantinople, and maintains that it would only be formidable if supported by a large land army, marching by the Balkans.

Austria, he maintains, would stop the march of such an army; she did not, however, take up arms last year to oppose the passage of the Danube.

Imperfect as this system of counterpoise as laid down by Count Buol manifestly is, the Austrian Minister has never said that if we would lower our demands to his standard, and these demands were refused by Russia, Austria would consider such refusal equivalent to a declaration of war.

Austria has always reserved a certain liberty of action upon this point. Count Buol's language to Lord Westmorland was very positive. I do not blame her for this reserve; she may properly wait to hear the language and the propositions of Russia. But her silence in this respect adds considerably to the difficulty of our situation.

I conceive there are only two possible solutions. 1st. The limitation of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. 2nd. The complete abrogation of the Treaty of 1841, and the admission into the Black Sea of vessels of war of all nations not having possessions or establishments in the Black Sea.

Lord Westmorland and I can only speak on Monday, the day of our next Conference, so far as we are authorized by our present instructions.

The final determination of a matter so weighty, and so pregnant with consequences, must be reserved for the Governments of Great Britain and France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 532.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 31.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 23, 1855.

ANOTHER meeting of the Conference was held to-day.

The Protocol of the last Conference was read and approved.

The general features of Baron Prokesch's plan for the freedom of navigation of the Danube consist in a declaration that the Lower Danube shall be subject to the general stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna in respect to the navigation of rivers; and the formation of two Commissions, the one to be appointed by all the Contracting Powers, to make general regulations; the other to be appointed by the river-bordering Powers, Austria, Russia, and Turkey, to carry these general regulations into effect.

Upon this subject I remarked that if the first Commission were of short duration, all that they regulated and prescribed might be neglected or thwarted by the Executive Commission, in whom the permanent power was to be placed. I therefore proposed that the Contracting Powers should also name the Executive Commission.

Count Buol objected very strongly to this proposal, as contrary to the Treaty of Vienna, on which the whole scheme was based. I said that as the scheme only affected the Lower Danube, and not the whole river so far as it was navigable, the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna could hardly be said to be observed.

Finally I agreed to a compromise that the European Commission should last till it was dissolved by common agreement (d'un commun accord). England can, if necessary, therefore, secure the perpetuity of this Commission, whose control, while it is in vigour, will be very absolute.

The Russian Plenipotentiary objected to three provisions:

1. To the use of the term "Syndicate," which he said had never been so applied. The word was given up, and that of "Commission" substituted.

2. To the proposal that each Power should have the right to send one or two ships of war to a station at the mouth of the Danube. This provision was alleged to belong to the third point, and Prince Gortchakoff reserved his right of objection.

3. To the proposal to make the islands of the Danube "neutral." This proposal was incomplete, for no defined authority was substituted for that of Russia, and the Austrian Plenipotentiaries were obliged to yield the point.

Upon the whole, it may be considered that the freedom of the navigation of the Danube will be promoted, and the material impediments to the navigation at its mouth will be successfully removed or diminished by the second point, as now developed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 533.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 33.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 24, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to inclose for Lordship's information two copies of the Protocol (No. 3) of the Conference held on the 19th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 533.

Protocol (No. 3) of a Conference held at Vienna, March 19, 1855.

Présens:

Pour l'Autriche—
M. le Comte de Buol-Schauenstein, et
M. le Baron de Prokesch-Osten;

Pour la France—
M. le Baron de Bourqueney;

Pour la Grande Bretagne—
Lord John Russell, et
M. le Comte de Westmorland;

Pour la Russie—
M. le Prince Gortchakoff, et
M. de Titoff;

Pour la Turquie—
Aarif Effendi.

LE Protocole de la séance du 17 de ce mois a été lu et approuvé.
Il a été reconnu que les pièces annexées au dit Protocole sous Litt. A et B

renfermaient des éléments précieux qui pourraient être utilisés lorsque le moment de commencer ses travaux serait arrivé pour la Commission qui aura à discuter les détails de la question des trois Principautés.

Aarif Effendi ayant fait observer que la Sublime Porte s'occupait de son côté d'un travail relatif aux Principautés, et qu'il espérait que le nouveau Plénipotentiaire Ottoman serait à même de faire connaître ce travail, MM. les Plénipotentiaires ont été d'avis que cela ne devait pas les empêcher de continuer en attendant la tâche déjà commencée à la dernière séance, en comparant l'un à l'autre les deux textes produits pour formuler les principes fondamentaux qui doivent servir de guide à la Commission, sauf à M. le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman de faire à ce sujet telle réserve générale ou spéciale qu'il jugerait convenable.

M. le Baron Prokesch a relu les deux textes précités, Article par Article, et après une discussion approfondie de chacun d'eux, on est tombé d'accord sur la rédaction ci-jointe en copie.

Ce travail achevé, Aarif Effendi a réservé au nouveau Plénipotentiaire Ottoman qui va arriver ici muni de pouvoirs plus étendus, la liberté d'appréciation au sujet de l'Article 3 et de ceux qui suivent.

(Suivent les signatures.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 533.

Annex to Protocol No. 3.

DEVELOPPEMENT DU PREMIER POINT.

1. LES Principautés Danubiennes de Moldavie, de Valachie et de Serbie continueront à relever de la Sublime Porte en vertu des anciennes capitulations et Hats Impériaux qui ont fixé et déterminé les droits et immunités dont elles jouissent.

Aucune protection exclusive ne sera dorénavant exercée sur ces Provinces.

2. La Sublime Porte, dans la plénitude de son pouvoir suzerain, conservera aux dites Principautés leur administration indépendante et nationale, et par conséquent la pleine liberté de culte, de législation, de commerce, et de navigation.

Toutes les clauses contenues dans les Hats Impériaux, lesquelles ont pour objet l'organisation intérieure de ces Principautés, ne pourront être développées que dans un esprit conforme à ces principes et selon les besoins dûment constatés du pays.

Le territoire des dites Principautés ne pourra subir aucune diminution.

3. La Sublime Porte, considérant dans sa sagesse que la position politique des trois Principautés, dont il s'agit, touche de très près aux intérêts généraux de l'Europe, s'entendra dans la voie la plus amicale avec les Puissances Contractantes, soit pour le maintien de la législation en vigueur dans ces Provinces, soit pour les modifications à y apporter. A cet effet elle consultera les vœux du pays et consignera dans un hatti-schérif solennel l'ensemble des dispositions relatives aux droits et immunités des dites Principautés. Avant de le promulguer elle fera communication de cet Acte aux Puissances, qui, de leur côté, après examen, en assumeront la garantie.

4. La force armée nationale organisée dans le but de maintenir la sûreté de l'intérieur et d'assurer celle des frontières, pourra être développée au besoin dans la mesure des ressources du pays. Les conditions d'un système défensif seront prises en considération dans l'intérêt commun de la Sublime Porte, des Principautés et de l'Europe.

5. Dans le cas où des doutes viendraient à être soulevés sur l'interprétation du Hat constitutif, les Puissances garantes examineront, de concert avec la Sublime Porte, le fond et la portée de la réclamation. Elles ne négligeront aucun moyen pour amener une entente.

6. Dans le cas où le repos intérieur des dites Principautés se trouverait compromis, aucune intervention armée n'aura lieu sur leur territoire sans être ou sans devenir l'objet d'une entente entre les Hautes Parties Contractantes.

7. Les Cours s'engagent à ne point accorder de protection dans les Principautés à des étrangers dont les menées pourraient être préjudiciables soit à la

tranquillité de ces pays, soit aux intérêts des Etats voisins. Désapprouvant de pareilles manœuvres elles s'engagent de même réciproquement à prendre en sérieuse considération les réclamations qui pourraient être soulevées à ce sujet par les Puissances, ou mêmes par les autorités locales. De son côté, la Sublime Porte enjoindra aux Principautés de ne pas tolérer sur leur sol des étrangers tels qu'on les a désignés plus haut, ni de permettre aux indigènes de tremper dans des menées dangereuses pour la tranquillité de leur propre pays ou pour celle des Etats voisins.

No. 534.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 27, 1855.*

WE think that no discussion on the fourth point should commence until an understanding on the third is come to.

No. 535.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 23.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 27, 1855.*

I INCLOSE herewith a copy, in English, extracted from "Chalmers' Collection of Treaties," vol. i, page 14, of a Decree issued on the 22nd of February, 1784, by the Empress Catherine of Russia, declaring Sebastopol and Kaffa free ports open to foreign trade.

The possession of this Decree may be useful to your Lordship, as enabling you to remind the Russian Plenipotentiaries, who, with reference to the Manifesto of the Emperor Alexander II, may rely upon the traditional policy of Russia, that the Empress Catherine turned the conquests of Russia to commercial and peaceful objects; and that it is only in comparatively later days that Russia, by systematic encroachments and large military establishments, has menaced the independence of her neighbours, and endangered the peace of the world.

This Edict is also published in French, in "Martens' Collection of Treaties," vol. iv, page 455; and it is stated by Martens to have been published in German in the "Neues St. Petersburgisches Journal vom Jahre 1784," page 265.

I am, &c.

(Signed CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 535.

Edict.

The Edict of the Empress of Russia; giving leave to all Foreigners, of what Nation or Country soever, to carry on a free and unlimited Trade, both by Sea and Land, with the several Countries bordering upon the Euxine, which have lately been annexed to the Russian Dominion; and allotting specially to such foreign Nations the Ports of Cherson in the Government of Catherineslaw, Sebastopolis (formerly called Acht-air), and Theodosia (formerly called Kaffa), both in the Province of Taurica, where they may reside and carry on their Traffic with the same Immunities and Privileges, religious and civil, as are allowed at Petersburgh and Archangel.

WE, Catherine the Second, by the grace of God, Empress and Autocratice of all the Russias, of Muscovy, Kiovia Wolodomiria, Novogorod, Czarina of Cazan, Czarina of Astrachan, Czarina of Siberia, Czarina of the Chersonesus Taurica, Lady of Pickof, and Great Duchess of Smolensko, Duchess of Estonia, Livonia, Carelia, Twer, Ingoric, Permio, Vitatkia, Bulgaria, and other places; Lady and Great Duchess of the country of Lower Novogorod, Chernigof, Ruzan.

Poloszk, Rostof, Jaroslof, Belosersk, Udersk, Obdorsk, Coudinsk, Witvrpsk, Mstislawsk, and Sovereign of all the northern coasts, Lady of the Twersky country, of the Carthalinian and Grauzinian Czars, of the country of Carbadinia; of the Princes of Circassia, and those of the mountains, and of the other countries, Heiress Lady, and Sovereign Ruler.

Our endeavours to increase the trade of our own subjects, and of the other nations throughout the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, have met with the wished-for success; the Treaty of Commerce which we concluded with the Ottoman Porte on the 10th of June, 1783, having finally removed those impediments and difficulties which, from the particular constitution of the Turkish Government, had obstructed the said trade in every step of its progress; which can only be guarded against by the institution of proper laws for the protection of commerce, and by granting it that entire freedom which its various speculations and turns so indispensably require. The principles of this unlimited freedom we have adopted, and followed from the earliest period of our government, as is manifest from the several edicts and regulations which have been issued from our throne; and we now extend these edicts and regulations in their utmost latitude to the trade of the Black Sea. The security and convenience of that commerce are now fully provided for by the annexation of the Province of Taurica, and the neighbouring territories, to our other dominions; we have opened therein divers seaports for the use of all persons who will carry away from thence the produce of Russia, and bring thither the produce and manufactures of other countries.

It is well known that the last Turkish war (a war which, during the six years that it lasted, was signalized by so many victories to our arms) was no sooner concluded than we erected within the government of Catherineslaw, upon the River Dnieper, and at a short distance, the city of Cherson; it having appeared to us that that situation was particularly commodious, as well for exporting the produce of Russia as for importing from other countries such things as might be useful to us; and we secured the trade thereof by the most effectual means of defence, encouraging it, moreover, by such helps as were best suited to it, and were not inconsistent with the general principles of commerce.

This town, as also Sebastopolis (formerly called Acht-air) and Theodosia (formerly called Kaffa), both which latter are situated in the Province of Taurica, and are provided with excellent seaports, we have, on account of the commodiousness of their situation, ordered to be opened to all nations living in amity with our Empire, for the purposes of their commercial intercourse with our faithful subjects. Accordingly we most solemnly declare, by these presents, that all such nations are at liberty to come to the said ports, either in their own or hired vessels, and under their own colours, as also to repair thither by land; and they are likewise free to depart from thence at their pleasure, paying the duties of importation and exportation agreeable to the tariffs established in the respective custom-houses. Moreover, all persons, of what nations and countries soever, may remain in these towns as long as their business or inclinations may lead them, and enjoy the free exercise of their religion, agreeably to those laudable institutions which have been handed down to us from our ancestors, Sovereigns of Russia, and which we ourselves have confirmed and augmented, permitting all strangers residing in Russia to worship the Almighty agreeably to the religion of their forefathers, offering prayers to him, together with our own subjects, that he will increase the welfare and strengthen the power of our Empire. We give leave to all and every one to carry on their trade with absolute freedom, either singly or in companies, promising by our Imperial word, that all foreigners shall enjoy the same privileges in those three towns as they enjoy in our Imperial city of St. Petersburgh, and in our provincial town of Archangel; and in case of a war, every one shall be secured by the principles of that neutral system which we have erected, and which, on our part, shall be kept sacred and inviolable. Finally, if any foreigners shall wish to settle in these or any other towns or places of our Empire, and to become our subjects, we will receive them most graciously under our dominion, promising that they shall not only be allowed the free exercise of their religion (as mentioned above), but the full enjoyment of all such privileges and exemptions with regard to trade and navigation as have been granted to our other subjects; as also to erect fabrics and manufactories, paying only such taxes as shall be paid by our other subjects of the same condition with themselves. All persons who shall thus

become our subjects shall be at liberty, they and their descendants, to remain under our government as long as may be agreeable to them, or as their interest may require; and in case they should afterwards choose to withdraw from the same, they shall be freely permitted so to do, on paying the taxes that had been laid upon them for three years to come. The particular privileges which will be granted to the above-mentioned towns will be set forth in their respective charters, which are speedily to be published.

Given at St. Petersburgh, the 22nd of February, 1784, and in the 22nd year of our reign.

(The original was signed with Her Imperial Majesty's own hand.)

No. 536.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 133.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 23, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a lithographic copy of the Protocol of the Conference of the 19th instant, which was signed yesterday by the Representatives of the several Powers, together with an Annex attached to it, containing the development of the first point of the four bases, which is now settled and sanctioned by the Conference, and which has been "paraphé" by the apposition of the initials of each of the Representatives.

The first general results arrived at for the arrangement of this first basis, was contained in the Annex C to the second Protocol, which embodied the ideas contained in the papers presented to the Conference by Baron Prokesch, Prince Gortchakoff and M. de Titoff, and which was transmitted to your Lordship in my despatch No. 125 of the 20th instant, in which I informed you that alterations would be made, more particularly in the 7th Article of that project, as well as in some of the other Articles contained it.

The result of the examination and deliberation which took place of all the proposals and remarks contained in the several papers to which I have above alluded, as well as of the suggestions of the different members of the Conference, is embodied in the Annex "paraphé" to the present Protocol.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosures 1 and 2 in No. 536.

Protocol (No. 3) of a Conference held at Vienna, March 19, 1855, and Annex.

[See Inclosures 1 and 2 in No. 533.]

No. 537.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 134.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 23, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour of inclosing an abstract of two despatches addressed by Count Buol to the Austrian Representatives at the German Courts, which have been published in the "Wiener Gazette," and which are in explanation of the conduct pursued by Baron Prokesch on the presentation to the Diet of Frankfort of the effective state of the Austrian army at present assembled upon a war footing, under the orders of General Baron Hess, and the consequent representations which were made by the Prussian Envoy to the Diet, M. Bismark-Schönhausen.

Your Lordship will have been informed, both from Frankfort and from Berlin, of the effect which has been produced by these despatches, the one dated the 28th of February, and the other the 5th of March. Count Buol is waiting with some anxiety for the explanations of the Prussian Government upon the subject referred to in this correspondence, which has been complicated by the article in the "Moniteur," which stated that the conduct of M. de Bismark had been disavowed by his Government, which statement, by an article in a semi-official Berlin paper, has been denied.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 537.

Abstract of two Despatches addressed by Count Buol to the Austrian Ministers at the German Courts.

THE first despatch of Count Buol of the 28th of Februnry, states that the Imperial Minister, President of the Diet, is instructed to communicate to the Diet an account of the whole Imperial army which stands on a war footing under the command of General Hess, in order to prove that Austria's preparations for war exceed the requirements of the decision of the Diet.

The Imperial Cabinet felt it necessary to remark upon the circumstance that the Prussian Plenipotentiary had proposed that the preparation of the contingents should take place within the territory of the Confederation. This proposition had found no favour among the members of the Confederation, and was not accepted as a resolution of the Diet; consequently the Imperial Cabinet remarked that the action of the Confederation in this matter did not depend only on the Federal Treaties, but also on the Agreement of the 20th of April (24th July) and the decisions of the 9th of September of last year, and that therefore the Confederation was bound not only to defend its own territory, but also to enforce the carrying out of the four points, and to defend the Austrian Monarchy and the Austrian troops in the Principalities against every attack; but that the proposition of the Prussian Military Plenipotentiary completely sets aside all agreement between the Federal decision of the 8th, and the former position of the Diet.

M. de Prokesch now informs us (the Imperial Cabinet) that when he, at the Federal meeting of the 22nd, laid before the Assembly the account of the Austrian army of operation, the Prussian Minister distinctly denied that the decision of the 8th depended on the decisions of the 24th of July and the 9th of December.

M. de Bismark wished to set aside entirely the case of the common defence of the Austrian Monarchy or of the Danubian Principalities, and to consider the decision of the Diet of the 8th of February as reposing on a new basis, namely, that of the necessity of making military preparations, to be employed in every direction, in consequence of the threatening aspect of European affairs.

A further proceeding in this direction, on the part of the Prussian Minister, was made on the question of the garrison of Rastadt, when Prussia proposed full war garrisons for Rastadt, Landau, Mayence, and Luxembourg, because this measure must necessarily follow as a preparation for defence in all directions.

How Prussia reconciles these declarations with her explanations of the object of her missions to London and Paris, we seek in vain to understand.

But we feel it our duty, in our care for the safety of Germany, to express our conviction that the German Confederation will involve itself in the most serious difficulties if it should give to its preparations for war any other object than the eventual fulfilment of the obligations incurred by the decisions of the 24th of July and the 9th of December, 1854. The obligations which the German Confederation have incurred, the nature of the task which we all those who recognise our policy as a truly German one, have to fulfil, speak so plainly that no explanation is necessary as to the military measures taken by the Confederation.

But the position would be quite different, if Germany, which is now prepared to arm itself, and when a short space of time must show whether the Powers will succeed in giving back peace to Europe, should in its further

declarations and measures follow a neutrality free from particular obligations. We should then feel it our duty to declare ourselves decidedly against such measures, and to refuse all responsibility for their possible consequences.

We might especially declare the proposition that our contingent should be withdrawn on to German territory as only an indirect abandonment of the responsibilities incurred in the common interest of Germany, and regard the proposal of removing the garrisons to the fortresses on the French frontier as an uncalled-for provocation.

The Imperial Minister President has received instructions to show, in the debates of the Committee, the gravity of the above considerations. We hope that he will find the same conclusions among the other Plenipotentiaries, and that the German Confederation will leave no room for doubt as to the object of the armaments.

You will express to the Government of the importance we attach to the recognition of the above-mentioned views, and to the despatch of corresponding instructions to the Plenipotentiaries at the Diet.

The second despatch of Count Buol, dated the 5th of March, states, that when the despatch of the 28th was written, in which mention was made of the objections raised by the Prussian Plenipotentiary at the meeting of the Diet of the 22nd to the proposition made on the part of Austria in fulfilment of the Federal decision of the 8th, a doubt still existed whether these verbal objections would be entered in the proceedings of the Diet.

The Imperial Minister President of the Diet has sent us the declaration, which follows in copy, subsequently entered by M. de Bismark in the Protocol of that meeting.

M. de Prokesch then made the declaration, which likewise follows in copy.

We are consequently in a position to put in practice the views expressed in the despatch of the 28th, and we have consequently not only entirely approved the declaration of the Imperial Minister President, but have instructed Count Rechberg, that in case the communication of the state of the Austrian army should be objected to by the Diet in the Prussian sense, or in case in any other way a practical fulfilment of the Prussian declaration should ensue, he must make a protest in strict conformity with it.

The Government to which you will communicate this despatch, as completing that of the 28th, will, we hope, appreciate the importance of the reasons which make it our duty to point out, in the most decided terms, our position, in contra-declaration to that view which, to our regret the Prussian Cabinet considers reconcileable with the decision of the Diet of the 8th of February.

No. 538.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 121.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 27, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government approve your having immediately, on the receipt of Mr. Colquhoun's despatch No. 17, which was forwarded under flying-seal in your despatch No. 131 of the 21st instant, sought explanations from General Hess with respect to the differences which have recently occurred between the Austrians and Wallachians; and Her Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction the improvement in the conduct of the Austrian troops that has taken place at Bucharest, and do not doubt that if the same means were employed, similar results would be obtained in other quarters.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 539.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 122.)

Foreign Office, March 27, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO has communicated to me a despatch from Count Buol, dated March 15, stating that the Austrian Government had been made acquainted by Count Arnim with the readiness of Prussia to accede to the Protocol of the 28th of December last year, and in a form which would admit of the personal ratification of the King.

The announcement that Prussia approves the general definition of the construction to be put upon the four preliminary points, as contained in the Protocol of December 28th, and that she is inclined to adopt it in full, has been received with satisfaction by the Austrian Government for two reasons: because this resolution of the Court of Berlin increases the probability of the restoration of peace, and because it diminishes the distance which still separates the position of Prussia from that of Austria.

The Austrian Government, moreover, fully appreciates the willingness of the Prussian Government to extend the formal sanction of its accession to the above-mentioned Protocol to the three Powers who were originally parties to it.

In the present state of affairs, the consideration of the proposal belongs especially to the Cabinets of London and Paris; the Austrian Government therefore confines itself to declaring that it would give them the liveliest satisfaction, if the overture of the Prussian Government should bring about the reunion of the four Powers upon common ground.

I told Count Colloredo that the efforts of Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French had never been wanting to produce a better understanding with Prussia, but that all attempts to induce Prussia to enter into an engagement that might involve her eventually in hostilities with Russia were hopeless, and that the offer to sign the Protocol of December 28 had merely for its object the readmission of Prussia to the Conference without contracting any engagement with the three Powers.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 540.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 135.)

Berlin, March 25, 1855.

My Lord,

IN the circular of the Prussian Government to its Representatives at the German Courts, a copy and translation of which were inclosed in my despatch No. 127 of the 19th instant, respecting certain propositions said to have been made to the Diet at Frankfort by M. de Bismark as to calling out the full Federal contingents and arming the Federal fortresses, a despatch is mentioned which had been addressed by Baron Manteuffel to Count Hatzfeldt. I have now obtained a copy of this despatch, and forward it herewith for your Lordship's information. It is dated the 2nd of March, but I have reason to believe that it was only written for the purpose of forming an inclosure in the above-mentioned circular, and M. de Moustier is under the impression that Count Hatzfeldt has never made any communication to the French Government respecting its contents.

In the beginning of this despatch the bitter tone pervading the late communications of the French Government is spoken of, and allusion is no doubt intended to the extracts of certain despatches from the French Envoys at Carlsruhe, Stuttgardt, and Munich, which had been read by M. de Moustier to Baron Manteuffel.

In these papers accounts are given of the conversations of these Envoys with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Baden, Wurtemburg, and Bavaria,

respecting the Article proposed by the Prussian Government to be inserted in a Treaty with France providing against the passage of French troops through Germany.

The Governments of Baden, Wurtemburg, and Bavaria, appear to have expressed their surprise that Prussia should have arrogated to herself the right to propose such a stipulation, characterizing the proceeding as an interference with the privileges of the Confederation, and they all seem to have observed that it was essential, under present circumstances, to provide against danger from the side of Russia, which might render the assistance of French troops most welcome.

The other part of the circular alludes to the language attributed to M. de Bismark at the sitting of the German Diet of the 22nd of February, and contains the declaration that no foreign interference should be tolerated in affairs that are being transacted in the German Diet.

The whole despatch is drawn up in a tone of disappointment and ill-humour, but there is one passage in it which is satisfactory, and may be considered a denial of the language attributed to M. de Bismark, for it it is stated: "Rien n'est plus éloigné du Gouvernement du Roi que de faire même l'apparence d'une démonstration contre les Puissances Occidentales."

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 540.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Hatzfeldt.

M. le Comte,

Berlin, le 2 Mars, 1855.

PLUS d'une fois, j'ai été dans le cas de faire mention envers votre Excellence d'entretiens confidentiels que j'avais eus avec M. le Marquis de Moustier, et dans lesquels celui-ci, d'ordre sans doute de son Gouvernement, montrait de la susceptibilité, pour ne pas dire qu'il portait plainte, au sujet du langage et des procédés des Ministres du Roi dans telle ou telle résidence étrangère. Ces insinuations imprégnées ordinairement de plus ou moins d'amertume coincidaient le plus souvent avec des conversations analognes que vous avez eues avec M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France.

J'ai, comme vous le savez, préféré de ne pas donner suite à de pareilles récriminations; j'aurais pû en vérité leur en opposer d'autres, car bien certainement nous ne manquerons pas d'indications sur l'attitude et le langage des Représentants du Gouvernement Français, qui portent un caractère très peu amical pour la Prusse et très peu conforme au désir manifesté par le Cabinet des Tuileries de rapprocher et d'assimiler autant que possible les vues politiques des deux Gouvernements; mais j'ai évité de suivre cette voie, parceque je crois avoir fait l'expérience que des semblables correspondances ont rarement pour résultat une véritable entente et ne contribuent souvent qu'à envénimer des rapports déjà entamés par la méfiance. Aussi ne m'éloignerais-je pas aujourd'hui de cette habitude, si la dernière communication dans le genre susmentionné que m'a faite M. de Moustier ne me paraissait pas porter un caractère particulier.

Il s'agit cette fois-ci du langage qu'aurait tenu M. de Bismark dans la séance de la Diète Germanique du 22 Fevrier, au sujet des motifs qui ont dicté la résolution Fédérale du 8.

Je vous avoue, M. le Comte, que rien ne pouvait m'arriver de plus étonnant que cette critique émanant d'un Cabinet étranger de ce qui s'est passé dans une séance de la Diète sur laquelle nous manquions alors presque nous-mêmes de rapports officiels détaillés, dont le Protocole n'était pas et n'est peut-être pas encore dans ce moment imprimé.

Le Cabinet du Roi était accoutumé, et lui pour sa part ne renoncera pas à cette habitude, à considérer les delibérations de la Diète comme l'expression de l'indépendance nationale Allemande, et par cela même placées à l'abri de toute ingérence étrangère. Nous sommes sûrs de nous rencontrer dans cette manière de voir avec celles des autres Gouvernements Allemands, qui comme nous ne voudront jamais admettre ce contrôle étranger des arrêts Fédéraux avant qu'ils

ne soit transformés en actes et tombés par là dans le domaine de la publicité, et qui partageraient surtout notre juste surprise de voir exposer même le langage confidentiel de leurs Représentants à la Diète au controle et à la critique étrangère.

C'est assez vous dire, M. le Comte, que je croirais dévoyer de la dignité de la Prusse comme Puissance Allemande en défendant le langage que tient son Représentant dans la Diète contre les reproches des Cabinets étrangers. Du reste, les motifs de la décision Fédérale du 8 Février sont formulées et il se peut qu'ils ne soient pas du goût même de tous les membres de la Confédération.

Libre à eux alors de s'en expliquer franchement envers leurs confédérés Allemands, mais libre bien certainement à ceux qui n'aiment pas à voir fausser par des interprétations posthumes des actes de l'organe centrale de l'Allemagne, de constater la portée générale sans s'exposer aux reproches dénués de tout fondement de faire par là des démonstrations incompatibles avec leur attitude politique.

Rien n'est plus éloigné du Gouvernement du Roi que de faire même l'apparence d'une démonstration contre les Puissances Occidentales, les instructions de M. de Bismark en font preuve: mais, d'un autre côté, nous devons tenir à conserver l'entière indépendance de nos convictions politiques. Le Gouvernement Français nous donne à entendre que notre attitude à la Diète n'est pas conforme à l'esprit de la mission du Général Wedell, et que ce contraste obligerait le Cabinet de Paris d'être plus exigeant sur les conditions du rapprochement que ce Général semblait appelé à opérer. Nous nions la justesse de cette argumentation. Certes, le désir d'un rapprochement est bien sincère de notre part; toutefois, ce n'est pas nous qui avons demandé l'accession au Traité du 2 Décembre, et si le Gouvernement Français, comme de propos délibéré, s'empare de tout prétexte pour nous montrer sa défiance, c'est nous, il me semble, qui serions en droit de douter la sincérité de son désir de se mettre d'accord avec nous; et le moyen d'arriver à ce résultat ne serait certainement pas bien choisi, or il est evident qu'aussi longtemps que nos deux Cabinets ne sont pas parvenus à s'entendre sur leur attitude politique générale, celle de leurs Représentants à l'étranger ne se rencontrerait pas toujours autant que nous le désirerions, tandis qu'il va sans dire que l'identité de vues politiques des Cabinets une fois constatée d'une manière obligatoire, cet accord ne tarderait pas à se faire également sentir dans le langage de leurs Agents.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 541.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 136. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March 25, 1855.*

SINCE writing my despatch No. 130 of the 22nd instant, I have seen Baron Manteuffel, and expressed to him my astonishment, after what he had told me, that M. de Bismark's conduct had not received that just reprobation which it appeared to have deserved.

His Excellency seemed to have totally forgotten all he had said on the 12th instant, as reported in my despatch No. 107 of that day, and argued that it was impossible to disapprove language that had never been held; but that if M. de Bismark had acted in the manner attributed to him, he would have been disavowed.

This is the only explanation I could obtain from the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the extraordinary assurances he had given me on the 12th instant, and it is a further proof of the little reliance that can be placed in anything that comes from that quarter.

The Marquis de Moustier has not seen Baron Manteuffel for some days past, and is, I believe, desirous to avoid doing so until he receives instructions which he has requested from Paris.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 542.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 137.)
My Lord, *Berlin, March 25, 1855.*

COUNT ESTERHAZY has communicated to Baron Manteuffel a further circular addressed by Count Buol to the German Governments, upon the late misunderstanding at Frankfort between Baron Prokesch and M. de Bismark, and has expressed to Baron Manteuffel the hope of the Austrian Government that an end will now be put to this polemical discussion, and that the interests of the two Governments at Frankfort may, without loss of time, be placed upon a better footing.

This communication has, I fear, been well received by the President of the Council; and as the Prussian Government has had the worst of the discussion, it may be expected that they will not be unwilling to avail themselves of this opportunity to conciliate their differences.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 543.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 113.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 27, 1855.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 130 of the 22nd instant, inclosing a copy of an official article published in the "Preussische Correspondenz," relative to M. de Bismark's proceedings at Frankfort, I have to instruct your Lordship to seek of the Prussian Government an explanation of the extraordinary contradiction between the statements made in that article and those made to your Lordship by Baron Manteuffel, as reported in your despatch No. 107 of the 12th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 544.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 114.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 27, 1855.*

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship, for your information, copies of a correspondence* which I have had with M. von Usedom and with Count Bernstorff on the claim of Prussia to take part in the Conferences at Vienna.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* Nos. 504, 505, 511, and 512.

No. 545.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March .)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, Wednesday, March* 28, 1855, 3·15 P.M.

I HAVE seen Count Buol, and told him we are not prepared to discuss the fourth point before the third is settled. I had told him before my opinion to the same effect; and he agrees not to discuss formally the fourth point, although he thinks some conversation upon it may be useful. We meet to-morrow, at all events, to settle the Protocol of former meetings.

No. 546.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1855.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS is going to Vienna, after conferring with Her Majesty's Government.

He is to be in London to-morrow morning.

No. 547.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 26.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1855.

THE historical facts enumerated in your Lordship's despatch No. 28 of the 21st instant, will furnish a conclusive answer to the assertion that the Russian Plenipotentiary may be expected to make, that the policy and the desire of Russia are to maintain the Ottoman Empire and to support the authority of the Sultan.

And when to these facts are added the mission of Prince Menchikoff, and his ill disguised attempt to secure by Treaty for Russia the right of interference between the Sultan and many millions of his Christian subjects, Prince Gortchakoff can hardly fail to admit that the Western Powers are justified in their jealousy of Russia, respecting which he appears to complain.

But he would not find it an easy task to account for the jealousy which he proposes to exhibit against the Western Powers: they have extorted no Treaties, and they have obtained no territory from Turkey; they exercise no undue influence in Turkey; but they have too long in silence and inaction observed the contrary course pursued by Russia, and it was only when that policy was about to be carried by Russia beyond the limits of endurance, when the rights of the Sultan in his own dominions were about to be usurped, and the virtual sovereignty over Turkey was about to pass into the hands of the Emperor of Russia, that England and France were roused from their apathy, and they determined to rescue Turkey from the impending disaster.

They bound themselves to maintain the integrity and the independence of the Ottoman Empire; they undertook to derive no exclusive advantage from the war in which they were about to engage with Russia; and they formally invited every Government in Europe, except Russia, to accede to the Treaty.

So far then are the policy and proceedings of the Western Powers from giving cause for suspicion or jealousy, that they have been admitted by Europe to be just and necessary; and if Russia be sincere in her professions to secure the future peace of Europe and to uphold the Ottoman Empire, she must admit that the guarantees for those important objects which are now sought, and which in principle she has already admitted, are neither uncalled for nor excessive.

True it is, as your Lordship says, that Russia has made great concessions by consenting to place the Principalities under a general guarantee of the Contracting Powers and to relinquish to the same Powers the securities for the privileges granted to Christians by the Porte; but even if the mode by which it is proposed

to give effect to the concessions were not likely to prove abortive, these are not the points that vitally concern Europe. The Principalities might still be misgoverned by Russian agents and exposed to Russian invasion. The Treaty of Kainardji, with the only interpretation of which it is susceptible, might still exist, and the peace and safety of Europe would be exposed to no more immediate danger now than for many years past from those causes.

But if Sebastopol is to be retained as a great naval arsenal, and if a powerful fleet is to be kept there in readiness to embark an army, a standing menace will exist against the Ottoman Empire, and the danger to the peace and equilibrium of Europe will be imminent and perpetual.

All discussion with the view of raising Turkey and her allies to something like equality with Russia as she has hitherto been in the Black Sea, is useless.

Powers at a great distance, however well disposed or active, can never counterbalance the Power that is on the spot, with all its vast resources at command. England and France cannot, and they will not, incur the expense and inconvenience of maintaining large armaments in the Black Sea and occupying the harbours of Turkey, in order to carry out a policy of protection and to maintain an armed truce with Russia; and no efforts could place Turkey on an equality with the unrestricted naval and military power of Russia in the Black Sea—her resources would be exhausted by preparations for defence which would prove inadequate for their object.

Her Majesty's Government will be surprised if such a system finds an advocate in the Austrian Government, as it can hardly consist with the interests and policy of Austria that powerful fleets of different nations should constantly be stationed in the Black Sea, whose first measure, in the event of a quarrel with Russia, would naturally be the blockade of the Danube, the effect of which would be the stoppage of the trade of Germany.

But if the Governments of England and France were to submit to the expense and inconvenience of maintaining fleets in the Black Sea for the purpose of keeping in check the naval force of Russia, I have to observe that that object has already been secured, for the greater part of the Russian fleet has been destroyed by the hands of the Russians themselves, and the flag of Russia has disappeared from the Black Sea. Russia cannot expect that this advantage will be gratuitously surrendered, or that England and France will withdraw their fleets in order to restore Russia to a position which she cannot occupy with safety to Europe.

The allied armies have suffered no reverse in the Crimea; but on the contrary their marked superiority over the Russians in the field has been on three occasions proved; they have not, however, obtained the complete success that was expected. Sebastopol has not fallen; it is stronger than it was some months ago, and it may require still greater efforts for its reduction; large reinforcements may be sent into the Crimea; the finances and trade of Russia may hitherto have suffered less than was expected, though well-founded information shows that they have already suffered greatly and extensively; the national spirit may still be unbroken, and the Muscovite party may still, to a certain degree, maintain itself in spite of the growing discontent excited in Russia by the pressure of the war. Nevertheless, Her Majesty's Government cannot, in the state of things, whether present or prospective, discover any justifiable ground for consenting to make peace on terms that would neither be honourable for the allies nor safe for Europe.

England and France have stood forth as the champions of Europe; they have proclaimed the conditions which they think indispensable for securing Europe from a renewal of the present complications; and if they were now to abandon those conditions, and to sheathe their swords without obtaining the guarantees they have demanded, they would accomplish the object announced in the Emperor Alexander's recent manifesto, of raising Russia to the highest pitch of glory and power, they would lay the seeds of future and not distant war, their own position throughout the world would be destroyed, and the alliance between England and France, associated as it would be with reminiscences of failure and discredit, would soon come to an untimely end. If these considerations are presented to the Austrian Government, and pressed with all that weight of argument that your Lordship will well know how to employ, Her Majesty's Government cannot but entertain a hope that decided action will replace the now wavering policy of that Government. It can hardly be doubted

that the readiness with which Russia volunteered the acceptance of the four bases, and the haste with which Prince Gortchakoff presses on the discussion in the Conference, have no other object than to break up the alliance of Austria with the Western Powers; the Russian Plenipotentiary displays the utmost willingness to make concessions on the first and second bases in order to make a case for Germany, and to lessen the power and the desire of Austria to stand firm on the third basis; and if Austria should be so ill-advised as to fall into this unconcealed trap, your Lordship will remind Count Buol that no settlement of the first or second basis will be binding on the Western Powers, and that, if the whole of the bases are not unequivocably adopted by Russia, all negotiations must be at an end.

This result would be regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a severe misfortune, but it is a contingency that must have been contemplated by the Austrian Government, and Her Majesty's Government, therefore, are unwilling to doubt that Austria will faithfully adhere to her engagements with the Western Powers, and that, for her own interest as well as for her own honour, she will not neglect an opportunity that may never again recur effectually to restrain the ambition of Russia.

The energy displayed by Austria in her preparations for war, the frankness with which she has professed to declare her policy to the Diet, and the just severity with which she has treated the vacillations of Prussia, have placed Austria in a position from which she cannot without discredit recede.

If Austria were now to abandon the allies, she assuredly would not thereby restore peace to Europe; if by not taking a decided part with them she failed to obtain the guarantees of which she stands in need, the day may not be distant when single-handed she may have to contend for her most vital interests, and it is for Austria, but not for Her Majesty's Government, to estimate what would be her loss of position in Germany, and what amount of fresh powers she would give to Prussia, who might then, indeed, triumphantly declare that events had proved the wisdom of her own policy, and had verified her constant predictions of the course that Austria would ultimately pursue.

In conclusion, I beg to assure your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government are fully alive to the great difficulties and to the critical position in which you are placed, and as they desire to share your responsibility they hope that your Lordship will not hesitate to consult them on all questions respecting which doubts may arise in your mind.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 548.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 27.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1855.

IT is with regret that I have to inform your Lordship that the Protocol respecting the first basis, even in its amended form, is, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, still very objectionable. It has for its object to confirm and even to increase all the assumed rights of internal interference in the Principalities hitherto exercised by Russia, and only to admit Austria to a joint exercise of those rights. Such an arrangement would be actually worse than the existing state of things; it would legalize, by the formal sanction of England and France, those practices against which we have always protested, and which have rested up to this time only on the interpretation which Russia has put upon her own Treaties with the Porte.

It is true that the right of internal interference is to be conferred on the four Contracting Powers, but that interference would of course practically fall to Russia and Austria.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 549.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 28.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1855.

WITH reference to that passage in your despatch No. 27 of the 20th instant, in which your Lordship expresses an opinion, that even if Sebastopol were to fall, the state of things as regards Russia would not be greatly altered, I may observe, that if the allied armies could take Sebastopol and occupy it, it is very doubtful whether any force which Russia could bring against them would drive them from such a stronghold. Having the command of the sea, if the allies had possession of the northern and southern banks of the harbour of Sebastopol, their position could be maintained against all attack.

Her Majesty's Government entirely concur with your Lordship, that if the war goes on, the cooperation of Austria will be most valuable and important, as a means of obtaining conditions of peace which would secure us against future dangers from the aggression of Russia against Turkey; but it is to be borne in mind, that if, in order to secure the alliance and cooperation of Austria we give up those conditions, we shall sacrifice the end to obtain the means, and shall thus defeat our own purpose.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 550.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 29.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1855.

HER Majesty's Government concur in the opinion expressed by your Lordship in your despatch, Separate and Confidential, of the 21st instant, that a Treaty between England, France, and Austria, and Prussia, if the latter Power would join, to maintain the integrity and independence of Turkey, would be a useful addition to the material and practical securities of the Black Sea, but would be wholly ineffectual by itself as a single substitute for them. The engagements of such a Treaty would be tardy of execution, as the experience of the last twelve months has proved; and if Russia had seized on Constantinople and the Straits, she would care little for the Treaty that was to protect Turkey from her aggression.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 551.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 30.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1855.

HER Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would be of great importance to the Sultan that he should have military possession of Giurgevo, Ibraila, and Galatz fortresses, which are "têtes de pont" on the northern side of the Danube, and of much value for defence of the frontier line.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 552.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 31.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1855.

ALTHOUGH it appears from your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 27th instant, that the Annex C to Protocol No. 2 is the work of M. Titoff, and probably therefore embodies the views and denotes the policy of Russia with respect to the future constitution and government of the Principalities, yet as there is no reason to doubt that those views and that policy would readily be adopted by Austria, Her Majesty's Government think it desirable to place on record their opinion respecting this project and the disastrous arrangements to which it would lead.

Article 1 seems free from objection.

Article 2 states that "all the clauses in former "hattis" which have for their objects the prosperity of the Provinces are to be maintained."

This if fairly carried out is a right stipulation, but who is to judge what is good for the prosperity of the Provinces. Russia and Austria would probably think the greatest amount of foreign interference and of internal despotism would most conduce to that prosperity.

Article 3. The manner in which the guarantee contemplated in the last line is to be given would require great consideration. It is proposed that it shall only be given after mature consideration by each Power. Is it likely that the Five Powers would take the same view, and how far would such guarantee give right of interference? Would it not be the first instance of a foreign guarantee for the internal organization of a part of the dominions of an independent Sovereign? Would not sufficient security for the maintenance of the rights granted to the Principalities by the Sultan, be found in those rights themselves, in a solemn act of sanction on the part of the Sultan, and in the formal communication of those acts by him to the other Powers of Europe. The great object to be kept in view in regard to the Principalities, is to exclude foreign interference, because that interference would be exercised necessarily and constantly by Russia and Austria; and the distinguishing character of the whole of the proposed arrangement is, that it would sanction and increase foreign interference in regard to Moldavia and Wallachia, and would for the first time apply that interference to Servia, which has hitherto been exempt from it.

Article 4. This proposed Article seems wholly inadmissible both in wording and in substance. The result of it would be to place the military and armed force of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia under the direct control of Austria and Russia. In the first place it says, that the armed force is to be maintained in the interest of Europe,—a new service for the armed force of an independent State; and then, that there may be no mistake, it goes on to say, that its augmentation is to be determined, in case of necessity, by an agreement between Turkey on the one hand, and Austria and Russia on the other, and the result of such agreement is to be communicated to the other Contracting Parties, who are to have no voice in the arrangement.

The whole of this Article ought to be struck out. There is no stipulation in former Treaties between Russia and Turkey limiting in any way the armed force of Servia, and it would be most objectionable to introduce new restrictions and new rights of foreign interference as the results of a war undertaken for the purpose of maintaining the independence of the Sultan and the integrity of his dominions.

Article 5. This erects the Four Powers, and of course Austria and Russia more especially, into a standing court of appeal and arbitration between the Sultan and the Governments of the three Provinces, and authorizes a direct and constant official communication with the Provincial Governments upon all matters of internal administration in regard to which any pretence could be founded that a doubt had arisen as to the interpretation of the Constitution granted by the Sultan. This would be entirely new as to Servia, and ought not

to exist for any of the three. If the Four Powers had reason to think, from information given them by their local agents, that the Constitution of any of the Provinces was violated by the Porte, they would naturally, and without any such stipulations, make friendly representations at Constantinople; but it would be objectionable to establish, as proposed, a divided allegiance for the Principalities.

Article 6. This Article is a perpetuation of the Treaty or Agreement of Balta Liman in regard to Moldavia and Wallachia, and its extension to Servia, to which Balta Liman did not apply. It consecrates, by the sanction of England and France, one of the principles of the Holy Alliance, namely, that the likelihood or existence of dangerous internal disturbance in one State are to be judged of by neighbouring States, and that such neighbouring States are to be allowed, according to their discretion, to march an armed force in, either to prevent or to put down what they may please to assume to be popular or insurrectionary movements in such State threatening danger to their own interests. Such an Article never could be sanctioned by England and France.

Article 7. This Article embodies another principle of the Holy Alliance, and applies it to all three Principalities, to none of which it has hitherto been applicable. By this Article no agent of any of the four Powers could give protection within either of the three Principalities to any person whatever, fellow-subject or other, whom Austria and Russia might desire to have expelled; and the Sultan would, for the first time, take a formal engagement to expel from his dominions any foreigner, of whatsoever nation he might be, whose expulsion Austria or Russia might demand. If this Article were agreed to by England and France, English and French subjects resident in the three Provinces would, by the consent of England and France, be liable to be expelled at the demand of Austria or Russia.

It is evident that these Articles have been drawn up by Prince Gortchakoff and M. de Titoff, as an inducement to Austria to abandon England and France on the questions concerning the Black Sea and the real securities for Turkey. A Treaty concluded on such conditions would rivet on Turkey the yoke of foreign ascendancy and dominion in all three Principalities, and would leave us without any security for Constantinople against a naval and military attack from Russian ports in the Black Sea.

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that Servia wants and needs no new protection, and should be left untouched as she is, and that hereditary Princes in Moldavia and Wallachia would place those Provinces in a greater state of separation from the Porte. The evil has not been encroachments and usurpations by the Sultan over the Provinces, but usurpations and encroachments by Russia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 553

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 32.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1855.

HER Majesty's Government approve your Lordship's proceedings, as reported in your despatch No. 35 of the 24th instant, with regard to the Austro-Sardinian differences. You will have observed, however, by my despatch No. 124 to Lord Westmorland of yesterday's date, that Mr. Hudson reports the Sardinian Government to be earnestly desirous of effecting a speedy settlement with Austria of the Lombardo-Sequestration question, and your Lordship is therefore requested to again press the subject on Count Buol.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 554.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 33.)

Foreign Office, March 28, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE to state to your Lordship, with reference to your despatch No. 31 of the 24th instant, in which you give an account of the proceedings of the Conference on the 23rd instant on the second point, that Her Majesty's Government apprehend that, although the first Commission will have great power in framing regulations, it will not have similar power to secure those regulations being carried into effect, and it would therefore appear highly important that an English and French Commissioner should belong to the Executive Commission charged with keeping the mouths and channels of the Danube. Her Majesty's Government can well understand why Russia, who has always prevented the removal of obstructions to the free navigation of the Danube, should object to English and French Commissioners who would carefully watch her proceedings, but the ground on which Austria joins in and supports the objections of Russia is not intelligible.

Her Majesty's Government doubt whether the right to station a small English ship of war in or at the mouth of the Danube would be useful unless we have rights which that ship of war might enforce, and in time of peace it could enforce them only by representations.

The evils complained of are not acts of violence which the presence of a ship of war could prevent, but acts of wilful omission which a member of the Executive Commission could watch and demand to have remedied.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 555.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 188.)

Constantinople, March 12, 1855.

My Lord,

IT results from a conversation which I held with Aali Pasha this morning, that virtually, though not yet formally, the Porte has decided on sending a second Plenipotentiary to Vienna; that should the intention be realized, his Highness will be the person appointed, and that his departure will probably take place in ten days or a fortnight.

Superior in standing and ability to Aarif Effendi, the Pasha will, no doubt, be left to exercise a wider discretion in the negotiations; but I apprehend that, although he will be instructed to take his place generally on the same ground with his colleagues from London and Paris, he will hardly be empowered to commit the Sultan's Government without reserve on those important and perhaps unforeseen particulars, which the application of admitted principles or the progress of military operations may eventually bring into question.

There are certain points, such, for instance, as the future state of things in the Danubian Principalities, the interference of the Christian Powers in matters of social or administrative reform in Turkey, and the regulation of the several forces destined to have access hereafter to the Black Sea, which the Porte habitually regards as matters of vital interest to her Empire. For the final settlement of such essential questions it may be foreseen that she will always strive to retain, if possible, a preponderating, but at all events an independent, opinion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 556.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 191.)

Constantinople, March 15, 1855.

My Lord,

THOUGH I have had no recent communication with the French Embassy upon the subject, I hear that appearances continue to confirm the expectation of Louis Napoleon's visit to Constantinople and the Crimea.

Colonel Beville, as I am informed, has selected for His Imperial Majesty's residence here the house at Balta Liman which was built by Reshid Pasha, and sold by his Highness to the Sultan, who made it over to the Princess his daughter, on the occasion of her marriage with the Grand Vizier's son.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 557.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.— (Received March 28.)

(No. 196.)

Constantinople, March 16, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that the Sardinian Envoy, Baron Tecco, concluded and signed yesterday with the Turkish Plenipotentiaries a Convention respecting the contingent of troops destined by the Court of Turin to take part in the operations against Sebastopol.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 558.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 253.)

Foreign Office, March 29, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 188 of the 12th of March, reporting the intention of the Porte to send a second Plenipotentiary to Vienna.

The reserves alluded to in your Excellency's despatch, and which it was notorious would form the chief subjects of discussion in the Conference, should have induced the Porte with a proper regard to its own interests to send the ablest man in the Sultan's service to be present at the opening of the negotiations. The Porte is now represented there by a diplomatist who appears to have but a limited knowledge of the affairs under discussion, who is without full powers for treating, and who can only communicate with his colleagues through an interpreter.

The Porte must have been well aware that Lord John Russell had undertaken a special mission to Vienna, for the purpose of attending the negotiations together with Her Majesty's Minister at that Court, and as it was alike their duty and their desire to uphold the Sultan's interests, it was both ungracious and unwise on the part of the Porte not to give them a colleague with whom they could advantageously communicate upon Turkish affairs.

I have to instruct your Excellency to read this despatch to the Grand Vizier, and to furnish me with any information which you can obtain as to the reason of the ill-advised course adopted by the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 559.

Lords John Russell and Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, Thursday, March* 29, 1855, 4:30 P.M.

WE met in Conference to-day. The French Minister declared we could not discuss the fourth point till an understanding was come to on the third.

The Austrian Minister proposed that we should meet on Monday to prepare information as materials for future discussion on the fourth point.

We agreed to refer this question to our Governments.

No. 560.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, Friday, March* 30, 1855.

I AM glad the French Minister for Foreign Affairs is coming here.

The Russian Minister sent off his messenger on the 28th, and does not expect an answer before the 15th. I think I ought to stay here till there is a settlement or a rupture on the third point.

Aali Pasha is expected here in six or seven days. Mr. Smith brings good account of the state of the army. He will go to-morrow, and take despatches.

No. 561.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 30, 1855.

INFORM the Austrian Minister that it is useless to proceed with the Conference until an understanding is come to on the third point, and that we cannot therefore agree to any preliminary discussion upon the fourth point. I have shown this to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who concurs, and wishes you to inform M. de Bourqueney accordingly.

No. 562.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 30, 1855.

THE object of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' visit to Vienna is to explain and recommend his plan of neutralization; and his visit here was in order to come to an understanding with us upon it. We are quite satisfied with him, and have agreed that the issue of the negotiation should turn upon this project rather than upon the original one of limitation of Russian naval force. M. Drouyn de Lhuys expects to be at Vienna in four or five days. It is clear that the Russian Minister wishes to delay a decision on the third point; but until it is settled or a rupture takes place upon it we think you should not leave Vienna.

No. 563.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 36.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 26, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to inclose two copies of the Protocol of the fourth Conference, which was held on the 21st instant.

The Protocol of the Conference of the 23rd instant is not yet signed.

I have, &c

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 563.

Protocol (*No.* 4) *of a Conference held at Vienna, March* 21, 1855.

Présens :

Pour l'Autriche—
M. le Comte de Buol-Schauenstein, et
M. le Baron de Prokesch-Osten ;

Pour la France—
M. le Baron de Bourqueney ;

Pour la Grande Bretagne—
Lord John Russell, et
M. le Comte de Westmorland ;

Pour la Russie—
M. le Prince de Gortchakoff, et
M. de Titoff ;

Pour la Turquie—
Aarif Effendi.

APRES la lecture du Protocole de la séance du 19 courant, qui a été approuvé et signé, MM. les Plénipotentiaires ont pris en considération le second des quatre principes établis, qui a pour objet d'assurer, par des moyens efficaces et sous le contrôle d'une autorité syndicale permanente, la liberté de la navigation du Danube.

M. le Baron Prokesch a lu le travail ci-joint en copie, dans lequel il expose ses idées sur l'application pratique de ce principe.

Cette lecture finie, M. le Prince Gortchakoff a développé à ce sujet quelques observations générales. Il a dit, que la question en instance présentait deux côtés, le côté politique et le côté commercial et pratique. Au point de vue politique il a établi, que la Russie n'ayant jamais contesté et ne contestant pas le question de droit, celle-ci se trouvait complétement vidée, et il a rappelé à ce propos que la Russie seule, entre toutes les Grandes Puissances, avait, il y a déjà un quart de siècle, stipulé la liberté de la navigation dans la Mer Noire en faveur de tous les pavillons marchands. Quant au côté commercial de la question, il a dit, que la nature avait créé, soit dans le cours du Danube, soit à ses embouchures, des obstacles plus ou moins graves, et que l'intention de la Russie avait été et était encore de faire tout ce qui serait en son pouvoir pour les enlever aussi complétement que la nature le permettrait.

M. le Baron Prokesch a répondu, qu'il était loin de sa pensée de mettre en doute les bonnes intentions du Gouvernement Impérial de Russie à ce sujet, mais que, d'un autre côté, il était incontestable que les résultats avaient été en désaccord avec ces intentions.

M. le Prince Gortchakoff a itérativement assuré, que le concours le plus loyal de la Russie était acquis à toutes les mesures ayant pour but d'affranchir la navigation du Danube de tous les obstacles, et M. de Titoff a complétement adhéré à cette déclaration de son collègue.

Après ces observations M. le Baron Prokesch a repris la lecture de son projet, Article par Article. Les trois premiers Articles n'ont pas rencontré d'opposition.

A l'Article 4, où il est dit que les délégués des Puissances Contractantes, agissant en Syndicat Européen, établiront pour la navigation du Bas Danube les bases de la législation fluviale et maritime, MM. les Plénipotentiaires Russes ont objecté à l'emploi du terme "Syndicat," parcequ'il ne présentait pas une idée claire et précise, et qu'il était d'ailleurs tout-à-fait inusité dans les relations internationales.

M. le Prince Gortchakoff a dit, que le second des quatre principes établis avait pour but d'assurer la liberté complète de la navigation du Danube ; que la Commission régulatrice, qu'on appelait du nom de "Syndicat," aurait un caractère scientifique et technique, que la question se rattachait au commerce, et qu'il importait de ne pas y mêler des considérations politiques.

M. le Baron Bourqueney a fait observer qu'on ne pouvait dépouiller de tout caractère politique une question qui avait été élevée à la hauteur d'une garantie Européenne; que quelque sincères qu'eussent été les intentions du Gouvernement Russe au sujet de la liberté de la navigation du Danube, les résultats tout opposés auxquels on était notoirement arrivé, étaient de nature à justifier même un surcroît de précautions, et que le Syndicat ne devait être autre chose que le représentant des intérêts de tous.

M. le Prince Gortchakoff a déclaré que si le mot "Syndicat" impliquait l'exercice d'un droit du souveraineté quelconque, il devait s'y opposer.

Le dernier alinéa de l'Article 4, où il est dit que chacune des Puissances Contractantes aura le droit de faire stationner un ou deux bâtiments de guerre aux embouchures du Danube, a donné lieu à MM. les Plénipotentiaires de Russie de réserver leur opinion jusqu'à la discussion de la révision du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, puisque le principe de la fermeture des Détroits, consacré par ce Traité, subsistait encore à l'heure qu'il est, et que ce principe s'opposait à ce que des bâtiments de guerre pénétrassent dans la Mer Noire par les Dardanelles.

M. le Baron Bourqueney a jugé très utile de déposer dès à présent au Protocole le principe de la surveillance de bâtiments de guerre aux embouchures du Danube, sauf à mettre ce principe en harmonie avec les Traités.

MM. les Plénipotentiaires de Grande Bretagne ont adhéré à l'opinion émise par le Baron Bourqueney.

MM. les Plénipotentiaires Russes ont maintenu leur réserve.

MM. les Plénipotentiaires Autrichiens se sont rangés à l'avis des Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne. Ils ont, de plus, fait observer, que sa position géographique offrait à l'Autriche le moyen de faire parvenir des bâtiments de guerre jusqu'aux embouchures du Danube sans qu'ils eussent besoin de passer par les Dardanelles, mais qu'ils n'en devaient pas moins se prononcer pour l'adoption du principe, que toutes les Puissances Contractantes fussent à même de contrôler efficacement l'exécution des stipulations arrêtées.

A l'Article 5 du Mémorandum, où il est établi que les délégués des Etats riverains, réunis en Commission, d'après l'analogie des stipulations du Congrès de Vienne, constitueront le pouvoir exécutif du Syndicat Européen, Lord John Russell a énoncé le désir de son Gouvernement d'être aussi représenté dans la Commission Exécutive, l'Angleterre ayant sur le Danube d'importants intérêts de commerce Européen.

MM. les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche ont répondu à cela, que selon l'Acte du Congrès, les Commissions de navigation ne devaient êtres composées que des délégués des Etats riverains, et que l'Autriche, en tant que cela concernait la partie du Danube qui traverse son territoire, tenait à l'application stricte de cette stipulation.

M. le Prince Gortchakoff, en adhérant au principe établi par M. le Comte Buol, a demandé qu'il fût appliqué également à la Russie. Il a, à ce propos, posé la question, si les Etats Allemands dont le territoire est traversé par le Danube, et nommément la Bavière, ne seraient pas représentés dans la Commission. M. le Baron Prokesch a répondu, qu'entre l'Autriche et la Bavière il y avait des stipulations spéciales sur la navigation de la partie supérieure de ce fleuve, et qu'il ne s'agissait maintenant que de régler la navigation du Bas Danube.

L'idée énoncée à l'Article 6, de naturaliser le Delta du Danube, en autant que l'exigerait la liberté de mouvement et d'action de la Commission permanente,

a rencontré de l'opposition de la part de MM. Plénipotentiaires de Russie. M. le Prince Gortchakoff a dit qu'il ne consentirait point à une combinaison qui avait l'air d'une expropriation indirecte. A propos de l'idée mise en avant, d'accorder aux membres de la Commission permanente le privilége de l'exterritorialité, M. le Prince Gortchakoff a fait observer que ce serait faire valoir au sujet de la Russie un principe qui n'était appliqué qu'aux échelles du Levant.

Lord John Russell ayant fait observer que, si ni l'une ni l'autre de ces combinaisons n'était admis, il serait indispensable de définir et d'énumérer exactement les attributions et les droits de la Commission permanente, le Prince Gortchakoff a dit qu'il concourrait volontiers à une entente à ce sujet, tout comme il tenait à constater que toutes les observations qu'il avait été dans le cas de présenter dans le cours de la discussion, n'avaient nullement pour but d'entraver, en quoi que ce soit, la liberté de la navigation du Danube, que la Russie désirait au contraire voir arriver à un développement complet.

Le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman a fait à l'égard des questions discutées dans cette séance, la même réserve qu'il avait déjà formulée à la dernière Conférence.

MM. les Plénipotentiaires ont décidé de faire mettre en circulation le projet élaboré par M. le Baron Prokesch et d'en reprendre l'examen à la prochaine séance.

(Suivent les signatures.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 563.

Annex to Protocol No. 4.

DEVELOPPEMENT DU SECOND POINT.

1. L'ACTE du Congrès de Vienne, auquel la Sublime Porte n'a pas pris part, ayant établi, dans ses Articles 108 à 116, les principes destinés à régler la navigation des fleuves traversant plusieurs Etats, les Puissances Contractantes conviennent entre elles de stipuler qu'à l'avenir ces principes seront également appliqués au cours inférieur du Danube, à partir du point où ce fleuve devient commun à l'Autriche et à l'Empire Ottoman jusque dans la mer. Cette disposition fera désormais partie du droit public de l'Europe et sera garantie par toutes les Puissances Contractantes.

2. L'application à faire de ces principes doit être toute entière dans le sens de faciliter le commerce et la navigation de telle sorte que la navigation de cette partie du Danube ne pourra être assujettie à aucune entrave ni redevance qui ne serait pas expressément prévue par les stipulations qui vont suivre, et que dès lors aussi les priviléges et immunités fondés dans les anciens Traités et les anciennes capitulations avec les Etats riverains de la partie du fleuve dont il s'agit, seront maintenus intacts.

En conséquence, il ne sera perçu sur tout le parcours susmentionné du Danube aucun péage basé uniquement sur le fait de la navigation du fleuve, ni aucun droit sur les marchandises qui se trouvent à bord des navires, et il ne sera apporté aucun obstacle, quel qu'il soit, à la libre navigation. Les mesures de précaution qu'on pourrait vouloir adopter sous le rapport des douanes et sous celui des quarantaines, devront être limitées au strict nécessaire et mises en harmonie avec ce qu'exigera la liberté de la navigation.

3. Afin de faire disparaître l'obstacle le plus important qui pèse sur la navigation du Bas Danube, on entreprendra et on achevera, dans le plus bref délai, les travaux nécessaires tant pour dégager l'embouchure du Danube des sables qui l'obstruent que pour écarter les autres inconvénients physiques qui diminuent la navigabilité du fleuve sur d'autres points en amont de son cours, à tel point que la circulation jusqu'à Galatz et Braïlow de bâtiments de marine commerciale du tonnage le plus fort soit délivrée des périls, empêchements et pertes, avec lesquels elle a eu à lutter jusqu'à ce jour.

Pour couvrir les frais de ces travaux et des établissements ayant pour objet d'assurer et de faciliter la navigation, des droits fixes d'un taux convenable pourront être prélevés sur les navires parcourant le Bas Danube, à la condition expresse que, sous ce rapport comme sous tout autre, les pavillons de toutes les nations seront traités sur le pied d'une parfaite égalité.

4. L'exécution et le contrôle des stipulations contenues dans les Articles précédents étant placés sous la garantie Européenne, les Puissances Contractantes nommeront aussitôt après la signature de la paix des délégués qui, après examen sur les lieux, présenteront aux Représentants des dites Puissances, réunis en Conférence, un relevé exact et circonstancié sur les obstacles qui s'opposent à l'heure à la libre navigation du Bas Danube, et sur les travaux à exécuter et les moyens à employer pour les faire disparaître. Ces délégués, agissant en Syndicat Européen, établiront, de même, les bases de la législation réglementaire et de police fluviale et maritime qui, après avoir reçu la sanction des Puissances Contractantes, formera dorénavant loi pour la navigation du Bas Danube.

Chacune des Puissances Contractantes aura le droit de faire stationner un ou deux bâtiments de guerre aux embouchures du fleuve.

5. Le Syndicat Européen, en tant qu'il est appelé à agir en autorité exécutive, sera composé, en conformité avec les stipulations du Congrès de Vienne, de délégués des Etats riverains. Cette Commission exécutive sera permanente et prendra le nom de "Commission de la Navigation du Bas Danube."

Elle sera chargée de commun accord, et en usant de moyens communs, de l'exécution des mesures approuvées par les Puissances pour l'abolition des obstacles de la libre navigation du fleuve dans son parcours susmentionné, ainsi que de l'application et du développement des principes réglementaires et de police. Elle sera munie des pouvoirs nécessaires pour pouvoir remplir sa tâche de la manière la plus complète, sans difficultés ni délais. La manière dont cette Commission permanente, agissant au nom de l'Europe, sera constituée, ainsi que la tâche qu'elle aura à remplir, seront spécifiées dans un Acte Séparé, et les dispositions qui s'y trouveront consignées, auront force obligatoire pour les trois Etats riverains.

6. Pour faciliter et assurer l'action efficace de la Commission permanente, la Russie, en possession des îles formant le Delta du Bas Danube, consentira à ne plus rétablir sur le bras de Soulina la ligne de quarantaine qu'elle y avait établie autrefois. Elle consentira également à ne conserver ni ériger aucun établissement militaire qui pourrait gêner les navires passant le fleuve. De plus elle déclare vouloir considérer, en tant que l'exige l'action de la Commission permanente, dont elle sera elle-même partie intégrante, les îles susmentionnées formant le Delta du Danube comme pays neutre, tout en se réservant la juridiction sur ses sujets y établis.

No. 564.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 38.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 26, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I saw Count Buol yesterday, in company with Lord Westmorland and Baron Bourqueney.

He informed us that he had had a long conversation with Prince Gortchakoff. That he had used the arguments with which your Lordship must be familiar, to induce him to consent to a limitation of the Russian naval force in the Black Sea. He had told Prince Gortchakoff that if it was true that Russia might keep up the force she pleased within her own limits, it was also true that other Powers had a right to require explanations, and upon their not being satisfactory to declare war. That the maritime Powers now shut up this boasted fleet in its own harbour, and might continue to do so. Prince Gortchakoff, after a good deal of discussion, confessed he was struck with this argument. He said the subject was capable of manipulations. This seems a preface to concession.

Count Buol thinks he will refer to St. Petersburgh. I should suppose rather that the Russian Plenipotentiaries were already furnished with instructions for any probable case that could occur.

It was the evident calculation of the Russian party in Germany that the plan of counterpoise would appear to the Austrian Government so fair a scheme that if a rupture were to occur on this point Austria must perforce side with Russia.

Upon this, as upon other occasions, Count Buol, while speaking the most friendly language to the Russian Plenipotentiaries, has behaved with great fidelity to the spirit of the engagements which his Government had contracted.

A Conference upon the third point is to be held to-day. I cannot but lament that while subjects vitally affecting the Turkish Empire are under consideration, Her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries and the Conference have not the assistance of a Turkish Ambassador fully informed of the views of his Court. The Sublime Porte, as I am informed, has never been taught to look on these negotiations as serious. I am sorry Her Majesty's Ambassador in Turkey should not have been aware of this misconception of our character and our intentions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 565.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 39.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 26, 1855.*

BARON BOURQUENEY received yesterday evening the despatches to which your Lordship's telegraphic message referred.

As we had already made some progress in obtaining the concurrence of Count Buol to the limitation of the Russian fleet, and Count Buol, on his side, had produced some effect on the mind of Prince Gortchakoff, the new propositions arrived at an unfortunate time.

Count Buol, whom we saw this morning scarcely half-an-hour before the Conference was to begin, seemed very unwilling to entertain the plan of neutrality, which he had had no time to consider.

He accordingly opened the Conference upon the third point, by declaring that the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea was a just cause of alarm to Europe, and that one of the prominent objects of the allies was to put an end to that preponderance. He thought it desirable, however, that the Russian and Turkish Plenipotentiaries should in the first place declare their views on a matter which concerned them both as Sovereigns on the coast of the Black Sea, and which concerned Turkey as holder of the gates of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.

Baron Bourqueney, Lord Westmorland, and I, having declared our wish to see a means found of attaining an object of European policy compatible with the honour of Russia, Prince Gortchakoff announced that he was prepared to discuss any propositions that might be made, but he was not prepared to make any himself.

Hereupon, Count Buol expressed a desire that he would refer to his Court, which he declared himself willing to do.

The Turkish Ambassador declared himself to be without instructions.

It appeared to me at this moment that if we continued to discuss in the Conference the various propositions for carrying the third point into effect, we should dispel the hope of peace which had just appeared on the horizon; I therefore proposed that the regular Conference should be suspended, and that we should only mention in conversation various projects for the information of the Russian Plenipotentiary.

This being agreed to, Baron Bourqueney threw out the idea of a neutral character to be given to the Black Sea. Prince Gortchakoff at once pointed out that such a plan would leave Russia disarmed in the presence of Turkey armed, and with no material defence against the fleets of France and England. Count Buol took no part in this discussion.

I mentioned, on my side, the objections to a counterpoise; the constant rivalry it would foster; the weakness of Turkey it would display; and the loss of her independence which would follow. It was impossible, I argued, for Turkey to be calling her allies to her aid upon every difference that might arise, without shaking the belief in her means of resistance, and destroying her character of an independent Power.

These propositions being thus enunciated without any formal action of the

Conference, the whole question is kept open for the day of regular discussion and final decision.

As far as I can learn, the prospects for that day are nearly as follows:—

1. The project of a counterpoise in permanent action is not seriously entertained. Russia would only be willing to adopt it as a plan which would be found impracticable, and would leave her mistress of the field.

2. The proposal of limiting the Russian marine to a fixed number will be considered by Russia as inadmissible.

3. The Emperor of Russia, left to take his own line, and bound in honour to keep his engagement, as consigned in the Protocol on the third point, will, it is possible, declare to Turkey in the Conference, that he is willing to remove all cause of alarm to her, and of jealousy to Europe, by not increasing the number of ships of war he may have available in the Black Sea at the time of signing the preliminaries of peace.

It has been my object, and that of Lord Westmorland, to keep for mature decision on the part of France and England, as well as Russia, the issue of these negotiations.

Should they be broken off, no one can say under what circumstances they may be resumed, or what fields may be stained with blood, before peace can be attained.

New Conventions must be signed; the position of Austria must be advanced; that of Prussia must be defined.

It has seemed to me well worthy of the foresight, the wisdom, and the benevolence of Her Majesty, as well as of her illustrious ally the Emperor of the French, to give a little time to reflection upon the first and second points of guarantee already arranged, and upon the prospects of Europe thus improved, before the gates of peace are finally closed.

No Englishman would see with satisfaction a peace which was not honourable for his country and safe for Europe; which did not make amends for the sacrifices made, and remove to a distance a danger which hangs heavily upon the prospects of the world. But if the Emperor of Russia is willing to show his deference for the wishes of the allied Powers, the extent of the concession he will make may be deliberately considered, and a grave question gravely determined.

The next meeting of the Conference is on Thursday, and will commence on the fourth point.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 566.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 376.)
My Lord, *Paris, March 29, 1855.*

IN consequence of finding that it would be more convenient for your Lordship to receive him on Friday, M. Drouyn de Lhuys did not set out for London until this morning.

I saw his Excellency yesterday afternoon. He said that he had just received his last orders from the Emperor, and that he had no doubt that they would meet with the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government. His first object would be to make peace on such terms as should be settled in London. The next, if negotiations failed, to obtain the active cooperation of Austria; but the Emperor, he added, was quite prepared for the failure of both contingencies, when His Majesty would press the war with all the means at his disposal.

Your Lordship will see M. Drouyn de Lhuys so soon that I need not enter into further details.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 567.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 380.)
My Lord, *Paris, March 29, 1855.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS mentioned to me yesterday, that he had received reports to the effect that the Russian deserters who gave themselves up to the Austrian troops in the Principalities, were immediately delivered up to the nearest Russian outposts. He proposed remonstrating with Count Buol against the aid thus given to Russia by the Austrian authorities in the Principalities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 568.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 331.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, March 30, 1855.*

HER MAJESTY'S Government entirely concur in the opinion of M. Drouyn de Lhuys as reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 360 of March 26.

Before receiving that despatch I had held similar language to Count Colloredo upon the proposals that he had been instructed to submit to Her Majesty's Government, and informed him that they were inadmissible.

I did not conceal from Count Colloredo my opinion upon the course that Austria seemed prepared to pursue, adding that whether Austria flew from her engagements, and abandoned the cause in which she was embarked, or not, nothing would induce England and France to make peace on terms that would be inglorious for themselves and unsafe for Europe.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 569.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 141.)
My Lord, *Vienna, March 26, 1855.*

YOU will learn from the report addressed to your Lordship by Lord John Russell that Count Buol and Baron Bourqueney met Lord John and myself by agreement yesterday, when Count Buol detailed to us the confidential conversation which he had held on the previous day with Prince Gortchakoff.

He reported that in this conversation he had mentioned his belief that the instructions of the English and French Ministers were of a nature to require the entire adoption by Russia of the engagement to which she had herself become a party by her adhesion to the third basis of the conditions of peace, by which he was bound to "mettre fin à la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire."

Count Buol called upon Prince Gortchakoff to conform himself in full to this requirement, which he thought he might carry out more effectually and more to the satisfaction of his Government if he was to take the initiative and himself make a proposal by which this object might be attained; and he had suggested to him that by proposing to limit the naval force of Russia to what at present remained of her fleet, and by engaging after the war not to increase it, it might be taken into consideration, and might become the ground upon which some transaction might be come to. Count Buol said that he cited many instances in which the riverains of an inland sea had come to arrangements amongst themselves according to which they bound themselves not to maintain a force on either side which might be considered as a menace to the other; and

in arguing this point he had mentioned the case of the lakes in Italy, the shores of which were occupied by different Powers, as well as the lakes of Canada, where the British possessions and those of the United States were placed on opposite shores.

Count Buol stated that in carrying out the stipulations of the third basis the question of right might be maintained, but there was also the principle of "convenance;" and between two Powers who were putting an end to a state of war with a sincere desire of re-establishing a durable peace, it was befitting that each party should remove, without injury to its own interests, in a state of peace such as it was entering upon, whatever might reasonably be considered as a cause of alarm or menace to the opposing Power. Count Buol added that Prince Gortchakoff must be aware that the peace of Europe had been broken by the acts of Russia, which by her preponderance in the Black Sea she had been able to carry out against Turkey, and therefore that the allied Powers had felt it their duty to stipulate amongst themselves that this state of things must be put an end to, and as Russia had herself agreed to the fulfilment of this stipulation, he felt that he was only calling upon the Russian Government to carry out this engagement by assuming an initiative with regard to it in the manner the most appropriate to their own satisfaction and consideration.

Count Buol stated that Prince Gortchakoff had replied to this reasoning by the assurance that he acknowledged the courtesy which had dictated the proposition; that he admitted the propriety of its being duly considered; and that he had no instructions to take such an initiative as had been proposed; but that if he was allowed to refer it to his Government, he would faithfully report it, and would as speedily as possible inform us of the decision he might receive.

Count Buol said that he had thought it his duty to acquaint us with what had thus taken place; and he left it with us to decide whether we would agree to allow him to bring this proposition forward in the Conference of this day, and whether, in case Prince Gortchakoff proposed the reference to his Government, as above stated, we should feel ourselves authorised to agree to it, and he (Count Buol) strongly recommended we should do so.

Just before our meeting with Count Buol took place yesterday, Lord John Russell and myself had received your Lordship's telegraphic message of the 24th instant, directing us to support a proposition for neutralizing the Black Sea, which had been transmitted by the French Government to Baron Bourqueney, but that Minister had not received this communication; it was, therefore, impossible to enter upon any discussion with regard to it. The message was, however, submitted to Count Buol, who conceived that the line of conduct he had recommended would, notwithstanding any other proposition, be the most advantageous to adopt; and both Lord John Russell and Baron Bourqueney, as well as myself, after considerable discussion, agreed to adopt the views of Count Buol for the opening of the Conference of this day.

At a late hour last night, Baron Bourqueney received the communication from his Government which had been announced, and he this morning brought it to Lord John Russell and myself, and after consulting with regard to it, we took it to Count Buol. He said that it was so entirely new a proposal, that it was impossible, at the moment the Conference was about to take place, that he should give any opinion with regard to it; but it appeared to him to be wanting in any security to Russia; that if she entirely disarmed her fleets in the Black Sea, she might at any time, upon the breaking out of any future hostilities, be at once overwhelmed by the fleets of Turkey, and possibly of her allies, who would enter that sea by the Bosphorus from Constantinople, or from any part of the world, without her being able to introduce into that sea a single ship for her defence. Count Buol also remarked that the whole plan was made subservient to the approval of the Government of the Sultan (whose acquiescence in it he very much doubted), before it could be officially proposed to the Russian Ministers.

Count Buol stated, that under these circumstances, he strongly recommended an adherence to the plan which had yesterday been agreed to, although he admitted that if Baron Bourqueney thought it right to mention this fresh plan to the Conference, and if Lord John Russell and myself agreed to support the proposition, he did not see any inconvenience in our doing so.

Immediately after this discussion, the Conference assembled, and your

Lordship will learn its result from the telegraphic message transmitted to you this day by Lord John Russell and myself.

The very lengthened discussion which took place in that Conference will be fully reported to your Lordship by Lord John Russell, who in the ablest manner advocated your Lordship's views, to which I gave my anxious support. The decision taken appears to possess the advantage of proving, that while in the course of this important discussion we maintained every principle which we had been instructed to support, we at the same time displayed moderation in putting forward those principles, and in our endeavour to carry them out—a course which appeared to us the best calculated to ensure their adoption.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 570.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 138.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 27, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose the translation of a confidential circular despatch, which has been addressed by Baron Manteuffel to the Representatives of Prussia at foreign Courts, under date of the 16th instant, and is well worthy of your Lordship's attention.

It relates to the misunderstanding between Baron Prokesch and M. de Bismark, and is written in a spirit of violent animosity against Austria, upon whom it is attempted to throw the responsibility of what has occurred.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 570.

Circular addressed to Prussian Representatives at Foreign Courts.

(Confidentielle.) *Le 16 Mars, 1855.*

COMME complément de ma circulaire du 8 de ce mois, je ne vois pas d'inconvénient à adresser à votre Excellence, pour l'intelligence complète des actes qui se passent en ce moment, copie de la circulaire Autrichienne du 28 Février, circulaire qui nous a été communiquée de plusieurs côtés, avec l'expression de l'étonnement qu'on avait éprouvé de voir que le Cabinet de Vienne eut fait ces démarches sans les avoir porté à notre connaissance, ni en même tems ni postérieurement. Le contenu de la pièce, qui nous était inconnue lors de la publication de la circulaire du 8 Mars, n'est propre qu'à nous fortifier dans l'attitude que nous avons prise. Il est clair que le Cabinet de Vienne veut substituer ses motifs à ceux de la Diète et en même tems nous en attribuer que nous n'avons pas, chercher des provocations là où il n'y a aucun motif d'en voir et donner comme faisant seuls loi à l'exclusion des principes généraux de la Confédération, les points de vue particulier du Traité du 20 Avril et de son Article Additionnel.

Nous serions entraînés trop loin si nous voulions signaler les erreurs que renferme la circulaire Autrichienne sur les déclarations véritables de notre Représentant à la Diète, et je m'en refère aux explications que je vous ai données dans ma circulaire du 8. La droiture de notre conduite est si évidente, que celui qui ne veut pas le reconnaître, doit certainement avoir pour cela ses motifs.

Je n'hésite pas à déclarer que c'est une injustice flagrante qui fait attribuer à M. de Bismark d'avoir déclaré, soit officieusement, soit officiellement, que la Prusse ait jamais voulu comprendre dans la "Kriegsbereitschaft" l'armement des forteresses fédérales.

Notre Représentant à la Diète, qui a été plus étonné encore des paroles que la circulaire du 28 a mises dans sa bouche que des autres erreurs qui y sont contenues, a déclaré de la manière la plus positive n'avoir pas dit ce qui,

d'ailleurs, ne serait compréhensible pour nous que dans le sens que nous avons donné. Il s'en rapporte au témoignage de ses collégues dans cette circonstance.

Il est de fait que des personnes qui ne pouvaient ni ne devaient savoir ce qui se passait dans la séance de la Diète, ont raconté des détails de cette séance, en les attribuant à M. de Bismark. Comment cette information leur est elle parvenue, c'est ce que nous ne chercherons pas à éclaircir.

Un vote de M. de Bismark dans la question de la forteresse de Rastadt—vote qui n'avait pas de portée politique—est resté ignoré du Baron de Prokesch, ancien Envoyé Autrichien près de la Diète. Le rapport de ce dernier, qui seul eut pu provoquer les assertions contenues dans la dépêche circulaire du 28, n'a pu ainsi leur fournir même un prétexte éloigné. La nature de cette imputation apparait donc au grand jour. Il serait superflu de s'étendre davantage.

Je ne peux pas m'empêcher de faire une autre remarque; M. de Buol ne s'explique pas comment nous pouvons faire concorder nos missions extraordinaires de Paris et de Londres avec notre attitude à la Diète quand même notre attitude à la Diète serait provocatrice pour les Puissances Occidentales—ce qui est sans doute la conséquence des fictions du Cabinet de Vienne, mais ce qui n'est en rien notre intention. Le soin du Comte Buol de nous mettre en opposition avec nous-mêmes serait rendu complètement vain, par ce fait, que d'après l'ordre exprès de Sa Majesté une entente complète ne peut exister avec les Cabinets de Paris et de Londres qu'au moment où la Prusse, par sa participation aux Conférences, aurait connaissance complète des bases de la paix pour l'obtention desquelles elle aurait des engagements à prendre. Sous ce rapport notre attitude été indiquée d'une manière complète par notre dépêche à vous, comme du 21 Janvier adressée au Comte de Bernstorff et au Comte de Hatzfeldt. Jusqu'ici il n'y a eu sur ce sujet entre les Cabinets Occidentaux et nous qu'une échange d'idées confidentielles, auxquelles nous avons, pour notre part, maintenu ce caractère, qui, peut-être, s'il avait été observé de tous les côtés, aurait empêché beaucoup de malentendus. Cet échange ne peut nous imposer aucune obligation anticipée, encore moins nous forcer, sous prétexte d'une apparente provocation, à restreindre la manifestation de nos convictions, alors qu'elles ont pour base les principes et qu'elles sont motivées sur les arrêts de la Confédération. Si M. de Buol trouve ici une contradiction, nous sommes hors d'état de la résoudre, mais nous demandons comment le Cabinet de Vienne, qui base toujours ses arguments sur les dangers qui menacent du côté de la Russie et sur son désir du développement des forces Allemandes contre elle, les met d'accord avec les espérances de paix et l'attitude très conciliante qu'il a pris aux Conférences de Vienne vis-à-vis des négociateurs Russes.

Vous êtes prié de faire usage de cette dépêche à l'occasion d'une manière très confidentielle.

(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 571.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 139.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 27, 1855.*

I UNDERSTAND that a despatch has been addressed within these last few days by Baron Manteuffel to Baron Werther at St. Petersburgh, directing him to exhort the Russian Government to desist from pretensions that must ensure a prolongation of the war. His Excellency states in this despatch, as I am informed, that the King of Prussia is resolved, under any circumstances, to remain unfettered by obligations that will bind him to a particular course; that further, Russia must not count on His Majesty's cooperation, for his desire is, if forced to side with any party, to unite with that one which will not have refused to make reasonable concessions in the interests of peace.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 572.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 143.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 28, 1855.*

YOUR Lordship will have probably heard from Paris, that the French Government are of opinion that it would still be desirable to obtain the accession of Prussia to the Vienna Protocol of the 28th December, containing the four bases of negotiation with Russia.

M. de Moustier has been in communication with Baron Manteuffel on the subject, and it appears that the Prussian Government are now desirous to take this step in the following manner. The Governments of France and England should communicate copies of the Protocol, either here or in London and Paris, and the Prussian Government would then reply to the communication by a note accepting the engagements contained in this document.

Baron Manteuffel would further propose the same course to the Cabinet of Vienna.

When his Excellency spoke to me this evening, and gave me this information, I asked his Excellency if the King intended this as a prelude to a Treaty. He replied that His Majesty had by no means changed his mind on this point, and that he had no intention of purchasing his admission to the Conferences by any such engagement, and that though he accepted the Protocol, he would not bind himself eventually to make war against Russia—a Power which certainly might have acted wrongfully at one time, but which had now given proof of a desire to make peace and to accept terms which the King thought ought to be satisfactory to the Western Powers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 573.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 144.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 28, 1855.*

WHEN speaking this evening to Baron Manteuffel on the subject of the Vienna Protocol of the 28th December, embodying the four points upon which Austria, France, and Great Britain are now treating with Russia, as the bases of peace, and which Prussia declares her readiness to accede, I observed to his Excellency that though, of course, Her Majesty's Government would be glad to see them adopted by the Cabinet of Berlin, they could not look upon the accession of Prussia in the light of an important concession, as Russia had agreed to them as a point of departure for the present negotiations. His Excellency replied that Her Majesty's Government might perhaps not attach great value to this step, but he could nevertheless assure me that at St. Petersburgh the accession was by no means approved of, and he had just received a despatch from Baron Werther stating that the Russian Government had expressed themselves dissatisfied with the intention of the King of Prussia, and would prefer that the accession did not take place.

I rejoined that I could not understand the meaning of their objection, as they themselves had agreed to them; to which Baron Manteuffel answered that the Russian Government did not allow that they had accepted them in the sense which they believed was put on them by the Western Powers, and they would consequently prefer that Prussia should not commit herself to the Protocol of 28th December; but he added this would not have any influence on the King's decision, and that if we desired to have the Protocol agreed to by Prussia, it would be done in the form that had been suggested, and which I understand from his Excellency has already been forwarded to Count Bernstorff.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 574.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 145.)

Berlin, March 28, 1855.

My Lord,

I WAS surprised, on calling this evening on Baron Manteuffel, to find that his Excellency appeared to be informed of what had passed at the Conference held at Vienna when the third basis was brought forward for discussion. His Excellency told me, that as the allies had had nothing to propose on this point, Prince Gortchakoff had declared that he must refer to St. Petersburgh for instructions, which had been done, and that in order not to lose time, the Plenipotentiaries had at once proceeded to the consideration of the fourth basis.

I asked if his Excellency thought that this hesitation of Prince Gortchakoff augured well for the result of the Conferences, and what he thought would come out of the meeting? He replied, that he thought Russia would not do anything to break off the negotiations, and would perhaps even agree to a limitation of her naval force in the Black Sea. I rejoined, that I presumed from what his Excellency said, that he should approve of such a suggestion on the part of the Western Powers; and I asked, if Russia refused to agree not to maintain hereafter in the Black Sea more than the number of ships now now afloat there, whether Prussia would consider such a refusal as an unjustifiable reason for breaking off negotiations?

He replied, that he could not say that such was the King's opinion, but it was his; and he gave me to understand that he hoped His Majesty might be brought to view the point in the same light.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 575.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 51.)

Copenhagen, March 24, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship the copy of a report, received by M. de Scheel, of the speech which the Emperor Alexander addressed to the Diplomatic body at St. Petersburgh, when they waited upon him on the 7th instant, in order that it may be compared with any other versions which may have reached your Lordship, of the language held by His Imperial Majesty on that occasion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 575.

Speech of the Emperor Alexander to the Diplomatic Corps, March 7, 1855.

JE suis persuadé, Messieurs, de la part sincère que toutes vos Cours ont prise au malheur qui vient de nous frapper. J'en ai déjà reçu des témoignages de plusieurs côtés qui m'ont très vivement touché, et j'ai dit hier aux Ministres de Prusse et d'Autriche combien j'y étais sensible. Je déclare ici solennellement, devant vous, Messieurs, que je reste fidèle à tous les sentiments de mon père et que je persévérerai dans la ligne de principes politiques qui ont servi de règle à mon oncle l'Empereur Alexandre et à mon père. Ces principes sont ceux de la Sainte Alliance, mais si cette alliance n'existe plus, ce n'est certainement pas la faute de mon père. Ses intentions sont toujours restées droites et loyales, et si en dernier lieu elles ont été méconnues par quelques uns, je n'ai pas de doute que Dieu et l'histoire ne lui rendent justice. Je suis prêt à tendre franchement la main à une entente sur les conditions qu'il avait acceptées. Comme lui je veux

la paix et voir se terminer les maux de la guerre; mais si les Conférences qui vont s'ouvrir à Vienne n'aboutissaient pas à un résultat honorable pour nous, je combattrais avec ma fidèle Russie, et je périrais plutôt que de céder. Quant à mes sentiments personnels pour vos Souverains ils n'ont pas varié, et (s'adressant au Baron Werther) je n'ai j'amais douté de l'affection fraternelle et amicale que Sa Majesté le Roi a toujours eue pour mon père et je vous ai dit hier à quel point je lui en suis reconnaissant; et (se tournant vers le Comte Esterhazy) je suis profondement sensible aux bonnes paroles que l'Empereur m'a fait transmettre. Sa Majesté ne peut douter de la sincère affection que mon père lui avait vouée à une époque qu'elle même vient de rappeler par l'ordre du jour que l'Empereur a adressé à son armée. Veuillez, Messieurs, communiquer mes paroles à vos Cours respectives.

No. 576.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 41. Confidential.)

Vienna, March 28, 1855.

My Lord,

IN the instructions which I had the honour to receive from your Lordship, the object of my mission to this capital is very clearly defined to be, either to obtain guarantees against Russian aggression, or, in case of the continuance of the war, to have Austria as a belligerent on our side.

There are, however, other objects of great importance, which a deliberate examination of the four points will make apparent to any fair observer.

France and Great Britain have expressly renounced any special advantages to themselves from the great sacrifices which, in entering upon this war, they were about to make. But when they were called upon to enumerate the conditions upon which they would consent to peace, they showed very clearly in their replies, that while they were indifferent to advantages for themselves, they were not forgetful of the cause of civilization, or of the privileges and the happiness of those nations upon whose behalf they were about to stipulate, and upon whose fate they might be called upon to decide. I propose in this despatch to review the present negotiations in this triple view of security against Russia, friendship with Austria, and the welfare of the inhabitants of the territories subject to the sway of the Sultan.

I have, for my own part, kept steadily in view these three objects.

1. To check the aggressive spirit of Russia:

2. To carry Austria with us in the negotiations, and, if peace should not be attained, in the further prosecution of the war.

3. To provide for the welfare and improvement of the Christian nations under Ottoman rule.

With respect to the first of these objects, I have taken for granted it was generally, if not completely provided for in the four points. The surrender of the exclusive protection of the inhabitants of Wallachia and Moldavia, which, in the course of eighty years, had been nearly converted from protection into dominion; the admission of the free navigation of the Danube, to be secured by effectual means; the limitation of the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea, and the relinquishment of her menacing attitude, and, finally, the conversion of the official protection of the Christians of the Greek rite by Russia, into a general encouragement to the Sultan to persevere in his benevolent reforms: these changes, short of a diminution of territory which the state of the war did not allow us to ask, appeared to the Western Powers the best securities that could be obtained for the arrest of the ambitious designs of Russia in the East.

The concurrence of Austria, as your Lordship knows better than any one, has only been obtained by long and laborious negotiation. The position of Austria at the commencement of these differences was indeed one of extreme difficulty. Her army had been reduced; her finances were embarrassed; the fire of the insurrections of Hungary and Lombardy still smouldered under the ashes. Had Austria at once taken part with Russia, Italy and Hungary would probably have burst into a flame. Had she declared for the Western Powers, a Russian army might in six weeks have been at the gates of Vienna.

In these circumstances Austria has prepared her armaments gradually, made engagements cautiously, and without declaring open war has checked the advance of Russia. In this slow and passionless manner she has obtained for herself the occupation of the Principalities, forbidden the advance of the Russian armies by the Balkan, and obtained, in conjunction with the Western Powers, from a proud Sovereign the concession of guarantees which in August last he had haughtily refused.

I have conceived it to be my duty to tread in the path which Her Majesty's Government had hitherto followed, and to attach a high value to the cooperation of Austria, whether in negotiation or in war.

With respect to the third object, I need only refer to the despatches of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe for the last twelve years. It has appeared to us to be our manifest duty, while checking the arrogant and selfish pretensions of Russia, to take care that the condition of 11,000,000 of people, subjects of the Porte, should be improved and not rendered worse by our interference.

The partial success of England and France in procuring fair treatment for the Christians in Turkey might, I conceived, by taking advantage of this opportunity, be converted into complete equality and permanent justice. The two sources of Ottoman misgovernment have been degradation by law in the first instance, outrage and plunder by abuse of power in the second. The law amended, and the administration purified, the Christians would have nothing to desire. Nor has the Sultan any wish to oppress or injure any class of his subjects. He is neither a tyrant by nature, nor a bigot by prejudice, and would willingly indulge his own benevolent disposition.

Leaving these general considerations, I come to the four points in the order in which they have been placed. It will be observed that the first and third tend directly to lessen Russian power; the second promotes European commerce, and indirectly counteracts Russian monopoly; the fourth provides for the welfare of the Christian inhabitants of Turkey, by means which will counterbalance Russian aggrandizement.

1st. The Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia have, since the year 1829, been subject to the direct influence of Russia. The despatch of Lord Aberdeen in reference to the Treaty of Adrianople points out the control over the Principalities which Russia was sure to derive from the Treaty of Adrianople. The fact I believe to be, that while Russia has interfered in the daily government of the Principalities, the demands of the Sultan have been confined to the payment of the regular moderate tribute, and have not embarrassed in any way the internal administration of the Hospodars.

At the present moment three Powers might be expected to contend for control in the Principalities. 1. Russia, while nominally yielding, might seek to retain, by an ostentatious patronage, an influence with the inhabitants. 2. Turkey might seek to restore the direct means of government which she held before the later Treaties with Russia. 3. Austria might seek, by keeping up a permanent Conference, to regulate from Vienna the provincial administration.

Lord Westmorland and I have not favoured any of these plans. By stipulating for a national administration with a collective guarantee of present and future privileges, and by denouncing and abolishing exclusive protection, we bar the claims of Russia. By not restoring the old powers of the Sultan, we shut out the evil of Turkish misgovernment. By refusing to erect a permanent Conference, we refuse to recognize a perpetual superintendence of the five Powers, which would end in the substitution of an Austrian for a Russian Protectorate.

I am aware it may be argued that the best mode of making the Principalities a barrier against Russia, would be to give the Turks a greater hold over the Principalities. But when I recollect the disorders which afflicted Thessaly and Albania last year from the conflict of Christians and Mussulmans, I cannot desire to expose the fertile and populous provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia to such a scourge.

The only resource, therefore, seems to be to strengthen the national institutions of these Provinces, to influence the Porte to make a good organic statute, and to leave the country to develop its natural resources.

Many questions arise upon this subject, upon which we have not taken upon ourselves to pronounce.

For instance, should the Provinces be united? Should the Executive power be vested in the hands of an hereditary Prince, or a Prince appointed for life, or chosen for seven years? Should a representation be given extending to the people at large? Should any part of the military defence be entrusted to the Turks? Should Mussulmans be allowed, without taking part in the administration, to settle in the Provinces?

These and other questions it appeared to us would be resolved far better in the presence of an Ambassador acquainted with the latest views of the Ottoman Government, or at Constantinople itself, than they could be by us, impressed as we were with the urgency of the business we had before us, and the scantiness of our information with regard to the exact state of the Principalities.

There are some views, however, which it will be well to keep in mind.

It would be desirable, certainly, to place the Executive power in the hands of a Prince of enlightened views, and intent upon reforming the abuses which the corrupt rivalry of the Boyars has engendered in such loathsome profusion.

There is to be objected however, in the first place, the difficulty of choice, and secondly, the consequences which would ensue.

With respect to the difficulty of choice, the state of Belgium, as compared with that of Greece, shows the importance of the selection of a wise and prudent Prince.

With respect to the second point, it may be enough to suggest that an hereditary Prince establishing himself by wise laws and conciliatory conduct would scarcely remain long a vassal of the Porte. The Pasha of Egypt has the tie of religion to bind him to the Caliph; but a Christian Prince, though he might call the Sultan his Suzerain, would be for all practical purposes independent.

On the other hand, the election for seven years, and the power of removal by the Porte, keeps up a mischievous rivalry among the Boyars, and tends to perpetuate the rule of intrigue and corruption.

With regard to free institutions, it must be remarked that the Sovereigns of Austria and Russia would never tolerate in the neighbourhood of Poland and Hungary promoters of disturbance and rebellion among their subjects.

Freedom of discussion and liberty of the press would scarcely be suffered to proceed to any large extent unmolested; disturbance would be alleged, insurrection feared, and armed intervention contemplated. It is questionable whether in such circumstances Great Britain could interfere in behalf of these weak provinces with any effect.

It is therefore worthy of consideration how far we should promote institutions which we should not afterwards be able to protect.

The removal of foreigners alleged to be engaged in plots was sure to be insisted upon, and Lord Westmorland and I could only obtain a modification of the Article on this subject. At all events Wallachia and Moldavia might be expected to do for Austria and Russia what Belgium and Switzerland feel themselves bound to do for France.

Either at Constantinople or here the future condition of the Principalities must be carefully weighed, and the various questions I have glanced at be maturely considered.

Should these questions be happily solved, Russia will be effectually checked, Austria will be satisfied with the removal of a great rival from her immediate neighbourhood, and the welfare of 4,000,000 of people be permanently promoted.

2ndly. The second point relates to the navigation of the Danube.

The Russian Envoys have always alleged that the impediments to the free navigation of the Danube at its mouth have been owing to natural obstacles, which the skill hitherto employed was not able to overcome. They have professed their willingness to lend their aid to any measures which might secure the freedom of navigation for the future.

The most important point in our discussions upon this subject, had reference to Article III of the Treaty of Adrianople.

I confess it did not appear to me, if the territory of Russia was not to suffer diminution, that we could give such proof of bad faith on the part of Russia, as to justify us in insisting upon the neutrality of the islands at the mouth of the Danube. As this proposal was strongly resisted by Russia, it was not pressed.

The appointment of an European Commission in which a French and an English Commissioner will sit, will give the means of appointing men of practical science to point out how the existing obstacles may be removed, and new

branches of the river made navigable. This Commission ought to be continued until the works ordered shall be completed, and until the British and French Governments are convinced by experience that the river-bordering Commission will do its duty effectually.

Should the navigation of this great outlet to the Black Sea be made really free, a powerful competition will be raised against the produce of the Russian provinces; Austria will gain both by the transit of Hungarian and Transylvanian produce, and by the popularity she will acquire in Germany; while the interests of commerce and civilization will be advanced, for the general benefit of the world.

I have thus gone over, I fear at tedious length, the discussions which have taken place upon two of the four points.

Whether the negotiations proceed happily, or break off suddenly, Her Majesty's Government are entitled to know the views upon which I have acted, and which seem to me to be in conformity both with the course hitherto sanctioned by Her Majesty, and with the instructions I have received.

Your Lordship will have seen with regret that the Conference has not had the benefit of a frank and full communication of the views of the Sublime Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 577.

Lords John Russell and Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 31*, 1855.

WE will inform the Austrian Minister that it is useless to proceed with the Conference until an understanding is come to on the third point, and that we cannot agree to any preliminary discussion on the fourth point. If the issue of the negotiations is to be made to turn on the plan of neutralization, we wish you would explain that plan to us in a despatch. We do not find it in any of our instructions.

Count Buol says it is beyond and out of the four points. On this ground he will probably not support it, and lay on the Western Powers the blame of the rupture.

No. 578.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 1*, 1855.

ADMIRAL LYONS writes to me on the 28th off Sebastopol; but gives no news.

No. 579.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 146.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 29*, 1855.

IN my despatch No. 127 of the 19th instant, I forwarded a translation of a Prussian circular of the 8th of March, relating to certain proceedings attributed to M. de Bismark at the Diet at Frankfort; and I have now the honour to inclose a translation of a despatch which has been addressed by Count Buol to the Representatives of Austria at the German Courts, dated Vienna, March 23, in reply to the above circular.

The Austrian Government express their dissatisfaction at the manner in

which the despatch came to their knowledge, which was through the public press, and make reproachful observations on its general tendency.

The circular closes by stating that the Austrian Government has no desire to prolong the discussion, and has therefore no communication to offer on the subject to the different German Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 579.

Circular addressed to Austrian Agents at Foreign Courts.

(Traduction.) *Vienne, le 23 Mars*, 1855.

LE circulaire du Cabinet Royal Prussien du 8 Mars, que M. le Comte d'Arnim devait me faire connaître, suivant l'ordre qu'il en avait reçu de son Gouvernement, ne m'a été communiqué qu'après que les journaux l'avaient publiée.

Après avoir eu connaissance de cette communication je ne pourrais que m'étonner que cette pièce eut été écrite pour des lecteurs au courant de la situation.

Nous avions cru que la considération même que nous avons pour le Gouvernement Prussien nous obligeait d'attribuer réellement aux déclarations verbales et écrites de son Représentant à Francfort une importance correspondante à la portée de ses paroles. Il nous semble, en outre, par là n'avoir pas donné occasion à l'appel que M. de Bismark a cru devoir faire à son Gouvernement, mais tout au plus à une nouvelle exposition de notre point de vue particulière après que le Ministre de Prusse eut, par ses déclarations formelles à la Diète, mal-interprété l'annonce faite par nous que nous avions exécuté l'Arrêté Fédérale du 8 Février. Il n'avait donc pas besoin de donner des explications sur les intentions plus ou moins douteuses de son Gouvernement.

Rien n'est moins dans notre pensée que de continuer une polémique infructueuse; aussi nous ne vous chargeons d'aucune communication pour le Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédités au sujet de la circulaire Prussienne dont il est ici question.

(Signé) BUOL.

No. 580.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 150.)

My Lord, *Berlin, March 30*, 1855.

WHEN I was with Baron Manteuffel this evening, I asked his Excellency if he had received any fresh accounts which could throw any light on the possible result of the Vienna Conferences.

He replied that he began to fear that they would not have a pacific solution, and that he had heard from Baron Budberg, who, he observed, however, was not always well informed as to the intentions of his Government, that Russia would not make concessions on the third point that were likely to satisfy the Western Powers.

Well then, I said, what do you think will be the position of Austria?

His Excellency answered that he believed she would stand by her engagements with the allies.

I rejoined that I was glad to hear that, at last, his Excellency seemed disposed to render justice to the intentions of Austria, and I hoped if it were so that we should hear no more of divisions in Germany, and that though Prussia might not be ready to enter into an alliance with us at this moment, we might count on her goodwill at a later period.

He answered that Prussia would stand by her engagements, and, by carrying out the stipulations of the Treaty of 20th April, would cover the flank of the

Austrian army, and that we might be certain of one thing, that she would not join Russia.

That, I observed, did not of course mean that Prussia thought of remaining neutral; for, I said, if hostilities commence she would soon find it impossible to maintain that position, and if the King was desirous to interpose his forces for the purpose of advancing the objects of our alliance, which were to obtain an honourable and durable settlement of the Eastern question, His Majesty ought not to hesitate to join us; that Russia would be compelled to sue for peace, if the war became European, and that the intentions of the alliance were just, and none other than the King ought to wish to support in the interest of the balance of power.

Baron Manteuffel then spoke of the unceasing desire of the King of Prussia to establish friendly and confidential relations with England; that he had but lately told him of his personal good feelings towards Her Majesty the Queen, and of his continued desire to place the relations of the two countries on a good footing.

I told his Excellency that this feeling was cordially reciprocated by Her Majesty's Government, but he must permit me to observe that the mission of Baron Usedom did not show much proof of this desire on the part of the King; for the impression which it had produced in England was, that His Majesty was not seriously disposed to ally himself with us.

Baron Manteuffel then said that this mission was not yet at an end, for the King had ordered Baron Usedom to remain in London; but his Excellency did not add that it was with any definite object, though he seemed to hold out the expectation that all chances of a Treaty were not over, and I presume that the impressions which have been received of the proceedings at Vienna, and that a possible rupture of the Conferences may be at hand, have induced the King to consent to Baron Usedom's prolonged stay in England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 581.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 45.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 30, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the seventh meeting of the Conference took place yesterday.

Lord Westmorland and I have objected to the wording of the Annex to the fourth Protocol, by which it appeared that a right to erect fortifications in the islands at the mouth of the Danube, belonging from 1829 to Russia, was extended further than the stipulations of the Treaty of Adrianople would warrant.

By that Treaty, Russia covenanted to have a quarantine establishment at the Sulina mouth, but agreed not to erect "other establishments or fortifications."

The Ministers of Austria were desirous to obtain the abolition of the quarantine establishment, and a provision by Treaty that the Russians should not erect, between the junction of the Pruth and the Danube, and the point where the St. George's separates from the Sulina branch, any fortifications which might impede the navigation; but, in framing these stipulations, they had, by looseness of expression, released Russia from her obligation not to erect fortifications other than a quarantine establishment on the islands adjoining the Sulina mouth.

The Russian Plenipotentiaries conceded the points of the quarantine establishment and of the fortifications between the mouth of the Pruth and the separation of the St. George's branch; but they argued that if, in the interest of the free navigation of the Danube, we thought it necessary to provide against any fortifications on the islands at the Sulina mouth, the same reasoning would apply to the St. George's mouth when rendered navigable.

It was at length agreed that there should be no fortifications between the point where the branch of St. George separates from the Sulina branch and the Sulina and the St. George's mouths.

On proceeding to the fourth point, Baron Bourqueney and the British Plenipotentiaries informed the Conference of the wish of their two Governments that no discussion should take place on the fourth point till an understanding had been arrived at on the third.

I stated that I had originally raised an objection to this proceeding in the interest of the Sultan to Count Buol, but had waived my objection at his desire. The British Government had, however, as well as the French, expressed the opinion I had originally entertained, and it was manifest we could not take part in any such discussion.

Count Buol, admitting there could be no regular discussion, proposed that we should refer to our Governments the question whether they would have any objection to a meeting of the Conference on Monday, the 22nd of April, to collect and compare information.

We could not object to this reference; but the Ottoman Minister doubted whether, according to his present instructions, and having no time for a reference, he could properly attend such a Coference.

Upon this, Count Buol suggested that we might meet without the Ottoman Plenipotentiary; but to this course I decidedly objected. I said I should have no difficulty in meeting Count Buol and Baron Bourqueney, but that I could not meet Prince Gortchakoff, the Representative of a Power with which my country was at war, without the presence of the Representative of Turkey, with whom my country was allied.

After some further discussion, the Ottoman Plenipotentiary agreed to attend the Conference if the Plenipotentiaries of France and England should do so.

With this understanding, the Conference was adjourned to Monday.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 582.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 46.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 30, 1855.

IT is but too obvious that the Austrian Government do not attach so much weight to the securities to be taken against the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea as they did to the exclusion of Russian protection from the Principalities and the freedom of the navigation of the Danube.

They maintain that Constantinople cannot be taken by a *coup de main*; that the only formidable attack on Turkey must be made by the Balkan, and that Austria would employ all her forces to prevent the success of such an attack.

However easy it may be to refute such reasoning, and however reasonably we may doubt the promptitude and vigour of Austrian intervention in behalf of the Porte, there is no doubt that a refusal to go to war with Russia, in case of her refusal of concessions in respect to her Black Sea fleet, would be highly applauded by the persons of most influence here.

Admitting that Austria were to be thoroughly engaged with the Western Powers, and ready to take part in the war upon the rupture of negotiations, it is not to be denied that the policy pursued by Prussia, and the success she has had with some of the smaller States of Germany, form a serious impediment to the action of the Austrian Government.

I submit to your Lordship, with some doubt and hesitation, the question whether, in contemplation of a rupture, we shall not offer to Austria our assistance in forcing Prussia to abandon her professed neutrality, which is only a name for assistance to Russia by intrigue and indirect means.

It is clear we are not bound to allow Prussia to continue to play this part as long as it suits her, and, when it shall suit her no longer, to throw off the mask, and appear in arms at the head of a little German confederacy against Austria.

It seems to me we should be perfectly justified in expressing these suspicions to Prussia, and calling upon her to give securities for her friendly neutrality by placing one of her fortresses in the hands of Austria, one in the hands of France, and her sea-port of Dantzic in the hands of England.

It is a question of policy, whether we should thus force her to abandon her present position. It may be said that she would in case of such a demand join at once with Russia; but it is doubtful whether the Prussian people, who rejoice in the material advantages of neutrality, would quietly consent to see Dantzic blockaded in order to favour the views of Russia.

The question is a very serious one, and I merely throw out this suggestion for the deliberate consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 583.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 47.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March 30, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose two copies of the Protocols of the fifth and sixth Conferences held respectively on the 23rd and 26th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 583.

Protocol (No. 5) of a Conference held at Vienna, March 23, 1855.

Présens:

Pour l'Autriche—
M. le Comte de Buol-Schauenstein, et
M. le Baron de Prokesch-Osten;

Pour la France—
M. le Baron de Bourqueney;

Pour la Grande Bretagne—
Lord John Russell, et
M. le Comte de Westmorland;

Pour la Russie—
M. le Prince de Gortchakoff, et
M. de Titoff;

Pour la Turquie—
Aarif Effendi.

LECTURE a été donnée du Protocole du 21 mois courant.

Relevant un passage de ce Protocole, M. le Baron de Bourqueney a fait observer que puisque M. le Prince Gortchakoff avait revendiqué pour la Russie seule l'honneur d'avoir stipulé en faveur de la marine marchande de toutes les nations la liberté de navigation dans la Mer Noire, il ne lui semblait pas hors de propos de réclamer aussi pour la Sublime Porte une juste part dans une disposition à laquelle elle avait concouru. Quant à la France en particulier, il a constaté que le Traité d'Andrinople n'avait rien ajouté à la liberté de navigation dont sa marine marchande avait déjà joui avant cette époque dans la Mer Noire.

Aarif Effendi a donné son entière adhésion à cette observation.

On a repris la discussion du mémorandum produit à la dernière séance par M. le Baron Prokesch et ayant pour objet le développement de la seconde base.

L'Article 1 a été définitivement adopté.

Sur l'observation faite par M. le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman que les anciens Traités, mentionnés à l'Article 2, avaient souvent donné lieu aux autorités Russes de mettre des entraves au commerce Turc sur le Danube, Lord John Russell a proposé de préciser davantage les priviléges découlant des anciens Traités et qui seraient à maintenir, en y ajoutant les mots, "qui ne sont pas en opposition avec le principe de la liberté de la navigation."

Cet amendement a été adopté, de même que l'Article 3 tout entier.

Arrivant à l'Article 4, M. le Baron Prokesch a proposé de substituer à son texte primitif une rédaction plus succincte et plus précise des attributions des deux Commissions appelées, chacune dans sa sphère d'autorité, à réaliser le principe de la libre navigation du Danube.

La discussion s'est engagée sur ce nouveau texte et notamment sur la valeur du mot "Syndicat."

M. le Prince Gortchakoff ayant déclaré que les objections qu'il avait élevées contre ce terme, ne portaient nullement sur l'institution elle-même et n'avaient pour but que de trouver un mot plus adapté à l'idée qu'il s'agissait d'exprimer, on est tombé d'accord de substituer au terme "Syndicat," celui de "Commission Européenne."

Lord John Russell a itérativement énoncé le désir de son Gouvernement d'être représenté et dans la Commission Européenne et dans la Commission Riveraine. A l'appui de ce désir il a fait valoir la considération que les obstacles physiques que rencontrait la navigation du Danube, comme par exemple les bancs de sable, étaient variables de leur nature; qu'il fallait donc, pour pouvoir les écarter en tout tems, une surveillance et une action constantes; qu'enfin, si la Commission Exécutive, ainsi qu'on le lui avait fait observer, ne devait, d'après l'analogie des stipulations du Congrès de Vienne, être composée que de délégués des États riverains, il désirait pour le moins, que la Commission Européenne ayant pour mission d'exercer un contrôle sur la liberté de la navigation du Danube à ses embouchures et jusque dans la mer, restât en permanence.

Quelques objections ayant été élevées contre la nécessité et l'utilité de cette permanence, Lord John Russell, appuyé par Lord Westmorland, a proposé de statuer que la Commission Européenne "ne sera dissoute que d'un commun accord."

Cet amendement a réuni tous les suffrages, de même que le reste de l'Article 4, conçu ainsi qu'il suit:

"Pour réaliser les stipulations contenues dans l'Article précédent, les Puissances Contractantes, en considération de l'intérêt Européen qui s'attache à l'ouverture complète du Danube dans ses branches navigables ou à rendre navigables jusque dans la mer, en assumeront, de commun accord, dans les limites tracées par l'Acte Final du Congrès de Vienne, la direction et la garantie de l'exécution, tout comme elles se chargeront du contrôle suprême pour le maintien du principe de l'ouverture du Danube. A cet effet elles détermineront, à l'aide d'un Commission Européenne, composée de délégués de chacune d'elles, l'étendue des travaux à exécuter et celle des moyens à employer pour faire disparaître les obstacles physiques et autres qui s'opposent jusqu'à cette heure à la libre navigation dans la partie du fleuve comprise entre Galatz et la mer. Cette Commission Européenne, qui ne sera dissoute que d'un commun accord, élaborera les bases d'un règlement de navigation et de police fluviale et maritime applicable au Danube dans son parcours susindiqué, et dressera les instructions pour servir de guide et de norme à une Commission Riveraine Exécutive, composée de délégués des trois États riverains, savoir, de l'Autriche, de la Russie et de la Turquie."

Le dernier alinéa de cet Article est conçu ainsi qu'il suit dans le projet du Baron Prokesch:

"Chacune des Puissances Contractantes aura le droit de faire stationner un ou deux bâtiments de guerre aux embouchures du fleuve."

Cette clause a provoqué un débat prolongé au but duquel les Plénipotentiaires de l'Autriche, de la France, de la Grande Bretagne et de la Turquie, s'étant unanimement prononcés en faveur du principe qu'elle établit, MM. les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ont déclaré réserver la discussion du principe et du fait jusqu'à l'examen de la troisième base de la négociation.

La nouvelle rédaction proposée par le Baron Prokesch pour l'Article 5 a été adoptée.

En examinant le sixième et dernier Article, les Plénipotentiaires de l'Autriche, de la France et de la Grande Bretagne ont appuyé sur le non-rétablissement de la quarantaine qui avait autrefois existé à l'embouchure du Soulina. Les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ont exprimé le vœu que l'intérêt de la santé publique, qui était aussi un intérêt Européen, ne donnât jamais lieu à regretter cette disposition. Ils y ont consenti toutefois en considération des développements présentés par le Baron Prokesch concernant la presqu'impossibilité de combiner la facilité de naviguer par le Soulina avec l'existence d'une quarantaine sur ce bras du fleuve.

Les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne ont touché la question de la délimitation entre la Russie et la Turquie telle qu'elle avait été fixée par l'Article III du Traité d'Andrinople, aujourd'hui annulé entre les belligérants par l'effet de la guerre.

M. le Comte de Westmorland a émis à ce sujet l'opinion que, puis qu'il s'agissait d'appliquer au Bas Danube les principes établis par le Congrès de Vienne, il serait désirable que la règle que le Thalweg forme la frontière—règle faisant loi dans le reste de l'Europe partout où des fleuves séparent deux Etats—fût aussi mise en pratique lors de la nouvelle délimitation entre la Russie et la Turquie.

M. le Comte Buol ayant fait ressortir, de son côté, l'importance qu'il y aurait, dans l'intérêt de la navigation et du commerce du Danube, à voir apporter des modifications à certaines clauses restrictives du Traité d'Andrinople, qui interdisent aux Turcs de former aucun établissement sur une partie de la rive droite du fleuve, et le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman ayant adhéré à cette opinion, M. de Titoff a appuyé sur le caractère bilatéral des stipulations auxquelles M. le Comte Buol venait de faire allusion, et qui avaient été parfaitement motivées par les circonstances locales à l'époque dont il était question. Aujourd'hui, où ces circonstances, grâce à la voie de réforme dans laquelle la Sublime Porte était entrée, avaient en partie changé, il n'y aurait peut-être pas d'inconvénient à prendre en considération jusqu'à quel point les stipulations dont il s'agit, étaient susceptibles de modification. Cet examen, selon lui, serait toutefois prématuré à l'heure qu'il est.

La discussion s'étant établie sur les garanties personnelles et locales qui seraient indispensables pour assurer aux Commissions Européenne et Riveraine la liberté de mouvement et d'action dont elles auront besoin pour pouvoir remplir leur tâche, MM. les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ont déclaré qu'ils ne se refuseraient à aucune combinaison dont la nécessité leur serait démontrée pour atteindre le but de la complète liberté de la navigation du Danube, mais qu'ils s'opposaient à des arrangements tels que la neutralité du Delta, qui, dans leur opinion, dépassait de beaucoup ce but, et serait même, à certains égards, contraire à sa réalisation.

M. le Baron de Prokesch, en discutant le sens de ce mot et son application au cas spécial, a établi qu'en l'introduisant dans sa première rédaction il n'y avait attaché aucune portée politique, ce qui résultait suffisamment de la réserve faite en faveur de la juridiction de la Russie. Il a ajouté que si, dans son appréciation, la neutralité et même l'abandon du Delta eussent été indispensables pour assurer la libre action des Commissions, il n'aurait pas cru, en formulant une proposition analogue dans un intérêt Européen, reconnu en principe par la Russie, sortir des bornes d'une modération conciliante, d'autant plus que ces îlots ne semblaient avoir pour la Russie aucune valeur réelle.

Après avoir encore examiné différentes variantes, on tombe finalement d'accord sur la rédaction du dernier alinea en adoptant l'amendement proposé par les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche.

Le texte du développement de la seconde base de négociation tel qu'il a été définitivement arrêté, est annexé au Protocole.

Inclosure 2 in No. 583.

Annex to Protocol No. 5.

DÉVELOPPEMENT DU SECOND POINT.

1. L'ACTE du Congrès de Vienne, auquel la Sublime Porte n'a pas pris part, ayant établi, dans ses Articles 108 à 116, les principes destinés à régler la navigation des fleuves traversant plusieurs Etats, les Puissances Contractantes conviennent entre elles de stipuler qu'à l'avenir ces principes seront également appliqués au cours inférieur du Danube, à partir du point où ce fleuve devient commun à l'Autriche et à l'Empire Ottoman jusque dans la mer. Cette disposition fera désormais partie du droit public de l'Europe et sera garantie par toutes les Puissances Contractantes.

2. L'application à faire de ces principes doit être toute entière dans le sens de faciliter le commerce et la navigation de telle sorte que la navigation de cette partie du Danube ne pourra être assujettie à aucune entrave ni redevance qui ne serait pas expressément prévue par les stipulations qui vont suivre, et que dès lors aussi les priviléges et immunités fondés dans les anciens Traités et les anciennes capitulations avec les Etats riverains de la partie du fleuve dont il s'agit, qui ne sont pas en opposition avec le principe de la liberté de la navigation, seront maintenus intacts.

En conséquence, il ne sera perçu sur tout le parcours susmentionné du Danube, aucun péage, basé uniquement sur le fait de la navigation du fleuve, ni aucun droit sur les marchandises qui se trouvent à bord des navires, et il ne sera apporté aucun obstacle, quel qu'il soit, à la libre navigation. Les mesures de précaution qu'on pourrait vouloir adopter sous le rapport des douanes et sous celui des quarantaines, devront être limitées au strict nécessaire, et mises en harmonie avec ce qu'exigera la liberté de la navigation.

3. Afin de faire disparaître l'obstacle le plus important qui pèse sur la navigation du Bas Danube, on entreprendra et on achevera dans le plus bref délai les travaux nécessaires tant pour dégager l'embouchure du Danube des sables qui l'obstruent que pour écarter les autres inconvénients physiques qui diminuent la navigabilité du fleuve sur d'autres points en amont de son cours, à tel point que la circulation jusqu'à Galatz et Brăilow de bâtiments de marine commerciale du tonnage le plus fort soit délivrée des périls, empêchements et pertes, avec lesquels elle a eu à lutter jusqu'à ce jour.

Pour couvrir les frais de ces travaux et des établissements ayant pour objet d'assurer et de faciliter la navigation, des droits fixes d'un taux convenable pourront être prélevés sur les navires parcourant le Bas Danube, à la condition expresse que, sous ce rapport comme sous tout autre, les pavillons de toutes les nations seront traités sur le pied d'une parfaite égalité.

4. Pour réaliser les stipulations contenues dans l'Article précédent, les Puissances Contractantes, en considération de l'intérêt Européen qui s'attache à l'ouverture complète du Danube dans ses branches navigables ou à rendre navigables jusque dans la mer, en assumeront de commun accord, dans les limites tracées par l'Acte Final du Congrès de Vienne, la direction et la garantie de l'exécution, tout comme elles se chargeront du contrôle suprême pour le maintien du principe de l'ouverture du Danube. A cet effet, elles détermineront à l'aide d'une Commission Européenne, composée de délégués de chacune d'elles, l'étendue des travaux à exécuter, et celle des moyens à employer, pour faire disparaître les obstacles physiques et autres, qui s'opposent jusqu'à cette heure à la libre navigation dans la partie du fleuve comprise entre Galatz et la mer. Cette Commission Européenne, qui ne sera dissoute que d'un commun accord, élaborera les bases d'un règlement de navigation et de police fluviale et maritime applicable au Danube dans son parcours susindiqué, et dressera les instructions pour servir de guide et de norme à une Commission Riveraine Exécutive, composée de délégués des trois Etats riverains, savoir, de l'Autriche, de Russie, et de la Turquie.

5. La Commission Riveraine appelée à agir au nom de l'Europe en autorité exécutive, sera permanente. Elle sera munie de pouvoirs nécessaires pour remplir sa tâche de la manière la plus efficace et la plus complète.

6. La Russie consentira à ne plus rétablir sur le bras de Soulina la ligne de

quarantaine qu'elle y avait établie autréfois. Elle veillera à ce qu'aucun de ses établissements militaires situés depuis le confluent du Pruth avec le Danube jusqu'au point où le bras de St. Georges se sépare de celui de Soulina, ne puisse gêner les navires passant le fleuve. Quant à la partie du fleuve entre le point de l'embranchement susmentionné et les embouchures de St. Georges et de Soulina il n'y aura aucune fortification.

Désirant assurer pour sa part, avec une empressement égal à celui des autres Puissances Contractantes, la libre navigation du Danube, la Russie s'engage à seconder de tous ses moyens l'action de la Commission permanente.

Inclosure 3 in No. 583.

Protocol (No. 6) of a Conference held at Vienna, March 26, 1855.

Présens:

Pour l'Autriche—
M. le Comte de Buol Schauenstein, et
M. le Baron de Prokesch-Osten;

Pour la France—
M. le Baron de Bourqueney;

Pour la Grande Bretagne—
Lord John Russell, et
M. le Comte de Westmorland;

Pour la Russie—
M. le Prince de Gortchakoff, et
M. de Titoff;

Pour la Turquie—
Aarif Effendi.

LE Protocole de la séance du 23 courant a été lu et approuvé.

M. le Baron Bourqueney a demandé à déposer au Protocole l'exposé ci-joint par lequel son Gouvernement a développé quelques points de vue qui n'ont point été pris en considération par la Conférence au moment où ont été établis les principes dont l'application doit assurer la réalisation de la première garantie.

Après avoir donné lecture du mémorandum du Cabinet de Paris, M. le Plénipotentiaire de France a ajouté que son intention n'était pas de provoquer quant à présent une discussion sur les questions qui y étaient traitées et qu'en tout cas il était bien entendu qu'elles ne sauraient devenir l'objet de délibérations communes que du consentement de la Porte.

Lord John Russell a fait observer que si dans la discussion sur la première base de négociation, il n'avait point abordé plusieurs questions telles que la réunion des deux Principautés en une seule, le gouvernement viager ou héréditaire des Hospodars, l'opportunité d'une représentation nationale, ce n'était point que leur importance lui eût échappé; mais il lui avait paru que l'initiative de propositions de cette nature revenait à la Sublime Porte et que leur prise en considération devait être ajournée jusqu'au moment où le Gouvernement Ottoman serait en mesure de faire connaître toute sa pensée à la Conférence.

Lord Westmorland a adhéré à l'opinion de son collègue.

Le Comte Buol s'est également rangé de l'avis que c'est à la Sublime Porte qu'appartenait l'initiative des propositions de cette catégorie.

Le Prince Gortchakoff a établi que par rapport au développement de la première base il ne pouvait y avoir d'obligatoire que ce que MM. les Plénipotentiaires avaient paraphé, mais que d'autres points de vue relatifs à cette question pouvaient en temps opportun fournir matière à discussion.

Le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman a établi que les questions entamées dans le mémorandum Français intéressaient trop directement les droits de la Puissance Suzeraine, pour qu'il ne dût pas à ce sujet réserver le droit d'initiative à son Gouvernement.

Cet incident vidé, M. le Comte Buol a proposé de passer à la troisième base de négociation, par laquelle deux principes ont été établis; celui de rattacher plus complétement l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre Européen par des modifications à apporter au Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, et celui de s'entendre sur une juste pondération des forces navales dans la Mer Noire. Il lui semblerait utile de s'occuper d'abord de la solution pratique du second principe, vu qu'une entente à ce sujet faciliterait la tâche que l'application de l'autre réserve à la Conférence. Si cet avis rencontrait l'approbation de l'Assemblée, il pensait que rien ne serait plus propre à amener un accord désirable que si MM. les Plénipotentiaires de Russie et de Turquie se trouvaient préparés à exposer eux-mêmes à la Conférence leurs idées sur les moyens d'y parvenir. Il n'était guère contestable qu'une extension illimitée des forces navales soit de l'une soit de l'autre des Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire se présenterait comme un sujet d'inquiétude pour l'Europe, et qu'il fût par conséquent de la plus haute importance d'aviser aux moyens d'obvier à une situation qui pourrait devenir une source de graves complications pour l'avenir.

Il était juste aussi de faire observer que le développement exagéré de flottes dans une mer dont l'accès été fermé aux autres pavillons de guerre de l'Europe, était en contradiction avec le but d'action assigné aux flottes de la Mer Noire. Ces considérations, auxquelles l'Europe était en droit d'attacher un haut intérêt, lui semblaient de nature à devoir porter les deux Puissances plus directement appelées à concourir à la solution du problème, à entrer avec la Conférence dans l'examen des moyens propres à établir un état de choses offrant des gages de sécurité à l'Europe.

M. le Baron Bourqueney est prêt pour sa part à suivre l'ordre de discussion indiqué par M. le Comte de Buol dans ses premières paroles.

Arrivé à un point de la négociation qui s'est présenté à beaucoup d'esprits comme hérissé de difficultés, il a, au contraire, exprimé l'espoir qu'il sera facile d'amener à ce sujet une parfaite entente. La confiance dont il est animé prend sa source dans la persuasion que c'est ici que tout le monde donnera des preuves de sa loyauté et que la Russie concourra franchement au développement d'un principe auquel elle a donné son adhésion morale. A quoi se réduirait en effet le problème à résoudre! A trouver une combinaison de nature à substituer l'appareil de la paix à l'appareil de la guerre dans des eaux intérieures qui semblent surtout faites pour la paix et les transactions commerciales, et qui néanmoins sont malheureusement devenues le théâtre de la guerre.

Lord John Russell, en rappelant la déclaration faite au début de la négociation par le Prince Gortchakoff, qu'il ne consentirait à aucune condition incompatible avec l'honneur de la Russie, a établi qu'aux yeux de l'Angleterre et de ses alliés les meilleures conditions de paix et les seules admissibles seraient celles qui, tout en étant les plus conformes à l'honneur de la Russie, fussent à la fois suffisantes pour la sécurité de l'Europe et pour obvier au retour des complications telles que celle à laquelle il s'agit de mettre fin.

Le Comte de Westmorland s'est exprimé dans le même sens.

Le Prince Gortchakoff, en se félicitant des dispositions conciliantes dans lesquelles cette question avait été abordée jusqu'ici dans la Conférence, a dit qu'il était préparé à discuter les moyens d'exécution qui seraient proposés par MM. les Plénipotentiaires, mais qu'il ne se croyait pas en position de devoir prendre l'initiative à ce sujet, ainsi que M. le Comte de Buol l'avait suggéré. Appréciant toutefois les sentiments de courtoisie et de conciliation qui d'après le langage unanime qu'il venait d'entendre semblaient avoir inspiré cette proposition, il s'est déclaré prêt à la prendre *ad referendum*, en se réservant de faire connaître à la Conférence la réponse qu'il recevait de sa Cour.

M. de Titoff s'est énoncé dans un sens identique.

En présence de cette déclaration des Plénipotentiaires Russes—déclaration dans laquelle tous les membres de la Conférence ont unanimement reconnu et apprécié l'intention de faciliter la solution du point en discussion—le Plénipotentiaire de France a cru devoir réserver le développement des idées de son Gouvernement sur l'application de la troisième garantie jusqu'au moment où la discussion pourra être complète de part et d'autre.

MM. les Plénipotentiaires de la Grande Bretagne ont entièrement adhéré à cette opinion.

Aarif Effendi, tout en déclarant n'être point autorisé à prendre l'initiative de propositions relatives au troisième point, a exprimé l'espoir que son Gouverne-

ment accéderait à celles que les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne se sont réservé de faire à ce sujet.

M. le Comte Buol a proposé d'aborder à la prochaine séance, fixée au 29 courant, la quatrième base de négociation, en attendant que la réponse du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg puisse arriver.

Le Prince Gortchakoff a accédé, pour sa part, à cette proposition, en constatant qu'il n'attachait au quatrième principe aucune idée politique, mais qu'il était bien convaincu que rien ne serait plus propre à faciliter au Sultan le gouvernement de son Empire, que ce qu'il ferait pour ajouter au bonheur et à la satisfaction de ses sujets Chrétiens.

Le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman, en déclarant que le Sultan a déjà donné et continue à donner des preuves irrécusables et notoires des intentions bienveillantes qui l'animent à ce sujet, a exprimé le désir que cette discussion fût ajournée jusqu'à l'arrivée prochaine du Plénipotentiaire venant de Constantinople, muni d'instructions plus complètes et de pouvoirs plus étendus.

M. le Comte Buol a répondu, que la Conférence accueillerait certes avec tout l'intérêt qu'elles méritaient les ouvertures que le nouveau Plénipotentiaire Ottoman aurait à lui faire, mais que selon lui cela ne devait pas empêcher la Conférence de continuer en attendant ses travaux.

(Suivent les signatures.)

Inclosure 4 in No. 583.

Annex to Protocol No. 6.

D'APRES le texte même des notes de Vienne et l'interprétation qui leur a été donnée d'un commun accord, la pensée des trois Cabinets alliés a été, non seulement de soustraire le territoire des Principautés à une influence qui s'y exerçait exclusivement, mais aussi d'en faire une sorte de barrière naturelle qu'elle ne puisse plus désormais franchir pour menacer l'Empire Ottoman au cœur même. Parmi les combinaisons qui se présentent pour assurer à la Moldavie et à la Valachie une consistance et une force suffisantes, la première nous paraît devoir être l'union en une seule des deux Principautés. Il n'est pas nécessaire d'insister sur ce que la nature a fait pour faciliter cette union, sur l'identité de la langue, des mœurs, des lois et des intérêts. Le vœu des deux Provinces à cet égard se présente conforme aux convenances des Gouvernements alliés; elles ne devraient voir dans leur fusion administrative que l'application d'un plan qui est depuis de longues années l'objet de leurs préoccupations constantes, et qui avait même été indiquée dans l'un des Articles de leur Règlement Organique élaboré par la Russie en 1829, à une époque où tout révélait un effort pour consommer leur séparation morale d'avec l'Empire Ottoman.

Dans le cas présent, l'intérêt de la Puissance Suzeraine est en parfait accord avec l'intérêt général et avec celui des deux Provinces, et il y a lieu de penser que les conseillers les plus éclairés du Sultan seraient favorables à une combinaison qui établirait ainsi sur la rive gauche du Danube une grande Principauté de près de 4,000,000 d'âmes à la place de deux Principautés jusqu'à ce jour trop faibles pour opposer une résistance efficace à l'action de la Russie.

Les mêmes considérations qui doivent faire désirer que la Moldavie et la Valachie soient placées sous un même Gouvernement, demandent que ce Gouvernement possède toutes les conditions de force et de durée, et un système se rapprochant le plus possible de la forme monarchique répondrait seule complétement au but que l'on se propose. Temporaire, le pouvoir laisse le champ ouvert aux compétitions et aux luttes de partis qui ne pourraient que faciliter le retour de l'influence qu'il s'agit d'éloigner. Viager, il aurait à peu près les mêmes inconvénients, car les changements de personne, pour être moins fréquents, n'éveilleraient pas moins de convoitises et ne provoqueraient pas moins d'intrigues. L'histoire des Principautés n'a été, en quelque sorte, que la triste expérience de ces deux modes.

L'autorité suprême serait donc héréditaire, si l'on voulait qu'elle pût remplir avec avantage le rôle important qui lui serait assigné.

Sur cette question de l'hérédité, l'opinion de la Porte ne nous est point connue. Toutefois le fait ne constituerait point à ses yeux une nouveauté; la famille de Milosch en Serbie avait obtenu du Sultan Mahmoud le privilége de l'hérédité, et il a été conféré en Egypte à la famille de Mehemet Ali, où il continue de régler la transmission de pouvoir. La Porte n'a rien vu dans ces concessions qui fût incompatible avec les droits souverains et avec le principe de l'intégrité de l'Empire. Elle n'aurait donc pas d'objections de fond contre un arrangement qui serait, d'autre part, si favorable à ses intérêts sur la rive gauche du Danube.

Il y aurait deux voies à suivre. Ou l'on se bornerait pour le moment à proclamer le principe de l'hérédité, en conférant la souveraineté à titre conditionnel à un Prince du pays, dont la Porte se réserverait d'apprécier dans un temps donné le dévouement et les titres. Ou bien (et cette mesure serait peut-être la meilleure) on trancherait dès maintenant la question, en faisant appel à un Prince d'une des familles régnantes de l'Europe.

C'est, nous le rappelons, la combinaison à laquelle on avait songé pour la Grèce, à une époque où les Puissances qui l'ont aidée à se constituer, pensaient encore qu'il y avait lieu de la maintenir sous la suzeraineté de la Porte. Elles ne doutaient pas que la Turquie n'y donnât son assentiment, et elles ne regardaient nullement comme impossible qu'un Prince Chrétien acceptât le Gouvernement du nouvel Etat à la condition de reconnaître la suzeraineté du Sultan. C'est ce qui résulte du Protocole de la Conférence de Londres du 22 Mars, 1829. L'importance de la nouvelle Principauté, par sa position politique comme par le chiffre de sa population, assurerait à une dynastie Chrétienne d'assez grands avantages pour que la vassalité ne fût pas peut-être une objection décisive.

L'Etat de la Serbie est également compris parmi les objets dont les Puissances auront à s'occuper pour compléter l'exécution de la première garantie. Mais la position de cette Principauté n'est pas exactement la même que celle des deux autres. Du moment où la Moldo-Valachie est fortement constituée, l'action qui dominait à Belgrade n'a plus les mêmes moyens pour s'y exercer. Il suffira donc, pour ce qui regarde les Serbes, d'assurer par une garantie collective et qui leur donne toute sécurité, les priviléges que la Porte leur a reconnus ou leur reconnaîtrait après s'être concertée avec ses alliés.

26 *Mars*, 1855.

No. 584.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 2, 8·30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, Monday, April* 2, 1855, 7 P.M.

CONFERENCE met to-day; but no business was done, and it adjourned until Monday next.

No. 585.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 2.)

(No. 145.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 30, 1855.

THE telegraphic message addressed to your Lordship yesterday by Lord John Russell and myself will have informed you of the question which arose at the Conference as to the preparatory discussion of the fourth point, which was proposed by Count Buol, and of our reference to your Lordship upon that subject.

At this Conference, the Protocol No. 5 was signed by the Representatives; and the Annex, which relates to the freedom of the navigation of the Danube, was "paraphé." The lithographed copies of these documents are herewith transmitted. The Annex is the one which I had announced to your Lordship in my despatch No. 140 of the 26th instant, as containing the important changes introduced into the one attached to the Protocol No. 4, and these changes are in conformity with the details given to your Lordship of the first discussion which took place upon the subject of the second basis of the conditions of peace in my No. 137 of the 23rd March.

The alterations in this Annex were only finally settled in the Conference of yesterday, when the initials of all the Representatives were affixed to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 585.

Protocol (No. 5) of a Conference held at Vienna, March 23, 1855.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 583.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 585.

Annex to Protocol No. 5.

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 583.]

No. 586.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 146.)

My Lord, *Vienna, March* 30, 1855.

I HAVE the honour of transmitting to your Lordship herewith the Protocol No. 6 of the Conference of the 26th of March, which was signed this day, as well as its Annex.

This Annex is the paper relative to the development of the first point, which has been drawn up by the French Government, and which Baron Bourqueney brought before the Conference with a request that it might be attached to the Protocol, in order to serve as a record of certain principles which, in the opinion of the French Government, should be taken into consideration when the final settlement of the first guarantee was arrived at. It was not, however, his intention to open any fresh discussion upon the first point until it was known whether the Porte approved the views which the French Government had embodied in this paper.

Lord John Russell and I explained that the reason why we had abstained from bringing before the Conference any special suggestions relative to the future organisation of the Principalities, was founded on the conviction we entertained that it would not be expedient to do so until we should be enabled to know the precise views of the Ottoman Government respecting the principles on which the constitution of those Principalities should be remodelled.

Count Buol said that he agreed entirely in the propriety of Baron Bourqueney bringing this document before the Conference, but expressed also his opinion that the views which it contained would most properly be brought forward by the Government of the Sultan; and Prince Gortchakoff in concurring with Count Buol, said that he could not consider that any points respecting the first basis had been arranged, except those contained in the "paraphe" Annexes to the former Protocols.

The Turkish Ambassador, in giving his general adhesion to what had been said, reserved to his own Government the right of taking the initiative in carrying out the views embodied in the paper now presented to the Conference by Baron Bourqueney.

After this conversation, the discussion of the third article of the bases was commenced, the general tenour of which I have already reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 141 of the 26th instant, and which has been more amply detailed to your Lordship by Lord John Russell.

At the close of the Conference a proposal, made by Count Buol, to enter upon a preparatory consideration of the fourth basis at the next Conference, fixed for the 29th, gave rise to a statement on the part of Baron Bourqueney, as well as of Lord John Russell and myself, that before giving our consent to this proposal, we must refer to our respective Governments to learn their opinion upon it. This reference was accordingly made to your Lordship by Lord John Russell and myself in our telegraphic despatch of yesterday, which is also referred to in my despatch No. 145 of this day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 586.

Protocol (No. 6) of a Conference held at Vienna, March 26, 1855.

[See Inclosure 3 in No. 583.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 586.

Annex to Protocol No. 6.

[See Inclosure 4 in No. 583.]

No. 587.

Mr. Bligh to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 63.)

My Lord, *Hanover, March* 31, 1855.

I HAVE the honour of thanking your Lordship for your despatches marked Confidential, Nos. 32 and 33 of the 22nd instant, with their interesting inclosures, which enabled me, in conversation with M. de Lentlie and others, without betraying any confidence, to manifest that I have the full conviction of the vigorous support which Austria has been giving to the Plenipotentiaries of the Western Powers in their Conferences with those of Russia at Vienna; and of the firm determination which she has been showing in her official communications respecting Russian agency at the Diet, not to allow that agency to nullify the decisions of that body respecting the warlike preparations of Germany.

For thus I am assisted in strengthening the determination of this Government to continue to side with the Cabinet of Vienna, as being the most likely means of inducing Russia to go on so far in the path of concession, on which she has happily entered, as will authorise the conclusion of such a peace as the belligerents desire, and as will alone prevent the breaking out of that general war which the neutral and the wavering so much deprecate.

General Budberg, cousin of the Russian Minister at Berlin, has been here for two days, for the purpose of presenting letters, notifying to the King the accession of the Emperor Alexander.

He dined both days at Court, and received as his reward the Grand Cross of the Guelphic Order, having been decorated in a similar manner at the Courts of Darmstadt, Brussels, and the Hague, where he had previously been on the same errand. From hence he goes this day to Oldenburg, where, of course, a similar honour awaits him. As, if he had represented his Sovereign at each of these Courts for as many years as he will have employed days in this itinerary of temporary missions, he could not have been more highly favoured in this way,

such an instance of the unequal distribution of foreign so-called distinctions ought to be an additional cause of satisfaction to all civil public servants of Her Majesty that they are allowed to be distinguished by the inability to receive them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. D. BLIGH.

No. 588.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April* 3, 1855

MESSENGER this day will carry full explanation of the scheme of neutralization. The agreement made between the English and French Governments is in writing, and M. Drouyn has a copy of it. We cannot think it goes beyond or out of the third basis, as the object of it is to put an end to the preponderance of Russia.

The Vice-Consul at Galatz can give full information respecting the trade and navigation of the Danube. Send for him to Vienna if you find it expedient.

No. 589.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No 38.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 3, 1855.

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol on the subject of the third point, which forms the greatest difficulty in the negotiations, and which is about to be taken into consideration by the Conference.

Count Buol observes that Russia, having admitted the principle that her preponderance in the Black Sea is to be put an end to, there can be no doubt that apparently the simplest and most direct mode of attaining the end which the allies have in view would be by the limitation of the naval forces of Russia in that sea. This result might be obtained by Russia engaging either to reduce her fleet to a fixed number of vessels, or not to increase their actual number: and the latter alternative, whilst it would make the sacrifice more easy, would come to nearly the same result, as half the fleet at Sebastopol has already been sunk by the Russians themselves.

But Count Buol thinks that there may be reason to apprehend that Russia may oppose this solution of the question, on the ground of its affecting her dignity and national honour, which the Emperor Alexander will have to consult as much, or perhaps even more, than his predecessor.

He argues, therefore, that it will be necessary to provide for the case of Russia refusing categorically to enter into any positive engagement to reduce her naval forces. In such an event, and supposing that a complete agreement had been come to on the three other points, would the belligerent Powers, Count Buol asks, consider it indispensable to continue the war on that account? But he adds, that whatever their decision might be, Austria, for her part, not being at present engaged in hostilities, would have no sufficient motive to declare war against Russia, if the sole obstacle to peace were the refusal of that Power to consent to the direct limitation of the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea.

In order then to arrive at a practical solution of the question, Count Buol is of opinion that recourse must be had to the system of counterpoise. For this purpose, he says that several possible combinations present themselves.

Russia and Turkey might enter into reciprocal engagements not to maintain in the Black Sea more than an equal number of ships of war.

In this case the only other point to be considered would be the revision of the Treaty of 1841, so far as to concede to the other Powers the right of maintaining a limited number of ships of war in the Black Sea, with the special object of watching over the due execution of the arrangements for keeping clear the navigation of the Danube at its mouths.

If, however, Count Buol adds, the naval forces of Turkey and Russia in the Euxine could not be placed in this manner on a footing of equality, the Porte might, whilst maintaining the principle of the closing of the Straits as a general rule, reserve to herself the right of calling into the Black Sea, as an exceptional measure, even in time of peace, as many ships of war of friendly Powers, as she might consider necessary whenever she found herself menaced.

If Russia persisted in maintaining in the Black Sea a fleet larger than could be required for purposes of defence, and refused to consent to any kind of limitation of them, it would be impossible to contest the right of Europe to consider the maintenance of such force as a permanent danger to Turkey: in this case the exception would become the rule, and the Porte would have continually reasons for giving firmans to the ships of war of friendly Powers to pass the Straits. Such a state of things would, Count Buol thinks, be little agreeable to Russia; and it is by strongly supporting this argument, that it may be possible to convince Russia that it is more for her own interest to prefer either a direct or indirect system of limitation.

I told Count Colloredo that I had listened to Count Buol's despatch with equal surprise as concern, as it was nothing short of an announcement that Austria would not adhere to the Treaty of December 2, if the Western Powers persisted in carrying the third basis into effect, for Count Buol must be aware that his proposed system of counterpoise was both inadequate and impracticable. A reciprocal engagement between Russia and Turkey to maintain an equal number of ships in the Black Sea would secure the preponderance of Russia, whose ships would always be better manned, better armed, and in a better condition than those of Turkey; but Count Buol proposed, that at the same time other Powers should maintain a limited number of ships of war in the Black Sea, for the special object of keeping clear the navigation of the Danube, and upon that I begged to observe, that the special object might or might not be the real one, and Count Buol might be sure that England and France would not profess one thing while they intended another. If Count Buol's proposals were really to be adopted, I could only say that ships of war would be utterly useless at the mouths of the Danube to watch over the fulfilment of stipulations that a Commission was appointed to carry out; that if these ships moved away from the mouths of the Danube, Russia would have just ground for complaint, and that if England and France were suddenly to be at war with Russia, this limited force might at once be overpowered by the force that Russia would be suffered to retain. But if England and France, under pretext of watching the Danube, were to send a force into the Black Sea to protect Turkey and keep Russia in check, then we should simply be continuing the present system, which effectually secures both these objects, but which system we are on every account desirous to put an end to.

Count Buol's next proposal, that Turkey should call in as many foreign ships of war as she thought necessary, whenever she found herself menaced, appeared to me, I said, even more objectionable; for it would impose upon the Western Powers the duties of perpetual police, while it would relieve Turkey from the care of providing for her own protection, as she would consider that she had acquired a right by Treaty to call upon England and France for aid whenever she thought herself in danger, without reference to the cost and inconvenience to them or to the distance at which their fleets might happen to be stationed. As Count Buol, however, abandoned the notion of limiting the naval force of Russia, and consequently of preventing its indefinite augmentation, Turkey would always be in danger, and consequently would always consider herself menaced.

But what was the meaning, I asked, of this right to call upon foreign Powers? Surely it could not be intended to uphold the independence of the Ottoman Empire by a stipulation which made its existence dependent upon foreign assistance? And what were England and France to do in the event of their obeying these calls, which might constantly be repeated? Why, they would have to send into the Black Sea on each occasion armaments as powerful as they now maintain there in order to be on a footing of equality with Russia, and they must always be expecting and be prepared to go to war with Russia.

But Russia will be mistress of her own policy and her own actions, and will know how best to carry out her own designs at the right moment.

So far from menacing Turkey she might establish the most friendly relations with her, she might lull her into false security, and within three days after she had picked a quarrel with Turkey, a Russian army might be in possession of Con-

stantinople, and occupied in fortifying the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles; and while the navies of England and France were upon a peace establishment, a Russian fleet of twenty-seven or thirty sail of the line might suddenly issue from the Baltic and sweep the British seas.

The Porte would then learn, Europe would then learn, but too late, the value of that delusive right which it is proposed to confer on Turkey of calling in her allies at the approach of danger.

Yet such were the terms, I said, upon which Count Buol seemed desirous to conclude a peace that was to be honourable and just, that was to maintain the independence and integrity of Turkey, and that was to furnish solid guarantees for the future tranquillity of Europe, but I need hardly say that in such arrangements Her Majesty's Government could take no part.

If the war went on it would be for Austria to consider her own position, not only during its continuance after the preparations she had made, the language she had held, and the engagements she had entered into, but also at its conclusion when peace was made between the four belligerent Powers. She may rest assured, however, that even though England and France were deprived of the immense advantage of Austrian cooperation in a cause that is essentially Austrian, they will not abandon that cause, but they will use every means at their command, and will shrink from no sacrifice, to obtain their demands, which are founded on justice and which have the safety of Europe for their object.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 590.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 39.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 3, 1855.*

THE Baron de Bourqueney's despatches having led the French Government to doubt whether it was the intention of Russia to accept the third basis in the sense in which it has always been understood by England and France, it occurred to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that the object in view might be effectually attained, and that the dignity of Russia might be better consulted, by excluding all ships of war from the Black Sea.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys accordingly prepared a memorandum upon the means of giving effect to the "neutralization" of the Black Sea, and he proposed that with the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government this project should be submitted to the Conference as a proof of the desire entertained by England and France to meet any reasonable objections on the part of Russia, and of the sincerity with which they labour to bring the negotiations to a peaceful conclusion.

A copy of this memorandum is herewith inclosed for the information of your Lordship and Lord Westmorland.

I acquainted your Lordship by telegraph on the 24th ultimo, that Her Majesty's Government acceded to the project of the French Government with a reserve which, on consideration of the memorandum of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, it appeared prudent to make.

The Baron de Bourqueney informed his Government that the project had not been favourably received at Vienna, and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, after taking the orders of the Emperor, determined to proceed himself to Vienna for the purpose of explaining and supporting his views, but to come in the first instance to London in order to establish a complete understanding between the two Governments as to the course that it would be expedient to pursue. M. Drouyn de Lhuys accordingly left Paris on the 29th ultimo, and on the following day a meeting was held here, at which were present the French Ambassador, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Lord Palmerston, Lord Lansdowne, and myself.

The questions of the neutralization of the Black Sea, and that of the limitation of the Russian naval force in that sea, were fully discussed.

With respect to the first (neutralization), it was agreed to propose:

1st. That Russia and Turkey should have no ships of war in the Black Sea, nor

in the Sea of Azoff, excepting some few small vessels for the purposes of sea police to prevent piracy; and that as regarded the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, an understanding should be come to with the Porte, with a view to ascertain whether the Porte would not be willing to include those waters in the arrangement if it should be necessary to do so, in order to obtain the consent of Russia to the application of the principle of neutrality to the Black Sea and to the Sea of Azoff.

2nd. That the ports of the two Powers in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azoff should be solely commercial ports.

3rd. That foreign Powers should be allowed to have Consuls in those ports.

4th. That there should be no menacing assemblage of troops by either Power on the shores of the Black Sea.

5th. That the allied Powers (England, France, and Austria) should have the right to send their naval forces into the Black Sea if the provisions of the Treaty should be violated.

6th. That the two Powers (Russia and Turkey) should have the right to maintain a fixed number of light vessels for the police of the Black Sea, and unarmed transports exclusively adapted for the conveyance of troops.

With respect to the second question, viz., the limitation of the naval force of Russia, it was agreed to propose:

1st. That Russia and Turkey should each of them maintain in the Black Sea, and in the Sea of Azoff, no more than four sail of the line and four frigates, with a proportionate number of light vessels for the police of those seas, and of unarmed transports exclusively adapted for the conveyance of troops, and that this same limitation should apply to the naval force which Turkey should maintain in the Bosphorus and in the Sea of Marmora.

2ndly. That England, France, and Austria should each be permitted to maintain half that number of ships in the Black Sea, that is to say, two sail of the line, and two frigates, and some smaller vessels for each of the three Powers if they should think fit so to station them. Russian ships of war not to be allowed to enter the Bosphorus, nor to pass through the Straits into the Mediterranean.

3rd. That, in case of danger to Turkey, and on the demand of the Porte, all the naval forces of England, France, and Austria, should be allowed to enter the Black Sea to assist in defending the Turkish Empire.

4th. That the Contracting Powers should be allowed to have Consuls at all the Russian and Turkish ports in the Black Sea and in the Sea of Azoff.

It was then agreed:

1st. That the two systems, namely, that of the neutralization of the Black Sea, and that of the limitation of the naval forces of Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea, should be explained to Austria, and that she should be asked whether she would adopt either the one or the other, so as to cooperate with France and England in proposing it to Russia, undertaking further to cooperate in war with France and England if the plan so proposed should be rejected by Russia.

2nd. That it should be understood that France and England would prefer the system of neutralization if Austria should leave the choice to England and France.

3rd. That if Austria should refuse to bind herself to cooperate in war with France and England, in the event of Russia rejecting that one of the two proposals which Austria might concur with France and England in proposing, then France and England should propose the plan of neutralization, and if it is rejected by Russia, the negotiation must be broken off.

I have only further to add, that Her Majesty's Government rely with confidence upon the best efforts of your Lordship and of Lord Westmorland being used for carrying into effect the agreement which they have come to with the Government of the Emperor of the French.

Since this despatch was written I have received your Lordship's telegraphic despatch dated the 31st ultimo, stating that Count Buol considers the plan of neutralization to be beyond and out of the four points, and that on that ground

he will probably not support it, and lay on the Western Powers the blame of the rupture.

Count Buol, however, must surely admit that the plan has for its object to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, and if so, he cannot deny that it is within the true and proper meaning of the third basis; but we might, with correctness, retort that the proposals of Count Buol, of which your Lordship will find a report in my despatch No. 38 of this day's date, are beyond and out of the fair sense of the points, for their tendency is to secure, and not to extinguish, the preponderance of Russian power in the Black Sea.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 591.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 40.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 3, 1855.

THE Protocol No. 4, with its Annex, inclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 36 of the 26th ultimo, have been attentively considered by Her Majesty's Government, who are of opinion that if the navigation of the Danube is to be regulated in accordance with the Treaty of Vienna, the Commission should consist of a Bavarian, an Austrian, a Russian, and a Turk; and the regulations should apply to the whole course of the Danube, from the sea up to the point where it first becomes navigable; and such an arrangement would require no further guarantee. If, on the other hand, there is to be a special arrangement to which Bavaria is not to be a party, and which is to apply only to that part of the river from the sea upwards to the point where it ceases to divide Austrian and Turkish territory, that is, to the point where both banks are Austrian, then the Treaty of Vienna is no longer the rule, and the Commission to be appointed ought to contain an English and a French member, because England and France are deeply interested in having the channels of the river kept free and open.

Your Lordship is well aware how often, in reply to our remonstrances, we have received from the Russian Government precisely the same assurances as the Russian Plenipotentiaries have now given, that every means would be taken to keep the channel clear; those promises were never fulfilled, and Her Majesty's Government have now certain information that the English engineer employed in the steam-dredge to clear the Sulina Mouth was absolutely prohibited by the Russian authorities from working the steam-dredge in an effectual manner.

Austria was more interested in this question than England and France, but her trade has been checked and her remonstrances have met with no attention from Russia.

The same motives will again be in operation, and the utmost vigilance will be required to prevent a renewal of the same obstacles.

The opposition of Austria to the appointment of an English and French member of the Commission is, therefore, unintelligible to Her Majesty's Government. Count Buol pleads as a reason, the necessity of adhering to the Treaty of Vienna, but the proposed plan, as I have shown, is a departure from that Treaty; and even if it were not, there can be no sufficient cause for adhering closely to the Treaty if an arrangement can be made by which important interests will be better protected.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 592.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 41.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 3, 1855.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 38 of the 26th ultimo, I beg to inform you that Her Majesty's Government learn with much satisfaction that in your Lordship's opinion Count Buol has behaved with great fidelity to the spirit of the engagements which his Government had contracted; and they concur in the observation of his Excellency to Prince Gortchakoff, that if it was true that Russia might keep up the force she pleased within her own limits, it was also true that other Powers had a right to require explanations, and upon their not being satisfactory to declare war. But the naval force maintained by Russia within her own limits gives her the preponderance in the Black Sea; and Austria, together with England and France, have declared that that preponderance must cease. The third basis is the form in which explanations are required of Russia, or in other words, the form in which Russia is invited to put an end to the uneasiness felt by other Powers at her vast means of aggression; and if these explanations are not satisfactory, and if Russia will not remove the causes of apprehension, it is to be hoped that Count Buol will admit that a *casus belli* then arises for Austria, and that England and France cannot make peace with Russia.

I am &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 593.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 42.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 3, 1855.

I HAVE the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the course pursued by your Lordship and Lord Westmorland at the Conference, as reported in your despatch No. 39 of the 26th ultimo. Her Majesty's Government, as I need hardly say, are most anxious that no door which affords an opening for the restoration of peace should be permanently closed, and it was quite right, therefore, that the Russian Plenipotentiary should be permitted to refer to his Government the terms by which it was proposed to give effect to the third basis; but Her Majesty's Government have learned with much surprise Prince Gortchakoff's announcement that he was prepared to discuss any propositions that might be made, but that he was not prepared to make any himself.

Russia, however, having accepted the principle of the third basis, must have determined in what manner she would consent to its practical application; and the refusal of the Russian Plenipotentiary to make any communication on the subject that most interested the belligerent Powers, is in singular contrast with the readiness he exhibited in making proposals upon the first two bases, which more immediately affected Austria. Her Majesty's Government are unwilling to assume, that by drawing this distinction between the three Powers, Prince Gortchakoff meant it to be understood that he was there to listen to the terms on which England and France asked for peace; but if such should be your Lordship's opinion, or should the same course again be pursued, Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that the error of Prince Gortchakoff will be effectually corrected by your Lordship. Her Majesty's Government entirely concur in your Lordship's views respecting the inadequate and impracticable system of counterpoise; but a simple declaration on the part of the Emperor of Russia, that he would not increase the number of ships of war he may have in the Black Sea at the time of signing the preliminaries of peace, would be hardly less inadequate for removing the alarm of Turkey and the jealousy of Europe.

Nor indeed would any declaration be sufficient, even if it promised the amount of limitation of the Russian fleet that we require; but if the Emperor

were disposed to make such a declaration, he could hardly refuse to convert it into a stipulation of Treaty.

A declaration of intention would be binding only on the Emperor personally, but a Treaty stipulation would be binding on him and on his successors permanently.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 594.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 136.)
Foreign Office, April 3, 1855.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government learn with much satisfaction, from your Lordship's despatch No. 141 of the 26th ultimo, the language held by Count Buol to Prince Gortchakoff on the question of putting an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea; and they entirely approve the course pursued by yourself and Lord John Russell in allowing the Russian Plenipotentiaries to refer to their Government the terms proposed for giving effect to the third basis.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 595.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 36. Confidential.)
Stuttgardt, March 29, 1855.

My Lord,

ALTHOUGH the subject is not within my province, it may possibly be advisable for me, under existing circumstances, to inform your Lordship that, to my knowledge, when the Grand-Duke Constantine was in England some years ago, he remarked that his father was the most obstinate man in the world, with the exception of his brother, the present Emperor.

His Imperial Highness also expressed his conviction that, sooner or later, his father would do something to astonish the world.

It is to be hoped that the alleged obstinacy of the Emperor Alexander the Second may turn out more deserving of the name of firmness—that is, obstinacy in the right direction; but I confess that certain expressions lately ascribed to his Imperial Majesty, have served to freshen my recollection of the foregoing anecdote.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 596.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 38.)
Stuttgardt, March 29, 1855.

My Lord,

THE language of M. de Magnus, the Prussian Secretary of Legation here, who has just returned from Berlin, is, as reported to me, in substance as follows: that the anti-Russian feeling in that capital is considerably on the increase; but much more so the irritation against Austria; that the necessity seems to be felt of an ultimate adherence to the western alliance; that Count Buol is considered to have shown a great want of tact and judgment, by the way in which he has wounded the feelings of the Prussian Government, especially as to entering into the Treaty of the 2nd of December, without inviting the concurrence of Prussia;

that the character of the King is of a nature to render him only the more determined against yielding, should any attempt be made either to force or to cajole him; and that were the Vienna Conferences to fail without their having been shared in by Prussia, the Court party at Berlin might possibly succeed in bringing about a warlike alliance with Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 597.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 39.)
Stuttgardt, March 29, 1855.

My Lord,

THE following incident would seem to prove both that Russia has been in the habit of treating this Government in an overbearing manner, and that the King of Wurtemburg is capable of showing more independence of Russia than she may either like or expect.

When the present French Empire was established, the King recognized it immediately upon hearing that Austria had done so; and when shortly afterwards, Prince Gortchakoff having heard of its recognition by Russia informed this Government that they might take a similar step, but found they had taken it already, he displayed the most opprobious dissatisfaction.

M. de Titoff is much more liked here than Prince Gortchakoff was, on account of the far greater amenity of his manners and official intercourse.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 598.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 45. Confidential.)
Frankfort, March 30, 1855.

My Lord,

THE incidents of the sitting of the Diet of the 22nd of February, have lost most of their political importance by the disavowal of the Prussian Cabinet of any intention of holding out a menace or doing aught in an unfriendly spirit towards the Western Powers, and especially to France.

M. de Bismark's language on the occasion referred to, could not, however, but be so interpreted; as whether he did or did not openly announce an intended motion for arming the fortresses on the French frontier, the pointed way in which he directed attention to the motives of the Federal resolution for military preparation, became, in its attempted ambiguity and the studied research with which it was sought to avoid the semblance of a menace to Russia, a clear declaration against France.

In that sense the French Government were fully justified in regarding it, and in acting accordingly, as they did, by remonstrating at Berlin.

The spirit in which those remonstrances were received, was not apparently of a friendly nature, and a circular of M. de Manteuffel to the Representatives of Prussia at the German Courts, complaining that M. Drouyn de Lhuys should make what passed in the Diet a subject of remark or ground of interference, is, as your Lordship has no doubt remarked, drawn up in rather sharp terms.

M. de Tallenay has just shown me a despatch which he received yesterday from his Government, and which he was directed to communicate to M. de Rechberg, which informs M. de Tallenay that the French Government do not admit M. de Manteuffel's reasoning. That in all matters concerning purely German interests, France would scrupulously abstain from anything of the sort, but when a foreign Government obtained a knowledge, as they had done, of matters having passed in that assembly which intimately concerned them, they had both the right and the duty to point out the dangers which the course indicated might bring on.

This despatch also remarks very pointedly on a passage of M. de Manteuffel's circular, in which, speaking of the non-participation of Prussia in the Conferences of Vienna, and the causes which had led to it, the Prussian Minister seems rather to plume himself on not having proposed to enter into a Treaty with the Western Powers, of a nature similar to that concluded by them with Austria; on which M. Drouyn de Lhuys remarks that the Government of his Imperial master accepts the reproach of having made overtures for the readmission of Prussia to an European concert, although he cannot but feel astonishment at its origin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 599.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 48.)
My Lord, *Vienna, March 31, 1855.*

I HAD understood from your Lordship that as late as the 20th of the present month, your Lordship and your colleagues were all of opinion that it was impossible to recede from our demand of limitation of Russian naval force in the Black Sea.

I had also understood that your Lordship was of opinion that the demand need certainly not be made in an offensive shape, and that it was possible that if Russia were allowed to view it as an arrangement required for the security and satisfaction of Europe, and as a proof of her non-aggressive intentions, instead of a condition imposed upon her by England and France, Prince Gortchakoff might be instructed to suggest restrictions on Russia that he would reject if proposed to him.

This course would, if I understood your Lordship rightly, be sound policy for the Emperor Alexander himself, who would thus begin his reign with the sympathies of Europe in his favour.

Acting upon similar views, Count Buol had suggested to Prince Gortchakoff that it would be better to propose limitations on the Russian naval power in the Black Sea on the part of his Court, than to accept such limitations when proposed by the belligerent Powers. Prince Gortchakoff had proposed himself ready to seek for further instructions from his Court, and the French Minister and we had fallen in with the proposition of Count Buol.

In so doing, I conceived I was acting entirely in accordance with your Lordship's views.

I was therefore a good deal surprised when, within forty-eight hours of the meeting of the Conference upon the third point, I received a notice of a plan of neutralization of the Black Sea, which I was instructed to support.

Baron Bourqueney received his despatches developing this plan late on the evening of the 25th, and it was not till 12 o'clock of the 26th that we and the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs were apprized of the contents of these despatches.

Count Buol was unprepared to support, or even to examine, so novel a plan; and in the Conference, as your Lordship is already informed, he pursued the course he had already, though imperfectly, communicated to us.

It may have been possible that the Governments of France and Great Britain had conceived the plan of neutralization to be more impartial and conciliatory than the plan of limitation. The French Minister, however, was soon made aware that it would not be so considered.

It appears by your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of last night that the issue of the negotiation is to be made to turn on the acceptance of this plan, and not on that of the limitation of the Russian naval force in the Black Sea.

It is my duty to point out to your Lordship the consequences which may be expected to follow from this course.

The Plenipotentiary of Russia will consider that he has been induced by the representations of Austria, Great Britain, and France, to ask his Court to make concessions which, even if made, would not be considered satisfactory.

The Austrian Minister will find in this new proposition an easy way out of his promises to observe all the engagements he has made.

Finally, the Western Powers, having so long dwelt on limitation, and changing their proposals at the last moment, may be liable to imputations which they have hitherto cast on Russia—of insincerity in the negotiations.

These consequences are so grave, that I have thought it my duty to lay them before your Lordship; and I trust they will be duly considered by Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 600.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 51.)
My Lord, *Vienna, April 1, 1855.*

WITH respect to your Lordship's despatch No. 33, I have to observe that the statutes of the European Commission are to serve as a rule and a guide to the river-bordering Commission.

Should your Lordship think it better to have a separate Commission for the mouths of the Danube, with French and English Commissioners, I feel little doubt that the preliminary Articles of Peace might be so framed.

The Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs has, I fear, an invincible objection to a Commission of an European character having jurisdiction over the Austrian banks of the river.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 601.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 52.)
My Lord, *Vienna, April 1, 1855.*

IN a despatch of Lord Cowley to your Lordship dated the 23rd ultimo, I find that M. Drouyn de Lhuys was prepared at that time, should he find his scheme of neutralization unpalateable at the Conference, to make the following proposition:

That the number of Russian ships in the Black Sea should be reduced, and a like number of Turkish ships only allowed to enter the Black Sea. He felt, however, that this would not be a sufficient guarantee for Turkey, as her ships alone could not be considered a match for those of Russia. It would be necessary, therefore, to insist on the admission of a limited number of allied ships of war; and he was further of opinion that it should be made allowable to the Sultan to call any greater number of allied ships to his assistance, should the Porte be under alarm of an attack from Russia. The power, however, reserved to the allied Governments of sending ships into the Black Sea should not be extended to Russia in an inverse sense, by a permission for Russian ships to pass into the Bosphorus.

It appears to me that this plan is a very reasonable one, and it is in conformity with all we have said.

I send your Lordship a paper I had drawn up in this sense, and which I read to Count Buol, M. Bourqueney, and Lord Westmorland, some time ago. They all thought, however, that it should not be produced at the Conference.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 601.

Memorandum.

THE High Contracting Powers, recognizing the necessity of attaching Turkey more completely to the balance of power in Europe, have agreed:

1. That the integrity of Turkey shall be guaranteed by all the Contracting Powers, so that no one of the said Powers shall seek redress of any wrong on the part of the Sultan by force of arms, or the occupation of Turkish territory, except by common consent of the Contracting Powers.

2. The Sultan, reserving to himself the right on any special occasion of closing the Dardanelles, consents to admit, in numbers greatly restricted, the ships of war of nations having no possessions or establishments in the Black Sea through the passage of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus into the Black Sea, and on their return; the number of such vessels at any one time belonging to one State not to exceed four in the Black Sea, the Bosphorus, and the whole passage from the mouth of the Black Sea to the Dardenelles.

The Emperor of Russia, on his side, being desirous of showing his respect for the principle of the balance of power in Europe, declares,—

3. The Sultan, on being menaced with hostilities, may, at his own discretion, exercise the right which he has hitherto exercised in time of war, that of calling his allies to his assistance.

4. Any ship or ships of war which France or Great Britain may station at the mouth of the Danube to protect the navigation of that river, shall be counted among the four ships of war hereinbefore mentioned.

No. 602.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 53.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April 1, 1855.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch No. 27.

It is with surprise I learn that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government the third Protocol has for its object to confirm and even to increase all the assumed rights of internal interference in the Principalities hitherto exercised by Russia, and only to admit Austria to a joint exercise of those rights. Your Lordship goes on to say, "Such an arrangement would be actually worse than the existing state of things; it would legalize by the formal sanction of England and France those practices against which we have always protested, and which have rested up to this time only on the interpretation which Russia has put upon her own Treaties with the Porte."

I must beg to call to your Lordship's recollection your own acts, and those of the former and the present Administration.

On the 8th August of last year, Lord Westmorland, by your Lordship's orders, delivered to Count Buol a note which he was instructed to declare resulted from "confidential communications which have taken place between the Courts of Vienna, Paris, and London."

In this note it was solemnly announced "that the three Powers are equally of opinion that the relations of the Sublime Porte with the Imperial Court of Russia, cannot be re-established on solid and durable bases:

"1. If the Protectorate hitherto exercised by the Imperial Court of Russia over the Principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia be not discontinued for the future, and if the privileges recorded by the Sultans to those Provinces dependent on their Empire be not placed under the collective guarantee of the Powers, in virtue of an arrangement to be concluded with the Sublime Porte, and the stipulations of which should at the same time regulate all questions of detail."

The provision which was declared necessary in the beginning of August was

maintained at the end of December. In the memorandum delivered to Prince Gortchakoff on the 28th December, the three Powers declare:

"Que leurs Gouvernements, en jugeant de commun accord qu'il était nécessaire d'abolir le Protectorat exclusif exercé par la Russie sur la Moldavie, la Valachie, et la Serbie, et de placer dorénavant sous la garantie collective des cinq Puissances les priviléges reconnus par les Sultans à ces Principautés dépendantes de leur Empire, ont entendu et entendent qu'aucune des stipulations des anciens Traités de la Russie avec la Porte concernant les dites Provinces ne pourrait être remise en vigueur à la paix, et que les arrangements à conclure à leur sujet seraient ultérieurement combinés de façon à donner une pleine et entière satisfaction aux droits de la Puissance Suzeraine, à ceux des trois Principautés, et aux intérêts généraux de l'Europe."

In like manner, at the first meeting of the Conference on the 15th of March, Count Buol declared in the name of the Austrian Government: "1. The Protectorate exercised by Russia over Moldavia and Wallachia shall cease, and the privileges acknowledged by the Sultan to belong to these Principalities, as well as to Servia, shall for the future be placed under the collective guarantee of the Contracting Powers."

The despatch containing a report of what passed in this Conference was acknowledged by your Lordship in your despatch No. 18 of the 20th ultimo.

I presume that your Lordship must have often reflected on the gravity and importance of the engagement to which Great Britain was to be pledged by this guarantee.

It is a matter of no slight importance to guarantee a territory. But the object is at all events a simple one. So long as that territory is not invaded, or the independence of its Sovereign threatened, the guarantee is dormant.

Not so with the guarantee of the privileges of a Province under the suzeraineté of another Power. No one can say how often or on how many points the privileges of the inhabitants of the Principalities might be violated by the Sultan, directly or indirectly.

The Ministers of the Porte might corruptly influence the nomination of a Hospodar, who, in his turn, might ask for Turkish troops to defend his violation of Wallachian or Moldavian privileges. In short, many cases may be conceived requiring representations to the Sultan, on the part of the guaranteeing Powers.

The state of Bulgaria during the occupation of the British army last year, afforded lamentable instances of the excesses of the Turkish soldiery. But neither will it have escaped your Lordship, for many months thinking and writing upon these subjects, that Austria and Russia, being neighbouring Powers, are likely to have a greater part in any interference than France and Great Britain can properly exercise.

I am far from saying that such an obligation is not onerous and inconvenient, but in my present position I am not called upon to defend the collective guarantee.

All I contend for is, that having embraced the principle, your Lordship, Her Majesty's Ministers, and I, must bear the consequences.

There is another point on which some explanation may be required.

Lord Westmorland and I were careful to limit our sanction to the removal of disturbers of the peace, who might be foreigners, to disapprobation, and a refusal of protection. So much we have always admitted in respect to British subjects abroad, and so much, if I am not mistaken, your Lordship and the Cabinet claimed from the United States in respect to their citizens engaged in fomenting disturbances in Ireland.

For such an Article as is now inserted I have all along been prepared.

I never expected that Austria and Russia would allow Hungary and Poland to be disturbed by the intrigues of foreigners in the Principalities.

They are too jealous of their power to allow such dangers to exist in their neighbourhood.

In my despatch No. 41, I have treated generally of the Protocol relating to the Principalities.

The more important arrangements to be made respecting it, must be either made here with the assistance and concurrence of Aali Pasha, or at Constantinople.

With an irresponsible Prince it would be difficult to secure good govern-

ment; with a Prince responsible only to the Sultan, the best ruler might be removed by corrupt influence.

The subject is a very difficult one, but if sufficient provision can be made for good government, I conceive the guarantee of the privileges of the Principalities may give rise to much less trouble than I have supposed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 603.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 45.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 5, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government concur in the objections raised by your Lordship and Lord Westmorland, as reported in your despatch No. 45 of the 30th ultimo, against the wording of the Annex to the 4th Protocol, which would have released Russia from her former obligation not to erect fortifications on the islands adjoining the Sulina Mouth of the Danube; and they learn with satisfaction that these objections were not resisted by the Russian Plenipotentiaries.

Her Majesty's Government approve of your Lordship having declined to take part in any discussion on the fourth point until an understanding had been arrived at on the third.

Although the third point was the one that most interested the Governments of England and France, and of which they desired the earliest possible solution, yet they agreed not to disturb the order in which the bases had all along been presented, and they did not anticipate that upon the third, the most important of all to Russia, the Russian Plenipotentiaries would be found to have no instructions. But it was impossible for England and France to consent that the delay occasioned by the reference to St. Petersburgh should be turned to their disadvantage; for if a discussion upon the fourth point had taken place, and an arrangement of some kind had been agreed to, Austria would have obtained all she required, Russia would have made all the concessions to which she attached small importance, and then, when the answer came from St. Petersburgh rejecting the terms proposed for giving effect to the third basis, the Western Powers would have been charged with obstinacy and indifference to the calamities of war if they refused to make peace upon conditions which they knew to be neither honourable nor secure.

Should the negotiations be broken off, and should all hope of the speedy restoration of peace be thus extinguished, it will be a cause of sincere and deep regret to Her Majesty's Government, who, in conjunction with the French Government, have carried moderation to its utmost limits, and cannot be responsible for the failure of their efforts; but if Russia unfortunately should not listen to reason, and should refuse to give the guarantees that we could accept for the future peace of Europe, the Conference must be considered at an end; and it is unnecessary to say, that England and France will in no way be bound by the preliminary arrangements that have been come to with respect to the first and second bases.

I have the satisfaction to state, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the course pursued by your Lordship and Lord Westmorland, in refusing to agree to the proposal of Count Buol, that you should attend a meeting of the Conference at which the Russian Plenipotentiaries were to be present, and from which the Ottoman Plenipotentiary was to be excluded.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 604.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 46.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 5, 1855.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 46 of the 30th ultimo, in which you state that the Austrian Government maintain that Constantinople cannot be taken by a *coup de main*, that the only formidable attack on Turkey must be made by the Balkan, and that Austria would employ all her forces to prevent the success of such an attack, I have to observe that if the Austrian Government, upon due reflection, entertain these opinions, they are quite justified in asserting them, but Her Majesty's Government are equally entitled to maintain their own opinions, which are in direct opposition to those of the Austrian Government.

It appears unquestionable, that if Russia is permitted not only to retain, but indefinitely to increase, her naval forces in the Black Sea, Constantinople must always be in imminent danger of a sudden attack, unless the Sultan were to keep up and hold in constant readiness a land and sea force sufficient to repel such an attack; but even if the finances of Turkey permitted of such a continuous exertion, it would create an armed and insecure truce, and not the state of peace that we are all desirous of restoring. There is no reason, however, why a combined movement should not be made by sea and land, or that a Russian army should not enter Turkey from Bessarabia, at the same time that a Russian fleet attacked Constantinople, and then, whatever might be the activity and goodwill of Austria, she would find it impossible to prevent the success of the operation.

Her Majesty's Government entirely concur with your Lordship, that if Austria were to be thoroughly engaged with the Western Powers, and ready to take part with them in the war, her action would be seriously impeded by the policy of Prussia, but Her Majesty's Government would not think it expedient, at the present moment, to call upon Prussia to give the securities for her friendly neutrality that your Lordship has suggested for their consideration.

A demand that two fortresses and a sea-port of Prussia should be placed in the hands of Austria, France, and England, would not only rouse the national spirit of the Prussians against the allies, but might induce the whole of Germany to adopt the cause of Prussia, and the King, thus supported and urged on, might then take part with Russia more openly than he has hitherto ventured to do.

But whenever Austria declares war against Russia, Her Majesty's Government will be prepared at once to concert with her as to the most effectual means of guarding against the designs of Prussia, if there should then be reason to consider them hostile.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 605.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 47.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 5, 1855.*

YOUR Lordship is aware that Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French have reserved to themselves the right of adding to the four points any other demands that they may think conducive to the future security and peace of Europe; and I beg therefore to direct your Lordship's attention to the subject of the Aland Islands, and in the event of the negotiations going on, to the necessity of our obtaining from Russia a formal engagement that no fortifications should again be erected upon those islands.

I inclose a memorandum that has been prepared in this office, by which your Lordship will see that although the fortification of the islands is not prohibited by the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Sweden, yet it has

nevertheless been the cause of uneasiness and alarm to Sweden; while the extraordinary secrecy observed by Russia on the subject, and the great extent to which, as we now know, the fortifications were to be carried, prove that Russia had designs which she was deeply interested in concealing from Europe.

In fact, there can be little doubt that Russia aimed equally at extending her dominion in the north and in the east, and that by the possession of the Sound as well as of the Bosphorus, she meditated a deadly blow at the independence of Europe.

The fortress of Bomarsund is now laid in ruins, and it must not be reconstructed. We have discovered the danger that threatened us; and it would be most unwise if we exposed ourselves to its recurrence; and Her Majesty's Government have therefore to request that your Lordship and Lord Westmorland will communicate with the Plenipotentiaries of France upon this important subject, and that with their concurrence, you will bring it to the notice of the Russian Plenipotentiaries.

Whatever may be the opinion of Her Majesty's Government upon the Treaty of 1809, by which Sweden was compelled to cede Finland to Russia, they do not, in the present state of the war, desire to disturb the existing arrangement; but they have a right to demand that under cover of that Treaty the security of other countries shall not be endangered, and that Bomarsund shall not be to the north of Europe the standing menace that Sebastopol is to Turkey.

Her Majesty's Government would therefore propose that a Convention should be signed between England, France, and Russia, providing that no fortification of any kind shall henceforward exist in the Aland Islands.

It is to be hoped that this proposed measure of security will not be considered by Russia as offensive to her dignity, as historical precedents abound of great Powers consenting by similar guarantees to remove the uneasiness that other Powers were justified in feeling; and Her Majesty's Government trust that the refusal of Russia may not impose upon them the duty of considering in what way Her Majesty's naval forces in the Baltic may be made instrumental towards an object that they desire to attain by peaceful means.

I inclose a copy of the Treaties between Russia and Sweden, which it may be useful to your Lordship to possess.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 605.

Memorandum on the Fortifications of Aland.

Treaty of Frederickshamn, September 17, 1809. State Papers, vol. i. p. 978.

THE Treaty of Peace of 1809, between Russia and Sweden, in which the cession of Finland by Sweden to Russia was made, contains no stipulation respecting the non-fortification of the Island of Aland, nor does the correspondence with Russia, or with Sweden, at that period, make mention of any stipulation or agreement upon the subject.

Sweden by that Treaty became the ally of Russia in the war against Great Britain, and the only reference to Aland which has been found in the correspondence, during the interval between 1809 and 1812, when peace was concluded between the three Powers, is the incidental statement, in May 1810, that the island is reported to have been "strongly fortified by the Russians."

From Mr. Foster, No. 38, May 1, 1810.

The correspondence appears also to be silent upon the subject from 1812 to 1834.

From Mr. Bloomfield, No. 34, February 28, 1834.

In the early part of the latter year, Russia being engaged in fortifying the island, it was ascertained by the Swedish Government that the works were intended to consist of an entrenched barrack, with ramparts and bastions, capable of containing from 2,000 to 3,000 men; but the works were not considered as falling under the denomination of a regular fortification, it not being understood that the barracks were to be casemated.

The project of forming a naval establishment upon the island was said to have been abandoned, because of the impossibility of constructing an efficient naval arsenal, owing to the shallowness of the water, and to the general difficulties of the navigation in that part of the Gulf of Bothnia.

From Mr. Bloomfield, No. 34, June 7, 1836.

In 1836 a Danish traveller, after some difficulty, obtained permission to see the fortifications. He reported that much activity had not been displayed in prosecuting the works; but that 2,000 men were expected to arrive, 500 of whom were to be employed each day during the summer; all the necessary materials having been collected.

The extent of the works, as stated in 1834, was to be limited to a simple fortified barrack, capable of containing about 2,000 men; presenting its strongest defence to the land side, and situated at some distance from the sea.

From Mr. Bligh, No. 17, April 4, 1837.

In 1837, the impression that had previously existed with respect to the extent of the intended fortifications, proved to be unfounded; when the particular attention of the British Government was drawn to a memoir in detail, accompanied by plans, relative to the fortress, or, as it was termed by the Russians, "Casemated Barrack," which was in a state of considerable forwardness on the Island of Aland.

The memoir had been prepared by an intelligent officer of the Swedish Guard, and it showed that Bomarsund was capable of becoming a most important naval and military post, and was admirably adapted for a menacing point against Sweden, with which intention these strong and costly works had evidently been undertaken.

When Mr. Bligh crossed Bomarsund in 1835, he was informed by the inhabitants of those parts that there was not sufficient water in the basin, near the new fortifications, for large ships; but, from what he had afterwards heard, there were channels by which they could pass, so as to be under cover of the guns on shore. He observed, however, that that point, as regarded Sweden, was of less importance, as it would be as a rendezvous for flotilla, and troops ready for embarkation, that Bomarsund would be formidable to Sweden.

He stated that it probably did not enter into the contemplation of the Russian Government to make a great naval depôt at that extremity of the Russian dominions; for, although some time would be gained in the spring by having a part of their fleet at Aland, they would hardly venture to expose it to attack by an enemy, whilst the remainder was inclosed in the ice at Cronstadt.

Mr. Bligh added that the establishment at Bomarsund would prove to the Swedish Government the necessity of devoting all their naval resources to the preparation and organization of such a flotilla as could alone secure them from the dangers by which their capital and coasts were menaced by the proceedings of their powerful neighbour, who seemed determined to be armed at all points, both for offence and defence.

From Lord Durham, No. 94, May 18, 1837.

Some remarks having been made to the Russian Ambassador in London respecting the fortifications on the Island of Aland, which were supposed to have been erected for the purpose of menacing Sweden, it was explained to Lord Durham at St. Petersburgh that the building in question was merely a defensive one; that it was, in fact, a fortified barrack for the protection of the Russian detachment quartered there, which consisted of 2 battalions, or about 1,800 men. It was added that there was no fortress there, and that the Swedish Government had never made any remonstrance or representation upon the subject.

It was further explained that, in consequence of Aland being so much nearer the coast of Sweden than that of Finland, it was absolutely necessary to give the soldiery on duty there some such security, in the event of a war breaking out suddenly with Sweden, as would enable them to resist any *coup de main* that might be attempted against them.

To Lord Durham, No. 131, June 5, 1837.

On the receipt of this explanation, it was remarked to Lord Durham, that the Russian Government might very naturally offer such explanations in this matter; but that, although it was stated that the barracks in Aland were to be fortified to defend the troops by which they were occupied, they had omitted to explain what the troops themselves were to be sent to Aland to defend.

It was at the same time made known to him, that the British Government had been informed that the barracks were of considerable extent and of great strength, the walls being six feet in thickness, and the buildings bomb-proof; that they were capable of being armed with 100 guns of heavy calibre, and that the barracks would be commanded by a neighbouring height—a circumstance which seemed to indicate that the barracks were only the commencement of more extensive works.

And with reference to the statement, that Sweden had never made any

remonstrance or representation upon the subject, it was replied, that it was not difficult to understand the reasons which might have prevented a weak Power like Sweden from formally protesting against such works, constructed to overawe it, by a stronger neighbour.

From Lord Durham, No. 97, May 25, 1837.

Lord Durham shortly afterwards stated, that he had had an opportunity of conversing upon the subject with the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburgh, who corroborated the account given by the Russian Government as to the nature and extent of the fortifications, and declared that he knew of no remonstrance that had been made by his Court upon the subject.

To Lord Durham, No. 140, June 6, 1837.

With reference to the last observation, Lord Durham was informed that the British Government knew that the Swedish Government looked upon the fortifications with great jealousy and uneasiness.

From Mr. Bloomfield, No. 71, October 2, 1838.

In the following year, 1838, it was stated to Mr. Bloomfield at Stockholm, by a proprietor of one of the principal iron foundries, that he had been told by the Russian officer who superintended such matters, that 2,000 heavy pieces of ordnance for the fortress of Aland would be soon wanted, and that they were to be procured from Sweden; that in answer to his inquiry, what could be the object of so many guns for such a small fortress, he was told that although the works of the fortress itself were not extensive, the intention was to form a naval depot at Aland, for which these guns would be required, in order to cover the various approaches to the harbour.

This information was communicated to the Swedish Government, as a matter of secondary interest to England, but one of vital importance to Sweden.

Inquiries were in consequence ordered to be made upon the subject. It was intimated, however, to Mr. Bloomfield, that the King of Sweden had repeatedly given his opinion, that in a military point of view the labours of the fortress would be thrown away; for, from its geographical position and want of resources, it could be easily blockaded, and that it would be impossible for a large garrison to hold out for any length of time.

From Lord Clanricarde, No. 42, April 30, 1839.

These particulars were forwarded to Lord Clanricarde at St. Petersburgh, but he was assured that the pieces of ordnance which had been ordered in Sweden were intended for the new forts erected on the frontier of Poland, and would be shipped at Stockholm for Dantzic; that the fortifications of Aland were on a very small scale; that they were capable of containing only two battalions; that the accommodations for that amount of force were so scanty, that some of the officers who were stationed in the island were lodged in houses not within the fortress; that they were only protected by half-a-dozen pieces of artillery, four of which belonged to the two battalions who formed the garrison; and that no considerable extension of the works, or addition to the defences, was in contemplation.

He was further told, that the Russian Government considered it necessary to have at Aland such fortifications as might enable the troops there stationed to hold out for a short time against any attempt to surprise them, because from their position they were exposed to a sudden attack in case of a war breaking out, and that would require three or four days for them to obtain succour from the nearest Russian garrison; but that the island was not of such value as to make it likely a large expedition would ever be sent against it, or to justify a great expenditure for its protection.

From Mr. Cartwright, No. 51, August 6, 1839.

Three months afterwards a steam-vessel went from Stockholm to the island, with a party on a trip of pleasure.

No obstacles were thrown in the way of their landing, and they were at first admitted to almost every place and every building they wished to visit; but that after it was discovered that some officers were of the party, restrictions were put upon their curiosity.

One of the party reported that the barracks and works which had been constructed were on a very grand scale, very well finished, and very neatly kept; that the Russians were very actively employed upon other buildings and other fortified works belonging to the plan which was marked out; and that when the whole should be completed, there would, he thought, be every capability of maintaining a force there of from 30,000 to 40,000 men, if not more.

When the Russian Government heard of the visit, orders were given to the military Government of Abo to reprimand the Commandant of Aland for having permitted it; and a long correspondence took place with reference to it between these two military authorities.

The registers do not contain a reference to any further correspondence relative to the fortifications of Aland, from 1839 up to the commencemen to the present war.

Foreign Office, February 24, 1855.

No. 606.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 48.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 5, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government have read with much interest your Lordship's able and important despatch No. 41 of the 28th ultimo. They concur in your opinion, with regard to the position and the proceedings of Austria during the last twelve months, and I need hardly add that your Lordship, in attaching a high value to the cooperation of Austria, whether in negotiation or in war, has acted in strict accordance with the views of Her Majesty's Government.

Her Majesty's Government also concur generally in your Lordship's opinions respecting the state of the Principalities, and the evils to be guarded against in their future administration; and if the Conference has not entirely shared your opinions, and the Protocols have not in certain particulars, which I have stated in previous despatches, given full effect to them, Her Majesty's Government are well aware of the difficulties with which your Lordship has had to contend, and the manner in which they have been aggravated by the inexplicable neglect of the Porte, in not giving to its Ambassador at Vienna complete instructions and full powers to treat, or in not sending there a Plenipotentiary who possessed the confidence of the Sultan.

If the Turkish Representative had been able to furnish the information on which it appears the Conference stood in need, various points involving the interests both of the Sultan and of the Principalities might have been advantageously discussed, if not definitively settled, which must now be reserved for future consideration.

Those points are enumerated by your Lordship, and I will briefly state the opinion entertained by Her Majesty's Government with respect to them, subject to the modifications they may undergo upon the views of the Porte being more clearly ascertained.

The union of Wallachia and Moldavia is thought to be inexpedient, and that a good understanding between the two Principalities will be best promoted by their remaining separate.

Each should be governed by a Christian Prince to be appointed by the Sultan, and it seems desirable that the Princes should not be natives of the Principalities; they should be appointed for life, but not with hereditary right, because, as your Lordship justly observes, an hereditary Prince establishing himself by wise laws and conciliatory conduct would scarcely remain long a vassal of the Porte. It would seem proper that the Sultan should have the power of revoking an appointment that he confers, but the intrigue and corruption respecting the distribution of offices which prevail at Constantinople might lead to dangerous abuse of such a power.

A representative system exists to a certain extent in the Principalities under their present Constitution, which might be advantageously developed without causing umbrage or just cause of alarm to neighbouring countries. Indeed, there would be no more reason why Austria should fear a representative system in the Principalities, than in Prussia, Saxony, or other German States.

The Sovereigns of Russia and Austria would certainly not tolerate that disturbance and rebellion among their own subjects should be promoted in the Principalities, and it would be the duty of the Princes effectually to guard against such acts; but Russia and Austria have not hitherto possessed the power of demanding the expulsion of foreigners, and it would be very desirable not to confer upon them rights, as regards the Principalities, that France does not possess with respect to Belgium and Switzerland. Her Majesty's Government observe with satisfaction that your Lordship and Lord Westmorland obtained a modification of the Article as originally proposed, and they trust that you may still find it possible to carry the amendment further.

It will probably be the desire of the Sultan to recover the right of which he was deprived by Russia to place garrisons in the fortresses on the left bank of the Danube, and should that be the case Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that no objection to it could with justice be raised.

In conclusion, I will observe that Her Majesty's Government think that liberty should be given to Turkish merchants and others to reside in the Principalities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 607.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 6.)

(No. 227.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 22, 1855.

THE accompanying reports from Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Moossul and Acting Consul-General at Aleppo, relative to the revolt in Kurdistan, reached me yesterday, and I hasten to forward them to your Lordship in copy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 607.

Consul Rassam to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Moossul, February 26, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that on the 24th instant, his Excellency Helmy Pasha received the following intelligence from his Kahya, who left this for Semail about a month ago. That he had dispatched Hussein Bey, the Emir of Yezidees, with his 2,000 followers, to attack the outposts of Yezdasheer Bey near Durnboona. That Hussein Bey had repulsed the Kurds with a loss of one man killed, and several wounded; the enemy, however, lost several men, and were driven to Phashapoor. Hussein Bey pursued them, and the enemy not being able to keep their ground fled towards Jezereh in the greatest confusion; he then directed his steps to Zukho, but the Kurdish garrison there, hearing of the defeat of their brethren, fled to the mountains with their Commander Adel Bey, leaving Hussein Bey in possession of the town, and he, the Kahya, had just received a letter informing him that he had taken the town in the name of His Majesty the Sultan.

Mohammed Pasha, who left this with his army on the 10th instant, are still encamped at Chil-Agha, only twenty-five hours from Moossul. There is, however, a report current here that Yezdasheer Bey surprised the camp on the night of the 22nd with 10,000 men, and was repulsed by the Nizam, with a severe loss of 3,000 killed, and 800 taken prisoners. This report requires confirmation, as since the army left this no official intelligence has been received from Mohammed Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. A. RASSAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 607.

Extract of a Letter from Aleppo.

February 27, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that yesterday 135 Kurds have been brought here as prisoners from Merdin, the original number having been 155, but 20 died on their way hither.

These prisoners were taken in the battle that was fought near Mediat by the combined Christian and Turkish forces against Yezdasheer Bey. The rebel Chief returned to Mediat shortly afterwards, as we learn by a letter dated Merdin, 29th Gemaz-il-evel, with a superior force, pillaged the town, and massacred Emir Antar and his cousin Emir Melek Khutte, and about twenty principal persons with them.

All the inhabitants have fled, 150 families to Deir Zaafran, and the remainder to Merdin, where the Patriarch has billetted these poor suffering Syrian families among the Christian population of Merdin.

The two brothers of Emir Antar had been killed by Bedr Khan Bey some years previous. All accounts received state the country about Jezereh to be in revolt, and the greatest atrocities are committed.

Inclosure 3 in No. 607.

Extract of a Letter from Aleppo.

March 6, 1855.

HIS Excellency Suliman Pasha left this for Antioch on the following day, Saturday the 3rd instant, accompanied with the same ceremonies, to a short distance from the city, by all the abovementioned officers, but not in full dress. His Excellency, who leaves universally regretted, visited in person, and took leave of all the Patriarchs and Bishops, as well as all the Consuls.

The two French mail messengers who left this on the 28th, to meet the steamers of the 1st and 2nd at Alexandretta, were robbed between Kan Dimbekerli and Beylan by twelve men, everything taken from them, and one of them wounded in eight places.

It is currently reported here that these men are the followers of Latfee Agha, in connection with Ahmet Bey, Mersaloglu, and that they hope by this step to compel the Government to replace that Chief in command of the "Amk," his rival Izzet Bey being exceedingly unpopular. His Excellency Ismail Pasha has sent persons to investigate and take measures to prevent any recurrence of such acts.

No. 608.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 6.)

(No. 228. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 23, 1855.

The Grand Vizier called upon me this morning, and entered into conversation on the subject of the negotiations by this time opened at Vienna.

It is evident from his Highness's language that the Porte has strong opinions of its own on some of the points which are to be debated there.

An Austrian protectorate in the Principalites, however limited, would never meet with its cordial assent. The consolidation of the two provinces under a single chief would also fail to receive its support. There is every disposition, I conceive, to improve the condition of the country, to secure its administrative independence, and to render the relations between the Boyards and the inhabitants in general less onerous to the latter. The Porte, I believe, is not insensible to the importance of calming the jealousy of Austria with respect to democratic institutions, and the advantages to which she looks for, herself, are less those of power, than of increased revenue and of surer defence against Russia. The Princes, I apprehend, will remain to be chosen among the native aristocracy, and, if the Porte has its way, the tribute will be reasonably augmented, and the destroyed fortresses will be revived for the reception of Turkish garrisons.

With respect to the Danube and its freedom of navigation, the Porte, I doubt not, will enter willingly into any measures adopted in common for the attainment of that important object. The Grand Vizier would be delighted to exclude the Russians from contact with the river, but he would not consent to cede the Dobrudscha to Wallachia.

The details of the third basis of negotiation are reserved at Constantinople, as elsewhere, for ulterior reflection and the contingencies of war.

The independence of the Crimea, of Circassia, and of Georgia, under the suzeraineté of the Sultan, is a favourite dream. I am inclined to think that no serious resistance would be offered to the erection of Sebastopol into a free port, and to the admittance of a regulated number of ships of war into the Black Sea proportioned to that which might be assigned to Russia. The latter of these questions would, in the Vizier's judgment, lie most open to objection.

In matters of internal reform and of Christian privilege, there is much continued profession of improvement emanating from the Porte herself, but a decided unwillingness to substitute a joint for a Russian protectorate.

I beg to reserve for another occasion such comments as I may have to offer on these intentions or inclinations of the Porte. In talking them over with Reshid Pasha, it was rather my object to encourage his confidence than to correct his impressions.

The communication, which is promised, of the Turkish Plenipotentiary's instructions prior to their receiving the Sultan's sanction, will afford a better opportunity for the performance of that duty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 609.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 229. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, March 25, 1855.*

THE French Chargé d'Affaires had an interview yesterday with the Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha at his own requisition. He had called upon me the day before and intimated a wish to extract from the Turkish Ministers some explanation of their views with respect to the four points of negotiation. It appeared from his language that he was acting in that respect under instructions from his Court. I have not seen him since the interview took place; but I have received from Reshid Pasha an account of what passed on the side of himself and his colleague, with the remark that M. Benedetti's object seemed to be rather to obtain information from them than to make them acquainted with the views of his Court.

I cannot feel confident that Reshid Pasha has put me in possession of all that passed on the occasion, but I cannot do better than inclose for your Lordship's information the report which M. Pisani addressed to me after having received the Grand Vizier's communication.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 609.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, March 24, 1855.*

M. BENEDETTI had an interview this morning with the Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha, on the subject of the four points. He put forward the proposal made some time ago by the Austrians, to place the two Principalities under a foreign Prince independent of the Porte, in order, said he, to check the exclusive protectorate of Russia. The Porte objects to it, and pretends that such a measure will have a contrary effect. With regard to the diminution of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, and the free navigation of the Danube, the Porte has no objection to offer. But only observes, with respect to the second point, that she will not allow that the Dobrudscha, as proposed, should be annexed to the Wallachian territory, but offers to do anything in her power for keeping the mouths of the Danube in a condition to afford facilities for its navigation.

As to the fourth point, respecting the spiritual immunities and privileges of the Christians, their Highnesses declared that the Porte is decided not to enter into any agreement thereupon with the allies. Turkey, said they, declared war to Russia, because this Power was encroaching upon the independence of the Sultan, by demanding to interfere in the spiritual affairs of the orthodoxes, and how can now the allies demand a concession which they declared themselves, more than once, both verbally and in writing, to be inconsistent with the Sultan's sovereign rights and independence.

What relates to the revision of the Treaty of 1841, the Porte is ready to subscribe to the conditions which the allies will propose.

Respecting the Deputies of the three Danubian Provinces to proceed to Vienna for giving local information to the Conference, the Porte proposes that those Deputies should be selected by the Porte, and attached to the Porte's Plenipotentiary, and not act independently.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 610.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 6.)

(No.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, March 25, 1855.*

I WENT over to Constantinople this morning at an early hour, and saw Reshid Pasha at a friend's house, where he had slept for two or three hours after passing the greater part of the night in Council. I found his Highness in cheerful spirits, notwithstanding the fatigue which he had undergone, and he told me, with every appearance of satisfaction, that he had at length obtained the consent of his colleagues to the principal heads of that system of social reform and administrative improvement which he had contemplated for many years with so much anxiety.

According to his confidential statement, the haratch is finally condemned, a tax being to be substituted in its place under the denomination of a succour or subsidy for war. Christians are to be received into the army, and to be made capable of holding rank as Colonels. In the administrative service, they are to be made eligible for employment in all the five classes of civil rank. This limitation would have them excluded from high offices of State and chief provincial commands. He stated, that with respect to the haratch, clear transgression of the Koran was undisguisedly adopted, but that the Sheik-ul-Islam had consented to the innovation, not indeed in his spiritual capacity, but as Minister of State. He added, that the construction of a new code of law was in progress; that he hoped the measures now adopted would open the way to other more complete reforms; that so great a change could not be effected at once; and that in his belief the Government was now fairly launched upon a career of improvement which would lead in time to the happiest results.

In expressing the pleasure which I derived from his communication, I was careful not to make too large an admission, or to allow him to lose sight of the defective execution which has hitherto attended every principle and measure of reform promulgated by the Sultan. I reminded him of the practical abuses and administrative crimes which pervaded the empire; of the fatal consequences which they entailed, and the necessity of foreign support and foreign superintendence to secure the enforcement of salutary laws. I repeated what I had so often urged before us to the dangerous condition of the Empire, and the slender prospect of its renovation, unless the system of Tartar exclusiveness were discarded, and the Empire not only internally improved in point of administration, justice, and humanity, but thrown open with little reserve to the capital, the industry, and the science of western civilization.

I should weary your Lordship if I were to record the whole series of arguments which I pressed on the Vizier's attention; but I must do his Highness the justice to say that, in making excuses for himself and his colleagues, he admitted the truth of my remarks, and expressed a sanguine hope that my

wishes for the benefit and advancement of the Empire would be gradually realized.

What more I have to state or to suggest on this interesting and comprehensive subject must of necessity stand over for another occasion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 611.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 55.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April 3, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship, two copies of the Protocol (No. 7) of the Conference held on the 29th ultimo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 611.

Protocol (No. 7) of a Conference held at Vienna, March 29, 1855.

Présens :

Pour l'Autriche—
M. le Comte de Buol-Schauenstein, et
M. le Baron de Prokesch-Osten ;

Pour la France—
M. le Baron de Bourqueney ;

Pour la Grande Bretagne—
Lord John Russell, et
M. le Comte de Westmorland ;

Pour la Russie—
M. le Prince de Gortchakoff, et
M. de Titoff ;

Pour la Turquie—
Aarif Effendi.

APRES la lecture du Protocole No. 6, M. le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman a déclaré qu'il venait de recevoir, par voie télégraphique, des nouvelles de Constantinople en date du 23 courant, portant qu'Aali Pacha était alors au moment de se mettre en route pour Vienne, muni des pleins pouvoirs étendus de la Sublime Porte. Conformément aux instructions qui lui étaient parvenues en même temps, Aarif Effendi a renouvelé les réserves qu'il avait déjà articulées dans les Conférences précédentes à l'égard de tous les points de la négociation sur lesquels le nouveau Plénipotentiaire Ottoman aurait à faire connaître les idées de son Gouvernement.

Les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne ont constaté que les instructions qu'ils venaient de recevoir de leurs Gouvernements respectifs, leur prescrivaient de s'en tenir à l'ordre des matières tel qu'il avait été fixé de commun accord au début de la négociation et qu'ils ne se trouvaient par conséquent pas en mesure d'aborder la discussion de la quatrième base de négociation avant qu'une entente mutuelle sur la troisième eût été amenée.

Les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche ont pris à tâche de faire ressortir l'opportunité qu'il y aurait à recueillir en attendant les matériaux nécessaires pour pouvoir discuter à fond le quatrième point. Ils ont émis l'opinion que l'espace de temps qui s'écoulerait jusqu'à la réception de la réponse du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg au compte rendu des Plénipotentiaires Russes pourrait être utilement employé, si la Conférence se livrait à ce travail préparatoire, qui, tout en ne préjugeant aucune question essentielle, serait de nature à faciliter considérablement la tâche qu'elle aurait à remplir plus tard avec le concours du nouveau Plénipotentiaire Ottoman.

Les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ont fortement appuyé cette opinion.

Cédant au désir qui leur en a été exprimé, les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne ont consenti à demander à leurs Gouvernements, par la voie électrique, l'autorisation de prendre dès à présent part à un travail préparatoire, qui ne préjugerait la solution d'aucune question.

Le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman a également consenti à assister aux Conférences qui seraient tenues dans ce but, du moment que les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne seraient autorisés à y intervenir.

(Suivent les signatures.)

No. 612.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 57.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April 5, 1855.*

THE eighth Conference was held on Monday, April 2nd, when the Protocol of the former Conference was read and agreed to.

Upon the declaration made by the French Minister, Lord Westmorland, and me, that our Governments did not agree to the discussion of the fourth point before the third was settled, Prince Gortchakoff took another opportunity of vaunting the sympathy of his Sovereign with the Christian subjects of the Porte.

Baron Bourqueney and I refuted this pretension. I took occasion to refer to the exertions made by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and applauded the humanity of the Sultan and his ready compliance with our desires.

When the Conference was over, Riza Bey thanked me for what I had said.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 613.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 58. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April 5, 1855.*

LORD WESTMORLAND and I had yesterday, in the course of a conversation with Count Buol, some discussion respecting the present and future condition of the Principalities.

I began the topic by stating that I was sorry to find that the grievances of which I had heard complaints of the oppressive conduct of the Austrian military in the Principalities had not ceased.

Count Buol turned away from this subject, by saying that it was not his department which was responsible for the conduct of the Austrian army. In fact, I believe he had nothing to add to his former statement, which I gave in my despatch on this subject.

Count Buol then went over several topics connected with the Principalities. He alluded to a conversation which Count Colloredo had had with your Lordship, of which I have not seen any account.

He said it was not clear which of the two systems your Lordship wished to see adopted. The one was, to give the Principalities hereditary Princes, or an hereditary Prince, and be prepared to see them independent of the Porte. The other system was, to strengthen the Turkish rule in the Principalities; but in that case we must be prepared to see the influence of Russia largely increased, and the Russian party foment intrigues and disturbance.

For his own part he did not desire Austrian occupation; it was very expensive and troublesome; but Austria could not bear disturbance so near her frontier. That he had no partiality for Prince Stirbey, but he understood that

his rival had very advanced opinions, and would probably cause much commotion in Wallachia. Such commotion might at any time lead to Austrian occupation.

England and France were far off and could hardly take that interest in the affairs of the Principalities which Austria, as a neighbour, must feel.

He suggested that a Prince might be named for life and a successor during the lifetime of the reigning Prince. The payment made to the Porte on the appointment of a Hospodar might be made on the nomination or accession of a new Prince.

I raised the question of Turkish garrisons in Giurgevo, Brailow and Galatz. To this he made no objection, but said, that upon this as upon other questions the feelings of the inhabitants must be consulted.

In fact, the ground on which we have to move must be trod with caution. Two Powers are in presence in Turkey and its dependencies; the one the recognized authority of the Sultan, the other the rising strength of the Greco-Slave population supported by the influence of the Christian Powers.

The Empress Catherine was the first among the Sovereigns of Europe to put forward this influence; she boasted of her acquisition, and announced her triumph in a proclamation issued soon after the Treaty of Kainardji.

It is now proposed, by the first and the fourth of the four points, to assume, on the part of the great Powers of Europe, not a protectorate, but an official position at Constatinople, conservative as regards the privileges of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and progressive as regards the institutions of Turkey.

It is manifest that this is a position of great delicacy. The policy of Russia was an easy one; it was to foster Mahometan prejudices on the one hand, and to be the patron of Christian disaffection on the other. Our object is a very different one; we wish to strengthen the throne of the Sultan, and at the same time to emancipate his subjects from degrading restrictions and vicarious oppressions.

It is always to be feared that in giving our support to the Sultan we may offend or alienate his Christian subjects; or, on the other hand, that in promoting liberal reforms, we may shake the very foundations of Mahometan institutions.

It appears to me, that in pursuing this difficult course, we should attempt rather to secure and develop existing privileges than to alter the bases of society.

The Christians in Thessaly and Macedonia, in Servia and Bulgaria, have a patriarchal organization. The family is united under its head; many families under the chief of the village. The financial system of Turkey was founded upon this simple system of self-government.

The Turks, on their side, have their own institutions blended with their religious faith. It is desirable, as it appears to me, not to attempt to confound the institutions of the two races. What is really required is very simple,—a good judicial system, and a well-disciplined army, organized by the Sultan, would free the Christians at once from the grievances which they endure from the irregularities of the law, and the outrages they suffer from an unpaid and, consequently, licentious soldiery.

Austria, France, and Great Britain would probable act cordially together in support of such a policy. Russia would endeavour by every means in her power to keep alive a separate influence. We must not forget that the immense numerical superiority of the members of the Greek Church over every other Christian persuasion facilitates the manœuvres of Russia. But your Lordship has doubtless considered all the difficulties of this position, and I will not dilate upon the question.

I will only say, therefore, that a strict and cordial union between France, Great Britain and Austria, appears to me to offer the only effectual counterpoise to Russian influence. If Austria is thrown into the arms of Russia, it will be difficult to preserve the throne of the Sultan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 614.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 59. Confidential.)
My Lord,

Vienna, April 5, 1855.

BEFORE Lord Westmorland and I began our representations to Count Buol yesterday, he spoke of the conduct of Prussia. He said that if Austria came to a rupture with Russia it would be necessary to ask for a thorough explanation with Prussia. That Prussia should be asked, whether she was for us, or against us. In case of her refusing to commit herself, Count Buol thinks her coast should be blockaded.

I mentioned slightly my notion of asking her for the custody of three of her fortresses.

I have always told your Lordship, that on the rupture of negotiations Austria will find it very difficult to remain neutral. Her great rival in Germany would thereby obtain a triumph which might be converted into a permanent superiority.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 615.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 60.)
My Lord,

Vienna, April 5, 1855.

I SPOKE again yesterday to Count Buol on the subject of the sequestrations in Lombardy.

He informed me, that only a week had elapsed since his colleague the Minister of the Interior had received from the Sardinian Chargé d'Affaires a list of those on whose behalf his Government claimed the removal of the sequestration.

This list had been sent to Marshal Radetzky and the Civil Governor of Milan (or Lombardy), with a request for detailed information.

I had already informed M. Buch of the anxiety of Her Majesty's Government on the subject of these sequestrations.

It appears that several of the persons whose property has been sequestered had come in, and had their property restored to them. I asked whether it was true, as I had understood, that these persons had been required to sue for pardon, or were required to live in Lombardy.

Count Buol answered, that no pardon was asked or granted; that these persons merely declared their intention to live quietly under the Imperial Government, and that they might ask for passports, and go to Piedmont, or elsewhere, the next day.

It is to be expected, therefore, that as between the Austrian and Sardinian Governments this question will soon come to a satisfactory result. M. Buch appears to entertain a wish to arrive at a settlement as soon as possible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 616.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 61.)
My Lord,

Vienna, April 5, 1855.

ALTHOUGH the Protocol of the eighth Conference has not yet been signed, I inclose, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of

he draft of that Protocol, as I understand it has been agreed to by the respective Plenipotentiaries. I will forward complete copies of the Protocol by the first opportunity, after it has been signed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 616.

Draft of Protocol (No. 8) of a Conference held at Vienna, April 2, 1855.

LE Protocole de la séance du 29 Mars dernier a été lu, approuvé et signé.

Le Plénipotentiaire de France a déclaré que la réponse qu'il avait reçu de son Gouvernement à la dépêche télégraphique du 29 Mars lui prescrivait itérativement de s'abstenir de toute discussion sur la quatrième garantie jusqu'à ce que le troisième point eût obtenu une solution complète. Indépendamment du prix que son Gouvernement attachait à maintenir l'ordre de discussion convenu dès l'ouverture de la négociation, il a fait valoir comme un nouveau motif d'ajournement l'arrivée imminente de MM. les Ministres de Affaires Etrangères de France et de la Sublime Porte, venant l'un et l'autre prendre part aux travaux de la Conférence.

Les Plénipotentiaires de la Grande Bretagne ont également annoncés qu'ils n'avaient point été autorisés à dévier de l'ordre de discussion chronologique établi dès l'abord et qu'ils ne pourraient donc, quant à present, prendre part à aucun travail concernant la quatrième base de négociation.

Le Prince Gortchakoff, tout en admettant la valeur du motif d'ajournement qu'il venait d'entendre, ne peut se dispenser d'exprimer les regrets que lui fait éprouver ce retard. Ses regrets sont d'autant plus vifs qu'il s'agit d'une question de conscience, d'un engagement d'honneur des Puissances Européennes, et que la politique devait y rester étrangère.

M. de Titoff s'associe aux sentiments dont son collégue s'est rendu l'interprète.

Le Comte de Buol, tout en regrettant pour sa part l'ajournement de la discussion du quatrième point, exprima l'espoir que le concours éclairé des nouveaux collaborateurs annoncés à la Conférence contribuera essentiellement à lui faciliter l'accomplissement de la tâche qui lui est réservée

Arif Effendi se déclare d'accord avec l'opinion émise par les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne.

Répondant à l'observation faite par M. le Prince de Gortchakoff, le Plénipotentiaire de France a constaté que le délai apporté à la discussion du quatrième point ne saurait de la part de son Gouvernement impliquer la moindre nuance entre l'intérêt qu'il voulait lui-même au sort des sujets Chrétiens du Sultan et celui que les Plénipotentiaires Russes avait témoigné en leur faveur.

L'importance même que le Gouvernement Français attachait à cette question avait été pour lui un motif de plus de ne pas autoriser son Plénipotentiaire à prendre part à un travail préparatoire sur cette matière au moment où le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte, attendu incessamment ici, allait mettre la Conférence à même de la discuter avec son concours en pleine connaissance de cause.

Le Prince Gortchakoff, tout en prenant acte de la déclaration du Plénipotentiaire de France, a peine à se rendre compte des raisons qui pourraient empêcher la Conférence de commencer le travail préparatoire dès l'arrivée de MM. les Ministres des Affaires Etrangères de France et de la Sublime Porte.

Lord John Russell a établi, de son côté, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, qui avait de tout temps désiré voir les sujets Chrétiens du Sultan traités avec justice et humanité, et qui avait par l'entremise de son Ambassadeur à Constantinople reçu des preuves non équivoques des intentions sincèrement bienveillantes dont la Porte était animée à ce sujet, ne saurait certes être accusé d'indifférence en cette matière. Comme toutefois les questions soulevées par le quatrième point touchaient de très près aux droits de souveraineté du Sultan, et qu'elles devaient être traitées avec une Puissance actuellement en état de guerre avec l'Empire Ottoman, la discussion serait nécessairement d'une nature délicate, et c'était là une des raisons pour lesquelles son Gouvernement insistait

de ne voir aborder le quatrième point que lorsque le troisième serait complétement vidé.

Le Comte de Westmorland se range entièrement de l'avis de son collégue.

Le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman adhère à l'opinion émise par les Plénipotentiaires de la Grande Bretagne.

Eu égard aux motifs d'ajournement précités et aux cérémonies religieuses de la Semaine Sainte, on est convenu de fixer la prochaine séance au 9 de ce mois.

No. 617.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April 8.*)

(No. 147.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April 4, 1855.*

REFERRING to my despatch to your Lordship No. 103 of the 10th of March, in which I explained an error which had escaped me in my despatch No. 10 of the 8th of January, and referring also to my confidential communication to your Lordship upon the same subject of the 13th of March, I beg to state with greater precision the mode in which that error had arisen.

I beg, in the first place, to remark that in the sixth paragraph of my despatch No. 10, I stated that Prince Gortchakoff "then withdrew the unofficial document he had read as merely a memorandum for his own guidance," and in a confidential communication to your Lordship of the 9th of January, I reported that "this document was stated by Count Buol to be the one which Prince Gortchakoff had submitted to him the day after the first meeting on the 28th of December.

I had also stated in my despatch No. 53 of the 31st of January, in reply to an observation in your Lordship's despatch to me No. 24 of the 22nd of January, that "I beg to declare distinctly that it (the document produced by Prince Gortchakoff) was not stated to be the embodiment of instructions received by him from his Government."

Under these circumstances I was very greatly surprised at finding, in your Lordship's instruction to Lord John Russell and to myself, No. 5, which is dated the 22nd of February, that you should allude to the document read by Prince Gortchakoff on the 7th of January, "as purporting to be the substance of the instructions which he had received from his court;" more particularly as this statement was in such direct contradiction to the various despatches I have above cited up to the 31st of January. I consequently turned to my original despatch of the 7th of January, when to my great annoyance I found that the insertion of the words "which he had embodied in an unofficial document which he read," and which words had been transmitted by telegraph two days after my despatch had been sent to the Foreign Office, had caused the misunderstanding which had taken place. I must explain the manner in which the error was committed.

On the second day after my despatch No. 10 had been transmitted to the Foreign Office, one of the gentlemen of the mission came to me to make the remark, that although I had stated in the sixth paragraph that Prince Gortchakoff then withdrew the unofficial document which he had read, yet I had made no mention in the beginning of the despatch of his having produced any such document, and that he thought I might have intended to have done so. I said that it certainly was an omission, and that I would write to explain it; he remarked it would be very easy to have it inserted in the first paragraph, and stated how, and I agreed to his suggestion without taking sufficient notice of the manner in which it was done, and till my attention was drawn to the statement in your Lordship's despatch No. 5, above alluded to, I had never remarked that the terms in which the explanation was conveyed entirely altered the character of the transaction of which the original despatch, without the insertion of this addition, gave a correct account.

I beg your Lordship will excuse this error in consideration of the circumstances under which it was committed; I regret that the many contradictions of this mistake which I have recapitulated up to the 31st of January, did not

prevent the insertion of the statement made in your Lordship's despatch of the 22nd of February; but I feel that it was my original error which occasioned it, for which I beg again (as I have already done in my despatch of the 10th of March) to apologise to you, and to express my regret that it should have taken place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 618.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 151.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April 4, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour of inclosing a copy of the Protocol No. 7, which was signed at the last Conference on Monday the 2nd instant, which reports the proceedings which took place at the previous Conference on the 29th of March.

Your Lordship has already been generally informed by Lord John Russell and myself of the discussions which arose at this Conference, the result of which was communicated to you by the telegraphic despatch which was transmitted to your Lordship by Lord John Russell and myself on the 29th of March, and to which we received your Lordship's answer by telegraph on the 30th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 618.

Protocol (No. 7) of a Conference held at Vienna, March 29, 1855.

[See Inclosure in No. 611.]

No. 619.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 155.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April 5, 1855.*

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 118 of the 27th ultimo, I took with me to Count Buol the correspondence relative to the entrance of Prussia into the Conferences. He was unfortunately called away to an audience with the Emperor before he had time to peruse it, and at his request I left those papers with him, informing him of your Lordship's desire that the communication should be considered as entirely confidential.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 620.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 156.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April 5, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour of transmitting herewith to your Lordship the accompanying despatches* which I have received under flying-seal from Her Majesty's Consul at Bucharest. I took occasion, on the receipt of these despatches, to make a further representation with reference to their contents to General Hess, and I

* Nos. 631 and 632.

urged upon him the expediency of rendering the military occupation of the Principalities as light as possible to the inhabitants.

General Hess replied that not only was it his wish that it should prove so, but also the express desire of the Emperor, who had watched with anxious interest the inquiry into the late disturbances at Krajova. His Majesty, he said, had ordered that the garrison of that place should be changed, and these orders were now being carried into execution by General Coronini; and it was his sincere hope that this measure would put an end to all further dissension between the inhabitants and the Imperial troops. A vigorous inquiry, he said, was still proceeding into the conduct of the late garrison, and the severest punishment should be dealt to any individual who might be found guilty of any offence. He believed, however, that part of the responsibility of what had passed at Krajova lay with the Préfet and the authorities of the Principality, who had now been superseded by M. Rosetti. General Hess concluded by saying that he was happy to state that Krajova was the only place from which he had recently received complaints, and that all his accounts from other parts of the Principalities were perfectly satisfactory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 621.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 160.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April 5, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour of submitting to your Lordship the inclosed copy of the Protocol of the Conference held on the 2nd instant, which has not yet been signed, but has been sent round to the different Representatives, members of the Conference, and approved by them. This Protocol will be signed at the Conference which is appointed to be held on Monday next, the 9th instant.

Your Lordship will receive the details of the discussion which took place at this Conference from Lord John Russell, in which his Lordship and myself communicated the instructions with which we had been furnished by the telegraphic message of the 30th March from your Lordship, not to enter upon any discussion or explanation as to the points contained in the fourth Article of the basis, until the question relating to the third basis had been decided upon.

The early arrival of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, was announced by Baron Bourqueney, and that of Aali Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Sultan, by the Turkish Ambassador, and it was consequently proposed by Count Buol, and assented to by the members of the Conference, that the further meeting of the Representatives should be postponed to Monday.

The declaration made by the Russian Plenipotentiaries, that with regard to the engagements of the fourth basis, they abandoned all questions of political advantages, looking only with anxiety to securing the privileges which had been accorded by the Sultan to his Christian subjects, called forth from Lord John Russell and myself the declaration that our Governments had certainly never been behindhand in endeavouring, by the constant solicitude of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, to profit by the generous intentions of the Sultan to obtain every effectual guarantee which could be desired for the security and well-being of the Christian population of the Turkish Empire.

Baron de Bourqueney, on the part of his Government, made a similar declaration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 621.

Draft of Protocol (No. 8) of a Conference held at Vienna, April 2, 1855.

[See Inclosure in No. 616.]

No. 622.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 155.)

My Lord, *Berlin, April 6, 1855.*

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatch No. 143 of the 27th ultimo, instructing me to seek of Baron Manteuffel an explanation of the contradiction between the statement made in an article in the "Preussische Correspondenz," and that made by his Excellency to myself, relative to M. de Bismark's proceedings at Frankfort.

The day after your Lordship's above-mentioned despatch was written, you will probably have received my No. 136 of the 25th ultimo, in which I reported the vague and unsatisfactory explanations I had obtained from Baron Manteuffel on the subject; and I trust that your Lordship, under the circumstances of my having already been told by the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs all that he is likely to say on this affair, will approve of my not having renewed the discussion.

I was the more inclined to let the matter drop, as the Marquis de Moustier had received an instruction from his Government, which he told me he should read to Baron Manteuffel. It is an answer to his Excellency's despatch to Count Hatzfeldt of the 2nd ultimo, copy of which was forwarded in my No. 135, maintaining the right of foreign Powers to notice questions brought under deliberation of the Diet, and finally alluding to the late reprehensible conduct of M. de Bismark, and to the disavowal of the same by Baron Manteuffel.

M. de Moustier had also previously requested an explanation from Baron Manteuffel, and received answers similar to those which I have reported; and he therefore felt convinced of the inutility of going again into details, and raising a discussion. Accordingly, he sought an interview of Baron Manteuffel, who it appears after listening to a few words, stopped M. de Moustier, and told him that the despatch appeared to be a long one, and that he should like to read it at his leisure, and begged him to leave it with him. The French Minister protested that he was not instructed even to read it to him; but on being pressed, M. de Moustier thought it was the best way of making Baron Manteuffel acquainted with the contents of the paper, and he left it with him.

Two days afterwards, M. de Moustier called on Baron Manteuffel, when his Excellency returned it to him without making a single observation on its contents; and the French Minister is therefore bound to consider that his Excellency accepts all that this despatch contains.

I inclose a copy of this French despatch, for the confidential information of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 622.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to the Marquis de Moustier.

M. le Marquis, *Paris, le 27 Mars*, 1855.

J'AI reçu les dépêches que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire jusqu'au No. 439.

M. le Comte de Hatzfeldt m'avait, il y a quelque temps, résumé dans une conversation la dépêche que M. le Baron de Manteuffel lui a écrite en date du 2 Mars; et je lui avais, sous la même forme amicale, fait part de mes observations.

Bien que je n'impute pas au Cabinet de Berlin la publication de ce document par la voie de la Prusse, il me semble indispensable aujourd'hui que j'en ai le texte sous les yeux, de vous charger de reproduire avec plus de force l'opinion que j'ai déjà exprimée à M. le Ministre de Prusse.

Je reviendrai tout à l'heure sur l'incident relatif à M. de Bismark; ce que je veux d'abord contester c'est la doctrine d'après laquelle il serait interdit aux Puissances étrangères de se préoccuper des délibérations intérieures de la Diète de Frankfurt. Tant que ces délibérations n'auront pour l'objet que des intérêts Germaniques, jamais la France, dans le respect qu'elle porte à l'indépendance des autres Etats, n'aura ni avis à émettre ni action à exercer, mais il ne saurait évidemment en être de même dans les circonstances de nature à affecter les relations qu'elle a à cœur d'entretenir avec la Prusse. Une diplomatie prévoyante et loyale a pour premier devoir de s'enquérir des dispositions qu'elle doit avoir un jour à seconder ou à combattre; son rôle n'est pas de réagir contre des faits accomplis ou décidés, il consiste surtout à prévenir, par de la vigilance et de la franchise, des incidents qui, une fois produits, entraîneraient de fâcheuses conséquences. Or, il n'est pas douteux, M. le Marquis, que l'attitude de M. de Bismark, dans la séance du 22 Février, pouvait légitimement appeler notre attention, puis qu'elle était à la même époque dénoncée comme dangereuse par le Cabinet de Vienne, aussi jaloux sans doute que le Cabinet de Berlin de la dignité de la Confédération qu'il préside. En signalant, à notre tour, une tendance qui nous semblait hostile et que M. le Baron de Manteuffel a désavouée, nous ne voulions qu'arrêter dès l'origine un conflit non moins contraire aux déclarations de la Prusse qu'à nos propres intentions à son égard.

Je regrette donc que la dépêche adressée à M. le Comte de Hatzfeldt ait déplacé le débat et m'ait mis dans l'obligation de vérifier la solidité du terrain où l'on appelle maintenant la discussion. Ce serait, à mon sens, amoindrir singulièrement l'importance de la Diète et des Etats qui la composent que de soutenir, lorsqu'une opinion avancée à Frankfurt a eu assez de retentissement pour franchir l'enceinte des délibérations fédérales, qu'aucune Puissance étrangère n'est fondée à l'apprécier, et s'il y a lieu, à en raisonner avec le Cabinet du représentant dont elle émane. Je n'accepte pas une telle doctrine et je vous invite à le déclarer à M. le Baron de Manteuffel.

Je n'admets pas davantage que l'on fasse peser sur les agents de l'Empereur au dehors une vague imputation de malveillance à l'égard de Prusse. Si nous nous sommes plaints, nous avons articulé des faits précis, nous avons cité des noms. Ce n'est pas dans un esprit de récrimination que nous avons agi, c'est dans un esprit de confiance et de concorde.

Nous avons supposé au Gouvernement Prussien les sentiments dont nous sommes animé et nous lui avons dit franchement ce qui, dans l'attitude et le langage d'un de ses principaux organes, nous paraissait dénoter des dispositions peu favorables au succès des négociations entamées entre les deux Cabinets.

Nous lui reconnaissons tout naturellement le droit dont nous usons envers lui, et si M. le Baron Manteuffel a à formuler contre un de nos agents des reproches ayant une base aussi certaine, je ne me refuserai, pour ma part, à aucune des explications qu'il pourra me demander. Mais ce qui m'a le plus surpris, je l'avoue, dans la dépêche que j'examine, c'est le regret qui s'y trouve exprimé de l'absence d'un acte qui, constatant d'une manière obligatoire l'identité des vues politiques de la Prusse et de la France, mettrait fin aux divergences de leurs Légations respectives. Il y a longtemps, M. le Marquis, que j'ai dit la même chose et que j'ai prévu le résultat. Nos efforts les plus sincères et les plus persévérants ont essayé de la conjurer et M. le Baron de Manteuffel m'aurait été que juste, si, en faisant allusion à nos démarches pour obtenir, dans un intérêt d'ordre Européen, l'adhésion de la Prusse au Traité du 2 Décembre, il se fut servi d'un langage moins empreint d'amertume. Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur, quant à lui, s'honore d'avoir tout fait pour faciliter l'accession du Cabinet de Berlin à l'alliance des Puissances Occidentales; il mérite à cet égard l'espèce de reproche qu'on lui adresse, mais il s'étonne de son origine.

Il ne me reste plus, M. le Marquis, qu'à vous dire deux mots du désaveu public que M. le Baron de Manteuffel a donné aux paroles que vous m'aviez transmises de sa part. M. le Président du Conseil, m'avez-vous écrit, vous a répondu bien formellement, sur le vu de la déclaration faite à la Diète par M. de Bismark, "que ce Plénipotentiaire, en présentant les préparatifs de guerre comme des actes de neutralité armée et de défense de tous les côtés, était en

dehors de ses instructions, et qu'il lui avait écrit fortement pour être plus prudent dans son langage et plus réservé dans ses actes."

Ces paroles ont-elles été prononcées? Contiennent-elles l'expression d'un blâme? Je m'en remets complétement à vous et à votre tact pour poser ces questions à M. le Baron de Manteuffel.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 623.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 156.)

My Lord, *Berlin, April 6, 1855.*

GENERAL WEDEL arrived here a few days ago from Paris, and was the bearer of a private letter from the Emperor of the French to the King of Prussia, which I understand is full of friendly expressions, and the desire of cultivating good relations, but does not enter into any particulars as to the late fruitless negotiations with this Government. The Emperor has, however, addressed a "lettre de Cabinet" to the King, in which His Imperial Majesty expresses his gratification at learning that the Prussian Government is ready to accede to the Protocol of the 28th December, adding, that he bears this resolution in mind. Nothing is as yet settled as to General Wedel's return to Paris; but it is believed that he will be sent back next week with some fresh instructions and proposals.

In the meantime the Prussian Government are annoyed at M. Drouyn de Lhuys not having passed through Berlin on his way to Vienna; and it is considered a bad return for the special mission to Paris. On the other hand this want of attention is producing a good effect on the public, who are beginning to feel some degree of dissatisfaction with the Government for having lowered the position of the country as an European Power; they have no wish for an alliance with Russia, and hence the Government are desirous to have it believed that serious negotiations for a better understanding with the Western Powers are being carried on, and the continued stay of Baron d'Usedom in London, and the return of General Wedel, are meant to keep up this delusion.

With Austria the same coldness exists; and the communications between the two Governments continue to be of an unsatisfactory nature; but I am not informed that any fresh cause of estrangement has lately occurred. On the contrary, the Austrian Minister at this Court assures me that his Government would willingly see a better state of things established; and he attributes the continuance of much of the ill-feeling to the influence of M. de Bismark, and to the jealousy of Austria at the Diet of Frankfort.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 624.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 158.)

My Lord, *Berlin, April 6, 1855.*

I THINK it my duty to report to your Lordship that for some time back the most active vigilance and stringent measures have been resorted to, both here and in other parts of Prussia, to repress the free political opinions of the press.

The "Times" of the 14th March was confiscated for a leading article directed against Prussia, and the "Indépendance Belge" of the 15th was likewise seized for reproducing this article. Both newspapers have been condemned by the tribunal of Cologne, and it is now in the power of the Minister of the Interior to prohibit at any time the entry of these journals into Prussia.

The editors of the journals here are entirely under the command of the

police authorities, who not only interfere for the purpose of prevention, but likewise prescribe the political tone which they wish the press to adopt.

There is, likewise, a central press bureau at Berlin, under the immediate control and guidance of the Prussian Foreign Office, which daily receives such information and political news as the Government are desirous of making public through the journals, in order to lead and direct public opinion.

An instance of the influence exercised by the Government over the press, has lately been shown in the forced retirement of Dr. Brüggeman, the editor of the "Cologne Gazette," a journal noted for its liberal views and its opposition to the present Ministry. After repeated confiscation, and threats of further repressive steps, Dr. Brüggeman has been at length ordered, under a threat of suppressing the journal altogether, to withdraw from the editorship; and the journal has only received permission to be carried on, provided that it assumes a more moderate tone, and does not oppose the measures of the Government with such acrimony.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 625.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 66. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Copenhagen, March 30, 1855.*

ACCORDING to accounts received here last month from St. Petersburgh, I am assured that the Russian Government manufactories were expected to deliver 80,000 Minié rifles in the course of the spring, and great hopes were entertained that the use of that weapon would place the Russian soldier on terms of equality with the troops of the Western Powers. Large reinforcements were also said to be on their march to the Crimea, and that not less than 40,000 men were forwarded to the army there in the month of February. In St. Petersburgh, therefore, it was generally believed that the allied expedition had no chance of success.

Great exertions were making to improve the defences of Cronstadt, and thousands of men and horses were employed near Oranienbaum, and opposite to the coast of Finland, in the transport of materials for closing the passages to the harbour, which were left open last year.

I presume the passages referred to must be the shallow water between the shore and the fairway, by which gunboats and vessels of that description might attack the batteries advantageously, or by turning them approach the harbour.

Preparations for a vigorous defence of Helsingfors and Sweaborg had also been made. The works of the fortress had been strengthened, and many batteries thrown up hurriedly last year, and in the efficiency of which the garrison had very little confidence, have now been converted into properly constructed and substantial works.

While the organization of a national militia was carried on with activity, differences of opinion were said to exist among the people as to the expediency of prosecuting the war. The language of the higher classes was, however, generally warlike; and several anonymous letters of an insulting or threatening character were said to have been received by Count Nesselrode, who is looked upon as the leader of the peace party.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 626.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 20. Confidential.)

Stockholm, March 17, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE obtained from a trustworthy source, copy of a memorandum which was lately drawn up by an officer of the Staff, at the request of a high military authority here, as to the King's power of calling out, without a declaration of war, the different classes of recruits; and I have thought that it may not be at the present moment without interest to your Lordship, and I accordingly have the honour to inclose it herewith.

It appears from this memorandum, that although His Majesty has virtually the power of calling out all the five classes of recruits, yet as that course has never been adopted, such a measure would be looked on as tantamount to a declaration of war.

The memorandum also states that, from the time necessary to drill and incorporate the Swedish recruits, as well as to assemble the Norwegian Diet, without whose consent His Majesty has not the power of moving any part of the Norwegian army beyond the frontiers of that kingdom, that fully three months would be required before the Swedish and Norwegian army could take the field.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

Inclosure in No. 626.

Memorandum.

(Translation.)

THE King has the power, without a previous declaration of war, to raise the first class of conscripts; and as, in any case, this class ought to be exercised, this measure would in no way appear extraordinary.

But the first class (of 20 years of age), which may be reckoned at 16,000 or 17,000 men, would be composed of soldiers too young to support the fatigues of a campaign; it must rather be considered as a reserve, intended to perfect itself little by little in the different depôts. Besides, this class would not be sufficient—two other classes would have to be raised, to enable us to reach the amount of 40,000 men, exclusively of, at least, 20,000 men to remain in the country.

Now, the raising of all three classes never having taken place in Sweden, it would be considered as a declaration of war, although perfectly in conformity with the laws of the country, which authorise the levying of as many as five classes.

None of these recruits have ever been more than fifteen days under arms; they would require three to four weeks' exercise, to fit them for incorporation into the body of enrolled and Indelta regiments. Once joined to the veteran troops, they would require fifteen days to accustom themselves to this amalgamation. Lastly, it would require fifteen days to go through the "manœuvres of division," which the army is at present ignorant of.

As relates to the Nowegian army, which one may reckon at 12,000 men, it consists of a "conscription," which serves for five years, and which might be ready to march somewhat earlier than the Swedish army; but the King has not the power to send these 12,000 men out of the country without an authorisation from the Norwegian Diet.

One must calculate six weeks for the assembling of this Diet and its vote of assent. If one adds to this the period necessary for sending the command to mobolise to all the different parts of the two kingdoms, the general inspections, &c. &c., one cannot but see clearly that we must decide upon war fully three months before we should be able to enter the field.

No. 627.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 21.)

Stockholm, March 19, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith translations of a letter from the Emperor Alexander II to the Civil Governor-General of Finland, and of a manifesto to his Finnish subjects, promising "to maintain in their full force all the advantages and institutions" which the Emperor Alexander had granted and the late Emperor had confirmed to those subjects.

These documents have been copied from the Finnish newspapers into Swedish, from which the translations have been made, and they show in a remarkable degree the anxiety of the present Emperor to conciliate the inhabitants of Finland, as they bear the date of the second day of his reign.

As I rarely write except by the monthly messenger it is not impossible your Lordship may be already in possession of these documents, but I nevertheless transmit them herewith.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 627.

The Emperor Alexander II to the Governor-General of Finland.

(Translation.)

To Our Governor-General of Finland, &c.

AS We have, by a gracious Manifest of this day's date, confirmed those rights and privileges which His Majesty the Emperor Alexander Pawlowitsch, of glorious memory, granted to the Grand Duchy of Finland, and which Our late well-beloved father the Emperor Nicholas Pawlowitsch confirmed, We have done it with hearty satisfaction, because we have graciously borne in mind the many proofs of gratitude and unshaken attachment to their Monarch and Benefactor, which have been given by the inhabitants of this country, whereby they cheered the heart of our never-to-be-forgotten father, which ever cared for their weal.

We command you to bring this to the knowledge of Our faithful Finnish subjects.

March 3, 1855.

Inclosure 2 in No. 627.

Manifesto.

(Translation.)

WE, Alexander II, by the grace of God Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, Grand Duke of Finland, &c., make known, since We, by the dispensation of Providence, have inherited the Grand Duchy of Finland, We hereby confirm and corroborate the religious and fundamental laws of the country, and those rights and privileges which each class in particular, and the inhabitants in general, within the said Grand Duchy, both high and low, have hitherto enjoyed according to the laws of the land; promising to maintain, fast and unshaken in their full force, all their advantages and institutions.

March 3, 1855.

No. 628.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 23.)

Stockholm, March 23, 1855.

My Lord,

A CONSIDERABLE diversity of opinion exists among the naval men of this country respecting the merits of the gunboat flotilla, or, as it is called here, the "Skärgard fleet." The officers of the larger ships stationed at Carlscrona decry its usefulness, and extol that of their own ships; while the gun-boat officers depreciate the use of ships of war for Swedish purposes, which may be summarily described as defending their own coasts or attacking those of Russia, and vaunt the merits of their own peculiar armament. It is not improbable that there is some exaggeration on both sides, and I have endeavoured to obtain from the best and most experienced sources information respecting the gunboat flotilla, as the armament the least known in England, and the most likely to be brought into useful cooperation, should this country hereafter take a part in the war against Russia.

The result of these inquiries, though all tending to elucidate the same point, is divided into three parts, coming from different sources; and whatever their practical merit may be in the eyes of professional persons in England, I can, I believe, with entire truth add, that their information is obtained from the best Swedish gunboat officers of the day, one of whom has had more practical experience in gunboat warfare than probably any man living, and others, who have either written on the subject or studied it theoretically. Under these circumstances, I am not without hopes that this information may, at the present moment, prove useful to Her Majesty's Government.

Inclosure No. 1 is a memorandum drawn up from the conversation of the persons alluded to above, on the necessity of a gunboat flotilla of light draft of water, for any invasion of Finland, from the peculiar conformation of the Finnish coast from Abo to Björkö, and the consequent impossibility of larger ships approaching or landing troops on that coast, and contains the pith of the whole.

Inclosure No. 2 contains information extracted from a work of Captain Leven, who has just been appointed to command a battalion of the Skärgard fleet, of gunboats, proving their advantage by reference to the naval campaigns against Russia in the last century.

The last inclosure has been drawn up by a very high authority, who has devoted much attention to the subject, and is a strong advocate for the more extensive use of gun-boats in the Swedish navy, and is more a historical sketch of their introduction into this navy, of the services which they rendered in the various wars since that time, and of the comparatively small loss which they suffered, either in battle or from shipwreck, since their introduction.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 628.

Memorandum on the necessity of a Gunboat Flotilla of Light Draught, similar to the present Swedish one, for an invasion of Finland.

THE English fleet that is coming out to the Baltic this year is far too large to confine its operations to a mere blockade. The invasion of Finland, with the assistance of troops, is therefore probably intended. The question then arises as to the landing these troops. Now the navigation in the Gulf of Finland, and even in some few spots close to the shore, is deep in general, but the mainland from Abo to Björkö is, with but few exceptions, entirely separated from the waters of the Gulf by an archipelago (Skärgard) of rocks and islands from five to fifteen miles in breadth, intersected by narrow, shallow, and intricate passages, amongst which in general there is only 4 to 8 feet water. From Sweaborg to Björkö there is an inner passage, which in its shallowest parts can

only be passed by vessels drawing 8 feet water, and there will be found plenty of Russian gunboats, and through it last year they made their way unknown to the English fleet; this year they will doubtless be in greater numbers, probably from 250 to 300, as the Russians have been building new ones at St. Petersburgh and Sweaborg. They did not come out into the open sea, because there they would be no match for the steamers, which could run them down; but they will be found among the rocks, lying in wait in the best positions for defence and attack, and had the large ships entered the Skärgard or Archipelago, which they never attempted, they would have come within range of the former's fire, probably without being able to return it or to approach the gunboats, owing to the difficulty of manœuvring in narrow and shallow passages: they might too have run ashore, and in all cases would have been exposed to great danger of being sunk.

To effect a landing then (which may be found requisite to ensure success, upon a part of the mainland covered by the archipelago), the large steam-ships are useless, as they cannot in general get in near enough, and would be exposed to a fire which they probably could not return, and the smaller steamers and vessels drawing more than 8 feet water will be equally useless for this purpose.

Nor will the ship's longboats and sloops do alone; for they are mounted with cannon of smaller calibre than the gun-sloops or yawls, are not decked, and cannot stand getting shot through them; whereas the gun-sloops and yawls are very difficult to sink by shot, the former too are smaller in size than the latter, and yet draw as much water: the gunboats would sink them with their heavier metal either at a distance or in close quarters. Again, ships' boats cannot get alongside of gunboats, the oars of the latter forming a barrier on each side, and then the 2 and 3-pounders would come into play, and the guns in the bow and stern effectually preventing an approach there. Such is the universal opinion among the Swedish naval officers who are best acquainted with gunboats.

Steam-gunboats again will draw too much water to penetrate into the shallowest parts and land troops, and to them the arguments already used with respect to the uselessness of the large ships in such operations apply, though in a less degree. In action, when the vessels are stationary, a gunboat propelled by oars is much easier manœuvred than one propelled by steam: it can creep along in the narrow passages, can change its speed, be stopped, and put in motion again with much greater ease, is not so likely to go ashore, and if it does can be got off with less difficulty, and is able to turn in a smaller space, and to do so in half-a-minute; whereas a gunboat propelled by steam cannot turn at all in many places where the space is confined, and would in general take much longer, at least five or six minutes. The new Swedish gunboats, of which there are about fifty, having round stems and bows, do not require to turn at all, but are rowed equally well both ways. For the more open skärgards steam-gunboats would doubtless be of much use.

Supposing now that a large gunboat flotilla, similar to the Swedish, consisting of gun-sloops and yawls, and landing sloops, was at the service of the invaders, the best plan for effecting a landing would be as follows. Fill all the ships' boats and the gunboat flotilla with troops, and proceed to the place selected: the gun-sloops should then use their 72-pounder shell guns, and the yawls their 24-pounders, assisted by the riflemen to clear the beach, to attack any gunboats opposing them, and to silence the batteries which may be erected on either side of the passage. The riflemen should next be put on shore, and form a chain, and the two 12-pounders from each of the landing sloops should be landed (a process not occupying a quarter of an hour), thus forming a park of artillery; lastly, under cover of the riflemen and the artillery, the rest of the troops could be disembarked.

The troops being landed, the use of the gunboats does not necessarily cease, for they can be subsequently employed in conveying those troops in different directions, and their crews can assist in other operations, such as constructing bridges, throwing up works, &c., and generally these gunboats must be looked upon in connection with the army, and as acting in conjunction with it, protecting the flank on the sea-side. In fact, the different strips of water must be considered as so many plains and valleys, and the rocks as heights; and so similar are the operations to those of an army, that a general officer, assisted by naval aides-de-camp, to give him information as to currents, weather, &c., would be a better Commander of a gunboat flotilla than a naval officer.

It is reckoned that each of the gun-sloops and landing sloops will, besides the crew, carry 100 men, and each of the yawls about 50. For each of the 72-pounder shell guns, 100 rounds of shell are required; for each of the 24-pounders, 200 of solid ball and grape, of which about 30 should be grape; and for each of the 12-pounders also 200 rounds, half being grape.

Inclosure 2 in No. 628.

Memorandum on the advantages of Gun-sloops and Yawls.

THE advantages of the gun-sloops and yawls, and their ability to withstand fire, were proved incontestably in the war with Russia, 1789-90. In the battle of Svensksund in 1789, which lasted 15½ hours, of the larger Skägard vessels 6 out of 17 were lost, but only 1 out of 23 sloops. In the battle at the same place in 1790, which lasted 12½ hours, the Russians lost 5 ships of war out of 8, 42 larger Skägard vessels out of 66, but only 3 out of 80 gun-boat sloops; on the Swedish side, 44 of the guns (nearly half 12-pounders) were on Skägard frigates and similar vessels, and 15 on galleys, but above three-fifths of the whole amount of cannon, being that part which especially contributed to the victory, were on board the gun-sloops and yawls, whose powerful fire principally contributed to the sinking of the Russian man-of-war "Nicholas."

The general result of the whole war was, that out of 398, only 17, or about 4 in 100, gun-sloops were sunk or blown up during sea-fights which lasted, on an average, 6¾ hours each.

The sloops and yawls have each their peculiar advantages: the former are steadier in bad weather and have heavier cannon; they can land more men, and they keep their place in line better from their greater draught, and are more applicable to the open skägards and on the coasts: the latter can, from their lesser draught, go into shallower places, and land troops on shallower shores; they present a less surface to be shot at; they can fire quicker, as they can be swung round and given a certain direction with the oars quicker than the sloops; they require less men to work each gun, and are most useful in more confined skägards and waters.

With the help of tug steamers, the transport of gunboats now becomes of course very easy.

Inclosure 3 in No. 628.

History of Swedish Gunboats, and the small loss they have sustained.

THE gun-sloops constructed by Chapman were introduced into the Swedish navy in the year 1785, and at the commencement of the war with Russia in 1788, there were at Stockholm 30, and at Sveaborg 40; but after the campaigns of 1788 and 1789 had proved their efficacy in the waters in which they had been used, the Swedish navy received during the winter of 1789-90, an augmentation of 150 small armed vessels, principally gun-sloops.

In the month of May, the whole of the Stockholm squadron left that place, at the same time that 12 gun-sloops and 12 gun-yawls left Pomerania, and 16 gun-sloops Gothenburg, and the whole arrived without any loss at the Russian frontier, in the Gulf of Finland.

At the retreat from Wiborg, 6 gun-sloops and 7 yawls were taken by the enemy, out of a number of 127 of the former and 87 of the latter, but not a single one was lost by stress of weather, although they had to pass the open sea in a strong breeze.

During the year 1808, when the war was vigorously carried on against Russia, only 2 sloops were lost by stress of weather, when returning late in the autumn to Stockholm.

In 1809, 34 gun-sloops went from the Sound to Stockholm, and the whole of the Gothenburg squadron to Malmö in the Sound without any loss.

In August 1809, on the undertaking of the expedition to Rathan, 48 gun-sloops went from Stockholm to Hernösand, and were towed by sailing vessels 132 English miles in 36 hours, with 100 men of the army on board each, and lastly returned to Stockholm by themselves, making in one day a passage of 76 miles, with the loss of one sloop wrecked, but crew saved.

In 1810, in the month of October, 12 gun-sloops left Malmö for Gothenburg, under the command of an officer whose education had been made wholly in sailing vessels of larger dimensions; 4 sloops were lost.

In 1811, 16 gun-sloops were stationed on different parts of the coast between Gothenburg and Carlshamn, the only open part of the coast of Sweden, and no loss ensued.

In 1813, 16 sloops left Stockholm for the coast of Pomerania, and arrived in safety, although having had to encounter a hard gale of wind in the south part of the Baltic.

During that year, 85 gun-sloops were in activity on the coasts of Sweden and Germany, without the loss of a single one.

1814, 47 gun-sloops and 3 gun-yawls were employed on the coasts of Sweden and Norway, in the war against the latter, and all returned safely to their different stations.

It ought to be remembered that gun-sloops in those days were very little unlike large ship launches, except in the heavier scantling necessary for carrying a heavier armament, whereas now they are decked, with openings for the men's legs when stationed at the oars, to be covered at a moment's warning with hatches, sufficiently to exclude any fear of foundering by getting water on deck.

Gustavus III, a King, whom nobody ever yet suspected of want of judgment, after a war of two years with Russia, and in which Sweden, from particular reasons, that is, the subsidies of France, brought out a fleet stronger, both actually and comparatively with the Russian fleet, than any man in his senses will suppose ever can be the case for the future, says to the Secret Committee of the States: "The experience of a former campaign has proved to me the greatest necessity, not only of restoring the navy of the narrow seas, (*i.e.* the gun-boat flotilla), but also of augmenting it as far as possible, and to have it ready as early as possible, particularly as the operations of the war might be carried on, even when the navy of the line of battle ships had not arrived in the Gulf of Finland."

The victory of Svensksund, which was gained a few months later by this navy, and which undoubtedly must be considered as one of the principal corner-stones upon which the favourable peace of 1790 was founded, proved the correctness of his views, and thus history will furnish proofs hardly to be overturned by the differing opinions of men, no doubt full of energy and knowledge in their own business, but without experience in this particular branch of the naval service.

No. 629.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 24.)

My Lord, *Stockholm, March 23, 1855.*

I CAN hardly hope that the information contained in the inclosed paper, as to the best means of attacking Cronstadt, will throw much additional light upon a subject which has doubtlessly received such attentive consideration in England, but they are the speculations of an old and experienced naval officer here, who knows the ground and has thought on the subject, and possibly may be worth a perusal.

I happen to know that Admiral Heyden, who was sent here to announce the death of the late, and the accession of the present, Emperor of Russia, and who, I believe, is Chief of the Staff of the Baltic fleet, stated to a person in this country, who repeated it to me, that he looked on Cronstadt as "impregnable;" not that he thought it was impossible for ships, at great risk and loss, to attack, and even to take it, if they could get sufficiently near, but because the Russian Government would render it impossible for such ships to approach the fortress, by sinking in the channel some of their old ships, as had been done at Sebastopol.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

Inclosure in No. 629.

Plan for taking Cronstadt.

It would be useless attempting to land troops on the north side of the island, owing to the force the enemy would have drawn up against them, and because the ground on that side was, during last summer and autumn, in anticipation of an attack, scientifically undermined, thereby exposing the troops to being blown up, even if they succeeded in getting on shore. That shore, too, is treacherous, as in many places there are several slips of sandbanks lying along it, which, although covered with two or three feet of water, have passages between of a depth of twelve to fifteen feet, and soldiers jumping out of the boats on to these banks, and proceeding towards the shore, would suddenly fall into these deep passages.

The plan suggested for attacking Cronstadt is the following:

By submarine sawing, mining, or other engineering means, to make a sufficient passage for the gun-boats, floating batteries, and steamers of light draught to pass through the barricade of poles, wrecks, and blocks of granite, &c., resting on a sandy bottom, which has been constructed between the north-eastern corner of the town and the mainland. The above vessels should then pass through the barricade, and, after repelling the Russian gun-boats and vessels which might come to oppose them, shell and burn the docks and shipping. St. Petersburgh would then be much more at the mercy of the invaders.

No. 630.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 27. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Stockholm, March 28, 1855.*

MY Austrian colleague, General Langenau, has had the goodness to communicate to me a despatch of the 8th instant, which he has received in reply to one which he addressed to Count Buol at the end of last month, reporting to his Excellency a conversation which he had had shortly before with the Crown Prince.

His Royal Highness had requested General Langenau to furnish the Swedish Government with the earliest intelligence of the progress and results of the Conferences about to be opened at Vienna, adding that it was a subject of the greatest importance to Sweden, and one to which they attached the greatest weight. I need hardly add, that His Royal Highness was of opinion that the Conferences could not lead to a pacific result.

Count Buol lost no time in replying to General Langenau. His Excellency commences by rendering a tribute of praise to the prudent and wise policy which the Swedish Government had followed since the commencement of the present war. He instructs General Langenau to assure the Crown Prince that the Imperial Government will have great pleasure in complying with his request, as much from the intimacy of their relations, as from the similarity of the political position of the two countries.

Count Buol expresses the hope that the negotiations at Vienna may lead to peace, and thinks the chances of peace are increased by the accession of a new Emperor to the Throne of Russia; should, however, the contrary take place, and Austria be obliged to throw the weight of her arms into the balance against Russia, he hopes such an example may not be without influence on the course which Sweden will adopt.

I draw your Lordship's attention to this despatch more particularly, because it is the first occasion upon which the Austrian Minister has been instructed to make any communication to the Swedish Government of a similar nature.

I can hardly doubt, from my conversations with General Langenau, and the opinions he has expressed to me, that he has correctly reported to his Government the sympathy and leaning of this country towards the Western Powers,

and it is for the first time those feelings have been directly encouraged by the Austrian Cabinet.

General Langenau delivered to Baron Stierneld an extract from the above-mentioned despatch, omitting all mention of the Crown Prince, with the request that he would submit it to the King, and I know from another and trustworthy source that His Majesty was much pleased with the communication.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 631.

Consul-General Colquhoun to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 19.)

My Lord, *Bucharest, March 19, 1855.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 10th instant, No. 17, I have the honour to inclose copy of a letter communicated to me by the French Chancelry from Craiova concerning the late disturbances there.

The Under-Secretary of State informs me that he has no further intelligence from Little Wallachia, but I have learnt that General Coronini is to send another battalion and some artillery from hence, and he has required the dismissal of the Administrator M. Felichiano on account of the language contained in his letter to the Austrian Commandant Machios—a request which I understand has been complied with.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

Inclosure in No. 631.

Letters from Craiova, dated March 4, 1855.

NOTRE ville vient d'être de nouveau le théâtre d'un horrible attentat commis par les Croates, soldats de Sa Majesté Autrichienne, en garnison dans notre ville. Hier, à 7 heures du soir, trois négociants, après avoir fermé leurs magasins, Rue des Lipsikins, se dirigeaient vers leur demeure, lorsqu'ils furent assaillis au milieu de la rue par quelques soldats Autrichiens, et massacrés de la manière la plus cruelle. L'un de ces trois malheureux est mort à l'instant même, victime de ces farouches Croates; l'autre est en danger de mourir des suites des profondes blessures qu'il a reçues; le troisième est déclaré hors de danger et en voie de guérison. Ce matin, à l'aube du jour, le cadavre d'un autre négociant assassiné a été trouvé dans la Rue de la Prison. Tous ces cruels attentats, sans précédent, et qui, depuis l'occupation de notre ville par les soldats de Sa Majesté Catholique et Romaine, ne cessent pas de se reproduire assez souvent, a mis en émoi et au dernier désespoir toute la population de la ville.

Aussi aujourd'hui, vers les 11 heures du matin, tout le marché et les magasins furent fermés, et plus de 150 personnes parmi les notables de la ville se portèrent à la Municipalité pour y délibérer sur les mesures à prendre afin qu'il soit mis un terme à tous ces désordres, suivis d'assassinats et de crimes. Après cette délibération, ils rédigèrent une requête au Prince Stirbey par laquelle ils le prient, avec instance, de faire cesser toutes ces horreurs commises par une soldatesque qui menace la vie et la sécurité des habitants. L'Administration a porté à la connaissance du Prince, par son rapport officiel, tous les méfaits et les horreurs commis presque journellement par les soldats Autrichiens; il a en outre adressé une note un peu verte au Général Machios, commandant les troupes en garnison chez nous, en l'invitant d'y mettre ordre, et rendre à la population la tranquillité et la sécurité dont elle jouissait avant l'occupation de la ville par les troupes placés sous son commandement. Le Conseil Municipal a de son côté fait son rapport au Ministre de l'Intérieur sur ce qui vient de se passer dans la ville. Aussi les habitants dans leur anxiété attendent avec impatience une réparation éclatante, et la fin des maux qu'ils endurent depuis si longtemps.

Les Boyards de Craiova n'étaient pas contents de la pétition adressée par les négociants de cette ville au Prince Stirbey. Ils ont adressé une autre dont le contenu est suivant :—

Nous avons cru, Altesse, qu'avec l'arrivée de l'armée Impériale d'Autriche le calme et le repos seraient ramenés dans tous les cœurs, et que nous serions épargnés de maux dont nous avons eu à souffrir jusqu'ici.

C'est dans ce seul espoir que nous avons accueilli avec joie les troupes de Sa Majesté d'Autriche.

Aussi avons-nous mis tous nos efforts pour satisfaire à tous les besoins d'un bon logement, et même au delà de nos propres moyens.

Aujourd'hui, Altesse, nous en sommes au dernier point du désespoir en présence des actes de cruautés commis sans cesse par les soldats Impériaux.

C'est ce qui nous amène devant votre Altesse pour vous implorer de vouloir bien insister à ce qu'il soit, non seulement fait réparation aux maux que nous endurons, mais de faire aussi cesser à l'avenir tous ces maux, attendu que tous les habitants de notre ville en sont dans la plus grande terreur, et personne ne saurait trouver de repos.

Nous sommes persuadés, Altesse, que par votre haute sagesse vous aviserez aux moyens propres à nous épargner à l'avenir de tous ces maux.

No. 632.

Consul-General Colquhoun to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 20.)

My Lord, *Bucharest, March* 22, 1855.

I THINK it my duty to transmit to your Lordship, through Her Majesty's Embassy at Vienna, copy in translation of a note addressed by the officer commanding the Austrian troops at Ibraila to the Governor of that town.

The greatest secrecy is observed respecting the events which have recently occurred in Craiova, Little Wallachia. I have only this day received copy of a letter addressed from thence from the same source as my preceding inclosure to my No. 19. I prefer sending it *in extenso*.

M. Rosetti has returned here, but I have not been able to see him.

The Wallachian authorities with whom I have conversed, endeavour to treat the whole matter as a grave exaggeration, and regret the weight that the Austrians have attached to it. My own opinion is, that it was simply an expression of feeling on the part of a population usually quiet even to a fault, against a soldiery who for some time had given proofs of want of discipline, and whose acts, when complained of, had not been sufficiently vigorously repressed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 632.

Letter addressed to the Governor of Ibraila, dated February 23, 1855.

D'APRES les hautes instructions il s'ensuit que les autorités Ottomanes ne pourront en aucun cas et sous aucun prétexte arrêter aucun individu, soit sujet Valaque soit tout autre, qui aura demandé la protection Autrichienne.

En conformité de cet ordre, je ne saurais jamais tolérer de pareils procédés, aussi je prie l'honorable administration de refuser péremptoirement toute demande de cette nature et de s'adresser en cas de besoin au Soussigné, qui est seul en droit d'aviser à ce qu'il y a à faire.

Je prie à ce que cette mesure soit communiqué aux fonctionnaires subalternes avec injonction de s'y conformer à la lettre.

Je prie en même temps que dans le cas où des troupes Ottomanes arriveraient ici, quelque petit qu'en soit le détachement, de même pour tout autre soldat,

il soit porté à ma connaissance, ainsi que le but de leur arrivée, attendu que la présence des troupes étrangères là où il y a des troupes Autrichiennes doit être portée à la connaissance de leur commandant supérieur.

Inclosure 2 in No. 632.

Letter from Craiova, dated March 13, 1855.

DANS ma précédente lettre je vous parlais d'une requête adressée au Prince par les habitants de Craiova, ainsi que de l'arrivée de M. Rosetti, Préfet de Police de Bucharest. Maintenant je vais vous mettre au courant de ce qui s'est passé depuis.

Pendant que les habitants consternés et pleins de résignation, allaient dans le meilleur ordre et avec calme chez l'administrateur du district lui remettre la pétition au Prince et porter leurs plaintes au sujet de l'assassinat connuis la veille dans la Rue des Lipsicaiens et dont je vous ai parlé dans ma dernière lettre, trois misérables parmi les Boyards, savoir, C. Glogoneano, Obedeano, et N. Poenaros, gens stigmatisés, quoique hauts fonctionnaires de l'Etat, hommes sans caractère et reconnus d'avoir trempé dans toutes les infamies et trahisons, allaient d'un côté dire au Général Machios, commandant les troupes Impériales en garnison chez nous, que toute la ville se trouva en pleine révolte, et d'un autre côté ils envoyaient des lettres à Bucarest par estafette pour annoncer que tout Craiova était en pleine révolte.

Le Général Autrichien ayant dans cette circonstance fait preuve de peu de jugement, en prêtant l'oreille à la malveillance, trop confiant, ou bien trop peureux pour aller parcourir la ville et voir de ses propres yeux tout ce qui s'y passait pour se convaincre de ce qu'il y avait de faux ou de vrai dans toute cette histoire, aima mieux rester enfermé chez lui et faire expédier par estafette des dépêches au Général-en-chef, Comte Coronini, en lui disant que Craiova était en pleine révolte et en barricades.

Le Comte Coronini expédia l'ordre au Général en garnison dans la ville de Slatina d'aller à marches forcées avec ses troupes porter secours à celle d'ici, et le Gouvernement Valaque délégua en même temps le Préfet de Police, M. Rosetti, avec pleins pouvoirs pour y rétablir l'ordre. Vraiment comme tout cela devient ridicule, mais très désagréable pour les pauvres habitants. Hier il faisait un temps terrible, une bourrasque et de la neige toute la journée. Voir arriver par un si mauvais temps ces pauvres soldats Autrichiens venant de Slatina à marches forcées, et arrêter de temps à autre, pour entendre le bruit des canons qu'ils se figuraient retentir dans les rues de Craiova! C'était vraiment triste.

Il en a été de même de M. Rosetti, qui se figurait la même chose, mais en entrant dans la ville il se rassura et en a été quitte pour la peur. Il y trouva la tranquillité la plus parfaite, et pas même l'ombre de cette révolte supposée. Le soir il est allé au théâtre où l'on jouait "La Fille du Régiment," et en a été très content.

Revenons à notre récit. Le Général fit mettre en quartier chez les 200 personnes qui avaient signé la requête au Prince, mais qui avaient été désignés comme des instigateurs à la révolte, 20 à 40 soldats pour chaque maison, et dans les plus propres appartements. C'est une exécution militaire que ces hommes, si inconsidérément calomniés, doivent endurer. M. Rosetti, qui a dans cette occurrence fait preuve de beaucoup d'esprit et de patriotisme, demanda à l'administrateur de lui désigner les révolutionnaires; l'administrateur ainsi questionné, lui demanda de son côté si c'était un rêve qu'il faisait ou non. C'est alors que M. Rosetti lui fit voir les lettres des trois Boyards susmentionnés. C'est à la suite de ces éclaircissements que l'administrateur demanda que ces mêmes personnes qui ont porté une fausse accusation contre les habitants de la ville, ainsi que le Général Autrichien, fussent mis en demeure de nommer les chefs supposés de cette révolte imaginaire, de sorte que ces misérables Boyards propagateurs des fausses nouvelles ne savent plus comment sortir de cette impasse et comment y répondre.

Nous ne saurons ce que l'on fera plus tard, mais on prétend que le Général Autrichien rejette maintenant toute la faute sur ces trois individus qui l'ont enduit en erreur et forcé, pour ainsi dire, à faire tout de bruit, de telle sorte

qu'aujourd'hui les journaux étrangers ne manqueront de s'emparer de cette fausse nouvelle pour faire croire au monde qu'il y a des troubles à Craiova. Par conséquent le Général persiste à ce que ces trois individus soient donnés sous jugement, et c'est très juste.

Mais il y a quelque chose de plus beau à vous dire. Depuis trois jours que M. Rosetti se trouve ici, chaque nuit a produit un meurtre, un massacre, ce qui est très à propos, d'autant plus que les meutriers soldats Autrichiens ont été pris en flagrant délit.

M. Rosetti à la suite de ces attentats commis sous ses yeux, alla chercher le Général lui dire, que les Romains avaient eu raison de réclamer contre les excès journellement commis par les soldats Autrichiens, car il a pu se convaincre que chaque nuit il se commettait des crimes dans la ville. Le Général Machios dans la perplexité où il se trouve semble avouer sa faute.

M. Rosetti vient de dresser une liste de tous ces crimes commis depuis l'occupation de la ville par les Autrichiens; il a recueilli tous ces renseignements officiellement constatés par la police et ses employés subalternes dans les quartiers de la ville.

Nous aurions à espérer que nous serons bientôt délivrés de l'infamie de cette exécution militaire qui pèse sur nous comme une punition qui nous est infligée, ayant à loger 20 à 40 soldats chacun, et à supporter leur plus mauvais traitement.

No. 633.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 24.)

My Lord, *Munich, April 4, 1855.*

INCLOSED is an extract from an article published in the columns of the "Augsburg Gazette," by the author of several other articles which have from time to time appeared on the present European crisis, and who, although he thinks proper to conceal his name, I run no great chance of contradiction in stating to be a person employed in the Foreign Department, and enjoying the confidence of the King. He has always written in a tone far more friendly towards Russia than towards the Western Powers and their allies, and his present production hardly forms an exception to the course he seems to have marked out for himself.

The article now under our notice, commences by stating that Russia has remained true to the assurances given by her since the 20th of November of last year, and that the question of the faith to be put in Russian promises, raised in the French notes, has been practically answered by the understanding come to at the Conference at Vienna on the first and second points of the guarantees, which the writer assumes to be definitively arranged.

Thus the two points which principally interest Austria and Germany, may, he says, be considered as settled; and both Austria and the Western Powers have good ground for presuming the free navigation of the Danube and the future position of the Principalities to be assured: this, however, has not been attained without great sacrifices on the part of Russia. She had, as must be admitted, even supposing her to have acted for the extension of her own interests, and on the conviction of the breaking up of the Turkish Empire alone—for no other Christian State has any share in this merit—procured for the Christian population of those countries the privileges they enjoy, and if she has now abandoned her exclusive right of protection, she has thereby given a proof that she is determined to refute by a fact, at least from this moment, the reproaches and suspicions of other Powers that she took advantage of that protection as a step towards territorial aggrandizement, or for the exercise of an improper influence. She has further done justice to German and European interests, in the matter of the free navigation of the Danube, by a compliance with the demands of the Powers opposed to her. These concessions the article asserts to have been made on so liberal a scale, that the question at once arose in Austria, and in the Austrian Cabinet, whether in the presence of the assurances previously given to Russia in regard to the third point, there any

longer remained the possibility of war on the part of Germany. At any rate Austria now appears in the character of a mediator, having a double object in view,—to restrain the Western Powers from making such excessive demands as shall be inconsistent with Russian honour, but principally to prevent the nature of the concessions from being such as might eventually be turned to account by the Western Powers to establish on their part a permanent and exclusive preponderance in Turkey and in the Black Sea.

The writer then proceeds to argue, that if the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were entirely thrown open to the ships of war of all nations, the inevitable consequence would be that England and France would become masters of Turkey; and he affirms that Russia could never, under such circumstances, consent to the limitation of her maritime force in the Black Sea, for she would then be unjustly exposed to the attacks of an adversary more powerful than herself at sea.

On the other hand, if these two straits remain closed to vessels of war, Russia might submit to the diminution of her fleet, upon the understanding that that of Turkey should never exceed the number of ships prescribed for her.

The above is the general tone of the article, of the concluding paragraph of which the accompanying inclosure is a translation. It is not easy to say from whence the author, who is a Prussian, has received his inspirations; but he is on terms so much the reverse of amicable with Baron von der Pfordten, that I cannot suspect the latter of having had anything to do with it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

Inclosure in No. 633.

Extract from the "Allgemeine Zeitung" of April 3, 1855.

(Translation.)

GERMANY, as well as the Germanic Confederation, would at all events raise another question, namely, how has the fourth point of the guarantees been considered or brought to a decision at Vienna?

The German Cabinets would in any case expect, we say, that in the event of the third point, which France and England desire effectually to settle, should remain unsettled; they would, we say, expect notwithstanding that the fourth point should be proceeded with, in order to be able to ascertain from it whether it would be worth while for Germany to enter upon a war for maintaining the integrity of Turkey and the independence of the Sultan, or whether it would not be more advisable earnestly to direct her efforts, in conjunction with Russia, to obtain for the Bulgarian, Bosniak, and Greek Christians in Turkey, and for the different Christian nations, at least a similar or equal position with that in which Wallachian and Servian Christians are placed in the Principalities and in Servia.

From this fourth and last point it would be seen who is minded to bind the Sultan by Treaty, for all depends on this: To give to Turkey such an internal development as will enable her, like any other legitimate State, to enter into the European system, and thereby enjoy the protection of European International Law.

Let not England and France deceive themselves, for without full information on this question the Germanic Confederation will no more permit itself to be drawn into a war on account of Sebastopol, and all the fine phrases about Russian preponderance in the Black Sea—which would then be waged for the maintenance of that Turkish barbarity and tyranny which is perpetrated in Europe and Asia against Christian, and, for the most part, useful populations.

Until now, no English organ of public opinion has ventured seriously and impressively to treat this fourth point as the essential question of the future; their views do not go beyond Sebastopol, and whilst they begin to endeavour to retain Austria by holding up to her the duty of being true to her alliance, they fail to perceive that the moment may soon come when, by the force of events,

while working for the integrity and independence of the Sultan, steps must be taken against both.

This is the end and the beginning of the song "Hic est Rhodus, Anglia, hic Salta!"

No. 634.

Mr. Bligh to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 67.)

My Lord, *Hanover, April 7, 1855.*

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 37, marked Confidential, of the 3rd instant, having by its inclosures put me in possession of the views of M. Manteuffel respecting the animadversions of the French Government upon the conduct of the Prussian Plenipotentiary at the Diet, and of the Prussian Agents at different Courts of Germany, for the purpose of influencing the policy of Germany at the present crisis, I cannot help going out of my own immediate sphere so far as to remark upon what appears to be an absurd pretension (causing unwarrantable susceptibility) on the part of the Prussian statesman that France or any other Great Power has no right to notice, and even to blame, what may take place at the Diet, until it shall have obtained official publicity, especially that of which the mover may be the Representative of a European as well as of a German Power, which in its former capacity is treating with France upon European questions in a different spirit.

My French colleague has not made to me any complaints of Prussian interference here similar to that upon which it appears that the French Envoys at Carlsruhe, Munich, and Stuttgardt have animadverted, although he is, in a general way, exceedingly irritated against Prussia.

I am sorry to say that I have little success in the endeavours which I think it my duty to use to calm the suspicions and fears which are entertained of French policy by most persons here, especially by those who are now in power.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. D. BLIGH.

No. 635.

Consul-General Ward to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 12.)

My Lord, *Leipzig, April 4, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, during the last fortnight, the Vienna Conferences have been the all-absorbing topic of public interest in Germany, and that the result is everywhere looked to with great anxiety.

The merchants and bankers, and that class of men who habitually speculate in stocks and shares, desire peace at any price, and care little or nothing about the conditions. But more reflective persons look rather to what will be attained by a pacification, and think that, so far as Germany is concerned, there is no ground for wishing a too precipitate end of the war. The German nation, in its best and most numerous elements, has all along been dissatisfied with the inactive policy of Prussia and the German Governments, and is now in some apprehension lest the conditions of peace should not effectively secure to German commerce the navigation of the Danube and the Black Sea.

A pamphlet entitled "Letters on the Freedom of the Danube," by a known publicist, Dr. Wurm, has been widely circulated, and is intended to show that Russia ought to be deprived of the territory which she holds at the mouth of that river. What, says the author, does Russia understand by "the freedom of the Danube, existing by right, and which she has never intended to limit?" (a phrase in the Russian note of the 5th of November, 1854). Russia has

always so interpreted the Treaties, and so exercised her dominion as to hamper the navigation in a legal way, and the other Powers have been consequently obliged to submit. New Treaties would be evaded in the same way, and even the proposed canal to avoid the Russian territory would be frustrated in its object by Russian tactics. The only sure means is to drive Russia from her position at the mouth of the Danube, which she was allowed to take in 1829, by the third Article of the Adrianople Treaty.

In this view of Dr. Wurm there are a great many who concur, and who fear that, whatever stipulations may be contracted at Vienna, the navigation of the Danube will never be, in fact, free, either for Germany or any other nation, so long as Russia holds the islands at the mouth, as a part of her dominions.

Another grievance, which is much complained of as injurious to the commerce of the East of Europe, is the system of vexatious restrictions upon trade, which Russia has established in the Kingdom of Poland.

The Treaty between Russia and Austria of the 3rd of May, 1815, Articles XXIV and XXVIII, and that between Russia and Prussia of the same date, Articles XXII and XXVIII, stipulated for the free navigation of the Polish rivers, and for freedom of commerce between all parts of the ancient Poland, as it existed before the year 1772. Russia has notoriously violated these stipulations, and neither Austria nor Prussia have ever been able to obtain redress as regards their subjects.

The Western Powers are not, indeed, parties to the Treaties cited, and so far as German interests are concerned, the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin are alone to blame that the commerce of Poland has not been kept entirely free.

The subject of Poland has, of late, a good deal occupied the liberal journals, and speculations are thrown out as to the probable occupation of that country by a French army, if the war should continue. The late Parliamentary debate on Mr. Phinn's motion has naturally excited much interest. The general impression seems to be that an insurrection could not take place in Russian Poland, without a similar movement in the Prussian Provinces of Posen and West Prussia, where the population is chiefly Polish; and the experience of the year 1848 makes in favour of such a conclusion. This is one reason why the Prussian Government so much dreads the continuance of the war.

The official organ of M. de Manteuffel, the "Prussian Correspondenz," is more sanguine than ever of its hopes of peace, since the French journals have declared that Sebastopol was not considered a point of honour for France. In the Prussian view, the Crimean expedition has been a brilliant episode, which was never likely to decide the issue of the war, and the fortress is neither the key to the interior of Russia, nor even commands the whole of the Black Sea. Consequently Prussia has the less reason to regret having persisted in a policy of expectancy and mediation; and she may now, if the negotiations should prove abortive, throw her power, undiminished in weight, into the scale of decision.

The debate in the Prussian Second Chamber, upon the further appropriation of the vote of credit, ended in the adopting the Ministerial proposition, by a majority of two-thirds of the Chamber. This result does not encourage the hope of any change of Administration in Prussia; but in Bavaria, M. von der Pfordten's Ministry has sustained a signal defeat, the Chamber of Deputies having passed a vote of censure in the shape of an address to the Crown by a majority of 78 to 37 votes, which led to a dissolution of the Bavarian Diet on the 25th of last March. The chief ground of the vote of censure was in fact the Russian tendency of M. von der Pfordten's Government; the Opposition leaders having constantly urged the necessity of union with Austria and the Western Powers. If the new elections should result in the bringing such men as M. de Lerchenfeld or Count de Hegnenberg into office at Munich, it would become quite possible to detach Bavaria altogether from the Russian policy, which, under the present Ministry, is scarcely to be hoped for.

A disagreeable impression has been made in Germany by the manifesto of the directing Synod of the Greek Church at St. Petersburgh, dated the 7th (19th) of March, and originally published in the "Northern Bee." It is thought a bad symptom that the new Czar should have begun by sanctioning an appeal of this sort, calculated as it is to excite in a high degree the religious feelings of the Russian population. If the Czar be really desirous of peace, why, it is asked, should he not be content with confirming the last act of his father, viz., the

Ordinance for a levy *en masse* throughout the Empire, but should set the Synod in motion to preach a religious crusade against the Western States of Europe? The manifesto is very inflammatory in its language, and tends to stimulate the well-known fanaticism of the orthodox Russians; it is therefore quite inconsistent with the pacific wishes which have been ascribed to the new Czar.

I have taken the liberty of stating thus much to your Lordship in reference to the topics which are just now uppermost in the public mind of Germany; and I have only to add, that the exclusion of Prussia from the Vienna Conferences appears to have given great satisfaction to those persons who are the most decidedly anti-Russian in respect of the war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. WARD.

No. 636.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 9.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 9, 1855.*

CONFERENCE at 1 o'clock P.M. to-day. Meeting of the French, English, and Austrian Plenipotentiaries afterwards. I have seen Aali Pasha, and have copy of his instructions; both very satisfactory. The French Minister and we shall act entirely in concert in our language to Austria.

No. 637.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 364.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 9, 1855.*

I INCLOSE to your Excellency the accompanying copies of proposed instructions to Mr. Longworth and to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte,* respecting a mission to Circassia.

Your Excellency will communicate these instructions to M. Thouvenel, stating, that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government the time has arrived for endeavouring to secure the active cooperation of the Circassian tribes in the war against Russia; and Her Majesty's Government therefore propose to send there Mr. Longworth, who has resided for some time in Circassia, and of whose ability and discretion Her Majesty's Government are well assured.

The real object of his mission will be to gain information, and to ascertain whether these tribes are hopelessly divided among themselves, or whether, for a common object, it would be possible to unite them under recognized Chiefs.

The communications hitherto held with the tribes, lead to the apprehension that the former will be the true state of things; and the recent operations at Soujak-Kalé appear to have failed, as far as the promised assistance of the Circassians was concerned.

The mission of inquiry with which Mr. Longworth will be charged, might assume too great importance in the eyes of the Circassians, if he were accompanied by a French agent; but should the French Government think otherwise, Mr. Longworth's departure shall be postponed until his French colleague is ready to accompany him; and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe will be instructed to communicate with M. Benedetti on the subject.

In the event of Mr. Longworth's proceeding to Circassia alone, it is hardly necessary to say that the information he may obtain will be communicated to the Government of the Emperor.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* Nos. 656 and 657.

No. 638.

Lords John Russell and Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 10, 1855.*

CONFERENCE met yesterday. The Russian Minister said he did not expect his despatches before the 17th instant. Conference to meet again as soon as they arrive. Meeting at Count Buol's of the Austrian, French, and English Ministers, on the third point: no result: to meet again to-morrow. Lord John hopes to be in London on the 27th. Messenger will be sent to-morrow morning, and should arrive in London on Friday night.

No. 639.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 53.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 10, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which your Lordship states, in your despatch No. 57 of the 5th instant, that you held at the Conference on the 2nd instant, in refutation of the pretensions of the Russian Plenipotentiary.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 640.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 54. Secret.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 10, 1855.*

IN reply to your Lordship's despatch No. 59 of the 5th instant, marked Confidential, I have to state that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government it will be necessary to come to a thorough understanding with Prussia respecting her future policy, whenever a rupture between Austria and Russia takes place; but until that event occurs, your Lordship will probably agree with Her Majesty's Government that it would not be prudent to adopt any course that might entail a quarrel between Prussia and the Western Powers.

Austria and Prussia are now animated by feelings of bitter hostility towards each other, and it is natural that Austria should desire to commit France and England against her rival, but it would be unwise on their part thus to commit themselves prematurely.

If Austria were to declare war against Russia, it is probable that several of the German Powers would be compelled to adopt her policy, and there might then be no great difficulty in dealing with Prussia, who would not venture to join Russia, and would be comparatively powerless in Germany.

But if Austria were unfortunately not to fulfil her engagements, and thereby should verify the constant predictions of Prussia, it is not impossible that the latter Power should then wish to draw closer to England and France, or, at all events, we might expect from her a policy more strictly neutral than she has pursued up to this time. In adopting such a policy, she might with reason claim the support of Germany, and Germany in all likelihood would rally round Prussia rather than Austria, but the position of Austria would then be alike humiliating and dangerous. Prussia would have obtained the superiority over her in Germany. She would have lost the moral and material support of England and France; and the consequences which that loss would entail might in many ways be most serious to her. She could not unite with Russia against herself; the state of her finances would not permit her much longer to keep a

large army in the field, and the fear of Russian vengeance must forbid any great reduction of her present military establishment.

If then Austria reflects upon the position she may occupy, and the course that Russia may pursue, she will possibly become aware that for her there are dangers even greater than war against Russia with the aid of powerful allies, and that by courage and good faith these dangers will be most effectually averted.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 641.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 145.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 10, 1855.

I HAVE to acquaint your Lordship, in reply to your despatch No. 147 of the 4th instant, that the explanation therein given regarding an error in your despatch No. 10 of the 8th of January is sufficient and satisfactory.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 642.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 150.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 10, 1855.

I APPROVE your Lordship's proceedings, as reported in your despatch No. 156 of the 5th instant, in making a further representation to General Hess on the conduct of the Austrian troops in the Principalities.

Her Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction that a searching inquiry into the late outrages at Krajova has been instituted; and it is to be hoped that the perpetrators of those outrages will not go unpunished.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 643.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 419. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, April* 10, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, the copy of a despatch dated the 25th ultimo, and addressed by M. Benedetti to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, giving an account of a conversation which he had had with the Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha on the subject of the instructions to be given to the latter on his proceeding to Vienna to act as Turkish Plenipotentiary at the Conferences.

I believe that a copy of this despatch has been sent to Count Walewski for communication to your Lordship, but I should be obliged by your not mentioning that you have received one from me.

The Emperor, I understand, is not at all inclined to enter into the Turkish view of the manner in which the Danubian Provinces should be administered for the future.

Upon the second point I may observe that I have seen an able memorandum, drawn up by a Frenchman who appears conversant with the subject, and who thinks that to neutralize the islands at the mouths of the Danube would be to establish so many nests of pirates. He observes (with what truth I know not) that, even with the excellent system of patrol now exercised by the Russians, acts of piracy are not unfrequent on the Lower Danube.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 643.

M. Benedetti to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

M. le Ministre, *Péra, le 25 Mars*, 1855.

J'AI eu hier avec le Grand Vizir et Aali Pacha une conférence sur l'interprétation que la Porte entend donner aux quatre garanties, et je me hâte, M. le Ministre, de vous en rendre compte.

Nous avons lu le memento communiqué à M. le Prince Gortchakoff dans la réunion du 28 Décembre, et suivant l'ordre adopté dans ce document, je n'ai rien negligé pour recueillir, sur les propositions qui y sont énoncés, toute la pensée des conseillers du Sultan. J'avais remarqué, dans mes entretiens antérieurs avec ces deux Ministres, et j'ai eu l'honneur de le dire à votre Excellence, qu'ils étaient, l'un et l'autre, dominés par une préoccupation qui exerçait sur leur esprit un empire exclusif; je m'attendais à les retrouver sous la même influence; je ne me suis pas mépris. Ils avaient à choisir entre deux ordres d'idées, l'un ayant, avant tout, pour objet de placer, désormais, la Turquie à l'abri des complications et des dangers qui ont menacé son existence; l'autre, plus conforme au sentiment public, tendant à développer, au lieu de raffermir la puissance ou plutôt l'autorité de la Porte; c'est dans la second de ces deux voies qu'ils semblent vouloir entrer, et les instructions d'Aali Pacha seront conçues dans ce sens. Le sentiment de la responsabilité, plus puissant chez eux, que les conseils d'une sage politique leur fait vivement désirer que l'issue des négociations soit en nature à satisfaire l'orgueil national; l'opinion publique en Turquie, pensent-ils, ne comprendrait pas qu'une guerre, entreprise avec le concours des puissants alliés pour sauvegarder l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, put aboutir à des combinaisons qui, aux yeux des populations, sembleraient en resserrer les limites; elle en accuserait l'insuffisance du Divan, et la crainte de s'exposer à un semblable reproche, jointe au désir d'obtenir un succès diplomatique propre à consolider leur popularité, me paraissent avoir suggéré les appréciations développées par le Grand Vizir et le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Après avoir rappelé en quelques mots, à propos de la première garantie, l'histoire des Principautés depuis le Traité d'Andrinople, je m'étais appliqué à mettre en relief la nécessité d'élever entre le Pruth et le Danube une barrière pouvant garantir la Turquie contre les tendances envahissantes de la Russie. "Tel est, disais-je, le but qu'il faut se proposer; comment l'atteindre? Voilà la question qu'il importe d'élucider et de résoudre." J'ai ajouté, M. le Ministre, que je n'avais mission de proposer à la Porte aucun plan de conduite arrêté d'avance, que je devais me borner à examiner les solutions diverses qui pourront suggérer les faits antérieurs et la situation actuelle, et développant les idées émises dans la note qui était jointe à la dépêche de votre Excellence du 24 du mois dernier, j'ai cherché à établir les avantages d'une système qui constituerait les Provinces Danubiennes en un Principauté assez puissante pour puiser dans ses propres ressources et dans son organisation, non moins que dans des stipulations diplomatiques, la force suffisante pour la soustraire à l'influence Russe et abriter la Turquie.

Voici en substance, Monsieur, la réponse et les opinions des deux Ministres: "La réunion des deux Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie en une seule, l'organisation d'un pouvoir unique et héréditaire affaiblirait les liens qui unissent encore ces provinces à la Turquie; ce serait en effet élever un Etat dans toutes les conditions qui constituent la souveraineté et l'indépendance; ce serait par conséquent démembrer l'Empire et consommer la séparation qui a été l'objet constant de tous les efforts de la Russie. Nous ne saurions conserver aucun illusion sur les conséquences d'une semblable combinaison; qu'elles seront les tendances et les aspirations de ce pouvoir nouveau et permanent? évidemment l'indépendance absolue et l'affranchissement définitif. La Puissance suzeraine trouvait jusqu'à présent l'occasion de s'exercer notamment dans le choix des Hospodars; nous avions conservé ainsi un contrôle qui nous assurait certains moyens d'actions, très limités nous en convenons, mais suffisants pour entretenir des sympathies qu'il a été donné à chacun de constater, au moment de la retraite des Russes et de l'apparition de nos troupes dans les Principautés.

Désormais aucun intérêt, nulle considération ne les porterait à resserrer leurs rapports avec nous; l'administration nouvelle n'aurait au contraire d'autre préoccupation que celle de s'ériger en Puissance Roumaine.

"L'exemple de l'Egypte loin de nous rassurer ne peut que justifier nos prévisions; comme la population le Vicerοi est Mussulman et cependant l'hérédité, même en Egypte, appelle l'indépendance. Nous aurions, donc, contribué à organiser la lutte dans laquelle périrait, avant peu, l'autorité abstraite et nominale qui nous serait dévolue. La Turquie ne retirerait donc d'une guerre heureuse, et pour laquelle le pays s'est imposé des sacrifices sans limites, d'autre résultat qu'une limitation plus restreinte de sa souveraineté. Nous ne saurions consentir, sans compensation d'aucune sorte, à une concession [qui blesserait à la fois et nos droits et le sentiment public. Nous le pouvons d'autant moins qu'à notre sens on se méprend en supposant qu'il est possible d'ériger dans les Principautés une Puissance qui serait en même temps un obstacle pour la Russie et une garantie pour l'Empire Ottoman. La similitude de religion et des frontières communes permettront toujours à la Russie d'exercer sur les populations de ces contrées une influence active, et cette influence s'y exercerait avec une liberté entière et un succès certain du moment où elle ne serait plus entravée par l'action directe et efficace du pouvoir suzerain. En constituant ces Provinces en une Principauté sous un Prince étranger dont l'autorité personnelle serait bientôt paralysée, en fondant cette création sur les derniers débris de notre Puissance dans ces contrées, loin d'assurer à la Turquie des garanties de paix et de sécurité, on organiserait une force nouvelle qui, se tournant fatalement contre nous par la nature de son institution, ajouterait au danger qui nous menace de ce côté.

"Il est une autre combinaison qui nous paraît propre au contraire à conduire au véritable but qu'on se propose. Que veut-on? Arrêter la Russie sur le Pruth et mettre un terme à sa prépondérance dans les Provinces Danubiennes? Le premier de ces deux résultats peut être obtenu au moyen d'un acte diplomatique conclu entre toutes les Grandes Puissances, et proclamant la neutralité des Principautés; le second en consolidant, au lieu de l'annihiler, l'autorité souveraine de la Porte. Les Statuts Organiques de la Valachie et de la Moldavie répondant à tous les besoins, la prospérité matérielle des deux provinces en fait foi; loin de songer à y porter atteinte, nous adhérerions volontiers, au contraire, à toutes les modifications qu'on jugerait utiles d'y introduire pour raffermir l'administration locale; nous nous bornons à demander la conservation d'un droit que nous n'avons jamais aliéné, le droit de suzeraineté que nous exerçons sous la garantie des Grandes Puissances, sans danger par conséquent pour les immunités que les Sultans ont concédées à ces Provinces.

"Par une interprétation abusive de l'Article V du Traité d'Andrinople et des Traités antérieurs qui y sont rappelés, de Puissance garante, s'était constituée de son plein gré la Russie, Puissance protectrice, et entendait partager avec la Porte les priviléges de l'autorité souveraine. Ces Traités ne sauraient revivre, mais on ne pourrait y substituer, sans préjudice pour notre puissance et notre sécurité, des arrangements qui ramèneraient de fait les frontières de l'Empire du Pruth sur le Danube. En replaçant notre autorité dans les Principautés sur sa véritable base, on nous permettrait, sans nuire à leur constitution actuelle, de développer notre influence dans ces provinces, d'y acquérir de nouvelles sympathies, d'y organiser, en un mot, tous les éléments de force et de résistance nécessaires pour opposer une digue à l'ambition de la Russie. Le Gouvernement Russe devait à la position qu'il avait conquise par la Convention d'Ackermann et le Traité d'Andrinople, ainsi qu'aux moyens d'agression dont il disposait contre la Turquie, de pouvoir exercer à Bucharest et à Jassy une action prépondérante; il n'avait pas réussi cependant à nous aliéner complétement l'esprit des populations. Qu'on oblige la Russie de renoncer à un protectorat auquel elle avait donné le caractère de la souveraineté et nous parviendrons à rattacher entièrement les Principautés à nos intérêts et au sort de la Turquie, à y élever enfin un boulevard contre la politique traditionnelle du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg. Si les événements de la guerre toutefois exigeaient un remaniement de la carte de l'Europe, et si la Russie se trouvait amoindrie sur d'autres points, ou bien encore, s'il devenait possible de faire à la Turquie des restitutions qui placeraient la Russie dans l'impossibilité de menacer désormais l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, la Porte pourrait trouver dans ces éventualités des garanties qui en mettant fin à de légitimes appréhensions l'autoriseraient à faire des concessions importantes sur le Danube; mais en dehors de

toute combinaison de cette nature, la limitation des pouvoirs du Sultan sur les Principautés deviendrait la source de nouveaux périls pour la Turquie."

En somme, M. le Ministre, aux yeux du Grand Vizir et Aali Pacha, donner aux Principautés une organisation nouvelle fondée, d'un côté, sur la réunion des deux provinces, de l'autre sur la constitution d'un pouvoir héréditaire, ce serait porter atteinte aux droits souverains du Sultan, si non démembrer son Empire; ce serait, encore, livrer ces contrées à l'influence de la Russie, qui n'y rencontrerait plus pour contrepoids l'action de la Porte; ce serait, enfin, jeter le germe de sentiments hostiles à la Turquie, naissant du désir naturel de conquérir une indépendance complète, et entretenus par les soins des agents Russes. Pour réaliser le but qu'on se propose, et donner à la guerre actuelle une issue que le Divan n'aurait pas lieu de regretter, il conviendrait dans leur opinion de dégager de toute intervention étrangère en les consolidant, d'une part, les immunités conférées aux provinces Danubiennes, de l'autre, l'autorité suzeraine de la Porte sur cette partie de son territoire.

Le même esprit et les mêmes préoccupations ont guidé les deux Ministres Ottomans dans l'interprétation de la deuxième garantie. Des trois solutions que j'ai indiquées, il n'en est qu'une, assurent-ils, qui puissent obtenir l'agrément de la Porte; les deux autres seraient d'ailleurs, ont-ils ajouté, d'une exécution impraticable; ils pensent que des difficultés de détail ne permettraient pas de neutraliser le territoire des bouches du Danube et d'en faire le siége d'une commission qui serait une création sans précédent, placée dans des conditions territoriales qui entraveraient la mission dont elle serait chargée. D'un autre côté, il ne suffirait pas d'attribuer à la Principauté de la Moldo-Valachie les bouches du Danube; il deviendrait indispensable dans ce cas de les y annexer en lui concédant l'une ou l'autre des deux rives du fleuve, sinon les deux. On ne saurait demander à la Turquie de consentir à une semblable aliénation sur la rive droite, et la Russie, qui possède les forteresses d'Ismail et de Réni sur la rive gauche, ne se résignera à en faire l'abandon qu'après avoir essuyé des revers qui l'obligeraient à subir une paix désastreuse. Comme il était aisé de la prévoir, Aali Pacha sera chargé de proposer à la Conférence de Vienne, de constituer les bords du Danube à son embouchure à la Turquie, qui prendrait à sa charge toutes les mesures nécessaires pour entretenir la libre et facile entrée du fleuve. Une Commission résidant à Constantinople et composée d'agents appartenant aux missions des Grandes Puissances, exercerait une surveillance directe et permanente qui serait une garantie certaine pour le but qu'on veut atteindre.

La troisième garantie ne saurait être réalisée, au dire des deux Ministres, que par la limitation sérieuse, restreinte et permanente, des forces de la Russie dans la Mer Noire. A cet égard ils ne posent pas de bornes aux sacrifices qu'ils jugent indispensables à exiger du Gouvernement de St. Pétersbourg, et au besoin ils ne reculeraient pas, m'ont-ils assuré, devant les charges d'une guerre prolongée. Le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman à Vienne aura l'ordre de se rallier fermement à l'opinion qui tendra à provoquer la plus forte réduction de la puissance de la Russie, et il devra, s'il y a lieu, en prendre l'initiative. S'il n'est pas satisfait à cette nécessité dans une proportion suffisante, la paix ne serait plus que l'ajournement de la guerre à une époque prochaine; le successeur de l'Empereur Nicolas la reprendra dès que les circonstances lui donneront lieu de supposer qu'il n'est pas exposé à rencontrer l'Europe entière coalisée contre lui. D'autre part et en reconnaissant qu'il n'est pas impossible de concilier l'admission des marines militaires dans les mers intérieures de la Turquie avec la garantie stipulée par le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, la Porte verrait cependant avec regret l'atteinte qui serait portée au principe consigné dans cet acte, et c'est autant dans le but de préserver son droit de fermer les Détroits que dans l'intérêt général de sa sécurité, qu'elle appelle de tous ses vœux l'abaissement de la Russie dans la Mer Noire. Elle consentira, si ses alliés l'exigent, à tenir les Dardanelles et le Bosphore ouverts à nos bâtiments, moyennant des restrictions et des engagements propres à rassurer les esprits les moins confiants; mais une semblable situation lui paraît constituer une sorte de paix armée qui pourrait être l'origine de conflits regrettables. Elle se flatte, si j'ai bien compris le langage qui m'a été tenu, que le pavillon Ottoman, en se montrant en force sur les côtes de la Turquie dans la Mer Noire, satisferait à toutes les exigences du moment où la Russie n'y posséderait plus qu'un nombre limité de bâtiments.

Le Gouvernement Ottoman n'aura aucune répugnance à réitérer et à proclamer dans les termes les plus solennels la déclaration qu'il a déjà faite de maintenir et de respecter les immunités concédées aux populations Chrétiennes. En ce qui la concerne la Porte n'entendra pas autrement que ses alliés la quatrième garantie. Elle se propose néanmoins d'y apporter une restriction qui me semble devoir mériter l'appui des Puissances Occidentales. Les Chrétiens possèdent en Turquie des priviléges de deux sortes: les uns exclusivement religieux, les autres civils ou relevant de l'ordre administratif. La Porte ne se propose d'apporter aucune entrave, ni à la liberté de conscience ni au libre exercice du culte; Aali Pacha et le Grand Vizir m'ont l'un et l'autre donné l'assurance que le Gouvernement Ottoman témoignera en termes formels son intention à cet égard; j'aime à croire en outre qu'il sera aisé d'en obtenir des résolutions nouvelles qui attesteront la loyauté de ses sentiments et qu'il fera notamment disparaître les obstacles qui s'opposent encore à l'édification des églises Chrétiennes. Mais le clergé Chrétien jouit d'un droit de juridiction civile et remplit certaines attributions judiciaires et administratives qui rendraient vaine toute tentative de réforme sérieuse si la Porte était condamnée à maintenir des traditions qui doivent leur origine à l'esprit de conquête et de domination. La régénération de la Turquie ne sera sérieusement entreprise que le jour où, par le moyen d'institutions nouvelles, conformes aux exigences du temps, on réussira à constituer l'égalité devant la loi; les conseillers actuels du Sultan le comprennent et semblent croire que tel doit être le but de tous les efforts de la Porte; ce sont, en effet, les diverses juridictions exceptionnelles qui marquent et perpétuent la séparation existante entre les différentes communautés, ce sont elles qui les distribue en plusieurs classes—en classe conquérante ou conquise, Musulmane ou Chrétienne, Grecque ou Arménienne. Pour mettre un terme à cette distribution, qui entretient l'orgueil des uns, l'abaissement des autres, les haines et les préjugés, il importe à y substituer une juridiction unique, uniforme, égale pour tous les sujets indistinctement du Sultan, ainsi que pour les étrangers résidants en Turquie, leur offrant à tous sans distinction de race ou de religion les mêmes garanties de justice et d'impartialité. La Porte a donc raison en annonçant la ferme résolution de se réserver la libre faculté d'introduire dans l'ordre civil et administratif l'unité de pouvoir et de juridiction.

Telles sont en substance, M. le Ministre, les idées que j'ai recueillies sur l'interprétation des quatre garanties durant mon entretien avec les deux Ministres du Sultan, et dont Aali Pacha sera l'organe au sein des Conférences.

J'ai saisi l'occasion qui m'était offerte par l'entrevue dont je viens de rendre compte à votre Excellence, pour entretenir le Grand Vizir et Aali Pacha de la nécessité d'appeler à Vienne des agents en état de fournir, en ce qui touche l'organisation intérieure des Principautés Moldo-Valaques et de la Servie, tous les renseignements propres à éclairer les Plénipotentiaires sur les besoins de ces provinces. Les développements dans lesquels ils étaient entrés sur l'interprétation de la première garantie, me donnaient la certitude, ainsi que je l'avais prévu, qu'ils accueilliraient cette idée avec autant de réserve que de défiance. J'ai donc eu soin de bien établir qu'il s'agissait de désigner des informateurs, et nullement des représentants, de chacune des trois provinces. J'ai eu néanmoins à combattre des objections qui attestaient le prix qu'on attache à repousser tout incident de nature à marquer d'une manière plus nette la séparation des provinces Danubiennes. Ma proposition a été toutefois admise en principe. Il restait à fixer le mode au moyen duquel il serait procédé au choix de ces délégués; j'avais proposé d'inviter les Princes à dresser chacun de son côté, en se concertant avec les Consuls-Généraux des Puissances alliées de la Turquie, une liste de trois personnes, réservant à la Porte la faculté de désigner celles qui seraient appelés à Vienne. Aali Pacha a renversé ma proposition; c'est à la Porte, a-t-il soutenu, qu'il appartient de préparer la liste des candidats, et les Princes seraient autorisés à choisir, chacun, sur cette liste celui des délégués qui jouirait plus particulièrement de leur confiance. Réchid Pacha a appuyé cette combinaison, qui a du être soumise au Conseil dans sa réunion de la nuit dernière. Les deux Ministres ont, en outre, entendu que les envoyés des trois provinces seraient adjoints à la mission du Plénipotentiaire Ottoman dont ils feraient partie, et qu'ils n'auraient en aucun cas le caractère de représentants, soit des Provinces Moldo-Valaques ou Serve, soit des Princes eux-mêmes.

Je suis, &c.

(Signé) V. BENEDETTI.

No. 644.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 420. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, April 10, 1855.*

IT would appear that shortly after the death of the Emperor Nicholas, M. de Seebach, the Saxon Minister, who is charged with Russian interests during the suspension of diplomatic relations between the French and Russian Governments, and who is, moreover, son-in-law to Count Nesselrode, had an audience of the Emperor of the French, during which His Imperial Majesty must have expressed regret at the death of the late Czar, and that M. de Seebach reported the substance of his conversation with His Imperial Majesty to Count Nesselrode. On Saturday last M. de Seebach called on M. Thouvenel, and stated that he was desirous that the Emperor should be informed of the impression which the courteous expression of his regrets had caused at St. Petersburgh, and he proceeded to read to, and afterwards left with, M. Thouvenel, the letter which your Lordship will find inclosed and marked No. 1.

M. Thouvenel observed that the sentiments expressed by Count Nesselrode in regard to his desire for peace would find their echo in the French Government. The question to decide was, what were to be the terms of that peace, and those could only be decided by the Vienna Conference.

M. de Seebach then drew a second letter from his pocket, written in Count Nesselrode's own hand, which he read to M. de Thouvenel, but which he did not leave with him. The substance of this letter will be found in Inclosure No. 2.

After hearing it, M. Thouvenel observed that, if it represented the determination of the Russian Government, he considered peace to be impossible.

M. de Seebach made some attempts to show how little it was the interest of France to cripple the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea, hinting that the true policy of the French Government was to prevent the increase of the power of England, but he was at once stopped by M. Thouvenel, who told him that it was useless endeavouring to sow the seeds of mistrust between the maritime Powers. The time was happily gone by when such manœuvres could be successful.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 644.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Seebach.

Mon cher Baron, *St. Pétersbourg, le Mars, 1855.*

J'AI reçu avec un vif intérêt votre lettre du 11 Mars, par laquelle vous avez bien voulu m'instruire des circonstances qui ont accompagné l'audience dont l'Empereur a daigné vous honorer.

Les sentiments manifestés par Sa Majesté à la réception de la nouvelle du malheur dont nous avons été frappés; l'émotion profonde avec laquelle ce monarque s'est associé à la douleur de la famille Impériale; enfin l'autorisation officielle du service funèbre célébré à la Chapelle de notre Ambassade; tous ces témoignages de respect dignement accordés à la mémoire du Souverain bien aimé dont nous déplorons la perte, ne pouvaient manquer d'être appréciés comme ils devaient l'être dans ce moment d'affliction et de deuil pour toute la Russie.

Je me suis fait un devoir d'en rendre compte à mon auguste Maître. Sa piété filiale en a été vivement touchée. C'est par son ordre que je vous invite à vouloir bien saisir la première occasion favorable pour exprimer à Sa Majesté combien il a été sensible aux témoignages d'intérêt dont vous avez été rendu l'organe, sous les circonstances qui interdisent jusqu'ici des communications directes entre les deux Cours Impériales.

Lorsque le moment sera venu pour les rétablir, le souvenir de bons

procédés loyalement échangés malgré la guerre, continuera à exercer une influence utile sur les dispositions qu'inspirera mutuellement le retour de la paix.

Les difficultés qui pourraient le retarder ne seront pas notre ouvrage. Vous avez rendu, mon cher Baron, une entière justice aux intentions personnelles de mon auguste Maître, en énongant la conviction où vous êtes de son désir sincère de prêter la main à une réconciliation, pourvu qu'elle soit accomplie à des conditions conformes à la dignité de sa couronne.

L'Empereur Napoléon porte en lui un sentiment si élevé de ses devoirs, comme Souverain d'un grand pays, qu'il ne saurait accepter la paix ni l'offrir à des termes dont il ne reconnaîtrait pas la parfaite équité, au point de vue réciproque de l'honneur national. Entre la France et la Russie il y a guerre, sans hostilité. La bonne intelligence renaîtra dès qu'elles auront librement et honorablement posé les armes. Vous serez dans le vrai lorsque vous ferez apprécier ces considérations dans vos entretiens confidentiels avec M. Drouyn de Lhuys, M. de Persigny, M. de Morny, et avec tous ceux qui ont l'honneur de posséder la confiance de l'Empereur. La paix se fera quand il la voudra. A mes yeux la situation se résume dans cette vérité. Je n'ai rien à y ajouter, mais je ne saurais terminer cette lettre sans vous exprimer, mon cher Baron, l'intérêt que l'Empereur attache à celle que vous venez de m'adresser.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 644.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Seebach.

St. Pétersbourg, le 26 Mars, 1855.

Mon cher Baron,

J'ESPERE qu'on sera content de la lettre que je vous envoie et que vous pourrez montrer à qui vous le jugerez utile, surtout en haut lieu. Ce que dit cette lettre, l'Empereur le veut et le pense. Mon auguste Maître désire sincèrement la paix; si les sentiments des autres répondent aux siens, jamais les circonstances ne seront plus propices. Si les alliés peuvent se vanter des victoires de l'Alma et d'Inkerman, les Russes ont à opposer à ces succès la belle défense de Sébastopol; l'honneur des armes est donc sauf des deux côtés, et l'amour propre, qui joue souvent un rôle en France, est hors de cause. Tiendrait-on vraiment à Paris à ce que nous n'eussions dans la Mer Noire que cinq vaisseaux au lieu de quinze? C'est plutôt le contraire qu'on devrait souhaiter. Voici, au surplus, de quoi dissipe toute inquiétude. La moitié de notre flotte a été coulée dans le port pour empêcher l'entrée des bâtiments ennemis. Il nous faudra des années et bien de l'argent pour la remettre dans l'état où elle était avant la guerre. Mais croyez bien, mon cher Baron, que rien n'est possible au delà et que la limitation de nos forces serait une de ces conditions humiliantes qu'on n'imposera pas à la Russie. L'Empereur, quelles que soient ses dispositions pacifiques, n'acceptera jamais des conditions semblables et la nation se soumettra à tous les sacrifices plutôt que de les subir.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

No. 645.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 11.)

(No. 241.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 29, 1854.

AALI PASHA has postponed his departure for Vienna till Saturday the 31st instant. I know not the reasons of this delay, but it is probable that his instructions were not completely prepared in time to allow of his embarking to-day.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 646.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 11.)

(No. 242.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 29, 1855.

IT is with much satisfaction that I report the defeat of the Kurd rebels under Yezdasheer Bey by the Sultan's troops, composed of about 4,000 Regulars, with a considerable addition of undisciplined soldiers.

It appears that the rebel chief escaped from the battle, and no confirmation of his reported death has, to the best of my information, yet reached Constantinople.

I am assured that the rebellion is in a fair way of being entirely suppressed. It is not, indeed, improbable that a consummation so greatly to be desired has already taken place.

It is stated, on fair authority, that Yezdasheer Bey had fled to the mountains, and that Jezereh, the principal seat of his unlawful power, was on the point of being re-occupied by the Sultan's authorities.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 647.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 11.)

(No. 247.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 29, 1855.

I HAVE just received information from the Porte that the French Chargé d'Affaires is to be received in audience by the Sultan to-day. The ostensible object of his audience is to felicitate His Majesty, in the French Emperor's name, on the repulse of the Russians at Eupatoria by the Turkish army under Omer Pasha. Whether the opportunity is to be taken for any other more secret communication I cannot take upon myself to say. It is very unusual, as your Lordship knows, and contrary indeed to established practice, for a Chargé d'Affaires to have personal access to the Sovereign.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 648.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 12, 12 *noon.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, Wednesday, April* 11, 1855, 10 P.M.

ANOTHER meeting to-day at Count Buol's; Turks present. Austria reserves her last words for the last moment. Concessions from Russia evidently expected here, and nothing decisive will be said till her answer arrives.

No. 649.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 64.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April 10, 1855.*

I READ with great satisfaction your Lordship's despatch No. 39, giving an account of what passed in London with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The plan of neutralization, and that of limitation, were there developed with great clearness.

There is only one point upon which I entertain doubts. Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that, in case Austria will not pledge herself to go to war for limitation, the plan of neutralization shall alone be proposed to Russia.

Supposing the plan of limitation to be proposed to Russia, she must either accept or refuse it. If she accepts, peace is made on terms which have already been consented to as sufficient for the safety of Europe. If she refuses, the sincerity of our wish for peace has been proved, and the war goes on as it would have done had no such offer been made.

On the other hand, if no offer is made to Russia on the plan of limitation, it may be said that a plan she might have accepted, and which we should have approved, has been withheld from her knowledge, and a new plan substituted which she was sure to refuse.

Practically, I imagine the answer from St. Petersburgh will either contain a refusal or an acceptance of the principle of limitation. If a refusal, we have only to produce the plan of neutralization, and, upon the rejection of that plan, break off negotiations. If an acceptance of the principle, we cannot decline to discuss the mode in which that principle is to be carried into effect.

I have had several long conversations with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and find him, as usual, very reasonable in his views, and very able in his exposition of them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 650.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 65.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April 10, 1855.*

ANOTHER Conference was held yesterday. M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Aali Pasha produced their full powers. The Protocol of the last meeting was signed.

Prince Gortchakoff, on being called upon by Count Buol, stated that he had sent his courier to St. Petersburgh on the 28th, and that he did not expect him back before the 17th.

In this calculation Prince Gortchakoff allows sixteen days for the courier's journey to and from St. Petersburgh. Our messengers, however, only take ten days, in ordinary seasons, for the journey there and back.

It may be conjectured that the Russian Government will take a week for deliberation, and perhaps seek to ascertain what Prussia will do in the case of a total refusal to limit the Russian naval force in the Black Sea.

I reckon upon leaving this capital on the 20th or 21st.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 651.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 66.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April 10, 1855.*

AFTER the Conference yesterday, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Baron Bourqueney, Lord Westmorland and I, met Count Buol and Baron Prokesch in Count Buol's official apartment.

Count Buol addressed us in a very formal manner, told us that he was about to explain to us fully (à fond) the policy of the Austrian Government on the third point. In the course of this and his subsequent discourses he frequently referred to the authority of the Emperor. He said that the plan of neutralization as developed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys appeared to him on reflection to come within the third point, and to attain its object very completely. That he should have no difficulty in saying that Austria would be glad to see it accepted. He had not, however, any hope that Russia would accept it, as she would thereby be disarmed in the Black Sea, while Turkey would be armed in the Bosphorus, or at all events in the Mediterranean.

He should in like manner be glad to see Russia consent to limit her forces. But looking at the concessions Russia had made on the first and second point, and the probability of her acquiescence in what might be settled on the fourth point, Austria was not prepared to go to war on account of the refusal of Russia to limit her naval force in the Black Sea. That force had been already nearly destroyed; what remained was blocked up, and Russia would hereafter be afraid to give offence to France and England for fear of similar consequences.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys answered these observations very ably. He laid it down as a principle that the value of a Treaty or agreement of any kind is that each Article, instead of being the cause of the separate members became the cause of the whole. That without any Treaty, Austria might have defended the Principalities, and the maritime Powers have sought to put an end to Russian preponderance in the Black Sea. That the value of the Treaty consisted in the union of objects and of efforts. In this spirit France and England had defended the free navigation of the Danube, and had Austria been thwarted in her endeavours on that subject, her allies would have been prepared to continue the war in her support. That he expected in like manner Austria would urge the adoption of the third point, which was very clear and positive in its terms. That unless she did so the alliance would lose all binding force, and would soon crumble to pieces. He explained and defended the plan of neutralization, which he conceived to be beneficial to the whole world. He therefore asked Count Buol very pointedly what he would do in support of the third point, which was essential to the conclusion of a durable peace.

Before Count Buol could answer, I requested his attention to what I conceived to be the position of Austria. From the first moment of Prince Menchikoff's leaving Constantinople I had thought that, with the assistance of Austria, we might easily defeat the designs of Russia in the East; that, without Austria, we should have a long, though doubtless a victorious, contest. I remarked that there were three roads by which Russia might reach her long-cherished object, the possession of Constantinople: one by Asia, the second by the Principalities and Bessarabia, the third by the Black Sea. That the Asiatic route might be put out of consideration for the present purpose; that the route by the Principalities was stopped by Austria and the allies; that the third route remained to be considered.

Marshal Marmont had gone into this question as a military man, and had shown how, by embarking 10,000 men with twenty-five sail of the line at Sebastopol, and a march of 60,000 men by Bessarabia, Constantinople might be seized by Russia. He argued, however, that all depended on priority; this time we had the priority, another time Russia might have it. I might be told that Austria would intercept the invasion by land; she had, however, not interrupted the passage of the Danube or the siege of Silistria, and she might be equally slow on another occasion.

I showed that the project of counterpoise was ineffectual, as we could not always have a large fleet at hand; humiliating to Turkey, if she were always to

lean in her infirmity on her two crutches of France and England; unsafe for Europe, which would be kept in the perpetual ferment of preparation for war. We had, however, examined this plan carefully, in conformity with the desires of Austria, and only gave it up from being convinced of its inadequacy.

I said M. Drouyn de Lhuys had so ably explained the plan of neutralization that no more need be said. We were, however, ready to adopt the plan of limitation if Austria, on its rejection, would join us in the war.

I alluded, lastly, to public opinion in England. I said we considered this as an European cause; and that, both as a great European Power, and from her position, Austria was called upon to take a leading part in defence of Turkey; that we had made allowances for the difficulties of Austria, but we had felt deeply that, when she was prepared for war in July last, she had allowed division after division to be taken from Bessarabia to the Crimea without attempting any diversion in our favour; that we had still hoped, and the voices against Austria were few. But if now, after the Treaty of the 2nd of December, Austria escaped its engagements by relying solely on the letter of that Treaty, the irritation against Austria in England would be very great. That it would be impossible to revive confidence, or to fasten again the parts of a cable which had failed to hold. It was the decisive moment for an alliance which, if kept together, would accomplish a great object.

After some time spent in discussion, Count Buol seemed to me to depart from the course he had taken at first. He no longer said that Austria was determined not to support us in case of a rupture. He spoke of treating the third point like the two former; of coming to no previous resolution respecting war; and of not engaging in hostilities for two ships more or less.

Another meeting for Wednesday, with the assistance of Aali Pasha, was proposed and settled.

This has been, in my opinion, an attempt on the part of Austria to induce the Western Powers to relinquish their proposals on the third point. As such, it has entirely failed. But a melancholy proof has been afforded of the timidity of Austria, and her reluctance to engage in hostilities.

We could do better with her active aid than with her passive neutrality; we shall do better without her aid in any way than with a support which fails at the moment it is most wanted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 652.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 67.)

Vienna, April 10, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to No. 48 of the 8th instant, inclusive.

I inclose copies of the Protocol of the eighth Conference, which was held on the 2nd instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 652.

Protocol (No 8) of a Conference held at Vienna, April 2, 1855.

Présens :

Pour l'Autriche—
M. le Comte de Buol-Schauenstein, et
M. le Baron de Prokesch-Osten ;

Pour la France—
M. le Baron de Bourqueney ;

Pour la Grande Bretagne—
Lord John Russell, et
M. le Comte de Westmorland;

Pour la Russie—
M. le Prince de Gortchakoff, et
M. de Titoff;

Pour la Turquie—
Aarif Effendi.

LE Protocole de la séance du 29 Mars dernier a été lu, approuvé et signé.

Le Plénipotentiaire de France a déclaré que la réponse qu'il avait reçue de son Gouvernement à sa dépêche télégraphique du 29 Mars lui prescrivait itérativement de s'abstenir de toute discussion sur la quatrième garantie jusqu'à ce que le troisième point eût obtenu une solution complète. Indépendamment du prix que son Gouvernement attachait à maintenir l'ordre de discussion convenu dès l'ouverture de la négociation, il a fait valoir comme un nouveau motif d'ajournement l'arrivée imminente de MM. les Ministres des Affaires Etrangères de France et de la Sublime Porte, venant l'un et l'autre prendre part aux travaux de la Conférence.

Les Plénipotentiaires de Grande Bretagne ont également annoncé qu'ils n'avaient point été autorisés à dévier de l'ordre de discussion chronologique établi dès l'abord et qu'ils ne pourraient donc, quant à présent, prendre part à aucun travail concernant la quatrième base de négociation.

Le Prince Gortchakoff, tout en admettant la valeur des motifs d'ajournement qu'il venait d'entendre, ne peut se dispenser d'exprimer les regrets que lui fait éprouver ce retard—regrets d'autant plus vifs, qu'il s'agit d'une question de conscience, d'un engagement d'honneur des Puissances Européennes, et que la politique devrait y rester étrangère.

M. de Titoff s'associe aux sentiments dont son collègue s'est rendu l'interprète.

Le Comte de Buol, tout en regrettant pour sa part l'ajournement de la discussion du quatrième point, exprime l'espoir que le concours éclairé des nouveaux collaborateurs annoncés à la Conférence, contribuera essentiellement à lui faciliter l'accomplissement de la tâche qui lui est réservée.

Aarif Effendi se déclare d'accord avec l'opinion émise par les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne.

Répondant à l'observation fait par M. le Prince de Gortchakoff, le Plénipotentiaire de France a constaté que le délai apporté à la discussion du quatrième point ne saurait de la part de son Gouvernement impliquer la moindre nuance entre l'intérêt qu'il vouait lui-même au sort des sujets Chrétiens du Sultan et celui que les Plénipotentiaires Russes avaient témoigné en leur faveur. L'importance même que le Gouvernement Français attachait à cette question, avait été pour lui un motif de plus de ne pas autoriser son Plénipotentiaire à prendre part à un travail préparatoire sur cette matière au moment où le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte, attendu incessamment ici, allait mettre la Conférence à même de la discuter avec son concours en pleine connaissance de cause.

Le Prince Gortchakoff, tout en prenant acte de la déclaration du Plénipotentiaire de France, a peine à se rendre compte des raisons qui pourraient empêcher la Conférence de commencer le travail préparatoire dès l'arrivée de MM. les Ministres des Affaires Etrangères de France et de la Sublime Porte.

Lord John Russell a établi, de son côté, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, qui avait de tout temps désiré voir les sujets Chrétiens du Sultan traiter avec justice et humanité, et qui avait par l'entremise de son Ambassadeur à Constantinople reçu des preuves non équivoques des intentions sincèrement bienveillantes dont la Porte était animée à ce sujet, ne saurait certes être accusé d'indifférence en cette matière. Comme toutefois les questions soulevées par le quatrième point, touchaient de très près aux droits de souveraineté du Sultan, et qu'elles devaient être traitées avec une Puissance actuellement en état de guerre avec l'Empire Ottoman, la discussion serait nécessairement d'une nature délicate et c'était là une des raisons pour lesquelles son Gouvernement insistait à ne voir aborder le quatrième point que lorsque le troisième serait complétement vidé.

Le Comte de Westmorland se range entièrement de l'avis de son collègue.

Le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman adhère à l'opinion émise par les Plénipotentiaires de la Grande Bretagne.

Eu égard aux motifs d'ajournement précités et aux cérémonies religieuses de la Semaine Sainte, on est convenu de fixer la prochaine séance au 9 de ce mois.

(Suivent les signatures.)

No. 653.

Lords John Russell and Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 13.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, Friday, April* 13, 1855, 8·30 A.M.

IT is said here that the Prussian Minister at St. Petersburgh has written to his Court, that Russia will consent to no limitation, and leaves it to the allies to propose plans of counterpoise. Russian courier expected here on Monday.

This news rests on good authority.

No. 654.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 13.)

(No. 432. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, April* 12, 1855.

M. DE MOUSTIER has informed the French Government by telegraph that he has learnt, from information on which he thinks he can rely that the instructions for the Russian Plenipotentiaries at Vienna only left St. Petersburgh on the 10th, that they exclude *in toto* the question of limitation, and will only admit a discussion upon that of declaring the Black Sea open to all ships, whether of war or commerce. The Plenipotentiaries, however, are desired to state that they have no offers to make, and can only discuss such as may be proposed to them.

Count Nesselrode had declined the proposition, urgently pressed upon him by the Prussian Government, to go himself to Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 655.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 13.)

(No. 164.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April* 10, 1855.

I HAVE the honour of inclosing the lithographed copy of the Protocol No. 8, which was signed at the Conference which took place yesterday, and of which I have already transmitted to you an unsigned copy in my despatch, No. 160, of the 5th instant.

At this last Conference the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, presented his full powers, and took his seat with the Representatives; and Aali Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, presented also his full powers, and took his seat as a member of the Conference.

Count Buol introduced these two Representatives, with the expression of the satisfaction with which he hailed their mission to the Conference, and expressed his hope that their presence would contribute to the great object for which we were assembled, of restoring the peace of Europe.

Count Buol then referred to the engagement taken at the Conference of the 26th, at which the Russian Plenipotentiaries undertook to refer to their Government for instructions as to the third point of the accepted conditions of peace, and inquired of them whether they had received any reply; upon being informed that they had not, he urged them to call upon their Government to lose no time in transmitting their decision upon the important question which had been submitted to them.

Count Buol added, that being satisfied that until this decision was received, it was the general feeling of the Representatives that the Conference could enter upon no other business, he proposed that our meetings should be adjourned until the Russian Representatives had received the reply they were expecting from their Government.

The Conference consequently separated, without fixing any further day on which we were to assemble.

After the Conference had separated, Count Buol requested Lord John Russell and myself, as well as M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Baron Bourqueney, to meet him and Baron Prokesch, for the purpose of discussing the conduct which should be pursued by the allied Ministers in the future course of the negotiation, in order that entire unanimity between them might be preserved.

Lord John Russell, who took a very prominent part in the discussion which ensued at this meeting, after the declaration of the Austrian policy which was made by Count Buol, will fully report to your Lordship what took place. I will, therefore, not enter into details.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys explained the policy which he was directed by his Government to pursue, and which he stated to be entirely in accordance with that of Her Majesty's Government.

At the termination of this discussion, it was proposed that M. Drouyn de Lhuys should confer with the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs as to the plan for the neutralization of the Black Sea, which he was instructed by his Government to bring forward; and it was arranged that we should meet again to-morrow, with Aali Pasha, to learn the result of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' communication to him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 655.

Protocol (No. 8) of a Conference held at Vienna, April 2, 1855.

[See Inclosure in No. 652.]

No. 656.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 291.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 13, 1855.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith, a copy of an instruction* under which Mr. Consul Longworth will proceed to Circassia, for the purpose of ascertaining how far the tribes of that country, as well as the other tribes of the Caucasus, may be induced to take an active part with the allies in the present war against Russia.

Your Excellency will give Mr. Longworth any additional instructions which may appear to you from time to time desirable, forwarding to me copies of any such instructions; and you will supply him with the necessary funds, for which you will charge in your account of extraordinary disbursements.

You will facilitate his proceeding to the coast as far as you may have the means of doing so, and obtain for him from the British naval and military authorities, or, if necessary, from the Turkish arsenals, any supplies which may be usefully intrusted to him for distribution.

I have applied to the War Department and to the Admiralty, to give the necessary authority for the issue, on your Excellency's requisition, of such supplies as may be available in the British stores at Constantinople; and the Admiralty has been further requested to cause Mr. Longworth to be conveyed to the coast in a ship of war, if that should seem desirable.

As the tribes are understood to entertain suspicions as to the views of the Porte, it will be necessary that your Excellency should obtain from the Turkish Government, and make Mr. Longworth the bearer of, an authoritative disclaimer from the Porte of all intention, now or hereafter, to claim sovereignty over Circassia.

The inclosed packet contains the original instructions to Mr. Longworth, of which I have furnished you with a copy. You will retain it until Mr. Longworth arrives at Constantinople, whither you will summon him from Monastir; and you will make such arrangements as you may judge best for the performance of his Consular duties at that place while he is absent on this service.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 657.

The Earl of Clarendon to Consul Longworth.

(No. 1. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 13, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government being desirous of obtaining accurate information as to the present state of affairs in Circassia, and as to the extent to which they might count on the cooperation of the various tribes inhabiting that country, if circumstances should render it advisable to call them into action, I have to instruct you to proceed at once to such place on the Circassian coast, as may appear to afford the readiest opportunity for communicating with the most influential Chiefs of the different tribes.

Having already resided in the country, you will have less difficulty in forming an opinion as to the quarters to which you should address yourself; but it may be convenient to you to have in your possession a brief summary which has

* No. 657.

recently been placed in my hands of the present state of the different tribes inhabiting the country on the eastern coast of the Black Sea.

You will be careful not to give a political character to your visit to the country, so as to raise expectations which may not be realized, or to cause claims to be advanced, or promises exacted, which it might be difficult to evade, and still more so to make and keep.

The ostensible object of your visit should be to inquire as to the amount of Cavalry which the Circassian tribes could place at the disposal of the British Government, upon the ground that it is troublesome to send out horses from England, and that the British Government place great reliance on the native horsemen.

Arrangements will be made for enabling you to obtain at Constantinople a supply of lead and gunpowder, which are probably the most acceptable presents of which you could be the bearer; and there would be no difficulty in adding a supply of rifles and mountain guns, if the Circassians should stand in need of them, and which could be sent from this country if the army stores at Constantinople cannot furnish them.

You will endeavour to place yourself in communication with Schamyl, and learn what is his position with reference to the other tribes, what are his intentions and plans with regard to carrying on hostilities, and what are his means of doing so.

As regards the Caucasian tribes in general, you will endeavour to ascertain the state and resources for active warfare of the country which they inhabit; whether the feuds among the different tribes would prevent their united action even against a common enemy; what prospect there would be of their future consolidation, and under what form of government; what sort of assistance they would desire or accept from the allies, against Russia; and what guarantees for their protection hereafter against that Power they would look for in return for their more active assistance during the war.

You will, however, be particularly careful to abstain from pledging Her Majesty's Government to anything beyond present assistance in carrying on the war. You may state, in general terms, that Her Majesty's Government have taken a great interest in the struggle which the Caucasian tribes have so long prosecuted against Russia, and would see with pleasure that struggle terminated to the advantage of the several tribes; and you may point out that at all events the cooperation of the tribes in the hostilities now in progress cannot place them in a worse position than that which they now occupy, while by assisting the allies in their endeavours to circumscribe the power of Russia, they will take the surest means of securing for themselves that independence which they have so long and so successfully striven to maintain.

Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople will give you such further instructions as may seem necessary for the more effectual execution of the duties entrusted to you, and you will forward under flying-seal, through his Excellency, the reports that you may from time to time have the means of addressing to me.

You will continue to draw your full salary as Consul at Monastir, and Her Majesty's Ambassador will supply you with such funds as you may require to enable you to meet the expenses of your mission.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 658.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 14, 1855.*

WE concur with your No. 61. If Russia refuses the principle of limitation, or if she admits the principle, but will not agree to a satisfactory mode of giving effect to it, propose the system of neutralization, if M. Drouyn de Lhuys concurs. Russia should have an option the same as Austria.

In the event of rupture, we think that with the concurrence of M. Drouyn

de Lhuys, an English and a French note should be addressed to the Austrian Government, calling upon them to concert measures for giving effect to the Treaty of December 2nd.

No. 659.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 440.)

My Lord, *Paris, April 13, 1855.*

IN communicating with M. Thouvenel, as instructed by your Lordship's despatch No. 364 of the 9th instant, on the subject of Mr. Longworth's mission to Circassia, I found that the French Government had already sent a gentleman, of the name of Chaupoiseau, to Batoom, for the purpose of proceeding thence into Circassia.

M. Thouvenel said that, as your Lordship had already communicated to the French Government your intention of sending an agent to see what could be effected with the Circassian tribes, M. Chaupoiseau had been ordered to wait at Batoom the further instructions of his Government, which it was desired should be in conformity with those issued from your Lordship's office.

I read then to M. Thouvenel the instructions which your Lordship proposed to furnish to Mr. Longworth, and, at M. Thouvenel's request, left them with him, in order that he might frame similar ones for M. Chaupoiseau.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 660.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 251.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April 2, 1855.*

THE official correspondence which has passed between Lord John Russell and myself, since the arrival of that distinguished Plenipotentiary at Vienna, though confined as yet to a single exchange of despatches, ought, I conceive, to be brought without delay to your Lordship's knowledge.

Under this impression I have the honour to inclose copies of two despatches addressed to me by his Lordship, under the respective dates of the 17th and 19th ultimo. I have not thought it necessary to send the inclosures, because they were, no doubt, transmitted to your Lordship's office from Vienna.

Copies of my answers to those despatches are also forwarded herewith. I consigned them to General Sir John Burgoyne, who was kind enough to take charge of them, and as the vessel in which he embarked was to stop only at Corfu for a few hours, on its way to Trieste, I trust they will reach Vienna in six or seven days from the present date.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 660.

Lord John Russell to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Vienna, March 17, 1855.*

I TAKE advantage of a courier whom the Turkish Ambassador is sending to Constantinople, to inform your Excellency that the first Conference took place on the 15th instant.

The several Powers were represented as follows:

Austria by Count Buol and Baron Prokesch, France by Baron Bourqueney, England by the Earl of Westmorland and myself, Russia by Prince Gortchakoff and M. de Titoff, and Turkey by Aarif Effendi.

Count Buol opened the Conference by reading an address, which was chiefly

remarkable for the pointed manner in which he stated that Austria was prepared to encounter any sacrifice to fulfil her engagements, and he concluded by recapitulating the four points in the terms set forth in the document which I inclose.

The French and English Plenipotentiaries severally declared their agreement in the sentiments expressed by Count Buol, and their adherence to the four points as laid down by his Excellency, but they reserved the right of the belligerent Powers to add other stipulations over and above the four points, should the interests of Europe require it.

Prince Gortchakoff declared his adherence to the statement of the bases of peace as recited by Count Buol, and his earnest desire for peace, but he added that he should object to any proposition which would be injurious to the honour of the Emperor of Russia. The Turkish Ambassador made a reserve in favour of the dignity of his Sovereign.

The four points in their integrity being thus accepted by all parties as a point of departure, the Plenipotentiaries proceeded to the discussion of the first article, relating to the Principalities and to Servia; and after some discussion as to whether the word "protectorate" correctly represented the relations heretofore existing between Russia and the provinces, it was suggested by the French Plenipotentiary that the term "protection" might be substituted for it, and it was accordingly agreed by the Plenipotentiaries that no exclusive protectorate over the Principalities should hereafter be exercised.

Baron Prokesch then brought forward a paper which he had drawn up containing several heads for the future government of the Principalities, and after some discussion it was resolved that the paper should be revised, and brought before the Conference at a subsequent meeting, in order to be referred eventually to a Commission selected from the Plenipotentiaries, who should be charged to examine into the details of the question with the view of bringing them into a manageable shape.

The Conference shortly after this separated with the understanding that the second meeting should take place to-day, when the Protocol of the previous meeting would be ready for signature.

I fear I shall not be able to furnish your Excellency with a copy of that document by the present opportunity, but I will forward it to you as soon as possible after I can obtain it from the Austrian Chancery.

Prince Gortchakoff remarked before the meeting broke up, that as time was precious, it might be desirable to enter to-day on the consideration of the second Article, relating to the Danube, but no fixed determination was taken on his proposition.

I may state to your Excellency, that the general impression which I derived from what passed on the first Conference, incidents which occurred,* I venture to draw the conclusion that the Austrian Government is disposed fairly to carry into effect its engagements with England and France; and it cannot be questioned that the formal renunciation by Russia of pretensions which for a century have been sedulously nourished and pertinaciously advanced, the concession of the four points, and especially the agreement to put an end to Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, are advantages which can hardly be exaggerated.

I think it right, in conclusion, to state to your Excellency that, as you will see by the inclosed copy of a despatch which I have addressed to the Earl of Clarendon, the Turkish Ambassador expresses himself to be considerably embarrassed by the want of definite instructions from the Porte. Your Excellency will, I am sure, perceive the importance of preventing any such omission on the part of the Turkish Government from impeding the progress of the negotiations. The delay and difficulties which must result from the necessity of continual reference to Constantinople might otherwise lead to most serious consequences which it is not too much to say would fall more heavily on the Porte than on the allies of the Sultan.

Your Excellency will, I conceive, do well to make the Turkish Government understand that if it will not do its utmost to facilitate the progress of the negotiations, it may possibly happen that the allies may have to proceed without waiting for the result of the tardy deliberations of the Divan.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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* *Sic in MS.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 660.

Lord John Russell to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Vienna, March 19, 1855.

My Lord,

THE Turkish Ambassador having delayed the departure of his messenger, I am enabled to send by him, for your Excellency's information, a copy of the Protocol of the first Conference on the 15th instant, which was only signed yesterday.

The second Conference took place on the 17th, but the Protocol of it is not yet drawn up. The time of the Plenipotentiaries during its sitting was principally occupied by settling the terms of the Protocol of the first Conference, and the form in which the Protocols should be signed. As regards the last point it was finally settled that Count Buol should sign separately, as President of the Conference; Baron Prokesch in the same column with the allies; and the Russian Plenipotentiaries in a separate column. A single Protocol is to be signed of each Conference, and the allies and Russia are to have alternately the place of honour, namely, the left side of the page.

After these points were settled, the Conference proceeded to consider the Protocol respecting the Principalities drawn up by Baron Prokesch, and which forms the Annex to the first Protocol, but time did not admit of our proceeding beyond the first three Articles, which I now inclose in the form in which they passed the Conference, and are to be referred to the further consideration of a Commission charged, as provided by the Protocol, with the development of the details of the several propositions.

It is proper that I should state that I am not informed of your Excellency's views with regard to the development of any one of the four points, and I need not add that I attach the highest value to your opinions on these important questions.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 660.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Lord John Russell.

Constantinople, March 31, 1855.

My Lord,

I CANNOT acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatches of the 17th and 19th instant respectively, without requesting your Lordship to accept my cordial thanks for the full and distinct manner in which the important proceedings incidental to the opening of the Conferences at Vienna, and to the conclusion of the first Protocol, are therein related.

In the uncertainty which still of necessity hangs over the ulterior progress and final issue of the negotiations so happily commenced, I observe with lively satisfaction the confidence which your Lordship expresses in the frankness and sincerity of the Austrian Government, as well as the pacific sentiments declared by the Russian Plenipotentiary.

It is not for me to entertain anticipations of a less promising character. The reservations made by Prince Gortchakoff on the one side, and by the Turkish Ambassador on the other, may be fairly interpreted as mere formalities suited to the occasion, and by no means significant of future difficulty.

That difficulties are likely to arise at a later period of the negotiations cannot be concealed from any one acquainted with the previous correspondence; but your Lordship's character, if no other security existed, would be a sufficient pledge for their being considered with that firm though temperate spirit which the interests of Europe so emphatically require.

I venture to remark that the Russian Plenipotentiary was fully justified in his exception to the word "protectorate" as applied to the late position of Russia towards the ultra-Danubian Principalities. Allow me to add that it would have been well for those provinces, and perhaps for the Government of Russia itself, if the absence of a right to a protectorate had led to an earlier extinction of the claim to protect.

The want of detailed instructions on the part of the Turkish Ambassador may be referred in part to his Excellency's unwillingness to sanction an unshared responsibility and to the delays attendant on the departure of Aali Pasha, occupied as he was with the administration of foreign affairs, and, owing to his absence at the time from Constantinople, imperfectly informed of preceding transactions and correspondence bearing on the present negotiation at Vienna.

As your Lordship has done me the honour, but little deserved I fear, of attaching a certain importance to my opinions respecting the four points, I cannot but regret the circumstances which have delayed their transmission to Vienna. It is also a cause of regret to me that time is insufficient to allow of my bringing them to your knowledge in an official shape by the present opportunity. But the form alone is wanting. Whatever I have to offer substantially on the leading points of negotiation will be conveyed to your Lordship with my despatches of this date, and I have to request that the communication may be viewed with indulgence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 660.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Lord John Russell.

Constantinople, March 31, 1855.

My Lord,

IT was not till yesterday afternoon that I received a copy of the official instructions prepared for Aali Pashi. Although they were immediately consigned for translation to the Oriental Secretary of Her Majesty's Embassy, I had no opportunity of perusing them till this morning. They were translated with clearness and rapidity by Mr. Alison, but their unwarrantable length precluded an entire completion of the task.

A copy of the translation is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's particular information. The memorandum annexed to it is still in the translator's hands, and I must therefore reserve the transmission of it to Vienna for another opportunity. I am not yet acquainted with its purport myself.

I am just returned from Constantinople, where I have been to take leave of his Highness the Pasha, who had previously taken leave of the Sultan. The visit was necessarily too brief to admit of my entering at any length upon the subject matter of the instructions. I availed myself of the opportunity, however, to recommend that he should put full confidence in your Lordship, and never hesitate to refer to you for advice on any incidental question of doubt or difficulty. He assured me that such was his intention. I also enjoined him to consult the Porte's interest by not insisting with too much perseverance on any special view opposed or unsupported by the allies. I admitted the perfect justice of the Sultan's claim to an indemnity from Russia for the expenses of the war, but submitted the difficulty of realising such a claim, and advised a temperate course of proceeding in concert with your Lordship. I did not take my leave of the Pasha without animadverting upon the Porte's repugnance to admit any foreign superintendence in the matter of Christian privileges, and I did not hesitate to add my opinion that without some auxiliary motives for enforcing the proposed measures the Sultan's best intentions would be exposed to the hazard of remaining a dead letter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 661.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 255.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 2, 1855.

REFERRING to a former despatch wherein I made mention of the abolition of the haratch, and other advantages which the Ottoman Council had resolved on granting to the Christian subjects of the Porte, I beg leave to draw

your Lordship's attention to the accompanying article, extracted from the "Journal de Constantinople," relating to that intention; your Lordship will observe, that in addition to the points enumerated by me, an extension of the liberty hitherto accorded to the Rayahs, in what relates to the repair or construction of their respective places of worship, is annexed. I am happy to say that the language of Reshid Pasha agrees with this unofficial indication of the reforms contemplated by the Sultan and his Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 661.

Extract from the "Journal de Constantinople" of April 2, 1855.

DE nouveaux réglements élaborés par le Conseil du Tanzimat et sanctionnés par le Sultan, ne tarderont pas à être publiés. Ces règlements attestent au plus haut point toute la sollicitude de Sa Majesté Impériale pour la condition des sujets Chrétiens de l'Empire. Par leurs dispositions le haratch est aboli; puis elles établissent que, dans l'ordre militaire, tout sujet Chrétien peut arriver au grade de colonel, et dans l'ordre civil, au rang de fonctionnaire de la seconde classe. Elles établissent encore que partout où la population ne sera pas mixtes, les églises Chrétiennes pourront être construites et réparées sans aucun empêchement, et que là où la population sera mixte, la construction des églises ne pourra avoir lieu qu'avec le consentement du Gouvernement Impérial.

Voilà, certes, des preuves manifestes que la Sublime Porte marche dans la voie du progrès et qu'elle désire l'égalité de toutes les populations de l'empire sans distinction de culte ni de nationalité.

Nous publierons la traduction de ces règlements dès qu'ils auront été publiés par la "Gazette d'Etat."

No. 662.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 256.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April 2, 1855.*

HAVING observed in the "Journal de Constantinople" an article which appears to come from authority, and which relates to a subject mentioned in a previous part of my correspondence, I conceive that there may be some utility in bringing it to your Lordship's notice, and I consequently forward it as an inclosure herewith.

The object of the writer is to point out the difficulty which the Porte experiences in granting employment in the Ottoman army to foreign officers who are unacquainted with the Turkish language. I have not, however, heard of any instances in which British officers employed in the Sultan's military service, have been actually recalled on that account.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 662.

Extract from the "Journal de Constantinople" of April 2, 1855.

DE LA NECESSITE POUR LES OFFICIERS EUROPEENS, QUI VEULENT SERVIR DANS LES ARMEES OTTOMANES, DE PARLER LA LANGUE TURQUE.

DEPUIS que la Turquie est en guerre avec la Russie, un grand nombre d'officiers de tous grades des autres Etats sont venus à Constantinople pour offrir leurs services au Gouvernement Impérial. Obéissant à un bon sentiment, ils devaient trouver auprès de la Porte l'accueil qu'ils méritaient, et la plupart d'entre eux ont été admis avec leurs grades et plus souvent avec des grades supérieurs dans les rangs de l'armée Ottomane.

Mais une fois dans les positions qui leur avaient été données, soit dans l'armée de Roumélie, soit dans celle d'Anatolie, on s'est bien vite convaincu que pour exercer un commandement quelconque et rendre des services à une armée, il faut au moins parler la langue des hommes qu'on a sous ses ordres. En temps de paix et pour l'instruction d'une compagnie, ou même d'un régiment, on peut à la rigueur se servir d'un Dragoman; mais cela est de toute impossibilité sur un champ de bataille: là, il ne peut pas y avoir d'intermédiaire; il faut que le chef qui donne un ordre, soit à l'instant même compris de l'inférieur qu'il le reçoit. Si non, il peut résulter des malentendus qui compromettent gravement le succès des opérations. Une victoire dépend sans doute de l'habileté des chefs et du courage des soldats; mais que pourrait l'habileté des uns, si leurs ordres n'étaient pas compris par le courage des autres? Il est donc absolument indispensable qu'en campagne, les supérieurs parlent la langue des inférieurs, et si on examine les autres Etats, on verra qu'il n'y en a pas un seul où il n'en soit ainsi.

Les officiers Européens qui ont été admis dans les armées Ottomanes sans savoir la langue Turque, n'ont donc pas pu rendre au pays les services qu'on attendait d'eux, et le Gouvernement Impérial s'est vu dans la pénible obligation de les rappeler des postes où ils les avait placés. Nous pensons que chacun d'eux est maintenant convaincu par l'expérience qu'il vient de faire, que, à moins d'être dans l'état-major, il est impossible qu'un chef, quel que soit son grade, puisse rendre des services à une armée s'il ne parle pas d'une manière passable la langue des soldats.

La convenance des réflexions qui précèdent nous paraît évidente et d'autant plus opportune, qu'indépendamment des officiers Européens qui sont venus en Turquie pour servir dans les armées Ottomanes, et dont la Porte, par le motif que nous venons d'énoncer, ne peut utiliser les talens, il en arrive tous les jours d'autres. Ces officiers quittent une position qu'ils avaient dans leur pays, sans pouvoir en trouver une nouvelle en Turquie dont ils ne connaissent pas le premier mot de la langue. Nous pensons que, dans l'intérêt de ces officiers, nos confrères d'Europe feraient sagement de donner la publicité convenable aux observations que nous venons de faire. Les mécomptes sont toujours pénibles, et s'il y en a du genre de ceux dont nous parlons, il ne faut pas qu'on s'en prenne à la Turquie, qui ne peut véritablement admettre dans ses armées des officiers Européens qu'autant qu'ils parlent la langue Turque. Tout homme raisonnable sera de cette opinion.

No. 663.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 226.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March 22, 1855.*

REFERRING to a former despatch, wherein I made mention of the Turkish Loan Commission and its operations, inclosing at the same time a report addressed to me by M. Revelaki, I have now the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's further information, a series of questions which I sent to that gentleman with a view to obtaining a fuller insight into the proceedings of the Commission and their results.

M. Revelaki's replies to my queries are also inclosed herewith.

The information which they exhibit is in some respects imperfect, but M. Revelaki leads me to expect more than one supplementary statement, and as soon as I am put in possession of what remains, I purpose returning to the subject, and offering to your Lordship such further explanations and suggestions as may, perhaps, conduce to the adoption of better arrangements with respect to any future loan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 663.

Queries.

1. OF what several votes were the various specified appropriations composed?

2. What proofs are there that the votes were practically applied to the stated object, either to the departments here, or to the local wants of the several armies?

3. At what period of last year was the war-budget exhausted?

4. When does the war-budget of the current, or coming year, begin to be available?

5. What is the amount of the budget?

6. Why is the sum of 705,000 piastres put down among the votes of the Commissioners, when it appears to make part of the sum of 85,170*l.* retained by M. Musurus?

7. On what account was the difference between the sum of 41,903,325 piastres, voted by the Commission to the Mallieh, and that of 18,055,164½ piastres, explained as being a loan appropriated to the same department?

8. Why is the balance in hand of about 140,000*l.* calculated in piastres at a rate of exchange not much exceeding 131 piastres the 1*l.*, when, in reality, the exchange on London is at 143 piastres 4 parás.

9. At what average rate of exchange has the produce of the loan been cashed?

10. What amount of schims has been issued on the recommendation of the Loan Commission, and how are they to be applied?

11. How are the loan-debts on contracts with merchants to be paid?

Inclosure 2 in No. 663.

Answers.

TO the 1st:

A regular list of the several votes composing the united sums put down in the statement presented to the Embassy is being copied out, and will be sent in in two or three days.

To the 2nd:

The Commission on the loan had not the means, as stated in my official report to his Excellency, of checking the application of credits voted, either here or at the various camps; but a regular account of the said application might officially be asked from the departments here, which may probably throw some light on that subject.

To the 3rd:

I am not quite sure at what period of last year the war-budget was exhausted, but I believe it was at the early part of August, since which the funds of the loan have been resorted to for all the expenses of the war.

To the 4th:

I do not possibly know when the war-budget for the current, or coming year, actually begins to be available. I believe it to be about the early part of June, excepting when the Treasury, as they often do, borrow money in advance from bankers at a high rate of interest—say about 12 per cent. per annum—on condition of refunding the same out of its first encashments.

I will try to obtain more precise information on the foregoing two queries, and report it to the Embassy.

To the 5th:

I have not the least idea of the amount of the budget, respecting which I will also make inquiries and report.

To the 6th:

The 705,000 piastres, representing a sum of 5,000*l.*, and paid by the Treasury to the Department of the Mint for value of coals furnished by the latter to our ships, goes in deduction of 90,000*l.* odd required by M. Musurus in London for contracts for ammunition, the amount of which will have to be defrayed by the fund of the loan.

The said amount was first put down at from 80,000*l.* to 90,000*l.*, and latterly, at from 125,000*l.* to 130,000*l.*, including the shipping expenses on the articles contracted.

To the 7th:

From the sum of 41,903,325 piastres, voted to the Mallieh for payments made by that department for the extraordinary expenses of the war previous to the installation of the Commission on the loan, 18,055,164½ piastres were subsequently voted at the urgent demand of the Mallieh for some extraordinary application for the war, on condition of its being refunded by that department out of the first recoveries of the general revenue.

To the 8th:

The balance in hand of so many piastres (18,405,589½) was merely calculated at about 140,000*l.*, bringing out an exchange of something over 131 piastres, in order to equalize the amount in sterling. But the approximate actual balance in piastres, in which money the whole produce of the loan was converted, is that stated in my said statement.

To the 9th:

The average rate of exchange at which the bills drawn on account of the loan were cashed, is 131⅜ piastres per 1*l.* sterling, which was the current rate at the time of the issuing of the drafts (from the 7th September to the 14th December last). But the portion of the loan brought out in specie yields a more favourable result in piastres, the Treasury having kept it in its coffers much longer, and thereby benefited by the subsequent rise in the exchange and the monies. The average yield of the sovereigns thus received I calculate at about 136⅛ piastres a-piece.

To the 10th:

Although the schims have been issued on the recommendation of the Loan Commission, and for the specific object of paying off the debts contracted for the war previous to the installation of the said Commission, we have not been apprised yet either of the amount issued, or of their intended application.

This had better, I believe, be inquired direct from the Porte, or rather from the Grand Vizier. I will also inquire myself from the Mallieh and report.

To the 11th and last:

The war debts contracted with merchants previous to the nomination of the Loan Commission, were to be gradually liquidated out of the said additional fund of schims, to which we would have added a portion out of the fund of the Commission, in order to facilitate the liquidation of the old war debts, but on condition of its coming under our control, the same as with the fund of the loan, in order to secure its regular and faithful application.

Galata, March 17, 1855.

(Signed) D. REVELAKY.

No. 664.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 299.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 14, 1855.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government consider the admission of Christian evidence in civil suits to be a matter of more every day and general importance to the Christian subjects of the Sultan, even than the admission of that evidence in criminal cases; and as their attention is particularly directed to the subject at the present moment, I have to

instruct your Excellency, with reference to my despatch No. 277 of the 9th instant, to advise the Porte to remove all doubt on the subject, should any exist, by issuing stringent orders for the admission of Christian evidence in all civil as well as criminal cases.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 665.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 68.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April 11, 1855.*

AS your Lordship has thought it necessary to place on record the opinion of Her Majesty's Government respecting the Annex C to Protocol 2, your Lordship will, I am sure, excuse me if I venture to place on record my opinion of that Annex, so far as it agrees with the Annex to Protocol 3 which was adopted by the Conference. I have no concern with the opinions of M. Titoff, but it becomes me to defend at least the general scope of a project to which I have placed my initials.

Article 2. The words to which your Lordship's remarks apply, have been omitted as too vague. The words substituted, provide that the internal organization of the Principalities must be developed in a spirit conformable to the principles of full liberty of worship, of legislation, of commerce, and of navigation.

Article 3. Your Lordship says, "Would it not be the first instance of a foreign guarantee for the internal organization of a part of the dominions of an independent Sovereign? Would not sufficient security for the maintenance of the rights granted to the Principalities by the Sultan, be found in those rights themselves, in a solemn act of sanction on the part of the Sultan, and in the formal communication of those acts by him to the other Powers of Europe?"

Upon this subject I can only say, that the Government of Her Majesty, in concert with those of Austria and France, having required Russia to assent to the principle of a collective guarantee of the privileges of the Principalities, and Russia having given that assent, it is hardly possible, consistently with good faith, to question the policy of such a guarantee.

An Organic Act, solemnly sanctioned by the Sultan, and formally communicated by him to the Powers of Europe, might perhaps be preferable to a guarantee. But, if after eight months of deliberation between three great Powers, I had opened the Conference by disputing the policy of the first of the four bases, and proposing a different system, I should have surprised our allies no less than our enemy.

I have, however, explained myself on this subject in a former despatch.

A guarantee of privileges certainly supposes a power of constant interference. But as the Representatives of France and England would have a voice, the practical interference with the internal Government might be very rare.

4. The Annex to the 3rd Protocol says, "The stipulations for a system of defence shall be taken into consideration in the combined interest of the Sublime Porte, the Principalities and Europe." Your Lordship observes, "The armed force is to be maintained in the interest of Europe, a new service for the armed force of an independent State," &c.

I have only to remark, that in the Protocol of the 28th of December, it is said that the arrangements to be made on the subject of the Principalities "shall be ultimately combined in a manner to give full and entire satisfaction to the rights of the Sovereign Power, those of the Principalities, and the general interests of Europe."

It is not for me to say how the defence of the Principalities against foreign aggression may interest Europe; it was not my business to appear in the Conference as the critic of documents which Her Majesty's Government had approved, and to which Great Britain and her allies had set their names.

The paragraph which gave a determining voice to Austria and Russia has been struck out.

The separate rights of Servia might be separately considered. But the

defence of Moldavia and Wallachia is surely a matter of European interest, and as such, Her Majesty's Government have treated it in their directions to me, to propose Turkish garrisons in Galatz, Ibraila, and Giurgevo.

5. If a guarantee is given, and there is a question whether the Constitutional Act has been observed, it is not unreasonable that the guaranteeing Powers should endeavour to bring the Sultan and the Provinces to an understanding.

The provision for a perpetual tribunal of appeal has been struck out.

6. The object of this Article is, I conceive, to prevent such an armed intervention on the part of Russia as took place in 1848. It provides, in such a case, for the presence of France and England to prevent or to disapprove, if they think fit, such intervention. This Article is perhaps unnecessary.

7. The same may be said of the 7th Article. I doubt whether these Articles are necessary in a Treaty of Peace, and I conceive, if the negotiation continues, the presence of Aali Pasha will enable the Conference to introduce other Articles providing for the life tenure of the Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia, and the institution of a more popular representative assembly than that which now exists. The Organic Statute of Moldavia published at New York, shows the present Assembly to have a very narrow basis.

The power to remove strangers who may be engaged in plots against the tranquillity of the Provinces, or against neighbouring States, has been provided for in this Article. I have already said I do not conceive it to form a necessary part of a Treaty of Peace. But it is not, as your Lordship supposes, provided that "no agent of any of the four Powers could give protection within either of the three Principalities to any person whatever, fellow subject or other, whom Austria and Russia might desire to have expelled." As the Article now stands, the Consular Agent of Great Britain would only be bound, in the case of a British subject, to take into serious consideration the complaints made against his conduct. This, I conceive, he would be bound to do without a Treaty. In the case of a foreigner, the British Consul would be bound not to give protection to a person engaged in plots which might be injurious to the peace of the Province or neighbouring States. But he must be satisfied of the truth of the charge. These Articles, I conceive, might well be omitted. But whether omitted or not, it is not to be expected that Austria will see with indifference an insurrection in Hungary or Poland organized in Bucharest or Jassy. The Sultan, as a neighbouring Sovereign, would be expected to expel the organizers of such disturbance, and in fact is, as Aali Pasha informs me, bound to do so.

I am quite as much averse as your Lordship can be to the principles of the Holy Alliance. I should be very glad to think that Austria and Russia could be bound never to interfere vexatiously either with the internal government of the Principalities, or with the conduct of individuals.

In discussing this subject in the Conference, I stated that a revolt in the Principalities might be justified by the oppressions and violences of a Hospodar; that the cure for such revolt was to be found not in an armed intervention, but in the remedy of grievances at the same time as the suppression of disturbance. It is to be feared that the admission of a Turkish army into the Principalities would prove to be a remedy worse than the disease.

I have now before me a report of Mr. Vice-Consul Cunningham on the state of Bulgaria. In this report he says, "Whenever I have asked a peasant or a Bulgarian of a town what their grievances were, what they had to complain of, they have always answered, 'Only let an end be put to the robberies and murders, that we may have some guarantee for our lives and the freedom of movement, and all else is bearable and may be remedied in time.'"

Again, in speaking of the Bulgarian inhabitant, he says: "Only stay the murdering hand of the Turk, and you have a happy and contented man fit for any social duty."

We must take care not to restore in Wallachia and Moldavia such cruel oppression. Besides every motive of humanity, such a course would attach to Russia every Christian inhabitant of the Principalities, and bring down curses on our name.

In respect to the general state of the Principalities and of Servia, it is difficult to form any system which is not open to objection. If we allow the Sultan to send his troops at any time to put down revolt, fresh abuses will grow, and the old habits of outrage will be resorted to in their support.

The very fact of the great Powers of Europe binding themselves to maintain the Turkish Empire is a premium on indolence, corruption, and rapine, —the worst vices of the Ottoman Government. If, on the other hand, we exclude all Mussulman interference, and take no part ourselves, we may be tolerably sure that in Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, Austrian eyes will be always watching for offenders, and Austrian arms removing all those who are objects of jealousy and suspicion.

Turkey has at present an agreement with Austria to remove from her frontier provinces those who may be engaged in exciting troubles. If France and Great Britain think the obligation and the privilege of interference too burdensome and too odious, they may decline it, but public and individual freedom would probably be promoted by the just and impartial influence of French and British Agents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 666.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 15.)

(No. 70.)

Vienna, April 12, 1855.

My Lord,

ANOTHER meeting was held yesterday at Count Buol's, at which Aali Pasha and Arif Pasha were present.

Count Buol read to us a paper which he had drawn up.

I afterwards asked him for a copy of this paper, but he declined to give it me; saying it had no official character, and had not been seen by the Emperor.

The paper, however, contained the present resolution of the Cabinet. This resolution is to hear the propositions of the Court of St. Petersburgh before committing themselves further. It may be that the answer of the Russian Emperor may be so unfavourable and so peremptory, that Austria will at once concert with her allies on the mode of breaking off the negotiations, and stating to Russia a *casus belli*. But it may be that the Russian answer will admit of further discussion in Conference, with a hope of a pacific settlement. The Austrian Government declines, therefore, to give any further pledge at the present moment.

This resolution, natural enough in itself, was based upon very unsound reasoning. Count Buol maintained, that in the first draft of the four points it was stated that the Treaty of 1841 was to be revised in the interest of the balance of power, but that the plan of reducing Russian power in the Black Sea was an after-thought, and had been adopted by the Austrian Government rather to please her allies than from any conviction of its necessity. That while they were ready to support the proposal in Conference, they were not prepared, from personal regard to their allies, to go to war without a case of proved necessity.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys and I combatted this reasoning. We stated that the views of the French and English Governments were no secret to Austria, or to the world. Speeches in Parliament on the part of the English Government, official notes published in the "Moniteur" on the part of the French, had attested in the most public manner, six or eight months ago, our apprehensions of the danger, and our estimate of the means of providing against it. We appealed to Aali Pasha as to the reality of the danger of an attack on the Bosphorus by a Russian fleet and army, and he fully confirmed our views by his own emphatic statements.

Count Buol argued that it was not necessary to make Turkey equal to Russia, as in the system of the balance of power small States could preserve their independence in the neighbourhood of States far superior to them in the number of their armies, and the extent of their resources.

But this was answered by pointing to the peculiar situation of the Black Sea, where Russia had kept up a great naval force without any commerce to guard, in the presence of no rival power, and too evidently for purposes of aggression.

Count Buol told us he had not pressed the neutrality of the islands at the mouth of the Danube, as he was sure if he had done so the Russian Minister would have broken up the Conference. He said he could not propose war to the Diet at Frankfort for two ships more or less.

I answered that, had Austria insisted on the neutrality of the islands at the mouth of the Danube, and a rupture of the Conference had taken place, I should not have argued in the British Parliament that this was a point which only concerned Austria, but I should have represented it as the cause of an ally, and I was sure three-fourths of both Houses would have supported Her Majesty's Government in such a quarrel.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed that our Treaty of December 2 was not with the Diet of Frankfort, but with Austria.

We both appealed to Austria to make the plan of neutralization or that of limitation a *casus belli*, and expressed our belief that if this was done, Russia would at once give way.

Count Buol positively declined to accede to this proposal, and maintained his former reserves.

While I consider this course as not unnatural on the part of a Power which has hitherto kept out of the war, and is very averse to plunge into it, I conceive the policy of such reserve to be unwise in itself, and unjust to her allies. Unwise, because Russia, after so many sacrifices of her pride and military position in the Principalities to please Austria, would nearly to a certainty give way, and thereby secure the peace so much desired; unjust to her allies, because, after the sacrifices they have made and are making, it is due to them that their armaments should not retire from the Black Sea without obtaining in the conditions of peace some special security against Russian preponderance in that Sea. The interests of Austria may be fairly supposed to outweigh in the Austrian Cabinet the general interests of Europe. There is, however, some chance that, at the last moment, Austria may prove firm. It seems to me that Russia must either refuse to limit her naval force in the Black Sea on the ground of her dignity and her greatness, or she must consent to make her limitation effectual for its object. In either case our position is a good one. Our present business is to concert with the French and Turkish Plenipotentiaries the exact mode in which we shall act in the Conference, and leave it to Prince Gortchakoff to declare the purport of the instructions which he may receive from St. Petersburgh.

Should these be of a nature to meet our proposals half way, M. Drouyn de Lhuys and I intend to declare at once what we would accept, without any further discussion. If this is refused, we break off; if a fresh reference to St. Petersburgh is asked, we intend to say, that we can only consent to such reference on condition that the answer must be a decided yes or no. For such an answer M. Drouyn de Lhuys and I should not wait.

If a rupture of the Conference takes place forthwith, we propose to write notes calling upon Count Buol to take the measures provided for by the Treaty of December 2.

If he shall decline to do this, the spirit, and perhaps the letter, of the Treaty of December 2 will, in our opinion, be violated by the Government of Austria.

In relating what passed at the meeting, I have omitted to say, that Count Buol, in the paper which he read to us, declared that if Russia were to refuse to guarantee the integrity of Turkey, it would be a *casus belli* with Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 667.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 15.)

(No. 71.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April* 12, 1855.

IT appears from the report of Prince Gortchakoff to Count Buol, that a Russian messenger left St. Petersburgh on the 10th with the ultimatum of the Czar.

He will probably arrive here on Sunday or Monday.
The hopes of peace diminish.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 668.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 15.)

Vienna, April 14, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE just had an important conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs and I have agreed, first, that if the Russian Minister declares against any limitation, we break off the Conference: if he should merely say that he is ready to hear the proposals, we ask him whether he is ready to hear and discuss the proposals for limitation which we have ready; if not, we break off the Conference. Secondly, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs will declare to Austria he abandons neutralization, provided Austria goes with us for limitation even to the point of war. Third, if Conference is broken off, we propose to present notes to Austria, asking her to execute the Treaty of December 2nd. If limitation admitted as a principle, the terms agreed upon between us are these:—

First. Russia and the Sublime Porte shall not have in the Black Sea more than four sail-of-the-line; four frigates, with proportionate number of light vessels, and unarmed vessels exclusively adapted for the transport of troops.

Second. The Powers who possess no establishment in the Black Sea may each have one half of the above-mentioned number of vessels.

Third. In case of danger, all the naval forces of Austria, France, and Great Britain may, at the summons of the Porte, enter the Black Sea.

Fourth. The Contracting Powers may have Consuls in all the ports of the two States on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof.

No. 669.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 168.)

Berlin, April 13, 1855.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL has just mentioned to me that he understands the instructions to Prince Gortchakoff left St. Petersburgh on the 10th instant, but he said that he was not aware of their nature, or that any distinct proposition was to be made by the Russian Plenipotentiaries at Vienna. Upon my pressing him, he observed that Baron Budberg persisted in the opinion that the Emperor can never consent to a limitation of the number of ships in the Black Sea, and he said further, that all that he was able to collect from the Russian Envoy at this Court, and from Baron Werther's correspondence, was, that the Russian Plenipotentiaries were empowered to treat largely on the bases of the agreement respecting the third point; to this I remarked that I saw then but a slender chance of our coming to an understanding, and that Austria would shortly find herself under the necessity of making up her mind as to her future arrangements.

He replied, that he knew that we placed reliance in the intentions of Austria, but that according to the last intelligence which he had received, he did not believe she was inclined to take that active part which we might expect, that her army in Gallicia had suffered greatly from disease, that 15,000 men had died there, that 15,000 were in hospital, and that they were by no means in a condition to take the offensive against Russia, that for financial reasons they could not remain in their present position, and that if Austria went to war she would eventually be ruined. This, he said, was the state in which he believed Austria to be at the present time, and which would not encourage her to embark in an uncertain contest.

I then asked him as to the policy that Prussia would pursue, and he

answered, that the King felt he had nothing to do at this moment; that he had not been treated by the Powers as he ought to have been, but that notwithstanding he had done everything to engage the Emperor Alexander to make concessions that would allow of the continuation of the Conferences at Vienna, and that if this failed it would not be from any want of exertion on the part of Prussia to bring a greater spirit of conciliation into the Conference.

The result of my conversation this evening with Baron Manteuffel is, that the King of Prussia feels deeply aggrieved at his exclusion from participating in the consideration of the great political questions of the day, and that he is resolved to maintain his independent position and will not change it until the present crisis at Vienna is over, and in fact that he is more determined than ever to continue free and unshackled by engagements of any kind.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 670.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 169.)

My Lord,

Berlin, April 13, 1855.

WHEN I was with Baron Manteuffel this evening, his Excellency mentioned that he had received a despatch from Count Bernstorff, reporting a communication which that Minister had made to your Lordship of the observations which he (Baron Manteuffel) had drawn up respecting your Lordship's speech delivered some time ago in the House of Lords, in answer to Lord Lyndhurst, on the policy of Prussia. His Excellency told me that he had felt it impossible to let these statements pass over without some remarks on his part, and that he was glad to learn the conciliatory manner in which your Lordship had met them.

It appeared to me from the words which were said by Baron Manteuffel that he himself did not desire to attach much importance to these speeches in Parliament, and that he had forwarded this communication merely as a matter of duty, and not from any desire to provoke discussion on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 671.

Mr. Bligh to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 70.)

My Lord,

Hanover, April 14, 1855.

THE King and Queen, as I reported in my despatch No. 68 of the 7th instant, as was their Majesties' intention, met the Grand Duke and the Grand Duchess of Oldenburg at Bremen on the 12th instant, and after dining with their Royal Highnesses at an hotel there, they returned here in the evening together with the Queen's father and sister, the Duke Joseph and Princess Theresa of Saxe Altenburg, who, having been for the last three weeks on a visit to Oldenburg, have doubtless been the means of effecting this desirable reconciliation between such near relations and neighbours.

The Duke of Brunswick and Prince Frederick of Prussia, the King of Hanover's half-brother, arrived yesterday on a visit to their Majesties to congratulate the Queen, and to assist at the festivities in celebration of Her Majesty's birthday.

The Duke of Brunswick tells me that he is apprehensive, from some remarks made to him yesterday by the King, that His Majesty is not so firm in his adhesion to Austrian policy as regards the Eastern question as he was a short time since. Of this I can have no means of personally judging, on account of the extreme reserve pertinaciously maintained by His Majesty, as regards all external policy, towards me and all other foreign Diplomatic Agents. But being well aware, as I am, of the want of firmness and decision in His

Majesty's character, and of the effect which Prince Solms's reports of what he saw and heard during his late mission to Petersburgh, where everything is so dazzling and deceptive for a novice, will be likely to have had upon such a mind, I think it very likely that the Duke may have formed a correct judgment of its present bias.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. D. BLIGH.

No. 672.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, Monday, April* 16, 1855, 11·30 A.M.

THE French Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople writes to M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the 12th, that the French Commander-in-chief in the Crimea writes on the 10th that the whole of the English and French batteries opened fire on the previous day, and that on the first day the fire of the allies had evidently the superiority.

Although nothing decisive had happened from which results could exactly be anticipated, appearances were favourable, and so was the general impression in the allied armies.

Expect two more long despatches in cypher.

No. 673.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April* 16, 1855.

THIRD point. Count Buol called the French and British Ministers together yesterday. He made formal proposals, and attached to them a *casus belli*. These were:

1. The closing of the Dardanelles, with exceptions in case of menace.
2. An European guarantee for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.
3. The principle of a limitation of the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea, or a counterpoise.

If a limitation, it is to be fixed at the number maintained by Russia before the breaking out of the war, and to be completed to that number on the system of a balance of forces. So that in the end the number of Russian and Turkish ships would be equal. If this plan is accepted by the allies, Austria will propose it at the Conference. If not agreed to by Russia, Austrian Minister to propose it at St. Petersburgh; and in case of non-acceptance, to leave St. Petersburgh in eight days. Military preparations to be completed; Sweden invited to join; Prussia also to be invited; and if she acts against Austria, *casus belli*, with the allies. Loan to Austria not guaranteed, but facilitated in England and France.

We argued that the limitation to Russia was only placing her in her former menacing position.

I cannot advise acceptance. Another message later.

No. 674.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 59.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 16, 1855.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 51 of the 1st instant, stating that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has an invincible objection to a Commission of a European character, having jurisdiction over the Austrian banks of the Danube, I beg to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the navigation of the river will always be secured by Austria and Bavaria within their respective territories; but that as the danger of obstruction lies in that part which flows through Russian and Turkish domination, an English and French Commissioner would be a great security for the keeping that part clear for navigation.

In the event, therefore, of the negotiations proceeding, Her Majesty's Government think it very desirable that this arrangement should be made.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 675.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 60.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 16, 1855.

HER Majesty's Government concur in the opinion expressed in your Lordship's despatch No. 64 of the 10th instant, and I lost no time in informing your Lordship, by the telegraph, that if Russia refused to admit the principle of limitation, or, admitting the principle, would not agree to a satisfactory mode of carrying it into effect, the system of neutralization should then be proposed to the Russian Plenipotentiaries. Russia would then have the same option between the two projects as Austria. If both should be declined, the negotiation will be at an end.

Her Majesty's Government assume that this mode of proceeding will have the support of M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 676.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(No. 61.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 16, 1855.

I HAVE the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your language in reply to Count Buol, as reported in your despatch of the 10th instant.

The opinions of Her Majesty's Government could not have been more faithfully represented, or more ably expressed.

Count Buol must now be convinced that no attempt on the part of the Austrian Government to induce the Western Powers to relinquish their moderate proposals on the third point can be successful, and it is to be hoped that no more such attempts will be made; but when Count Buol speaks of treating the third point like the two former, of coming to no previous resolution respecting war, and of not engaging in hostilities for two ships more or less, he does not appear to bear in mind that the third point differs from the two former, inasmuch as upon them Russia was prepared to make concessions, while she considers that the third, which is the only real check upon her designs, involves her honour and dignity, and she is therefore not likely to yield upon it. Count Buol may object to a previous resolution respecting war, but he must be aware that England and France cannot agree to an unsafe and dishonourable peace, and that if Russia will agree to no other terms, the *casus belli* for Austria will arise. He may think it inexpedient to engage in hostilities for two ships more or less, but the question is, whether the naval force of Russia in the Black Sea shall be so limited as not to endanger the Ottoman Empire and the future peace of Europe, for that is the object of the war.

In the event of the negotiations being broken off, Her Majesty's Government, if M. Drouyn de Lhuys concurs, are of opinion that the English and

French Plenipotentiaries should address separate notes to Count Buol, inviting the Austrian Government to concert with them the measures necessary for giving immediate effect to the Treaty of December 2.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 677.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 307.)

Foreign Office, April 16, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 255 of the 2nd instant, inclosing an extract from the "Journal de Constantinople," from which, as well as from the language of Reshid Pasha, you gather that the Porte contemplates a further extension of the advantages to be accorded to Rayahs in Turkey; and I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government learn with much satisfaction this further proof of the good intentions of the Sultan towards his Christian subjects.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 678.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 141.)

Foreign Office, April 16, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 169 of the 13th instant, reporting a conversation with Baron Manteuffel on the subject of the recent debate in the House of Lords on the policy of Prussia, I have to inform your Lordship that Count Bernstorff read to me a despatch from Baron Manteuffel respecting my speech on Lord Lyndhurst's motion on this subject, and as it was neither discourteous nor acrimonious, I told Count Bernstorff that I should prefer not to make an answer to it, for I supposed that Baron Manteuffel had thought it is duty not to allow any strictures upon Prussian policy to pass wholly unnoticed by him.

I would, therefore, confine myself to remarking, that Baron Manteuffel could not expect me publicly to defend a policy which was at variance with, or I might rather say hostile to, that of Her Majesty's Government; but that my object had been to say nothing in the House of Lords beyond what had already been brought to the knowledge of Baron Manteuffel, as the opinions of Her Majesty's Government, either through my conversations with Count Bernstorff or my despatches to your Lordship, and to the best of my belief I had not exceeded my intention. And respecting the passage to which Baron Manteuffel seemed to take particular exception, viz., that the policy of Prussia was neither European, nor German, nor Prussian, I said I must adhere to the opinion I had expressed. The policy of Prussia was not European, because it had been restricted to German interests. It was not German, because it had divided Germany. It was not Prussian, because it was contrary to the opinions and, as I ventured to think, to the interests of the nation, that Prussia should favour the designs of Russia, and pursue a course that would extend and protract the war.

Some further conversation, not worth recording, then took place with respect to the exclusion of Prussia from the Conference in August last, and the successful exercise of her influence in persuading Russia to make concessions.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 679.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, April 16, 1855.

THE Russian messenger will arrive to-day; Conference will probably take place to-morrow. The Austrian Minister wishes it to adjourn for further deliberation till next day.

If other hope is lost, I wish to propose to the Conference the following plan. The French Minister is favourable to it. Austria will not support any demand for cession of territory.

1st. As the existence of an aggressive Russian fleet in the Black Sea would be in flagrant contradiction with the assurance so often given by Russia, that she does not wish to impair the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, it is agreed:

(1.) That with the exceptions stated in the following Articles, the rule of closing the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, recognised by the Treaty of 1841, shall be force so long as the Russian naval force in the Black Sea shall not exceed four sail of the line, four frigates, and six smaller vessels.

(2.) That while the said rule subsists, two sail of the line, two frigates, and three smaller vessels of any Power which has no establishment in the Black Sea, and which is in amity with the Sultan, may enter the Black Sea upon giving four days' notice to the Ottoman Government.

(3.) Upon any increase of the Russian naval forces beyond the number specified in Article 1, or on the existence of a larger Russian force being ascertained, a larger number of ships of war of the allies of the Sultan may pass through the Straits into the Black Sea, in conformity with the desires of the Sultan and in the proportions to be regulated from time to time by agreement with the Ottoman Porte; such increase not to form, at any time, a legitimate subject of remonstrance on the part of Russia.

(4.) At no time shall any ships of foreign nations, beyond the small ships belonging to the Embassies admitted hitherto, anchor in the Golden Horn, nor shall any number of line-of-battle ships belonging to foreign Powers not having establishments in the Black Sea exceeding four, pass at one time before the capital in their passage from the Dardanelles to the Black Sea, or from the Black Sea to the Dardanelles, whilst the Sultan is at peace.

2nd. The cession to Turkey of the islands at the mouth of the Danube surrendered by the Treaty of Adrianople.

3rd. The Asiatic frontier, on the side of Russia, to be newly laid down and defined.

4th. An European guarantee of the territorial circumscription of the Ottoman Empire in Europe as defined in the Treaty.

5th. The forts on the Asiatic coast, now abandoned by Russia, not to be reoccupied.

No. 680.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, Tuesday, April 17, 1855, 12·15 P.M.

CONFERENCE meets at 1 o'clock to-day. I expect to leave Vienna on Friday morning.

No. 681.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.

Vienna, April 17, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Conference met to-day upon the invitation of Count Buol, who stated his having received from Prince Gortchakoff the announcement that he had received the reply of his Court.

This reply was to the effect that the Russian Government would receive and discuss any proposition which came from the allies, with the reserve only of a reference to the declaration of Lord John Russell contained in the sixth Protocol, that the best conditions of peace, and the only ones which would be admissible would be those which, being conformable to the honour of Russia, were at the same time sufficient for the security of Europe.

After some discussion, the proposal of Count Buol was agreed to, that the Conference would be adjourned in order that the allies might decide upon what propositions they would bring forward.

At an adjourned meeting of the allied Plenipotentiaries, and in the discussion which ensued, proposals were brought forward by Count Buol to which (while reserving to themselves the power of more fully expressing their opinions) Lord John Russell, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and the Turkish Plenipotentiary, Aali Pasha, generally assented, and a meeting of the allied Ministers was fixed for to-morrow for further discussion and for the production by Aali Pasha of his plan of carrying out the proposals which had been brought forward.

The impression was, that the Conference might be called together on the following day, when those plans would be produced, as a preliminary step, while awaiting the replies to the telegraphic despatches addressed yesterday to your Lordship and to the French Government, as also to the report which was to be sent of the meeting of this day.

No. 682.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 264.)

Constantinople, April 5, 1855.

My Lord,

REFERRING to your Lordship's instruction No. 231 of the 23rd ultimo, I take occasion to submit that the Turkish Ambassador must have been under a false impression when he told Lord John Russell, as your Lordship supposes, that he had not received his full powers. The Porte sent me a copy of the full powers some time ago, and informed me that they were going, if they had not been actually sent, to its Ambassador at Vienna.

With respect to instructions, I have to remind your Lordship that two instructions relating to the Conferences at Vienna were addressed by the Porte to Aarif Effendi and forwarded to your Lordship by me in translation after I had received copies of the originals from the Porte. One of these instructions authorized the Ambassador to place himself on the same ground with the British and French Plenipotentiaries on the four points and the reserve. The other contained observations intimating the view taken by the Ottoman Government of several particulars connected with the bases of negotiation. At a late period the Porte was solicited by Count Buol to send a second or special Plenipotentiary, to which request, after demurring at first, the Porte acceded on learning that Aarif Effendi himself entreated a release from single responsibility. It was then decided that Aali Pasha should be the special Plenipotentiary; and of course the instructions, which were still thought necessary at Vienna, could not, with any advantage, precede the person who was to carry them into effect. Aali Pasha, as your Lordship has been informed, embarked for Vienna with the supplementary instructions transmitted to your Lordship, in the form of a translated copy, on the 31st ultimo, and there is reason to hope that he will reach his destination in four or five days from the present date.

With respect to Aarif Effendi's ignorance of any language but the Turkish,

I beg to observe that Riza Bey, who talks French like a native, was sent out to him with the rank of Councillor, and that former negotiations have been carried through successfully by Turkish Plenipotentiaries unacquainted with any Christian tongue.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 683.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 266.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 5, 1855.

IN the hope of increasing the salutary, though perhaps imperfect, impression previously made upon Reshid Pasha and his colleagues with respect to the reforms so greatly needed and so strenuously recommended in this country, I directed M. Pisani to read your Lordship's instruction No. 237 of the 23rd ultimo, to the Grand Vizier and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

M. Pisani, in reporting the execution of my instruction, states that these two Ministers gave assurance to the following effect, namely, that the "measures contemplated in the Reform Council would be carried into effect, and that Europe would have reason to be satisfied with the sincerity of the Porte and with the nature of the reforms affecting the Christian population of Turkey."

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 684.

Mr. Howard to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 44.)

My Lord,

Paris, April 17, 1855.

I CALLED on M. Thouvenel to-day, and as I found he had received no very late intelligence from Vienna, I thought your Lordship would not disapprove of my reading to him the substance of Lord John Russell's telegraphic despatches which reached me this day.

When I had finished reading these documents, M. Thouvenel said, he considered the proposals upon which alone Austria seemed disposed to attach a *casus belli* to be altogether unacceptable; the first part of the plan, however, which Lord John Russell, in a subsequent despatch, proposes, if other hope is lost, to present to the Conference, met with his approbation, and he believed Count Buol would not be indisposed to join the allies in demanding the adoption of a scheme of limitation which he (M. Thouvenel) designated as "une limitation facultative."

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. G. HOWARD.

No. 685.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, Thursday, April 19, 1855.

YOUR despatch of yesterday has been received. Conference to day at 1. Only limitation and neutralisation are to be proposed by English and French Ministers; nearly sure to be both rejected, and Conference suspended till further orders from our Governments. After this day direct messages and instructions to Lord Westmorland.

No. 686.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 19.)

(No. 271.)

Constantinople, April 9, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE received confidential information from the Porte, to the effect that the whole of the Russian forces in Bessarabia have been withdrawn from that province, and that arrangements are made to provide against the contingency of an attack from the Turks or their allies.

The source of this intelligence is a letter from the Hospodar of Moldavia, and a copy of the document is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information.

I have communicated the news to Lord Raglan, and a copy of my despatch to his Lordship is also transmitted herewith.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE..

Inclosure 1 in No. 686.

Prince Ghika to Reshid Pasha.

Jassy, le 21 *Mars*, 1855.

Monseigneur,

D'APRES les nouvelles positives qui me sont parvenues de la Bessarabie, toutes les troupes qui étaient échelonnés le long du Pruth ont reçus l'ordre de se rendre en Crimée et sont parties le 18 courant. La garde de cette frontière a été confiée provisoirement aux gardes frontières indigènes et à quelques soldats Baschkirs.

Il a été enjoint en même temps aux autorités de la Bessarabie de mettre le feu à tous les édifices appartenant à l'Etat, aussitôt que l'armée alliée apparaîtrait sur la frontière.

Des poteaux recouverts de foin et enduits de goudron ont été échelonnés du quartier-général dans toutes les directions de la frontière pour qu'ils puissent servir de signaux dans le cas d'un envahissement. J'ai pensé devoir porter à la connaissance de votre Altesse Sérénissime toutes ces dispositions prises par l'ennemi, qui trahissent suffisamment le sentiment qui le domine.

Je viens de recevoir aussi de Vienne par la voie télégraphique la bonne nouvelle que l'Espagne et le Portugal vont entrer dans l'alliance commune.

Je saisis, &c.

(Signé) GR. GHIKA.

Inclosure 2 in No. 686.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan.

Constantinople, April 9, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE received the accompanying paper confidentially from the Porte. The Hospodar of Moldavia has announced, by means of it, the withdrawal of the Russian forces from Bessarabia for service in the Crimea.

Supposing the information to be correct, the Porte might naturally wish to know whether, under present circumstances, an incursion might be made into the evacuated provinces, with prospects of support warranting a reasonable hope of success.

The eventual advantage, if that were the case, might obviously be great, especially if it were attended with the exclusion of the Russians from every stronghold on the left bank of the Danube.

I am fearful of trespassing too far on your Lordship's indulgence; but a

timely knowledge of the opinion of the Commander-in-chief would enable me to hold a suitable language to the Ottoman Ministers on a question of much importance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 687.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 19.)

(No. 275. Confidential.)

Constantinople, April 9, 1855.

My Lord,

SEVERAL coinciding circumstances, brought successively to my knowledge, tend to show that the French Government directs a more than usual attention to the Island of Candia. I have reason to believe that the appointment of Veli Pasha, the Porte's late Ambassador at Paris, to that government, originated in a desire to please the French Emperor. His recall was delayed from the same motive; and when it was finally decided upon, the disappointment both to himself and to his supporters at Paris, was softened by his nomination to a command which had been formerly exercised by his father during several years with much distinction.

His father, who held the office of Grand Vizier during the early part of last year, and whose political connections estrange him from Reshid Pasha, has lately had a lawsuit with that Minister, which terminated in his own discomfiture. The point at issue was the validity of an agreement for selling to Mustapha Pasha a small piece of ground detached from a property which has lately come into the possession of the present Prime Minister. As far as my information goes, I believe that the purchase had been virtually completed, even to the payment of the price, but that an essential form was wanting to render the transaction legal. Reshid, I conceive, would have done better to give way, as it seems that the land in question was of more importance to his antagonist than to himself; but his friends allege that the purchaser acted with so much offensive disrespect, as to warrant an appeal to the strict requirements of the law.

The French Chargé d'Affaires thought proper to interfere on behalf of the former Governor of Candia, and even went so far as to have recourse in person to the Sultan at a private audience. He gained nothing by this intrigue, which was made known to Reshid by the Sultan himself; but he has, nevertheless, continued to annoy the Grand Vizier with renewed applications on the same subject, and an undisguised protection of his opponent, putting forward the Emperor's name.

I learn from the same authentic source whence this information has reached me, that an incident likely to create further alienation between the French Government and the present Turkish Ministry has occurred recently in Egypt. It appears that M. de Lesseps, on returning to that country, obtained from Said Pasha the communication of a private and confidential letter which had been addressed to him by Kiamil Pasha, the President of the Council here, with the view of producing a postponement of the scheme for opening a canal through the Isthmus of Suez. Kiamil Pasha is married to a relative of the Viceroy, and formerly resided in Egypt.

This indiscretion, or act of treachery, on the part of Said Pasha, has excited the more indignation here, as the letter has been sent to Paris by M. de Lesseps.

These circumstances are worthy of your Lordship's consideration, as indicative of tendencies which in their progress may be productive of much serious inconvenience, and perhaps eventually of consequences more easily lamented than remedied.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 688.

Mr. Forbes to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 16. Confidential.)

Dresden, April 10, 1855.

My Lord,

ON the 30th of the present month, I had the honour of receiving by post from Berlin, your Lordship's two despatches Nos. 4 and 5, marked Confidential, of the 22nd of the same, transmitting to me for my information first a copy of a despatch from Lord John Russell, reporting the proceedings of the first Conference, and secondly, copies of two of your Lordship's despatches addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna. At the same time that I beg leave to offer my thanks for these most interesting communications, I must at once plead as my excuse for acknowledging their receipt so late, that I was unable to communicate the slightest alteration in M. de Beust's opinions, or at least language, for he listens with kindness and attention to whatever I or my Austrian colleague say, without pretending that it makes any impression. He told me latterly, that now he was quite devoted to his department of the Interior, and was taking no part whatever in foreign policy; that I had only to read one of his despatches to the Saxon Minister in Vienna, which had been published in the newspapers, to be convinced of his wish to assist in bringing about peace. I answered, that if he considered the geographical position of Saxony, it was the only line for him to adopt, and that I sincerely hoped that he would continue to follow it, for that if the war became general, Saxony would suffer most, and must follow Austria; what then would be his personal position, committed as he now was to Prussia? he only answered, that he has a confident hope that affairs would not come to such an extremity. M. Drouyn de Lhuys arrived here at 10 o'clock one evening, and left it early the next morning, but travelled from Eisenach to Dresden in the same carriage with my Prussian colleague, Count de Redern, who affects to have induced him to speak much on politics. I am on the best terms with Count de Redern, whom I very much like, and who evidently does not share many views and opinions which he is bound to support: but I cannot implicitly believe that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs would choose a Prussian Envoy as his confidant at such a moment. The justice of one of his remarks has, however, made a great impression as well on Count de Redern as on M. de Beust; the French Minister said, that in talking of concessions which Russia had made, people forget that France and England were complete masters of the Black Sea, where no Russian ship dared to appear, and from which Russia could never expel us, as long as it suited us to remain; that at no very distant epoch the Russian trade would be entirely ruined, to avert which, Russia must make concessions. My Austrian colleague is lately become much more communicative to me than heretofore, and with the French Chargé d'Affaires, Count Lallemand, I am on the most intimate terms. I have to thank him for constant and interesting communications.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS R. FORBES.

No. 689.

Mr. Forbes to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 17. Confidential.)

Dresden, April 14, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour on the 6th of this month of receiving your Lordship's despatch No. 7, marked Confidential, of the 3rd ultimo, transmitting to me for my information a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin, inclosing one of a despatch from Baron Manteuffel to Count Hatzfeldt, regarding communications between the French and Prussian Governments on the proceedings of the Diet.

I saw M. de Beust the day before yesterday, and was struck with the moderation of his language respecting the allied Powers. He said that peace became daily more requisite, and that, although he had nothing very precise

to tell me respecting the proceedings of the Conference in Vienna, he saw no difficulty in admitting that at Sinope or elsewhere a fortified naval station should be made, where sufficient ships-of-war might be stationed, to counterbalance any which Russia might have in the Black Sea; that, as for opposition on the part of Turkey to a measure so inimical to her independence, that need not be minded.

I remarked that we had taken up arms for the purpose of preserving her independence. He answered that the independence of Turkey would always exist in a very modified form.

The articles printed in the "Moniteur" of the 11th of this month, are generally regarded here as having been written with the view of insuring a complete liberty of action for the Emperor Louis Napoleon, and of leaving him more free on the question of peace, by proving to the world that his original instructions had been disregarded, and that all the present difficulties originated in the having landed at Eupatoria instead of Theodosia. The tactics of those opposed to England and France are to try to excite suspicion of the sincerity of Austria. They say constantly that the liberty of commerce on the Danube being once established, she will leave us to finish the war as we can. Even His Saxon Majesty, when I had last the honour of seeing him, alluded to this, but added, "England is sincere in her wish for peace, but the Emperor of the French is the real obstacle." I answered that I believed an honourable peace, established on a lasting basis, was as much an object to the French as to the English Government, but experience had made us cautious in any dealings with Russia, whoever sat on the throne. The King merely smiled without further remark.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS R. FORBES.

No. 690.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 318.)

Foreign Office, April 20, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 266 of the 5th instant, I have to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of your having caused my instruction No. 237 of the 23rd of March to be read to the Grand Vizier and the Turkish Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and that Her Majesty's Government will learn with sincere satisfaction the fulfilment of the promises given to your Excellency by the Turkish Ministers, that the measures contemplated in Turkey would be carried into effect, and that Europe would have reason to be satisfied with the sincerity of the Porte and with the reforms affecting the Christian population.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 691.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, April 19, 1855.

CONFERENCE just over. The French Minister opened the plan of limitation, supported by British, Turkish, and Austrian. The Russian Ministers asked forty-eight hours to consider. Conference adjourned to Saturday. Guarantee of integrity and independence of Turkey agreed to unanimously.

My departure must be delayed till Monday.

No. 692.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 77.)

Vienna, April 16, 1855.

My Lord,

WE had yesterday a meeting, of four hours' duration, at Count Buol's. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Baron Bourqueney, Lord Westmorland, and I were present.

Count Buol having been earnestly called upon by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to join the Western Powers in case of rupture, had prepared an ultimatum of the Austrian Cabinet. It was obvious that great care had been taken in preparing the ground upon which Austria means to take up her position. Count Buol dwelt especially on the importance of closing the Dardanelles, and the value of an European guarantee of the Turkish Empire. But the real point of his discourse lay in the declaration that Austria would not assent to press Russia on the question of limitation further than the restoration of the *status quo* of the Russian fleet before the war.

The question was put in this way. In order to carry into effect the third point Count Buol proposed the following measures to be submitted to the Conference. 1st. The closing of the Straits. 2nd. The guarantee of Europe for the territorial circumscription of the Ottoman Empire. 3rd. The principle of a limitation of the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea. In presenting this third measure as a *casus belli* to Russia it was to be thus stated: limitation fixed at the number of the fleet before the war, to be completed according to the system of a balance of power. By this last phrase I understood was meant that as fast as the Russians should build ships, Turkey should be allowed to introduce ships into the Black Sea; so that in some years if Russia should have fifteen ships of the line at Sebastopol, Turkey might have fifteen sail of the line cruizing in the Black Sea.

It would be difficult and wearisome to give the details of a conversation which lasted for four hours. I will endeavour, therefore, to give an abstract of the arguments employed.

Count Buol set before us the insignificance of the danger to be feared from the presence in the Black Sea of ten ships of the line, not yet in existence, nor likely to be so for some time, compared with the advantages to be derived from a peace attended with such important concessions by Russia. He extolled the security which Turkey would obtain by the European guarantee. He spoke of the means which Turkey possessed for her defence. He again declared that the limitation of the naval forces of Russia had not entered into the original definition of the third point, and Austria had only adopted it in deference to the urgent representations of the Western Powers. But Austria would not make war for ten ships more or less. She could not justify such a course to Germany or to Europe. She had never pledged herself to war against Russia for such a cause, and never would. She would look to the whole of the peace to be made, and not to a single part.

On the other hand, the French and British Plenipotentiaries maintained that a limitation to be good for anything must be an effectual limitation; that it would be a limitation to say that Russia should not have more than 6,000 ships of war, but such a limitation would be absurd. Looking at the particular proposal before us, it was evident that the state of the Russian naval force before the war was the very state of danger against which we were anxious to guard.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys referred to the attacks on the Turkish ships at Sinope, and the declarations of Admirals Hamelin and Dundas that they could not with prudence divide their forces.

I said that the British Government had always pointed to the Russian fleet in Sebastopol as a standing menace to Turkey, and to provide by Treaty that this very force might again be constructed and assembled would be a course they could not justify to Parliament or the nation. That Russia, if she consented to limitation, would hardly refuse to agree to one that would be efficient. The closing of the Dardanelles and an efficient limitation were consistent propositions; but if the limitation was not to be efficient, the closing of the Straits would be inconsistent. He had himself argued that the danger consisted not in the magnitude of the Russian force, but in the *tête-à-tête* of Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea. Yet this very danger he now proposed to restore.

Count Buol was ready to propose Consuls at Sebastopol and elsewhere in the Black Sea; stations for small vessels at the mouth of the Danube; the faculty for the Sultan of calling the fleets of his allies to his assistance in case of menace; and other subsidiary provisions. He laid it down as a principle that the existence of an aggressive fleet in the Black Sea is in flagrant contradiction with the assurance so often given by Russia that she does not wish to disturb the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. But he did not consider that a fleet of fifteen sail of the line was excessive, or could be dangerous to Turkey. He spoke of ten sail of line-of-battle ships, not yet built, as not forming any real object of alarm to Europe.

The Ottoman Minister, who was unfortunately not summoned to meet us, is of a totally different opinion. He thinks it would be injurious to the Porte to require that she should devote her revenues to the fortifications on the Bosphorus, when internal improvements so urgently require her attention. He doubts whether any forts on the Bosphorus would save Constantinople from attack.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in the conversation I am reporting, said that he was ready to increase the number of Russian ships of war to be maintained to the number now above water in the Black Sea.

I added, that although I had no authority to do so I would undertake the same engagement.

Count Buol, however, persisted in his proposal, and asked us to refer it to our Governments. This I have already done by telegraphic message.

It is not necessary to state the measures which Austria would be prepared to take to convey an ultimatum to Russia upon this basis. They are well conceived, and would be doubtless acted upon with good faith.

But I cannot suppose that Russia would prefer war with Austria, to a peace which would give her leisure and means to prepare a new attack on the Ottoman Empire.

In the case of such an attack renewed five years hence, could we rely on the Austrian guarantee of the integrity of Turkey? I apprehend that the same financial embarrassment, the same doubt of Prussia and the German States, and an army reduced to the establishment of 1852, would paralyze her then as they did in 1853.

The occupation of the Principalities by Russia she felt to be dangerous to her existence as a great Power, and she risked war to put an end to it. But that point accomplished, I fear we must not count upon her aid to save Constantinople from the encroaching ambition of Russia.

I await your Lordship's answer, by the telegraph, to the present proposal of Austria.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 693.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 78.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April* 16, 1855.

I ENTIRELY agree with your Lordship's view, that no menace should at present be used to Prussia. My suggestions were intended solely for the case of Austria's being engaged in war with Russia, and having to apprehend the action of Prussia on her flank.

If Austria does not join us, Prussia may be expected to become more friendly to Great Britain than she has hitherto been.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 694.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 21.)

(No. 80.) *Vienna, April* 18, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, copies of the Protocol of the ninth Conference, which was held on the 9th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 694.

Protocol (No. 9) of a Conference held at Vienna, April 9, 1855.

Présens :

Pour l'Autriche—
M. le Comte de Buol-Schauenstein, et
M. le Baron de Prokesch-Osten ;

Pour la France—
M. Drouyn de Lhuys, et
M. le Baron de Bourqueney ;

Pour le Grande Bretagne—
Lord John Russell, et
M. le Comte de Westmorland ;

Pour la Russie—
M. le Prince de Gortchakoff, et
M. de Titoff ;

Pour la Turquie—
Aali Pacha, et
Aarif Effendi.

LE Comte de Buol a ouvert la séance en introduisant leurs Excellences les Ministres des Affaires Etrangères de France et de la Sublime Porte—M. Drouyn de Lhuys et Aali Pacha—munis l'un et l'autre de pleins pouvoirs pour prendre part aux négociations de paix. Il croît n'être que le fidèle interprète des sentiments de toute l'assemblée en saluant leur présence avec une véritable satisfaction et comme un nouveau gage du haut prix que leurs Gouvernements attachent à voir les travaux de la Conférence aboutir au rétablissement d'une paix solide et durable.

Les nouveaux Plénipotentiaires ont exhibé leurs pleins pouvoirs respectifs, qui, après avoir été examinés et trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont été déposés aux Actes de la Conférence.

Le Protocole No. 8 ayant été lu, approuvé et signé, on est convenu d'ajourner la prochaine séance jusqu'à l'arrivée des nouvelles instructions que les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ont sollicitées de leur Cour à la suite de la Conférence du 26 Mars par un courrier expédié d'ici le 28.

(Suivent les signatures.)

No. 695.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 21.)

(No. 81.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April* 18, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a paper which has been communicated to me by Aali Pasha, respecting the present condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and the further privileges which the Sultan proposes to grant to them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 695.

Memorandum.

AU moment où les sujets non-Musulmans de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan fixent l'attention, il ne serait pas inutile de passer succinctement en revue quelles étaient leurs conditions avant les réformes si glorieusement entreprises par Sa Majesté le Sultan, et quel est le degré d'amélioration où elles sont arrivées depuis quelques années.

Pour démontrer l'importance du progrès qui s'est opéré, on n'aura besoin que d'énumérer seulement des faits, et en laisser le jugement à l'impartialité du lecteur.

La législation Musulmane, dans ses principes comme dans son esprit, prescrit et ordonne la tolérance la plus entière pour toutes les communautés religieuses soumises à la domination Ottomane, et en plaçant l'honneur, la propriété, et la vie de tous les sujets non-Musulmans sous la sauvegarde de la loi, elle établit pour ceux-ci une condition des plus avantageuses, et exempte de toutes les charges et obligations qu'impose le devoir de servir la patrie.

Dans aucune époque de l'histoire de l'Empire Ottoman on ne trouvera la moindre trace de ces persécutions religieuses qui ont ensanglanté toute l'Europe durant la longue période du moyen âge.

C'est au moment où Constantinople venait d'être conquise par la force des armées Ottomanes, que Sultan Mohammed II a accordé spontanément au Patriarche Grec de cette capitale ces priviléges religieuses dont il est question aujourd'hui. Les successeurs de ce grand Monarque ont respecté et développé ces priviléges, sans qu'ils y fussent contraints par aucune pression étrangère.

Ainsi les priviléges religieux, loin d'être violés ou limités, ont reçu des développements considérables, et qui ont été, malgré les efforts de ceux qui veulent se servir de la Turquie comme d'un instrument de persécution contre les autres communautés Chrétiennes, généralisés à l'égard de toutes ces communautés.

Cette assertion est tellement vraie que toutes les demandes qui ont amené l'état actuel des choses, ont eu pour origine et pour motif réel, quoique non avoué, la tendance de la Turquie de traiter tous ses sujets sur le pied de la plus parfaite égalité.

La Turquie a cependant eu son moyen âge aussi. Mais les priviléges religieux ont traversé cette période sans aucune atteinte.

Pendant plus d'un siècle, tous les sujets de l'Empire, Musulmans et Chrétiens, ont souffert des abus administratifs et des vexations arbitraires des autorités subalternes. La vie, l'honneur, et le bien des sujets se sont trouvés sans garantie ; les Chrétiens ont eu des distinctions humiliantes, une sorte d'incapacité aux emplois, des difficultés pour la construction ou la réparation de leurs églises, &c.

La pensée de la réforme, en embrassant toutes les populations de l'Empire, a porté à cet état de choses un coup décisif.

A peine commencée, elle donna d'heureux résultats pour ce qui concerne surtout les populations non-Musulmanes—résultats qui doivent surprendre ceux qui comprennent la puissance du temps si lent et si paresseux d'ordinaire pour venir à l'aide du réformateur. En peu d'années, le progrès fut grand et les sujets

non-Musulmans se trouvèrent tout d'un coup dans une position, sous quelques rapports, préférable même à celle des sujets Musulmans, ainsi que nous le verrons par les quelques faits qui suivent.

Nous parlerons d'abord de la capitation.

Cet impôt personnel était une simple redevance obligatoire pour tous les sujets non-Musulmans des pays conquis, mais qui en retour leur accordait le libre exercice de leur culte, et par suite l'exemption du service militaire et la protection de la loi pour leur vie et leurs biens.

Peu à peu, l'obligation de payer cette capitation devint une marque de distinction dégradante, une source de mépris et un moyen de vexation entre les mains des employés subalternes.

Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan vient d'abolir cette redevance, malgré la puissance des préjugés populaires, et le principe qui l'avait établi. Il déclara par ce fait seul qu'il ne reconnaissait plus de distinction entre peuple conquérant et peuple conquis.

Les sujets non-Musulmans portaient des costumes différents adaptés à leurs nationalités. Cependant ce qui, dans son origine, était une mesure politique, devint plus tard une marque d'infériorité et d'humiliation. Tout cela n'existe plus. Commencées par son glorieux Père, les mesures de réforme tendant à améliorer le sort de tous les sujets de l'Empire, sans distinction de religion, ont été victorieusement et sérieusement continuées par Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan Abd-el-Medjid.

Avant la réforme, les sujets non-Musulmans étaient exclus des affaires publiques; ils n'avaient ni position ni rang dans la hiérarchie Musulmane. On voit aujourd'hui plus d'un Chrétien qui représentent à l'étranger leur Souverain.

Un grand nombre entre eux ont obtenu et obtiennent journellement des rangs jusqu'à celui de fonctionnaire de première classe. Dans la carrière militaire, il y en a plusieurs qui portent le rang et l'uniforme d'officier supérieur. Une mesure récemment prise les assimile complétement et sous tous les rapports à ceux des Musulmans du même rang.

Le droit de témoignage leur est accordé par la création des Tribunaux Criminels et Commerciaux régis par des lois dont l'esprit et la lettre n'admettent aucune espèce de distinction entre toutes les classes des sujets du Sultan. Ces lois et les tribunaux en question vont recevoir de notables améliorations.

La Commission de Tanzimat s'occupe à l'heure qu'il est d'élaborer un Code Criminel complet, avec une nouvelle organization concernant les tribunaux qui doivent être chargés d'exécuter ce Code. Cette innovation doit être considérée comme une des réformes les plus importantes et qui, il faut l'avouer, dans une autre pays placé dans des conditions analogues, aurait peut-être rencontré bien des hésitations et des obstacles non moins grands qu'on n'aurait pas eu le courage d'aborder avec autant d'énergie. Elle est riche en conséquences salutaires pour les sujets non-Musulmans et complète d'une manière absolue leur égalité devant la loi.

A l'admission du témoignage, qui est déjà une garantie très grande, la Sublime Porte vient d'en ajouter une nouvelle encore plus importante. C'est la composition mixte des susdits tribunaux. Ainsi à côté des juges Musulmans doivent siéger des juges appartenant à chaque communauté non-Musulmane, ayant un égal droit de juger les Musulmans et les Chrétiens sans distinction. Une réforme législative d'une aussi grande portée prouve la ferme résolution du Gouvernement du Sultan de faire partager d'une manière égale les bienfaits de ses intentions paternelles à tous les sujets de l'Empire. Une loi spéciale ouvrira plus tard aux sujets Chrétiens l'entrée au service militaire, avec des garanties pour leur religion et pour son exercice.

Des écoles de tout genre pour l'instruction religieuse et civile de la jeunesse non-Musulmane se trouvent autorisées, et plusieurs jeunes Chrétiens font leurs études en Europe aux frais du Gouvernement. L'École Impériale de Médecine de Constantinople reçoit, instruit, habille, et nourrit, à la charge du trésor de l'Etat, la jeunesse de toutes les communautés indistinctement. Cette dernière institution, où regne une égalité parfaite entre les différentes nationalités, enseigne avant tout à la jeune génération dont elle est composée, que tous les sujets, sans distinction aucune, n'ont qu'un pays et un souverain, et que la divergence de cultes ne doit nullement les désunir et empêcher leurs actions communes au service de la patrie.

Chaque année, l'examen de doctorat, auquel assiste Sa Majesté Impériale, donne au pays des docteurs en médecine appartenant aux différentes communautés sujettes du Sultan, et qui immédiatement prennent rang et position dans l'armée Impériale.

Les enfants Musulmans et non-Musulmans y fraternisent et apprennent dès leur première jeunesse à s'entr'aimer. Ils reportent ensuite ces impressions au sein de leurs familles; ainsi peu à peu, à l'aide de semblables institutions qui ne manqueront pas d'être fondées encore, l'opinion publique, que nulle volonté souveraine ne peut contraindre, se forme dans le sens des réformes et finit par aller même au devant des besoins du siècle. Aussi doit on citer cette initiative du Sultan comme une des plus heureuses et plus hardies de toutes celles que sa pensée prédominante d'améliorer le sort des populations non-Musulmanes, lui a fait prendre jusqu'ici.

Ces faits, auxquels on peut ajouter bien d'autres d'un ordre secondaire, comme par exemple l'état de la fortune des Chrétiens, qui est incontestablement beaucoup plus prospère que celui des Musulmans et qui est acquis par suite des nouvelles réformes, ces faits, disons-nous, dénotent clairement les intentions bienveillantes du Sultan, et l'immense progrès que la Turquie a fait sous les auspices tutélaires de ces intentions.

Quant à la liberté des cultes, ceux qui ont vu Constantinople peuvent attester le degré de respect qu'on y porte. On rencontre souvent dans les rues des processions religieuses qui sont encore aujourd'hui interdites chez la plupart des nations de l'Europe.

Les obstacles ou les difficultés de construire et réparer les églises n'existent plus, la liberté de conscience est assurée, et l'interdiction de passer d'un rite à l'autre est définitivement abolie.

No. 696.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 21.)

(No. 82.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April* 18, 1855.

A CONFERENCE was held yesterday, when Prince Gortchakoff informed the Plenipotentiaries of the result of his reference to St. Petersburgh.

He said that as the third point was directed to the overthrow of Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, it appeared to the Emperor that it belonged to the allies rather than to him to take the initiative; that referring to a declaration of mine, he was ready to accept that declaration, but that he could not accept any condition which limited the rights of sovereignty of the Emperor in his own dominions.

I observed upon this that no doubt the Emperor was sovereign in his own dominions; but a Sovereign had his choice between maintaining all his rights and being at war, or ceding some of those rights and making peace. I instanced Louis XIV as a Sovereign who had yielded his rights over Dunkirk, and the concession he had made had been maintained from 1713 to 1783.

Prince Gortchakoff answered me, not by denying the power or the propriety of making similar concessions, but by alleging that Louis XIV had then sustained repeated defeats, which was not the case of Russia at the present time.

The Conference was then adjourned after a somewhat animated discussion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 697.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 83.)

Vienna, April 18, 1855.

My Lord,

YESTERDAY after the Conference the Plenipotentiaries of France, Great Britain, and Turkey, met in Count Buol's apartment.

There had been an anxious feeling at the result of our former meeting. The position on both sides appeared to be uneasy, though much more on the side of Austria than on ours. We should, indeed, have a great war to conduct at an immense expense without any obvious termination.

It would, indeed, in all probability have continued to be a struggle glorious to England and to France, and calculated to maintain the reputation of those two great Powers. But the waste of life and money would be enormous.

On the other hand, the fact of Austria's declining to join in the war would have roused a very angry feeling in France and in Great Britain. With the Western Powers alienated, Prussia triumphing over her in Germany, and Russia bent on her humiliation, her situation would have been almost intolerable. The state of her finances would hardly have allowed her to maintain during the whole period of the war her vast army, and yet if she had diminished it she would have been forced to retire from the Principalities in breach of her engagements.

These considerations on both sides led to the prevalence of a conciliatory spirit in the meeting of yesterday. After much discussion, which was conducted with great temper on all sides, and in which the judgment and tact of Aali Pasha were of material assistance, Count Buol proposed to the belligerent Powers a general understanding to the following effect:

1. That the plan of limitation of numbers agreed to in London should be first proposed, and be supported by Count Buol.

2. That it should be proposed that Russia and Turkey, by mutual agreement, should maintain reciprocally a force no larger than that which shall remain to Russia at the end of the war. A list to be drawn up, and the Convention referred to in the Treaty to have the same force as if it formed part of the Treaty. Ships of war of the allies to be admitted into the Black Sea in limited numbers, not exceeding for each half the Russian force.

3. In case of the failure of both these propositions, he thought that bases of peace might be found in the following conditions:

A general engagement to respect the integrity of the Turkish Empire, on behalf of each of the Powers, and against any one of them which should violate this engagement.

A provision that the closing of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus should continue to be the rule, with the exception that Powers which have not establishments in the Black Sea may be admitted by the Sultan to the extent of half the number maintained by Russia for each Power.

Consuls in the Russian ports.

A Treaty with Austria that if Russia shall increase her naval force in the Black Sea beyond the number maintained by her in 1853, it shall be a *casus belli* for the Contracting Powers.

It was agreed that the guarantee of the integrity of Turkey should be proposed before any of these plans, the questions being taken in the order of 1st, guarantee; 2nd, closing of Straits and limitation.

I reserved my opinion for further consideration.

Such was the general result of this important meeting.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys called upon me in the evening, and we drew up together a rough outline of the proposals to be made.

It will be seen, that supposing the second proposition to be rejected as well as the first, the value of the third depends on three things:

1. Guarantee by all the Contracting Powers of the territory of Turkey.

2. A system of counterpoise in the Black Sea.

3. The limitation of the Russian force in the Black Sea to the number of ships maintained before the war, under pain of war with the allies.

The value of this last Article consists in the maintenance of the alliance directed against Russia.

I confess it appears to me, that if this third system can be made an ultimatum by Austria, it ought to be accepted by the Western Powers. In saying this, I may appear to contradict my former opinions. But in fact I do not retract those opinions. The system of limitation I believe to be far better than that of counterpoise. But the question is between an imperfect security for Turkey and for Europe, and the continuance of the war.

Should the Government of Her Majesty, in concert with that of France, be of opinion that such a peace can be accepted, they will instruct Lord Westmorland accordingly. If not, I hope to be allowed to be heard personally before a final decision is made.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 698.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 84.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April* 13, 1855.

ANOTHER meeting of the Plenipotentiaries of the allies was held to-day at Count Buol's.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys read a draft he had made of Articles on the three systems proposed.

When this discussion was about to close, I asked Count Buol, as the third system was not in accordance with our instructions, what, supposing we supported it, and Russia rejected all the three systems, would be the conduct of Austria?

Count Buol declined to give an answer to this question, and hinted at some fourth system which might arise out of the ashes of the three systems now floating in the air.

If Her Majesty's Government should decide to accept any one of the three systems which the Conference can agree upon, I think they should insist that Austria should make the rejection of all three a *casus belli* with Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 699.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Howard.

(No. 24.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 21, 1855.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 44 of the 17th instant, I have to acquaint you that I approve of your having read to M. Thouvenel the substance of the telegraphic despatches from Lord John Russell which reached you on the date of your despatch, and I have further to acquaint you that I entirely agree with M. Thouvenel respecting the Austrian proposals.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON

No. 700.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 21.)

(No. 179.)

Vienna, April 18, 1855.

My Lord,

AT the Conference which was held yesterday the Protocol No. 9, a copy of which I have the honour of inclosing herewith, was approved and signed.

Prince Gortchakoff reported that he had received the reply of his Government to the reference which had been made to them, and expressed their satisfaction at the courteous manner in which that reference had been made. They could not, however, take the initiative in proposing any plan for putting an end to Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, but they were willing to receive any proposal which might be made with that view, and they would not exclude any proposition from discussion. Lord John Russell had stated in the Protocol No. 6 that in the eyes of England and her allies, the best conditions of peace, and the only admissible ones, would be those which, while they were most conformable to the honour of Russia would at the same time be sufficient for the security of Europe, and the Russian Government in recalling these expressions must state that they could not consent to any terms which would be dishonourable to their Emperor, and which, by limiting his sovereignty within his own dominions, would be derogatory to his honour.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed his regret that the proposals to the Russian Government which had emanated from the Conference had not been replied to by some proposition of arrangement which might have become a subject of consideration and discussion in Conference. In the absence of any such proposition he proposed the adjournment of the present meeting, in order that the allies amongst themselves might settle the proposals which they would decide upon bringing forward.

Lord John Russell expressed surprise at the statement made by Prince Gortchakoff and regretted that the answer of the Russian Cabinet was not more conformable to the spirit in which the proposal of the allied Ministers had been made to them. He remarked that the honour of the Emperor would be no more affected by a limitation of his sovereignty such as had been alluded to by Prince Gortchakoff, than the honour of Louis XIV, when he accepted the arrangement with respect to Dunkirk, or than that of Great Britain in the different arrangements which she had entered upon with the United States.

Prince Gortchakoff replied, that great Sovereigns had occasionally found themselves in a position to be obliged to make great sacrifices for their own interests, and such was the case with the King of France in the arrangement respecting Dunkirk, but Russia, he said, did not find herself at present in such a position.

Count Buol regretted that the reply of Russia was of so contracted a nature, as it did not propose any point of departure upon which to establish the future negotiations.

I then stated that it was to be hoped that the principle of the "convenance réciproque" between States bordering on a closed sea for a mutual arrangement of their respective forces, would not be excluded by the Representatives of Russia, and that I concurred in the regret expressed by my colleagues who had preceded me, that the proposal made to the Russian Government had not met with a more satisfactory reception.

After some discussion (in the course of which Prince Gortchakoff noticed with regret the meeting which the allies proposed to hold amongst themselves, which appeared to constitute a separate Conference), the proposal for the adjournment of our meeting was agreed to, and Count Buol undertook to summon another Conference as soon as the proposals of the allied Representatives were prepared.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 700.

Protocol (*No.* 9) *of a Conference held at Vienna, April* 9, 1855.

[See Inclosure in No. 694.]

No. 701.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 21.)

(No. 180.)

Vienna, April 18, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegraphic despatch of yesterday, I have to report to your Lordship, that at the meeting of the Representatives of the allied Governments which took place after the Conference had been adjourned, Count Buol brought forward for discussion the general plan for the attainment of the engagement taken by the Protocol reservé of the 28th of December last, namely, "de faire cesser la prépondérance Russe dans la Mer Noire." The plan which was developed by Count Buol consisted of the following propositions, which were successively to be offered to the Plenipotentiaries:

First. The plan of the limitation of the Russian and Turkish ships of the line with a fixed number of frigates which was not to be exceeded. This stipulation was to be accompanied by the recognition of the principle of the closing of the Straits of the Dardanelles to all foreign ships of war, with the exception of two steam-frigates of each nation—England, France, and Austria—which, upon a firman of the Sultan, were to be admitted to the Black Sea, for the purpose of observing the strict execution of the Treaty for securing the freedom of the navigation of the Danube.

Secondly. The Russian and Ottoman Governments might agree among themselves as to the number of vessels of war which each should employ or possess in the Black Sea, agreeing to announce to each other the "état" or amount of that number, and stipulating that without agreement among themselves, they would not augment them.

The stipulation for foreign vessels for the protection of the navigation of the Danube would remain the same as stated in the first proposition, and the Governments of England and France would each be empowered, upon the consent of the Sultan, to introduce into the Black Sea one half the number of vessels maintained by Russia.

Thirdly. In case Russia refused both these proposals, the allied Governments would propose that the Treaty of 1841 should be modified in the following manner:

That as Russia objected to any limitation of the number of her floating ships of war at present existing in the Black Sea, the Governments of England and France should each be empowered, upon the consent of the Sultan, to place a number of ships of war equal to half the number of Russian vessels in that sea; and if the Government of Russia increased their number of ships, for every two they added to their fleet, England and France would each have the power of adding one, until the amount of the Russian fleet reached the number of ships that Government possessed in 1853, before the commencement of the war; but if Russia exceeded that number, it would be announced to her that the Governments of England, Austria, and France, had engaged themselves by Treaty to consider it a *casus belli*, which Treaty would be published at the same time with the general Treaty of Peace. In case Russia engaged to agree to the above proposed limitation of her naval force, the Treaty would still be signed by the three Powers; its existence would be notified to Russia, but it would be considered as "reservé," and would not be published except by common consent amongst the Contracting Parties.

In addition to these stipulations, the presence of Consuls from each Government would be required to be received in the Russian ports.

The regulation as to foreign ships passing to and from the Black Sea, with the firmans of the Sultan to that effect, would be regulated according to the system hitherto established, or by agreement with the Porte.

A general guarantee of the territorial circumscription of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, with an agreement on the part of the States bordering upon that Empire, for the maintenance of the existing frontiers which constitute their present boundaries, would form one of the principal Articles of the General Treaty.

At the meeting which took place this day between the allied Representatives at Count Buol's, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Aali Pasha, produced the plan for carrying out the proposals for the modification of the Treaty of 1841, which he had yesterday undertaken to do, and which was generally approved of; after which a long discussion took place upon the general arrangements as to the mode of carrying out the engagements taken by the third basis.

In the course of this discussion, many points which had not yesterday been foreseen were entered upon, and many difficulties arose, the details of which will be fully explained to your Lordship by Lord John Russell. At the termination of the meeting, it was arranged that a Conference would be called for to-morrow, when it is probable that only the two first of the plans proposed by Count Buol, and mentioned in the commencement of this despatch, will be brought forward for discussion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 702.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 174.)

My Lord, *Berlin, April 19, 1855.*

I HAVE had some conversation this evening with Baron Manteuffel on the news from Vienna. His Excellency said that he had not much to communicate on the subject, and all that he had heard was, that Prince Gortchakoff has informed the Conference that he was ready to discuss the third point, but he had no propositions to make. His Excellency did not seem to believe that there was likely to be an immediate termination of the Conferences, though he was unable to form any opinion as to the turn the affairs were likely to take. I replied that it was strange that the Russian Plenipotentiary should have required so long a time to get so vague an answer from St. Petersburgh, and that I thought this unnecessary delay was only a further proof the desire of Russia to protract the discussions with a view to foster the existing state of indecision in Germany, and to keep Austria from entering into new engagements with the Western Powers. I asked what he considered would be the course that Austria was likely to pursue? His Excellency replied that he believed that she might be induced to act with us; that means might be employed for this purpose; and threw out a hint that her pecuniary embarrassments were the main difficulty, and that if they were overcome there would be no objection left to her joining us. I then asked what we had to expect of Germany? He answered that the influence of Austria was very great among the smaller States, that their general desire was for peace, as was the case in Prussia, and that we should meet with sympathies amongst them. Prussia then, I said, was our great difficulty and I feared her influence would be employed against us. To this his Excellency observed that she was in no way engaged to Russia; that the King had certainly no intention at this moment of joining us, but that he would not ally himself with Russia as long as we respected his position, and did nothing to interfere with his independence. But I observed to his Excellency that His Majesty must see that in the interest of peace his feelings ought to be identical with ours, and that the war in which we were engaged could only be protracted by the ambiguous position of Prussia, whilst her neutrality could scarcely be maintained if the three other great Powers were united against Russia.

Baron Manteuffel made no direct answer to this remark, but he endeavoured to convey the impression that Prussia would be open to conviction, and that means might be found, even without serious difficulty, of removing the difficulties which had arisen between her and the Western Powers, and that Prussia was not in reality so far from us as the public expression of opinion in England seemed to indicate.

Upon the whole, his tone exhibited some improvement, and he wished me at all events to understand that Prussia was perfectly free to adopt that course hereafter which circumstances would direct as best adapted to her interests.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 703.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Forbes.

(No. 8.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 20, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which you state, in your despatch No. 17 of the 14th instant, that you held to M. de Beust and to the King of Saxony, in regard to the war.

The system of counterpoise which M. de Beust regards with so much complacency, would not be the solid and durable peace for which England and France are contending, but an armed truce which they have no intention of agreeing to.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 704.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 159.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 21, 1855.*

COUNT COLLOREDO yesterday informed me that he had received a despatch from Count Buol, instructing him to state that Austria was willing to propose to Russia that her naval force in the Black Sea should not be increased beyond the number existing before the war, and would be prepared to make an increase of that number a *casus belli* for Austria.

In support of this proposed arrangement, Count Buol argues that it is of far greater importance to limit the political than the material power of Russia, and that this will be effected by the concessions that Russia has already made, and the guarantees that may still be required from her; that it did not consist with the dignity of the Emperor of Austria to discuss numbers, or to make the question of peace or war turn upon a few ships more or less; that the objects which the Western Powers have in view could be attained by the system of counterpoise, as Turkey might keep up a naval force equal to that of Russia, and that the Sultan, whenever he was menaced, might call for the aid of his allies.

I expressed in strong terms to Count Colloredo the surprise and regret with which I had listened to a proposal which must have been made with a conviction that it would be declined. Austria could not expect, and it was not the part of a friend and an ally to propose, that England and France should withdraw their fleets from the Black Sea, where the Russian flag had disappeared, and, in satisfaction for the vast sacrifices they had made, should agree to the restoration of a Russian naval force, the same in amount as before the war, which force they had repeatedly declared to be a standing menace to Turkey, and therefore a constant danger to the equilibrium and tranquillity of Europe. England and France, I added, had given abundant proofs of the value they attached to the alliance of Austria, but they were not prepared to sacrifice for it their honour and the future security of Europe, and peace upon the terms proposed by Count Buol would be as dishonourable as it would be hollow and unsafe.

I said that the opinions of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the system of counterpoise were well known to Count Buol, and it was hardly necessary to repeat that they looked upon it as impracticable and illusory.

Neither the finances nor the habits of the Turkish Government would permit of their maintaining a powerful fleet in a constant state of efficiency, and it would be most unjust towards Turkey, after the exhausting efforts she has made, and altogether at variance with the policy of the Western Powers, that she should be required to keep up a large naval force for no other purpose than to watch Russia. Neither would it suit England and France to send their fleets for the same purpose into the Black Sea, where they have no ports, nor would they be prepared to hold themselves at all times in readiness to go to the aid of the Sultan, whenever the danger which they themselves would have created by agreeing to Count Buol's proposal became more pressing and immediate.

I said, that five or ten years hence, when the navy of England was replaced on a peace establishment, and when Russia would have a powerful fleet in the Baltic, as well as a large squadron in the Black Sea, it would not be possible for Her Majesty's Government to send a naval force to protect the Sultan, and to leave our own coast exposed to insult or attack from Russia.

I told Count Colloredo that no part of Count Buol's despatch had caused me so much surprise and disappointment as that in which he stated that Austria could not submit to discuss the number of Russian ships that was to be maintained, for on that the question as to the Russian preponderance in the Black Sea mainly depended; nor could I understand in what way Austria would fulfil her engagement that Russian preponderance in the Black Sea should cease, unless the amount of Russian naval force which created that preponderance was limited; but Austria admitted this when she declared that a *casus belli* for herself would arise if Russia exceeded the number of ships which she had in the Black Sea before the war, to which number Count Buol now proposed she should be limited. If however Austria, at this moment, when she was fully alive to the danger of Russian designs; when she had made great preparations for war; and when she could reckon upon the cordial support of powerful allies, still thought it beneath her dignity to discuss numbers, and would not suffer the question of peace or war to depend on a few ships more or less, was it possible, I asked, that, some years hence, and under circumstances far less favourable, she would go to war with Russia if a single ship were added to the fleet at Sebastopol?

In conclusion, I told Count Colloredo that Count Buol's despatch gave much reason to fear that Austria would propose nothing that Russia would be unwilling to accept; while, on the other hand, it seemed probable that Russia would agree to nothing that would interfere with the determination that the Emperor Alexander announced of carrying out the policy of Peter and of Catherine.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 705.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 22.)

(No. 88.) *Vienna, April* 19, 1855.

My Lord,

THE Conference which took place this day had for its object to enable the Plenipotentiaries of France, Great Britain, and Turkey to open their propositions on the third point.

This was done with great clearness and conciseness by M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

I will not trouble your Lordship with speeches which will afterwards appear in the Protocol, but make it my endeavour to convey the general impression which I received.

The guarantee of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire met with no serious opposition.

Aali Pasha proposed a declaration placing Turkey under the safeguard of the European system, which tallied well in substance with the Article drawn up by M. Drouyn de Lhuys. A few words were added, to make the sense of the Article suit the case of a wrong on the part of Turkey.

Another pretension of Russia, namely, that of making her Treaties with Turkey separate from the public law of Europe, is thus overthrown.

Upon the Articles in the project here annexed, which fix the numbers of Russian vessels in the Black Sea, being read, Prince Gortchakoff desired to hear the opinions of every member of the Conference.

Count Buol, who spoke last, gave the plan proposed his hearty support.

Prince Gortchakoff requested him to state how far he would carry the support of his Government; but the Austrian Minister said, with great dignity and propriety, that the present object was to come to an understanding; any ulterior purpose must be reserved for the time when it would be necessary to declare it.

Thus deserted on all sides and seeing nothing but a compact phalanx around him, Prince Gortchakoff asked the Conference to allow him forty-eight hours to prepare his reply. He left it quite uncertain whether he meant to give a laboured negative to the proposal, or whether he would avail himself of a suggestion thrown out by us that he might make a convention with the Turkish Plenipotentiaries to be afterwards recorded in the Treaty; or finally, whether he meant to make proposals himself.

But what was quite evident was, that since the 26th of March there has been a great change in the hopes, whether of victory or disunion among the allies, which appeared to have animated the Russian Plenipotentiaries at that time. They complained that we seemed to be preparing for a rupture; they expressed sympathy with the Turks, and their fears of the power of France and England in the Mediterranean.

Still there was no symptom of yielding so far as to fix the number of the Russian fleet to be kept up in the Black Sea by the Treaty of Peace.

I am, however, inclined to think that some proposition will be made to the allies on Saturday, intended to throw upon the allies the odium of exorbitant pretensions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 705.

Project.

PREMIER SYSTEME.

Art. 1.—LES Hautes Parties Contractantes, désirant que la Sublime Porte participe aux avantages du concert établi par le droit public entre les différents Etats de l'Europe, s'engagent chacune de son côté à respecter l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, garantissent en commun la stricte observation de cet engagement, et considéreront, en conséquence, tout acte ou tout évènement qui serait de nature à y porter atteinte, comme une question d'intérêt Européen.

Art. 2.—Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et Sa Hautesse le Sultan, voulant se donner réciproquement un témoignage de leur confiance et prévenir les inquiétudes qui pourraient naître du développement excessif de leurs forces navales dans l'Euxin, s'engagent à n'avoir chacun dans cette mer que quatre vaisseaux, quatre frégates, avec un nombre proportionné de bâtiments légers et de navires non armés exclusivement adaptés au transport des troupes.

Art. 3.—La régle de la clôture des Détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, consacrée par le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, restera en vigueur sauf les exceptions spécifiées dans les Articles suivants.

Art. 4.—Chacune des Puissances Contractantes qui n'ont pas d'établissement dans la Mer Noire sera autorisée par un firman de Sa Hautesse, en le notifiant cinq jours à l'avance, à faire entrer dans cette mer un nombre de bâtiments égal à la moitié des forces navales que chacune des deux Puissances riveraines y entretiendra conformément à l'Article 2.

Art. 5.—En aucun temps les vaisseaux de guerre des nations étrangères, à l'exception des bâtiments légers appartenant aux Ambassades admis jusqu'à ce

jour, ne pourront jeter l'ancre à la Corne d'Or ; et, en temps de paix, le nombre des vaisseaux de ligne des Puissances Contractantes qui n'ont pas d'établissement dans la Mer Noire, ne pourra être de plus de quatre à la fois, devant Constantinople, dans leur trajet des Dardanelles à la Mer Noire, et de la Mer Noire aux Dardanelles.

Art. 6.—Dans le cas où (ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise!) le Sultan serait menacé d'une agression, il se réserve le droit d'ouvrir les passages à toutes les forces navales de ses alliés.

Art. 7.—Les deux Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire, pour témoigner aux autres Parties Contractantes leur désir d'entretenir avec elles les relations les plus amicales, s'engagent à admettre dans tous les ports situés sur la Mer Noire, les Consuls que celles-ci jugeraient utile d'y établir.

Art. 8.—Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et Sa Hautesse le Sultan, voulant donner une marque des sentiments généreux dont elles sont animés, promettent une amnistie pleine et entière à tous ces habitants et fonctionnaires des provinces qui ont été le théâtre de la guerre. Aucun d'eux ne pourra être recherché ni poursuivi pour ses opinions, pour ses actes, ou pour la conduite qu'il aurait tenue, soit pendant la guerre, soit pendant l'occupation temporaire des dites provinces par les troupes respectives des parties belligérantes. Les habitants des Iles d'Aland sont admis au bénéfice de cette disposition.

Art. 9.—Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne est comprise dans la présente paix. Les relations commerciales et autres sont rétablis entre ce Royaume et l'Empire de toutes les Russies sur le pied où elles étaient avant la déclaration de guerre.

No. 706.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 22.)

(No. 90.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April* 19, 1855.

I AM much gratified to find that the language recorded in my despatch No. 66, has been approved by Her Majesty's Government.

With respect to the transmission of a note to Austria, in case of the breaking off the Conference, calling upon her to execute the Treaty of December 2, I had some conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, M. de Bourqueney, and Lord Westmorland, to-day.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed that such a note would produce a reply justifying the conduct of Austria, and accusing the Western Powers of pressing their demands in an unwarrantable manner. He thought it would be unwise to irritate Austria, and rather wished to derive from the alliance such fruits as it might yet produce.

Baron de Bourqueney and Lord Westmorland concurred in this view, which appeared to me to be just.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 707.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April* 21, 1855.

AUSTRIA proposes to address an ultimatum to Russia. The terms are:

1st. Guarantee as against each other of the independence and integrity of Turkey.

2nd. The closing of the Straits, with exceptions in favour of the allies, not in favour of Russia.

3rd. The allies may have each two frigates in the Black Sea.

4th. If the Russians exceed the number of ships now actually floating in the Black Sea, the allies may have each half the number of Russian ships of war.

5th. In case of danger the Sultan may call up the whole naval forces of his allies.

6th. Austria will propose to Russia an engagement not to increase her naval forces in the Black Sea beyond the actual number existing in 1853, and whether Russia accepts this engagement or not, will sign a Treaty with us, making the increase beyond 1853 a *casus belli*.

The French Minister has proposed instead of the number of 1853, an increase beyond our limitation—say to six—say to eight. This will probably be refused by Austria. He asks the Emperor whether he is then to refuse his consent to the ultimatum of Austria, which in that case will not be sent. He asks whether in that case the Conferences are to be suspended, or put an end to.

I ask the same questions, and seeing the urgency, join the French Minister in asking for a reply by telegraph.

I write from the Conference. The Russian Ministers reject our propositions absolutely. They propose general admission through the Straits of ships of war of all nations.

Lord Westmorland asks these questions with me. I stay till Monday evening. In case my despatch No. 83 has not arrived, I add that I have expressed a hope that this proposition of Austria will not be rejected without my being present; but seeing the urgency I do not ask for this delay.

No. 708.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April* 21, 1855.

THE Conference adjourned *sine die*, after absolute refusal by the Russian Minister of the propositions of the English and French Ministers for neutralisation, as well as limitation. They declared that they had no other to make, and could discuss no other. It rests now with England and France to decide on the proposal of Austria to address to Russia the ultimatum stated in my previous message, and to instruct their Plenipotentiaries accordingly.

No. 709.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April* 22, 1855.

YOUR second despatch of yesterday renders all discussion upon the first unnecessary.

Russia has absolutely refused to adopt the principle of limitation as well as that of neutralization, and it remains, therefore, only for England and France to call upon Austria to give effect to the Treaty of the 2nd of December. Instructions upon that course of proceeding will be sent as soon as we have consulted the French Government.

No. 710.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

Paris, April 22, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

LET me know as soon as possible the answer which you propose to send to Vienna.

The Emperor will be here by 7 o'clock this evening.

No. 711.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

Foreign Office, April 22, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Russian Plenipotentiary having absolutely rejected the propositions for limitation, as well as neutralization, it appears to us that the Plenipotentiaries of England and France should at once call upon Austria to concert measures for carrying into effect the Treaty of the 2nd of December.

I have informed Lord John Russell that instructions will be sent to him as soon as we know whether the French Government agree to this mode of proceeding.

No. 712.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 24.)

Vienna, April 23, 4 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

WE have just signed together the Protocol of the Conference of Saturday. Nothing more was done at the Conference. Important steps have been taken by Count Buol in reference to the Austrian plan. The Emperor entirely approves of it, and of a defensive Treaty between Austria and the maritime Powers for the future protection of Turkey. If adopted in Paris and London it will be submitted to the Conference by Count Buol. Till this question has been decided by Her Majesty's Government, Austria cannot be asked to fulfil her Treaty. The plan is approved of by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Hammond will carry letters from me explaining and developing it. I go home by Frankfort, Cologne, and Calais.

No. 713.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 163.)

Foreign Office, April 24, 1855.

My Lord,

THE arguments used by the British Plenipotentiaries against the proposal of Count Buol, as reported in Lord John Russell's despatch of the 16th instant, are strong and conclusive, and are entirely approved by Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 714.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 164.)

Foreign Office, April 24, 1855.

My Lord,

THE memorandum by Aali Pasha, inclosed in Lord John Russell's No. 81 of the 18th instant, is dexterously drawn up, and has been read with interest by Her Majesty's Government; but I have to observe that it passes over some of the urgent wants of the Christian subjects of the Sultan.

It is true that Christian evidence is admissible in criminal Courts, though in many places it is not admitted; but the judges in such cases are still exclusively Mahometans. The only mixed tribunals are the commercial Courts, whose functions are very limited. Christian evidence is still inadmissible in civil cases; and inasmuch as robbery is a more frequent crime than murder, civil injuries are oftener perpetrated against Christians than personal injuries, and the inadmissibility of Christian evidence in civil cases is a severe and daily-felt grievance. There ought both in civil and criminal cases to be a Court composed of an equal number of Christian and Mahometan judges.

All the local authorities in the Provinces are still Mahometan, and this leads to endless oppression and injustice committed and connived at towards Christians.

There ought to be some Christian officer of suitable rank attached to each Mussulman Governor, so that such Christian officer might be appealed to by injured Christians, and he should have the right of appealing to Constantinople in the event of his not being able to obtain justice from the local Governor.

Christians ought to be allowed to rise to any rank in the military and civil services, and their advancement should not form an exception to the rule by which they are excluded from the higher ranks of their profession: the interests of the Sultan would unquestionably be promoted by enlarging the field of selection, and taking into his service many able and intelligent men who have now no access to it.

The description given in the memorandum of the Medical School at Constantinople, and of the kindly feelings which the youths of different creeds are taught to entertain towards each other, should encourage the Porte to proceed in a system which has been productive of such happy results, and primary schools should be established in all the chief towns throughout the Turkish Empire, in which Christian and Mussulman children should receive elementary instruction together.

Her Majesty's Government do full justice to the enlightened views and benevolent intentions of the Sultan, and they are convinced that if it depended solely on the will of His Majesty, justice would be impartially administered throughout his dominions, and the state of his Christian subjects would be prosperous and contented: but unfortunately the men on whom devolves the duty of giving effect to the Sultan's will are not animated by his spirit; and until rapacity, injustice, and corruption are systematically discountenanced and punished, the social system of Turkey must continue to deteriorate, and the reforms and improvements upon which the prosperity and the independence of the Ottoman Empire depend will exist only in name.

Your Lordship will communicate this despatch to Aali Pasha, and furnish him with a copy if he should desire it.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 715.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 165.)

Foreign Office, April 24, 1855.

My Lord,

THE proposal No. 2 of Count Buol, contained in Lord John Russell's despatch No. 83 of the 18th instant, is that Russia and Turkey by mutual agreement should maintain reciprocally a force no larger than that which shall remain to Russia at the end of the war; that a list should be drawn up and the Convention referred to in the Treaty to have the same force as if it formed part of the Treaty. Ships of war of the allies to be admitted into the Black Sea in limited numbers, not exceeding, for each, half the Russian force.

This would leave the principle of the limitation of the Russian fleet to stand upon a separate Convention between Russia and Turkey, to which England and France would not be Contracting Parties; and though such Convention would be referred to in the General Treaty, we know by experience that Russia has invariably attempted to escape from the obligations of such separate Conventions incorporated into the Treaty of Vienna of 1815, alleging that, though so incorporated, they concerned only the parties who contracted them, that the incorporation was only a registration, and did not give the other parties who signed the General Treaty a right to require the execution of those separate Conventions, and this doctrine, which was repeatedly put forward in all questions relating to Poland, was equally maintained by Austria and by Prussia, as well as by Russia.

The proposal of Count Buol would also go much further than anything contemplated by England and France, because it would prevent Turkey from having anywhere, and not merely in the Black Sea, a naval force greater than that which may remain to Russia in the Black Sea at the end of the war.

In the event of the proposals being rejected by Russia, Count Buol, among other bases of peace, suggests a provision that the closing of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus should continue to be the rule, with the exception that Powers which have not establishments in the Black Sea may be admitted by the Sultan to the extent of half the number maintained by Russia for each Power.

This appears to allow an unlimited increase of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, while England and France should each have only half the Russian number—a condition which, if Russia had a large fleet and England and France were not ready to act jointly, would place that one of the two which happened to be ready in a condition of great inferiority to Russia.

I have stated in my despatch of the 21st instant,† the opinion of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the further proposal of Count Buol for a Treaty with Austria, that if Russia shall increase her naval force in the Black Sea beyond the number maintained by her in 1853, it shall be a *casus belli* for the Contracting Powers.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 716.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 166.)

Foreign Office, April 24, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to Lord John's Russell's despatch No. 82 of the 18th instant, in which his Lordship reports that he had instanced Louis XIV, who had yielded his rights over Dunkirk, and that Prince Gortchakoff replied, that Louis XIV had then sustained repeated defeats, which was not the case of Russia, I have to observe, that the discomfiture of Russia in the Black Sea has been complete. Not many months ago she possessed there a powerful fleet, and her supremacy was unquestioned; but she has since been compelled in her own

defence to sink half that fleet, and the naval and commercial flag of Russia has disappeared from the Black Sea. But the question at issue being the limitation of the naval force of Russia, the Powers by whom her supremacy has for the present been extinguished, are as well entitled to demand concessions from her as those Powers were in exacting from Louis XIV the securities which were then thought necessary for maintaining the peace of Europe.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 717.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April* 24, 1855.

WE suspend further instructions as to the course you are to take until we are fully informed as to the important steps taken by Count Buol in reference to the Austrian plan, which are alluded to in Lord John Russell's despatch received this morning.

No. 718.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 91.)

Vienna, April 21, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copies of the Protocol (No. 10) of the Conference held on the 17th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 718.

Protocol (No. 10) of a Conference held at Vienna, April 17, 1855.

Présens:

Pour l'Autriche—
M. le Comte de Buol-Schauenstein, et
M. le Baron de Prokesch-Osten;

Pour la France—
M. Drouyn de Lhuys, et
M. le Baron de Bourqueney;

Pour la Grande Bretagne—
Lord John Russell, et
M. le Comte de Westmorland;

Pour la Russie—
M. le Prince de Gortchakoff, et
M. de Titoff;

Pour la Turquie—
Aali Pacha, et
Aarif Effendi.

APRES la lecture et la signature du Protocole du 9 courant, le Comte de Buol a annoncé que le Prince Gortchakoff l'avait informé de l'arrivée de la réponse faite par la Cour Impériale de Russie au compte rendu de ses Plénipotentiaires.

Le Prince Gortchakoff a dit que sa Cour, tout en appréciant hautement les intentions qui avaient inspiré aux membres de la Conférence l'idée d'abandonner au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg l'initiative des propositions concernant le développement du troisième principe, ne se sentait point appelé à faire usage de l'initiative qui lui avait été offerte ; que toutefois elle avait autorisé ses Plénipotentiaires, conformément à ce qu'il avait déjà déclaré dans la réunion du 7 Janvier dernier, à entrer très sérieusement et avec l'intention sincère de parvenir à une entente, dans l'examen des moyens qui seraient proposés, pourvu qu'ils ne fussent pas de nature à porter atteinte aux droits de souveraineté de l'Empereur de Russie chez lui ; qu'il adhérait enfin pour sa part à la manière dont Lord John Russell avait posé la question, en déclarant dans la Conférence du 26 Mars, que les meilleures conditions de paix et les seules admissibles seraient celles qui, tout en étant les plus conformes à l'honneur de la Russie, seraient à la fois suffisantes pour la sécurité de l'Europe et pour obvier au retour des complications actuelles.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys exprime ses vifs regrets de voir, après un délai de dix-huit jours, renvoyer aux auteurs de la proposition l'initiative qu'ils avaient déférée à la Russie dans une Conférence à laquelle il n'avait pas assisté. Ses regrets sont d'autant plus sincères que les alliés, dans l'attente d'un résultat tout opposé, ne se trouvent pas préparés à formuler sur le champ leurs propositions. Il pense donc que les alliés devraient se réunir immédiatement pour se concerter à ce sujet. L'importance de la réserve faite par le Prince Gortchakoff l'engage à lui demander des explications ultérieures sur le sens qu'il y attache. Il lui pose la question, si la Russie considérerait ses droits de souveraineté comme atteints, en s'interdisant la liberté de construire dans la Mer Noire un nombre illimité de bâtiments de guerre.

Le Prince Gortchakoff répond, que la Russie ne consentira pas à laisser imposer, soit par Traité, soit d'une autre manière, un chiffre quelconque à l'état de sa marine.

S'associant, du reste, aux regrets exprimés par M. Drouyn de Lhuys du délai apporté aux négociations, il l'explique par les distances, en ajoutant que les Plénipotentiaires de Russie avaient été dès le 26 Mars prêts à entrer en discussion et qu'ils ne s'étaient chargés d'en référer d'abord à leur Cour qu'en cédant aux vœux unanimes qui leur en avaient été exprimés.

Quant à la nécessité qu'il y aurait, selon M. Drouyn de Lhuys, d'établir une entente préalable entre les alliés, avant de pouvoir faire des propositions, il la trouve en contradiction avec le principe posé dans les réunions préparatoires des mois de Décembre et de Janvier, que chacun conserverait individuellement son entière liberté d'interprétation au sujet du développement des quatre bases de négociation.

Le Baron de Bourqueney, en s'associant aux regrets exprimés par M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France, fait ressortir, en réponse à la dernière observation du Prince Gortchakoff, que les membres de la Conférence ont le droit de délibérer entre eux, comme ils signent les Protocoles.

Lord John Russell ne dissimule point la surprise que lui a causée la déclaration du Prince Gortchakoff. L'initiative déférée à la Russie n'avait pour but que de lui offrir l'occasion de faire des propositions conformes à son honneur. L'histoire présente plus d'un exemple de grands et glorieux Souverains qui ont consenti à une limitation de leurs droits de souveraineté chez eux, animés qu'ils étaient du désir de mettre fin à l'effusion du sang par un Traité de Paix, ou d'obvier à une rupture et aux maux de la guerre qui s'en suivent. Il cite Louis XIV souscrivant à la démolition de Dunkerque, et différents autres exemples tirés de Traités conclus entre la Grande Bretagne et la France, et la Grande Bretagne et les Etats Unis, dans le but d'éviter la guerre. Il avait espéré que la Russie ferait spontanément, et pour faciliter le rétablissement de la paix, des propositions tendantes à ce but. La Cour de St. Pétersbourg ayant décliné de prendre à ce sujet l'initiative, les chances de succès des négociations de paix se trouvent à ses yeux beaucoup diminuées.

Le Prince Gortchakoff répond, qu'une Puissance du premier ordre n'accepte guère des limitations du genre de celles auxquelles Lord John Russell a fait allusion, qu'après avoir subi une longue série de désastres, et que l'exemple de Dunkerque ne saurait en aucune façon être appliqué à la position actuelle de la Russie. Quant aux chances de paix, qui, selon Lord John Russell, ont diminué, il le prie de considérer que la Russie n'a mis hors de discussion qu'un seul

principe, tout en étant prête à examiner tous les modes de solution qui seraient proposés en dehors de ce principe.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys exprime le désir d'écarter, s'il est possible, les questions de dignité. Du moment qu'une stipulation est sanctionnée par le consentement mutuel, nul ne saurait prétendre que la souveraineté est lésée, et par conséquent l'honneur atteint. La Russie elle-même, en consentant dans le cours de la négociation à la restriction de certains droits, par exemple, dans les îles du Danube, n'a fait que souscrire à des propositions parfaitement honorables.

Le Prince Gortchakoff admet que l'honneur est sauf dès qu'il y a consentement mutuel. C'est ainsi que la Russie a jugé de sa convenance de consentir librement aux stipulations concernant le Danube. Il n'en serait pas de même quant à la limitation de ses forces dans la Mer Noire. Toutefois, il ne prétend point exclure péremptoirement l'examen de toute proposition se rattachant au principe de la limitation, sauf à y refuser son adhésion.

Le Comte de Westmorland exprime l'espoir que le principe de convenance réciproque entre Etats riverains ne sera pas exclu par les Plénipotentiaires Russes. Il partage, au reste, la pénible impression produite sur les autres Plénipotentiaires par l'accueil que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg a cru devoir faire à la proposition de prendre l'initiative.

Aali Pacha se range à l'avis de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France, que dans la nouvelle phase où la question est entrée par suite de la déclaration des Plénipotentiaires de Russie, il importe de combiner d'avance les propositions qu'on devra leur faire : il ne saurait concevoir comment on pourrait s'entendre définitivement si chacun des Plénipotentiaires devait apporter à la Conférence un plan d'arrangement formulé sans entente préalable ; ce mode lui paraîtrait en outre contraire aux engagements réciproques qui existent entre les Puissances alliées. Il ajoute cependant que, dans son opinion, la limitation des forces maritimes dans la Mer Noire offre le seul mode de solution praticable et honorable pour tout le monde.

Le Baron de Prokesch établit, que puisque les Puissances alliées se sont entendues sur les quatre bases de négociation, rien n'est plus logique pour elles que de s'entendre également sur leur application.

Le Comte Buol partage les regrets exprimés par les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne que la réponse du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg n'ait pas été de nature à servir de point de départ à des délibérations ultérieures. Il aurait désiré que la Cour Impériale de Russie n'eût pas seulement apprécié les intentions qui avaient inspiré l'offre de l'initiative, mais qu'elle se fût également pénétrée des facilités qu'elle aurait apportées à la réussite des négociations en entrant dans cette voie. Quant à l'entente proposée par M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France, elle n'est, aux yeux de Comte Buol, qu'une conséquence naturelle de l'ensemble de la position, comme de la marche suivie jusqu'ici avec fruit. Sans avoir un caractère hostile contre qui que ce soit, elle aura pour effet d'accélérer et de faciliter les négociations.

La discussion s'engage entre les Plénipotentiaires de Russie, d'un côté, et ceux d'Autriche et de France, de l'autre, sur la question de savoir, si l'entente préalable entre les quatre alliés est, ou non, contraire au principe établi, selon le Prince Gortchakoff, dans les Conférences préparatoires ; principe d'après lequel les Plénipotentiaires, après avoir constaté ensemble l'accord de leurs pensées sur les bases de paix, auraient individuellement conservé leur complète liberté d'interprétation au sujet du développement de ces bases.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys ayant prouvé par le Traité du 2 Décembre que les alliés ont contracté l'engagement réciproque de n'entrer dans aucun arrangement avec la Russie avant d'en avoir délibéré en commun, et que par conséquent rien n'est plus simple que de rencontrer dans la négociation d'un côté les alliés comme être collectif, et de l'autre la Russie, le Prince Gortchakoff, sans vouloir se dissimuler le fait de l'alliance, appuie sur la nuance qu'il y a entre une Puissance belligérante et une Puissance qui, tout en étant l'alliée des belligérants, n'est pas elle-même en état de guerre. Il établit, que lors de la conclusion du Traité du 2 Décembre, qui a eu pour objet de poser les bases de la paix, leur interprétation n'était point arrêtée, tout comme l'Autriche est restée libre de juger, dans le cas où la paix ne serait pas rétablie, laquelle des Puissances l'aurait empêchée.

Le Baron de Bourqueney ne veut pas contester que chacun des Plénipotentiaires conserve ici sa liberté d'esprit en prenant part aux délibérations de la Conférence ; mais c'est une conséquence rigoureuse du Traité du 2 Décembre

que les alliés cherchent à faire prévaloir une pensée commune vis-à-vis de l'adversaire commun.

M. de Titoff, en protestant que la Russie n'est pas l'adversaire de l'Autriche, soutient que la marche proposée constituerait non seulement une Conférence à côté de la Conférence générale, mais entraînerait aussi au point de vue pratique des lenteurs regrettables.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys réplique, que l'entente préalable par lui proposée n'est ni un fait nouveau, ni un fait illégitime; que c'est de droit que la France demande cette entente à ses alliés; qu'il ne verrait, pour sa part, des motifs de retard que dans le système contraire; qu'enfin, puisque les alliées, dans l'attente des propositions de la Russie, n'en avaient pas formulé de leur côté, il fallait bien s'en occuper maintenant de commun accord et sans le moindre retard.

Le Comte de Buol a adhéré à la proposition de M. Drouyn de Lhuys, soit au point de vue du principe, soit en considération de l'avantage pratique qu'offrirait son application—avantage déjà prouvé par la marche suivie lors de la discussion des deux premiers points, sans préjudice pour la liberté d'opinion de chacun.

Sur l'observation de M. de Titoff que l'initiative de la Sublime Porte lui semblerait au fond mieux que toute autre répondre à la nature des choses et aux exigences de la situation, M. Drouyn de Lhuys a dit que les alliés auraient à cœur de tenir très grand compte de cette initiative dans l'entente préalable qui allait avoir lieu entre eux.

MM. les Plénipotentiaires se sont réservé de convenir ultérieurement du jour où ils se réuniraient de nouveau de Conférence.

(Suivent les signatures.)

No. 719.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 94.)

Vienna, April 21, 1855.

My Lord,

BEFORE giving an account of the Conference of this day, it may be well to advert to the former Conference, the whole proceedings of which are not reported in the Protocol.

Prince Gortchakoff, as I expected, endeavoured to excite the apprehensions of Turkey of the designs of France and England. He expressed much surprise that the fleet of Russia should excite so much alarm, while the great armaments of France and England at Malta and Toulon did not appear to rouse the fears of the Sublime Porte.

To this I replied that the reason why the fleets of Russia excited more alarm in Turkey than those of France and England, was that Russia had for a century pursued a policy of aggression against Turkey; that many of the provinces under Russian dominion had been wrested from the Turkish sceptre; and that the present war was of itself a proof that Russia was a neighbour to be feared and distrusted. France and England, on the other hand, had not been suspected of a design to appropriate to themselves the provinces of Turkey, and had in their engagements with the Sultan shown themselves his disinterested supporters.

M. Titoff appealed to Christian sentiments, and deprecated the introduction of topics which might embitter the discussion.

Prince Gortchakoff alluded to the severance of Algiers from Turkey by the arms of France.

The French Plenipotentiaries answered that Algiers was held by France with the entire assent of the Sultan.

This spirit of recrimination was continued in the Conference of this day. I will not attempt to analyse the papers read by Prince Gortchakoff, which will be annexed to the Protocol; but your Lordship will see in them the laboured attempt to throw off from Russia the charge of inordinate ambition, and to excite suspicions of the intentions of the Western Powers.

There is no endeavour to represent Russia as willing to diminish her Black Sea fleet; on the contrary, the maintenance of a considerable Russian fleet in the

Black Sea is held to be necessary to the balance of power in the East. The independence of the Sultan, it is declared, would be endangered by the monopoly of naval forces in the hands of France and England. The charge of ambition is not only denied but retorted.

Such being the spirit of this document, the substance is clear and unequivocal. The proposals of France and England, and any proposals which would fix the number of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, are positively rejected. In order to put an end to Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, it is proposed that the passages of the Straits should be thrown open to vessels of war of all nations. That certain exceptions should be made for the case of the Sultan's being at war, and for special occasions.

These proposals, however, would leave the Russian Emperor at liberty to show his fleet before the Sultan's palace, and to send it at any time on a cruise to excite disaffection in the Greek Islands.

I could not forbear saying, therefore, that instead of providing a new security for the Sublime Porte, this provision would expose him to a new danger.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys urged his proposal of neutralization with great ability. He displayed the advantage to Russia of being left undisturbed in the Black Sea, and to the world of having a spacious lake unruffled by the conflicts of rival nations; he dwelt on the value of the closing of the Straits as a security to Russia against the Mediterranean Powers.

Prince Gortchakoff was evidently elated with the last news from Sebastopol.

Count Buol, after a long sitting, said it was evident no result could be attained by prolonging the discussion; he hoped other means of peace might be found.

I said that although the means of peace were, I hoped, not exhausted, our instructions were. We had nothing further to say on our present instructions.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said he must apply to the Emperor for fresh orders.

No day was fixed for our further meeting, and the Conference broke up.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 720.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 95. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Vienna, April 22, 1855.

I HAD the honour of having an audience of the Emperor this day. His Imperial Majesty dwelt much on the importance of keeping up the alliance of Austria, France, and Great Britain.

He was willing to go as far as possible to comply with the terms of the Treaty he had signed, but he could not say he was either bound or inclined to go to war for eight ships of the line, more or less. He hoped England and France would respect his opinion and his scruples in this respect. By the terms he proposed, Russia would be held in check by the entrance of the vessels of the allies, and by the limit of the establishment before the war.

I observed that the plan of counterpoise was very inconvenient. That England might be disposed to send her ships into the Black Sea at one time, and France at another. That the number of vessels maintained before the breaking out of the war, was the precise number which had given us uneasiness.

The Emperor thought that the knowledge of the firm alliance of the three Powers would be, after all, the best security for Turkey. He was not unwilling to conclude a Treaty when peace was signed, binding the three Powers to a defensive alliance in favour of Turkey. He hoped we might remain together, and that he should not be pressed to call upon his people and on Germany to go to war with Russia, for a point which it was difficult for Russia to grant, unless she was utterly defeated.

I mentioned the unfavourable impression that would be created in England, and I should think in France also, when it was known the Conference was

broken up, and that Austria was not at war with Russia. That the Czar would send fresh reinforcements to the Crimea, relieved from any fear of hostilities on the part of Austria.

The Emperor replied that he was aware of this. He deeply deplored the division among the allies, and knew the advantage which Russia would derive from it, but he could not go beyond the ultimatum he had proposed.

It is due to Her Majesty's Government to state that I believe the Emperor to be faithful to the alliance, and firm to his own convictions.

We may regret that he is not more heartily with us, and that he is not ready to enter into the war on the terms we have ourselves laid down.

The neutrality of Prussia, the attachment of his own nobility to the Muscovite cause, the disorder of the finances, and the desire for repose after so many and such severe internal troubles, may all influence the mind of the Emperor. There may be a brotherly feeling towards a young Sovereign seated, like himself, on an Imperial throne; but with all these drawbacks, I believe the Emperor Francis Joseph to mean honestly by his allies, by Europe, and by his own people. He deserves therefore consideration and respect.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 721.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 96.)

Vienna, April 22, 1855.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the paper containing the second system proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys. It differs slightly from the first, and was mixed up with it in the discussion; but I think it may be convenient that it should be formally placed on record in the Foreign Office.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 721.

Project.

SECOND SYSTEME.

Art. 1.—LES Hautes Parties Contractantes, désirant que la Sublime Porte participe aux avantages du concert établi par le droit public entre les différents Etats de l'Europe, s'engagent, chacune de son côté, à respecter l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, garantissent en commun la stricte observation de cet engagement, et considéreront, en conséquence, tout acte ou tout évènement de nature à y porter atteinte, comme une question d'intérêt Européen.

Art. 2.—Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et Sa Hautesse le Sultan ayant réglé entre elles d'un commun accord, par une Convention en date du , la pondération de leurs forces navales respectives dans la Mer Noire, la dite Convention sera communiquée aux Hautes Parties Contractantes, avec le tableau qui s'y trouve annexé, et aura la même force et valeur, à l'égard de toutes les parties, que si elle était textuellement insérée dans le présent Traité.*

Art. 3.—La régle de la clôture des Détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, consacrée par le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, restera en vigueur, sauf les exceptions spécifiées dans les Articles suivants.

Art. 4.—Chacune des Puissances Contractantes qui n'ont pas d'établissement dans la Mer Noire sera autorisée par un firman de Sa Hautesse, en la notifiant cinq jours à l'avance, à faire entrer dans cette mer un nombre de

* NOTA.—Dans cet arrangement on prendrait pour base de limitation l'effectif actuel des forces navales Russes à flot dans la Mer Noire.

bâtiments égal à la moitié des forces navales que chacune des deux Puissances riveraines y entretiendra conformément à l'Article 2.*

Art. 5.—En aucun temps les vaisseaux des Puissances étrangères, à l'exception des bâtiments légers appartenant aux Ambassades admis jusqu'à ce jour, ne pourront jetter l'ancre à la Corne d'Or; et en temps de paix, le nombre des vaisseaux de ligne des Puissances Contractantes qui n'ont pas d'établissement dans la Mer Noire, ne pourra être de plus de quatre à la fois, devant Constantinople, dans leur trajet des Dardanelles à la Mer Noire et de la Mer Noire aux Dardanelles.

Art. 6.—Dans le cas où (ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise!) le Sultan serait menacé d'une agression, il se réserve le droit d'ouvrir les passages à toutes les forces navales de ses alliés.

Art. 7.—Les deux Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire, pour témoigner aux autres Hautes Parties Contractantes leur désir d'entretenir avec elles les relations les plus amicales, s'engagent à admettre dans tous les ports situés sur la Mer Noire les Consuls que celles-ci jugeraient utile d'y établir.

Art. 8.—Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et Sa Hautesse le Sultan, voulant donner un marque des sentiments généreux dont elles sont animées, promettent une amnistie pleine et entière à tous les habitants et fonctionnaires des provinces qui ont été le théâtre de la guerre. Aucun d'eux ne pourra être recherché ni poursuivi pour ses opinions, pour ses actes ou pour la conduite qu'il aurait tenue, soit pendant la guerre, soit pendant l'occupation temporaire les dites provinces par les troupes respectives des parties belligérantes.

Les habitants des Iles d'Aland sont admis au bénéfice de cette disposition.

Art. 9.—Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne est comprise dans la présente paix. Les relations commerciales et autres sont rétablis entre ce Royaume et l'Empire de toutes les Russies sur le pied où elles étaient avant la déclaration de guerre.

No. 722.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 183.)

My Lord,

Vienna, April 22, 1855.

THE Conference assembled yesterday for the purpose of receiving the answer of Prince Gortchakoff, to the proposals which had been made to him on the 19th instant, the substance of which has been reported to you in my despatch No. 181 of the same date.

The Conference was first engaged in receiving the report of the Protocol of the Conference of Thursday, which, after some discussion was approved of, and has been signed this day, and which will be transmitted to your Lordship as soon as the lithographic copies are distributed from the Chancery of State.

Prince Gortchakoff then read an elaborate reply to the proposals which had been submitted to him, and which he desired might be inserted in the Protocol.

This reply was a total rejection of that part of the proposals which limited the number of ships of war which Russia was to possess in the Black Sea. Prince Gortchakoff stated that he conceived that by opening the navigation of the Black Sea to the ships of war of all nations, (but subject to the consent of the Porte) the Russian preponderance in the Black Sea would effectually be done away with. As the reply of Prince Gortchakoff is of considerable length, and as it will be transmitted to your Lordship with the Protocol, as soon as it is approved and signed, I will not enter into any details with regard to it, further than to state, that the mode in which the Russian Plenipotentiaries had thus responded to the proposals made to them, were considered by all the Representatives of the allied Governments, as not fulfilling the expectations which had been formed from the general tenor of the language which Prince Gortchakoff and his colleague had hitherto been understood to have employed, and this sentiment was very strongly expressed during the remainder of the sitting, as will

* NOTA.—On pourrait à l'Article 4, dans ce second système, limiter le nombre des bâtiment des Puissances alliées, à deux bâtiments stationnaires pour chacune de ces Puissances.

appear in the Protocol. The meeting terminated by a declaration on the part of Count Buol, that he should have regretted proposing that we should separate if he saw any chance of our being likely to come to an understanding, but as that was not the case, he would only say that whenever he learnt that there was any further proposal to be made to the Conference, he would invite the Representatives again to assemble.

Lord John Russell will give your Lordship ample details of this meeting, and of the impression it has left upon him, and you will have received his telegraphic message, which was written during the Conference, and in which he applies for your Lordship's directions to him and to myself as to the proposals Count Buol intends to offer, and in which M. Drouyn de Lhuys suggests an alteration. We expect your Lordship's reply by to-morrow evening.

Count Buol expressed to me his anxious hope that your Lordship might sanction his proposal, which he looked forward to with hope as likely to obtain the adhesion of Russia, and in every case to bind still closer the alliance of Austria with the Governments of England and France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 723.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 184.)
Vienna, April 22, 1855.

My Lord,

LORD JOHN RUSSELL had this day a private audience to take leave of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor. His Lordship will himself report to you the details of the conversation he had with His Majesty, who expressed to him the hope he entertained that the proposal which the Austrian Government wished to submit to the Russian Plenipotentiaries in the form of an ultimatum would be accepted and supported by the British and French Governments, and that he looked to it for the most beneficial results to the general alliance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 724.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 185.)
Vienna, April 22, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship the Protocol No. 10 of the meeting of the 17th instant, the general proceedings of which I reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 179 of the 18th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 724.

Protocol (No. 10) of a Conference held at Vienna, April 17, 1855.

[See Inclosure in No. 718.]

No. 725.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 278.)
Constantinople, April 12, 1855.

My Lord,

IN pursuance of your instructions, I have read, or rather caused to be read, to the Grand Vizier your Lordship's despatch No. 253 of the 29th ultimo.

Not having time to wait upon Reshid Pasha myself, I directed Mr. Odo Russell, attended by Mr. Stephen Pisani, to perform that duty.

I have now the honour to inclose herewith, in copy, Mr. Russell's report of what passed on the occasion.

Auli Pasha not being within reach himself, I know not from what better or other source I could hope to derive the information required by your Lordship.

With respect to my own impressions, I am not aware of having concealed any part of them from your Lordship, and without looking back into my previous correspondence, I have no hesitation in stating whatever occurs to my recollection upon the subject at this moment.

It may be doubted whether the Turkish Ministers ever expected any advantage to result from the Conferences at Vienna under existing circumstances, and it is not their habit to incur premature responsibility. It was also a question whether, on the meeting of the Plenipotentiaries, any approach to a pacific result could be obtained. They may therefore be presumed to have felt an unwillingness to take more part in the attempt to negotiate than what their ordinary diplomatic establishment allowed of.

I was myself under an impression that expedition was of more consequence than the transmission of instructions wholly without reserve; and finding, as it appeared, that my French colleague had no intention to press the appointment of a second or special Plenipotentiary, I urged the sending full powers with suitable instructions to Aarif Effendi, preferring that course to the loss of time inseparable from the selection, preparation, and conveyance to Vienna of a more important personage.

Of Arif Effendi I had never heard anything calculated to give me a mean opinion of his capacity or fitness for negotiation. The negotiations of 1840-41 were carried through by the late Chekib Effendi, an Ambassador by no means remarkable for intellectual superiority, and unacquainted with any Christian language. Riza Bey, who went out as Counsellor to the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna, was well able to supply his Excellency's deficiencies in language and information of detail.

When the Ambassador himself complained of responsibility, and cried out for help, I ceased to acquiesce in the Porte's hesitations, and hastened the departure of Auli Pasha to the best of my power. I have no reason to doubt that M. Benedetti, who had not differed from me in the outset, continued to pursue the same course with myself.

I have only to observe in conclusion, that with all confidence in the friendly and enlightened regard entertained by Her Majesty's Government for the Sultan's interests, no powers of persuasion possessed by me could prevail on the Turkish Ministers to forego their own ideas on points to which they attach a vital, though perhaps an exaggerated importance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 725.

Mr. Russell to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord,
Constantinople, April 11, 1855.

IN obedience to your Excellency's instructions, I waited this day on the Grand Vizier, and read to him the Earl of Clarendon's despatch No. 253 of the 29th ultimo.

His Highness desired me to express to you how much he regretted that any inconvenience should have been experienced at the first Conferences by the

Representatives of the allied Governments at Vienna in consequence of the absence of the second Ottoman Plenipotentiary. No doubt (certain reserves having been made) the instructions sent to Aarif Effendi were limited, but not in such manner as to cause the Porte to apprehend that the progress of the negotiations could thereby suffer.

On learning that Lord John Russell had undertaken a special mission to Vienna for the purpose of attending the Conferences, the Sultan had been deeply impressed with the necessity and importance of sending the ablest man to represent the interests of Turkey at those Conferences, and His Majesty had accordingly been pleased to make choice of His Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose abilities were well known, and whose conduct and policy had met with the approval of the allied Governments. Aali Pasha had been furnished with the necessary full powers; but his Highness, having made himself acquainted with a large number of despatches and documents relating to the subjects under discussion in the Conferences, his departure had been necessarily delayed. The Grand Vizier ended by repeating the expression of his deep regret that this unfortunate but unavoidable delay should have proved a source of annoyance to Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 726.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 25.)

(No. 279. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April* 11, 1855.

WE are threatened with a change of Ministry at the Porte. Reshid Pasha has intimated to me his wish—I might almost say his resolution—to retire. He has had occasionally some reason to be dissatisfied with Baron Koller's proceedings; but that which now weighs upon him is the conduct of M. Benedetti, having apparently for its object the establishment in power of a French party, composed principally of individuals more or less adverse to his Highness's person and policy.

The French Chargé d'Affaires, not contented with interfering between the Pasha and his adversary in a law suit, or obtaining privately from the Sultan a promise that Riza Pasha, the Seraskier, should not be removed from office, now insists on the dismissal of Kiamil Pasha, the President of the Council, for a private act, which implicates the Grand Vizier, and has a direct and sinister bearing, if not on British interests, at least on the views of Her Majesty's Government. I allude to a confidential letter addressed by Kiamil Pasha to the Viceroy of Egypt respecting M. de Lesseps and his projected canal. It was in right of family connection, and of a long tenure of office in the administration of Mehemet Ali, the Viceroy's father, that Kiamil Pasha expressed his thoughts on that subject with the knowledge and private sanction of the Grand Vizier.

This latter circumstance does not appear; but it is, no doubt, suspected by M. Benedetti, and I have reason to believe it true, though I knew nothing of the correspondence till long after it took place.

The letter in question has been lately communicated to me in confidence, and I forward a translation of it herewith for your Lordship's information.

The Viceroy, in handing it over to M. de Lesseps, appears to have committed a flagrant breach of confidence, and I do not comprehend on what ground of public right M. Benedetti can demand the punishment of its author, who does not lie open to the charge of having given any just cause of offence, either by his expressions or by the objections which he urged against the immediate adoption of a scheme repudiated by the French Government as an object of their official support.

Your Lordship knows how careful I have been to avoid giving umbrage by any kind of open or positive opposition to the proposed enterprize. Crippled in that respect by my unwillingness to compromise greater interests, I find the more reason to regret the advantage taken by M. Benedetti of my moderation, with the obvious purpose of not only forcing the acceptance of M. de Lesseps' project, but also of obtaining a signal triumph over Reshid Pasha to the complete

discomfiture of that Minister and the curtailment of British influence in connection with him.

The success of M. Benedetti's ill-timed endeavours might be taken with indifference, if it were not for the consequences which it would probably entail. The Ministers, or candidates for Ministerial employments, whom Reshid Pasha's ascendancy either excludes from office or holds in check, are those who belong more or less to the school of bigotry and corruption. If any influence, exercised by Her Majesty's Embassy, has contributed to their repression, it has not been brought into action by any personal motive, or even for any special object of British interest, but simply and purely for the benefit of the Sultan's Empire, and the advancement of those great views which are in close connection with its welfare. I may conscientiously add, that perceiving the jealousy and spirit of exaggeration which have for some time attended upon every successful proceeding of mine, I have abstained from taking a prominent part in much that might legitimately have engaged my exertions. The only result of my circumspection would seem to have been a more active and bolder determination on the part of the French Embassy to seize the very power which I have been erroneously supposed to possess, and falsely accused of having exercised to the prejudice of others.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 726.

Kiamil Pasha to Said Pasha.

(Translation.) *March* 8, 1855.

I BEG to state confidentially what follows. M. Lesseps has received the answer to the despatch of which he was the bearer, and has taken his departure. An additional despatch was given and forwarded to you inclosed. You will learn from it the delicate nature of this subject in a political point of view, and there is no need for further details. My sincere duty towards your Highness obliges me to state to you those things which I consider it incumbent on me to do.

The Grand Vizier, then, however desirous of showing his affection and regard for your Highness's person by complying with your requests, is unable to do so in this instance. This canal business is a very exceptional one, and it was necessary to require explanations respecting it. As the letter addressed by you precedingly to his Highness to sound his disposition was not of an official, but confidential character, and as people here are not familiar with the idea of a company, the subject dwelt on the minds of the Ministers. The circumstances of the times rendered its immediate execution impossible, and it was viewed as requiring protracted discussion and consideration. Lesseps arrived at this posture of affairs, and by the urgency of his demands completely indisposed the minds (of Ministers); because the subject was not brought before the Cabinet in an official shape. While it was represented unofficially on the part of the French Embassy, that the French Government would feel gratified by the construction of the canal, the English Embassy likewise made, unofficially, certain objections implying that they did not wish the canal to be made; but as they saw the danger of creating a soreness between two Governments in alliance with each other, neither of them would speak out. They want the Porte to bear the burden of the angry feelings engendered by the construction or non-construction of the canal, and act themselves behind the curtain, perceiving the danger to themselves, and, indeed, to the whole world, of engendering angry feelings between the two Governments. If the Porte were to offend either of them, it is easy to perceive the mischief and grief that would come of it. It is a strange question fraught with two great dangers to the Porte, and of protracted consequences to the world at large.

The railroad is a different matter, for it did not affect French interests in any way. The French Government not only said nothing to prevent it, but the Ambassador Lavalette, who was there at the time, encouraged the undertaking. But the Sublime Porte adopted the rule of considering the statements

of Abbas Pasha as null and void, until he should have obtained a firman. It is to be deplored, that the Sublime Porte should be beset with new difficulties at a time when she is plunged into weighty cares.

If the matter were placed in an official light between the two Governments, that is, if they discussed it between themselves, the question would assume another aspect, and the canal would be constructed or not, according to the decision come to, and we should be saved this embarrassment. The inclination evinced by your Highness has in these highly critical times added considerably to this embarrassment. The Sublime Porte, until she receives satisfactory explanations and strong security against the breaking out of embarrassing difficulties hereafter, considers herself justified in witholding the firman required (by your Highness). Your Highness, no doubt, will not take this in ill part. You will not without proper reflection, and without having obtained the permission of the Sublime Porte, commence the undertaking. My object in saying this, is founded on what Mr. Lesseps told me that your Highness would have begun, but that he prevented you. I replied to him, that your Highness would not hurry; that you understood the gravity of the question, and appreciated the value of the Sultan's favour. I consider it my duty to say, that if it should occur to your Highness to adopt the course of undertaking this work, without the official sanction of the Sublime Porte, or if you should issue an official instrument on your own responsibility, it would require a great deal to state the dangerous consequences that would result. It is above all, and without exaggeration to be apprehended, that the naval force before Sebastopol would proceed into the Egyptian waters, and that the whole world would be set by the ears—calamitous things. Because, although England does not come forward officially in this matter, she must be believed. The subject now, by being lulled, is in a fair way of being set at rest, and remaining a dead letter; otherwise, if she requires the certitude that in reality it is to be carried into execution, your Highness must not entertain any doubt, that there is nothing she will not be capable of doing.

With reference to the Egyptian side of the question, the letting out of lands to the Company for a long period, and the erection of fortifications, &c., according to the tenour of the memorandum, are matters requiring deep attention and calculation. Moreover, the hesitation shown by your late father respecting the construction of the canal, the advantage of which was clear, arose out of his not wishing to bring down upon Egypt the hostility of a powerful country like England. It was observed at the time, that the ruler in Egypt can only find peace by abstaining from giving offence to either of these two Governments, and by gratifying them as occasion may arise; for experience teaches that nothing but trouble comes out of clinging to the one, and throwing off the other.

Your Highness is aware that the affairs of this world are never free from change, so that it requires a good deal of consideration before one clings wholly to one party, and opposes strenuously the other. The English Government has her hands full with the pending question; and she is the close ally of France. If the French wish to profit by these circumstances in the expectation that England will be obliged to hold her peace, it is well known that the English is an enterprising Government. The canal in question affects closely the interests of the country. How, then, can the English Ministers, who are in the habit of making much ado about nothing, stand this?

Your Highness will see, from these details, that in proportion to the gravity of the subject and to the embarrassment of the Porte will be also the difficulties of your own position. It is a great consolation to all hands that things being in this condition, your Highness, with the ability, uprightness, and devotion evinced by you towards His Imperial Majesty will, in uniting together under these circumstances so critical to the Mussulman people the noble sentiments of zeal and patriotism, find means, surely, for staving off this evil. It will also be seen, by the vizirial despatch, that when it was proposed to Lesseps before the Commission to enter upon an explanation of the conditions of the contract, he did not remain but returned.

Relying on your Highness's pardon, and strong in my feelings of hereditary devotion, I have thus communicated the impressions I entertain, I trust that your Highness will appreciate them. I served your late father eighteen years, and having acquired his favour by communicating promptly my thoughts on

important matters, I look upon you as if our late master were still in life, and I serve you by stating my convictions. Looking to the gravity and delicacy of the subject in all its bearings, do not, out of consideration for your late father's memory, and to the circumstances of the times, put hand to this business without receiving an official sanction from the Porte. You will increase beyond measure the good consideration which you have in a short time acquired at the Sublime Porte. Think well therefore over the matter, and state your just observations and full explanations to the Sublime Porte. I beg to intreat, in the next place, that you will not be offended with me for offering any suggestions on a matter which might change the aspect of the affairs of the world. I know, moreover, that your Highness is most particularly observed of that great quality of illustrious men, that of keeping a secret. I have been emboldened by my feelings of devotion to address this communication to you, and I beg that you will not disclose it; because if it were to become known that Kiamil Pasha wrote such a letter, and the French were to get a copy of it, all the respect and consideration which I have been so long in acquiring, would be affected by it. Your Highness would not wish this, for I am aware I enjoy your favour and indulgence.

No. 727.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 179.)

My Lord, *Berlin, April 23, 1855.*

THE King and Queen of Prussia, accompanied by all the Princes and Princesses of the Royal House, were present this day at a religious ceremony held at Brandenburgh, in memory of the Emperor Nicholas, on the occasion of delivering to the 6th Regiment of Cuirassiers the uniform which the late Emperor had worn as Colonel-in-Chief of that Regiment. By His Majesty's commands all the officers in the Prussian service at Berlin, possessing Russian decorations, were ordered to attend this ceremony; and it was likewise signified to those officers retired from the service, that their presence, although not commanded, would be agreeable.

Although this ceremony cannot be considered one of novelty—the uniforms of the late Emperors Alexander and Francis having been in like manner presented as tokens of remembrance to the Prussian regiments of which they were Colonels—yet on this occasion the personal presence of their Majesties and their Court, the numerous attendance of the military, and the unusual pomp which was displayed, has imparted to it a political importance, and has stamped it in the eyes of the public with what its originators probably desired,—the character of a Russian demonstration.

The Russian Minister at this Court, having obtained the King's permission, was present at this ceremony.

Baron Manteuffel likewise attended, at His Majesty's special desire.

As great soreness has been evinced here at the enthusiastic reception given to the Emperor and Empress of the French, during their visit to Her Majesty, the Court party here has doubtless profited of this occasion to raise their Russian sympathies, and to demonstrate the intimate union existing between the two Courts. From what I can learn, however, it has produced a very contrary effect on the public, who view with dissatisfaction this worship paid by their Sovereign to Russian relics, and who regard the affair as an unmeaning triviality.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 728.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

Foreign Office, April 25, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

WE think it impossible to agree to the proposal of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, which would be a complete abandonment of the third basis.

No. 729.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

Paris, April 25, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

SUBSTANCE of the Emperor of Austria's parting words to M. Drouyn de Lhuys:

"I regret I cannot do more than the plan proposed, but when the Emperor knows it in the form in which it has last been drawn up, I hope he will find, as I do, that a perpetual alliance between us to defend the Ottoman Empire against Russia by sea and land is better than a more or less limited number. This ultimatum is war, in which I shall be supported by my conscience, by my subjects, and by Germany. Tell the Emperor that, if he adheres to it, the day it is presented to Prince Gortchakoff we will sign the Military Convention. Tell him (he added, with profound emotion), I ask for his adherence as a mark of his friendship for me. I should like much to have a meeting with him; such meetings cement union, and I should wish ours to be a lasting one."

No. 730.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

Paris, April 25, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

I RECEIVED your despatch whilst with the Emperor. There was certainly a momentary disappointment, but he rallied quickly, and evidently, at heart, thought we were right.

Unfortunately, half-an-hour after, a despatch arrived from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, which again discomposed him.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys insisted on an immediate decision in favour of his plan; spoke of the French cause being lost in Austria if it was refused; that Austria and Russia would coalesce, &c.

The Emperor eventually replied to him that he had accepted the system of limitation unwillingly, and that he could not make further concessions; that Her Majesty's Government was of the same opinion; that M. Drouyn de Lhuys was to leave Vienna without a rupture, merely saying he was coming to defend his plan.

Pray let me have a strong letter, with your opinions, before M. Drouyn de Lhuys' arrival, or he may again get the upper hand.

No. 731.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 26.)

(No. 97.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April* 23, 1855.

I HEREWITH transmit to your Lordship copies of the Protocol of the eleventh Conference, which took place on the 19th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 731.

Protocol (*No.* 11) *of a Conference held at Vienna, April* 19, 1855.

Présens:

Pour l'Autriche—
M. le Comte de Buol-Schauenstein, et
M. le Baron de Prokesch-Osten;

Pour la France—
M. Drouyn de Lhuys, et
M. le Baron de Bourqueney;

Pour la Grande Bretagne—
Lord John Russell, et
M. le Comte de Westmorland;

Pour la Russie—
M. le Prince de Gortchakoff, et
M. de Titoff;

Pour la Turquie—
Aali Pacha, et
Aarif Effendi.

LE Protocole de la dernière séance ayant été lu et approuvé, on a repris la discussion sur la troisième garantie. M. Drouyn de Lhuys a rappelé le double objet de cette garantie. La Sublime Porte étant intéressé en première ligne à ce que son existence soit plus complétement rattaché à l'équilibre Européen, M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France a invité les Plénipotentiaires Ottomans à s'expliquer les premiers sur cette partie de la question.

Aali Pacha est d'avis qu'elle pourrait être résolue d'une manière satisfaisante par une stipulation conçue dans les termes suivants:

"Les Puissances Contractantes voulant manifester l'importance qu'elles attachent à ce que l'Empire Ottoman participe aux avantages du concert établi par le droit public entre les différents Etats Européens, déclarent considérer désormais cet Empire comme partie intégrante de ce concert et s'engagent à respecter son intégrité territoriale et son indépendance comme condition essentielle de l'équilibre général."

Les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne ont donné leur entière adhésion au principe établi par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte.

Les Plénipotentiaires de Russie y adhèrent également. En expliquant leur pensée, ils ajoutent qu'ils n'entendent point par là engager leur Cour à une garantie territoriale.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys, dans le but de formuler avec plus de précision le principe unanimement admis, propose une rédaction d'Article, qui est adoptée.

Sur l'observation du Comte du Buol, qu'il fallait aussi prévoir la possibilité d'un conflit entre la Sublime Porte et une des Puissances Contractantes, on tombe d'accord sur la rédaction d'un second Article, joint ici en même temps que le premier sous Litt. A.

L'un des objets de la troisième garantie se trouvant ainsi réglé, on passe à l'autre partie de la question, savoir, la cessation de la prépondérance Russe dans la Mer Noire.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys expose ses vues sur cette matière. Il établit que le moyen le plus naturel et le plus efficace de faire cesser la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire consiste en la limitation des forces maritimes qu'elle y entretient. La Russie ayant accepté le principe de la cessation de la prépondérance dans la Mer Noire, le Gouvernement Français ne s'attendait pas à voir exclure le principal moyen d'exécution par la déclaration des Plénipotentiaires de Russie, qu'ils considéreraient toute limitation comme attentatoire aux droits de souveraineté de l'Empereur leur maître.

Il entre dans de longs développements tendant à prouver que tout Traité implique une certaine restriction des droits de souveraineté, qui toutefois, étant librement consentie, n'est nullement dérogatoire à la dignité souveraine.

Envisageant la question au point de vue des faits, il constate que la Mer Noire n'est en ce moment occupée que par les forces de trois Puissances à l'exclusion de la Russie. Ces Puissances, maîtresses de la Mer Noire, le resteront autant que durera la guerre. Ce n'est donc pas à elles à demander des concessions à la Russie. Voulant bien poser la question, il serait plus exact de dire, que c'est à la Russie à demander aux trois Puissances à quelles conditions elles consentiront à faire cesser l'exclusion dont son pavillon de guerre est actuellement frappé. S'imposer une limitation modérée pour rentrer en possession d'une portion de souveraineté, qui, de fait, n'est plus entre les mains de la Russie, ce serait donc faire un sacrifice tout à fait raisonnable et justifié par les circonstances. Ce sacrifice serait d'autant plus motivé et honorable, qu'il contribuerait essentiellement à donner à l'Europe un gage de la durée et de la solidité de la paix qu'il s'agit de rétablir.

Après avoir ajouté qu'il avait à cœur de bien constater que les propositions à faire à la Russie étaient parfaitement honorables, et qu'en les refusant elle mettrait les torts de son côté, il a donné lecture des Articles 3 à 10 ci-joints en copie sous Litt. B. En entrant dans les préliminaires de paix, sauf les changements de rédaction à y apporter, ces Articles seraient, selon lui, suffisants pour rassurer l'Europe et pour sauvegarder l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman.

Le Baron de Bourqueney n'a rien à ajouter à la clarté d'exposition ni à la force des arguments dont M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France a fait usage.

Lord John Russell a établi que dans les circonstances ordinaires une Puissance qui regarde comme excessive la force d'une Puissance limitrophe, peut avoir recours à ses propres ressources pour rétablir l'équilibre. C'est ainsi par exemple que la Grande Bretagne, ayant été informée il y a une vingtaine d'années, que la Russie avait augmenté sa flotte Baltique, s'est bornée à renforcer sa propre marine. La Mer Noire cependant se trouve placée dans une situation exceptionnelle. Le principe de la clôture de cette mer, après avoir, de tout temps, été une règle de l'Empire Ottoman, est, par le Traité de 1841, entré dans le droit public de l'Europe. Des deux Puissances qui dominent seules les bords de la Mer Noire, l'une, déjà très forte, augmente continuellement ses forces, tandis que l'autre se trouve affaiblie par les guerres qu'elle a eu successivement à soutenir contre la Russie. Dans cet état de choses l'Angleterre envisage l'accroissement excessif de la flotte Russe dans la Mer Noire comme une menace perpétuelle suspendue sur le Bosphore et Constantinople, où cette flotte pourrait, en très peu de temps, transporter des forces de terre considérables. La Turquie ne trouvant pas dans ses propres forces les garanties de sécurité qu'elle-même et l'Europe avec elle ont le droit de réclamer, il est juste de les chercher dans la diminution des forces maritimes de l'autre Puissance riveraine, dans une proportion qui ferait cesser le caractère menaçant de ces forces. Ce sacrifice étant nécessaire pour le repos de l'Europe, l'Empereur de Russie ne saurait, selon lui, le qualifier de dérogatoire à sa dignité. Admettre que l'Empire Ottoman est un élément essentiel de l'équilibre Européen et vouloir maintenir à la fois une menace perpétuelle dirigée contre cet Empire, lui semblerait une contradiction patente.

Au point de vue de l'honneur militaire il n'y aurait, selon lui, dans l'adhésion aux idées développées par M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France, rien qui pût froisser les susceptibilités de personne. Les armées qui attaquent

Sébastopol et celle qui défend cette forteresse, se sont également couvertes de gloire, et l'honneur militaire est sauf des deux côtés.

Le Comte de Westmorland, en adhérant à l'opinion de son collègue, fait valoir, en faveur du mode de solution proposé, des considérations puisées dans la convenance réciproque entre Etats riverains.

Le Comte de Buol voit dans le projet en discussion un moyen efficace pour mettre un terme à l'effusion du sang et pour rassurer l'Europe contre la disproportion excessive qui subsiste entre les forces respectives des deux Etats riverains de la Mer Noire. Il établit en thèse générale que prétendre limiter les forces de terre ou de mer d'une Puissance étrangère, ce serait porter atteinte à ses droits souverains. D'un autre côté, l'accroissement illimité de l'état militaire d'une Puissance, autorise les autres à en faire un objet de réclamations. Appliquant cette règle à la position tout exceptionnelle du Pont Euxin, mer close, où l'on ne saurait attribuer qu'une tendance agressive à un développement indéfini des forces maritimes de l'une des Puissances riveraines, il trouve que dans ce cas spécial et dans ces eaux intérieures la limitation est juste et nullement de nature à compromettre la dignité souveraine.

Le Baron de Prokesch a dit que l'Autriche ne peut que vivement désirer de voir la Russie accepter la proposition en instance, qui, à ses yeux, est propre à rassurer l'Europe et à mettre les faits en accord avec les assurances du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg.

Le Prince Gortchakoff adresse au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche la question, si la limitation des forces Russes dans la Mer Noire, que le Comte Buol avait admise par exception à un principe général reconnu par lui-même, devait dans son opinion être amenée par voie de coërcition dans le cas où la Russie se refuserait à y concourir spontanément.

Répondant à cette interpellation le Comte Buol constate que l'Autriche, quant à présent, appuie le projet en discussion, en le recommandant à l'adoption de la Russie; que du reste, il doit réserver à l'Empereur son maître toute sa liberté quant au choix des moyens par lesquels il jugerait à propos de prêter éventuellement son appui à cette proposition.

Le Prince Gortchakoff s'étant réservé de s'expliquer dans la prochaine Conférence sur le mode de solution proposé, M. Drouyn de Lhuys fait valoir tous les motifs d'urgence qui militent en faveur d'une décision immédiate, en insistant particulièrement pour savoir au moins, dès à présent, si les Plénipotentiaires de Russie acceptent ou non les grandes lignes du projet, sauf à en régler ultérieurement les détails.

Dans la discussion qui s'engage à ce sujet, les Plénipotentiaires de Russie établissent que ce n'est pas à eux qu'on saurait avec justice imputer les retards et les lenteurs de la négociation. Le Prince Gortchakoff dit, qu'il était parti du principe que chacun proposerait individuellement son mode d'exécution, mais que, se trouvant aujourd'hui en face d'un plan combiné entre quatre sur une base qu'il avait toujours indiquée comme un écueil à éviter, il croyait à bon droit pouvoir demander, pour peser mûrement ce plan, dont il n'avait entendu qu'une rapide lecture, autant de tems qu'il en avait fallu pour l'élaborer, c'est-à-dire, deux fois vingt-quatre heures.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys fait observer que si, dans le système proposé, la Russie trouvait à redire à la fixation d'un chiffre déterminé et à la signification directe et immédiate de ce chiffre aux Plénipotentiaires Russes par la Conférence, on pourrait imaginer un biais qui éviterait ce double inconvénient. Les Plénipotentiaires de la Russie et de la Porte s'entendraient entre eux au sein de la Conférence sur une base de pondération de leurs forces respectives, laquelle base serait consignée dans un arrangement qu'ils signeraient entre eux et qui, annexé au Traité, aurait même valeur et même force.

Sur l'observation générale émise par Lord John Russell, qu'il ne comprenait pas les scrupules de la Russie, lorsque la Porte se montre disposée pour sa part à épouser le principe de limitation, M. de Titoff expose que pour résoudre les difficultés d'une manière équitable et conforme aux besoins et convenances des deux Puissances riveraines, le moyen le plus efficace consisterait sans doute à faciliter des explications directes entre les Plénipotentiaires de Turquie et ceux de Russie. Pénétré des effets salutaires d'une bonne intelligence entre les deux Etats, il est persuadé que rien n'offrirait aux Plénipotentiaires Russes de meilleure occasion pour prouver les dispositions conciliantes de leur Cour, que s'ils étaient dans le cas de discuter les intérêts mutuels avec une Puissance libre de ses résolutions et de ses mouvements.

Cette opinion ayant soulevé de plusieurs côtés l'objection que les Traités signés par la Porte à l'occasion de la guerre, lui interdisent de s'arranger avec la Russie sans le concours des alliés du Sultan, M. de Titoff soutient, que discuter n'est point la même chose que s'engager. Il croit donc que sans déroger aux obligations que la Porte s'est imposées, les amis de la paix ne devraient pas décourager cette Puissance d'adopter une voie que la nature des choses indique à deux pays; que la guerre n'empêche point d'avoir une foule d'intérêts limitrophes et susceptibles d'être le mieux appréciés, dès qu'ils seraient livrés à l'examen compétent de chacun dans ses affaires.

Le Prince Gortchakoff déclare être tout-à-fait d'accord avec les sentiments exprimés par son collègue, et regrette de voir la Sublime Porte, dont il s'agit de sauvegarder l'indépendance, dans une position qui y semble si contraire.

Aali Pacha proteste contre cette manière de poser la question. Il exprime ses regrets de se voir obligé, malgré son désir de ne pas envenimer la discussion, de répondre aux observations de M. le Prince Gortchakoff, en établissant que la Sublime Porte a été forcée par des circonstances qui sont à la connaissance de tout le monde, à recourir aux armes pour défendre ses droits; que les deux Grandes Puissances Occidentales ayant reconnu la justice de sa cause, ont signé avec elle un Traité d'Alliance, qui repose sur des bases de parfaite réciprocité; que la clause qui lie l'Empire Ottoman vis-à-vis des Puissances Occidentales, de ne rien conclure sans s'entendre au préalable avec elles, les lie en retour au même degré vis-à-vis de la Sublime Porte; que du reste ses pleins pouvoirs ne l'autorisent point à entamer avec la Russie une négociation séparée en dehors de la Conférence.

Inclosure 2 in No. 731.

Annex A to Protocol No. 11.

Article 1. LES Hautes Parties Contractantes, désirant que la Sublime Porte participe aux avantages du concert établi par le droit public entre les différents Etats de l'Europe, s'engagent, chacune de son côté, à respecter l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, garantissent en commun la stricte observation de cet engagement, et considéreront, en conséquence, tout acte ou tout événement qui serait de nature à y porter atteinte, comme une question d'intérêt Européen.

Art. 2. Si un conflit survenait entre la Porte et l'une des Puissances Contractantes, ces deux Etats, avant de recourir à l'emploi de la force, devraient mettre les autres Puissances en mesure de prévenir cette extrémité par les voies pacifiques.

Inclosure 3 in No. 731.

Annex B to Protocol No. 11.

Article 3. SA Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, et Sa Hautesse le Sultan, voulant se donner réciproquement un témoignage de leur confiance et prévenir les inquiétudes qui pourraient naître du développement excessif de leurs forces navales dans l'Euxin, s'engagent à n'avoir, chacune dans cette mer, que quatre vaisseaux, quatre frégates, avec un nombre proportionné de bâtiments légers et de navires non armés, exclusivement adaptés au transport des troupes.

Art. 4. La règle de la clôture des Détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, consacrée par le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, restera en vigueur, sauf les exceptions spécifiées dans les Articles suivants.

Art. 5. Chacune des Puissances Contractantes qui n'ont pas d'établissement dans la Mer Noire, sera autorisée par un firman de Sa Hautesse, en le notifiant cinq jours à l'avance, à faire entrer dans cette mer un nombre de bâtiments égal à la moitié des forces navales que chacune des deux Puissances riveraines y entretiendra, conformément à l'Article 2.

Art. 6. En aucun temps les vaisseaux de guerre des nations étrangères,

à l'exception des bâtiments légers appartenant aux Ambassades admis jusqu'à ce jour, ne pourront jeter l'ancre à la Corne d'Or, et en temps de paix, le nombre des vaisseaux de ligne des Puissances Contractantes qui n'ont pas d'établissement dans la Mer Noire, ne pourra être de plus de quatre à la fois devant Constantinople, dans leur trajet des Dardanelles à la Mer Noire, et de la Mer Noire aux Dardanelles.

Art. 7. Dans le cas où (ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise!) le Sultan serait menacé d'une agression, il se réserve le droit d'ouvrir les passages à toutes les forces navales de ses alliés.

Art. 8. Les deux Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire, pour témoigner aux autres Hautes Parties Contractantes leur désir d'entretenir avec elles les relations les plus amicales, s'engagent à admettre dans tous les ports situés sur la Mer Noire les Consuls que celles-ci jugeraient utile d'y établir.

Art. 9. Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, et Sa Hautesse le Sultan, voulant donner une marque des sentiments généreux dont elles sont animées, promettent une amnistie pleine et entière à tous les habitants et fonctionnaires des Provinces qui ont été le théâtre de la guerre. Aucun d'eux ne pourra être recherché ni poursuivi pour ses opinions, pour ses actes, ou pour la conduite qu'il aurait tenue, soit pendant la guerre, soit pendant l'occupation temporaire des dites Provinces par les troupes respectives des parties belligérantes.

Les habitants des Iles d'Aland sont admis au bénéfice de cette disposition.

Art. 10. Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne est comprise dans la présente paix. Les relations commerciales et autres sont rétablies entre ce Royaume et l'Empire de toutes les Russies sur le pied où elles étaient avant la déclaration de guerre.

No. 732.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 98.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April 23, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copies of the Protocol of the 12th Conference, which took place on the 21st instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 732.

Protocol (No. 12) of a Conference held at Vienna, April 21, 1855.

Présens:

Pour l'Autriche—
M. le Comte de Buol-Schauenstein, et
M. le Baron de Prokesch-Osten;

Pour la France—
M. Drouyn de Lhuys, et
M. le Baron de Bourqueney;

Pour la Grande Bretagne—
Lord John Russell, et
M. le Comte de Westmorland;

Pour la Russie—
M. le Prince de Gortchakoff, et
M. de Titoff;

Pour la Turquie—
Aali Pasha, et
Aarif Effendi.

LA lecture du Protocole No. 11 donne lieu au Prince Gortchakoff de demander qu'il y soit expressément fait mention des explications dans lesquelles

il était entré dans la Conférence précédente pour établir qu'il n'attache pas à la garantie dont il est question dans l'Article I unanimement adopté, le sens d'une garantie active de l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys expose que l'engagement à contracter par les Puissances, ainsi qu'il a été constaté dans la dernière Conférence, leur impose l'obligation de respecter elles-mêmes et de faire respecter par les autres Parties Contractantes l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, de manière que toute Puissance Contractante qui porterait atteinte à cette intégrité territoriale serait responsable envers les autres, qui useraient alors, pour faire respecter l'engagement commun, de tous les moyens en leur pouvoir, l'emploi de la force non excepté.

Le Prince Gortchakoff reconnaît qu'il y aurait obligation pour la Russie de considérer toute acte attentatoire à l'intégrité territoriale comme une question d'intérêt Européen, mais il se refuse à l'engagement d'en faire un cas de guerre. Il insiste sur l'insertion au Protocole précédent de son observation explicative.

Les Plénipotentiaires de Grande Bretagne et d'Autriche, en adhérant à l'opinion exposée par M. Drouyn de Lhuys, demandent de leur côté, en même temps que les Plénipotentiaires de France, à consigner au Protocole d'aujourd'hui l'expression des regrets avec lesquels ils prennent acte de l'interprétation restrictive du Prince Gortchakoff.

Le Comte Buol ajoute que son impression avait été que les explications échangés de part et d'autre dans la dernière Conférence, avaient fait entièrement disparaître la divergence d'opinion manifestée d'abord par le Prince Gortchakoff.

La lecture du Protocole No. II terminée, le Prince Gortchakoff dit que les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ont aujourd'hui un double devoir à remplir ; celui de donner leur opinion sur les propositions faites dans la dernière Conférence, et celui d'exposer leurs propres idées sur les moyens de développer le troisième principe.

Les propositions qui leur ont été faites, étant à leurs yeux dérogatoires aux droits de souveraineté de l'Empereur leur maître, contraires à l'équilibre Européen, et dangereuses pour l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, ils ne peuvent que les décliner.

Avant de faire connaître à la Conférence les vues des Plénipotentiaires de Russie sur le sens dans lequel pourrait avoir lieu la révision du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, le Prince Gortchakoff exprime itérativement ses regrets de ne pas voir représentée ici l'une des Puissances Européennes dont le double droit de participer à ces délibérations ressort, à ses yeux, de sa qualité d'Etat de premier ordre, et du fait qu'elle est cosignataire de ce Traité.

Après avoir donné lecture du mémorandum annexé sous Litt. A, le Prince Gortchakoff demande si la Conférence désire aussi connaître les idées des Plénipotentiaires de Russie sur le mode d'application des vues générales qu'il vient d'exposer.

Lord John Russell déclare que le plan développé par le Prince Gortchakoff repose sur une base sur laquelle il n'est pas autorisé à traiter; que par conséquent il lui est interdit d'entrer dans la discussion des détails de ce plan ; que toutefois il ne peut empêcher le Prince Gortchakoff de les faire connaître.

Le Prince Gortchakoff, après avoir donné lecture de la pièce annexée sous Litt. B, tient à constater que la Russie s'étant engagée à proposer les moyens de rétablir l'équilibre des forces dans la Mer Noire, a dégagé sa parole.

Aali Pacha déclare que ses instructions lui prescrivent de maintenir le principe de la clôture des Détroits, que le plan Russe tend à abolir; que la Sublime Porte, ayant de tout temps considéré ce principe comme une garantie de son indépendance, tient à le voir respecté, sauf quelques exceptions, qui pourraient être stipulées ; que l'ouverture de la Mer Noire constituerait à ses yeux, non-seulement un danger pour l'Empire Ottoman, mais multiplierait aussi les occasions de conflit entre les Puissances Européennes.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys constate, qu'il n'est pas autorisé à discuter les détails du plan Russe, dont l'idée fondamentale est diamétralement opposée au système que la France aurait voulu faire prévaloir. Ce système tendait à obvier au danger de laisser les deux forces inégales en présence l'un de l'autre, en faisant disparaître de la Mer Noire, sauf les exceptions justifiées par le service de police des deux Etats rivernins, tout appareil de guerre, tandis que le projet Russe permettrait de l'augmenter indéfiniment. La France, empruntant cette idée à l'Impératrice Cathérine de Russie, aurait désiré faire du Pont Euxin une mer

entièrement commerciale, d'où seraient exclus les pavillons de guerre de toutes les nations ; le plan produit par le Prince Gortchakoff tend au contraire à les y appeler tous. La France maintient le principe de la clôture; la Russie veut l'abolir.

M. Titoff ayant fait observer que l'Article 5 du projet de Traité présenté par M. Drouyn de Lhuys enfreint aussi le principe de clôture et même d'une manière, selon lui, très dangereuse pour l'indépendance de la Porte, et le Prince Gortchakoff ayant également déclaré que rien ne serait menaçant pour cette indépendance et pour l'équilibre Européen en général, que des combinaisons qui admettraient de l'autre côté des Détroits l'existence des flottes les plus formidables du monde, tandis qu'en deça le contrepoids de la marine Russe serait anéanti, M. Drouyn de Lhuys réplique que le Gouvernement Ottoman est le meilleur juge de la question de savoir si les exceptions stipulées par l'Article 5 sont, ou non, conformes à son intérêt; que d'ailleurs l'exception ne fait que confirmer la règle, et qu'en tout cas il n'y a pas de comparaison possible entre les cas exceptionnels prévus par l'Article en question, et l'abolition totale du principe de clôture que la Russie propose.

Lord John Russell rappelle, qu'il a déjà établi dans la dernière Conférence que les dangers qui menacent l'Empire du Sultan ne viennent que de la Russie ; que la France, pas plus que la Grande Bretagne, ne sont soupçonnées de viser au renversement de la puissance Ottomane ; que rien ne prouve mieux que la guerre actuelle les sentiments tout opposés dont ces Gouvernements sont animés. La Sublime Porte a fait appel aux Puissances Occidentales, soit pour avoir leur assistance contre l'agression de la Russie, soit pour obtenir des garanties de sécurité pour l'avenir. L'Angleterre aurait vu un moyen efficace de les lui procurer dans l'adoption du système de neutralité de la Mer Noire, dont M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France a fait mention. La Russie aurait pu y adhérer sans danger, puisque la Mer Noire serait restée close à tous les pavillons de guerre. La Russie ayant rejeté ce système, tout comme celui de la limitation réciproque des riverains, avec admission d'un nombre restreint de bâtiments de guerre des Puissances Contractantes, et n'ayant proposé de son côté qu'un plan basé sur un principe tout opposé et n'offrant, selon lui, aucune garantie contre les dangers qu'il s'agit d'écarter, il ne peut qu'exprimer ses profonds regrets de ce qu'il n'ait pas été possible de s'entendre au sein de la Conférence sur les moyens de solution pacifique, et de voir l'Angleterre et la France réduites à la nécessité de chercher les garanties indispensables dans la continuation de l'occupation de la Mer Noire et de la Mer Baltique.

Le Comte de Westmorland partage l'opinion de son collègue.

M. de Titoff regrette que les Plénipotentiaires de Grande Bretagne ne se trouvent pas même autorisés à discuter le projet mis en avant par la Russie, tandis qu'une pareille latitude aurait semblé offrir un véritable gage de leur sincérité à désirer la paix.

Le Baron de Bourqueney ayant fait observer que tout le plan développé par les Plénipotentiaires Russes a l'air d'avoir été inspiré par la pensée que la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire, à laquelle la Conférence doit chercher les moyens de mettre fin, est une nécessité absolue pour l'équilibre Européen, le Prince Gortchakoff réplique, que le travail présenté par lui a eu le double objet de mettre en lumière, d'abord, que la force agressive de la flotte Russe dans l'Euxin n'est pas à beaucoup près aussi redoutable qu'on a l'air de le croire, et puis, que dans l'intérêt de l'équilibre Européen comme dans celui de l'indépendance de la Porte, l'existence d'une force navale Russe dans la Mer Noire est nécessaire.

Le Comte Buol dit, que l'Autriche n'ayant rien plus à cœur que de contribuer au rétablissement de la paix, il regrette sincèrement voir la Russie proposer le principe de l'ouverture de la Mer Noire, tandis que les autres Puissances sont unanimes à proclamer le principe contraire comme nécessaire à la tranquillité de l'Europe. L'Autriche comprend que la Russie tient à avoir dans la Mer Noire une force respectable, mais elle voit dans l'extension illimitée de cette force un danger non-seulement pour la Turquie, mais pour la Russie elle-même. Les Plénipotentiaires Russes ont constaté eux-mêmes, que la flotte de la Mer Noire a été trop faible pour contribuer dans la guerre actuelle efficacement à la défense des côtes. Il n'en est pas moins vrai, qu'elle est encore trop forte vis-à-vis de la marine Ottomane, ainsi que les faits de la guerre l'ont également prouvé. C'est donc dans le but d'obvier au retour de nouvelles

complications que l'Autriche désire voir apporter une certaine limitation aux forces maritimes de la Russie dans la Mer Noire.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys établit que la Russie ne veut donner à l'Empire Ottoman aucune espèce de garantie. Quant à celle renfermée dans l'Article 1, et adoptée dans la dernière Conférence, la Russie la réduit à une chimère, puisque même dans le cas où une province Turque serait envahie par une des Puissances Contractantes, la Russie, d'après l'interprétation du Prince Gortchakoff, se bornera à l'emploi de ses bons offices. De l'autre côté elle n'admet aucune limitation d'un flotte qui, au jugement de toutes les Puissances, est disproportionnée aux forces de l'autre Puissance riveraine, au point de constituer pour elle une menace permanente. La Russie signale elle-même comme un danger pour la Porte le rassemblement des forces Européennes autour de Constantinople, et cependant elle propose un plan d'après lequel elles pourraient y accourir librement, et qui permettrait même à la flotte Russe de la Baltique de venir rejoindre celle de la Mer Noire.

Le Prince Gortchakoff ne prétend point que son projet soit exempt d'inconvénients. Mieux vaudrait, en général, abandonner la Sublime Porte à ses propres inspirations et lui laisser davantage sa liberté de mouvement. En tout cas son projet présente moins d'inconvénients que celui produit par M. Drouyn de Lhuys, auquel il attribue la tendance d'humilier la Russie, puisque le principe de limitation touche aux droits souverains.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys proteste contre la tendance imputée à son projet. Si la Russie n'a pas l'intention de donner à sa marine de la Mer Noire un développement indéfini, pourquoi ne s'entendrait-elle pas de gré-à-gré avec la Puissance limitrophe sur une base de limitation réciproque, pourquoi les deux Puissances ne donneraient-elles pas ensuite connaissance à la Conférence du concert établi entre elles? Où serait là l'humiliation et où le déshonneur?

Le Baron Prokesch constate que lorsque quatre Puissances sont unanimes à voir dans l'existence d'une flotte illimitée dans la Mer Noire un danger pour l'Empire Ottoman, l'opinion contraire de la Russie ne saurait les empêcher d'aviser à des mesures de précaution pour obvier à ce danger. Les Plénipotentiaires Russes ont admis eux-mêmes, qu'un développement illimité des forces navales Russes dans la Mer Noire n'était ni dans les intérêts ni dans les intentions de la Russie. Pourquoi dès lors ne pas s'imposer cette limitation sous une forme aussi convenable que celle d'une entente réciproque entre Puissances limitrophes?

Le Prince Gortchakoff répond à M. le Baron de Prokesch qu'il ne saurait que partager le respect que le Plénipotentiaire d'Autriche manifeste pour un droit de souveraineté de la Sublime Porte; qu'il le reconnaît comme incontestable et s'incline devant ce principe; mais qu'en retour il demande à M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Autriche, pourquoi la même valeur n'est pas accordée par lui à un droit de souveraineté également incontestable de l'Empereur de Russie, celui de décider du nombre des vaisseaux qu'il lui convient d'avoir dans ses propres ports? Il lui semble que dans ce cas la réciprocité serait de la plus stricte équité.

Le Baron de Prokesch établit que la réponse est dans la différence des positions respectives, l'Autriche étant dans la crise actuelle l'alliée de Puissances qui sont en guerre avec la Russie. D'ailleurs, quelle que soit la confiance que méritent la sagesse et la modération des Souverains, elle ne suffit pas pour rendre superflues les stipulations positives des Traités, nécessaires aussi longtemps qu'il y a des Gouvernements.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys tient à répéter que le projet produit par lui avait été inspiré par une pensée sincèrement conciliante et qu'il ne renfermait absolument rien de blessant ou de provoquant pour la Russie. Le problème à résoudre consistait à trouver les moyens de rattacher l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre Européen, et de mettre fin à la prépondérance Russe dans la Mer Noire. Mais lorsqu'il s'agit de mettre à l'abri de toute atteinte l'intégrité territoriale de la Turquie, la Russie dit qu'elle veut la maintenir, mais point garantir, et lorsqu'il s'agit de parer aux dangers qui menacent la Turquie du côté de la mer, la Russie rejette péremptoirement toute espèce de limitation de sa flotte, même sous la forme d'un arrangement direct avec la Sublime Porte.

La discussion ayant été ramenée à la question de la garantie agitée déjà au début de la séance, et sur l'opinion divergente de celle des autres membres de la Conférence que les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ont émise sur la portée de cette garantie, le Baron Bourqueney constate qu'en sa qualité de signataire du Traité

de 1841, il a déjà assisté à la même lutte que celle dont il est aujourd'hui témoin. Si ses efforts n'ont pas réussi alors à faire passer le principe du préambule dans le dispositif, il aura au moins la satisfaction de soutenir deux fois la même doctrine, en face, il est vrai, des mêmes adversaires. Qui oserait contester que l'obligation internationale demandée aujourd'hui à la Russie par les quatre Puissances, inscrite alors dans les Articles d'un Traité, n'eût pas imposé à toutes les Parties Contractantes des devoirs dont le prompt accomplissement eût étouffé dans leur germe les complications actuelles?

Le Comte Buol établit que si l'une des Puissances Contractantes attache à la garantie commune un autre sens que les quatre autres, ce sera à ses risques et périls, puisques les quatre maintiendront leur interprétation.

Aali Pacha propose pour l'Article 1 une rédaction modifiée, dont copie est ci-jointe sous Litt. C, en ajoutant que l'engagement pris par chacune des Puissances Contractantes en vertu de cet Article, consiste, dans son opinion, à respecter et à faire respecter l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, et que la garantie commune s'applique par conséquent à la stricte observation de cet engagement de la part de chacune des Parties Contractantes.

Le Baron Prokesch trouve qu'il serait plus logique de fondre les Articles 1 et 2 en un seul.

La Conférence tiendra compte de ces propositions lors de la rédaction définitive.

Le Comte Buol ne regarde pas comme épuisés les différents modes de solution et considère particulièrement comme la tâche de l'Autriche de s'occuper de la recherche des moyens de rapprochement. Il espère donc que la Conférence se réunira de nouveau dès que l'un de ses membres aura de nouvelles propositions à lui faire.

Lord John Russell, tout en rendant justice à l'esprit conciliant de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche, déclare pour sa part que ses instructions sont épuisées.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys fait la même déclaration, en ajoutant qu'il se voit obligé de prendre les ordres de l'Empereur son maître, et en se réservant d'en informer éventuellement le Représentant de France à la Cour de Vienne.

(Suivent les signatures.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 732.

Annex A to Protocol No. 12.

LE Cabinet Impérial de Russie en acceptant "les quatre points" pour base de négociations, ne s'est pas dissimulé leur véritable signification; encore moins a-t-il jamais songé à l'altérer.

La pensée fondamentale qui préside aux délibérations de la Conférence est de faire cesser la position isolée de l'Empire Ottoman, de le rattacher à l'équilibre Européen, de le faire entrer dans le droit public du monde civilisé; enfin de lui assurer des conditions d'existence propres à lui offrir à lui-même des gages de sécurité, à donner à l'Europe des garanties contre de nouvelles complications.

La réalisation de cette pensée devait nécessiter des sacrifices essentiels de la part de la Russie. Décidée à les faire, pourvu qu'ils conduissent réellement au but qu'on se proposait, la Russie a accepté franchement et loyalement le nouveau programme.

Les Plénipotentiaires de Russie n'ont pas besoin de rappeler la manière large dont le Cabinet Impérial l'a tout récemment formulé. La circulaire de M. le Comte Nesselrode a été lue ici même; elle est sans doute présente à tous les esprits.

Durant tout le cours des Conférences l'attitude des Plénipotentiaires de Russie a consciencieusement répondu à ce programme. Ils ont réuni tous leurs efforts pour le mettre en œuvre avec franchise et loyauté.

Les discussions qui ont eu lieu sur la position future des Principautés du Danube, ainsi que sur la libre navigation de ce fleuve, en fournissent la preuve.

Se bornant à écarter des stipulations tout ce qui pouvait rappeler des appréhensions et des méfiances, qu'ils repoussent comme injustes et non-motivés, les Plénipotentiaires de Russie sont entrés, pour le reste, sans restriction ni

détour, dans toutes les vues tendantes à réaliser le nouveau système politique qui aurait désormais à régir l'Orient.

Ils n'ont reculé, à cet effet, devant aucun sacrifice compatible avec l'honneur et la dignité de leur Souverain et propre à concourir au but qu'on se propose d'atteindre.

Les membres de la Conférence leur rendront, on peut l'espérer, la justice de reconnaître que toutes leurs démarches ont eu pour objet de réaliser la pensée commune, qui est, de consolider la position de l'Orient de manière à faire cesser les rivalités des Grandes Puissances.

Cette pensée, ils l'apportent avec la même abnégation à la solution du troisième point. Ils désirent seulement que, pour y arriver, on veuille bien quitter le terrain des préventions, pour se placer sur celui de l'équilibre Européen qui embrasse la question Orientale.

En examinant de ce point de vue élevé les engagements qui découlent du troisième point, on arrivera facilement à une solution honorable pour tous et offrant des garanties réelles à toutes les Parties Contractantes.

Avant tout il est nécessaire de mentionner que ce que l'on veut bien appeler la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire a été le résultat de la nature et de l'ensemble des relations politiques des deux Empires riverains. C'était une supériorité d'autorité que la Russie a exercée plutôt par l'ascendant que lui donnaient ses Traités particuliers avec l'Empire Ottoman que par sa suprématie maritime. Elle résultait de l'isolement de la Porte, bien plus que de son infériorité sur mer.

Développée sous l'empire de circonstances indépendantes de la Russie, telles que la régénération de la Grèce, la bataille de Navarin, la conquête de l'Algérie par la France, les tendances autonomes du Pacha d'Égypte, des Beys de Tunis et de Tripolis, qui privaient la Porte de secours maritimes assez importants, cette infériorité n'était pas provoquée par la Russie. Elle n'avait fait l'objet d'aucune stipulation. Elle pouvait cesser au gré de la Porte.

La configuration topographique du Bosphore, si favorable à l'organisation d'un système de défense inexpugnable; la possession de forteresses et de ports, tels que Varna, Sisépolis, Bourgas, Trébisonde, &c.; l'avantage de pouvoir grouper toutes ses forces autour de trois bassins contigus, c'étaient là, et ce sont encore, des avantages marquans, que la Porte possédait et possède toujours sur la Russie, qui, obligée d'entretenir des forces navales dans quatre mers séparées par des distances immenses, ne saurait donner à sa marine dans la Mer Noire qu'un développement restreint.

Si, malgré les méfiances que, depuis une vingtaine d'années, on a cherché à exciter contre la Russie, la Porte n'usa pas de ses avantages, ne serait-ce pas parce que, au lieu de voir un danger pour elle dans le développement maritime de la Russie, elle eut l'instinct de ceux qui la menaceraient d'autre part et contre lesquels, au besoin, les forces de la Russie pourraient lui servir de défense?

Moralement aussi bien que matériellement les faits sembleraient justifier cette appréciation.

On s'est étrangement abusé à l'endroit des dangers que la flotte Russe pourrait faire courir à l'Empire Ottoman.

En affirmant dans son ouvrage sur la Russie Méridionale, qu'avec sa flotte, portée, il est vrai, à trente vaisseaux, la Russie pouvait à volonté occuper Constantinople, le Maréchal Marmont a accrédité une double erreur; d'une part, parceque les forces navales Russes de la Mer Noire ne peuvent jamais atteindre ce chiffre sans leur réunion avec celles de la Baltique, réunion qui est impossible; de l'autre, parceque si même un développement maritime aussi gigantesque pouvait s'effectuer, il serait bien loin d'offrir les dangers qu'on semble appréhender. Ce qui se passe actuellement en Crimée suffirait pour le prouver.

Les faits réels sont encore bien autrement en désaccord avec ces hypothèses. Prenons pour exemple ce qui se passait en 1833. A cette époque la flotte Russe paraît dans le Bosphore et effectue une descente, mais dans quelles conditions? C'est avec le consentement du Sultan et pour venir à son secours. D'ailleurs, appareillant de toutes voiles, la flotte Russe ne put transporter à cette époque que 10,000 à 12,000 hommes environ. Et l'on avouera que cette force, importante comme auxiliaire, eût été complétement insuffisante si elle se fut présentée en ennemie.

Depuis lors on a beaucoup parlé des développements qu'a pris la marine Russe. Malgré tout ce qu'on en a dit, que voyons-nous vingt ans après, c'est-à-dire en

1853? La flotte Russe emploie une quinzaine de jours environ pour l'embarquement, le transport et le débarquement d'une division d'Infanterie, c'est-à-dire, de 16,000 à 16,000 hommes, de Sébastopol à Redoute Kalé.

En tenant compte de la proximité des établissements maritimes de la Russie, on peut évaluer tout au plus à 20,000 hommes le nombre des troupes de descente que la marine Russe de la Mer Noire, dans son plus grand développement, serait à même de transporter sur un point quelconque du territoire Ottoman dans l'espace d'environ trois semaines.

Est-ce là un danger bien grand? Justifie-t-il les appréhensions qu'on a conçues? Ne risque-t-on pas, cherchant à l'éviter, de sacrifier à un danger chimérique les véritables conditions de la sécurité de l'Orient et d'équilibre Européen?

Des dangers ont maintes fois menacé l'Empire Ottoman d'autre part que du nord. On a vu même un Amiral du Sultan conduire sa flotte à son vassal rébelle. Qui répond que des faits de cette nature ne puissent se renouveler encore?

D'ailleurs les flottes Anglaise et Française, prises non collectivement mais isolément, ne sont ni moins puissantes ni moins dangereuses que celles de la Russie. Parceque les établissements maritimes de la France et de l'Angleterre sont plus éloignés, ils n'en sont pas plus inoffensifs. L'Europe est moins à même de surveiller les évolutions des flottes qui en sortent.

Grâce à la rapidité des communications électriques, elles peuvent, appareillant de Toulon et de Malte au moment même où la flotte Russe quitterait Sébastopol, arriver assez à tems pour parer aux dangers de la Porte. Mais qui répond qu'elles ne se présentent un jour avec la même célérité, soit isolément soit collectivement, devant le Sérail en ennemies de la Porte?

La rapidité avec laquelle la flotte Française appareilla vers Salamine en 1853, en montre la possibilité matérielle de la part de la France. Les menaces dont usait peu avant M. de Lavalette en prouvent la possibilité morale. Pour ce qui concerne l'Angleterre, nous nous bornerons à mentionner la violation du Détroit en 1849 sous prétexte de tempêtes.

Où serait, si la Mer Noire était désarmée, le secours contre de telles tentatives? Où le contrepoids pour empêcher qu'elles ne soient légèrement entreprises?

Ces simples réflexions suffisent pour démontrer, que quelle que soit la modalité qui serait adoptée dans la révision du Traité de 1841 afin de rattacher l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre Européen, le maintien dans la Mer Noire de forces navales Russes respectables, non seulement ne serait pas de nature à élever des appréhensions sérieuses, mais serait même une des conditions nécessaires pour assurer, par une pondération des forces navales qui peuvent se trouver en présence dans les eaux du Levant, le maintien intact des stipulations conclues dans l'intérêt de l'équilibre Européen; et qu'on n'objecte pas que ce serait là le maintien du *statu quo* et que par là la prépondérance que la Russie exerçait dans la Mer Noire ne viendrait pas à cesser.

Il a été démontré plus haut que cette prépondérance tenait à l'isolement de la Turquie; elle cessera donc avec l'entrée de celle-ci dans le droit public Européen.

La Porte conserverait non seulement la faculté qu'elle a toujours eue de donner selon son gré à sa marine le développement qui lui paraîtrait nécessaire, mais elle acquerrait encore une garantie morale contre toute attaque de la part de la Russie, qui, certes, ne risquerait pas, pour une entreprise des plus hasardeuses, d'attirer sur elle, par une violation du droit public Européen, une coalition générale.

Du reste, la Russie ne se refuserait pas pour sa part à offrir de nouvelles garanties par une révision du Traité de 1841, si cela était dans les convenances du Sultan.

Les transactions de la Russie conclues directement avec la Porte n'ont jamais fait de la Mer Noire une mer close. Au contraire, le Traité d'Andrinople a eu le mérite d'avoir ouvert cette mer à la navigation marchande de toutes les nations indistinctement.

La fermeture des Détroits au pavillon de guerre n'a donc pas été le résultat de transactions de la Russie avec la Porte. Elle est provenue uniquement de l'ancienne législation de l'Empire Ottoman.

Le Traité de 1841 n'a servi qu'à reconnaître et à confirmer ce principe

établi par les Sultans en leur qualité de Souverains du territoire qui avoisine les deux Détroits.

Ils sont libres d'ouvrir le passage, comme ils étaient maîtres de le tenir fermé.

Tant que les Détroits restaient clos, il en est résulté naturellement que la navigation de la Mer Noire devenait accessible uniquement aux bâtiments de guerre des deux Puissances riveraines: l'une la Russie, l'autre la Turquie.

Les Plénipotentiaires Russes sont les premiers à admettre la faculté que possède le Sultan, de droit et de fait, d'ouvrir le passage des Détroits au pavillon de guerre des Puissances avec lesquelles la Porte est en paix, mais réciproquement en ouvrant à égal titre les Détroits pour autoriser le passage d'une mer à l'autre, et cela en faveur de toutes les nations.

Adoptée d'un commun accord dans l'intérêt de l'équilibre général, une disposition semblable peut servir à faire cesser l'infériorité relative dans laquelle la Porte se trouvait placée dans la Mer Noire. Elle pourrait être complétée par d'autres mesures qui en seraient les corollaires. Convaincus que des stipulations empruntées dans cet ordre d'idées doivent amener la solution tant désirée et donner à la paix de l'Europe de nouveaux gages de sécurité, les Plénipotentiaires de Russie croient de leur devoir de faire appel aux sentiments qui animent les membres de la Conférence pour les engager à entrer dans cette voie salutaire et à discuter des propositions formulées dans ce sens.

Inclosure 3 in No. 732.

Annex B to Protocol No. 12.

Article . LES Hautes Cours Contractantes ayant à cœur de faire cesser les inquiétudes qui pouvaient naître de l'inégalité des forces navales des deux Puissances riveraines dans le bassin de la Mer Noire, Sa Hautesse le Sultan, par un acte spontané de sa volonté souveraine, consent à modifier la règle de la clôture des Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, consacrée par le Traité du $\frac{13}{13}$ Juillet, 1841, et à accorder désormais indistinctement aux pavillons de guerre de toutes les nations le libre passage à travers ces Détroits pour se rendre de l'Archipel dans la Mer Noire et *vice versâ*.

Art. . Les dispositions qui régleront le passage des bâtiments de guerre à travers les Détroits et détermineront les points et la durée des mouillages, feront l'objet d'un règlement spécial que la Sublime Porte promulguera selon les besoins de sa sécurité.

Art. . Le règlement mentionné à l'Article précédent sera identique pour les pavillons de guerre de toutes nations en état de paix avec la Sublime Porte, qui, appelées à en jouir sur un pied de parfaite égalité, s'engageront à l'observer scrupuleusement.

Art. . Sa Hautesse le Sultan se réserve toutefois, en vue de circonstances particulières, d'apporter dans les dispositions de ce règlement, en faveur de tel pavillon qu'il lui plaira, des modifications exceptionnelles et transitoires destinées à en élargir les franchises pour un temps limité.

Art. . Pour le cas où (ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise!) la Sublime Porte serait elle-même en état de guerre, ou verrait sa sécurité compromise par des hostilités qui viendraient à éclater entre d'autres Puissances, Sa Hautesse le Sultan se réserve la faculté de suspendre le libre passage à travers les Détroits, soit totalement, soit partiellement, jusqu'à la cessation des circonstances qui auraient motivé cette mesure.

Inclosure 4 in No. 732.

Annex C to Protocol No. 12.

LES Hautes Parties Contractantes, pénétrées de l'importance qu'il y aurait pour le maintien de l'équilibre général de voir la Sublime Porte participer aux avantages du concert établi par le droit public entre les différents États Européens, déclarent la considérer désormais comme partie intégrante de ce concert;

s'engagent, chacune de son côté, à respecter l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman; garantissent en commun la stricte observation de cet engagement, et considéreront en conséquence tout acte, &c.

No. 733.

Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 26.)

(No. 99.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April* 23, 1855.

I HAD some further conversation with M. Bach, and subsequently with M. Cantono, the Sardinian Chargé d'Affaires, on the subject of the sequestrations. After some remarks on the incorrectness of the list sent him, and the time required for a reference to Milan, M. Bach avowed that the chief difficulty in the way of granting a repeal of the sequestration order arose, from the open defiance of the Austrian Government by some of the persons affected, and the unwillingness of the Government to grant more liberal terms to others than those upon which Duke Litta and several more had claimed and received back their property.

I used such arguments as occurred to me against the first of these objections. I quoted from M. Cantono the illustration that as the sequestration was said to be a measure of precaution, it resembled the precaution of a householder who has lost some property. He locks the door and stops all his servants from going out. But the search made for the guilty once over, he allows them all their liberty. Austria had been two years finding out the guilty, and ought to let those who were not guilty go free.

The other objection I could not so well answer. What has been done by many proprietors, might, it seems to me, be done by the rest; I mean if it is merely an assurance of quiet and peaceable conduct.

I advised M. Cantono to get from M. Bach a copy of this assurance, and to send it to his Government. He will then take such steps as his Government may direct.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 734.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 26.)

(No. 187.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April* 23, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the lithographed copy of the Protocol No. 11 of the 19th instant. Lord John Russell left Vienna this evening; he will have stated to your Lordship that the Protocol No. 12 (a manuscript copy of which is forwarded in his despatch to your Lordship, No. 98) was this day signed at the Imperial Chancery of State. He will also have reported the communication he received from Baron Prokesch, by the express direction of the Emperor, notifying His Majesty's assent to the project of Treaty which had been drawn up by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and which Lord John Russell will submit for your Lordship's approval, with the request that you will address to me your directions with regard to it.

I cannot allow Lord John Russell to leave Vienna without expressing to your Lordship my sincere regret at his departure, and bearing testimony to the general regard and respect with which he has been received in this capital by the Imperial family, as well as by all the persons, without exception, with whom he has been placed in contact, in the course of the important negotiation with which he has been charged.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosures 1, 2, and 3 in No. 734.

Protocol (No. 11) of a Conference held at Vienna, April 19, 1855, and Annexes A and B.

[See Inclosures 1, 2, and 3 in No. 731.]

No. 735.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 26, 1855.*

COUNT BUOL called a Conference this day at the request of the Russian Representatives. I had a great objection to take part in it, but upon consulting with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who determined to attend it, I did so upon the grounds explained in my despatch of this day, but declaring, in the words of Lord John at the last Conference, that my instructions were exhausted.

The proposition of Prince Gortchakoff was, first, that the principle of closing the Straits should be maintained in time of peace.

Secondly, that the Sultan should reserve to himself the right to accord a passage through the Straits to foreign ships of war at pleasure, or whenever he should think that his security was menaced.

These propositions were not accepted, either by Austria or the allies, as advancing the objects of the Conference.

No. 736.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 27, 1855.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS left this morning for Paris. He thinks he will be of greater use in explaining his views there.

No. 737.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, April 27, 1855.*

SUBSTANCE of a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, dated yesterday evening:

The plan proposed is not our system of limit, but something better, in my opinion.

I start to-morrow, with verbatim and written explanations.

At a Conference this morning the Austrian Plenipotentiaries remained firm with us.

To judge from language of the Russians, the plan proposed at Vienna would have no chance of being accepted at St. Petersburgh. It is a decided reason for us to adhere to it, because its rejection involves the *casus belli* for Austria.

No. 738.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 332. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 27, 1855.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 279 of the 12th of April, and have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government have learnt from it, with extreme regret the intention of Reshid Pasha to resign, and they trust that in this serious crisis of the Sultan's affairs he will not carry this intention into execution.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 739.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April .)

(No. 51. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, April 25, 1855.*

I HAVE been informed, in strict confidence, that Russia entertains the intention of proposing, or causing to be proposed by some other State (probably Saxony), to the Diet a declaration of neutrality.

My information is, that a delay is caused by hesitation on the part of Bavaria to enter into a Treaty to that effect; she has, I am assured, been invited so to do by Prussia and Saxony. The proposed Treaty would be to the effect that Russia having satisfied German interests by accepting such and such conditions of the four points discussed at Vienna, those States agreed to observe a strict neutrality. Bavaria has, I am told, refused in the first instance to enter into such a Treaty. Every effort is still being made by Prussia to obtain her consent.

Decypher.—[I am assured that the price offered is the Tyrol.]

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 740.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, April 28, 1855.*

THE Emperor has telegraphed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys as follows:

If Austria will not consent to limit the naval power of Russia by a Treaty signed with that Power, break off negotiations. Anything else would be derogatory.

Summon Austria to execute the Treaty of December 2, and come back immediately.

No. 741.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, April 29, 1855.*

I HAVE received your private letter of yesterday.

Am I to continue to maintain here the impossibility of accepting the Vienna propositions, or am I to leave the matter doubtful?

M. Drouyn de Lhuys arrives to-morrow, and I cannot conceal from your Lordship that the Emperor's decision will probably depend on our view of what should be done.

Pray answer by telegraph.

No. 742.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 188.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April 24, 1855.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS called upon me this morning, to state that he had received an answer from his Government to the first proposition, which, in concert with Lord John Russell, and in accordance with the views expressed by Count Buol, he had transmitted to Paris, and that, to his great regret, this answer was not favourable. He said, that notwithstanding this first "échec," he would not give up the hope of better success, particularly as he believed the more detailed project he had since forwarded to the Emperor Napoleon, would produce a more satisfactory result. He then expressed his anxious desire that Lord John Russell should be informed of the want of success of his first communication to Paris; and as he (Lord John Russell) was as convinced of the importance of the proposal as he was himself, that he should be requested to recommend it personally or by telegraph to your Lordship, in order that upon his arrival at Paris he might hope for the support of Her Majesty's Government. M. Drouyn de Lhuys at the same time announced to me that he was going from my house to the Emperor, where he was to have his audience to take leave, and that he should leave Vienna the following morning.

Under these circumstances, I decided upon transmitting to Lord John Russell the message of M. Drouyn de Lhuys by the messenger Haviland, who had remained in Vienna after Lord John Russell's departure, and I inclose for your Lordship's information a copy of the private letter to Lord John, of which he was the bearer.

In the course of the evening, and after the departure of the messenger, I again saw M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who informed me that since the morning he had received a more favourable communication from his Government; that they had consented to reconsider their first decision upon the project which had been transmitted to them, and consequently that he had determined not to leave Vienna in the morning as he had intended.

As soon as I received this intelligence, I sent a telegraphic message to Mr. Forbes (a copy of which I inclose), requesting him to announce to Lord John Russell the circumstances I have above stated.

April 25.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has had an audience to take leave of the Emperor. His Imperial Majesty expressed to him, as he had done to Lord John Russell, his anxious hope that the project of alliance which had been discussed with Count Buol, might be accepted by the Governments of England and France. M. Drouyn de Lhuys assured me that he was so entirely convinced of the sincerity of this desire on the part of His Imperial Majesty and of his Government, and that he believed the project to be so entirely in the best interests of his own Government and that of England, that he would make every exertion with the Emperor Napoleon to obtain his assent to it. M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me that since he spoke to me on Tuesday evening, he had received

further communications from Paris, which were still more favourable than those he had reported to me, and that he should now remain in Vienna till he received further instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 742.

The Earl of Westmorland to Lord John Russell.

Dear Lord John, *Vienna, April 24, 1855.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has just been with me. He has received an answer from his Government to his telegraphic messages of the day before yesterday, which is against his project. He is now more convinced than he was before of the value of this project, and he consequently leaves Vienna to-morrow morning for Paris, that he may personally support it. He will try to see you on his journey; but he earnestly requests you will telegraph to London your own views, desiring that, if they make a favourable impression on our own Government, a telegraph to that effect may be sent to the French Government so as to meet him (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) on his arrival at Paris. He is anxious that you should reach London as early as possible in order to give your personal support to his project with your colleagues.

I send the messenger Haviland with this letter to catch you at Leipsig, and he will then go straight on to London, so that you may send by him any communication which you wish should reach London before yourself.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 2 in No. 742.

The Earl of Westmorland to Mr. Forbes.

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 24, 1855.*

PRAY tell Lord John Russell that I have dispatched the messenger Haviland, who will join him to-morrow evening either at Dresden or Leipzig. Since I wrote the private letter of which he is the bearer, to Lord John, I have again seen the person whom I mentioned in it (M. Drouyn de Lhuys). He has received favourable news from Paris, and does not, therefore, leave Vienna as he intended. The interview with the Emperor which I named took place and was satisfactory.

No. 743.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 189. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, April 25, 1855.*

I HAVE learnt from M. Drouyn de Lhuys that he had received a telegraphic message from his Government similar to the one I received from your Lordship dated the 24th instant, and in which it was stated that instructions would be sent to him when the Emperor Napoleon received the details of the important communications made by Count Buol. M. Drouyn de Lhuys was also desired to remain for the moment at Vienna.

That Minister informed me that Count Buol had distinctly stated that he was prepared if our Governments approve his project, to propose it to the Conference, and to send his ultimatum to St. Petersburgh. M. Drouyn de Lhuys considers the ultimatum to be improved since Lord John Russell saw it, and he thinks the decision of our respective Governments upon the whole project may be expected here on the 1st and 2nd of May, and that the communication might be made to the Conference, and the ultimatum dispatched to St. Petersburgh on the same day. He thinks he shall remain here till then.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys told me that he believes the Emperor Napoleon is decided to go to the Crimea, and he considers that as the Minister of Foreign Affairs he ought to accompany his Sovereign, and he would propose to join His Majesty at Constantinople from hence, unless the Emperor should require him in Paris previously.

He said he had endeavoured to dissuade His Majesty from the expedition to the Crimea. He had stated to him that he did not consider it as an undertaking of sufficient importance for the Emperor to engage in, that the position of the armies laying siege to Sebastopol was more as if they were engaged in a tournament, pent up as they are in a "presqu'île." I told him I could not but agree with him, as I considered it unlikely that the armies could break up from before Sebastopol to enter upon a campaign in the field against the Russian forces, that they could not do so without leaving a considerable body of troops to cover the works and the guns they had before that place against any sorties of the garrison, which must very much diminish the army which would have to take the field. Besides, that army must be completely equipped with Artillery, Cavalry, and the means of transport, and I doubted if there could be supplied from the means existing, or which could be assembled in the Crimea. But naturally that such questions must be decided by the generals commanding the armies, and I merely mentioned this opinion as one which presented itself to an old campaigner, but who being at a distance well knew how entirely the plans of a campaign must be judged of by the officers upon the spot, and who are in possession of all the necessary information.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys still thought that the Emperor would make a point of going to visit the allied troops in the Crimea, and of thus proving the interest which he felt in an army which had displayed so much gallantry, perseverance, and discipline.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 744.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 29.)

(No. 190.)
Vienna, April 25, 1855.

My Lord,

HAVING received an invitation from Count Buol to attend a Conference to-morrow which the Russian Plenipotentiaries had asked for, I went to M. Drouyn de Lhuys to inquire what decision he had taken upon this subject.

He said he should certainly attend the Conference; that it would be impossible to do otherwise, considering that at the close of the last Conference Count Buol had stated his hope "que la Conférence se réunira de nouveau dès que l'un de ses membres aura de nouvelles propositions à lui faire." As by his signature to the Protocol M. Drouyn de Lhuys had become a party to this declaration of Count Buol, he felt bound not to refuse his attendance, and to hear any proposition that might be made; but he should go no further, and should state at the Conference, in conformity to what had been declared by Lord John Russell, as well by himself, that his instructions were exhausted. He added that he felt he was securing an advantage for the position of his Government by attending this Conference, as if the Russian Plenipotentiaries still refused the demands made to them, they put themselves yet further in the wrong; if they yielded to them, his Government would have the means of deciding at once the course to be pursued. I told M. Drouyn de Lhuys that I had felt great doubts as to the line I should pursue on receiving the invitation to a fresh Conference; but as he appeared not to have participated in these doubts, and as I know that the first object of my Government was to act in unison with his, I should follow his line of conduct, but that I should most distinctly declare that my instructions having come to an end, I only attended to hear whatever might be proposed.

I shall therefore attend the Conference, and I hope your Lordship will approve my doing so.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 745.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 29.)

(No. 194.)
Vienna, April 26, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, in original and translation, an article upon the proceedings of the Conferences which has appeared in the "Ost-Deutsche Post" journal, which, as your Lordship is aware, is understood to reflect the opinions of the Imperial Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 745.

Extract from the "Ost Deutsche Post" of April 26, 1855.

(Translation.)

THE "Oesterreichische Correspondenz" to-day declares the Conferences to be continuing, Lord Palmerston calls them adjourned, the public looks on them as closed. In these differences there is, however, no absolute contradiction. The original organization of the Conferences, the powers entrusted to its members, the objects for which it was created, still exist; the deliberations have, however, for the moment been adjourned, and one of its most important phases is certainly closed. A period which held the expectations of the whole world in breathless suspense is passed, without bringing us satisfaction, and we find ourselves at the termination of a moment of intense excitement, as far as regards the principal question, exactly where we were, months ago. Those who mistrusted Russia's peaceful prognostications and listened incredulously to the smooth words of the last despatch of Nesselrode, have proved after all in the right.

In the "Aide mémoire" communicated by the three allied Powers to Prince Gortchakoff, in the preliminary meeting of December 28th, the third point was defined as follows:

"The revision of the Treaty of 1841 shall have for its object, to unite the existence of the Ottoman Empire more perfectly with the equilibrium of Europe, and to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea."

In the reply of Prince Gortchakoff to the four points in the Conference of January 7, the interpretation of the third point was given thus:

"Revision of Treaty of 1841, to unite the existence of the Ottoman Empire more with the equilibrium of Europe. I do not refuse to come in formal conferences for peace to an understanding on the means which the three Courts will propose to put an end to what they call the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, on condition that, in the means chosen, there shall be nothing touching the rights of sovereignty of my august master within his own territory."

On this double programme the negotiations commenced. Each party knew what it must concede; Russia knew that the meaning of the third point was a restriction of her power in the Black Sea; the allies knew that this restriction must not comprise Russian territory. In accordance herewith, all restriction of Russian arms and defences on the shores of the Pontus was excluded from the demands of the allies. Now, that the secret which the members of the Conference had bound themselves to keep during their deliberations, has to a certain degree transpired, we learn gradually what was demanded, and what refused. Two modifications were submitted to Russia for choice: either to reduce her number of ships of war in the Black Sea to a number which should make any future attempt against Constantinople impossible, or so to revise the Treaty of 1841, that it should be extended to the Pontus, so that in future ships of war of all nations should be excluded from the Dardanelles as well as the Black Sea. If there is hardly any restriction of the rights of sovereignty of the Czar within his own territory, to be found in the first

sition (for the sea is not Russian territory), still less by far is there any in the second proposal which establishes reciprocity; all exchange of obligations to be taken by all the Powers.

But Russia refused also this proposition, and it became more and more evident that her object in the negotiations for peace, was solely to gain time against her enemies, to depress their warlike energies, and get more latitude for her own armaments, concentration of troops, fortifications, organisation of militia, &c. &c. Encouraged by the gradual approach of Prussian policy towards her, by the unsteady hesitation of some of the other German States, she thought herself secure against a coalition of united Europe, and hoped to separate Austria from the Western Powers, and to isolate her, if not to drag her over in the wake of Prussia, to Russia's own side. But the wreck of these hopes must now be evident to Russia. The harmony between the Powers allied by the December Treaty is the same that it was before the Conferences. Austria looks on the four points as one whole, and the supposed loss of a few concessions on the two first for the sake of loosening the unity regarding the third, has not had the desired effect. The alliance between Austria and the West is a principle; it is not the bubble of a day which bursts at the first opportunity; it is not a question of momentary expediency, but a programme for the future, as far as human powers can foresee or control it.

Those who hoped that Austria would not vindicate her honour, those who looked to see her at the tail of Prussia, withdrawing her votes and propositions at Frankfurt, and bowing with a cry of "peccavi," before the statesmanship of Barons Manteuffel, Beust, and Van der Pfordten, will not have long to wait before they are undeceived by substantial, material proofs of their error.

No. 746.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 198.)

Vienna, April 26, 1855.

My Lord,

IN accordance with the decision communicated to you in my despatch of yesterday, No. 190, I attended at the Conference held this day, and I have already informed your Lordship, by telegraph, of the little importance which was attributed by the Representatives of Austria and of the allied Governments to the propositions of Prince Gortchakoff.

I have the honour of inclosing a copy of the document submitted to the Conference by that Minister, and I am satisfied it was rightly characterised by Count Buol, in the course of the discussion which followed its presentation, as being quite incapable of being of use towards enabling the Conference to bring to a settlement the important questions with which they were entrusted.

Previous to the presentation of this document, Prince Gortchakoff had entered into a lengthened discussion as to the extent to which his Government would agree to give their guarantee to the territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire, but as the discussion upon this point will be detailed in the Protocol, and as it led to no real change in the nature of the propositions put forward by Prince Gortchakoff at the last Conference, I need not detain your Lordship in further reporting it.

Immediately after the statement had been made by Prince Gortchakoff of the objects for which he had requested the Conference to assemble, M. Drouyn de Lhuys made the declaration, that he could not enter upon any discussion of the proposals he (the Prince) had announced, and that his full powers were "épuisés;" but he desired to reply to an insinuation which had been made by the Prince as to the menacing attitude which might be assumed by France towards Turkey with respect to the position of the Bey of Tunis: he repelled any such insinuation.

I followed the same line as M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and quoted from the Protocol of the last Conference the words which had been employed by Lord John Russell, in which he declared that his instructions were exhausted. I also repelled an insinuation which Prince Gortchakoff had put forward, that England might menace some of the possessions of Turkey from her establishment at Aden, and

I stated that, as the British Government had never broken any of the engagements she had taken, the Russian Plenipotentiaries had no right to make such an allusion. Prince Gortchakoff replied both to M. Drouyn de Lhuys and to me, by stating that what he had said was intended merely as alluding to the possibility of collisions which might arise from the possessions and positions of different Powers, but that he retracted any expression which might be construed as throwing any doubt upon the good faith of either of our Governments.

Count Buol stated that he could only look upon the proposals of Prince Gortchakoff as an "esquisse," or an "ébauche;" he admitted that the principle of recognising the closing of the Dardanelles was preferable to the one the Prince had put forward at the last Conference, but that it in no way was calculated to meet the great evil which we were called upon to provide against, namely, the preponderance of the Russian naval force in the Black Sea. All he could say with regard to the Russian proposal was, that the principle of "mare clausum," which it recognized, might possibly enter into some arrangement which would meet the objects the allied Governments had in view.

Baron Prokesch made a declaration in the same sense as Count Buol, and the Turkish Ambassador also stated that he was without any instructions which would enable him to take into consideration the proposals of Prince Gortchakoff.

I have thus reported to your Lordship, in as detailed a manner as the shortness of the time since the breaking up of the Conference has allowed me, the general import of the proceedings and of the discussions which took place. I must refer your Lordship, for a fuller report, to the lithographed Protocol which I hope to receive to-morrow or the day after, and which I will transmit to you by the first opportunity. I have only to remark that the impression of all the allied Ministers was that the proposals of Prince Gortchakoff were entirely insufficient to satisfy the expectations which had been raised that the Russian Government was prepared to make such offers as were calculated to meet the views of the allies, and to lead to the reestablishment of peace.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys, immediately upon the close of the Conference, which took place without any proposal being made for a further meeting, announced his intention of leaving Vienna to-morrow morning for Paris. I have just now taken leave of him; he is strongly impressed with the importance of agreeing to the propositions which have the sanction of Count Buol and of Lord John Russell, and which he has already proposed to his Government, and he goes to Paris with the view of pressing, in the strongest manner, their adoption. He requested this information might be communicated to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 746.

Propositions of Prince Gortchakoff at the Conference of April 26, 1855.

Article 1. LE principe de la fermeture des Détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles en temps de paix, consacré par l'ancienne législation de la Sublime Porte, et par le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, reste en pleine vigueur.

Art. 2. Le Sultan se réserve la faculté d'ouvrir à titre d'exception transitoire les Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore aux flottes des Puissances Européennes que la Sublime Porte croirait devoir appeler lorsqu'elle jugerait sa sécurité menacée.

No. 747.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 183. Confidential.)

Berlin, April 27, 1855.

My Lord,

WHEN I was with Baron Manteuffel to-day I endeavoured to learn from his Excellency what news had reached him from Vienna, and he told me that he had received some account of a counter proposition which had been presented by the Russian Plenipotentiaries, but he was either unacquainted with the details of this proposition, or he wished to avoid entering into any discussion on the subject, but he gave me to understand that the counter proposition had not been well received, though he did not say it had been altogether rejected. He seemed, however, to believe that Austria was more inclined to act with the Western Powers than she had been. As to the position of Prussia, he said it was unchanged.

He replied to a question which I put to him as whether any fresh communication had been made to this Court from St. Petersburgh that matters were as before, but I have heard from a private source, on which I place reliance, that Baron Budberg had been making overtures to this Government to declare its neutrality and to set on foot a negotiation with the smaller German Powers to unite with Prussia in this sense, and to engage other States to join the coalition; but I am assured that this proposition was declined, and that the King has positively declared that he will do nothing of the sort, but remain for the present independent of all engagements. My informant added, that though there existed much bitterness of feeling towards Austria the King would not hesitate to support her in the event of her being attacked by Russia, and that His Prussian Majesty had no intention whatever of entering into an alliance with Russia, that the King's feelings were always favourable to England, and that he was under the impression that he should hereafter be useful to her, and with this view he would keep himself free to act as circumstances might dictate.

I informed your Lordship in my despatch No. 179 of the 23rd instant, that Baron Budberg had accompanied the King to Brandenburgh last Monday, and I am assured that upon this occasion the Russian Minister sought to engage His Majesty to enter into conversation on the question of neutrality, and that he completely failed in effecting his object, and that Baron Manteuffel was mainly instrumental in preventing any discussion on this point between his Royal Master and the Russian Minister.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 748.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 48.)

Frankfort, April 23, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE had several conversations with Count Rechberg on the state of affairs in Germany, and the aspect which they assume in the Diet, since his Excellency assumed the Presidency of that body in the stead of M. de Prokesch.

Generally speaking I have found the impressions I already entertained confirmed by what I have learnt from M. de Rechberg.

He told me that he had felt it his duty very shortly after his arrival here, to write to his Government respecting the influence which it was conceived at Vienna that Austria still maintained in the Diet, in a way calculated to modify the conceptions of his Government most materially, and his Excellency allowed me confidentially to read the answer he had received from Count Buol to the representations he had made.

Count Buol, in that document, remarked on the difference of the reports made to him by Count Rechberg and by M. de Prokesch, and expressed his

regret that the state of things wore an aspect so little favourable to the policy which the Imperial Government desired to see adopted in Germany, in relation to Eastern affairs.

His Excellency said, that the reserve which it had been already found prudent to adopt, in bringing measures before the Diet, was evidently still more necessary to be observed, in consequence of the views taken of the posture of affairs by Count Rechberg than had been the case previously, and it was therefore, for the present, not advisable to moot either the question of placing the Federal Contingents on the war footing, or that of the nomination of a Commander-in-chief.

Count Rechberg went on in speaking on this subject, to advert strongly to the vast importance of the course that might be taken by Bavaria, and said that present indications were not favourable. I said that in all these transactions, past and present, in Germany, it was impossible not to see one prominent evil; every one was waiting for a decision, and in my humble opinion a bold one would carry all the wavereers with it.

If Austria now, instead of consulting the Diet as to what they had further to do in certain contingencies, after she had in fact assured herself of the principle of their support, by the adhesion given to the Additional Article, which bound the Diet to give material assistance, even if Austria's forces were attacked in the Danubian Principalities, would, in case of the Vienna Conferences being broken off, at once declare war against Russia, and then require the aid of the Confederation, I felt convinced there was a prospect of its being given under pressure of such an emergency, which no other course that could possibly be adopted held out.

I was much gratified at finding Count Rechberg assent to this opinion, and if (as I sincerely trust) he has authority for admitting the fitness of such a course, it would give better grounds for trusting that a resolution has at length been taken by Austria to pursue a policy in Eastern affairs unfettered by German dilatoriness, which no previous circumstance which has come to my knowledge has afforded.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 749.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 49.)

Frankfort, April 23, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to the dispositions in favour of Russia, well known to your Lordship to exist in so many of the German Courts, I have reason to believe that the recent interchange of extraordinary missions consequent on the death of the late and accession of the present Emperor, have tended to renew and cement the attachment so generally felt to the Great Northern Court.

The scrupulous attention with which the Russian Government has sent its Envoys to every reigning German Sovereign has been, as I am assured, unexampled, and the calculation of reaping a return for the attention is not ill-founded. I have, in fact, been assured from more than one quarter, that though the hold of the Emperor Nicholas on the fears, the respect, or the attachment of the several German Courts could hardly be increased, the expectations at present entertained by the majority of these petty Sovereigns and their courtiers and dependants, are not less strongly indicative of the feelings with which they regard his successor, and are likely greatly to influence their policy in the present conjuncture.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 750.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon:—(Received April 29.)

(No. 55. Confidential.)

Frankfort, April 27, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my preceding despatch, conveying to your Lordship the proposal for subsidizing certain of the minor German States, which I have briefly sketched from Count Rechberg's communications to me on the subject, it becomes necessary for me to add some notice of the state of things in the Diet gathered from various sources, and it will be easy for your Lordship to deduce what degree of influence such a posture of affairs must have on the particular policy of Austria.

My despatch No. 51 of the 25th instant informed your Lordship of the projected Treaty of Neutrality between Saxony and Prussia, set on foot, as I am positively told, by Saxony, and to which Bavaria has refused adherence. This refusal has for the present caused the plan of getting up a declaration of neutrality by the Diet, to drop; but so insecure does M. de Rechberg feel of his position, that he cannot venture to bring forward the proposal of mobilizing the Federal forces, in the apprehension that it would be voted for by Prussia, and immediately followed by the proposal of neutrality, which would infallibly be carried.

By a letter from the Austrian Minister at Munich, which Count Rechberg showed me this morning, I further learn that M. von der Pfordten, whose ingenuity is generally exercised in trying to steer a middle course between the divergent ones of the two greater States, is now meditating a proposal that the Diet should place the forces of the Confederation in a position to cover the rear of Austria, so as to be able to come to her assistance if Russian troops passed the frontier.

This dubious support, as Count Rechberg observed, was almost as bad as the open neutrality desired by Prussia, and such a proposal in the Diet being quite as mischievous, is equally to be feared.

I have stated to your Lordship in my preceding despatch which are the six votes on which Austria reckons in the Diet, but scarcely feel so much confidence in that of the fifteenth vote, which comprises Oldenburg, Anhalt, and Schwarzburg, as Count Rechberg professes to entertain.

If defeated in the Diet on a motion for declaring war against Russia, Austria by concert with the minority on the steps to be taken, as provided by the 42nd Article of the Final Act of the Vienna Conferences, for the case of common danger, succeeded in inducing such States as adhered to her to place their forces at her disposal, she would be under the apprehension that Prussia, under pretext of providing for the public tranquillity, might militarily occupy those States deprived of their national forces, and this consideration is, I have good ground for believing, acting strongly upon Hanover at present, and deterring that kingdom from supporting Austria as she has heretofore shown strong inclination to do.

I have always and unreservedly laid before your Lordship my conviction of the great difficulty which Austria must have in separating herself from Germany At the same time the language I have held has been that I thought she ought to do so, and that I was convinced that a bold course on her part would carry many wavereers in her wake.

I must, however, admit, though I do it with much regret, that this opinion has undergone serious modifications since I have observed the moment for decision becoming more imminent; and the causes are to be sought, not only in fear of consequences and Russian attachments, but in the material hindrances which become more and more evident and pressing as the necessity for an outlay makes itself felt, which scarcely any of these little States are in a condition to meet for a momentary exertion, much less for a prolonged effort.

They are, to use Count Rechberg's own language, proud but poor, and when called on to fulfil an obligation find all sorts of pretexts and excuses but the true one, making a vast parade of principles, which only serve to cloak their poverty, but would never stand in the way of proper arguments.

Now giving Austria all credit for sincerity of purpose and good faith in her

engagements with Great Britain and France, it is impossible not to admit, that in declaring war against Russia, without any guarantee of aid from Germany, she runs risks calculated to cause deep anxiety, and not groundless hesitation.

Her actual prospects with the Diet are anything but encouraging, and it is most natural that Austria should seek every practicable issue from the difficulties in which she finds herself; that issue would be found if a majority of the German States lent her their support, and joined with her and the Western Powers in open hostility against Russia.

The question resumes itself in the fact, that a majority in the Diet enables Austria to declare war, without doing so at a risk too great for her courage to accept; and, therefore, that her active support is to be obtained by an outlay on the part of Great Britain, which, knowing the unpalateableness of such a course, I should never have thought of recommending to your Lordship's consideration, had I not looked upon it as the only certain means of securing so all-important a result.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 751.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 174.)

Foreign Office, May 1, 1855.

My Lord,

YOUR despatches No. 190 of April 25, and No. 198 of April 26, have been received and laid before the Queen.

I have to acquaint your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve your having attended the Conference held on the 26th April, at the request of the Russian Plenipotentiaries.

Her Majesty's Government concur with the allied Plenipotentiaries that the proposals made by Prince Gortchakoff at this Conference were entirely insufficient to satisfy the expectation which had been raised, that the Russian Government was prepared to make such offers as were calculated to meet the views of the allies and to lead to the reestablishment of peace.

With regard to your Lordship attending any future Conferences which may be called, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that much inconvenience would arise from the erroneous impressions which would be created by the meetings of the Conference on occasions where there was no reasonable ground for expecting any useful result from such meetings, but that, on the other hand, it would be unadvisable to refuse a meeting, if there was any good ground for expecting that such meeting would lead to any satisfactory result.

If, therefore, at any time Count Buol should express a wish for a meeting of the Conference for the purpose of considering any proposal to be made, either by himself or by Prince Gortchakoff, your Lordship will request Count Buol to state and explain the nature of such proposal, in order that you may make it known to Her Majesty's Government, who would then be enabled to judge whether it would be worth while or not that the Conference should assemble to discuss it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 752.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, May 2, 1855.

SINCE writing to you this evening I have had a long conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys. It was anything but satisfactory, according to my humble notions of the question at issue. He said, however, that the Emperor had insisted

on the abandonment of all mention of the *status quo ante bellum*, and that he had drawn up an Article, which he had sent to London, leaving it to Turkey to decide when the Russian fleet became so excessive as to render it dangerous and to call for the interference of the allies. This, in reality, means nothing.

I pushed him on the question whether Austria would begin operations the day that Russia refused her ultimatum, supposing it to be made?

He replied that there certainly was no engagement to that effect; and he admitted that, if Austria did not pledge herself so to do, the plan proposed was worth nothing.

I will write at length by messenger, but it is clear to me that the question must be decided by Her Majesty's Government.

No. 753.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 202.)

Vienna, April 28, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, in original and translation, an extract from the "Ost Deutsche Post," relative to the concessions demanded from Russia. This journal, as your Lordship is aware, is understood to reflect the opinions of the Imperial Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 753.

Extract from the "Ost Deutsche Post" of April 28, 1855.

(Translation.)

IF Russia alone were called upon to diminish her fleet in the Black Sea, we could understand that she would rather plunge into the most hopeless war than submit to such a humiliation. But it has been repeatedly declared, not only by Austria, but by France and England as well, that no one intends to humiliate Russia. The reduction of the fleet in the Black Sea is not to be on one side alone; a reciprocal Treaty is to regulate for the future the navigation of the Black Sea. At present there is, in fact, no Russian navy there, as not the smallest boat dares venture out of her harbours, whilst the mightiest vessels of other nations traverse those waters freely. Consent to a Treaty, say the allies; from that moment the ships of war of Europe shall disappear from that sea, and the Russian navy circulate there freely and actively as before; not its merchant navy alone, but also its ships of war, if only the number of the latter be fixed at so many line-of-battle ships, frigates, &c. And the Sultan, as independent a sovereign as the Czar, will bind himself, too, to maintain no more than the same number of so many ships of war, whilst the fleets of other Powers will, by the continuation of the Dardanelles arrangement in the Treaty of 1841, be entirely excluded from those seas.

Such a Treaty would not touch the rights of sovereignty within their own territory, more or less, than any other Treaty ever signed. Certainly Russia might argue,—"We cannot look on the reduction of the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea as equivalent to that of the Russian. That the Turkish fleet is by no means dangerous to us, was sufficiently proved at Sinope. The fear of seeing the Ottomans attack Sebastopol does not in the least disturb us. But our fleet can at any moment undertake a *coup de main* against Constantinople, and not without good chance of success." These arguments would be logical enough, but they are carefully avoided, just because they contain so clearly and truly the key to the ultimate objects of the Russian fleets and fortresses on the Pontus.

The Russians rather take refuge behind sentimental protestations regarding their honour, their rights of sovereignty, and many other fine phrases, intended to divert the eyes of the world from their real motive—the accomplishment of the objects for which Catherine II indicated the road from Cherson to Constantinople, and for which the largest possible Black Sea fleet is a positive necessity.

Truly, it is not so much the supposed restriction of sovereignty within their own territory which prevents peace, but rather the insupportable restriction of their sovereignty to their own territory.

No. 754.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—Received May 3.)

(No. 499.)

My Lord,

Paris, May 2, 1855.

I HAD the honour to inform your Lordship yesterday that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had returned to Paris, and had resumed his duties as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I had a long interview with his Excellency last night, during which the conversation turned principally upon the negotiations in which he had been engaged. He alluded very early in it to the last propositions of Austria, and, it is evident, is anxious that the maritime Powers should agree to them. He said, however, that the Emperor had objected to any mention being made of the *status quo ante bellum* as that which should regulate the amount of the Russian navy in the Black Sea, and that he had consequently, with His Majesty's concurrence, drawn up, and transmitted to London, for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, a form of declaration, by which it would be in the power of the allies to send their fleets into the Black Sea whenever the Russian fleet should again assume the preponderance which appeared to them excessive.

It is not necessary that I should state to your Lordship the remarks which I made to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, because they were accompanied by a declaration, on my part, that they had no official value, and could only be considered as the opinions of an individual. I said, however, that Her Majesty's Government had the strongest objections to entertaining the proposition called the "ultimatum" of the Austrian Government. Whether the modifications now suggested would alter their opinion of its merits, was a question which they alone could determine.

I ought, however, to observe, that during the whole conversation M. Drouyn de Lhuys assumed that the cause of the allies was almost hopeless. He said that France could not afford to maintain an army of 100,000 men in the Crimea for an indefinite period; that it would be too great a drain on her resources, and expose her, in a weak state, to the attack of Germany should Germany eventually declare against her. To this I replied, that these chances ought to have been foreseen before the war was undertaken; that I did not think it was for diplomatists to determine whether our cause was a hopeless one or not; that such did not appear to be the opinion of the best military authorities; that, at the councils held while the Emperor was in England, neither Marshal Vaillant, nor Lord Hardinge, nor Sir John Burgoyne, showed any despondency, and that until they did, or that the Commanders-in-chief in the Crimea stated their situation to be unsafe, I did not see why the two Governments were to give up all for which they had been contending. If the day ever came when those armies were really in peril, the two Governments would have to consider whether they would make peace to preserve them, and, assuming a decision to be taken in the affirmative, their Plenipotentiaries would be obliged to make the best terms they could; but before this was done, it really appeared to me that the preliminary question of necessity should be well considered and determined upon.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys could not admit that military men were competent judges in such matters.

I asked his Excellency whether he understood that Austria would take the

field immediately, supposing her ultimatum to be agreed to by the Western Powers and refused by Russia. He replied that he augured from the expressions which fell from the Emperor and from Count Buol, that such was the intention of the Austrian Government; but he admitted that all that Austria had consigned to writing was, that if Russia should refuse the ultimatum, the Austrian Minister should leave St. Petersburgh, and the allied Cabinets proceed to concert what further measures should be taken. I reminded M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that during the whole of these negotiations there was hardly a document signed by Count Buol, that that Minister had not said, that in affixing his signature, it was a declaration of war he was signing, and I asked him whether he did not think that it would be better to follow the course which your Lordship had informed me was that preferred by Her Majesty's Government, namely, to ask Austria to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of the 2nd December, or to state in writing the exact nature and scope of the plan which she proposes, and what means she intends to employ in order to enforce its adoption. M. Drouyn de Lhuys answered that Austria could not be more explicit than she had been, except on the question of going to war, and that he was quite of opinion that she ought to be called upon to explain herself categorically on this point, and that her proposal ought to be rejected if her answer was not unequivocal and satisfactory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 755.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 81.)
My Lord, *Copenhagen, April 27, 1855.*

PRINCE CHRISTIAN of Denmark arrived here the day before yesterday, on his return from St. Petersburgh.

His Highness appears to have been treated with much attention by the Imperial family and the Russian authorities; and he has brought with him the insignia, in diamonds, of the Order of St. Catherine, which has been conferred on her Highness the Princess Christian.

I am told that the defences of Cronstadt were visited by his Highness, and that he describes public opinion at St. Petersburgh as being entirely in favour of a vigorous prosecution of the war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 756.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, May 4, 1855.*

THE Emperor is for rejecting Austrian propositions. Details by the messenger.

No. 757.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 4, 1855.*

IT was impossible to assemble the Cabinet yesterday; it meets to-day, and I hope to send an answer to the amended Project this evening.

No. 758.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 503.)
My Lord, *Paris, May 3, 1855.*

DURING an interview which I had with M. Drouyn de Lhuys this morning, his Excellency stated that he had heard from Count Walewski that Her Majesty's Government had come to no decision on the modification proposed by the French Government to the Austrian propositions, but that they begged to be informed whether M. Drouyn de Lhuys considered Austria engaged to go to war immediately, if Russia refused the proposed ultimatum. His Excellency added, that he had consulted the notes which he had brought with him from Vienna, and that he considered the declaration of Austria on this point to be unequivocal. He had so informed Count Walewski.

I remarked to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that what he stated was in contradiction to what I had understood him to say the night before last; that he would recollect that I had put a similar question to him, and that he had replied that from the declaration which had been made to him by the Emperor and by Count Buol, he augured that Austria would take the the field immediately, but that in writing Count Buol had not committed himself so far, and had only engaged to recall the Austrian Minister from St. Petersburgh, and to concert further measures with the allies for attaining the object which they all three had in view. I said that I had so repeated his words to your Lordship.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that I had correctly stated what had fallen from him. The fact was that Count Buol had, at a meeting (held, I believe, on the 15th ultimo), to settle proceedings, read a paper which contained the assurance that if the ultimatum was refused, Austria would go to war immediately, but he had not given a copy of this paper; M. Drouyn de Lhuys however made a note of it on the instant, and he thought Lord John Russell had done the same thing.

I trouble your Lordship with this explanation, as there would otherwise appear to be a contradiction between my report to your Lordship and the statement of M. Drouyn de Lhuys made through Count Walewski.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 759.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, May 3, 1855.*

YOUR Lordship will hear, direct from Paris, the nature of the question Baron Bourquency was this day desired to put to Count Buol on the part of his Government.

He considers the answer he has received (with the sanction of the Emperor) as satisfactory.

No. 760.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 304.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, April 19, 1855.*

THE official note of which I have this day forwarded a copy to your Lordship, has been communicated to Sultet Effendi, and M. Pisani informs me that it is to be laid before the Military Council, which is summoned to meet the day after to-morrow, in connection with the Reform Council. It is the intention of Reshid Pasha to preside at the meeting in person, and the question of com-

prising Christian recruits in the corps to be paid and officered by Her Majesty's Government will then be fully discussed, and I hope definitively settled.

The Council, which entered upon the subject to-day, appears to have seen difficulties which it will require the immediate intervention of Reshid Pasha to remove.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 761.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 307.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April 20, 1855.*

THE work which I have daily to go through personally in-doors from sunrise to sunset, in reading correspondences, receiving visitors on business, giving instructions to the Dragomans, and writing official notes and despatches, allows me but little time for going out, or even for seeing the Ottoman Ministers, who very rarely pay visits themselves, or appear in Christian society. With Reshid Pasha, whose influence operates the most immediately on the progress of public business, by reason of his position, experience, ability, general good-will and admirable memory, my personal intercourse has found an additional cause of interruption in the distance at which he has lately resided from the capital. A visit to his Highness requires, for any good purpose, the expenditure of half-a-day, to say nothing of inconvenience from weather and the wretched condition of the roads. Ten days ago, when I went out to him by agreement, our conversation had little more than begun when he was sent for by the Sultan; and after waiting more than two hours for his return, I received a note to inform me that a meeting of the Council ordered by His Majesty prolonged his detention, and I was therefore obliged to go home, after the loss of a whole morning, to repeat the same operation a few days later.

I trouble your Lordship with these particulars, in order to show how small would be the prospect of getting through business at all, if it were not for the assistance derived from the interpreters, and occasionally also from the Oriental Secretary. I have, nevertheless, made a point of seeing the Grand Vizier at leisure within the last few days, and of endeavouring to make a serious impression on his mind with respect to the dangers resulting from the dilatory, imperfect, and sometimes deceptive manner in which the affairs of the Empire continue, with few exceptions, to be conducted. It cannot be necessary for me to go in detail over ground already so well known to your Lordship. It may suffice for me to state, that I placed without reserve before his view my convictions as to the real nature and tendencies of the contest in which we are engaged. I conjured him to act with more systematic energy in the suppression of crime and disorder throughout the provinces; in the enforcement of the Sultan's ordinances against corruption; in the selection of proper functionaries both here and elsewhere; in the conscientious fulfilment of the Porte's obligations towards her allies; and in the adoption and promulgation of those reforms which are become indispensable, as well for the satisfaction of Europe as for the administration of the Empire. I did my best to make him comprehend the consequences of any permanent failure on the part of the alliance against Russia, and the necessity of vigorous and sustained exertions, well combined and faithfully carried out, to prevent the occurrence of so dreadful a calamity. I asked him whether, in the event of our conquering an honourable and secure peace from Russia, it was to be expected that the Powers of Europe would look with indifference on a continuance of that state of misgovernment and weakness which unhappily went so far to characterise the Porte's administration at present, notwithstanding the many pledges of improvement which had been given on the one side, and the many admonitions and opportunities afforded on the other.

I venture to hope that a salutary impression has been made on Reshid Pasha by this language, though it has little novelty in my mouth, and inculcates only such truths as the most careless observer might perceive. It is the more essential that such should be the case, as the Grand Vizier, whatever defects or short-comings he may exhibit, is after all the most enlightened and efficient Minister in the Sultan's service. I cannot, indeed, conceal from myself that his overthrow, at a moment of such vital importance, not to Turkey alone, but to Europe at large, especially now that he is well seated in the Sultan's confidence, and strengthened by the removal of his principal antagonist, would be a subject of the deepest regret. The circumstances which have come in aid of my exhortations, to reconcile him to the duty of remaining in office, notwithstanding the intrigues so perseveringly directed against him, and the more commanding efforts which may shortly be made to give them success, are well calculated to increase his ascendancy, and to diminish that timidity which often restrains him from acting agreeably to his judgment and inclinations. If his firmness in conduct were equal to his discernment, to the liberality of his ideas and the generosity of his nature, he would be as great and as useful a man as the unpurified atmosphere of Constantinople permits to exist in ministerial power. I shall be more than ever disappointed if he does not now respond more truly and actively than heretofore to the requirements of this unparalleled juncture. The difficulties, however, engendered by weakness of every kind during a lapse of many years cannot be surmounted at once. An Empire so far gone in decay cannot be galvanized into strength. The process of recovery, if to be realized at all, must necessarily be subject to frequent obstructions and occasional relapses. Your Lordship will be able to learn from my subsequent reports whether I have allowed myself to entertain too sanguine a hope. The conduct of the Porte in matters of pending interest will afford the best criterion in that respect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 762.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 83.)

My Lord, *Copenhagen, April 29, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the translation of an article which was published yesterday in the "Fredreland," animadverting upon Prince Christian of Denmark's recent mission to St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 762.

Extract from the "Fædreland" of April 28, 1855.

(Translation.)

HIS Highness Prince Christian of Denmark has returned from his journey to St. Petersburgh, and it is said is extremely delighted with the cordial reception which he has met with, he himself probably decorated with some image of a saint, and with plenty of golden presents bestowed upon his suite, which it is also said causes great delight in our Russian aristocratic circle. It is really touching to see a small Holstein-Glucksburg Prince tenderly embraced by the great Imperial family of Russia; it is flattering to see an heir to the Danish throne honoured by the intimate friendship of the Russian Court; it is certainly tranquillizing and promises well for our future, that the great Power of the East does not withdraw from Denmark her protecting good faith and grace, although the wicked Western Powers have obtained water, vegetables and meat in our harbours, and landed their sick on our coasts; General Hansen and Admiral Bille's costly demonstrations have not been without effect. But we must needs observe that the Danish people do not partake this delight, this satisfaction, this

contentment. The Danish people think, that if Prince Christian owes any one gratitude and respect besides His Majesty the King of Denmark, who proposed him as heir to the throne, it is not to the Russian Court, which neither here or any where else bestowed an apple without obtaining a pear in return, but to the Danish people, who with a careless and shortsighted readiness, acquiesced in his being elected, notwithstanding that he had never distinguished himself, except by the very negative merit of not having taken part in a revolt. The Danish people think, that if even Prince Christian felt ever so deep a sorrow for the late Emperor's death, or ever so great a joy at the accession of the present one to the throne, if he even felt himself ever so much attached to these distant relations whom he, as far as is known, has never seen before, these personal and private feelings ought not to interfere with the regard which, as the chosen heir to the throne, he owes to the Danish people so as not to wound their feelings, not to expose to misconstruction their sympathies, not to compromise their present and future position with the Powers whose friendship it is their well understood interest always, but especially at the present moment, to preserve. The Danish people begin to perceive some doubt arise as to their carelessness and pliability having been pushed too far, when they conferred the succession to the throne upon a Prince whose qualities and sympathies were equally unknown, and whether they may not perhaps have thereby sacrificed an honourable, safe, and glorious future for a miserable existence, externally dependent, internally discordant—an existence at the same time doubtful and powerless; and the Danish people think, at all events, Prince Christian ought not by separating himself from them, by leaning towards antinational and unpopular parties and classes, by manifesting sympathies which must annoy as well as alarm the people, contribute to excite, nourish and diffuse such a doubt. Prince Christian must be told of this, and he must be told it now, while he can still reflect on it, while he can attend to what he has hitherto neglected, and make good what is wanting. It will be too late to tell him so when he is confirmed in customs and ideas which may be dangerous to himself as well as to us. Prince Christian must be told, if history has not already taught him, that not only thrones actually occupied, but also the succession to thrones, can be lost by the fault of those who are in possession of them or are the successors to them, and this loss may be caused by such faults as in their own eyes, and in those of their closest connexions, may be looked upon as virtues and merits. He should know that the surest succession to the throne, and its strongest support, is the confidence and attachment of the people, but that the most unsafe succession is that which depends on foreign favour, and its frailest support is that of a foreign Power. He must know that whilst a free nation exacts from their Prince less than a nation which is tyrannized over, at the same time it bestows on him more. But if they do not obtain from him what they are justified in asking as a right, then all affection ceases: the people consider him less as a governor than as an opponent, doubly dangerous because he sits upon the throne; they therefore do not obey but oppose him, and thus the question is merely which is the stronger of the two, a subject on which there can be no doubt.

We have not made this statement because we attribute to Prince Christian's journey any great political meaning, or are apprehensive of any immediate injurious effect from it. We took the liberty when he left this to show that it was an error; an error of his to have gone at all, an error of the Government to permit him to go, and which can only be explained by its having been considered as a private mission, which was settled without the Government having deliberated on it. We believe that our words found an echo among the highly enlightened and free-thinking majority of the nation, and that the non-official contradiction which they met with, may be considered of very little weight or importance.

In respect to this journey one reservation only was required, and that was made. In now returning to this subject it is only to prevent our "Philo-Cossacks" from forgetting this in their joy. For, when the subservient writers of the Danish aristocracy day after day in the "Copenhagen's Post," adore on their knees Holy Russia, offering up ardent prayers for, and publishing, in a very narrow circle it is true, brilliant hopes of her triumph over the ungodly and irreligious West, it becomes then necessary occasionally to proclaim that here Russia's friends are not the people's friends. The people desire peace so long as it is possible, because peace is most advantageous, but their wishes and hopes are

not with, but against Russia; and should we ever be obliged to take a part in the war, our mind is made up as to which side we shall take. The people owe Russia neither gratitude nor sacrifices. They know that the friendship of no State has been so ruinous to Denmark as that of Russia, and they know that from none can they expect more harm and less good for the future. Therefore they wish neither to be represented nor governed by a Russian; they wish no Russian about the throne, and none on the throne.

No. 763.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, May 5, 1855.*

THE Emperor sent for me this morning. I find that M. Drouyn de Lhuys has, as I suspected, completely deceived him as to the nature of the Austrian proposition. His Majesty supposes that Austria asks Russia to agree to a limitation of her fleet in the Black Sea on the basis of the number of ships afloat when peace shall be made. I do not understand the proposition in that light, and the Emperor has desired me to meet M. Drouyn de Lhuys at 2 o'clock, at the Palace. In the meantime I am to tell you, confidentially, from His Majesty, that much as he desires to carry Austria with us, he would not purchase her alliance on dishonourable terms; that he thinks Russia must agree to accept a limitation, in what terms he leaves it to diplomatists to discuss. If it can be made palateable to her for His Majesty, the better. He thinks also it would be injudicious to make the augmentation of the Russian fleet by one ship a *casus belli*, and that is why he felt that condition somewhat vague.

The Emperor is of opinion that we should ask for the establishment of Consuls in the Black Sea.

No. 764.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 5, 1855.*

ALL is right, and we agree with the Emperor. I will write by messenger to-night the answer that we think should be given to the Austrian proposal.

No. 765.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, May 5, 1855, 10·30 A.M.*

I HAVE informed the Emperor of what passed in the Cabinet yesterday. His Majesty maintains his opinion, that the Austrian propositions must be rejected.

Sunday, 12·40 (day).

The Emperor agrees to the course you propose in regard to Austria; but he suggests that the Austrian Government should be informed that the allies can listen to no proposals which do not impose some conditions on Russia.

No. 766.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 429.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 5, 1855.*

I INCLOSE herewith the copies of two documents that were placed in my hands by Count Waleswki: the one being an amendment of the proposal which Austria is ready to submit for the acceptance of Russia; the other being

the project of a Treaty between Great Britain, France, and Austria, for guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Turkey, to which it is understood that Austria will be prepared to assent.

Count Walewski read to me a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who expressed in it his opinion that the project would not only put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, but would establish there that of the allied Powers, and that the plan was upon the whole preferable to any other, with the exception perhaps of neutralization, that had yet been proposed for giving effect to the intentions of the allies.

I told Count Walewski, that the three Powers had pledged themselves to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea; and I much feared that that object would not be fulfilled by the plan of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, admitting though I did, that it was an improvement upon the Austrian proposal.

Count Walewski, however, I said, well knew the deep anxiety of Her Majesty's Government to put an end to the war by a just and honourable peace; and it was unnecessary therefore, to say that any scheme by which the Government of the Emperor thought that that great object might be achieved, was sure to meet with the favourable consideration of Her Majesty's Government. I should accordingly lose no time in submitting the project to my colleagues, and informing them that Count Walewski had been instructed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to recomend it to the adoption of Her Majesty's Government.

I need not inform your Excellency that the projects received the most attentive and anxious consideration of Her Majesty's Government. It was impossible, however, to disguise from ourselves that no limit being placed on the naval force of Russia, and the naval forces of England, France, and Turkey being admitted without limit into the Black Sea, Russia would have a fair pretext for increasing her Black Sea fleet to the highest amount compatible with her means; neither could we shut our eyes to the fact, that the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea rests in the belief of her strength as much as in the display of that strength; and that if with Sebastopol untaken, and the Russian army untouched, the armies and fleets of England and France were to retire without accomplishing the objects that they were to attain; and if the ships of Russia, which have now disappeared from the Black Sea, were permitted by Treaty to reassemble there in the number and force that we have repeatedly declared to be a standing menace and a danger to Turkey, we should give a moral and a military triumph to Russia that would raise and perpetuate her preponderance in the Black Sea.

But notwithstanding the manifest objections to such an arrangement, Her Majesty's Government determined upon so grave a subject to come to no hasty decision, and the further consideration of it was adjourned to this day.

Before the Cabinet met, however, to-day, Count Walewski informed me that he had received by telegraph a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, stating that after mature reflection, the Emperor preferred to adhered to the original project of limitation as it had been proposed at Vienna, instead of the last project that had been sent to Count Walewski.

Her Majesty's Government, for the reasons to which I have above alluded, have concurred in the opinion which M. Drouyn de Lhuys' despatch conveys; and it was agreed that with the concurrence of the French Government, Austria should be invited to concert with England and France the measures necessary for giving effect to the Treaty of December 2, accompanying that invitation by an assurance, that although there were parts of the proposal that she was prepared to make to Russia, with which it was impossible for us to agree, yet that we should gladly receive from her any further propositions for effectually attaining the object to which Austria stands pledged, together with England and France.

Your Lordship is instructed to read this despatch to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 767.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 206.)

My Lord, *Vienna, May 2, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour of inclosing herewith copies of the thirteenth Conference, on one of which the signatures of the Representatives appear in the order in which they were affixed to the original document.

I have sent a copy of this Protocol to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and one to Lord Bloomfield.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 767.

Protocol (No. 13) of a Conference held at Vienna, April 26, 1855.

Présens:

Pour l'Autriche—
M. le Comte de Buol-Schauenstein, et
M. le Baron de Prokesch-Osten;

Pour la France—
M. Drouyn de Lhuys, et
M. le Baron de Bourqueney;

Pour la Grande Bretagne—
M. le Comte de Westmorland;

Pour la Russie—
M. le Prince de Gortchakoff, et
M. de Titoff;

Pour la Turquie—
Aali Pâcha, et
Aarif Effendi.

LE Comte de Buol ouvre la séance en disant, qu'il a invité les membres de la Conférence à se réunir sur la demande des Plénipotentiaires de Russie, qui ont déclaré avoir des communications à faire.

Le Prince Gortchakoff tient à établir que ce sont les Plénipotentiaires de Russie qui, dans la douzième Conférence, ont déposé au Protocole la dernière proposition tendant à la solution du troisième principe, et que ce sont eux encore qui présentent aujourd'hui, dans le même but, de nouvelles idées.

Avant de développer celles-ci, il croit devoir revenir sur une assertion de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France, consignée dans le Protocole No. 12, et portant "que la Russie ne veut donner à l'Empire Ottoman aucune espèce de garantie, et que quant à celle renfermée dans l'Article 1, et adoptée dans la onzième Conférence, la Russie la réduit à une chimère, puisque même dans le cas où une province Turque serait envahie par une des Puissances Contractantes, la Russie, d'après l'interprétation du Prince Gortchakoff, se bornera à l'emploi de ses bon offices."

Il fait observer que les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ont, de commun accord avec les autres membres de la Conférence, consacré le principe de faire participer la Sublime Porte aux avantages du concert Européen et de la placer sous l'égide du droit public de l'Europe; ils ont enfin, au nom de leur Cour, pris l'engagement de respecter l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman. Ces engagements peuvent-ils être qualifiés de chimère? Une des raisons pour lesquelles il a décliné une garantie territoriale active de l'Empire Ottoman, se trouve dans la difficulté de définir avec certitude ses limites. La garantie terri-

toriale une fois stipulée, ne faudrait-il pas l'étendre aux points les plus éloignés, tels, pour exemple, que Tunis et Aden, et faire un cas de guerre de toute attaque dirigée contre l'un de ces territoires par une des Parties Contractantes ? Il se refuse à donner une si grande extension à l'engagement qu'il prend, parceque le sang de la Russie n'appartient qu'à la Russie. Cela ne veut pas dire toutefois que la Russie se bornera exclusivement à de bons offices. L'indépendance de la Sublime Porte n'est pas seulement un intérêt Européen, mais aussi un intérêt Russe. Si elle était menacée, la Russie ne serait pas la dernière à la défendre, mais elle se réserve le droit de peser, le cas échéant, s'il y a lieu ou non à l'emploi de ses ressources matérielles.

Abordant l'objet spécial de la Conférence d'aujourd'hui, il établit que le plan proposé par les Plénipotentiaires de Russie avait eu pour but non seulement de résoudre les difficultés du moment, mais encore d'entourer l'indépendance de la Porte de garanties pour l'avenir ; que ce plan toutefois ayant été décliné, surtout par la raison qu'il reposait sur un principe contraire à un droit de souveraineté de la Porte, dont elle juge le maintien nécessaire à son indépendance, il a cherché la solution dans un ordre d'idées différent. Il fait lecture des Articles 1 et 2 ci-joints en copie, l'un donnant une nouvelle consécration au principe de fermeture des Détroits, et l'autre laissant la Sublime Porte elle-même juge souverain des cas où l'intérêt de sa sûreté exigerait des exceptions à ce principe et où elle croirait devoir appeler, selon les circonstances, soit les flottes des Puissances Occidentales, soit celle de la Russie.

Répondant au Prince Gortchakoff, M. Drouyn de Lhuys maintient les paroles que celui-ci a citées. Il constate de nouveau que la France prend l'engagement de respecter non seulement l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, mais aussi de les faire respecter, tandis que la Russie se refuse à contracter ce second engagement. Quant à la Régence de Tunis à laquelle le Prince Gortchakoff a fait allusion, il n'éprouve, pour sa part, aucune difficulté à étendre à ce pays l'engagement qu'il est prêt à souscrire.

Pour ce qui concerne les nouvelles propositions des Plénipotentiaires Russes, il a déjà déclaré dans la dernière Conférence que ses instructions étaient épuisées, puisque la Russie avait exclu la limitation sous quelque forme que ce fût. Il applique la même déclaration aux propositions d'aujourd'hui. Sous cette réserve il fait observer que ces propositions tendent si peu à la cessation de la prépondérance Russe dans la Mer Noire, qu'elles prévoient même le cas où la flotte prépondérante deviendrait hostile.

Le Baron Bourqueney adhère en tout point à l'opinion de M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

Lord Westmorland se réfère à la déclaration émise par Lord John Russell dans la dernière Conférence, et portant que les instructions des Plénipotentiaires de Grande Bretagne étaient épuisées.

Quant à l'établissement d'Aden, dont il a été question, il constate que son Gouvernement n'y a rien faite de contraire à ses Traités avec la Sublime Porte.

Le Prince Gortchakoff répond que parlant d'Aden, son intention n'a pas été de faire des récriminations sur le passé, mais seulement de poser un cas hypothétique de nature à démontrer les conséquences extrêmes auxquelles conduirait, dans certaines éventualités, la garantie territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman.

M. de Titoff ajoute à l'exposé de son collègue l'expression de l'espoir que la Conférence reconnaîtra que les obstacles à un rapprochement ne viennent pas des Plénipotentiaires de Russie, qui, loin de se renfermer dans un système exclusif, proposent aujourd'hui un plan sur une nouvelle base, tandis que les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne déclarent leurs instructions épuisées.

Aali Pacha et Aarif Effendi constatent que leurs instructions ne les mettent pas dans le cas de donner leur adhésion à la proposition des Plénipotentiaires de Russie, ni d'énoncer une opinion à cet égard, et qu'ils se trouvent absolument dans la même position que les Plénipotentiaires des Puissances alliées.

Le Comte Buol prend acte de la nouvelle proposition Russe. Il voit avec satisfaction que dans l'Article 1, le principe de la clôture ait été substitué à celui de l'ouverture, antérieurement proposé. Il pense que l'Article 2, qui réserve au Sultan la faculté d'appeler éventuellement à son secours des flottes étrangères et d'ouvrir exceptionnellement les Détroits, est susceptible d'une application pratique. La proposition lui semble discutable ; elle renferme des

éléments dont l'Autriche tâchera de tirer parti pour un rapprochement, mais à l'état d'ébauche où elle se trouve encore, il ne saurait la considérer comme une solution, ni même comme une base de solution.

Le Baron Prokesch dit que, puisqu'il y a disparité dans les positions respectives des Puissances, il sera difficile de faire prévaloir le principe de réciprocité sur lequel repose l'Article 2. Personne ne soupçonnera l'Autriche de vouloir porter atteinte à l'indépendance ou à l'intégrité territoriale de la Turquie. Lorsque les Puissances maritimes ont, de concert avec la Russie, concouru à l'émancipation de la Grèce, elles n'en ont retiré aucun agrandissement territorial. En revanche, la Russie, dans une suite de guerres faites à l'Empire Ottoman dans le cours d'un siècle, lui a enlevé provinces sur provinces. La marche suivie par elle en 1853 a été jugée par les Puissances signataires des Protocoles de Vienne comme renfermant de grave dangers et pour la Sublime Porte et pour l'Europe. C'est contre ces dangers qu'elles cherchent aujourd'hui à se prémunir. Les positions respectives n'étant pas égales, ce n'est pas à la Russie à chercher des garanties ; elle n'en a pas besoin, ni pour elle-même, puisqu'elle les trouve dans ses propres forces, ni pour la Sublime Porte, qui n'en réclame pas de ce côté ; mais il est juste que les Puissances alliées en demandent à la Russie dans l'intérêt de la Porte et contre le retour de dangers qui ont été pour tout l'Europe une cause de si graves perturbations et de si énormes sacrifices.

Au point de vue pratique il trouve que la flotte Russe, pour être éventuellement à même de porter efficacement secours à la Sublime Porte, devrait avoir une force considérable. L'Article 2 aurait donc pour effet de perpétuer un danger qu'il s'agit précisément de faire cesser.

Le Prince Gortchakoff répondant aux Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche, constate que le projet aujourd'hui présenté est plus qu'une ébauche, qu'il a la valeur d'une base réelle ; que ce projet ne tend pas seulement à la solution de la complication actuelle, mais qu'il embrasse aussi les prévisions de l'avenir, et que son exécution mettrait fin à la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire, tout en entourant l'existence de la Turquie de nouvelles garanties. L'Article 2 ne fait pas de la réciprocité une nécessité absolue ; il rend hommage à l'autonomie de la Sublime Porte, en la constituant seul juge des dangers qui pourraient la menacer et en lui laissant la plus entière liberté de choix quant à ceux qu'elle voudrait appeler pour conjurer ces dangers. La faculté réservée au Sultan de pouvoir faire aussi appel au secours de la Russie, s'il le juge convenable, ne suppose pas *à priori* qu'elle devra entretenir dans la Mer Noire une force navale prépondérante. Du reste, les Plénipotentiaires de Russie en proposant d'abord le "mare apertum," ensuite le "mare clausum," croient avoir fourni la preuve irréfragable de leur désir sincère de faciliter l'entente générale.

Le Comte Buol fait observer qu'en n'attachant au projet Russe d'autre valeur que celle d'une ébauche, il a été mu par la considération que ce projet propose seulement les moyens de mettre fin à la prépondérance navale de la Russie lorsqu'elle se serait déjà élevé aux proportions d'un danger intolérable, mais ne tend nullement à la faire cesser d'une manière permanente et dans l'état ordinaire des choses.

Le Prince Gortchakoff réplique, que combiné avec les principes auxquels il a souscrit et qui ont pour objet de placer la Sublime Porte sous l'égide du droit public de l'Europe et de respecter son indépendance et son intégrité territoriale, son projet lui paraît avoir la valeur d'une œuvre complète.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys constate que la solution que la France aurait désiré faire prévaloir, eût été de nature à écarter le danger de quelque côté qu'il vint. Aujourd'hui il n'est question que de chercher des garanties contre les dangers qui menacent la Turquie de la part de la Russie. Il ne suffit pas de proposer les moyens de mettre éventuellement un terme au conflit lorsqu'il a déjà éclaté ; il faut écarter la possibilité d'un conflit, puis que tout conflit trouble l'Europe. Le nouveau projet Russe laissant subsister l'inégalité des forces dans la Mer Noire, ne rassure l'Europe que sur l'issue des conflits qui pourraient naître. Dans le but d'en écarter la possibilité, la France a proposé l'engagement de faire respecter l'intégrité territoriale de la Turquie. Cet engagement, auquel la Russie se refuse, était pour la Sublime Porte une garantie plus sérieuse que les secours qu'on lui offre en perspective ; car si la flotte Russe est forte, les forces à lui opposer seront encore plus considérables, et si elle est faible, le secours qu'elle pourra porter ne sera pas efficace.

Le Prince Gortchakoff établit que le contrepoids contre la prépondérance

Russe se trouverait dans la faculté du Sultan d'appeler à son secours des flottes étrangères, et que la plus solide garantie pour l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance de la Porte réside dans son entrée dans le concert Européen; que, de l'autre côté, l'existence d'une flotte Russe respectable dans la Mer Noire est, à ses yeux, une condition essentielle, soit de l'équilibre Européen, soit de l'indépendance de la Porte. Il prende, du reste, acte du jugement que M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche a porté sur la nouvelle proposition Russe, en exprimant l'espoir que les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne, dont les instructions, à son grand regret, ne leur permettent pas de las discuter, la soumettront à leurs Cours, et il ne doute pas que les Plénipotentiaires Ottomans n'en apprécient trop l'importance et les avantages, pour ne pas s'empresser de demander à la Sublime Porte des instructions à ce sujet.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys reconnaît avec le Comte de Buol que le projet Russe n'est pas une base; qu'il en renferme tout à plus un élément, en ce sens que le principe de clôture est préférable à celui d'ouverture. Tel qu'il est, ses instructions ne lui permettent pas de la discuter, pas plus qu'il ne consentirait à le porter à Paris.

Le Baron de Bourqueney constate que la position n'est pas modifiée par les nouvelles propositions, et il fait réserves pour que le silence qu'on s'impose volontairement ne puis être pris pour une adhésion.

Le Comte de Westmorland s'énonce dans un sens identique.

M. de Titoff fait observer qu'on paraît trop oublier que la troisième garantie avait pour objet de mettre fin à la prépondérance maritime de la Russie dans la Mer Noire, en fortifiant à la fois l'indépendance et la autonomie de la Sublime Porte. Ce double objet lui paraît mieux assuré par le projet Russe que par le principe de limitation soutenu par les adversaires; si bien que la Russie, si elle avait les projets ambitieux qu'on lui prête, aurait même des motifs de préférer une certaine limitation, résultant d'ailleurs en pratique de la nature des choses, à une combinaison qui ouvre la Mer Noire aux flottes étrangères dès que la Sublime Porte se croirait menacée.

MM. les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche ayant dit que c'est pour ce motif qu'ils eussent désiré voir adopter l'idée d'une entente directe à amener au sein de la Conférence entre les Puissances riveraines sur une limitation réciproque de leurs forces navales, le Prince Gortchakoff établit qu'autre chose est apprécier la valeur pratique d'une entente directe sur une limitation réciproque, ainsi que M. de Titoff a été le premier à le faire, et autre chose vouloir imposer à la Russie cette limitation moyennant une négociation au sein de la Conférence—marche qui ne lui paraît pas pratique et que les Plénipotentiaires Ottomans ont d'ailleurs déclinée.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys réclame la paternité de l'idée d'une entente directe, en ajoutant qu'Aali Pacha n'avait point objecté à la forme sous laquelle il l'avait lui-même proposée, mais qu'il s'était seulement opposé à une entente en dehors de la Conférence, comme contraire aux engagements réciproques contractés par les alliés.

Le Prince Gortchakoff rappelle que M. de Titoff avait de son côté appuyé sur la différence qu'il y a entre discuter et conclure définitivement.

Aali Pacha émet l'opinion que le troisième point ayant été adopté en commun, la base de l'arrangement qui doit en amener la solution, ne saurait également être arrêté qu'en commun au sein de la Conférence; que des négociations directes avec les Plénipotentiaires de Russie au sujet de cette base seraient contraires aux engagements réciproques contractés entre les Puissances alliées, et que c'est seulement sur les détails que l'on pourrait recourir au mode dont il s'agit.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys établit que son idée tenait compte des trois points de vue essentiels; 1, inscrire la sécurité des alliés dans le Traité Général; 2, donner à cette garantie la forme d'une entente directe entre les Puissances riveraines; et empêcher, enfin, qu'aucun des alliés n'entre dans un arrangement séparé.

Le Comte de Buol ayant à toute bonne fin pris acte des deux principes déposées dans les Articles proposés, le Prince Gortchakoff lui fait observer qu'il ne faut pas oublier que ces principes se rattachent intimément à l'adoption de l'ensemble du plan qu'il a présenté.

Le Baron Prokesch, étant revenu sur la question du sens à attacher à la garantie accordée à la Sublime Porte par les Puissances Contractantes, M. Drouyn de Lhuys constate qu'il a déjà fait ressortir le peu de solidité des garanties que

la Russie offre pour sa part à l'Empire Ottoman. Si son intégrité est violée par terre, la Russie ne s'engage pas à la défendre, mais seulement à interposer ses bons offices; si elle est attaquée du côté de la mer, la Russie fait espérer le secours éventuel de sa flotte en demandant qu'elle puisse entrer dans la Méditerranée.

Le Prince Gortchakoff ayant répliqué, que puisqu'il est de l'intérêt de la Russie de défendre l'indépendance de la Porte, l'engagement explicite n'est pas nécessaire, M. Drouyn de Lhuys fait observer qu'il ne s'agit pas ici des intérêts découlant de la position géographique, mais de stipulations positives.

Aali Pacha établit qu'aux termes de l'engagement à prendre, tout conflit entre la Sublime Porte et une des Puissances Contractantes serait considéré comme une question d'intérêt Européen; que, par conséquent, les cas où la garantie commune pourrait entraîner la guerre ne sauraient être imminents.

Le Prince Gortchakoff, ayant exprimé l'espoir que les idées présentées par les Plénipotentiaires de Russie seraient prises en sérieuse considération, les Plénipotentiaires de France, de Grande Bretagne, et de Turquie, déclarent ne pouvoir que persister dans leur première déclaration.

Le Comte Buol renouvelle, en les résumant, les paroles prononcées par lui, ajoute que le projet développé par M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France, et décliné par les Plénipotentiaires de Russie, contenait un système complet et efficace; qu'il n'en saurait dire autant des propositions aujourd'hui présentées; que la Russie, en n'attachant à la garantie commune que la valeur d'un engagement de ne pas porter atteinte à l'indépendance et à l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, la réduit au fond à une obligation qui s'entend pour ainsi dire de soi-même; que la combinaison proposée pour servir d'application au principe de la cessation de la prépondérance Russe dans la Mer Noire, se borne à la faculté réservée au Sultan d'appeler à son secours les flottes étrangères lorsque la prépondérance de la flotte Russe deviendrait menaçante pour lui, ce qui, en fin de compte, ne ferait qu'augmenter les chances de conflit; que, somme toute, les propositions Russes ne sauraient être considérées comme renfermant des principes de nature à être introduits dans un système général et complet.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys adhère en tout point au langage de Comte Buol.

Les Plénipotentiaires Ottomans y adhèrent de leur côté.

Au moment de la clôture de la séance, le Prince Gortchakoff constate que les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ont largement dégagé leur parole en proposant plusieurs modes de solution.

(Suivent les signatures.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 767.

Annex to Protocol No. 13.

Article 1. LE principe de la fermeture des Détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles en temps de paix, consacré par l'ancienne législation de la Sublime Porte et par le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, reste en pleine vigueur.

Art. 2. Sa Hautesse le Sultan se réserve la faculté d'ouvrir, à titre d'exception transitoire, les Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore aux flottes des Puissances étrangères que la Sublime Porte croirait devoir appeler lorsqu'elle jugerait sa sécurité menacée.

No. 768.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 210.)

My Lord, *Vienna, May 2, 1855.*

UPON the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 164 of the 24th ultimo I informed Aali Pasha that I had received a communication from you in which, while it was stated that Her Majesty's Government had read with interest the memorandum which he had drawn up, which was inclosed in Lord John Russell's despatch No. 81 of the 18th of April, yet you were desirous of bringing before

him some remarks upon that document, which were embodied in that despatch, and that I would read it to him, and, in accordance with your Lordship's directions that if he desired it, I would leave with him a copy. Aali Pasha requested me to read the contents to him, and after I had done so he expressed his anxiety that I should furnish him with a copy of it, as he felt that by only having it read he could not judge of the important considerations produced in this document, which he felt to be the more necessary, as, being well convinced of the friendly anxiety for the prosperity of the Sultan's dominions which was felt by your Lordship and by Her Majesty's Government, he should be desirous of well considering the reply he was desirous of making to it.

I, consequently, in obedience to your Lordship's instructions, assented to his request.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 769.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 355.)
Foreign Office, May 5, 1855.

My Lord,

IN answer to your despatch No. 307 of the 20th of April reporting the substance of a conversation which you had with the Grand Vizier respecting the question of reform in Turkey, I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your sound advice and judicious language to Reshid Pasha on this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 770.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 357.)
Foreign Office, May 5, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my instruction No. 227 of the 9th of April and to your Excellency's despatch No. 310 of the 23rd of that month, respecting the question of the admission of Christian evidence in Turkish Civil Courts of Justice, I have to state to you that this subject demands your vigilant attention; and I have to instruct your Excellency to urge it on the Porte, as there can be no doubt that the admission of Christian evidence is more necessary because more frequently required in civil even than in criminal cases.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 771.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 188.)
Berlin, May 3, 1855.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL stated to me to-day that he had been desired by the King to inform me that His Majesty had seen with deep regret in the "Kreuz Zeitung" an article containing allusions which were offensive and disrespectful to the Queen, and that His Majesty had given orders that the editor

of the newspaper should in consequence be prosecuted. I told his Excellency that I learned this intelligence with satisfaction; that I trusted this interference of the Government would have a beneficial effect in producing an improvement in the general tone of this journal; that I had on former occasions frequently observed to his Excellency on the unfriendly allusions to England which pervaded the columns of the "Kreuz Zeitung," and that as the tone of it had undergone no change, I thought it useless to speak again on the subject, but that I felt if the Government chose to put down this paper they might have established their influence over this in the same extent as they had now done over every other journal published in Berlin, as it was notorious that the power of the authorities over the press was amply sufficient to control it when they were so disposed. Instead of this being exercised in our favour, I said, the reverse appeared to be the case. However, I took the assurance his Excellency had just given me as one of good omen for the future, and I hoped the success of the intended prosecution would have beneficial results.

Baron Manteuffel replied, that the press was less shackled than I apprehended; and he gave me to understand that the "Kreuz Zeitung" was a paper whose opinions were far too exaggerated to be agreeable to the Government, and that he had not succeeded in establishing that control over it which he desired to have.

I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship a translation of the article in question, and beg leave to add that a day rarely passes without some violent allusions in it which are highly offensive to England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 771.

Extract from the "Kreuz Zeitung."

(Translation.)

THE speech of Stahl was held for Europe. We do not say that the orator took no account of the Prussian House of Lords, or left the relations of Prussia out of consideration. On the contrary, the subject which the speaker proposed to himself, was to render the policy of Prussia clear on all sides, to declare openly why it was necessary to take up this position, and to maintain it. He has fulfilled it most successfully. But he has not only fulfilled it for the Prussian House of Lords and for the people of Prussia,—all Europe can clearly and distinctly perceive from this beautiful and lively picture, what are the wishes of all those in Prussia whose honour it is to preserve an independent position for their fatherland, and who prefer, not in vain pride, but in hopeful confidence, to be isolated with a good conscience rather than to be allied against conscience.

Such a neutrality does not stand at zero with a lukewarm heart between hot and cold, to rub their hands for their own gratification when losses occurred on the right or left; it has its force in the consciousness that a nature fulfils its duty by justice, and that he who prefers right to calculation, and honour to interest, will never come to shame. Clearly to know what one desires, and energetically to desire what one knows, that is the stamp of a statesman. Half hearts and half courage lead to half measures, but never to a good goal. We wish, namely, that England may read and consider this Prussian speech with attention; perhaps, Lord Lyndhurst will then admit that one can be conservative and a lawyer without closing one's ears in blind passion to the arguments of the adversary. Verily, Great Britain has other necessities than haughtily to get into a passion with those who will not walk in her path. It is self-denial and a knowledge of herself that we desire for old England, above all at present, when she has done honour to the Ruler of the French by forgetting her own history; or is it desired to pursue this path further? The Waterloo Hall has already received a new name to please Napoleon III.; is it perchance to be proposed that Her Majesty Queen Victoria should give up her own name, which she received in memory and in honour of the victory over the uncle? Shall she call herself hereafter "Francesca;" for her second name "Alexandrina" would be also

insulting to her present ally, as it calls to memory the intimate alliance with the predecessor of the present common foe? What does old England give up for her new policy? Her ancient glory; her ancient splendour; her ancient dignity; possibly also soon her ancient liberty. But liberty is the life of England.

No. 772.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 49. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Stuttgardt, May* 1, 1855.

REFERRING to my confidential despatch No. 30 of the 12th of March, giving an account of an interview between the King of Wurtemberg and the French Minister, during which His Majesty made some observations regarding the late Emperor of Russia, I have the honour to state that the Marquis de Ferrière has informed me that the King also observed that one of the defects of the Emperor Nicholas was ignorance of every country but his own; that His Imperial Majesty appeared to believe that all Europe was like Russia; and that he had occasionally given him advice respecting this country, which seemed to show that His Imperial considered the people of Wurtemberg to be no better than "mougiks."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 773.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 51.)

My Lord, *Stuttgardt, May* 1, 1855.

I HAVE been credibly informed that the Russian party at Berlin are trying to make friends at Munich, by holding out the hope of the restitution of the Tyrol to Bavaria, were war to break out between Austria and Russia, and to end successfully for the latter Power, after she had been assisted by Bavaria as well as by Prussia.

I have communicated this information to Her Majesty's Minister at Munich.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 774.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 53.)

My Lord, *Stuttgardt, May* 1, 1855.

WITH reference to my confidential despatch No. 14 of the 18th of February, reporting a conversation at the Palace with the King of Wurtemberg, I beg leave to state that it has since appeared to me, that in speaking of certain undefined observations alleged to have been made by Lord John Russell in the House of Commons, and which might possibly be inconveniently recollected at Vienna, His Majesty may have alluded to his Lordship's reported opinion that Austria would be at liberty to secede from the Treaty of the 2nd of December, were the interpretation of the four points by the Western Powers to involve terms of peace of which she disapproved.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 775.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 56.)

My Lord, *Stuttgardt, May* 1, 1855.

COUNT SECKENDORFF, the Prussian Minister, has observed to me, that from what he knows of Prince Gortchakoff, he is convinced that he will never say his *dernier mot*, in the way of concession, until Count Buol shall have announced to him the *casus belli*; and Count Seckendorff has told the Marquis de Ferrière that he believes Prince Gortchakoff to be in favour of our propositions regarding the Black Sea.

On the other hand, Baron de Linden tells me he understands that Prince Gortchakoff is opposed to any positive limitation of Russian vessels of war.

Count Seckendorff has also remarked to me that perhaps the continuation of hostilities during the Conferences has been adverse to a peaceful solution. I replied in the sense that it was Russia who proposed the negotiation; that we had never held out any hope of an armistice pending such a transaction, but on the contrary; and that the progress of the siege of Sebastopol ought hardly to have influenced the Russian Plenipotentiaries, since, even had the fortune of war compelled us to leave the Crimea, we should still have remained masters of the Black Sea, and should consequently still have adhered to the terms we now demand.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 776.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 57.)

My Lord, *Stuttgardt, May* 1, 1855.

I ASKED Baron de Linden yesterday if this Government would oppose the mobilization of the Federal Contingent, were war between Austria and Russia to cause the former to repeat her demand for that measure.

His Excellency replied that it would depend entirely on the explanations furnished by Austria at the time, but he appeared desirous of conveying that Wurtemberg's consent was at least as likely as her refusal, although, as he said, the former would be given unwillingly.

It has been observed to me, that in the case supposed, the three German States lying between France and Austria, namely, Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, would hardly venture, or be able, to withhold their cooperation against Russia.

This Government perhaps feels that it is high time to make arrangements for not being ultimately on the losing side, as well as that the present aspect of affairs may possibly indicate the beginning of the end.

The financial part of the question is also looked upon here with no little alarm, in the present penurious state of the country, and consequently were a German war to break out, the leading idea might be to favour its early termination, by throwing all the strength on one side.

Some weeks ago Baron de Linden made a speech in the Chamber of Peers, to the effect that there could be no question about the anti-Russian object of the preparations for war, thereby contrasting himself with the Prussian Minister at Frankfort on a late occasion.

As the Diplomatic body are rarely invited here to the Royal table, it may possibly be worth mentioning, considering the present state of diplomatic affairs, that I had the honour this evening of dining at the Palace, in company with my French, Austrian, Prussian, and Bavarian colleagues. In conversing with me, the King alluded to what he terms the splendid occurrences in England,

but His Majesty did not touch upon politics, beyond asking if Lord John Russell had arrived in London. The King appeared in the highest spirits, and he conversed much and cheerfully with the Austrian Minister—a circumstance perhaps worth remarking, as His Majesty is considered a great actor.

The Prince and Princess Royal are not expected to return from St. Petersburgh before next month.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

P.S.—Another observation I made yesterday to Baron de Linden was, that we considered Russia's refusal of our terms regarding the third point, as a proof that she wished to continue making an aggressive use of the Black Sea.

G. S. S. J.

No. 777.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 28.)
My Lord, *Munich, April 29, 1855.*

THE messenger Robbins arrived on the 27th instant, and delivered to me your Lordship's despatches to No. 22 inclusive, with two marked Separate, bearing date the 14th and 23rd instant.

The prospects of the Government here are in many respects the very reverse of satisfactory, and it really seems that at length the public opinion of the country will succeed in producing some effect on the minds of those who are at this moment intrusted with the administration of affairs. The circumstances under which the recent dissolution of the Chambers took place, appear to have aroused some misgivings as to the manner in which this ill-advised step might be construed by the mass of the population, and the consequence was that the King, who felt the necessity of clearing up all doubt upon this point, summoned to the capital the Presidents of the different provinces into which the kingdom is divided, for the purpose of reporting to him confidentially the real state of public feeling in regard to the sudden dissolution of the Chamber, and the probable result of the new elections which must shortly commence.

I understand, that with the single exception of the President of the Palatinate, whose report excited so much surprise that he is suspected of having misrepresented the sentiments of the population, the whole of them stated, without the least disguise, that the sympathies of the provinces were decidedly adverse to the present foreign policy of the Government, and in favour of an immediate, close, and almost unconditional alliance with Austria, into whose hands the entire country, with one voice, seems desirous of confiding the interests of Germany during the actual European crisis. This leaning towards Austria is so strongly pronounced throughout the kingdom, that even the northern provinces, which were generally supposed to entertain some lurking tendencies towards Prussia from religious and other motives of a more material character, are now represented to be the most eager for the Austrian alliance.

Upon all the details bearing upon these points, it is said the Presidents were very closely questioned, and as their replies were by no means of a nature to reassure the Government, it is not unlikely that their visit to the capital may be so far beneficial as to lead, for a time at least, to a greater deference to public opinion than it has hitherto shown.

That it has seriously compromised its own credit and popularity, by the undeniable incapacity which it has throughout distinguished its whole system of internal, and especially its financial, administration, is sufficiently manifest by the strange suspicions and accusations circulated, principally I believe by the organs of the ultramontane party, with the object evidently of exciting the popular feeling against Baron von der Pfordten, and again arousing apprehensions of the absolutist propensities of the Court, which he is said to do all he can to encourage and strengthen.

The leaders of this party are highly incensed against Baron von der Pfordten, in consequence of his being either unable or unwilling to aid them in

carrying through the demands of the Episcopacy; this has not only induced them to withdraw the support upon which he has mainly relied for the maintenance of his position in the country, but has converted them into open and declared opponents of himself personally, as well as of his policy, against which the whole weight of their influence will be brought to bear in the approaching elections.

The adherents of Austria, of which the High Church party is chiefly composed, found their hopes of getting rid of him upon the somewhat uncertain prospect of a more categorical declaration on the part of the Imperial Cabinet against the aggressive proceedings of Russia on the religious protectorate question, to force on which all their efforts tend; for they argue that it would be totally impossible for Baron von der Pfordten to continue to occupy the post he now holds, if Austria could once be persuaded to cut short the intrigues and appeals of the minor German Governments, by quitting her present doubtful attitude, and placing herself frankly on the side of the Western Powers.

Whether this calculation be correct, is, I think, open to some doubt; but the chiefs of the ultramontane party are not easily discouraged or diverted from their objects, and in this country their power is so great as to be much dreaded by the Sovereign and his present advisers, who I am told make no secret of their expectation that the result of the next elections will, under the influence of the priesthood, be a Lower Chamber which will render all Government impossible, at least, according to their notions of constitutional rule. It is more than probable that the consequences of the hasty course pursued by the Government may be such as are apprehended, but there must be other more deeply-seated influences at work, to foment the discontent which no one attempts to deny pervades all classes; for it can scarcely be supposed that the Protestant provinces of the north, which are reported to be to the full as anti-Prussian as the others, would allow their judgment to be swayed by a Catholic priesthood which they abhor, and with which they carry on a perpetual feud, with but little tolerance on either side.

The only plausible elucidation I am able to offer for this apparently anomalous state of things is, that the anti-dynastic spirit of the year 1848 is again abroad among the smaller German States even in a more intense, though perhaps less open, form than at that epoch. Instead of being confined to the lower, as was the case in that year of trouble, the conviction that the minute subdivision of Germany is an obstruction and hindrance to the welfare of the whole country, has now become deeply-rooted in the minds of the middle classes, which, although more cautious and less demonstrative, are not the less determined to work out a change whenever a favourable and safe opportunity shall present itself. I cannot doubt the truth of the information which has reached me on this state of public feeling, for it has been more than once confirmed by the reluctant avowals of some of my German colleagues, who are best able to appreciate the effect produced by the recent senseless policy of their Governments on the Oriental question. The consciousness of the fermentation that is going on, and the apprehensions it inspires, are beyond question the real cause of the excessive devotion of all the small Potentates to Russia, whose power they are averse to see weakened from considerations which, from their point of view, there is no difficulty in comprehending. Baron von der Pfordten admits to every one that the sole aim and object of his policy is the preservation and advantage of this country, and that he is determined to resist to the utmost all encroachment, however small, against its independence, and to oppose any participation in the present struggle until the benefits which are to result from it are made perfectly clear to him. He is almost as averse to a closer union with Austria as with France and England, because, as he recently explained in a conversation with one of the leading members of the Chamber, which was subsequently repeated to me, he considers his Government to be embarked on the same liberal course which renders the other two so hateful to the would-be absolute rulers of the minor States. What his notions of Royal authority may be, I will not take upon me to say; but if the actual system of government in France does not come up to them they must be somewhat exaggerated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 778.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.

Vienna, May 6, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

M. COLQUHOUN écrit de Bucharest le 6 Mai :

"An order was signed by General Coronini on the 29th ultimo by which these Principalities are to be placed under martial law: it has not yet been promulgated, but I have a copy of it which I will send to Constantinople to-night for forwarding from thence."

No. 779.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May 6, 11·30 P.M.*)

Vienna, May 6, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE read Mr. Colquhoun's telegraphic despatch of this day to General Hess. He said the report as to martial law must be altogether erroneous, as no such information had reached him, and such a measure could not even be contemplated without reference to him.

No. 780.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May 7.*)

(No. 312.)

Constantinople, April 23, 1855.

My Lord,

I AM endeavouring, in concert with Lieutenant-General Vivian, to obtain from the Porte such arrangements as are necessary to give effect to the Convention by which it was agreed that a body of 20,000 Turkish soldiers should be paid by Her Majesty's Government, and commanded by British officers. Difficulties are to be encountered, but I trust that they will give way to our exertions. An idea of the doubtful progress which we have hitherto made may, perhaps, be best conveyed to your Lordship by means of the instruction, copy inclosed herewith, which I addressed yesterday to M. Pisani, and of his official report, which is also transmitted herewith in copy.

Your Lordship will observe, on perusing these documents, that the Porte's suggestions imply a more notable deficiency of numbers than before; that our allies have obtained possession of the locality which I had proposed for encamping the troops, when collected either wholly or in part under General Vivian's command; and that means of conveyance for that portion of the troops which would have to be embarked at Varna, cannot be furnished by the Porte.

Reshid Pasha is reported by M. Pisani to have promised an exact list of the proportions of Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery to be assigned to General Vivian, but I have not yet received it.

Meanwhile I have found, on the one side, from Mr. Longworth, that the Turkish Regulars stationed at Monastir, to the amount, as he presumes, of nearly 6,000 men, are placed under circumstances which would render them available for the corps in our service; and I have ascertained, on the other, that the Sultan entertains the opinion, with which I am impressed myself, that we cannot look to Omer Pasha's camp for any part of the troops to be supplied.

Knowing the deep interest which your Lordship naturally takes in this matter, I am unwilling to delay the transmission of such particulars as relate to its progress, though I am well aware how imperfect and uncertain must be the inferences to be deduced from them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 780.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

British Embassy, April 22, 1855.

Sir,

YOU informed me yesterday, on the authority of the Grand Vizier, that the Council at which his Highness presided had come to a decision respecting the mode of furnishing the troops destined to be paid and officered by the British Government. I understand that 5,000 Regular Infantry are to be supplied from the army of the Danube, 2,500 from the garrison of Constantinople; that 7,500 Armenian conscripts are to be joined to them; and that Artillery and Cavalry are to be added, though it is not yet stated in what proportions, nor whence taken, except that a squadron or two of Cavalry may be obtained from here, and perhaps also the three battalions of Artillery reserved for Lord Raglan.

I wish you to wait on Reshid Pasha this morning. You will express to him my satisfaction at the Council's decision to take recruits from among the Christians, and my persuasion that General Vivian will not object to receive a portion of them into the ranks of his corps. I presume, at the same time, that he will not approve of too large a number in the first instance; and on my part, I must add, that I was not prepared to include Rayahs in the conscription at once. My notion has always been that the recruitment of Christians, or other Rayahs, for the Sultan's army, should be at first voluntary, and the more so as their admission to the enjoyment of civil rights is at best limited, and has still to be declared and enforced. I feel convinced that Reshid Pasha will recognise the justness of my impressions, and comprehend, without difficulty, my objection to receive any number of conscripts under the present circumstances. He may remember that I anticipated difficulty as to the Porte's supplying the number of soldiers agreed upon without some recruitment; and his Highness, by allowing our officers to collect recruits themselves, will but enable me to reconcile Her Majesty's Government to the deficiency of Regulars.

You will read this instruction to the Grand Vizier; and you will also make inquiry as to the Artillery and Cavalry appointed to be placed under Lieutenant-General Vivian's command.

I cannot too strongly urge the importance of expedition. It is necessary at once to form a body of 10,000 men, of the three arms, duly proportioned: and I conceive that the troops thus collected, *en attendant* the remainder, might be located near Hunkiar Skelessi.

How is provision to be made for the conveyance of the troops from Bulgaria?

Your, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 780.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, April 22, 1855.

My Lord,

HAVING, in compliance with your Excellency's directions, communicated and explained to Reshid Pasha your instruction of this day's date, respecting the troops to be paid and officered by the British Government, I have now the honour to report, that his Highness told me in reply, that he will transmit forthwith to your Excellency an exact list of the number of Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry to be placed under Lieutenant-General Vivian. The 5,000 to be drawn from the army of the Danube, will be ordered to Varna: but the difficulty is to convey them to Constantinople, the Porte having no conveyance at its disposal.

Omer Pasha, said the Seraskier, whom I saw at the Grand Vizier's, will be able, now that the Egyptians are with him, to spare about 5,000 of his troops for the Contingent.

With reference to the Christian recruits, his Highness observed that the Porte does not mean to force the Rayahs to take service; but will take such measures as to carry the object in view into execution with prudence and success. What regards the civil rights, the haratch and other reforms, already sanctioned by the Sovereign, are to be promulgated simultaneously with the conscription.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ETIENNE PISANI.

P.S.—Hunkiar Skelessi has already been taken by the French, and therefore another spot must be selected.

ET. P.

No. 781.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 212.)

My Lord, *Vienna, May 4, 1855.*

YOUR Lordship will be aware by the telegraphic despatch which I sent to you last night that Baron Bourqueney had received a satisfactory answer from Count Buol to the question which he was instructed to address to him. I abstain from entering into the details of the confidential communications which passed between Count Buol and Baron Bourqueney, as I know that they will have been already transmitted to your Lordship from Paris, but I think it right to acquaint your Lordship that Count Buol has this day reiterated to me all the statements which he made yesterday to the French Minister. He told me at the same time that he had learntwith great satisfaction from M. Hübner at Paris, as well as from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that your Lordship was nearly agreed with the French Government respecting the project at present under consideration, and that it was probable that the adhesion to it of the two Governments would almost immediately be transmitted to Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 782.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 176.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 8, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government approve your having furnished Aali Pasha with a copy of my despatch No. 164 of the 24th ultimo, on the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte, as reported in your Lordship's despatch No. 210 of the 2nd instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 783.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 180.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 8, 1855.*

COUNT COLLOREDO read to me, a few days ago, a despatch dated the 23rd ultimo, from Count Buol, stating that the Russian Plenipotentiaries having declined to take the initiative in proposing measures for giving effect to the third point, and having rejected the proposal made for that object by the Four Powers, and having subsequently, at the twelfth Conference on the 21st ultimo,

brought forward a proposal of their own, which, having for its basis the opening of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to the ships of war of all nations, could not seriously be considered, it had become necessary, Count Buol said, to resort to other means for the solution of the problem.

He had accordingly consulted the Plenipotentiaries of England and France, who, after taking into consideration the position of Austria, and the difficulties of various kinds that war would entail upon her, unless her motives for going to war were powerful and clearly established, had agreed to refer to their Governments two propositions, that might, as a last resource, be presented to Russia as ultimatums, the rejection of which would lead (entrainerait) Austria to war.

The first of these propositions was a guarantee by Treaty for the Ottoman Empire against Russia, by a system which, "without imposing any direct or explicit limitation upon Russia, would compel her nevertheless to impose a limit upon herself, as she would be under the weight of a graduated counterpoise, and a line would be traced which she could not pass without exposing herself immediately to war with the allied Powers."

The second proposition rested upon a limitation that was to be the result of an understanding between the Plenipotentiaries of Russia and Turkey.

Count Buol concluded his despatch by saying, that as Her Majesty's Government were informed of the details of the propositions, he had merely given the substance of them to Count Colloredo.

I told Count Colloredo that the details alluded to by Count Buol had not reached Her Majesty's Government in a formal shape, and I could therefore offer no opinion upon the vague proposals in Count Buol's despatch, or say more, at that time, than that Her Majesty's Government were desirous to consider any proposal for a safe and just peace, that would give effect to the objects that Austria was pledged, in conjunction with England and France, to secure; but I added, as the Conferences were then suspended, and as Lord John Russell was to leave Vienna on the same day that Count Buol's despatch was dated, Her Majesty's Government had determined to take no further steps until his Lordship's arrival, and they had had the advantage of hearing his advice and opinions; the same course would, I believed, be pursued by the French Government, in waiting for the return of M. Drouyn de Lhuys. It is right I should here inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government are not at this moment, any more than at the time when Count Buol's despatch was read to me by Count Colloredo, in possession of any written document, containing in precise terms the proposal that Austria is willing to make to Russia. Such a document, however, was read on the 15th ultimo, by Count Buol to Lord John Russell and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, but he declined to give them a copy; and when Count Buol was reminded of this by the English and French Plenipotentiaries before Lord John Russell's departure from Vienna, Count Buol stated that all the necessary information had been sent to Count Colloredo, by whom, however, as I learned yesterday, nothing further has been received than the despatch to which I have already alluded.

But Lord John Russell and M. Drouyn de Lhuys rely upon the accuracy of the notes which they respectively took to assist their own recollection; and these have been the subject of anxious consideration on the part of Her Majesty's Government. Some delay has been caused in coming to a decision upon the subject, in consequence of a communication from the French Government, the nature and the result of which your Lordship will find detailed in my despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, a copy of which is inclosed.

In consequence of the determination taken by Her Majesty's Government, which your Lordship will find announced in that despatch, and having ascertained that the French Government concurred in that course of proceeding, I requested Count Colloredo to call upon me yesterday, and I read to him the following terms, which Lord John Russell had reported to Her Majesty's Government that Austria proposed to address to Russia:

1st. Guarantee as against each other of the independence and integrity of Turkey.

2nd. The closing of the Straits, with exceptions in favour of the allies, not in favour of Russia.

3rd. The allies may have each two frigates in the Black Sea.

4th. If the Russians exceed the number of ships now actually floating in

the Black Sea, the allies may have each half the number of Russian ships of war.

5th. In case of danger the Sultan may call up the whole naval forces of his allies.

6th. Austria will propose to Russia an engagement not to increase her naval forces in the Black Sea beyond the actual number existing in 1853, and whether Russia accepts this engagement or not, will sign a Treaty with us making the increase beyond 1853 a *casus belli*.

I then proceeded to state that Her Majesty's Government could not attach much practical value to the engagement of Austria to make, at some future period, a *casus belli* of the increase of the Russian fleet beyond a given amount, for she had already declared that it was beneath her dignity to discuss numbers, and that she could not admit that the question of peace or war should turn upon eight or ten ships of the line; and if such were the case now, when circumstances would enable Austria to go to war with advantage, what prospect would there be of her doing so some years hence under circumstances likely to be far less favourable, for the very same cause, though in a lesser degree, that she would not now entertain.

I reminded Count Colloredo that Austria was pledged to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, and I asked how that pledge would be redeemed by the proposal that the allied armies and fleets should withdraw from the Crimea and the Black Sea, and that England, France, and Turkey should agree by Treaty that the naval forces of Russia should be re-established in that sea, the same in number and in power as before the war, which amount we had constantly declared, and Austria had agreed with us in declaring, was a menace to the Ottoman Empire, and to the peace and equilibrium of Europe. I said that on a former occasion I had expressed, in strong terms, to Count Colloredo the opinion of Her Majesty's Government upon this proposal, and it was hardly necessary to inform him that that opinion was unchanged.

I said, I was sure that Count Buol would admit that the Plenipotentiaries of England and France had faithfully adhered to the course of proceeding that he had himself suggested in a despatch communicated to me by Count Colloredo in November last, that England and France should not, in the course of the negotiations, bring forward demands of a nature calculated to insure their rejection; and the best proof of their having done so would be found in the fact, that the several proposals made by them to Russia had received the frank and cordial support of the Austrian Plenipotentiaries; but as those proposals had been rejected by the Russian Plenipotentiaries, who had declared that no limitation of Russian forces would be listened to, and no interference with the sovereign rights of Russia within her own territory would be allowed, and as, moreover, they would not even join in a real and *bonâ fide* guarantee of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, little doubt could exist that Russia had not abandoned her designs against Turkey; and that unless means were taken for curtailing her aggressive power, those designs would assuredly sooner or later be executed.

The time was now therefore arrived for England and France to invite Austria, in fulfilment of her engagements, to concert with them the measures for giving immediate effect to the Treaty of December the 2nd. It was unnecessary, I said, to inform Count Colloredo that Her Majesty's Government desired peace, but they would prefer the continuation of the war to a peace that would not be honourable nor likely to last, and which would not effect the objects we had undertaken to secure for the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, and the future tranquillity of Europe. Count Buol had said, that he did not think the means of restoring peace were exhausted, and that he considered it to be the special duty of Austria to apply herself to devising the means of accommodation ("de s'occuper de la recherche des moyens de rapprochement").

If, therefore, Austria can discover such a scheme, it will not only be favourably considered by Her Majesty's Government, but will be to them a cause of the most sincere satisfaction; but it must be a scheme that will be effectual for its purpose: it must impose conditions on Russia, and not be a scheme by which the allies are to impose conditions upon themselves, leaving in the Black Sea complete freedom of action to Russia.

Count Buol, I said, must be well aware that such a scheme is impracticable;

the proposals he has supported, and the language he has used in the Conferences, prove that, in his opinion, Russia might, consistently with her honour and her dignity as a first-rate Power, consent to satisfactory arrangements, if she is sincere in the profession of her wish to maintain the Ottoman Empire and to give no just cause of uneasiness to Europe; but, on the other hand, if Russia, while endeavouring to elude the real question at issue by concessions respecting the Principalities and the navigation of the Danube, refuses to enter into engagements, and persists in her right to retain and to augment her means of aggression, it is clear that her professions are not sincere, that her designs are dangerous, and that the active cooperation of Austria with her allies will be essential to her own interests, and will be justified in the eyes of the world for the purpose, not of humiliating nor of injuring Russia, but of arresting the progress of her ambitious policy and of obtaining securities for the future peace of Europe.

Your Lordship is instructed to read this despatch to Count Buol.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 784.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 161.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 8, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction, from your Lordship's despatch No. 188 of the 3rd instant, that the Prussian Government have at length determined to take notice of the libels of the "Kreuz Zeitung" newspaper, which might easily have been controlled. Baron Manteuffel says he has not sufficient power, but would not the power of the Prussian Government be sufficient to prevent any article offensive to Russia?

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 785.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 324.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April 30, 1855.*

I LEARN from a report addressed to me by M. Pisani, and inclosed herewith in copy, that the Sultan has given his sanction to the proposal of the Council to enlist Christians in his army.

This measure is coupled with another of equal importance—the abolition of the capitation tax, or haratch, and both these measures are to be promulgated simultaneously.

I have, &c.
For Viscount Stratford,
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 785.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, April 29, 1855.*

IN reference to my report of the 26th instant, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Sultan has sanctioned the proposal of the Council to enlist Christians in the army and issued orders for the adoption and execution of the measure. This measure, and the abolition of the haratch, are to be promulgated forthwith and simultaneously.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 786.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May 9.*)

(No. 325.)

Constantinople, April 30, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a translated list, communicated to me by Saffet Effendi, of the proportion of troops of different arms, which the Porte proposes to place under General Vivian's command.

I have, &c.

For Viscount Stratford,

(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 786.

List of the Contingent.

(Translation.)

THE above men have been arranged according to military proportions, *i.e.*, at the rate of one in six to be Cavalry, and two guns for nearly 1,000 men, so that there shall be five foot batteries and two horse batteries.

	Men.
Infantry	15,750
Cavalry	3,300
Artillery	950
	20,000
Pieces with guns	42

Necessary to be taken from the army in the Crimea:

Infantry	3,937
Cavalry	826
Artillery	237
	5,000

Necessary to be taken from the army of Roumelia:

Infantry	3,937
Cavalry	826
Artillery	237
	5,000

Necessary to provide from Constantinople:

Infantry	1,968
Cavalry	414
Artillery	118
	2,500

Necessary to get from new arrangements:

Infantry	7,500

Recapitulation.

Crimea	5,000
Roumelia	5,000
Constantinople	2,500
Recruits	7,500
	20,000

N.B.—As these 7,500 will have to be recruited afresh, it naturally follows that they will have to be subdivided into Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry, according to the well-known proportion.

No. 787.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May 9.*)

(No. 514.)

Paris, May 7, 1855.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has resigned the portfolio of Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I will endeavour, as far as I can, to make your Lordship acquainted with the causes that have led to this distinguished statesman's retreat.

Your Lordship is aware, from my despatch No. 499 of the 2nd instant, as also from the more detailed communications which have been made to you by Count Walewski, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys returned from Vienna, determined to give the weight of his support to the last propositions of Austria; that he found the Emperor unwilling to accept the *status quo* of the Russian fleet in 1853, as the hinge on which future peace or war should turn, but that His Majesty proposed a modification to the Austrian plan, by which the state of the Russian fleet at the present moment should be taken as the basis of an arrangement. According to the Emperor's modification, any augmentation of the Russian fleet beyond its actual numbers, so as to give it excessive proportions in the eyes of the Contracting Powers, would oblige those Powers to unite for the defence of the Ottoman Empire.

I should state that the object which the Emperor proposed to himself, and which His Majesty conceived had been attained by this modification, was, first, to limit the naval power of Russia to the number of ships actually afloat whenever peace should be signed; and, secondly, to meet the views of the Austrian Government by not making the addition of one or two ships to that number a cause of war. The *casus belli* would only arise when the allies became convinced that the development of the Russian navy in the Black Sea must be intended for aggressive purposes.

With these views, and under the supposition that his modification attained them, His Majesty desired that it should be transmitted to London, in order to ascertain whether the idea was approved by Her Majesty's Government.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys misunderstood the Emperor's intentions, and, instead of transmitting the proposition for the consideration of Her Government, appears to have instructed Count Walewski to bring it forward in the Emperor's name, and to urge it on the acceptance of the Cabinet.

The Emperor, in the mean time, after further consideration of the terms, which he thought had only been sent confidentially to London, became convinced that there was no direct limitation imposed by them on Russia. He learned also that Her Majesty's advisers, while desirous of meeting wishes which they supposed had been so unequivocally expressed by His Majesty, were yet anxious to know the motives which dictated them, and that they felt in fact that they were called upon to make an entire change in the conditions of peace (such in reality not being His Majesty's intentions). He found that the honour of his army would not, in the opinion of the highest military authorities, be satisfied by such a conclusion of the war as that proposed, and he determined in consequence to direct M. Drouyn de Lhuys to state to Her Majesty's Government, through Count Walewski, that, all things considered, His Majesty was of opinion that it would be better to reject the Austrian propositions in a courteous manner, and maintain the plan of limitation brought forward by the maritime Powers and supported by Austria at the Vienna Conferences.

This occurred on Friday last. On the evening of that day M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote to the Emperor, and placed his resignation in His Majesty's hands. The Emperor replied in the kindest tone, reminding M. Drouyn de Lhuys that if any one had reason to complain, it was His Majesty himself, since M. Drouyn de Lhuys had acted at Vienna in direct contradiction to his instructions, and no reproach had been addressed to him. His Majesty invited M. Drouyn de Lhuys to come to him on the following day to talk the matter over. M. Drouyn de Lhuys declined the Emperor's invitation, and Count Walewski was then written to to undertake the business of the Foreign Department.

I have not succeeded in seeing M. Drouyn de Lhuys since these events occurred; but I understand that he defends his conduct, not on the ground that

the Emperor finally declined the Vienna proposition, but because His Majesty did not persist in supporting the modification of it which, with his sanction, had been sent to London.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 788.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 515. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, May 7, 1855.*

THERE are some details connected with the subject of my preceding despatch, which I am desirous of submitting to your Lordship in a more confidential form; the more so, as my name has, in some of the Parisian circles, been brought forward in connection with M. Drouyn de Lhuys' resignation. It is right, therefore, that your Lordship and Her Majesty's Government should know what participation I have had in this event.

Before proceeding, however, to the enumeration of these details, it is necessary that I should call your Lordship's attention to matters of anterior date.

Your Lordship will recollect, that from the commencement of the differences between the Western Powers and Russia, M. Drouyn de Lhuys was the most ardent promoter of hostilities. Russia had not a more bitter enemy, or more determined antagonist. The series of remarkable papers which have been published under his signature, expose in the most able and lucid manner the danger to be apprehended from the Northern Colossus, and the means to be employed to avert them. In fact, it was more necessary to calm than to excite the late Minister for Foreign Affairs. I freely confess that, in the outset, I thought this language and conduct to be the result of apprehensions for the fate of the Turkish Empire, and for the perils which would naturally ensue to the equilibrium of Europe should Turkey fall into the hands of Russia. Subsequent events, however, convince me that these apprehensions had but inferior influence over the policy of M. Drouyn de Lhuys; that the principal cause of his antipathy to Russia was the advantage which she had obtained in the question of the "Sacred Places," and the refusal of the Czar to acknowledge the Emperor Napoleon as his brother. The aggression of Russia upon Turkey was rather the pretext for, than the actual reason of, M. Drouyn de Lhuys' animosity. Accordingly, we find him gradually abandoning the ground which he had at first occupied. His object is changed. He imagines that the severest blow to Russia, and the most brilliant achievement for himself, will be to detach Austria from Russia, and so to break up the Northern alliance, which had been conceived in hostility to France. For this purpose, he is willing to forget all his previous declarations, all his recorded engagements: for this purpose, whilst professing to me—Her Majesty's Representative—unbounded attachment to, and implicit confidence in, England, to the Representatives of Austria, of Prussia, and of the German States, he represents the necessity of an alliance with France, in order to keep the demands of Great Britain within bounds; for this purpose he would have sacrificed the alliance of England, and have accepted any terms of peace with Russia that Austria might be inclined to support.

Such were the feelings, I am convinced, with which M. Drouyn de Lhuys proposed to the Emperor that he should be sent to Vienna; and it was under this conviction that I pressed upon him the necessity of going in the first instance to London, in order that his plans might be fully discussed and understood by Her Majesty's Government, and that there might be no mistake in future negotiations. I do not pretend that M. Drouyn de Lhuys did not intend to have carried the plans, so accepted, into execution, if he could have won the consent of Austria, on which he counted; and I had even hoped that, after the discussions which had taken place in London, he would have found it impossible to do more.

Such, however, has not been the case; and this brings me to the recital of those details respecting myself, which I would gladly have saved your Lordship the trouble of perusing. But, as it might reach your ears that I am accused of intriguing against M. Drouyn de Lhuys and compassing his fall, I hold to stating what has really occurred.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys returned to Paris on Monday, the 30th of April. On Tuesday, the 1st of May, he saw the Emperor, when the Austrian propositions were discussed, and the Emperor's modification was sent to London. I had an interview with him on the evening of that day, the details of which I had the honour to report to your Lordship in my despatch No. 499 of the 2nd instant.

I saw M. Drouyn de Lhuys again on the Thursday morning, when I informed him that no decision had been taken by Her Majesty's Government with respect to the Emperor's modification—that it was a grave matter, which required deliberation, &c. On the afternoon of that day I was honoured by a letter from the Emperor, at the end of which His Majesty inquired what I thought of the modification which he proposed to the Austrian propositions. Unwilling to give an opinion upon a matter which was under the discussion of Her Majesty's Government, I took the liberty of making no reply to His Majesty's interrogation; and the following morning I was summoned to the Tuileries, when the Emperor put the same question to me.

I told His Majesty I was embarrassed how to reply; that Her Majesty's Government had come to no decision, &c. He went on to show what, in his opinion, were the advantages of the scheme; and I soon found that His Majesty was under the idea that the notification which had been sent to London contained a direct limitation to be accepted by Russia of her naval force in the Black Sea. I showed him that this was not the case; and he then desired me to telegraph to your Lordship to state his impression that no arrangement could be made which did not place restrictions on Russia. On His Majesty stating that he would see M. Drouyn de Lhuys again on the matter, I honestly confess that, having no faith in the political honesty of that gentleman, I asked permission to be present at the interview, and most heartily do I rejoice that the Emperor granted it, though the fact may be taken as one of hostility to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

The Emperor thought proper to summon Marshal Vaillant to be present at the same time.

During the meeting, the question of the tendency of the Emperor's modification was first discussed, but the discussion naturally extended to the objects of the war, and how far they were realised by the Vienna propositions. The Emperor stated his desire to have been to find terms which, while they bound Russia, should yet be palateable to Austria; but he declared that if his modification did not impose some sort of limitation on Russia, he would abandon it at once.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys was obliged to admit that the Vienna proposal contained no direct limitation of Russian power; but he argued long and ably, though, I think, inconclusively, on the advantages which that proposal offered—advantages which he considered greater than those contained in the plan of the allies.

Marshal Vaillant confined himself to stating that the army would not be satisfied with a peace on those terms.

I, on my part, said that I wished rather to establish facts than to give an opinion, for I did not doubt that at the moment I was speaking, Her Majesty's Government were discussing the merits of the proposal. It was agreed on all sides, I said, that neither the Austrian proposal nor the Emperor's modification contained a limitation of Russian power. The question, then, which the two Governments would have to consider, was whether, having declared that the objects for which they went to war, as far as the third point was concerned, were to destroy Sebastopol and prevent its reconstruction as a naval arsenal, to destroy the Russian forts in the Black Sea, to limit the naval power of Russia in those waters, and to appoint Consuls in order to exercise some supervision, whether, these being the objects which they had originally in view, they were now prepared to abandon, not one or two, but the whole of them; nay more, whether, having solemnly declared that their intention was to cause the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea to cease, they were prepared to reestablish that preponderance.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys denied that this was the case; but I said that, if the two Governments permitted Russia to maintain her actual fleet, while they limited the allied squadron to four frigates, that preponderance was in the first

instance assured. I could not admit, as argued by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that a Turkish fleet would restore the balance.

To resume, the question was whether the allies were driven to the necessity of making fresh terms to Russia after she had, almost haughtily, refused those which had been offered.

Not to weary your Lordship, I will only add that the meeting terminated by the Emperor's declaration, that, all things considered, he despaired of finding terms that would suit the honour of the belligerent Powers, and would yet be acceptable to Russia, and he concluded that it would be better to abide by those made in the Conferences at Vienna.

Your Lordship has now a faithful record of the part which I have taken in these matters. I should think myself very unworthy to fill the high position which Her Majesty's Government have confided to me, if I condescended to intrigue against the Minister with whom I had principally to deal. I might, indeed, have complained to the Emperor of the double language held by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in regard to the English alliance, but I have never done so, because I knew that his Imperial Master's straightforwardness was not to be compromised by the Minister's tortuous policy. I have certainly had my own opinions respecting M. Drouyn de Lhuys' political honesty, but I have never made it the theme of discussion with others.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 789.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

Foreign Office, May 9, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

IN the instructions sent yesterday to Baron Bourqueney by Count Walewski, he is told to propose a Tripartite Treaty to Austria.

We do not think this would be expedient at the present moment.

Ask Baron Bourqueney not to act on that part of his instruction until he hears again from Count Walewski.

No. 790.

Aali Pasha to M. Musurus.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. Musurus, May 9.)

Vienne, le 3 Mai, 1855.

Monsieur,

VOUS trouverez ci-joint en copie une dépêche de Lord Clarendon; elle vient de m'être communiquée par le Comte de Westmorland, en réponse à un mémoire que j'avais présenté à Lord John Russell, à mon arrivée à Vienne.

Je ne puis que rendre justice aux sentiments bienveillants qui ont dicté cette dépêche, et en témoigner ma reconnaissance au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique pour les Affaires Etrangères.

Avant d'entreprendre la tâche de donner des éclaircissements sur les différents points auxquels touche la pièce en question, je vous dirai franchement la peine que j'éprouve de voir tous les jours combien on cherche à nous dénigrer auprès du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine d'Angleterre, et à dénaturer à ses yeux tout ce qui est déjà fait en faveur des Chrétiens. Ainsi on lui a rapporté:

1. Que le témoignage des Chrétiens n'est pas admis dans plusieurs endroits où les juges sont encore exclusivement Musulmans, et dans les causes civiles dans lesquelles ils peuvent être plus fréquemment lésés que dans les affaires criminelles.

2. Que les seuls tribunaux mixtes sont les Tribunaux de Commerce, dont les fonctions sont très limitées.

3. Que toutes les autorités de provinces sont encore composées des Musulmans, et cela encourage l'oppression et l'injustice contre les Chrétiens.

Il est vrai qu'il y a des tribunaux civils régis par la loi religieuse, qui

n'admettent pas le témoignage des non-Musulmans contre les Musulmans, mais les Chrétiens ne sont nullement obligés d'y recourir; ou s'ils y sont condamnés, ils ont la faculté de faire appel en dernière instance jusqu'au tribunal le plus élevé, au Conseil Suprême de Justice. Dans les provinces, la pluspart des procès civils sont jugés par les Conseils Locaux où toutes les différentes communautés sont représentées par des membres élus par elles-mêmes. Ces Conseils réunissent à leur pouvoir judiciaire des fonctions administratives très étendues; les Gouverneurs sont tenus de ne rien faire sans avoir pris d'avance leurs avis; ce sont eux qui président à la répartition et à la perception des impôts. Les membres non-Musulmans de ces corps y remplissent déjà la mission de défendre les intérêts de leurs coreligionnaires; tout individu sujet de Sa Majesté le Sultan, de quelle religion qu'il soit, a chez nous le droit d'en appeler à la capitale, toutes les fois qu'il se croit lesé dans ses droits. Il arrive très souvent que des Gouverneurs-Généraux sont destitués et mis sous jugement par suite d'une pétition collective des Chrétiens de leurs Gouvernements.

Il résulte de ce qui précède:

1. Que les sujets non-Musulmans ne sont pas privés de garanties suffisantes dans leurs procès civils comme dans leurs procès criminels et commerciaux.

2. Que les membres non-Musulmans des Conseils Provinciaux prennent une part égale à l'administration de leur pays, et qu'ils exercent une sorte de contrôle sur tout ce qui regarde leurs coreligionnaires.

3. Que le droit d'appeler à Constantinople est assuré à tous les sujets de l'Empire sans distinction de culte ou de religion.

Quant aux attributions des Tribunaux Mixtes de Commerce, il me suffira de dire qu'elles ont la même étendu et les mêmes limites que celles des Tribunaux de Commerce de l'Europe.

Est-ce à dire cependant que la Sublime Porte considère sa mission réformatrice comme avoir atteint son dernier résultat? Non! Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, dont le règne a été si fécond en bienfaits à l'égard de tous ses sujets, ne se laissera jamais de consacrer sa généreuse attention à perfectionner l'œuvre régénératrice qu'il a si heureusement commencée. Oui! Il peut encore se commettre quelques abus administratifs, quelques irrégularités, dans la marche des affaires de détails; cet état de choses peut ralentir quelquefois la rapidité du développement de la prospérité du pays: mais il faut regarder un peu en arrière; comparer l'état actuel de la Turquie avec ce qu'elle a été il y a dix à quinze ans; examiner impartialement si les sujets non-Musulmans de l'Empire Ottoman n'y sont pas incomparablement plus heureux que les Musulmans, les Protestants et les Catholiques en Russie sous les auspices de ce Gouvernement qui se fait en Europe le défenseur du Christianisme en Orient, et tyrannise ouvertement chez lui tout ce qui n'appartient pas à l'Eglise Orthodoxe; voir si ces quelques abus administratifs, dont je parle plus haut, frappent exclusivement les Chrétiens, ou s'il y a un système de persécution organisé contre eux, si le Gouvernement ne réprime pas sévèrement le moindre écart de la part des autorités; et tenir compte enfin des difficultés que la transformation d'un société offre au Gouvernement qui l'entreprend.

Vous savez, Monsieur, que la majorité de nos compatriotes Chrétiens ne sont pas moins exempts de préjugés religieux que les populations Musulmanes. Il faut en conséquence que le Gouvernement marche pas-à-pas, sans précipitation et avec une grande prudence. La Sublime Porte est obligée de ménager, comme tous les Gouvernements prévoyants, l'esprit religieux et national des différents peuples soumises à sa domination et de mesurer l'étendue des réformes au degré de leur éducation, afin de ne pas amener un bouleversement et faire la besogne des ennemis de son existence.

Certes! on ne peut pas dire que les Iles Ioniennes sont mal administrées, que leurs habitants sont persécutés et humiliés par les Gouverneurs Anglais. Malgré tous les bienfaits de son administration juste et sage, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique sait de quel côté leur sympathie est tournée; combien ils cherchent à se faire considérer comme les victimes d'un système tyrannique, et combien les Lords Hauts Commissaires sont obligés de déployer une vigilance continuelle pour les maintenir en bon ordre. Eh bien! ne serait-ce pas équitable d'attribuer une grande partie des plaintes exagérées et souvent sans fondement qui arrivent aux Puissances Européennes de la part des Chrétiens de Turquie, à ces mêmes causes qui rendent les Ioniens si ingrats envers la Métropole, c'est-à-dire, à cette sympathie religieuse habilement exploitée par la Russie?

J'ose croire qu'une étude approfondie et sérieuse prouvera l'exactitude de ce que je viens de dire.

Notre auguste Maître a déjà donné trop de preuves réelles et matérielles de ses intentions bienveillantes à l'égard de tous ses sujets, de la magnanimité de son cœur et de l'élévation de ses vues pour ne pas avoir le droit à une confiance entière de la part de ses puissants alliés. Il est temps aussi que toutes ces calomnies auxquelles la nation Musulmane est en butte de la part d'un parti dont les efforts ne tendent à rien moins qu'à l'anéantir, cessent, et qu'on veuille bien croire qu'elle n'est nullement ennemie ni de la civilisation ni de ses compatriotes non-Musulmans.

La guerre que l'Angleterre a entreprise au prix de tant de sacrifices, prouve l'intérêt qu'elle attache à l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman. Nous sommes donc persuadés qu'elle ne permettra jamais aux insinuations perfides, à des vues puisées dans des sources intéressées, de détruire l'édifice qu'elle veut voir se consolider.

Veuillez soumettre ces considérations à Lord Clarendon, et conjurez sa Seigneurie de vouloir bien les peser dans sa haute sagesse, dans sa justice et dans sa pénétration.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) AALI.

No. 791.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

Paris, May 10, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

FRENCH Minister at Vienna has been desired not to take initiative in the ipartite Treaty. He thinks that Austria will make further proposals.

No. 792.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 370.)

Foreign Office, May 10, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE to state to your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government have learnt with much satisfaction, from your Excellency's despatch No. 324 of the 30th ultimo, the decision of the Sultan to admit Christians into his army, and to abolish the capitation tax or haratch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 793.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 11.)

Vienna, May 10, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

BARON BOURQUENEY has received a telegraphic message from Count Walewski, dated May 8, announcing that he has succeeded M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and that the policy of France with regard to Austria remains unchanged.

Count Buol immediately communicated this to the Emperor of Austria, who expressed his great satisfaction, which he desired might be conveyed to the Emperor Napoleon.

Variations from the project communicated by M. Drouyn de Lhuys are proposed in the same despatch.

No. 794.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 12.)

(No. 528.)

Paris, May 10, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI having assumed the direction of Foreign Affairs, I took an early opportunity of waiting upon him.

His Excellency observed, that he had thought it right to establish at once, that nothing was changed in the policy of the French Government by his having assumed the direction of Foreign Affairs; that he had seen M. de Hübner, and reassured him on this point. His Excellency went on to say, that before leaving London he had come to a distinct understanding with Her Majesty's Government, as to the line to be pursued in regard to Austria. He then read me a despatch which he had addressed to M. de Bourqueney, in which this policy was set forth. It will have been communicated to your Lordship by M. Baudin, and I need not enter into details.

This morning Count Walewski informed me that Her Majesty's Government objected to the immediate signature of a tripartite Treaty with Austria. His Excellency said that he had never intended to make it the subject of a proposition to Austria, as your Lordship appeared to suppose; he had merely admitted the possibility of such a proceeding should Austria desire it: however, he had now telegraphed to M. de Bourqueney not to take the initiative in it.

I am afraid, notwithstanding this precaution, that if the idea is palateable to Austria, difficulties may yet arise; as I have reason to think that before knowing your Lordship's wishes, Count Walewski had told M. de Hübner that France and England were not averse to the signature of a tripartite Treaty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 795.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 12.)

(No. 534.)

Paris, May 11, 1855.

My Lord,

I BEG to call your attention to the inclosed copy of an article from the "Indépendance Belge," giving an account of the reasons which led to M. Drouyn de Lhuys' resignation. It is known to have been written under that gentleman's dictation, and was considered to be so offensive that the responsible correspondent of the newspaper in question was sent for by the Minister of the Interior yesterday, and informed that he must not permit himself to be the channel for the publication of such articles in future.

To the astonishment of every one, the article appeared this morning in the columns of the "Moniteur," which may be said to be tantamount to the recognition of its exactitude by the French Government. I found Count Walewski much disturbed over its appearance, and intending to speak to the Emperor upon the subject.

I take this opportunity of mentioning that Count Walewski has addressed a circular despatch to the Agents of the French Government at the principal Courts of Europe, explaining the retirement of M. Drouyn de Lhuys as having been occasioned by a misunderstanding of the Emperor's orders, which had placed him (M. Drouyn), as that gentleman thought, in a false position. Count Walewski gives assurance at the same time that the Emperor's policy has undergone no change.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 795.

Extract from the "Indépendance Belge."

Paris, 8 Mai.

LA démission de M. Drouyn de Lhuys et la nomination de M. Walewski, appelé à le remplacer au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, annoncées officiellement par le "Moniteur," étaient dès hier connues de tout le monde. Je me suis exprimé hier avec assurance sur les motifs exclusivement politiques de cette retraite. Je me crois en mesure de confirmer ce que je vous en ai dit, et d'y ajouter quelques détails.

C'est sur le question de la proposition de l'Autriche que le Ministre qui s'était si complétement associé à la politique extérieure de l'Empereur, s'est vu obligé de conserver une opinion différente des résolutions de Sa Majesté. La proposition dont il conseillait l'acceptation par la France devait avoir, paraît-il, pour effet ou de rétablir la paix si elle était acceptée aussi par la Russie, ou d'assurer le concours immédiat et énergique de l'Autriche dans la guerre, si la Russie la refusait. En un mot, l'Autriche, après s'être mise d'accord avec les Puissances Occidentales, autorisée à déclarer leur adhésion acquise à sa proposition, l'aurait formulée dans un ultimatum qu'elle aurait adressé à la Russie, ajoutant qu'elle faisait absolument, péremptoirement, du rejet de cet ultimatum, un *casus belli*, et qu'en conséquence elle ne répondrait plus à ce rejet que par une déclaration de guerre.

Cela avait, il faut en convenir, l'avantage de créer une situation très-nette, et d'engager explicitement l'Autriche. Mais fallait-il rechercher cet avantage dans les conditions déterminées par la proposition de l'Autriche? C'est ce que l'Empereur n'a pas pensé. Je n'ai pas encore eu de renseignements qui me fissent suffisamment connaître les conditions, les termes de la proposition Autrichienne; je ne suis pas en mesure de les apprécier. Mais il est certain que le Gouvernement Anglais se montrait décidé à repousser cette proposition. L'Empereur aurait donc eu, pour refuser, les mêmes motifs que ce Gouvernement, c'est-à-dire, qu'il aurait trouvé qu'elle n'offrait par une paix qui apportât assez de dédommagement et de garanties aux Puissances qui ont fait tant de sacrifices pour défendre et pour assurer le droit Européen. Sa Majesté aurait eu de plus, le sentiment du Gouvernement sur la question étant connu, le désir de maintenir dans son intégrité et dans sa force l'alliance avec l'Angleterre.

Je ne puis, je le répète, exprimer une opinion sur la proposition même. Mais, quel qu'en fût le mérite, M. Drouyn de Lhuys l'avait adoptée, après réflexion, avec conviction, on ne peut en douter. Il n'aura pas pensé qu'il pût rester attaché à la politique qui s'en éloignait; il n'aura pas voulu continuer à être l'organe de vues et de résolutions dont sa raison se séparait. Il aura reconnu qu'il ne pouvait, ni dignement pour lui-même, ni utilement pour l'Empereur, le servir encore comme Ministre quand il n'aurait plus été associé, par son intelligence et par son patriotisme, à la politique de l'Empereur.

Il est probable, et on me l'assure en effet, que l'Empereur n'a pas vu sans regret l'éloignement du Ministre dont les services, déjà anciens, avaient obtenu d'éclatants témoignages de sa haute satisfaction. Il résulterait de renseignements que j'ai lieu de tenir pour exacts que Sa Majesté n'aurait pas accepté la démission de M. Drouyn de Lhuys sans avoir fait d'affectueuses instances pour l'engager à ne pas la maintenir. Mais la divergence des idées se trouvait trop marquée pour que la séparation n'eût pas lieu. La question personnelle n'a, du moins, ni amoindri ni troublé les causes et les circonstances de cette séparation. Les procédés sont restés, si je suis bien informé, bienveillants de la part de l'Empereur, honorables pour son ancien Ministre, profondément empreints du respect et du dévouement de celui-ci.

No. 796.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 539.)

My Lord, *Paris, May 11, 1855.*

I HAVE read to Count Walewski, as desired by your Lordship, your despatch to me No. 429 of the 5th instant. Count Walewski subscribes to the accuracy of the statement made by your Lordship as to what took place between himself and you; only he desires, for reasons which he has already stated in person to your Lordship, the omission of the word "strongly" in the fourth paragraph.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 797.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 222.)

My Lord, *Vienna, May 9, 1855.*

IN acknowledging the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 171 of the 1st instant, I have to express the satisfaction I have received from the approval of Her Majesty's Government which your Lordship conveyed to me in that despatch, for having attended the Conference of the 26th of April, under the circumstances as explained in my despatch No. 198 of the 26th ultimo.

I shall attend to your Lordship's instructions on the proposal of any further meeting of the Conference.

The only invitation to any further Conference which appears at present likely to take place, would be by Count Buol, for the purpose of bringing forwarded the proposal submitted by Lord J. Russell and M. Drouyn de Lhuys to your Lordship and the French Government; and upon which invitation, in case it should take place, your Lordship's instructions might perhaps be forwarded to me upon the receipt of this despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 798.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 223.)

My Lord, *Vienna, May 9, 1855.*

COUNT ARNIM waited upon Count Buol on Monday last, by order of his Government, to ask whether there was any truth in the report that your Lordship had made a statement in the House of Lords, that the European guarantee and Protectorate of the Principalities, which it was proposed to substitute for the present Protectorate of Russia, would not include the guarantee of Prussia, as she was not a member of the Conference, and therefore would not be a signing party to the Treaty which might result from the Conferences now assembled.

The reply of Count Buol was, that while Prussia remained, as at present, entirely aloof from the negotiations for peace, she could not naturally take part in any result which might proceed from them, and could not become one of the Contracting Parties; but whenever she chose to become so, her presence would be received with great satisfaction.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 799.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 14.)

Vienna, May 13, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE communicated to Count Buol your letter in answer to the Austrian proposition. He was gratified by the courtesy of its expression, but would reserve his reply to it. He proposes to call a meeting of the Plenipotentiaries, for the purpose of bringing the Conferences to a close with that courtesy and consideration which he thinks all parties owe each other. He intends at this Conference to renew the second plan detailed in my despatch No. 180 of the 18th April. As this will probably be refused, as it has already been refused, by the Russian Plenipotentiaries, Austria will declare there is no further object for continuing the Conferences. Count Buol begs a prompt answer on this point with reference to your despatch No. 174 of the 1st of May; I also beg for your instructions. The second plan above referred to was an original proposition of the French Plenipotentiaries.

No. 800.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 197.)

Berlin, May 10, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to forward to your Lordship on the 8th instant a telegraphic despatch in cypher in the following words:

"The Cabinet of St. Petersburgh have addressed a communication to Frankfort stating that they abide by their declaration at the Vienna Conference on the first and second points; they have made a similar communication to the Court of Berlin.

"They expect Germany to declare her neutrality in return for these concessions to her more immediate interests."

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 801.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 330.)

Constantinople, May 2, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith in copy a report from M. Pisani, which has been just received at the Embassy, announcing the resignation of Reshid Pasha and the formation of a new Ministry.

The hatti-sheriff relative to these changes, which was read publicly at the Porte this afternoon, is likewise inclosed in translation.

I have, &c.

For Viscount Stratford,

(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 801.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, May 2, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency, that in consequence of the recall of Mehemet Aali Pasha from banishment, and the constant attacks of M. Benedetti against Reshid Pasha, his Highness last night tendered his resignation, which having been accepted by the Sultan, Aali Pasha has been selected by His Majesty to succeed him, and until the latter arrives from Vienna, the Malié Naziri, Shefik Pasha, is to act as Caïmakam. Fuad Effendi replaces Aali Pasha in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the rank and title of Pasha. Nutlar Bey, formerly Minister of Finance, has been called to fill that post again, with the rank and title of Pasha.

Reshid Pasha is to go to Vienna as Plenipotentiary to the Conferences on the part of the Porte; Aali Pasha is to remain there until the former reaches that city.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ET. PISANI.

P.S.—I beg to inclose, for your Excellency's information, a translation of the hatti-sheriff or Imperial Rescript announcing Reshid Pasha's resignation and the appointment of the new Ministry.

Inclosure 2 in No. 801.

Hatti-Sheriff.

(Traduction.)

Toi, mon Vizir Chefik Pacha!

COMME Réchid Pacha vient de supplier d'être déchargé des nombreuses occupations qui pesaient sur lui, il a été remercié du poste de Grand Vizir, et en conséquence cette haute dignité a été conférée au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Aali Pacha, qui se trouve à Vienne chargé d'une mission spéciale. En même temps Réchid Pacha a été destiné à remplacer Aali Pacha.

Je confère aussi, à toi, le place de Caïmakam (suppléant) du Grand Viziriat, jusqu'à l'arrivée d'Aali Pacha; et à Fouad Effendi, le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, avec le rang de Vizir (Pacha de la première classe), et avec la préséance, au surplus, du Conseil des Tanzimat.

Je nomme au poste de Ministre des Finances, devenu vacant par votre nouvelle position, Mouhtar Bey, surintendant de Tophana, avec le rang de Vizir.

Tu auras à donner de la publicité à toutes ces nominations. Que le Très-Haut daigne nous accorder à nous tous ses faveurs divines! Ainsi soit-il.

16 *Shaaban*, 1271. (2 *Mai*, 1855.)

No. 802.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. de Bourqueney.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, May 14.)

Paris, le 8 Mai, 1855.

M. le Baron,

VOS dépêches sont exactement parvenues au Département jusqu'au No. Je viens de prendre possession du poste auquel je suis appelé par la confiance de l'Empereur, et le temps me manque pour entrer dans de grands détails, mais je suis en mesure de vous faire connaître exactement les intentions des Cabinets de Paris et de Londres. Les propositions de la Cour de Vienne, je n'ai pas besoin de vous le dire, ont été l'objet de l'examen le plus sérieux, et, si elles n'ont, en

définitive, été jugées suffisantes ni par le Gouvernement de l'Empereur, ni par celui de Sa Majesté Britannique, leur rejet n'implique aucun amoindrissement de notre confiance dans la loyale fermeté de l'Autriche non plus que dans la stabilité et le développement de l'alliance du 2 Décembre. Soyez à cet égard aussi net, aussi explicite que possible. La combinaison proposée par M. le Comte de Buol, du reste, offre, à certains égards, des avantages que je ne méconnais pas ; elle répond aussi bien que nous pourrions le souhaiter au premier paragraphe de la troisième garantie ; elle rattache l'Empire Ottoman au système d'équilibre de l'Europe, et met ses entraves à l'ambition de la Russie. En revanche, il est un point qu'elle est loin de régler d'une façon aussi satisfaisante, quoique le Protocole du 28 Décembre impose également aux trois Puissances alliées le devoir de le resoudre, conformément à leur rang dans le monde, et à leurs intérêts généraux. Je veux parler de la cessation de la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire. Si grande qu'ait été l'envie de la France et de l'Angleterre de trouver dans les œuvres de l'Autriche une garantie qui, dans l'hypothèse de l'acceptation du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg—hypothèse beaucoup moins improbable qu'on ne le pense à Vienne—fût non seulement une compensation de leurs sacrifices, mais une assurance pour l'avenir, il leur a été impossible de leur attribuer ce caractère. J'en appelle sans crainte à la bonne foi et à la haute intelligence de M. le Comte de Buol, et je suis certain que, placé dans les conditions analogues à celles où je suis, et où se trouve le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique, il ne verrait pas, dans un système de contre-poids, si habilement gradué qu'il puisse être, une force capable de mettre fin à la prépondérance de la Russie sur l'Euxin.

Or, M. le Baron, c'est à obtenir ce résultat que nous sommes tous engagés d'honneur ; la cessation positive de cette influence dangereuse dont les effets ont troublé l'Europe, fait partie intégrante du programme connu sous le nom des quatre garanties. Ne pas remplir ce programme au-dessous des limites qu'il trace, ce serait reculer, ce serait concéder à notre adversaire un succès moral, aussi nuisible à notre considération dans le présent qu'aux intérêts essentiels que nous avons voulu sauvegarder. Je ne prétends pas que, replacé en face des difficultés de la question, M. le Comte de Buol ne parvienne pas à vous indiquer un moyen de les surmonter ou de les tourner, et vous pouvez lui donner l'assurance que tout ce qui nous sera proposé par le Cabinet de Vienne sera examiné dans l'esprit de modération et de concorde qui préside à nos rapports, et avec le plus vif désir de notre part et de celle de l'Angleterre d'y trouver une solution. Cela posé je ne vous cacherai pas, M. le Baron, que jusqu'à plus ample informé, il nous paraîtrait plus logique et plus simple de s'en tenir fermement à ce qui a été discuté officiellement dans les Conférences. Les Plénipotentiaires alliés, sans que rien dans leur attitude et leur langage ait trahi la moindre différence d'impression, ont proposé la neutralisation ou la limitation. A ces ouvertures, les Plénipotentiaires de Russie n'ont répondu que par des offres dérisoires et jugés d'un commun accord et sans aucune arrière pensée absolument inacceptables. En nous reportant donc aux termes du Traité du 2 Décembre, si les négociations étaient aujourd'hui déclarés rompues, elles seraient dissoutes du fait de la Russie, et le cas prévue par l'Article Secret serait arrivé à son échéance. Je ne crois pas, M. le Baron, qu'il y eût rien à reprendre à cette argumentation. Vous n'aurez pas, toutefois, à la présenter sous sa forme la plus arrêtée ; nous voulons, au contraire, dans une affaire aussi grave et dans des conjonctures aussi solennelles, accorder à l'Autriche et le mérite de l'initiative et le temps de la réflexion. Ce qu'il importe seulement, c'est de ne lui laisser aucun doute, 1, sur l'insuffisance de son interprétation de la troisième garantie ; 2, sur le prix que nous attachons à démeurer unis à elle. Pour le prouver et afin de détruire par avance toutes les suppositions auxquelles on serait tenté de se livrer, pour établir que, loin de se relâcher, les liens qui nous unissent sont indissolubles, vous êtes autorisé, comme le sera Lord Westmorland, à demander à M. le Comte de Buol s'il ne serait pas disposé à signer, sans plus de retard, le projet de Convention joint à l'ultimatum, mais en supprimant l'Article Secret. Notre bonne foi réciproque et les intérêts communs compenseraient le vague du dernier Article Patent. Par cet acte, et à quelque temporisation qu'elle dût encore avoir recours, l'Autriche ne consoliderait dans la position qu'elle a prise, et toutes les spéculations que l'on pourrait faire à Berlin et à St. Pétersbourg et ailleurs sur un prétendu dissentiment entre les Puissances signataires du Traité du 2 Décembre seraient immédiatement anéanties. Vous trouverez sans que je vous les indique les considérations à faire valoir pour provoquer une résolution qui raffermirait l'opinion publique et serait une considération nouvelle de la politique suivie en commun par les trois Cours depuis l'origine de la crise d'Orient.

No. 803.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. de Bourqueney.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, May 14.)

M. le Baron, *Paris, le 10 Mai, 1855.*

SA Majesté Impériale répond aujourd'hui à la lettre autographe que l'Empereur François-Joseph lui a adressée et je profite du départ d'un courrier spécial pour compléter mon expédition du 8 de ce mois. J'ai vu le lendemain M. le Baron de Hübner. Il a défini la situation en ces termes : l'Autriche n'a pas la prétention d'imposer aux Puissances Occidentales une paix qui ne leur conviendrait pas, mais elle a la prétention, et croit avoir le droit, de ne pas se laisser imposer une guerre qui ne lui serait pas commandée par ses intérêts.

Pour rassurer M. le Baron de Hübner, j'ai cru ne pouvoir mieux faire que de lui donner à titre confidentiel lecture de ma précédente dépêche. La conversation a continué et il m'a semblé que M. le Ministre d'Autriche regardait les propositions de son Gouvernement comme une interprétation satisfaisante de la troisième garantie au double point de vue de l'entrée de l'Empire Ottoman dans le système de l'équilibre général et de la cessation de la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire. Je n'ai pu, M. le Baron, lui concéder la justesse de sa conclusion. Le Cabinet de Vienne, il est vrai, je l'ai déjà dit et je n'hésite pas à le répéter, a pourvu, avec autant de soin qu'il nous était permis de le souhaiter, aux dangers permanents que l'oubli qui avait été fait de la Turquie en 1815 laissait planer sur l'Europe. La Turquie, si je puis ainsi parler, a une existence politique assurée ; rien de ce qui la touche, rien de ce qui la menacerait, ne sera plus une affaire à régler entre elle et son puissant voisin. C'est là, je ne le nie pas, un résultat considérable, mais la troisième garantie en indiquait encore un autre qui n'est pas atteint et que l'on s'efforcerait vainement de confondre avec le premier. Cela est tellement vrai, M. le Baron, que la France, l'Angleterre, et l'Autriche, après une délibération qui a dû lever tous les doutes du Cabinet de Vienne sur les intentions de ses alliés, ont ajouté à la rédaction primitive de la troisième garantie un amendement dont l'énoncé parfaitement clair et précis revèle toute l'importance. Les termes du Protocole du 28 Décembre ne se prêtent à aucun ambiguité, et s'il avait existé à cet égard le moindre nuage, la résistance que M. le Prince Gortchakoff a opposée le même jour à l'acceptation intégrale du mémento qui lui a été présenté suffirait pour le dissiper. L'Autriche, en un mot, s'est engagé virtuellement, sans restriction ni réserve, à ne traiter, comme nous, avec la Russie que si cet empire consentait à la cessation de sa prepondérance sur l'Euxin ; et le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg en se faisant représenter aux Conférences a admis le même principe. Un seul point à cette époque est demeuré dans le vague. Les alliés du 2 Décembre se sont confiés à leur loyauté réciproque. L'Autriche a jugé que nous ne lui demanderons rien d'excessif lorsqu'il s'agirait de passer à l'exécution de notre mutuel engagement ; la France et l'Angleterre, de leur côté, ont pensé que le Cabinet de Vienne, sans aller peut-être aussi loin qu'elles l'eussent souhaité, ne leur offrirait rien qui ne fût sérieux et efficace. Pour me résumer, la question des voies et moyens était réservée ; c'est elle qui nous occupe aujourd'hui.

L'Empereur, M. le Baron, après s'être mis d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, n'a pu trouver dans les propositions émanées de la Cour d'Autriche une solution qui répondit à la fois aux sacrifices de la France et aux intérêts d'ordre Européen qui lui ont fait tirer l'épée. Sa Majesté Impériale et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique ont fait l'alliance du 2 Décembre, dont ils sentent également le prix, une grande concession en s'obligeant à limiter les effets de la guerre, et à renoncer, quelles que soient en définitive les péripéties de la campagne entamée, à user de leurs droits ultérieurs de belligérants à l'égard de la Russie, dans le cas où cette Puissance, calculant le danger, admettrait des conditions relativement restreintes. La France et

l'Angleterre se doivent à elles-mêmes et elles doivent au monde de ne pas descendre au-dessous de ce niveau. Faite dans les termes où elle nous serait offerte—car je ne mets pas en doute l'adhésion du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg—la paix ne serait bonne que pour notre adversaire. Lui seul aurait grandi la lutte qui devait le diminuer. Mais j'abandonne ces considérations générales; j'arrive au point pratique de la discussion et je veux vous indiquer, pour que vous les reproduisiez, les motifs de la résolution de l'Empereur. Sa Majesté, qui a mûrement pesé toutes les conséquences de l'ultimatum que l'Autriche était prête à adresser à la Russie, est demeurée convaincue que le système qui s'y trouve ne mettrait d'aucune façon un terme à la prépondérance dont la cessation est devenue le but de la guerre, comme elle doit être aussi la consécration d'une paix solide. La simple lecture du plan de M. le Comte de Buol en démontre l'inefficacité. Aux yeux de Cabinet de Vienne, la position formidable que la Russie s'était faite dans l'Euxin serait si peu anéantie que toute la combinaison Autrichienne repose pour ainsi dire sur une échelle des défiances et des contre-poids à opposer à une resurrection des forces que la guerre a atteintes. Au lieu de tout finir aujourd'hui et de nous aider au moment où le succès serait certain, l'Autriche nous offre de recommencer plus tard avec nous la tâche que nous avons entreprise avec ses sympathies et que par sa demande nous laisserions incomplète ce que la France et l'Angleterre veulent, c'est d'assurer le repos de l'Europe. L'Autriche se contenterait-elle d'un repos momentané, troublée d'avance par ses propres prévisions? De bonne foi, M. le Baron, est-ce là ce qu'elle nous avait promis? Si, de l'ensemble je descendais aux détails, il me serait facile de prouver que la Russie, libre envers nous de tout engagement direct, aurait encore dans la Mer Noire, avec les débris de sa flotte, une attitude menaçante pour la Turquie. Elle attendrait l'occasion en se réparant dans le mystère de ses arsénaux et le jour venu notre imprudence éclaterait en même temps que sa force. Userions-nous de la faculté qui nous serait accordée d'entretenir de compte à demi avec l'Angleterre une escadre égale dans la Mer Noire? Où seraient nos ports de refuge? A quelles dépenses ne serions-nous pas contraints? Que deviendraient bientôt nos relations avec le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg? Notre apparition au delà des Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore serait l'avant-coureur certain d'une nouvelle perturbation.

J'en ai dit assez, M. le Baron, pour vous mettre au courant des idées du Gouvernement de l'Empereur, et vous donner les moyens de convaincre le Cabinet de Vienne que les siennes ont été scrupuleusement étudiées. Développez vous-même ces arguments et notre sincérité du moins sera hors de cause. Comme Sa Majesté Impériale m'a autorisé à la déclarer, nous examinerons avec le plus vif désir d'arriver à une entente les nouveaux plans que M. le Comte de Buol voudrait encore nous proposer; mais je ne puis cependant me défendre d'une réflexion—c'est qu'il serait plus simple, au lieu de perdre un temps précieux à des discussions entre nous, de mettre catégoriquement la Russie en demeure de faire savoir si elle a dit dans la troisième Conférence son dernier mot par l'organe de ses Plénipotentiaires. La situation serait alors fort nette. Si ce dernier mot, au contraire, n'a pas été dit, qu'on le prononce; nous aviserions et la vérité des rôles serait sauvegardée, puisqu'en définitive la France et l'Angleterre n'ont ni demandé la paix, ni chargé personne de la proposer en leur nom. Ce point a été établi par M. le Comte de Buol lui-même au début des négociations.

No. 804.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May* 15, 1855.

COUNT WALEWSKI is in London, and can come to no decision respecting the proposal of Count Buol until he has received the orders of the Emperor; he returns to Paris to-morrow.

In the mean time we wish to know exactly what is the project that Count Buol desires to propose to the Conference. Is it Annex B in Protocol XI?

Is it project of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, alluded to in your No. 180? In what way would it be proposed to frame the Convention between Russia and Turkey, and what would be the amount of limitation?

We cannot give answers on such important questions without understanding them clearly.

No. 805.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May* 15, 1855.

SEND the precise terms, word for word, in which Count Buol's projected proposal to the Conference will be drawn up.

No. 806.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, May* 16, 1855.

BARON BOURQUENEY and I were directed by telegraph to address the same question to Count Buol. As our answers could only be very incompletely rendered by telegraph, I write to-night by a messenger, who will arrive in London on Saturday. My despatch will contain the proposition itself which Count Buol means to bring before the Conference, and which is based, as I have already stated, on the limitation of the Russian naval forces to their effective force at the end of the war. Count Buol requires that this communication should be considered as entirely confidential. He maintains his right to invite the Conference to assemble, as well as our right to absent ourselves from it. But the latter case would constitute the definitive rupture of the negotiations.

I beg for your instructions by telegraph after receipt of my despatch, as the invitation to the Plenipotentiaries to meet in Conference cannot be delayed beyond Monday.

No. 807.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 570. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, May* 18, 1855.

COUNT WALEWSKI informed me last night, that if the telegraphic despatches received from M. de Bourqueney had been rightly understood, the intention of Austria, when the Conference was again assembled, was to propose the adoption of the Annex B to the eleventh Protocol. He said, that if this was the case, no time should be lost, in the opinion of the Emperor and of himself, in acceding to the proposition of Austria to meet again in Conference. Annex B contained all for which the allies had contended,—a limitation of the Russian naval force in the Black Sea; an equal number of allied ships to those

which it would be permitted to Russia to keep; and consequently, a free passage of the Bosphorus for them, without reciprocity to Russia; Consuls in the ports of the Black Sea, wherever it was judged expedient to establish them.

Count Walewski observed, that if Russia accepted these terms, the allies would hardly be justified in refusing them; but that to avoid future discussion, it would be necessary to appoint a Commission to verify the actual state of the Russian fleet. Admiral Bruat's opinion was, that there were but three ships of the line left.

On the other hand, if Russia refused them, Austria would be forced to break off the Conferences, and would be more bound to the allies than would be the case if they refused to accede to her invitation to meet the Russian Plenipotentiaries again.

I observed, that it was very difficult to discuss a proposition the tenour of which was as yet but imperfectly known; but supposing it to be that which Count Walewski imagined, I asked whether he was prepared to adopt it without any engagement on the part of Austria to make its refusal by Russia a *casus belli*. His Excellency replied, that he considered the rupture of the Conferences by Austria herself to be worth purchasing by an appearance at a fresh Conference; that the rupture having taken place, it would be in the power of the allies to make what representations they pleased to Austria; that he had discussed this point with the Emperor, and that their idea was, that if the allies obtained any success in the Crimea, Austria should be summoned to declare herself; that, in fact, the language to be used towards Austria must depend very much on the state of the warfare in the Crimea.

I then said that there was another point of view in which the question must be considered; namely, the probability of the acceptance by Russia of the Austrian proposals. Was I to understand that France was ready to make peace on the terms supposed to have been sent from Vienna? "Yes," replied Count Walewski, "supposing always that we have obtained an advantage (un succès) over the Russians." "But," I rejoined, "supposing a reverse—and a few days will probably give one or the other—what then?" "Oh, then," replied the Count, "it would be impossible to make peace on any terms. The honour of our arms would require to be avenged." "You would then," I replied, "be in this predicament;—you would have accepted terms of peace, without a decided intention of abiding by them." I did not think, I added, that such a position would be accepted by Her Majesty's Government, or by the nation to whom Her Majesty's Government was accountable.

Count Walewski observed, that after the regulation of the third point, the war would naturally continue until after the fourth point had been settled; that then in the opinion of both Governments there were many parts of the first point which required reconsideration; that the two Governments had further reserved to themselves the right of adding other conditions to those contained in the four points; that they might ask indemnities, &c. To which I replied, that if the question of Russian supremacy in the Black Sea was once settled, no matter how, hostilities could not, in my humble opinion, be continued; that an armistice would be the natural consequence; that Commissioners could not be sent to examine the effective state of the Russian fleet while the opposing armies were in active conflict; and that I did not believe that either France or England would comprehend the continuation of warfare after the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea had been declared by the two Governments to have been reduced to safe proportions.

I mention these details of a conversation, purely confidential, in order that your Lordship may understand exactly how matters stand here. You will draw your own conclusions from them, as I have drawn mine, but I am bound to say, that the more I see of this Government, the less do I conceive that any reliance can be placed in the stability of their intentions. Everything is done to meet the expediency of the moment. Not a lesson has been learnt from the past; not a thought cast towards the future. It appears to me that Her Majesty's Government must make up their minds on the consideration of what their own honour and interests require, and having done so, maintain their opinions in face of any opposition here. The more we yield, the more we shall be expected to yield. Firmness, tempered by discretion, will, I feel confident, do more for the alliance than concessions which we regret, in however friendly a spirit they may be made.

Before closing this despatch, I should add, that in speaking of Annex B, Count Walewski evidently intended the second of the three systems mentioned in Lord John Russell's despatch No. 83 of the 18th ultimo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 808.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 573. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, May* 18, 1855.

COUNT WALEWSKI gave me this morning, in confidence, to read, a circular despatch addressed by the Russian Government to its Agents abroad, giving the Russian version of what has taken place at the Conference at Vienna. This document is evidently intended for publication. It is of considerable length, and is of course written to display to Europe the magnanimity of the Czar upon the first, second, and fourth points of negotiation, and the return with which that magnanimity has been met by the imperious bearing of the allies on the third point. As usual, nothing has been neglected to make Russia appear to be the real advocate and protector of the privileges of the Principalities and of the Christian subjects of the Porte.

Count Walewski is occupied in drawing up an answer, to be published whenever this despatch sees the light.

As his Excellency has obtained possession of this copy from a secret source, it is possible that your Lordship may not yet have seen it. I have requested him, therefore, to send a copy to M. Baudin, for your Lordship's information, which he has promised me to do.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S.—Count Walewski has just sent me the copy in question, which I have the honour to inclose.

C.

Inclosure in No. 808.

Circular Despatch addressed to Russian Agents abroad.

St. Pétersbourg, le Avril, 1855.

LES délibérations de la Conférence de Vienne, sans être définitivement rompues, restent en suspens, MM. les Plénipotentiaires de France et d'Angleterre ayant déclaré leurs instructions épuisées.

Afin de mettre les Légations Impériales à même de porter un jugement correct sur l'état actuel de la négociation, je me fais un devoir d'en retracer l'ensemble, de constater les résultats qu'elle a obtenus, enfin de signaler les circonstances qui, en l'arrêtant dans sa marche, ont mis obstacle à un succès.

Ma dépêche du 26 Février vous a fait connaître l'esprit dans lequel ont été conçues les instructions dont feu l'Empereur Nicolas de glorieuse mémoire avait fait munir ses Représentants à l'époque où les Conférences de Vienne allaient s'ouvrir. Confirmées par notre auguste Maître à son avènement au trône, ces directions ont été fidèlement suivies par les Plénipotentiaires appelés d'ordre de Sa Majesté à cette importante négociation. Elle embrassait quatre questions:

1. Immunités des Principautés.
2. Navigation du Danube.
3. Révision du Traité de 1841.
4. Garantie et libertés civiles et religieuses des populations Chrétiennes soumises à la domination de l'Empire Ottoman.

Avant d'entrer en discussion sur ces Articles, les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ont fait précéder un examen d'une déclaration formellement constatée par le Protocole 1. Elle est conçue en ces termes : "Le Prince Gortchakoff a dit, &c."

[Voir le Protocole.]

Tel est le point de départ que les Plénipotentiaires de Russie, conformément aux ordres de leur Cour, ont clairement établi dès le début de la négociation. Aucun des membres de la Conférence n'a contesté la validité de cette déclaration de principes. Loin de là, tous ont itérativement attesté qu'il n'entrait pas dans la pensée de leurs Cabinets d'articuler des propos blessants pour la dignité de la Russie. Sur la foi de ces assurances la délibération s'est ouverte le 15 Mars.

Les séances des 17 et 19 Mars ont eu pour objet le règlement de la question des Principautés; elle a été résolue avec honneur, avec loyauté, avec désintéressement comme feu l'Empereur le voulait. Dans son auguste pensée, il avait essentiellement à cœur de maintenir les populations de la Moldavie, de la Valachie, et de la Servie, dans la paisible jouissance des immunités religieuses et civiles que la Russie leur avait assurées au prix de son sang versé depuis un siècle pour la cause de ses coreligionnaires.

Leurs immunités demeurant intactes les Protocoles de Vienne 2 et 3 ont servi à en consolider le maintien sous la garantie collective de toutes les Hautes Parties Contractantes. Par cette garantie le régime privilégié des Principautés entre dans le domaine du droit public Européen. Jusqu'ici le soin de veiller à l'exécution des engagements pris par la Porte en sa qualité de Puissance Suzeraine retombait sur la Russie seule. Elle partagera désormais cette obligation avec les autres Puissances garantes. Cette communauté de devoirs mettra fin au sentiments de rivalité qu'inspirait à celles-ci une surveillance exercée par la Russie isolément.

Trop longtemps l'opinion publique a dénoncé cet état de choses à la haine de l'étranger sous le nom de "Protectorat Russe." C'est ici l'endroit où il est bon de vous rappeler que vous ne trouverez ce terme nulle part dans nos Traités, ni dans celui de Kaïnardji, ni dans celui de Bucharest, ni dans la Convention d'Akermann, ni dans le Traité d'Andrinople. Il ne s'agissait donc point aujourd'hui de faire disparaître de nos actes ce Protectorat qui n'y existait pas. La Russie dans le passé avait contracté une promesse, celle de garantir la prospérité des Principautés. Le Traité d'Andrinople avait confirmé cette promesse. Le Cabinet Impérial l'a remplit encore aujourd'hui et il la remplira dans l'avenir lorsque de commun accord avec toutes les Puissances il place les immunités des Principautés sous la sanction formelle du droit public Européen.

A ce point de vue les Protocoles de Vienne méritent d'être appréciés comme un gage permanent de sécurité ajouté aux bases sur lesquelles repose l'existence politique et nationale des Provinces Danubiennes. Le Cabinet Impérial a la conscience d'avoir loyalement accompli ce résultat dans le double but, d'une part, d'assurer le bien-être de les contrées, de l'autre, d'écarter de la politique générale de nouvelles causes de mésintelligence, de rivalité et de perturbation.

C'est dans le même esprit que les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ont traité et résolu la secondième question, celle de la navigation du Danube. Elle a fait l'objet des séances du 21 et du 23 Mars.

Par les Protocoles 4 et 5, on est convenu d'appliquer à la navigation du Danube les principes généralement établis en matière de communications fluviales par les Actes du Congrès de Vienne. En vertu de cette législation, une Commission Mixte veillera dorénavant au soin d'écarter les obstacles matériels qui ont entravé la navigation et motivé plus d'une fois les réclamations du commerce.

Après avoir heureusement applani les difficultés que présentaient les deux premiers Articles, les Plénipotentiaires ont passé à l'examen du troisième, compris sous la dénomination de révision du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841.

Le Cabinet Impérial attendait avec calme l'exposé des vues que les Puissances Occidentales feraient présider à la discussion de cet objet. Jusqu'alors leurs instructions, commentées en sens divers, soit par les organes de la presse, soit par les discours parlementaires, n'avaient pas été clairement définies dans les réunions préliminaires tenues à Vienne le 28 Decembre et le 7 Janvier. A cette époque les Représentants de France et d'Angleterre s'étaient bornés à annoncer qu'aux yeux de leurs Cabinets la révision du Traité de 1841 devait avoir pour objet de rattacher plus complétement l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre Européen, et de mettre fin à la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire.

Quant aux arrangements à prendre à cet égard, les Plénipotentiaires ont déclaré "qu'ils dépendraient trop directement des événements de la guerre pour qu'on puisse dès à présent en arrêter les bases." Les manifestations publiques en France et en Angleterre trahissaient néanmoins la pensée qui se cachait au fond de ces paroles. Elle visait à la destruction de Sebastopol. Sans une doute, selon le calcul des Cabinets de Londres et de Paris, les opérations militaires en Crimée marchant de front avec les délibérations diplomatiques, devaient peser sur le sort des Conférences de Vienne.

Au moment où elles se sont ouvertes, cette prévision n'avait pas été justifiée par l'événement. Aussi le nom de Sebastopol n'a-t-il pas été prononcé. La Russie doit ce silence à l'héroique résistance de ses braves généraux, officiers, marins, et soldats. Leur noble dévouement a été, de tous les moyens de négociation, le plus victorieux. En sa présence, les combinaisons de nos adversaires ont pris une autre forme et emprunté un langage nouveau. Dans la Conférence du 26 Mars, les Plénipotentiaires de France et d'Angleterre ont mis en avant l'idée qu'il appartenait aux deux Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire de s'entendre directement sur les moyens à employer pour arriver à la pondération de leurs forces navales; s'abstenant toutefois de formuler à ce sujet une proposition claire et précise, ils ont réservé aux Plénipotentiaires de Russie de prendre l'initiative des mesures que le Cabinet Impérial jugerait à propos d'indiquer spontanément dans le but d'établir entre les forces relatives un juste équilibre.

Le Prince Gortchakoff et M. de Titoff, sans préjuger les intentions de leur Cour, ont cru devoir solliciter la décision de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, quant à l'aspect nouveau sous lequel se présentait la troisième question actuellement mise en discussion.

Ainsi à la date du 26 Mars les délibérations ont été ajournées jusqu'à la réception des réponses attendues de St. Pétersbourg. Dans l'intervalle, les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche et de Russie ont été d'avis qu'il conviendrait de passer à l'examen du Article 4, relatif aux immunités des populations Chrétiennes en Orient.

A cette question, vous le savez, le sentiment national de la Russie attache une importance si haute et si grave, que feu l'Empereur avait prescrit à ses Représentants de la placer au premier rang dans le texte du Traité à conclure. Nul doute que toutes les Puissances ne fussent appelées à reconnaître, de concert avec la Russie, la grandeur de cet intérêt commun à toute la Chrétienté dans le but unanimement avoué de sauvegarder par une transaction Européenne l'avenir des populations Chrétiennes d'Orient sans distinction du rit qu'elles professent.

Les Plénipotentiaires de France, nous le disons à regret, après avoir pris les ordres de leurs Cours, ont refusé de passer à l'examen de cette question tant que pa discussion sur l'Article 3 demeurait en suspens. Les formalités requises dour constater et motiver ce refus ont rempli la septième et la huitième séance du 29 Mars et du 2 Avril.

La dixième du 9 Avril a été employée à la vérification des pleins pouvoirs de M. Drouyn de Lhuys et d'Aali Pacha. La présence de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France, en donnant aux travaux de la Conférence un nouveau degré d'importance, semblait raffermir l'espoir de la voir aboutir à une solution pacifique. Cet espoir s'est affaibli dans les réunions subséquentes dont il me reste à faire le récit.

Dans la journée du 13 Avril, les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ont reçu les instructions qu'ils avaient réclamées; elles ont été basées sur un principe simple et vrai: l'idée de soumettre à révision le Traité de 1841 n'appartenait pas au Cabinet de Russie; pour sa part, il aurait été prêt à renouveler les engagements en vertu desquels l'ancienne législation de l'Empire Ottoman concernant la fermeture des Détroits avait obtenu la sanction d'un Acte Européen. Le désir de modifier cet état de choses a été manifesté par les Puissances Occidentales. C'était donc à elles à prendre l'initiative des propositions à émettre pour arriver à une révision dont elles ont fait, dès l'origine, l'une des bases préliminaires des négociations de paix.

Feu l'Empereur, en autorisant ses Représentants à y prendre part, avait daigné les munir de directions précises, approuvées par Sa Majesté à la fin de l'année dernière dans l'attente de l'ouverture prochaine des Conférences de Vienne. Pour plus de clarté, je vais résumer l'exacte teneur de ces instructions. Elles partaient du principe que le Sultan, comme Souverain du territoire

voisinant les deux Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, est le maître d'en fermer et d'en ouvrir le passage. Elles ne s'opposaient point à l'ouverture de la Mer Noire aux pavillons étrangers, si la Porte elle-même en admettait le principe. Dans ce cas, elles en déduisaient la conséquence naturelle d'une parfaite réciprocité, afin que les bâtiments Russes fussent libres de traverser les Détroits pour entrer dans la Méditerranée, de même que les bâtiments de guerre, sous pavillon étranger, auraient la faculté de naviguer dans la Mer Noire; elles admettaient, de plus, l'entière liberté du Sultan, dans l'exercice de ses droits de souveraineté, d'alléguer à la marine étrangère des ports Turcs comme lieux de ravitaillement et de refuge. Sous ces conditions, feu l'Empereur avait autorisé éventuellement ses Plénipotentiaires à donner leur assentiment à l'abrogation du principe de la fermeture des Détroits. Fidèle à la pensée de son auguste père, l'Empereur Alexander II a prescrit à ses Plénipotentiaires de s'en tenir strictement à l'exécution des ordres dont ils se trouvaient déjà munis. En leur faisant connaître cette décision le $\frac{22\ \text{Mars}}{3\ \text{Avril}}$, Sa Majesté a daigné les autoriser à continuer la délibération commencée dans la séance du 26 Mars et à discuter la matière à fond, laissant à nos adversaires le soin de prendre l'initiative d'une révision provoqué par les Puissances Occidentales et non par le Cabinet de Russie.

Dès le lendemain de la réception des ordres de leur Cour, le Prince Gortchakoff et M. de Titoff, dans la séance dixième du 17 Avril, ont mis les Plénipotentiaires de France et d'Angleterre en demeure d'entrer en explication sur les modifications que leurs Cabinets tenaient à cœur d'apporter au Traité de 1841.

Ces modifications ont formé l'objet des séances onzième et douzième des 19 et 21 Avril.

Dans la première, les Plénipotentiaires des Puissances Occidentales ont exposé le plan concerté entre leurs Cours.

Dans la seconde, les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ont présenté un contre-projet basés un les instructions du Cabinet Impérial.

Nous allons analyser sommairement l'un et l'autre.

Le premier projet, dont lecture a été faite dans la séance du 19 Avril, se compose de dix Articles.

Le 1er reconnaît ce principe, que l'Empire Ottoman participera aux avantages du concert établi par le droit public entre les différents Etats de l'Europe, constate le respect que les Hautes Puissances Contractantes portent à l'indépendance et à l'intégrité de cet Empire, et garantit en commun la stricte observation de cet engagement.

La 2me prévoit l'éventualité d'un conflit entre la Porte et l'une des Puissances Contractantes, et stipule que, le cas échéant, cette dernière, avant de recourir à l'emploi de la force, mettra les autres Puissances en mesure de prévenir cette extrémité par les voies pacifiques.

A ces deux Articles le Prince Gortchakoff et M. de Titoff, usant de la latitude des pouvoirs que l'Empereur avait daigné leur accorder, n'ont pas hésité à donner leur assentiment. Cette adhésion, il faut le dire hautement, est fait pour imposer silence à tous ceux qui chercheraient encore à rejeter sur la Russie le reproche de vouloir troubler la paix de l'Europe. Après un gage de sûreté si librement et si formellement donné pour raffermir à l'avenir le maintien du repos de l'Orient, qu'elle assurance reste-t-il de plus à demander? Lorsque les Protocoles de Vienne auront acquis une entière publicité, tout observateur impartiel y trouvera la preuve de la bonne foi qui a dicté le langage du Plénipotentiaire de Russie. Ils l'ont attestée encore dans cette occasion. En effet, appelés à se prononcer sur la portée de l'Article 1, ci-dessus mentionné, ils ont exposé sans détour, sans réserve, les motifs qui ne permettaient point à la Russie de placer l'intégrité territoriale de la Turquie sous la protection d'une garantie matérielle. La Russie ne prend d'autres engagements que ceux qu'elle est en état de remplir. Or, quand il s'agit d'un Empire dont les frontières touchent à trois parties du globe, et qui renferme dans son sein des éléments divers de dissension et de désordre qu'il n'est au pouvoir de personne de maîtriser, une politique loyale et sage doit déconseiller à chaque Etat de se charger d'une responsabilité au delà des limites prescrites à la prévoyance humaine.

Ces vérités ont été exprimés par les Plénipotentiaires de Russie avec tant de clarté et de force que nous croyons rendre à leurs intentions une entière justice en reproduisant textuellement leurs paroles:

"Le Prince Gortchakoff a dit: Une des raisons pour lesquelles il a décliné une garantie territoriale active de l'Empire Ottoman se trouve dans la difficulté de définir avec exactitude ses limites. La garantie territoriale une fois stipulée, &c."

[Voir au Protocole 1.)

Sous cette restriction et dans ces limites, les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ont cru devoir adhérer aux Article 1 et 2, en vertu desquels l'Empire Ottoman serait admis à faire partie du système général de l'équilibre Européen. Après avoir arrêté ce principe pour servir de complément au Traité de 1841, la Conférence a passé à la lecture des autres Articles du Projet présenté par M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France.

Par l'Article 3, les deux Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire s'engageraient réciproquement à n'avoir chacune dans cet mer que quatre vaisseaux, quatre frégates, avec un nombre proportionnel de bâtiments légers et de navires de transport non armés.

L'Article 4 confirme l'ancienne règle de la clôture des Détroits, sauf les exceptions spécifiées dans les Articles suivants.

L'Article 5 réserve à chacune des Puissances Contractantes qui n'ont pas d'établissement dans la Mer Noire la faculté d'y faire entrer un nombre de bâtiments égal à la moitié des forces navales que chacune des deux Puissances riveraines y entretiendra.

L'Article 6 stipule que le nombre des vaisseaux de ligne des Puissances Contractantes qui n'ont pas d'établissement dans la Mer Noire ne pourra être de plus de quatre à la fois devant Constantinople dans leur trajet entre les deux Détroits.

L'Article 7 réserve au Sultan la faculté d'ouvrir les passages à toutes les forces navales de ses alliés, s'il était menacé d'une agression.

Par l'Article 8, les deux Puissances riveraines s'engageraient à admettre, dans tous les ports situés sur la Mer Noire, les Consuls que les autres Hautes Puissances Contractantes jugeraient utile d'y établir.

L'Article 9 concerne l'amnistie à accorder aux habitants des Provinces qui ont été le théâtre de la guerre.

Par l'Article 10 les relations entre la Russie et la Sardaigne seraient rétablies sur le pied où elles étaient avant la déclaration de guerre.

Lecture faite de ce projet, les Plénipotentiaires de Russie, sans entrer en discussion sur les Articles 3—10, se sont réservé de se prononcer dans la prochaine Conférence sur le mode de solution proposé.

La rapidité des communications télégraphiques établies entre Vienne et St. Pétersbourg a permis au Prince Gortchakoff de porter immédiatement à la connaissance du Cabinet Impérial les propositions formulées dans la Conférence du 19 Avril. De prime abord, elles différaient essentiellement de la définition fort remarquable que Lord John Russell avait établie le 26 Mars, pour servir de règle à la solution du problème qui formait l'objet de la délibération actuelle. Nous allons citer les paroles de Lord John Russell insérées dans le Protocole 6.

[Voir au Protocole 6.]

Après cette déclaration formellement émise en Conférence, le 26 Mars, Lord John Russell ne saurait être surpris de voir que les propositions faites le 19 Avril n'eussent pas été jugées par le Cabinet Impérial comme les meilleures ni comme les seules admissibles, pour nous servir de l'expression du Plénipotentiaire Anglais. En vérité, déterminer le nombre des vaisseaux dans la Mer Noire, tandis que les forces navales de la Méditerranée restent sans limite et sans contrôle; ouvrir à la France et à l'Angleterre les Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore tandis qu'ils demeureraient fermés au pavillon Russe; stipuler, enfin, la nomination de Consuls étrangers dans nos ports, sans que le Gouvernement Impérial fût libre de leur refuser "l'exequatur" à l'égal du droit que la France et l'Angleterre possèdent dans les territoires soumis à leur domination, ce n'étaient assurément pas là des conditions faites pour assurer à l'Europe le bienfait d'une paix solide et durable, car une transaction, pour être de longue durée entre Etats, doit être mutuellement honorable: autrement, on ne conclut pas la paix; on signe une trêve.

Ces considérations, appréciées dans leur exacte vérité, achèveront de prouver que, de bonne foi, les combinaisons suggérées par les Plénipotentiaires de France

et d'Angleterre auraient offert à la paix de l'Europe des gages de sûreté moins solides que le plan dont feu l'Empereur avait arrêté la base. Il ouvrait la Mer Noire librement au pavillon de toutes les nations. Par là il faisait cesser l'isolement de l'Empire Ottoman et mettait fin à l'appréhension qu'inspirait à l'étranger la disproportion des forces navales des deux Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire. En cessant d'être close, elle rentrait dans le domaine de surveillance et d'observation accessible à toutes les nations. Dès lors venait à disparaître la crainte du danger présumé auquel la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman pourrait se trouver exposée par le voisinage de nos établissements maritimes. En un mot, ce plan conçu par une politique à la fois prévoyante et désintéressée aurait, d'une part, assuré à l'Europe une garantie permanente de sécurité, tandis que, de l'autre, il ne blessait en rien la dignité de la Russie. De son côté, elle aurait obtenu à égal titre, en faveur de son pavillon, l'ouverture des Détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles. De part et d'autre il y aurait eu, dans l'adoption de ce plan, le mérite d'une réciprocité parfaite, qui forme la base des relations internationales ; principe immuable de justice que respecte et qu'approuve le sentiment d'honneur de tous les pays.

Pénétré de cette conviction, notre auguste Maître a réitéré à ses Représentants l'ordre de s'en tenir à l'exécution de ce plan tel qu'il avait été tracé par leurs instructions sous le règne de feu l'Empereur.

Les communications télégraphiques ont imprimé à la transmission de cet ordre une incroyable rapidité. Ainsi le plan présenté à Vienne le 19 Avril, examiné à St. Pétersbourg le 20, a été décliné par les Plénipotentiaires de Russie dans la Conférence du 21.

Après s'être acquittés de ce devoir, d'ordre de leur Cour, ils ont présenté dans la même séance un autre projet fondé, selon leurs instructions, sur le principe de l'ouverture des Détroits et de la libre navigation de la Mer Noire.

A l'appui de ce plan, ils ont donné lecture, 1, d'un memorandum qu'ils ont rédigé dans le but de développer les avantages de la combinaison proposé par le Cabinet Impérial dans l'intérêt général de la conservation de l'équilibre Européen ; et 2, d'un exposé renfermant la série des Actes destinés à convertir ce projet en forme de Traité. A la demande des Plénipotentiaires de Russie, ces deux pièces ont été annexées au Protocole 12. Comme elles attestent aux yeux de toutes les Puissances amies la sincérité et la persévérance des efforts que le Cabinet Impérial n'a cessé de vouer à l'accomplissement de l'œuvre de la paix par tous les moyens compatibles avec la dignité de la Russie, nous avons jugé nécessaire de joindre ces documents à la présente dépêche, afin de compléter ainsi la relation des faits dont elle rend compte.

Nous avons le regret d'y ajouter que les soins employés par nos Plénipotentiaires pour faire adopter le plan qu'ils étaient chargés de proposer, ne sont point parvenus à surmonter les obstacles qu'il a rencontrés dans son exécution. Le premier a été élevé par le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman. Il a déclaré que ses instructions lui prescrivaient de maintenir le principe de la clôture des Détroits ; que de tout temps la Sublime Porte a considéré ce principe comme une garantie de son indépendance et qu'elle tient à le respecter, sauf quelques exceptions qui pourraient être stipulées.

MM. les Plénipotentiaires de France et d'Angleterre ont décliné de discuter le contre-projet Russe comme étant fondé sur base entièrement contraire à leurs instructions. En conséquence, ils ont déclaré ne pas être autorisés à entrer en délibération sur les détails de ce plan. En conclusion, ils ont annoncé qu'ils regardaient leurs instructions comme épuisées.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche attestant que sa Cour n'a rien de plus à cœur que de contribuer au rétablissement de la paix, a exprimé le regret de voir la Russie proposer le principe de l'ouverture de la Mer Noire, tandis que les autres Puissances soutiennent unanimement le principe contraire comme nécessaire à la tranquillité de l'Europe.

Cependant, il ne regarde pas comme épuisés les différents modes de solution, et il considère particulièrement comme la tâche de l'Autriche de s'occuper de la recherche des moyens de rapprochement ; il espère donc que la Conférence se réunira de nouveau dès que l'un des membres aura de nouvelles propositions à émettre.

Le lendemain de la séance du 21, Lord John Russell a quitté Vienne pour retourner à Londres. Son départ n'a pas mis fin aux travaux de la Conférence ; elle a repris ses délibérations le 26 Avril à la demande des Plénipotentiaires de Russie.

Leurs instructions, en les autorisant à donner l'assentiment du Cabinet Impérial à l'ouverture des Détroits comme un moyen d'arriver à une pacification générale, partaient de l'idée qu'une combinaison conçue dans cet esprit, pour être rendue exécutoire, devait obtenir l'adhésion préalable de la Porte, en sa qualité de souveraine des territoires avoisinant les Détroits. La déclaration émise par le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman, dans la séance du 21, mettrait fin à cette éventualité. Dès lors, il restait aux Plénipotentiaires de la Russie d'user de la latitude de leurs pouvoirs, pour arriver à une nouvelle solution, d'accord avec les intérêts directs de la Russie.

Dès l'origine, comme nous l'avons dit, le Cabinet Impérial, sans provoquer la révision du Traité de 1841, aurait été prêt à en renouveler les stipulations. Ce n'est que pour épuiser les moyens de négociation en son pouvoir, qu'il a cru répondre aux intentions des Cabinets de Londres et de Paris, en leur proposant d'ouvrir la navigation de la Mer Noire aux pavillons de toutes les nations. Leur refus d'entrer dans cette voie de conciliation, dispensait complétement le Cabinet Impérial d'y insister. Loin de là, plus d'un motif se réunissait à notre avis en faveur du principe de la fermeture des Détroits, auquel nous avions consenti à renoncer, non pas dans la vue d'une politique exclusive, mais par des considérations très graves d'intérêt général.

Dans la situation qui résultait pour nous de l'issue de la Conférence du 20 Avril, nos Plénipotentiaires, dégagés de l'obligation de plaider la cause de la Mer Noire, rejetée par nos adversaires eux-mêmes, sont restés libres de proposer un nouveau plan.

Il consistait en deux Articles : le 1er confirmait l'ancienne règle de la cloture des Détroits ; le 2me laissait la Sublime Porte elle-même juge souverain des cas où l'intérêt de sa sûreté exigerait des exceptions à ce principe, et où elle croirait devoir appeler, selon les circonstances, soit les flottes des Puissances Occidentales, soit celles de la Russie.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France, réitérant la déclaration qu'il regardait ses instructions comme épuisées, ne s'est pas cru autorisé à discuter le projet actuellement mis en délibération. MM. les Plénipotentiaires Ottomans se sont abstenus de se prononcer sur son mérite. M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche, en prenant acte de cette proposition, a vu avec satisfaction que dans l'Article 1 le principe de la clôture ait été substitué à celui de l'ouverture des Détroits. Il a pensé que de plus l'Article 2, qui réserve au Sultan la faculté d'appeler éventuellement à son secours des flottes étrangères et d'ouvrir exceptionnellement les Détroits, est susceptible d'une application pratique. La proposition lui semble discutable ; elle renferme des éléments dont l'Autriche tâchera de tirer parti pour un rapprochement. Mais à l'état d'ébauche où elle se trouve encore, il ne saurait la considérer comme une base de solution.

De leur côté, les Plénipotentiaires de la Russie ont tenu à établir que ce sont eux qui, dans la douzième Conférence, ont déposé au Protocole la dernière proposition tendant à résoudre le troisième point des négociations, et que ce sont eux encore qui ont présenté, dans le même but, les nouvelles idées formant l'objet de la treizième Conférence. Ils l'ont terminée par constater qu'ils ont largement dégagé leur parole en proposant ainsi plusieurs modes de solution. Cette déclaration émise par le Prince Gortchakoff a servi de clôture à la séance du 26 Avril. Le lendemain, M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France a quitté Vienne pour retourner à Paris.

Tel est le résumé des négociations jusqu'à la date du $\frac{14}{26}$ Avril. Afin de conserver à cet exposé le caractère de simplicité et de calme qui convient à une relation historique, nous avons pris soin d'en écarter toute récrimination. Il suffisait d'établir les faits dans leur ordre et dans leur enchaînement pour vous éclairer sur les instructions que le Cabinet Impérial a fait présider à chacune des questions mises en délibération. Nous allons les récapituler sommairement.

La première en était une de rivalité politique. L'Empereur l'a jugée d'un point de vue plus élevé ; il l'a résolue dans l'intérêt du bien-être des Principautés dont la Russie a promis de garantir la prospérité. Elle a tenu, et elle saura tenir cette promesse.

La seconde était liée aux intérêts généraux du commerce. L'Empereur l'a décidée en faveur de la liberté commerciale de toutes les nations.

La troisième concernait non seulement l'équilibre général, mais elle touchait de près à la dignité et à l'honneur de la Russie.

C'est ainsi que notre auguste Maître l'a jugée. Le sentiment national de notre pays tout entier répondra à cette décision.

La quatrième en était une de liberté religieuse, de civilisation et d'ordre social pour toute la Chrétienté. Aux yeux du Cabinet Impérial, elle est celle qui devra être un jour à la tête d'un Traité de Pacification générale, digne d'être revêtu de la sanction de tous les Souverains de l'Europe.

Les Plénipotentiaires de France et d'Angleterre ont refusé même d'aborder cette question d'intérêt religieux, avant que celle concernant la navigation de la Mer Noire ne fut réglée. Après cette réflexion, il ne nous reste plus rien à ajouter au récit que nous venons de faire.

Vous êtes autorisé à placer cette relation sous les yeux du Cabinet auprès duquel vous avez l'honneur d'être accrédité. Il jugera de quel côté s'est prononcé le désir d'arriver avec loyauté au rétablissement de la paix. Il décidera aussi de quel côté se sont élevés les obstacles qui ont retardé jusqu'ici l'accomplissement de cette œuvre salutaire. Si elle vient à échouer définitivement par la rupture des Conférences, l'opinion impartiale des Puissances amies rendra au moins à la Russie la justice de reconnaître qu'elle n'a épargné aucun effort pour assurer le succès d'une négociation destinée à réaliser le vœu profondément senti d'une pacification générale.

L'Europe peut compter sur la sollicitude constante et ferme que l'Empereur saura vouer à ce grand intérêt, lorsque l'heure sera venue où la Providence Divine aura éclairci la conscience des Cabinets dont l'hostilité implacable devant le deuil qui couvre une tombe auguste appelle Sa Majesté à défendre les armes à la main la sûreté et l'honneur de son pays.

Recevez, &c.

No. 809.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 574. Confidential.)

Paris, May 18, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE learnt from a confidential but trustworthy source—what, however, may be already known to your Lordship—that the Prussian Government, founding its demand on words attributed to your Lordship in the House of Lords, inquired, towards the end of last month, whether the Austrian Government admitted your Lordship's theory: that if Prussia did not take part in the Conferences, she would be excluded from the Protectorate to be exercised in future in the Principalities; adding, that if this was the case, Prussia considered herself released from all the obligations contracted towards Austria by the Treaty of April 20. The Austrian Government returned at first an evasive answer, but since the refusal of France and England to accept her last propositions in regard to Russia, has given satisfactory assurances at Berlin.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 810.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 226.)

Vienna, May 14, 1855.

My Lord,

IN your Lordship's despatch No. 180 of the 8th instant, it is stated that Her Majesty's Government was still not in possession of any written document containing in precise terms the proposal that Austria is willing to make to Russia, but that Lord John Russell and M. Drouyn de Lhuys rely upon the accuracy of the notes which they respectively took to assist their own recollection.

I therefore transmit to your Lordship the copy of the proposed Treaty which is above referred to as forming part of the Austrian proposals, as they

were accepted for reference to their Government by Lord John Russell and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, together with copies of the subsequent communications which, at the request of M. Drouyn de Lyuys, as stated in my despatch No. 212 of the 4th instant, were given to M. de Bourqueney by Count de Buol, and which were in reply to a statement by M. Drouyn de Lhuys by telegraph, that he was in communication with the British Government, and was in hopes of obtaining their adhesion to the project agreed between Lord John Russell and himself, with some modifications of no great importance, but that he desired to know from Count Buol the precise value he attaches to the words he had used as to the application of the *casus belli*.

The two documents which I now inclose, Nos. 2 and 3, are the copies of the replies transmitted by Baron Bourqueney, the first being by telegraph, and containing the reply to this question by Count Buol, who had agreed to the wording of it; the second is the private note addressed by Count Buol to Baron Bourqueney after he had seen the Emperor, which was forwarded the same afternoon to M. Drouyn de Lhuys by post, and which contains the Emperor's adhesion to the statements made by Count Buol.

I should have transmitted these documents to your Lordship at the time the transactions took place, had I not been in the belief that they had been forwarded to you by Lord John Russell, and the later ones by M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

I also transmit to your Lordship the copy of a memorandum containing the statement and reasoning which was put forward in support of the Austrian proposition.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 810.

Draft of Arrangement between England, France, and Austria.

LEURS Majestés l'Empereur d'Autriche, l'Empereur des Français, et la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, animées du désir d'assurer l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, et voulant régler entr'elles l'exécution de l'engagement stipulé dans l'Article du Traité conclu le entre ont nommé pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, &c.

Lesquels ayant trouvé leurs pleins pouvoirs ont arrêté les Articles suivants:—

Article 1. Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à employer, le cas échéant, leurs forces de terre et de mer pour atteindre le but ci-dessus indiqué.

Art. 2. En conséquence, si l'une des Puissances signataires du dit Traité du commettent contre l'Empire Ottoman une agression de nature à mettre en péril l'un ou l'autre des deux principes consacrés dans le préambule du présent Traité, les Hautes Parties Contractantes, sur l'appel du Sultan, concourraient à la défense de cet Empire dans des proportions déterminées pour chacune, et délibérées en commun.

Art. 3. Serait considéré comme un acte agressif devant donner lieu à l'application des Articles 1 et 2, le développement excessif des forces navales de la Russie dans l'Euxin.

Art. 4. Ratifications.

Articles Secrets.

Art. 1. Dans le cas où la Russie viendrait à augmenter en nombre ou en force son état naval dans la Mer Noire jusqu'à atteindre l'effectif qu'il présentait au commencement de la guerre, suivant le tableau ci-annexé, et où les remontrances adressées à la Russie, et la présence des flottes alliées dans la Mer Noire, seraient restées sans effet, les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à considérer ce fait comme donnant lieu à l'application de l'Article 3 du Traité Patent de ce jour. En conséquence, elles considéreront l'existence d'un tel effectif

comme un cas de guerre, et emploieront immédiatement leurs forces de terre et de mer à l'effet de contraindre cette Puissance à rentrer dans les conditions d'équilibre que réclame l'intérêt Européen.

Art. 2. Ratifications.

Inclosure 2 in No. 810.

M. de Bourqueney to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

Vienne, le 3 Mai, 1855.

(Télégraphique.)

VOICI la déclaration même du Comte Buol en réponse à votre dépêche télégraphique d'aujourd'hui :

"La non-acceptation de l'ultimatum de l'Autriche par les Plénipotentiaires Russes en Conférence constitue le *casus belli* et entraîne la signature immédiate de la Convention Militaire qui fixe la mesure de coopération de chacune des Puissances et la date de l'entrée en campagne. Le rejet de l'ultimatum à Pétersbourg c'est la rupture ; l'ouverture de la campagne ne dépend plus que des engagements réciproques consignés dans la Convention Militaire."

Le Comte Buol verra l'Empereur dans la journée et je vous enverrai la sanction donnée par Sa Majesté aux paroles de son Ministre.

Je crois le rejet de plus en plus vraisemblable. Qu'on se hâte à Londres et qu'on ne perde pas un temps précieux pour des modifications sans importance. Le Comte Buol vous supplie de tout préparer pour les arrangements militaires, afin que la Convention puisse être signée ici sans retard après le refus des Plénipotentiaires Russes.

On est vraiment de plus en plus en face d'une perspective sérieuse de la guerre. Le Général Hess devait partir hier soir. L'Empereur le retient jusqu'aux réponses de Paris et de Londres pour arrêter avec lui les dernières dispositions.

Inclosure 3 in No. 810.

Count Buol to Baron de Bourqueney.

Vienne, le 3 Mai, 1855.

Mon cher Baron,

J'AI littéralement rendu compte à l'Empereur de la dépêche télégraphique dont nous sommes convenus. Il y a trouvé le résumé de sa pensée et adopté le programme en entier. L'Empereur insiste surtout sur la nécessité de procéder immédiatement à la conclusion de la Convention Militaire, du moment que le Prince Gortchakoff ne se crût pas autorisé d'accepter l'ultimatum sans réserve. Il croit utile que la Convention fut débattue et signée ici et que les Plénipotentiaires Militaires fussent en mesure de présenter les idées de leurs Gouvernements et de faire connaître aussi la mesure et la nature de la coopération sur laquelle nous pourrions compter au terme fixé pour l'ouverture de l'offensive commune. Je crois qu'on ne saurait trop se hâter de les munir des pleins pouvoirs et instructions nécessaires. Les moments sont précieux. De grâce n'en perdons pas inutilement.

Mille et mille amitiés,

(Signed) BUOL.

Inclosure 4 in No. 810.

Memorandum.

THE reasoning upon which the Austrian plan for securing the cessation of the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea was proposed, was as follows :

The Russian fleet in Sebastopol is known to have been reduced to six sail of the line and some frigates and steamers still afloat. This force, if peace were

made, could not be a menace to Turkey ; but in order to insure the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, it was proposed that neither the Porte nor Russia should increase their ships of war in the Black Sea to above that amount, there being no limit, however, to the reserve the Porte might maintain at Constantinople, in the Sea of Marmora, or in the Dardanelles. Besides the force which would thus exist for the protection of the Sultan, the allied Powers would each be entitled to have two frigates in the Black Sea, to observe the navigation of the Danube ; and these vessels of war, which would amount to six (two English, two French, and two Austrian), would be a constant watch upon the movements of the Russian fleet.

If these stipulations were not agreed to by Russia, it was proposed that while the general rule of keeping the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus closed to all foreign ships of war should continue to exist, yet, if it was found that Russia was increasing her fleet beyond the present number, the Porte would have the right, acknowledged in the Treaty, of calling, for every two ships the Russians should add to their navy, one ship of each of the two allies, England and France, into the Black Sea, with the view of preparing to repel any offensive movement on the part of the Russian fleet which its increase might appear to menace ; and if the Russian fleet was augmented, notwithstanding the remonstrances which will have been made, so as to be looked upon as dangerous, or should attain the numbers of which it consisted in 1853, then each of the three Powers would be bound by the Treaty now proposed, on the call of the Sultan, to move to his support, both with their fleets and armies in such proportions as should be agreed upon between them. This engagement, which would be supplementary to the Treaty for the general guarantee of the Turkish Empire, would be proposed to Russia either as an Article in the General Treaty, or as a Secret Article, according as Russia should or should not agree to a limitation of her naval forces to an amount such as above has been described, but in all cases the Treaty between the Three Powers would be signed.

This was the general substance of the propositions of Count Buol.

The arguments in their favour were, that the Russian fleet, now reduced to six ships, could not for a considerable time be increased so as to become a menace to Turkey ; that if Russia should attempt by degrees to make it so, she would be met at once by the whole of the Turkish naval force in Constantinople and the Sea of Marmora, and by the aid of a limited number of ships of the allies and at the pleasure of the Sultan, in accordance with the above cited stipulations, by the whole of their fleets and land forces. It was therefore stated that in the face of such a regulated preponderance of force to be brought at any time against her, Russia could never attempt to reestablish a preponderance she had now lost, and which she could only seek to recover by the slow process of building, for she had no entry for ships of war into the Black Sea but by the Bosphorus, which was in the hands of Turkey ; it was therefore to be supposed, by every calculation of the policy of a Government under such circumstances, that the Russian Government would give up all hope of reestablishing their naval preponderance in the Black Sea, which is at present entirely annihilated, and that they would content themselves hereafter with maintaining that amount of force which would serve to guard her coasts and support her independent position.

In making these remarks, it was also stated that while the reduced Russian fleet at present in the Black Sea could be no menace or danger either to Turkey or Europe, and therefore on that account could not of itself be considered as a sufficient reason for the continuation of the present war, or for the declaration of war on the part of Austria, yet that from the moment it became a menace and a danger, the three Powers, by the Treaty proposed for them to sign, would be united with Turkey to meet and repel, with their preponderating forces, any such danger, and would thus establish a permanent alliance amongst themselves for the protection and defence of the Turkish Empire.

No. 811.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 232.)

Vienna, May 16, 1855.

My Lord.

THREE days ago I received a message from General Hess, stating that he had only that day received from the Austrian officer in command in the Principality of Wallachia, a report as to the issue of an order which is entitled "Standrecht," and which is applicable to the Austrian army, and to all persons who should be guilty of seeking to seduce them from their ranks by desertion, or in any other way, from their allegiance.

General Hess stated that this order had been issued in consequence of repeated attempts of that nature which had taken place in the Principalities, and, in some cases, to the detriment of military discipline. He had, however, been in total ignorance up to that day of the issue of that order, and he had called for explanations upon the subject.

I immediately applied to Count Buol upon the subject, requesting that he would explain to me the cause and the intention of this proceeding, which had been reported to Baron Bourqueney as well as to myself, and also to Aali Pasha.

Count Buol stated that the measure had not been reported to the military authorities in Vienna till after it had been taken; that he had immediately sent directions that it should in no way be made applicable to any foreign residents in the Principalities, and that in case any complaints of the nature contemplated by the order were made against any foreigners, they should be addressed to the Consuls or Agents of the countries to which they belonged.

Count Buol stated the same to the Turkish Ambassador, who has reported the same to his Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 812.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 233.)

Vienna, May 16, 1855.

My Lord,

AT the meeting which took place this day with Count Buol, at which Baron Bourqueney was present with myself, and when the questions put by the telegraphic despatches received from your Lordship and from Count Walewski, of yesterday's date, were discussed at very great length, I had no opportunity of entering into any detail with regard to your Lordship's despatch to me, No. 180 of the 8th instant. But I pressed upon Count Buol the great importance of that despatch, and my anxious desire to receive from him a satisfactory answer as to the decision he intended to take upon it.

Count Buol replied that he felt all the importance of the subjects treated of in that despatch as strongly as I could represent it to him, and that he was occupied in drawing up his reply, which he intended to transmit to Count Colloredo to be communicated to your Lordship. All he could say at present was, "que nous déplorons la réponse qui nous a été envoyée, mais que nous nous expliquerons avec toute la loyauté et la franchise qui sont dues à l'alliance qui nous unit."

With respect to that part of your Lordship's despatch which calls upon Austria to execute the Treaty of the 2nd of December, your Lordship is aware that Lord John Russell, in his despatch No. 149 of the 19th of April, explained the opinion he entertained upon this subject, in conjunction with M. Drouyn de Lhuys; and I only mention it to state that the fears they had expressed that it might be the cause of irritation to Austria, have not been realised: nothing of that nature has been manifested by Count Buol. He has only felt very deep regret that the proposal of the Austrian ultimatum has not met with the approbation of Her Majesty's Government, or of that of France, as he had most sincerely believed that it would either have attained the object for which the Conference had been assembled, or would have led to a permanent alliance between the three Governments, which would have been the best security for the future independence and prosperity of Turkey.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 813.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 234.)

Vienna, May 16, 1855.

My Lord,

THE proposition of Count Buol, a sketch of which was sent to your Lordship in my telegraphic despatch of this day, is annexed to this despatch.

Count Buol has felt that since the publication of the Protocols of the Conferences by Her Majesty's Government, the position of Austria in the eyes of the public would be rendered extraordinary if she did not take any measure to fulfil the words which he had himself used at the last Conferences, namely, that Austria would still seek the means of bringing about an understanding between the Great Powers of Europe. Having in view, therefore, the fulfilment of this engagement on the part of Austria, which had now been made public, and having as a second object to give to the final closing of the Conferences (if, indeed, they were to be closed) the dignity of an official form, Count Buol had drawn up the proposition now submitted to your Lordship, which he thought had the great advantage of not betraying that that perfect unity of ideas between Austria and the Western Powers which had been so manifest during the whole course of the negotiations had in any manner been disturbed.

Count Buol, therefore, making use of the right to convoke the Conference which appertains to each of its members so long as it is not formally dissolved, proposes to state to the assembled Plenipotentiaries that, in accordance with the language he had held at the twelfth and thirteenth Conferences, he had invited them to assemble in order to submit to them the proposition which accompanies this despatch, all the stipulations of which had originally been suggested by the British and French Plenipotentiaries.

Count Buol believes that the proposition will be supported by the Representatives of England and France, and that it will be rejected by the Russian Representatives, as it has already in part been rejected by them. Count Buol would then declare, on the refusal of the Russian Plenipotentiaries to entertain this project, that it appeared to him that there was no further object for the meeting of the Conference, which he would then formally close.

In communicating this plan to Baron Bourqueney and myself, Count Buol begged that our Governments should be solicited to consider its communication as of the most confidential character. With regard to the proposition itself, he pointed out to us that it was entirely based upon ideas which had emanated from the British and French Plenipotentiaries, to which he had added some modifications of his own. He stated distinctly that the proposition, such as it was, was one which must be either accepted or rejected by Russia, and that he would not bring it forward as one capable of bearing discussion and modification.

Count Buol then stated that as he still considered that the project which had recently been submitted (as Austria's ultimatum to Russia) to the British and French Governments and rejected by them, fulfilled the engagements which Austria had taken with regard to the third basis, he would not consider that the rejection of the present proposition by the Russian Plenipotentiaries in Conference would entail upon Austria the giving effect to the extreme obligations of the Treaty of the 2nd of December.

Count Buol then said, that while he recognised the right of the British and French Governments to abstain from the Conference which he intended to convoke, he must remark to us that such abstention would constitute the rupture of the negotiations by our Governments, and would thus render patent the dissidence of opinion which prevailed between them and the Government of Austria.

I have thus submitted to your Lordship the views of Count Buol in framing his present proposition, and the general opinions he entertains in favour of its adoption; and I have to solicit your Lordship to furnish me with your instructions upon these important points by telegraph, as Count Buol considers that it will be impossible for him to delay issuing the invitations for the meeting of the Conference beyond Monday next.

I would also request your Lordship, as Baron Bourqueney has also requested the French Cabinet, to extend your instructions to the case in which the Russian Plenipotentiaries should require time to transmit the proposition of Count Buol to St. Petersburgh for the consideration of the Russian Cabinet, as well as to the case in which they should bring forward any counter-proposition for consideration.

When Baron Bourqueney asked Count Buol what line he would follow in case of the adoption of either of the above courses by the Russian Representatives, he answered that it was impossible, without knowing what would be the language of the Russian Plenipotentiaries, to say how he would reply to it; but that the great object of the Conference was to display unity of opinion among the allies, and he should therefore use every endeavour to make his language conform to that of the British and French Ministers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 813.

Proposition to be submitted by Count Buol to the Conference.

1. LES Hautes Parties Contractantes, désirant que la Sublime Porte participe aux avantages du concert établi par le droit public entre les différents États de l'Europe, s'engagent chacune de son côté à respecter l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, garantissent en commun la stricte observation de ces engagements, et considéreront en conséquence tout acte ou tout événement qui serait de nature à y porter atteinte comme une question d'intérêt Européen.

Si un conflit survenait entre la Porte et l'une des Puissances Contractantes, ces deux États, avant de recourir à l'emploi de la force, devraient mettre les autres Puissances en mesure de prévenir cette extrémité par les voies pacifiques.

2. La règle de la clôture des Détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, consacrée par le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, restera en vigueur, sauf les exemptions spécifiées dans les Articles suivants.

3. Chacune des Puissances Contractantes qui n'ont pas d'établissement dans la Mer Noire sera autorisée par un firman de Sa Hautesse à y faire entrer et stationner deux frégates ou bâtiments de moindre force pour protéger leur pavillon de commerce et exercer la surveillance nécessaire.

4. Les Plénipotentiaires Russes et ceux de la Sublime Porte proposeront d'un commun accord à la Conférence l'effectif égal des forces navales que ces deux Puissances Riveraines entretiendront dans la Mer Noire, et qui ne devra pas dépasser l'état actuel des bâtiments Russes à flôt dans cette mer. L'arrangement qu'ils auront pris entre eux à cet égard fera partie intégrante du Traité Général.

Seront également insérés dans le Traité les moyens dont les mêmes Plénipotentiaires seront convenu à l'effet de contrôler l'exacte et constante observation des dispositions du présent Traité.

5. Dans le cas où (ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise!) le Sultan serait menacé d'une agression, il se réserve le droit d'ouvrir les passages à toutes les forces navales de ses alliés.

No. 814.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 189.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 19, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government learn, with satisfaction, from your despatch No. 223 of the 9th instant, the reply returned by Count Buol to the question addressed to him by Count Arnim, with respect to the reception of Prussia as a party to the European guarantee of the Principalities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 815.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 20, 1855.*

MESSENGER Waring arrived late last night. Your despatches will be considered by the Cabinet to-morrow; after which, I will send you an answer by telegraph. It is impossible to do so sooner, as we must consult the French Government.

We are uninformed of the reasons which make it imperative on Count Buol to summon the Conference to-morrow.

No. 816.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 335.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, May 7, 1855.*

INCLOSED herewith, for your Lordship's information, is a translated copy of the instruction addressed by the Porte to the Roumeli Valessi, or Governor-General of Roumelia, for the relief of certain Christian villages in Albania, recommended to my consideration by Mr. Longworth, and to that of the Turkish Government by me.

The instruction amounts to nothing more than an inquiry into the facts of the case, in consequence, as it is alleged, of no report having been received, as the Porte has been led to expect from the local authorities.

As Reshid Pasha assured me verbally that no attempt to levy the taxes in arrear would be made without further orders from here, the kind of relief required by the inhabitants of the villages in question would seem for the present, at least, to be practically afforded to them.

I shall, however, press the matter once more on the consideration of the Turkish Ministers, and the personal acquaintance of Fuad Pasha with the affairs of Albania may prove favourable to a satisfactory result.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 816.

Vizirial Letter to the Governor-General of Roumelia.

(Traduction.) 29 *Regel*, 1271. (16 *Avril*, 1855.)

ON nous a dit que les troupes irrégulières qui ont été expédiées en conséquence des événements qui se passaient avec les Hellènes, ont pillé les biens des habitants de neuf villages dont les noms sont connus, dans le district de Refitzé,

et qu'ils ont incendié leurs maisons; et que votre Excellence allait nous écrire pour nous donner des détails sur ces faits.

Toutefois, nous n'avons rien reçu à cet égard de la part de votre Excellence, ce qui nous met dans le cas de lui demander un rapport là dessus.

Et d'abord est-il bien vrai que les habitants susmentionnés ont essuyé des pertes? et puis, qui les leur ont causées?

Il faut aussi que votre Excellence nous fasse savoir de quelle manière on doit venir au secour de ces villageois.

Le tout doit être exprimé dans un Mazbatà.

No. 817.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May 20.*)

(No. 336. Confidential.)

Constantinople, May 7, 1855.

My Lord,

THE Ministerial changes which have recently taken place here are already announced to your Lordship. Subsequent inquiries show that the resignation of Reshid Pasha was brought on by the intrigues of the French Chargé d'Affaires, and there is some reason to believe that M. Benedetti was not unconcerned in the steps which preceded the recall of Mehmet Aali Pasha.

I regret the success of his manœuvres, not only on account of their total want of foundation in a diplomatic sense, and the discredit which they entail on the Sultan and his Government, but also in consideration of their injurious political consequences, and bearing on the position and character of Her Majesty's Embassy.

The two grounds of complaint on which M. Benedetti has chiefly taken his stand, are, without a doubt, the one in substance, the other in form, private matters, which the Turkish Government would have been fully justified in leaving without a reply. It is not my intention to enter into the merits of either. The law suit between Reshid Pasha and Mustapha Pasha received no kind of notice from me, although the latter applied in secret for my interference. Of Kiamil Pasha's letter to the Viceroy of Egypt I obtained no knowledge whatever till after its communication to the Porte by M. Benedetti, who had received it from M. Lesseps, himself put in possession of it by the levity or treachery of Said Pasha. What I wish to submit to your Lordship respecting them is, that if Diplomatic Agents are allowed on their own responsibility to appeal to the Sovereign on matters of a private character, for the purpose of producing Ministerial changes, under critical circumstances, their colleagues, who have to act in concert with them on questions of the highest interest, are placed in a situation calculated to compromise both themselves and their Governments to a very serious degree.

According to diplomatic usage, M. Benedetti is not entitled to approach the Sultan at all. He has already abused His Majesty's condescension on more than one occasion, and has now crowned the irregularity of his proceedings by forcing the resignation of the Prime Minister under circumstances which I am unwilling to characterize more particularly, and at the hazard of introducing, without any shadow of reason, into the Sultan's counsels an additional element of confusion and weakness.

Inclosed herewith is the paper which contains M. Benedetti's charges against the late Grand Vizier. It was sent to the Sultan, and placed without observation by His Majesty in Reshid Pasha's hands. The Pasha's reply is also inclosed herewith. It was submitted to the Sultan, and consigned by His Majesty's order to the French Chargé d'Affaires.

Your Lordship will not fail to observe that some of M. Benedetti's assertions have received a positive contradiction from Reshid Pasha. Your Lordship will also observe that the name and character of Her Majesty's Ambassador here have been placed under the Sultan's notice by the same hand in utter disregard of diplomatic propriety, correctness of statement, and political consequences.

I have not time to go further into this subject; but I leave it with confidence to your Lordship's discernment. For myself, I am at a loss to understand how it will be henceforth possible for me to carry on with M. Benedetti that concert in matters of common interest between our respective Governments which is strongly enjoined by their instructions to both of us, and which is manifestly so essential to the progress of their joint political and military operations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 817.

Report by M. Schéfer of a Conversation between M. Benedetti and Reshid Pasha.

Le 9 Avril, 1855.

M. Benedetti.—IL est des situations qui en se prolongeant amènent fatalement les plus graves complications: pour prévenir ces complications je ne connais qu'un moyen, c'est de s'expliquer nettement en tems opportun, et c'est ce qui m'a conduit aujourd'hui auprès de votre Altesse.

Rechid Pacha.—Que c'est-il donc passé?

M. Benedetti.—J'ai d'abord une question à poser à votre Altesse. N'ai-je pas constamment employé tous mes soins à écarter les difficultés qui ont pu s'élever depuis un an, à éviter tous les froissemens, à préserver de toute atteinte les rapports de l'Ambassade avec la Porte.

Rechid Pacha.—Certainement je me plais de le reconnaître.

M. Benedetti.—J'ai le regret de ne pouvoir émettre la même opinion sur la conduite de quelques Ministres de Sa Majesté le Sultan. J'avais dû remarquer que dans plusieurs circonstances l'Ambassade n'avait pas été l'objet de certains égards qui lui étaient dûs; j'ai cru pouvoir en attribuer la cause à des exigences dont on avait peut-être raison de tenir compte.

Rechid Pacha.—Mais les affaires qui intéressent la France n'ont-elles pas été expédiées par moi selon vos désirs?

M. Benedetti.—Je reconnais avec empressement que plusieurs réclamations de l'Ambassade ont été favorablement accueillies par votre Altesse. Il s'est produit cependant plusieurs incidents qui m'autorisaient à penser que la balance n'était pas toujours tenue d'une manière égale. (Ici M. Benedetti a cité quelques faits qui n'ont pas été constatés par Rechid Pacha.) Je me suis abstenu dans un esprit de conciliation de la signaler; j'espérais que le tems et une appréciation plus saine des relations de la France avec la Turquie modifieraient des dispositions qui ne m'avaient pas échappées. Malheureusement il n'en a pas été ainsi. Quoiqu'j'aie pour principe de n'aborder qu'à la dernière extrémité les questions d'intérêt personnel, je citerai tout d'abord l'affaire de Mustafa Pacha. A l'origine de cette déplorable affaire j'ai fait appel à vos sentiments de justice et de modération. J'ai eu l'honneur de vous adresser une lettre sous la forme confidentielle et particulière. Dans cette lettre je faisais remarquer particulièrement à votre Altesse que chaque témoignage de bienveillance donnée à Paris à Vély Pacha coincidait avec une mesure sevère envers son père à Constantinople. J'employais la prière pour vous supplier de mettre fin sans bruit et sans éclat à un conflit qui, en se prolongeant, donnerait lieu à des commentaires de nature à produire à Paris une fâcheuse impression. Depuis, et me fondant sur le même motif, non moins que sur des considérations d'un autre ordre, je vous ai indiqué l'arbitrage comme l'unique moyen et le plus convenable pour arriver à une transaction. Votre Altesse n'a tenu aucun compte de mes avis et pendant quinze jours au milieu d'une sollicitation qui réclamait le tems et les soins de tous les serviteurs de l'Etat, lorsque le Ministre des Finances est à tout d'expédients, lorsque les travaux sont peut-être sur le point d'être suspendus à l'arsenal, et le Ministre de la Guerre voit ses services entravés par la pénurie du Trésor, lorsque des affaires urgentes qui intéressent le salut de l'Empire attendent une solution, les deux Conseils les plus élevés de l'Etat ont été saisis d'une simple question de propriété—question qui est portant du ressort des tribunaux inférieurs.

Rechid Pacha.—Mais n'ai-je, quoique Grand Vizier, le droit de me défendre quand on conteste ma propriété?

M. Benedetti.—Je n'ai jamais prétendu que votre Altesse devait faire le sacrifice de ses droits et j'en donnais la preuve en suggérant de recourir à des arbitres; mais vous ne vous êtes pas contenté de la décision de deux Conseils de justice et du Tanzimat. Vous voulez en outre humilier Mustapha Pacha.

Rechid Pacha.—Mustapha Pacha est un menteur; vous n'écoutez que lui. C'est un homme grossier, un Albanais. Il a insulté le Président du Conseil. Il ne peut pas manquer impunément à la considération due à un fonctionnaire aussi élevé.

M. Benedetti.—Je sais parfaitement comment les choses se sont passées. Kiamil Pacha a provoqué le mouvement de vivacité de Mustapha Pacha; du reste vous pouvez prendre à son égard telle décision que vous jugez convenable; et si vous ne voulez pas accepter les excuses qu'il est disposé à faire vous pouvez provoquer son exil. Je sais ce que j'aurais à faire; je ne vous ai même parlé de l'incident qui le concerne que pour établir ce que je disais en commençant; c'est que je n'ai été nullement écouté dans un circonstance où j'invoquais des considérations qui m'étaient dictées par le sentiment des convenances. Je n'insiste pas sur cette affaire. Si j'ai pu en entretenir avec votre Altesse à titre confidentiel, il ne m'appartient pas, je l'ai déjà dit, dans un autre moment d'y intervenir d'une manière plus directe ou plus active. Mais il en surgit un autre qui m'impose le devoir de présenter à votre Altesse les plus sérieuses considérations, et je me hâte d'y arriver. Votre Altesse se rappelle que je lui ai dit et répété que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur considérait l'ouverture du canal de Suez comme une entreprise utile à la prospérité de l'Empire, que cette œuvre avait dès lors toutes ses sympathies, mais que je devais m'abstenir de m'en entretenir autrement avec les membres du Divan.

Rechid Pacha.—C'est parfaitement exact.

M. Benedetti.—Quand le Vicerοi d'Égypte vous a fait parvenir la demande tendant à obtenir la sanction du Sultan, votre Altesse en a saisie le Conseil. Il fut décidé que de nouveaux éclaircissements seraient demandés à Said Pacha. Je n'avais aucune objection à faire; je n'ai fait aucune. Mais pendant que votre Altesse communiquait au Vicerοi la résolution du Conseil, on lui adressait une lettre confidentielle.

Rechid Pacha.—Je l'ignore.

M. Benedetti.—Dans laquelle on l'engageait vivement à renoncer à un projet auquel M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre était personnellement opposé. On lui disait que les Agents Anglais sont toujours appuyés et soutenus par leur Gouvernement, tandis que le Gouvernement Français, au contraire, n'ayant pas de stabilité, était dans l'habitude de désavouer les siens; qu'il fallait à tout prix éviter d'éveiller la rancune de l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique—rancune redoutée avec raison par tout le monde à Constantinople; que s'il voulait jouir paisiblement de l'administration de l'Egypte, il ne devait pas s'exposer à appeler devant Alexandrie les flottes de l'Angleterre; que s'il persistait dans son dessin, il perdrait les bonnes graces de Sa Majesté le Sultan. Votre Altesse connaît cettre lettre; elle a été signé par un membre du Cabinet—le Président du Grand Conseil, Kiamil Pacha.

Rechid Pacha.—Je n'en ai eu connaissance qu'après son envoi. Je ne suis pas d'ailleurs responsable des fautes des autres. Si on veut m'en faire porter la responsabilité c'est autre chose.

La Porte, du reste, s'est trouvée dans une position bien difficile. La France n'a pas voulu paraître pour ne pas donner de l'ombrage à l'Angleterre. L'Angleterre, de son côté, s'est abstenu pour ménager la France. Que pouvions-nous faire? Je ne me rappelle pas bien les termes de la lettre dont vous me parlez; mais je ne crois pas que les expressions que vous avez citées soient exactes. Kiamil Pacha est le beau-frère du Gouverneur d'Egypte; il lui a écrit comme membre de sa famille; je n'ai rien à y voir.

M. Benedetti.—Kiamil Pacha est avant tout pour moi un Ministre Ottoman, membre d'un Gouvernement qui est allié à la France par les liens de la reconnaissance. Peut importe les termes de la lettre; le sens est exact; votre Altesse ne le conteste pas. Votre Altesse nie toute participation à cette lettre; je pouvais présumer le contraire. Les explications que vous venez de me

donner m'y autorisent; on n'en pensé pas autrement en Egypte. J'accepte néanmoins la version de votre Altesse. Qu'a fait Kiamil Pacha? Il s'est livré à des appréciations de la plus haute inconvenance sur la situation et les habitudes du Gouvernement de l'Empereur. Il a abaissé la Porte à un rôle que je ne veux pas qualifier; il a osé faire intervenir le Sultan et parlers en quelque sorte au nom de Sa Majesté. Quel était le premier et unique devoir du Grand Vizir, quand il a eu connaissance d'un pareil oubli de convenance commis par un de ses collègues? Il devait le signaler au Sultan. Sa Majesté, j'en suis convaincu, aurait pris immédiatement une mesure qui aurait attesté sa désapprobation et son mécontentement. Ce devoir le Grand Vizir ne l'a pas rempli; il a toléré au contraire qu'un membre du Ministère Ottoman put impunément penser, dire et faire croire que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur ne possède pas au même degré que les autres alliés de la Porte le sentiment de la dignité dans un moment où la France lutte avec la plus noble désintéressement pour le salut de la Turquie.

Rechid Pacha.—Je crois que je suis un obstacle aux bons rapports de mon pays avec la France. Je me retirerai.

M. Benedetti.—Depuis un an votre Altesse m'a exprimé ce désir à plusieurs reprises et dans des circonstances bien graves. Je l'ai toujours combattu, votre Altesse ne peut pas l'avoir oublié. A mon sens, votre Altesse était l'homme de la situation et nul autre Ministre ne me semblait pouvoir justifier avec un égal succès la confiance du Sultan et celle des alliés de la Turquie. J'avoue que des dispositions que j'avais mises en doute jusqu'à présent, ont modifié mon sentiment personnel. Je puis et je vais le dire, car depuis un an je m'étais constamment appliqué à faire partager mon erreur. Votre Altesse me met dans la nécessité de me désavouer. C'est une tâche cruelle, et que je dois nécessairement regretter plus que personne. Je ne suis pas seul à penser ainsi; ceux de vos amis qui vivent pour ainsi dire de votre propre vie redoutent la solidarité de certains actes et saisissent certaines occasions qui leur sont offertes pour aller remplir de nouvelles fonctions loin de Constantinople. Ils s'éloignent de votre Altesse; je croyais qu'ils s'exagéraient le danger de certaines préoccupations personnelles; je suis obligé de reconnaître aujourd'hui qu'ils avaient raison et que j'avais tort.

Rechid Pacha.—S'ils veulent s'éloigner qu'ils en aillent.

M. Benedetti.—En faisant part à votre Altesse des renseignements qui sont venus jusqu'à moi, et les observations que je ne pouvais m'abstenir de vous soumettre, je n'ai d'ailleurs d'autre but pour le moment que de définir d'une manière exacte et avec cette même franchise dont je n'ai cessé de vous donner des marques réitérées, une situation que je n'ai pas faite et que je déplore. J'ai appris ce qu'on peut penser à la Porte des égards que l'on doit à la France, sans que votre Altesse ait jugé utile et convenable de désavouer celui de ses collègues qui s'est permis de parler en quelque sorte au nom du Cabinet tout entier; mon premier soin devait être de dire à votre Altesse que j'étais parfaitement renseigné, et c'est ce que j'ai voulu faire aujourd'hui.

Rechid Pacha.—Je suis désolé de tout ce que vous dites. J'aviserai.

Inclosure 2 in No. 817.

Reply of Reshid Pasha to M. Benedetti's Memorandum.

LES communications pleines de reproches que M. Benedetti m'avait faites le 9 Avril n'étant pas basées sur des raisons solides, m'avaient paru avancées pour amener une occasion de dissentiment; je n'étais pas alors entré assez avant dans la discussion des faits. Mais comme la plainte tacite effectuée actuellement par M. le Chargé d'Affaires au Palais Impérial, me donna l'occasion de présenter le veritable état de choses, je dois plutôt lui faire agréer des remercîments. M. Benedetti a mis en discussion deux questions, dont la première est que je n'ai pas eu égard aux avis qu'il m'avait donnés sur la contestation de propriété que j'avais avec Mustapha Pacha. La seconde question consiste en ce que la lettre écrite par Kiamil Pacha au Gouverneur-Général

d'Egypte contenait des assertions blessantes pour la dignité et l'honneur du Gouvernement Français.

Il paraît que dans la question de cette contestation de terrain, Mustapha Pacha, en même temps qu'il se faisait voir à l'Ambassade comme ayant le bon droit pour lui, a dû parler de manière à faire croire qu'il serait violemment envoyé devant les tribunaux d'une façon incompatible avec sa dignité. M. Outrey se présente en conséquence chez moi, muni d'une lettre particulière de M. Benedetti. Je lui fis voir alors les pièces authentiques qui prouvaient mon droit, et lorsque je lui eus expliqué que la contrainte employée pour faire comparaître un personnage considérable comme Mustapha Pacha devant le tribunal, n'avait pas lieu en le faisant appréhender au corps par les huissiers mais bien elle consistait à le faire inviter à comparaître par le canal d'un fonctionnaire d'un rang élevé, M. Outrey comprit entièrement le fait tel qu'il est, et se retira en exprimant même sa satisfaction sur ce que les pièces lui avaient été communiquées.

M. Benedetti ayant ensuite proposé la nomination d'un arbitre par chacun des ayants cause, qui choisiraient à leur tour un troisième arbitre dont l'avis serait accepté comme la décision définitive de l'affaire, cette décision fut soumise au Cheik-ul-Islam. Celui-ci annonça qu'il n'avait pas connaissance d'un pareil genre d'arbitrage; mais qu'anciennement il était arrivé à de rares intervalles que les deux parties en contestation avaient choisi une personne pour arbitre, mais que ce système avait été abandonné parce qu'il portait atteinte au respect dû à la justice. Il fut donc impossible d'adopter cette methode. Seulement je ne me rappelle pas si j'ai averti l'Ambassade de ce résultat. Néanmoins l'un des points de reproche adressés par M. Benedetti est, qu'il avait émis l'opinion qu'il fallait étouffer le procès de Mustapha Pacha, et qu'on n'avait pas eu égard. Etouffer le procès signifierait l'abandon de mon droit. Une pareille proposition ne peut être convenablement fait à qui que ce soit; car se retirer d'un procès qui était à la connaissance de tout le monde, était l'aveu de l'injustice de ma réclamation, et aboutissait à m'humilier par mon propre fait. Je déclarais donc, que j'étais excusable si je ne faisais pas une telle démarche; mais il paraît que ceci a été oublié, puisqu'il n'en est pas question dans la pièce envoyé au Palais Impérial par M. Benedetti. Il y est, il est vrai, énoncé que j'avais traité Mustapha Pacha de menteur et d'Albanais; mais comme les paroles de M. Benedetti qui avait altéré cette réponse ne s'y trouvait pas rapportées, il est aussi nécessaire d'éclaircir ce point. M. Benedetti avait dit que les paroles de Kiamil Pacha lui-même avaient donné lieu à Mustapha Pacha de prononcer quelques mots inconvenants; qu'on n'avait jamais vu une unanimité pareille dans un Conseil si nombreux à l'égard d'aucune question, et si on appelait à présent tous les membres de ce Conseil pour avoir leur opinion, il faudra se demander s'ils ne répondraient pas tous d'une manière conforme au but désiré.

Or, M. Benedetti m'attribuant tacitement une sorte d'injustice et avançant des assertions de nature à blesser la considération de tant de fonctionnaires, j'avais alors, il est vrai, prononcé les mots du "menteur" et "d'Albanais," en même temps que je lui répliquais qu'il écoutait seulement Mustapha Pacha, sans vouloir entendre aucune autre personne, et qu'il n'était pas convenable de tomber dans des suspicions qui blesseraient la considération de tant d'honorables personnages. Car quoique Mustapha Pacha ait proféré ses paroles contre Kiamil Pacha au Conseil en présence de quarante à cinquante personnages, il les a cependant niées, et chacun sait qu'il a voulu donner une autre tournure à ses invectives, et qu'on ne pourra pas donner la tournure de calomnie à ce qu'il soit qualifié de menteur.

D'autant plus que M. Benedetti m'avait lui-même raconté, lors de notre première entrevue, qu'il avait exposé en présence de Sa Majesté Impériale que Mustapha Pacha agit un peu à l'Albanaise, et qu'il fallait excuser ses écarts; si l'emploi de ce terme est une faute, M. Benedetti s'y trouve lui-même associé.

Il est dit, dans la pièce susdite, qu'au moment où le Gouvernement a tant d'importantes affaires devant lui, deux grands Conseils ont été occupés pendant quinze jours par le jugement d'un procès qui est dévolu ordinairement aux tribunaux inférieurs. Il s'y trouve d'autres paroles d'accusation dont le sens serait que les affaires importantes de l'Etat sont sacrifiés à de pareils sujets de personnalité; et que quelques personnages qui sont de mes amis, redoutant la solidarité de certains actes, saisissent des occasions pour s'éloigner de Constantinople. Il y est, enfin, suggéré qu'il y aurait parti pris d'inquiéter Mustapha Pacha.

Les affaires de l'Etat ne sont négligées en aucun temps et les questions dont la solution est possible se mettent sans retard en exécution, comme l'affaire de l'emprunt, qui est aujourd'hui le remède le plus efficace à porter à la question des finances. M. Benedetti n'ignore pas que les instructions nécessaires ont été expédiées depuis déjà assez longtemps pour cet objet. Il est en outre incontestable que dans chaque pays les questions importantes de l'Etat ne doivent pas entraver l'expédition des affaires particulières. La contestation élevée avec Mustapha Pacha était d'abord en jugement devant le tribunal de Vakoufs, lorsque Mustapha Pacha ne se contentant pas de la sentence de cette instance, il fut résolu de la poursuivre en présence de Cheik-ul-Islam, pour qu'il y eut plus de confiance de sa part. Mais Mustapha Pacha n'acceptant pas non plus cette instance, supplie Sa Majesté Impériale d'ordonner le jugement de l'affaire d'après les réglements et les ordonnances dont le lieu est le Conseil Suprême; et comme l'adjonction du haut Conseil de Tanzimat était de nature à lui inspirer encore plus de confiance, en s'occupe seulement deux jours, pendant deux à deux heures, au sein du Conseil Suprême, de décider sur ce procès, parcequ'un droit particulier n'a pas été abandonné, il ne s'ensuit pas qu'il faille accepter l'accusation de donner la préférence aux affaires particulières sur les affaires de l'Etat.

Celui de mes amis qui en ces derniers temps est allé au dehors, est Mahmoud Pacha, Gouverneur-Général de Saida. Si celui-ci est parti, comme le dit M. Benedetti, pour échapper à la solidarité, je m'offre de moi-même à l'application des peines les plus sévères. Il faudrait demander à M. Benedetti quels sont les grands crimes dont je me suis rendu coupable pour devenir tellement nuisible aux intérêts de mon Souverain, de ma nation et de ma patrie, au point d'inspirer ainsi des craintes à mes amis.

Personne n'a aucun dessein contre Mustapha Pacha, aucune malveillance dirigée contre lui. La nomination de Vely Pacha, fait il y a peu de jours seulement sur les représentations de M. Benedetti, étant encore présent, y a-t-il lieu à dire que cette famille est toujours inquiétée? L'un des reproches de M. Benedetti consiste en ce que l'Angleterre serait toujours préférée à la France; et que chaque désir de l'Ambassadeur Britannique serait aussitôt réalisé. La France est aussi une très grande Puissance! les services qu'elle rend aujourd'hui même à l'Empire Ottoman, les nobles sacrifices qu'elle s'impose, sont sous nos yeux. Ne pas apprécier de telles choses, ne pas vouloir tenir la France et l'Angleterre sur le pied de parfaite égalité pour les égards et la déférence, serait une faute, un très grand degré d'intelligence [*sic*]. Ce fait aussi est inadmissible. Est outre fait qu'il y a peu de temps encore, Hairéddin Pacha s'était mis avec sa famille sous la protection de l'Ambassade Britannique, n'a pas cependant échappé à l'exil, est connu de M. Benedetti. M. le Chargé d'Affaires a raconté à Saffet Effendi que l'épouse divorcée de Kibizle Mehmed Pacha avait présenté une requête contre celui-ci, pour réclamation d'intérêt, et que sur la prière de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre cette requête avait été mise de côté. Mais jamais une pareille demande n'a eu lui de la part de ce Représentant, et c'est le Conseil Suprême qui a décidé que l'affaire serait envoyée par devant le cour de justice: ainsi il n'y a pas à douter que celui qui a ainsi rapporté le fait à M. Benedetti, l'a induit en erreur.

J'ai dit aussi, il est vrai, à M. Benedetti, qu'étant considéré comme un obstacle aux relations intimes entre la Sublime Porte et le Gouvernement Français, il ne me restait qu'à retirer; mais n'ayant jamais manqué d'aucune manière dans les égards et les affaires qui ont rapport à la France, je ne me crois pas en réalité un obstacle à ces relations intimes. Seulement dès la mission de M. Lavalette, l'Ambassade Français s'est laissée aller à mon égard à toutes espèces de suppositions. Il est surtout à la connaissance de Sa Majesté Impériale que dans la question de Lieux Saintes, je m'étais attaché, plus que tout autre, à faciliter l'accomplissement des désirs du Gouvernement Français, et cependant, quelle qu'en soit la cause, M. Lavalette a voué à mon égard des sentiments hostiles dont je vois les traces persistant jusqu'aujourd hui dans toutes les transactions. Je comprends donc que je serai toujours compté par l'Ambassade comme un obstacle, et comme je suis prêt, en tout temps, à faire tous les sacrifices personnels pour sauvegarder les intérêts de mon Souverain, j'ai dû prononcer ces paroles. Mais quoique l'objet de ces soupçons de l'Ambassade je ne doute pas que la haute intelligence et les sentiments de modération et de

justice universellement reconnus de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français ne lui fusse démêler la vérité des faits.

Quant à la question du canal de Suez, comme des deux Grandes Puissances l'une est favorable et l'autre est contraire au projet, et qu'il répugne naturellement au Gouvernement Ottoman de désobliger à l'une ou à l'autre des deux Puissances qui sont ses alliées, l'idée avait été émise au Conseil des Ministres pendant la discussion de ce projet, que si le Gouverneur-Général de l'Egypte s'empressait trop par hazard à commencer les travaux, avant qu'un moyen plausible pour contenter à la fois les deux Puissances fût trouvé, il serait allé au délà des conditions renfermées dans le firman Impérial d'hérédité, et il mettrait ainsi dans une position difficile et le Gouvernement Ottoman et lui-même. Kiamil Pacha, qui est parent du Gouverneur-Général de l'Egypte, a dû sans doute se faire un devoir, la plus légère réflexion suffira pour le comprendre, de lui en donner avis d'une manière confidentielle. Outre est la position de Kiamil Pacha comme Ministre et outre celle qu'il a comme parent. Il serait juste de ne pas mêler ces deux conditions. Néanmoins, comme il est nécessaire de discuter ici les accusations de M. Benedetti, c'est-à-dire, de mettre en balance ces chefs d'accusation avec le sens de la lettre confidentielle écrite par Kiamil Pacha, les faits seront rapportés article par article.

M. Benedetti a rapporté verbalement comme par écrit qu'on engageait vivement dans cette lettre confidentielle le Gouverneur-Général à renoncer à un projet auquel l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre était personnellement opposé, parceque les Agents Anglais étaient toujours appuyés par leur Gouvernement, tandis que le Gouvernement Français n'ayant pas de stabilité, était dans l'habitude de désavouer les siens; qu'il fallait éviter d'exciter la rancune de l'Ambassadeur Britannique, redoutée avec raison par tout le monde à Constantinople; que s'il voulait jouir paisiblement de l'administration de l'Egypte il ne devait pas s'exposer à appeler devant Alexandrie les flottes de l'Angleterre; et que s'il persistait dans son dessein il perdrait les hautes grâces de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan. Ayant demandé la minute de cette lettre à Kiamil Pacha, je l'ai lue et relue maintes fois, sans y voir une seule de ces paroles. D'abord il ne s'y trouve pas un seul mot qui puisse signifier que le Gouvernement Français n'a pas de stabilité, ou, comme on a voulu dire plutôt, n'a pas de constance, et qu'il est dans l'habitude de désavouer ses employés. Il ne s'y trouve inséré rien au sujet de l'opposition personnelle et de la rancune de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre. Lorsque ce Représentant a donné à M. Pisani des instructions sur ces sujets du canal, il avait aussi montré le copie des instructions envoyées de Londres au Consul-Général d'Alexandrie. Il n'y avait donc pas de raison pour pouvoir parler d'une opposition personnelle; la signification véritable de cet phrase de la susdite lettre confidentielle qui fait craindre, en énumérant les difficultés soulevées de ce projet, que les forces maritimes qui sont devant Sébastopol seront transportées au rives de l'Egypte et que le monde entier deviendrait sens dessus dessous, doit clairement être ainsi expliqué—que les forces maritimes de deux Grandes Puissances, laissant de côté Sébastopol, se jetteraient l'une sur l'autre dans le Méditerranée. Il n'est pas compréhensible d'où l'on a pu en inférer le sens que les flottes de l'Angleterre seule viendraient devant Alexandrie tandis qu'il n'y a aucune indication spéciale à cet egard.

Quant au conseil que donne Kiamil Pacha au sujet de ménagement que doit garder tout Gouverneur-Général de l'Egypte envers les deux Grandes Puissances à la fois, s'il désire vivre tranquillement dans son administration, qu'y a-t-il donc là qui puisse porter atteinte à la dignité du Gouvernement Français?

Si Kiamil Pacha raconte au Gouverneur-Général dans sa lettre particulière qu'en réponse à ce que M. de Lesseps avait dit que "Said Pacha allait commencer les travaux et que lui l'en avait empêché," il a repliqué que le Gouverneur ne se hâtera pas ainsi dans une œuvre dont il connait l'importance, appréciant comme il le fait, le valeur des hautes grâces que Sa Majesté Impériale a témoignées à son égard. Est-il possible d'en inférer autre chose que l'avis de ne pas commencer les travaux tant que le firman d'autorisation ne lui serait pas parvenue?

Quoiqu'il ne soit pas juste et en usage de faire une question d'une correspondence absolument privée, s'il y avait cependant dans cette lettre, même un seul mot qui put affecter la dignité ou la réputation du Gouvernement Français, j'aurais encore été le premier à revendiquer la chose de Kiamil Pacha.

Seulement, comme il serait possible que par l'imperfection de la nature humaine et surtout par incapacité personnelle, je puisse avoir failli dans l'examen

de la pièce, je crois qu'il n'y aurait aucune objection à ce que d'autres personnes impartiales et d'une intelligence parfaite examinent de nouveau la minute de la lettre.

Quoique M. Benedetti ne soit pas aujourd'hui bien disposé à mon égard, je ne nierais en aucun cas son caractère conciliant; et s'il donne son attention à ces questions, sans écouter les suggestions incessantes de mes ennemis, j'ai l'espoir que lui aussi parviendra incessament à la connaissance réelle de ces faits.

No. 818.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 341.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 7, 1855.*

REFERRING to my despatch No. 336 of this date, I have the honour to inclose herewith for your Lordship's more complete information, a translated copy of the letter by which the late President of the Council, Kiamil Pasha, resigned his office into the hands of the Grand Vizier.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 818.

Kiamil Pasha to the Grand Vizier.

(Traduction.) 16 *Shaaban*, 1271. (2 *Mai*, 1855.)

TANDIS que je n'ai proféré ni écrit des paroles de nature à porter atteinte à l'honneur et à la dignité de l'illustre Gouvernement Français, tandis qu'une pareille chose ne m'a pas même passé par l'esprit, le Chargé d'Affaires de France, M. Benedetti, a porté contre moi des plaintes qui n'ont aucun fondement et qui m'ont fait une peine extrême.

Je suis très-en état de prouver la vérité; mais vu la grande haine que M. Benedetti a contre moi, si je le faisais, il naîtrait de là une foule de difficultés; voilà ce que j'ai compris. C'est pourquoi, et afin de ne pas causer des embarras à votre Altesse, il est devenu nécessaire que je donne ma démission de l'illustre charge dont je suis revêtu comme Président.

Sa Majesté le Sultan, notre bienfaiteur et maître, comble de faveurs tous ses serviteurs fidèles, et ceux qui sont en place, et ceux qui ont été dénus de leurs charges. Je ne doute pas donc que Sa Majesté Impériale daignera me donner à chaque occasion, à moi aussi, des marques de sa clémence souveraine, et en conséquence je supplie votre Altesse de faire agréer ma présente humble prière.

(Signé) KIAMIL PACHA.

No. 819.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 342).

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 7, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, with reference to what I have stated elsewhere as to the proceedings of M. Benedetti, a report addressed to me by M. Pisani, under date of the 4th instant. The person mentioned therein by the name of Mekirdiz Djejairly, is the Armenian banker who brought charges of corruption against Mehmet Ali, the Sultan's brother-in-law.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 819.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, May 4, 1855.

My Lord,

MEKIRDIZ DJEJAIRLY, whom I met at Reshid Pasha's yesterday, told me to inform your Excellency that he received a message from M. Benedetti to the effect, that as Mehmet Ali Pasha was pardoned, and expected to return to the capital very shortly, he thought it is duty to advise him to address a letter to him (M. Benedetti), declaring that he never gave any bribe to Mehmet Ali Pasha, and that the amount he paid to him was his share of the custom dues, being himself a partner in the transaction.

Djejairly declined to comply with the request, and said, that not being in the habit of telling lies, and consequently he could not, in order to exonerate Mehmet Ali Pasha, lay the blame on himself.

This poor man seems to be very uneasy about the Pasha's return, and thinks of leaving the country for three or four months. His intention is to go to England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 820.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 207.)

Berlin, May 18, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE seen private letters giving the following information of what is passing in the Russian provinces bordering on East Prussia, and which may interest your Lordship.

The landed proprietors are described as in a state of considerable uneasiness, on account of a hostile feeling manifested by the peasantry in Lithuania and in Courland.

The Governor-General of Riga has resorted to severe measures to enforce discipline among the Baskir troops, who commit every species of outrage, and it appears that such is the disorder prevailing in those provinces, that the merchants are unable to transmit money through the country by the ordinary channels.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 821.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 209. Confidential.)

Berlin, May 18, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to the inquiry which your Lordship addressed to me yesterday by the telegraph (the words of the message will be found in my despatch No. 208 of this day,) I feel it my duty to make the following observations on the subject of the trade of Russia now carried on through Prussia, and which I had suggested in my despatch No. 202 of the 11th instant, that it would be advantageous to check, in order to increase the distress already caused to the enemy by the blockade.

I was led originally to draw your Lordship's attention to this subject, as it appeared to me that almost the only effectual means we at present possess of inflicting serious injury on Russia, in the Baltic especially, is by cutting off her trade and her supplies. I am assured that the price of colonial produce at St. Petersburgh and the large towns of Russia is double what it used to be;

that the cotton-mills and other manufactories are almost at a stand-still for want of material to work with; and that the shortness of the supply of foreign produce is becoming generally and seriously felt.

It is therefore with a view to increase the distress already existing that I have suggested the adoption of measures which shall restrict still further the trade of Russia. I am, however, by no means prepared to say that the Prussian Government would agree to a demand that we might address to them on this subject, but I believe that they would hesitate in their answer if they were made aware that our demand would be enforced by coercive measures, and that in the end they would yield to the necessities of the case, rather than expose their merchants to complete ruin.

If, however, Her Majesty's Government is not prepared to support the demand by coercion, it had better not be made, for Prussia will not willingly resign the advantages of her present position, and will hold to her independence as long as she can do so without exposing herself to material injury.

On the other hand it may be observed that the effect of coercion on Prussia might work an advantageous change in our political relations. Prussian trade has, up to the present moment, derived benefit from the war; the Government desire the continuance of the existing state of things, but it might become a question whether the employment of coercive measures to put down a trade chiefly advantageous to our enemy might not cause a reaction against the Government.

It is certainly a doubtful experiment, but as the system of conciliation which we have adopted towards Prussia during the last fifteen months, has not been productive of good results, might not an opposite course be more advantageous?

Our forbearance is not valued as it should be; it may be considered a proof of goodwill towards Germany, but it has not called forth any corresponding sentiment on their part.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 822.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, May 21, 1855.

AFTER writing to you yesterday I had another long conversation with the Emperor.

The despatch to M. Baudin was stopped in consequence of reflection on the part of His Majesty. He will do whatever we decide upon. He asks whether, in our opinion, it will be possible to go into Conference, making our reserves? If this cannot be done honourably in the opinion of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, he is for decisive language at Vienna.

It has struck me that Austria cannot propose terms singly to Russia without violating the Treaty of the 2nd December.

I will write at length by the messenger.

Send me the text of the Austrian instructions.

No. 823.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 581. Most Confidential.)

Paris, May 20, 1855.

My Lord,

I CALLED yesterday afternoon by appointment on Count Walewski, but the courier whom he expected from Vienna not being arrived, he was not better informed of the nature of the Austrian propositions than he had been on the previous day. He informed me, however, that the Council, from which he had just come, had decided that if these propositions turned out to be such as were expected, that is, Annex B to the 11th Protocol, with the

single modification that the *status quo* of the Russian fleet at the end of the war should be the measure of limitation taken, instead of four ships of the line and four frigates, as proposed in that Annex; in that case they should be accepted. But his Excellency maintained the same reserve of carrying on the war after the third point was settled, if the allied armies should have met with no success.

I need not recount the conversation which I had with Count Walewski, as it differed but little from that which I had the honour to recount in my confidential despatch No. 570 of the 18th instant, I will merely observe that its tone at times was so peremptory and imperious in regard to what should be done by the two Governments, that for my own sake in future discussions, as well as to let him understand that Her Majesty's Government had a voice in the question, I felt myself under the obligation of telling him that if he attempted to carry matters with so high a hand, he would soon find himself in the predicament of having to choose between an alliance with England or with Austria. I am bound to add that on my making this remark, he became profuse in his declarations of friendship for England, and that he stated in the most unequivocal terms, that happen what might, France would never desert her alliance with Great Britain, and that he had not intended that his expressions should convey more than a desire to place before Her Majesty's Government the opinions formed by the French Government on propositions submitted to both,—opinions, however, open to modification, should Her Majesty's Government object to them.

The only other remark I have to make is, that Count Walewski, more than once, observed that France could not afford to lose Austria; and he further gave me to understand that he had been greatly astonished to find how sincere and general was the wish for peace in France.

In general, throughout the conversation, the Count made use of the Emperor's name freely, as if His Majesty agreed entirely with his views.

In the course of the same afternoon, I had occasion to see Marshal Vaillant, and I took the opportunity of alluding to what Count Walewski told me had passed at the Council in the morning, adding, that I was surprised to find so great and sudden a change both in the Emperor's sentiments in regard to the war, and in his own.

Although I rejoice in the answer which the Marshal gave me, it is painful to me to have to state it. It was to the effect that the Emperor's opinions were perfectly unchanged; that he was determined to carry on the war; and that, as to himself, he had that very morning declared in Council (much to the chagrin of some of his colleagues, he admitted), that he would sooner see the whole French army driven into the sea, than accept such a peace as had been proposed; that an army could be replaced, but that the dishonour of a bad peace could not be effaced.

Later in the day I saw M. Fould. Although I did not press him as closely as I pressed Marshal Vaillant, I did not infer from his conversation that Count Walewski had reported correctly the opinions of the Council of Ministers. His opinion seemed to be that the continuation of the war was dreadful, but that peace for the moment was impossible.

I regret to have to trouble your Lordship with these details, but it is really necessary under the extraordinary circumstances which I have recounted, and which I have yet to recount.

This morning I again saw Count Walewski. He informed me that his messenger had arrived from Vienna; that Count Buol had stated his proposition in chapter and verse; that it was Annex B, with the modification which he, Count Walewski, had expected; that, however, no mention was made of the establishment of Consuls in the Black Sea; and that the allies were to be restricted to four ships, instead of each having half the number of Russian vessels left. Further, there was no mention of any amnesty.

Count Walewski continued that he had had a long conversation last night with the Emperor, and that, in the opinion of both His Majesty and himself, the French and English Plenipotentiaries ought to accept the Conference proposed by Count Buol, notwithstanding the propositions were such as he had stated to me. As to the number of ships which France and England might have in the Black Sea, it really did not signify, he said, as neither really intended to keep a force there; and, indeed, when this question had been argued in London, in

M. Drouyn de Lhuys' presence, it had been understood that the last word had not been said upon this subject, and that the maritime Powers were prepared to accept less. With respect to the omission of the Article respecting Consuls, he admitted that he was not so satisfied; still, on the whole, he thought the advantages of going into Conference were greater than the disadvantage of staying away. We could not prevent Austria making her propositions, and we had better show confidence in her by supporting them. After the late circular of Count Nesselrode, he felt certain that Russia could not accept the terms offered, and in that case she must break with Austria.

I remarked, that I differed from him in opinion, and that I felt convinced that Austria would propose nothing, of the acceptance of which by Russia she was not previously sure; and I asked the Count whether he authorized me to state to your Lordship that France was prepared to make peace on the terms now proposed by Austria?

Count Walewski evaded an answer to this question. He said that all he wished to do at present was to consult Her Majesty's Government; that, as he had already stated, the Emperor and himself thought the proposed terms acceptable; but that if Her Majesty's Government still insisted on a larger number of allied ships being admitted into the Black Sea, and if they wished for the establishment of Consuls, the French Government would then propose that we should state confidentially to Austria, that we would go into Conference to support her propositions as far as they went; but that, if they were accepted by Russia, we should afterwards put forward our own propositions for an augmented squadron and for the establishment of Consuls.

As I was obliged to leave Count Walewski in order to make some presentations to the Emperor, I had but little conversation with him. His manner, however, showed how little he was at his ease in recommending the course of action I have had the honour thus rapidly to place before your Lordship.

The Emperor detained me after the presentations. I told His Majesty, after some conversation on other subjects, what had passed between myself and Count Walewski; and I begged him to inform me (in the strictest confidence, if he would) whether his own opinions were changed, and whether he really was willing to make peace on the terms proffered by Austria. His Majesty replied, in the most decided language possible, that nothing would induce him ever to accept such terms; that he had thought M. Drouyn de Lhuys' best plans bad enough, but that these were far worse: but that what he wanted was to prevent Austria having any excuse for joining Russia; that, therefore, inasmuch as Count Buol had supported our propositions in Conference, reserving to himself the right of proposing others, if ours were not accepted by Russia, so, he thought, we might turn the tables and accede to the propositions of Austria, as far as they went, reserving to ourselves the right of asking for whatever additions the two Governments might think advisable. Thus Austria would have no cause to complain, and no excuse to join Russia. "For," His Majesty added, "I must fairly own, France is not strong enough to carry on a war in the East, and at the same time a contest with all Germany." His Majesty asked what I thought.

I replied nearly as follows: That the reserve made by Austria towards us, was very different to the reserve France proposed to make towards her. That Austria might fairly say, "if your propositions are not accepted, I reserve to myself the right of proposing less;" but that we could hardly say in return, "if your propositions are accepted, we reserve to ourselves the right of asking more." That I must, moreover, express the conviction, that public opinion in England would not brook this sort of double dealing; if peace was to be made, the nation would insist upon its being made at once without *arrière pensée*, and, if upon bad, at all events upon comprehensible, terms. But that no Government could stand before Parliament having accepted conditions of peace, with the intention of continuing the war. That the intentions of Austria were clear: she intended, with or without us, to make propositions which she thought or knew could be acceptable by Russia; Russia would accept them, and would then with right say to Austria, "I have accepted what you think fair proposals, and you cannot declare against me now." But this game would be played whether we went into Conference or not, and it seemed to me safer and better to refuse the Conference, than to establish points of difference between ourselves and Austria in the presence of the Russian Plenipotentiaries.

The Emperor seemed to participate in these objections: he said that he was

perfectly bewildered; that he knew what he wanted, but that he did not know how to obtain it. I asked His Majesty whether I had permission to state what had passed at this interview to your Lordship. His Majesty replied, "Certainly; dites que je m'embrouille—que je ne pense pas à faire la paix, mais que je veux louvoyer pour avoir l'Autriche avec nous."

I replied that I feared His Majesty was embarked in a ship that would sink under him; there was but one way to meet Austria, and that, in all probability, would not help us—by a straightforward declaration. Her conduct since the beginning of the Eastern question might be contrasted with that of the allies, and an appeal might be made to her honour to pronounce whether, after all that had passed, it was possible for the allies to accept her proposals, or fair in her to separate from them if they refused. The more we courted Austria, the more we should become entangled. Then again, how could we make fresh propositions, having hardly a fortnight since declared that we had gone to the utmost limits of concession?

Such, my Lord, is the present state of this complicated question. I must apologize to your Lordship for the extreme haste, and consequently unfinished style, in which this despatch is written; but I am contending against time, and am yet anxious that Her Majesty's Government should have, at an early date, a rough sketch of what I have seen and heard. I need not recommend what I have stated as entitled to strict confidence, for many of the statements will recommend themselves.

I have only to add that my opinion remains unchanged, that Her Majesty's Government must judge this question with reference to their own honour and interests alone, and I should rather say that they must take the honour and interests of France into their safe keeping, for there are no men to do it here.

Count Walewski writes in detail to M. Baulin, to whom I must refer your Lordship for the better elucidation of a course of policy which I cannot comprehend myself, and of which I could obtain no satisfactory or consistent explanation of his Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 824.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 344.)

Constantinople, May 10, 1855.

My Lord,

HAVING had occasion to wait upon the Sultan in private a few days ago, I availed myself of the opportunity to elicit His Majesty's sentiments respecting the late Ministerial change, and its immediate or remoter consequences. The principal points of the conversation may be conveyed to your Lordship in few words. My objects in carrying it on were to facilitate the return of Reshid Pasha to power; to prevent, meanwhile, the consolidation of a party adverse to British views; and to put the Sultan on his guard against further intrigues or inconvenient demands.

I have reason to believe, from the tenour of His Majesty's language, that Reshid Pasha's reinstatement in office will not be deferred to a very distant period. Consideration for public opinion and the Sovereign's own character requires, even in my own judgment, that it should not take place immediately. The Sultan observed that his Minister's resignation had left him to his own resources, but, save this expression, there was no appearance of dissatisfaction.

With respect to the Pasha's adversaries, His Majesty assured me that his brother-in-law, Mehemet Ali, should not, on his return from exile, have access to his presence; that neither he nor Mustapha Pasha should receive any official appointment, and that, in case of any fresh intrigue, the former should be banished for life, together with the Princess, his sister, if her removal from the capital were to be found necessary. He spoke with regret of their marriage, and explained by what influence it had been effected in the earlier part of his reign.

When I observed that the grounds on which the arbitrary banishment of the Pasha had been justified, militated against the propriety of his recall after so short an interval, His Majesty excused himself by pleading that no period had been assigned, and that the ladies of his family had wearied him with their solicitations.

As to any embarrassment likely to accrue from the Sultan's very natural desire to please the French Government, and particularly its Chief, under present circumstances, I am convinced that His Majesty is perfectly alive to the inconveniences of his situation. He assured me that he had expressed no opinion whatever on the subject of M. Benedetti's complaints; that any deference which he might show to wishes proceeding from that quarter, was merely a result of passing occurrences; that his real policy, founded on the well-known character and oft-tried friendship of the British nation, continued with unshaken steadiness, and that he looked to his alliance with Great Britain as the best hope of his empire whenever the exceptional circumstances in which he was now placed shall have passed away. He repeated more than once the assurance that no political change was involved in the late Ministerial arrangement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 825.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 345.)

Constantinople, May 10, 1855.

My Lord,

IT is with no small degree of satisfaction that I forward to your Lordship herewith a printed official copy of the Imperial Proclamation by which the abolition of that odious tax upon the Rayah subjects of the Porte, known under the name of "haratch," has been promulgated. That badge of degradation is removed, I trust for ever, from the Christian population of this Empire; and the Sultan, in thus redeeming the pledge which he deigned to give me several months ago, has acquired a fresh title to the affection of his people and to the sympathies of Europe.

Your Lordship will observe that the moral advantages derived from these sources are accompanied with measures calculated on the one side to meet the loss of revenue incident to the abolition of the haratch, and on the other to open a new source of recruitment for the Sultan's army. The principles on which these provisions are made to rest have not been concealed. They appear to be essentially sound; and a just application of them is to be secured by subsequent regulations, on the character and prudent enforcement of which the success of the entire measure will greatly depend.

It is satisfactory, moreover, to observe that the present reform is announced as part of an improved system already in progress of adoption, and destined to be carried gradually into effect.

Commissioners, to the number of about twenty, are appointed to watch over the enforcement of the general measure in specified localities; and among the individuals designated for that service, are some distinguished by their abilities and other qualifications.

It will probably be necessary for me to return to this subject at some later period.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 825.

Extract from the "Journal de Constantinople" of May 10, 1855

PROCLAMATION.

TOUS les sujets de l'Empire, sans exception, jouissent de prospérité et de bien-être à l'ombre des lois de justice qu'il a été donné à Sa Majesté Impériale de créer et d'établir dans l'unique intention de raffermir les bases de l'Etat et de consolider l'édifice du gouvernement et de la nation.

En vertu d'un ordre Impérial, les améliorations administratives et les garanties légales propres à produire et à assurer une plus grande somme de bien-être général sont l'objet de délibérations et seront mises à exécution au fur et à mesure de leur adoption.

Comme il a été reconnu nécessaire de déterminer d'abord, en les adaptant aux règles de l'Empire, les obligations principales qu'imposent à chaque classe des sujets de l'Empire ses devoirs de sujétion, des règlements seront successivement formés sur ces matières et mis à exécution.

La première et la plus importante de ces obligations étant le service militaire, il a été jugé urgent de fixer les bases des règlements qui seront établis sur cet objet.

Il est évident que toutes les classes des sujets de l'Empire sont, sans exception, astreintes à remplir les obligations résultant des devoirs de sujétion et que la plus lourde de ces charges est le service militaire.

Les sujets Musulmans la remplissaient seuls jusqu'à present, tandis que la défense de la patrie commune est un devoir pour tous. Les autres classes aussi devront donc participer à ce service qui était exclusivement dévolu à une seule. Ceux qui rempliront ce service en personne, s'en acquitteront par leurs corps, et ceux qui ne prendront pas part au service effectif, y contribueront par un équivalent rachat.

Comme les règles de la justice exigent d'établir une égale analogie pour l'accomplissement de cette importante obligation, nous proclamons la décision qui a été prise à cet égard en vertu d'un ordre Impérial et d'après l'avis unanime des plus hauts fonctionnaires de l'Etat.

Ce service militaire de l'Empire Ottoman étant, ainsi que nous venons de le dire, un devoir pour tous les sujets de l'Empire, les sujets non-Musulmans qui n'y contribuaient pas, payaient, indépendamment de la taxe générale, un impôt spécial sous la dénomination légale de "djidzyé" (indemnité).

Dorénavant, ces classes aussi fourniront un contingent militaire dont le nombre sera fixé par le Gouvernement.

Eu égard au chiffre des populations Musulmanes et à leur habitude de manier les armes, la plus grande partie des forces militaires qui seront entretenues par l'Empire Ottoman, sera toujours composée de Musulmans et la plus petite en sera formée par les autres communautés des sujets.

Ainsi, conformément à la décision qui sera prise à cet égard, une fraction déterminée du contingent général que toutes les autres classes fourniront d'après le chiffre de la population mâle et proportionnellement à ceux fournis par les sujets Musulmans, sera appelée au service effectif et entrera dans les rangs de l'armée, et le reste paiera, comme équivalent, indépendamment de la taxe générale, une contribution militaire.

La règle qui servira de base à la perception de cette contribution est la suivante:

Le contingent général qui sera fourni à l'avenir par ces classes, sera fixé d'après l'analogie et les proportions ci-dessus spécifiées. Le montant de la contribution militaire de ceux qui rempliront ce service en personne sera défalqué de la quotité totale de cet impôt, et le restant en sera réparti sur tous les sujets mâles appartenant aux susdites classes qui doivent contribuer au service militaire, et prélevé conjointement avec la taxe générale.

Des réglements spéciaux seront faits pour fixer, équitablement, la quotité de cette contribution et le mode de sa perception et répartition.

La durée du service et le système de conscription prescrit par les institutions militaires à l'égard des personnes qui se trouveront au service militaire actif, serviront de base à la formation de réglements spéciaux qui auront pour but d'établir un rapport exact pour la fixation des contingents et le mode de leur enrôlement, ainsi que de soumettre à une règle uniforme les droits de ceux qui se rendraient dignes d'obtenir des grades d'officiers, soit par la capacité qu'ils auraient déployée dans les rangs de l'armée, soit par les connaissances qu'ils auraient acquises dans les Ecoles Impériales.

Ces réglements sont en voie de discussion et seront prochainement promulgués et mis à exécution.

La Sublime Porte, appréciant les preuves de zèle et dévouement que tous ses fidèles sujets n'ont cessé de lui témoigner, et connaissant que tous également désirent, dans de pareilles circonstances, servir le Souverain leur bienfaiteur, l'Etat et leur patrie, et voulant que ceux de ses sujets qui n'ont pas pris part

jusqu'à présent au service militaire, participent sans retard à l'honneur et à la gloire qui ont illustré dans ces temps ce service, a décidé que, par mesure extraordinaire et jusqu'à ce que les règlements permanents et spéciaux susénoncés soient complétement établis, on prendra la quantité de contingents qui sera jugée nécessaire parmi les habitants des localités convenables d'Anatolie et de Roumélie.

Quoique ceci soit une mesure extraordinaire, le service des soldats qui seront enrôlés en ce moment jouira du bénéfice des lois permanentes qui seront faites plus tard, et le nombre des soldats qui sera pris de cette manière, sera passé en compte du contingent général qui sera fixé d'après les règles permanentes et qui consistera en service effectif et en contribution militaire.

Si parmi les soldats pris, par mesure extraordinaire, il y en avait qui donnassent des preuves de capacité et méritassent d'être nommés officiers, ils obtiendraient des grades militaires à l'avenir d'après le degré de leurs services et de leur mérite. Les décisions ci-dessus ayant été prises, le mode de leur exécution sera notifié par firmans spéciaux et on procédera immédiatement à y donner suite.

En faisant participer de cette manière et d'après leurs facultés et leur position, toutes les classes de sujets au service militaire, qui réunit les peines et les fatigues à l'honneur du service, la Sublime Porte a eu pour but d'alléger la charge du service qui pesait exclusivement sur les Musulmans et de faire aussi participer les autres classes des sujets de l'Empire à l'honneur et à la gloire de servir l'Etat et la patrie. Ceci étant une nouvelle preuve de la générosité et de la sollicitude que Sa Majesté Impériale n'a cessé de prodiguer à l'égard de tous ses sujets en général, nous ne doutons pas que chacun n'en soit pénétré de satisfaction et de reconnaissance.

Par décision Impériale, plusieurs hats fonctionnaires de la Sublime Porte ont reçu la mission de se rendre très prochainement dans les diverses provinces de la Roumélie et de l'Anatolie pour y procéder à l'application équitable de l'ordre souverain qu'on vient de lire.

No. 826.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 389.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 21, 1855.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 300 of the 19th of April, I inclose, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a letter from the War Department, expressing the regret of Lord Panmure at the delay which has taken place in assigning a proper amount of troops for the Contingent to be placed, according to Treaty, under the order of Lieutenant-General Vivian.

It is now more than three months since the Convention was signed, and from that date, at least, the ultimate object of it should have been steadily kept in view.

Her Majesty's Government have performed, as far as they have been allowed by the Porte to do so, the obligations which Her Majesty contracted in that Convention. The officers to be supplied by them have been appointed; arrangements have been made for the pay and provisioning of the Contingent; preparations have been made for the organisation of the force; and its Commander and several officers of high rank have long since arrived at Constantinople. But not a single man has been prepared by the Turkish Government; and out of the Contingent of 20,000 men, which the Porte engaged to furnish, not a company nor a section is forthcoming.

Her Majesty's Government had reason to believe, several weeks ago, from authentic sources, that Omer Pasha would not spare a man for service in this Contingent; and this information should have been furnished by the Porte when your Excellency first called upon it to provide the stipulated amount of men, in which case you might have succeeded in inducing the Turkish Government to look at once to other quarters for the troops, instead of continuing to rely upon a source of supply which it knew would fail; and your Excellency would not

have had to report, after Lieutenant-General Vivian's arrival, that the Porte still calculated upon obtaining from Omer Pasha a large proportion of force to eke out the supply of 2,500 troops drawn from the capital, and 7,500 troops drawn from the army of the Danube.

Her Majesty's Government regret to see that the Turkish Government appears to consider that, in fulfilling the engagements of the Convention, it is conferring a favour on Great Britain, whereas, of all the boons which this country has conferred on Turkey, this, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, is the greatest.

Her Majesty's Government have undertaken to pay, officer, and lead to the field, a large portion of the Turkish army, and to place it in as efficient a state as that of British troops, thereby laying the foundation for a future organization of the greatest importance to Turkey, and in return for this engagement Her Majesty's Government have met with nothing but indifference and neglect on the part of the Porte.

I have now to instruct your Excellency to demand, in the most formal way, from the Government of the Sultan, an immediate fulfilment of the obligations which it contracted by the Convention of February 3, 1855; and unless means for that object have been adopted before this despatch reaches you, your Excellency will specifically require:

1. That the 2,500 men in the capital should be forthwith given over to General Vivian.

2. That General Vivian should be furnished with ample powers to select from the army of the Danube 7,500 men, whom he shall be authorised to march to Constantinople, and there form.

3. Your Excellency will say that if 5,000 more really drilled troops are forthcoming, Her Majesty's Government will not object to take 5,000 recruits already raised, although they had no reason to expect that they would have to do this.

I have to instruct your Excellency to press these demands at once on the Porte, and I have no wish that you should conceal from the Turkish Government that if these demands are not at once complied with Her Majesty's Government may find themselves reduced, by considerations of what is due to the honour of this country, to abandon the vain attempt to help the Porte, which will not lend a hand to help itself, and to renounce any obligation to give effect to a Convention which had promised so much advantage to Turkey and to the common cause, and which should have been faithfully carried out by the Porte if it had clearly understood its duties and its interest.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 827.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 21, 1855.*

THE Cabinet met to-day, but no final determination was come to, because the opinion of the French Government was not known, and will not be communicated to us till to-morrow.

It would be most improper to come to a hasty decision upon a matter of such grave importance; and we shall take time for mature deliberation, particularly as we have not yet received the answer to my despatch No. 180 that Count Buol is to send to Count Colloredo, and as we can see no pressing reason for convoking the Conference with the object of making to it the communication proposed by Count Buol.

No. 828.

Mr. Hudson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 79.)

My Lord, *Turin, May 15, 1855.*

HAVING occasion to see Count Cavour on business this morning, at the close of our conversation he said that he thought he had some cause to take exception to the mode in which the Sardinian Government had been treated at the Vienna Conferences.

No communication with regard to what had taken place at those Conferences had yet been made to the Sardinian Government, who thought that the interests of the King, as one of the allies, had been treated lightly by the 10th Article of Annex B to Protocol No. 11, which Article runs as follows: "Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne est comprise dans la présente paix. Les relations commerciales et autres sont retablis, &c."

M. de Cavour thought that considering the mode in which Sardinia had been treated by Russia, who withdrew her Minister from Turin on account of the reforms in the Sardinian Administration, who had never renewed amicable relations with this Court, and considering that in such cases as that of the present war, Articles such as the 10th generally contain a declaration as to the renewal of amicable and diplomatic relations, he thought, he said, that the Article in question passed lightly over the position of Sardinia, and especially because, if the last part of the 10th Article was ever carried out, "le pied où les relations étaient avant la déclaration de guerre" would be a state of non-intercourse, as far as diplomatic and amicable relations were concerned, between Russia and Sardinia.

M. de Cavour said he desired not to complain, but to point these things out to me, and he added that he was certain my Government would appreciate the conduct of the Sardinian Cabinet in the matter of the sequestrations of Piedmontese property in Lombardy; that he had never pressed for an answer, that he had desired to give every time and opportunity to the good offices of the Ministers of the allies at Vienna to take effect; that this question had been put off from day to day by the Austrian Cabinet; but still, knowing the great interests at stake, he had not urged the settlement of this great cause of complaint to Sardinia, lest he might injure the progress of negotiations and the hope of a general peace.

I told M. de Cavour that I would report to your Lordship what he now said; that I had last night received from your Lordship a copy of the papers relating to the negotiations at Vienna, but that as I had scarcely had time to open them, he could not expect me to discuss with him the merits of the 10th Article of the 11th Protocol; and that I was quite willing to bear testimony to his desire not to embarrass the negotiations in question by bringing forward matters which solely affected Sardinia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES HUDSON.

No. 829.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, May 21, 1855.*

COUNT BUOL will wait the communication you announce in your telegraphic despatch of yesterday. He will not call the Conference till he has received it, and probably not before Wednesday.

The question as to the Consuls was to form part (according to arrangement with M. Drouyn de Lhuys) of the discussion of the terms of limitation between Russia and the Porte, which would afterwards be brought under the general discussion of the Conference. For this reason it is not mentioned in Count Buol's present proposal. Please to reply upon this point.

Aali Pasha leaves for Constantinople on Sunday next.

No. 830.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 22.)

Vienna, May 22, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE communicated your telegraphic despatch of yesterday to Count Buol, and the French Ambassador made a similar communication from his Government.

Count Buol will wait for further communications from London and Paris till Friday evening, when (in consequence of Aali Pasha's departure on Sunday) he feels that he must convoke the Conference for Saturday. Aali Pasha's departure will, he hopes, justify his not delaying the Conference beyond the 26th instant.

No. 831.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

Foreign Office, May 22, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

WE cannot explain our views by telegraph, and we are still in communication with the French Government. I shall send a messenger to you with the least possible delay.

No. 832.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 589. Confidential.)

Paris, May 21, 1855.

My Lord,

THERE is some discrepancy between the statement made to me, and alluded to in my confidential despatch No. 574 of the 18th instant, respecting the inquiries made by Prussia at Vienna with regard to her admission as a party to the Protectorate of the Danubian Provinces, and the report made to your Lordship by Lord Westmorland in his despatch No. 223 of the 9th instant on the same subject.

It would appear by the latter that the answer of Austria had been precise and final, whereas my informant gave me to understand that a second communication, more favourable to Prussia, had been made lately.

On further inquiry, I find that this second communication had been made verbally at Berlin by Count Esterhazy, and that it admitted the right of Prussia to be included in the Protectorate.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 833.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 590. Confidential.)

Paris, May 21, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE have had a further interview with Count Walewski this morning.

I found his language somewhat changed from yesterday.

He said that he had not yet sent the despatch which he had informed me he was about to address to M. Baudin, but that it would go to-day.

If I understand his Excellency correctly, what he now proposes to Her Majesty's Government is, that Great Britain and France should state to Austria that they approve her propositions if the force of the combined squadron to be for the future in the Black Sea is increased to that of the Russian, and if the maritime Powers are to have Consuls in that sea. If Austria refuses to accept these amendments, Count Walewski is still of opinion that the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and France should assist at the Conference convoked by Austria, but that they should declare, should the Russian Plenipotentiaries accept the propositions of Austria, which he considered unlikely, that they could not be satisfied with less than has been stated above.

I observed to Count Walewski that his plan appeared to me far more calculated to deteriorate than to improve our position with Austria. What would infallibly happen in a Conference so conducted would be this: Austria would propose her plan: the Russian Plenipotentiaries would naturally ask whether it met with the approval of the allies, and we could not refuse to answer. We should be obliged to state our amendments and our objections; Austria would not support them, and the moment that this was ascertained by the Russians they would close with the Austrian propositions, and call upon Austria to separate from us. This was, probably, what Austria wanted. I thought a far better plan would be to state to Austria, in temperate language, what our position was, and how impossible it must be for us to subscribe to terms such as she proposed; and to add that, if she persisted in convoking a fresh Conference, for which there was no real necessity, it could only be for the purpose of showing the disagreements which existed between her and the maritime Powers, with a view of disengaging herself from the alliance which she had, partially at least, contracted with them. There might be a hope in preventing the convocation of a fresh Conference, and that should be the object to have in view.

Count Walewski admitted that, if Her Majesty's Government objected to the course which he proposed, some such measure as that which I had suggested might be employed.

I asked his Excellency whether he was better informed as to the future intentions of Austria than when I had last asked him the same question, that is, what Austria proposed doing supposing we came in to her terms, and that they were refused by Russia?

He replied that Count Buol had been very explicit on this point, and that he had declared to M. de Bourqueney that a refusal on the part of Russia would not entail hostilities on the part of Austria.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 834.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 174.)

Foreign Office, May 22, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 200 of the 11th instant, inclosing a copy of a despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Frankfort, directing him to inform the members of the Diet that the Russian Government adheres to the engagements contracted at Vienna relative to the affairs of the Principalities and the navigation of the Danube, conditionally upon the assurance that Germany maintains a strict neutrality in the present war, I have to instruct you to take an opportunity of observing to Baron Manteuffel that if the German Powers were to take an active part in the war against Russia, it would not depend upon Russia to determine what should be the arrangements to be made about the Principalities on the Danube, because Russia would, in that case, be obliged to submit to any reasonable conditions which the allies might think it right to impose upon her.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 835.

M. Musurus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 22.)

Bryanstone Square, le 13 Mai, 1855.

My Lord,

J'AI l'honneur de transmettre, ci-joint, à votre Excellence copie du mémoire sur la question des privilèges religieux des Chrétiens de l'Empire Ottoman, que, comme je l'ai déjà annoncé à votre Excellence, son Altesse Aali Pacha m'a envoyé par sa dépêche du 6 de ce mois pour le communiquer à votre Excellence.

J'ai, &c.

(Signed) C. MUSURUS.

Inclosure in No. 835.

Memorandum.

PARMI toutes les questions qui intéressent l'avenir de l'Empire Ottoman, il en est une qui préoccupe plus spécialement les esprits. Les souvenirs de temps d'intolérance, déjà loin de nous, les débats de la presse Européen lui ont donné une haute importance; la politique Russe, habile à user de toutes les armes, a réussi parfois à l'exagérer au point d'égarer momentanément les plus sincères et les plus utiles alliés de la Turquie. Cette question, traitée imprudemment, pourrait amener en Orient les résultats les plus opposés au but que poursuivent de grandes nations, aux prix des plus immenses sacrifices, et, heureusement résolue, favorisera la consolidation de tous les intérêts pour la défense desquels la guerre actuelle a pris naissance. Il est donc indispensable de l'examiner et d'étudier dans toute son étendue.

Cette question est celle de la protection religieuse des Chrétiens sujets du Sultan, ou, autrement dit, la demande de garanties journellement exprimées pour le maintien et l'observance de leur privilèges religieux; demande qui, présentée par la Russie, a été hautement désapprouvée par l'Europe et a occasionnée les complications actuelles, et qui, enfin, si elle était accueillie sous une forme quelconque, soit au profit d'une communauté, soit au profit de toutes, constituerait la plus dangereuse atteinte aux droits de souveraineté et à l'autorité légitime du Sultan.

Quel plus grand obstacle, en effet, que la proclamation d'une garantie étrangère pour l'exercice de l'autorité souveraine dans une pays, et quelle atteinte plus mortelle à la liberté d'action et au prestige si nécessaires à l'existence de tout Gouvernement?

Si l'on jette un coup d'œil sur l'histoire du passé, on comprendra facilement comment les idées les plus erronées se sont glissées dans les esprits et y ont, en quelque sorte, pris racine. L'état de guerre fréquent dans lequel les Empires de l'Europe se sont trouvés engagés vis-à-vis de la Turquie, le mélange des répulsions politiques et des répulsions religieuses, le besoin d'exciter les populations aux plus grands efforts militaires en appuyant sur la religion des guerres dont la possession de territoires disputés était la vrai cause, tout à contribué à égarer l'esprit des nations les unes sur les autres. Nous avons sur les yeux un exemple analogue et récent de ces méprises de l'histoire, en voyant la Russie réussir à persuader au plus grand nombre de ses sujets que la guerre d'invasion qu'elle a tentée sur un Empire lié indissolublement à l'équilibre Européen de l'aveu de toutes les déclarations publiques des Puissances Européennes, n'était qu'une croisade religieuse.

Comment l'Europe Chrétienne aurait-elle pu concevoir, au moment où les barrières religieuses séparaient si complètement les nations, que les Chrétiens jouissaient librement de l'exercice de leur culte sous la souveraineté de l'Islamisme, et qu'à côté de la mosquée Musulmane s'élevait paisiblement l'Eglise Chrétienne? Comment aurait-on pu faire croire à cette vérité à présent incontestable, que la loi même d'un peuple conquérant et Musulman renfermait l'obligation de respecter la religion des vaincus, et que, si l'on fait la part de la sévérité des temps et du peu de lumières répandues sur ces questions, si l'on fait

la part d'inégalités de conditions surtout politiques et qui ont été plus ou moins communes à toute l'Europe, jamais, sous le sceptre des Musulmans la propagande religieuse n'a pris la forme persécutive!

Il est vrai que la tolérance des Sultans a été presqu'unique dans l'histoire; que, sur les territoires conquis par les Ottomans, les diverses populations vaincues se sont conservés dans leurs nationalités, leurs lois, leurs religions, et que, tandis que la fusion des divers éléments qui composent les peuples, a été, presque partout, violemment poursuivie, les divers éléments se sont paisiblement maintenus dans toute la variété do leur dissemblance sous l'autorité des Sultans, et se retrouvent aujourd'hui protégés et conservés par les principes mêmes de cette loi Musulmane que l'on a si souvent et si inexactement accusé d'intolérance.

On chercherait en vain à découvrir la cause qui a pu, dans des temps de lumière, tels que le notre, maintenir jusqu'à un certain point la pensée que, sans protection étrangère, les privilèges religieux des Chrétiens de l'Empire Ottoman étaient exposés, si l'on ne songeait qu'une ennemie acharnée et persévérante de l'Empire Ottoman, la Russie, a travaillé de la manière la plus active et la plus heureuse, pendant longtemps, à obscurcir le jugement de l'Europe sur cette question, afin de faire réussir, à l'ombre de faux semblant religieux, des plans purement politiques. Désorganiser l'Empire Ottoman, l'amoindrir par tous les moyens possibles, démembrer son autorité politique aussi bien que ses provinces, et, ensuite, s'établir dans des contrées où la confusion aurait remplacé tout ordre régulier, tel a été, tel est encore, le plan de la Russie. Heureusement qu'elle n'a plus de complices et n'en pourra plus trouver dans l'avenir, en égarant l'opinion de l'Europe, comme elle a réussi à le faire plus d'une fois. Les événements qui ont entouré la révolution de laquelle est sorti le Royaume actuel de Grèce, sont le dernier exemple de cette habileté perfide dont la dernière heure a enfin sonné.

C'est librement, au moment même de la conquête et dans la plénitude de la plus entière autorité, que les Sultans, fidèles au sentiment de l'humanité et à l'esprit même de l'Islamisme, ont accordé aux Chrétiens de l'Empire Ottoman leurs premiers privilèges. Aucun empêchement matériel ne s'opposait à ce que ces Souverains n'usassent d'une puissance illimitée contre la foi des vaincus, et ils n'ont usé de cette puissance que pour protéger et maintenir cette foi, en l'entourant de privilèges qui n'ont jamais été violés. Si, dans l'intérieure de l'Empire Ottoman, il y a eu, comme ailleurs, des actes d'oppression, la cause en était l'ignorance des temps, la différence des races et le rapprochement, trop grand encore, de la période de guerre et de conquête. Toutes proportions gardées, l'Empire Ottoman a suivi, à cet égard, les mêmes phases que les autres pays, et l'on peut même dire hardiment, sans crainte d'être démenti, qu'aux époques d'obscurité et d'intolérance plus ou moins grande qui ont pesé sur l'Europe entière, ce n'était pas dans l'Empire Ottoman que les minorités vaincues avaient le plus à regretter leur état.

Il y eut peut-être une époque où la physionomie de la domination Musulmane prit un aspect regrettable pour les Chrétiens dans quelques parties de l'Empire Ottoman. Ce fut au temps du développement démesuré de l'influence des janissaires, qui avaient usurpé une position redoubtable à toutes les autorité, et à tous les droits. Mais la justice des Sultans a détruit pour jamais cette redoutable corporation, ainsi que toutes les influences qui s'y rattachaient; et les hommes d'Etat de l'Europe les plus considérés n'ont pas craint de proclamer que depuis la destruction des janissaires, la Turquie avait, dans l'espace d'un petit nombre d'années, progressé, toute proportion gardée, plus que tout autre pays. Jamais l'autorité Musulmane n'a cherché à convertir violemment un sujet non-Musulman. Les patriarchats constitués aux époques où la Russie ne l'était pas encore, réunissent un tel faisceau de droits civils et religieux que l'on peut vraiment dire, qu'à la réserve de l'autorité politique que le Gouvernement Musulman exerce seul, les Chrétiens sont plutôt administrés, jugés et dirigés par une autorité Chrétienne que Musulman. C'est volontairement, sans y être amenés par aucune autre considération que celle de leurs devoirs de Souverains, que les Sultans ont établi un tel état de choses, qui n'a jamais été sérieusement compromis; et ce n'est que la seule Russie qui a intérêt à faire croire le contraire et à s'efforcer de persuader aux Chrétiens sujets Musulmans, de même qu'aux Puissances Chrétiennes, que c'est à l'intervention étrangère que les privilèges accordés aux Chrétiens ont dû leur naissance et devront leur conservation.

La Turquie a le droit d'attendre de l'impartialité de tous les hommes d'Etat

justes et éclairés une sérieuse appréciation de vérités aussi incontestables que celles qu'on vient d'exposer. C'est d'elle-même et pour aller au devant des vœux de ses alliés que, dans ces derniers temps, la Sublime Porte a confirmé et étendu les privilèges religieux des Chrétiens, et qu'elle a annoncé l'amélioration aussi rapide que possible de la situation de ses sujets, sans distinction de race ni de religion. C'est à la face du monde et pour répondre de la manière la plus éclatante aux calomnies de la Russie que ces améliorations ont été réalisées et que ces nouveaux progrès ont été promis. Si les déclarations les plus franches et les plus éclatantes ne paraissaient pas suffisants aux Puissances alliées de la Sublime Porte qui se croient en devoir de ne rien négliger pour assurer le sort de leurs coreligionnaires, quels gages meilleurs pourrait-on imaginer que ceux qui découlent de l'intérêt même du Gouvernement du Sultan à rendre heureux et prospères tous ses sujets, quelle que soit leur religion? L'Europe peut-elle trouver une sécurité plus complète que celle qui résulte de cette garantie morale venant confirmer les plus sincères et les plus éclatantes assurances, spontanément données?

Si donc, par ses actes dans le passé, par ses déclarations les plus explicites dans le présent, par l'appréciation de ses plus chers intérêts d'avenir, la Sublime Porte offre des garanties suffisantes pour le maintien et l'observance des privilèges religieux des Chrétiens sujets de son Empire, quelles ne seraient pas les conséquences dangereuses de la stipulation d'une garantie! L'insistance sur l'insertion dans les Traités d'une garantie explicite impliquerait gratuitement:

1. Une atteinte à la dignité du Gouvernement Impérial; car elle supposerait mie arrière pensée à toutes les déclarations, un manque de franchise et de bonne foi dans de solennelles assurances que la Sublime Porte peut méconnître tout ce qu'il y a de plus constaté en fait de principes d'administration, la règle essentielle pour tout Gouvernement de réaliser, par tous les moyens possibles, le bien-être de tous ses sujets.

2. Une atteinte aux droits de souveraineté de la Sublime Porte; car elle porterait le caractère d'une volonté et d'une initiative étrangères venant s'associer, par immixtion, à celles du Sultan dans l'exercice de son autorité de souverain.

3. Une paralyse de l'action de l'autorité administrative; car, en établissant aux yeux des populations de l'Empire Ottoman que le maintien et l'observance des privilèges des Chrétiens seront dus, dans l'avenir, à l'influence étrangère, non moins qu'aux intentions bienveillantes et éclairées du Gouvernement de la Sublime Porte, ce prestige et cette intégrité de commandement si essentiels à l'unité et à la force de toute autorité administrative, se trouveraient profondément et dangereusement lésés.

4. Enfin, les Puissances amies et alliées de la Sublime Porte se donneraient en quelque sorte un démenti à elles-mêmes, si elles insistaient sur l'insertion textuelle, dans un Traité quelconque, de la garantie sus-énoncée. En effet, tout le monde sait que la mission dont le Prince Menchikoff était chargé, avait pour objet de surprendre ou d'arracher une reconnaissance de l'association du Souverain de la Russie à la protection des privilèges des Chrétiens de l'Empire Ottoman. Tous les hommes d'état comprirent que, dans un voile d'intérêt simulé pour les Chrétiens orthodoxes de l'Empire Ottoman, la Russie voulait obtenir à son profit un véritable démembrement moral de l'autorité souveraine des Sultans—démembrement qui atteignait plus profondément les lois d'existence d'une souveraineté que la perte des territoires les plus importants; car c'était au cœur même de toute légitime et solide domination que venait s'implanter le germe destructeur. C'est avec l'approbation de l'Europe entière que le Gouvernement de la Sublime Porte repoussa cette injuste prétention, sous quelque forme captieuse que, d'abord éclatante, elle ait ensuite voulu se dissimuler.

Il est donc peu naturel que les Puissances amies et alliées de la Sublime Porte, après avoir approuvé Sa Majesté le Sultan dans sa légitime défense de son autorité souveraine, jusqu'à prendre les armes pour sa cause et envoyer les soldats mourir à côté des siens en combattant glorieusement pour la consolidation de l'intégrité morale et matérielle d'un Empire déclaré toujours indispensable à l'équilibre Européen; il est donc peu naturel, disons-nous, que ces mêmes Puissances réclament au nom de l'unité, de la part de la Sublime Porte, cette même concession à l'influence étrangère qu'elles trouvaient et trouvent encore si dangereuse aux mains de la Russie. On pourrait même ajouter que l'insertion dans un Traité de la garantie sus-énoncée, et dont le peu d'opportunité vient d'être démontré, créerait des situations nouvelles, embarrassantes pour chacun, et

desquelles les conflits d'autorité les plus délicats pourraient naître par la suite.

La justice, la logique, la prudence s'unissent donc ensemble pour éloigner une demande dangereux à introduire dans le droit public Européen. Il est, en conséquence, à présumer que les Puissances unies et alliées de la Sublime Porte, après avoir obtenu, par la coopération loyale de leur diplomatie et de leurs armes, le raffermissement matériel de l'Empire Ottoman, ne voudront pas lui faire subir un ébranlement politique et moral dont les résultats seraient contraires à toutes leurs déclarations et à toutes leurs intentions. Il est donc à espérer que la question dont nous venons d'exposer les différents côtés sous leur véritable jour, sera l'objet du plus sérieux et du plus mûr examen. La position d'une empire que les hommes d'Etat de l'Europe veulent faire entrer complétement dans la concert Européen, ne doit pas s'y trouver inférieure à la position de tout autre; et l'unité, l'intégrité de l'autorité souveraine de chacun de ces Etats doit être la règle commune pour tous.

No. 836.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, May* 23, 1855, 2·30 P.M.

THE French Government is going to send you a modified proposition. Details by messenger.

No. 837.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, May* 23, 1855.

I HAVE communicated your telegraph of last night to Count Buol. He feels that as Aali Pasha is to leave on Sunday, he must call the Conference for Saturday, at which he will bring forward his proposition as transmitted in my despatch No. 234. If, however, you announce by telegraph that you propose still to continue a negotiation, and do not wish the Conference to be closed in the manner Count Buol proposed, he will urge Aali Pasha, upon so important a communication, to delay his departure for a day or two.

He believes his answer to your despatch No. 180 will reach Count Colloredo to-morrow. I beg for your Lordship's instructions by Friday, as to my attending the Conference, if invited, for Saturday, before the arrival of your Lordship's messenger, and as to the language you wish me to hold if I do attend it.

No. 838.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May* 24, 1855.

WE cannot agree to Count Buol's proposal. Urge him not to call the Conference until you receive further instructions.

No. 839.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 603. Confidential.)

Paris, May 23, 1855.

My Lord,

ON calling this morning on Count Walewski I found that he was in possession of the decision taken by the Cabinet yesterday, that the late proposals of Austria should be courteously declined.

Count Walewski said that he was about to submit by to-night's mail a fresh proposition to your Lordship, that it had been considered by the Council, and had received the approbation of the Emperor and the French Ministers. This proposition, the Count observed, had at all events the merit of being short, simple, and easily understood. It would place the whole question in an intelligible manner before Europe, and he trusted would be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government.

He proposed to state to the Austrian Government that if Count Buol, on summoning the Conference, would agree to ask the Russian Plenipotentiaries purely and simply (purement et simplement) whether they adopted the principle of limitation, and would declare the Conferences broken off if a reply was given in the negative, that the belligerent Powers on their part would consent to continue the negotiations if the answer was given in the affirmative.

Count Walewski remarked that if, as he believed would be the case, the Russian Plenipotentiaries refused to acknowledge the principle of limitation, the rupture of the Conferences would fall upon them. If, on the other hand, they accepted the principle, the Conferences would continue, and he should be quite willing to see further negotiations conducted on the basis laid down between Her Majesty's Government and M. Drouyn de Lhuys during the short visit which the latter paid to London. His Excellency then read me a telegraphic despatch containing instructions in the sense indicated above, which he proposed addressing to M. de Bourqueney, if it met with the approbation of Her Majesty's Government. I asked for a copy of it for your Lordship's information; but the Count informed me that the Emperor had not yet seen it, that he should submit it to His Majesty later in the day, and that he would then transmit me a copy of that or whatever else it might be proposed to send in the place of it. If I receive it in time it will be annexed to this despatch.

I asked Count Walewski, after he had developed his plan, whether I was to understand that he was willing to make peace upon it, observing, as I had done before, that Her Majesty's Government would, I was convinced, be no parties to a proceeding instituted either to gain time or to cajole Austria; that they would consider his proposition, and form their opinion of it, upon its intrinsic merits only, and with reference to an immediate peace, or to a continuation of the war. Count Walewski's answer was less precise than I could have wished; but I gathered from it that much would depend upon the state of affairs in the Crimea.

I then inquired, supposing Austria to refuse the proposition which his Excellency now suggested, what he proposed doing. He had evidently not taken this alternative into his consideration. He replied at first that the belligerent Powers might themselves ask the question of Russia; and at a later period of the conversation, he said that he would be willing to leave to Her Majesty's Government the decision of going into Conference, should Austria persist in insisting on the acceptance of her original plan.

I asked how he proposed meeting an evasive answer on the part of the Russian Plenipotentiaries. It was improbable, I remarked, that Austria would want us to take such an answer into consideration. Count Walewski's reply was positive on this point. He would insist upon a categorical answer—yes or no—from the Russian Plenipotentiaries. If they asked for time to consult their Government he would give the necessary delay to enable them to ask for and receive instructions by telegraph.

I gave no opinion on this new proposition, further than that I thought it was more likely to entangle us than to help us, and that the object we should have in view should be to prevent Austria summoning a Conference at all, or if

she did summon one, to engage her to make a simple statement; that having failed, after due consideration, in finding any scheme likely to meet with the acceptance both of the maritime Powers and of Russia, she reluctantly abandoned the task, and must consider the Conferences at an end. Neither she herself nor any one else would be compromised by such a course.

One other observation I made was the following. I did not think that Her Majesty's Government would allow so delicate a question to depend on the transmission of orders by telegraph. If inclined to follow Count Walewski's advice, they would probably require to know beforehand the exact words which Count Buol would address to the Conference in asking the Russian Plenipotentiaries whether they accepted the principle of limitation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S.—I have just received the inclosed paper from Count Walewski.

Inclosure in No. 839.

Draft of a Telegraphic Despatch from Count Walewski to Baron Bourqueney.

LES Plénipotentiaires Russes ont jusqu'à présent refusé péremptoirement de négocier sur le principe d'une limitation quelconque. Il n'y a donc pas lieu à discuter entre nous les détails avant de savoir si la Russie admet ou non le principe.

Que le Comte Buol propose à la Conférence l'adoption du principe.

Si la Russe l'accepte, prenez en acte; nous en discuterons ensuite, en Conférence, l'application.

Si Russie refuse, les Conférences seront closes et l'Autriche reconnaitra avec nous que la négociation est rompue du fait de la Russie.

Si les Plénipotentiaires Russes demandent à en référer à Pétersbourg, accordez trois jours.

Il faut surtout qu'il soit bien entendu qu'il n'y aura pas de discussion dans la Conférence: l'acceptation ou le refus pur et simple du principe de la limitation.

Si le Comte Buol, par impossible, refusait de poser les choses ainsi, faites lui comprendre toute la responsabilité qu'il prend sur lui et référer en à nous.

No. 840.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(Private.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 24, 1855.

I CAN see no good object to be gained by the new proposal. Austria will probably refuse to make it; and if she does make it, Russia must refuse it. How will that improve our relations with Austria, or prevent her escaping from us as Count Walewski expects? And will it not be beneath the dignity of France and England, and expose themselves to a fresh refusal from Russia?

Pray make this known to Count Walewski as my opinion, for I have not been able to consult my colleagues, and I fear we cannot have a Cabinet till Saturday.

There is, however, no hurry about answering Count Buol; and I have told Lord Westmorland to urge him not to call the Conference until the French and English Ministers receive instructions.

The Cabinet agreed to the despatch I sent you yesterday, with some trifling alterations; but it will not be sent until we have come to an agreement with the French Government.

No. 841.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 353.)

Constantinople, May 14, 1855.

My Lord,

IN pursuance of your instructions I have given to Lieutenant-General Vivian, since his arrival here, all the assistance in my power towards the collection and assignment to him of the Ottoman troops destined by the terms of the Convention to serve under his command. The operation, like every other in this country, is subject to difficulty and delay. I cannot say that any apparent attempt has been made by the Turkish authorities to evade the execution of the Treaty, and they always maintain that in some way or other the troops are forthcoming; but it is, nevertheless, true that the preparations for assembling the numbers agreed upon are still only in progress, and much remains to be done before the expected corps can be duly adapted to the principles of its formation and rendered fit to take the field with confidence. The Porte, however, is not unprovided with plausible excuses for the delay. The transfer of so large a portion of Omer Pasha's army to the Crimea has created an unexpected difficulty, and the heavy demands upon the steam-transport service for the conveyance of French and Sardinian troops, to say nothing of our own wants, increase the causes of delay. Before General Vivian's arrival, when I repeatedly urged the Turkish Ministers to allow us to recruit, by means of our own officers, in the event of any demur, I was assured in the most positive terms that the Porte would fulfil her engagements to the letter, and that, if there should be a deficiency, which was not expected, in the number of Regulars and Redifs, the Porte would supply the recruits which might be wanted to complete the corps.

As the matter now stands, the Seraskier proposes to furnish 15,750 Infantry, 3,300 Cavalry, and 950 Artillerymen, with 42 guns, making in all the complement of 20,000 men.

He proposes to take 3,937 men from the army of the Crimea, 820 Cavalry, 237 Artillery, and similar amounts from the army of Roumelia, making together 10,000 men. From Constantinople he offers 1,968 Infantry, 414 Cavalry, and 118 Artillery, making 2,500 men. These principally, if not entirely, are to come from Thessaly.

The remainder, amounting to 7,500, he proposes to take from the new conscription of Christians, which, under present circumstances, I conceive to be an objectionable arrangement, and have therefore withheld my consent. The Seraskier has undertaken to attend to my representations, and I hope, with General Vivian's concurrence, to limit the number of Christians in the first instance to 2,000 at most.

The result of a further communication with the Seraskier this morning is, that five days hence 5,000 troops will be ready for embarkation at Varna, and 2,500 at Volos.

I am under a strong impression that Omer Pasha will not detach any part of his army from the Crimea, and that he will be countenanced by the opinion of Lord Raglan and General Canrobert. The Seraskier, in reply to my remarks on that hand, asserts that the Pasha will be obliged to submit to the orders of his Government.

It is thought advisable to make arrangements for the reception of the troops in this neighbourhood in preference to any more distant locality.

For means of transport, we are up to this moment quite at a loss. The Porte has no steamers at its immediate disposal, but consents to defray the expense of hiring them. In hopes of saving time, I have addressed myself to Admiral Grey, and a copy of my letter to him is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 841.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Rear-Admiral the Hon. F. C. Grey.

Sir,

British Embassy, May 14, 1855.

THE pressure upon me for means of transport to collect the troops respectively destined for Lieutenant-General Vivian and Major-General Beatson, the urgency, under instructions, of losing as little time as possible in the performance of the service, and the Porte's inability to supply the requisite means of conveyance, oblige me to trouble you with a fresh application on this important subject.

The Turkish battalions which are to serve under General Vivian, are to embark at Varna and Volo. The recruits engaged for General Beatson are assembling at Salonica, Beyrout, Sinope, and Varna, for conveyance to the Dardanelles. The latter are all Cavalry, and the men are accompanied by their horses. The former comprise proportions of Cavalry and Artillery.

I am informed that the transports which are conveying Sardinian troops to Balaklava return in ballast, and I beg, therefore, to inquire whether they might not be directed to call on their way back at Varna, and assist in the conveyance of the battalions collected there.

I am also informed that steam-vessels capable of receiving General Beatson's Cavalry may be obtained, in case of necessity, at the Dardanelles, and fitted for service on reasonable terms.

You will, of course, be the best judge of those matters, and, in calling your attention to them, I feel the utmost confidence that you will take any measure in your power to facilitate the operations in question.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 842.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 356.)

Constantinople, May 14, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to reply to your Lordship's inquiry on the subject of Christian evidence in civil courts of justice in this country. I directed M. Pisani to read your Lordship's despatch to Fuad Pasha, whose answer was couched in terms of characteristic levity. I replied, with some expressions of surprise, for further explanation; and I beg now to state the substance of the Minister's answer on both occasions.

The Porte, he declared, is preparing to establish commercial tribunals, like that which already exists here under the denomination of "Tidjaret," in all the provinces of the Empire, and separate courts of novel formation for questions relating to landed property.

Fuad Pasha excused the slowness of the operation, by alleging that caution was necessary in thus introducing novelties distasteful to the Mussulman population, and that the Porte found it politic to throw the old tribunals gradually into disuse, rather than submit the feelings of the Prophet's disciples to a trial too rude for their prejudices.

In the meantime, at Smyrna, Beyrout, and Salonica, the Court of Tidjaret has been for some time established.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 843.

Count Buol to Count Colloredo.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, May .)

Vienne, le 23 Mai, 1855.

M. le Comte,

LES graves préjudices qui résultent pour notre commerce maritime de l'état d'abandon où se trouve aujourd'hui la passe de Soulina, ont fait reconnaître l'urgence de pourvoir, autant que possible, à la sécurité de la navigation sur ce point. A cet effet, le Gouvernement Impérial a résolu d'engager l'administration du Lloyd Autrichien à faire stationner à poste fixe dans cette embouchure du Danube un de ses bateaux-à-vapeur, chargé d'y faire le service de remorque, et de prêter, en général, non seulement aux navigateurs Autrichiens, mais à ceux de toutes les nations, l'assistance dont ils auraient besoin.

En conséquence de l'invitation qui lui a été adressée, la Compagnie du Lloyd vient de prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour qu'un steamer soit envoyé sans délai sur les lieux, dans le but dont il s'agit.

Votre Excellence voudra bien, si l'occasion s'en présente, donner connaissance au Gouvernement Anglais de cette mesure, dont j'ai déjà informé l'Envoyé de l'Empereur à Constantinople et notre Consul à Galatz, avec ordre d'en prévenir leurs collègues.

Je crois utile d'ajouter ici que le Consulat Impérial à Galatz, auquel est confié le soin des intérêts de notre navigation sur le Bas Danube, est chargé d'envoyer un de ses employés à bord du bâtiment remorqueur, où il aura à rester, tant pour surveiller le service que pour maintenir la discipline parmi les hommes de l'équipage des navires Autrichiens qui passeront le canal de Soulina. Cette indication vous mettra à même, M. le Comte, de répondre aux questions qui vous seraient adressées à ce sujet.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) BUOL.

No. 844.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 25.)

Vienna, May 25, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

HAVING, in company with the French Ambassador, urged upon Count Buol your Lordship's desire, as well as that of the French Government, that the Conference should not be called till we had received further instructions from our Governments, he replied, that with the anxious view of meeting the wishes we had expressed, he would delay the invitation to the meeting till after Tuesday next.

No. 845.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

Foreign Office, May 25, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

WE think that our Representatives might declare in Conference, that since, in the words of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, recorded in the thirteenth Protocol, Russia had rejected limitation in every form whatsoever, the British and French Governments saw no advantage to be derived from the continuance of the Conferences.

Or Count Buol might make the declaration in the name of the two Governments, and in the presence of the Russian Representatives.

No. 846.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 33.)

Munich, May 19, 1855.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government has, of course, received from Frankfort information respecting a despatch recently addressed by Count Nesselrode to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires accredited to the Diet, and communicated by him to the different members of that Assembly, having for its object to secure the suffrage of the minor German States in favour of a declaration of neutrality on the part of the Confederation in the event of any proposal being brought forward for "mobilising" the Federal Contingents, the Russian Cabinet on its part undertaking to retract nothing of the concessions relative to the navigation of Danube, which it seems to consider it has made to the interests of Germany during the late Conferences at Vienna. A copy of this despatch was communicated to this Government a few days ago by the Russian Minister here, who, I am told, used every exertion to obtain such a reply as might bear the interpretation of a binding engagement, to favour the policy of Russia, at least to that extent. The proposition was too congenial to the hopes and wishes of the Government not to produce a certain effect; but, I believe that after much consultation, and principally in accordance with the advice of Baron von der Pfordten, who, however, scarcely appears to have fully comprehended the danger of the snare, the King resolved to confine his answers to common-place acknowledgments for the mark of confidence placed in his policy by the Emperor of Russia. The whole negotiation, if such it can be termed, was conducted in a confidential form, and I am consequently but as imperfectly acquainted with its details as I am with the precise contents of the Russian despatch itself. I have, however, reason for stating that Baron von der Pfordten alluded to the subject in a conversation with the Austrian Minister, and observed that the decision of the question rested entirely with the two great Federal Powers, upon whom the duty of defining the policy of Germany in the present struggle necessarily devolved. His Excellency also availed himself of this opportunity to make professions of the earnest wish of this country to be able to act with Austria, which he said had, in consequence of the turn affairs were taking in Europe, become a more important duty than ever. In short, his language, which is evidently dictated by his newly-strengthened conviction that it is the intention of Austria to keep aloof from the war, has of late been marked by a more friendly spirit towards that Power on all occasions.

My Austrian colleague has, in obedience to the orders of the Imperial Cabinet, just communicated to this Government officially the Protocols of the Conferences held at Vienna, and has let it be understood that they will be followed by ulterior propositions, the nature of which will be determined by the answer returned to the last overtures for a pacific arrangement of the Eastern question made to the English and French Cabinets.

I took occasion in a recent interview with Baron von der Pfordten to allude to these negotiations, and I endeavoured to ascertain the impression produced on his Excellency's mind by the perusal of the papers; but although I cannot say that I found him disposed to be very communicative, he appeared to me to be of opinion that Russia had made real and valuable concessions to German interests in the matter of the navigation of the Danube, and he left me to draw the conclusion that as far as Germany was concerned the result attained at the Conferences was perfectly satisfactory. Certain it is that the suggestion which was adroitly introduced by Prince Gortchakoff respecting the participation of Bavaria in the Commission for regulating the details connected with that question, has been interpreted here as the acknowledgment on the side of Russia of a principle highly favourable to this country as an independent State, and the calculation as to the effect to be awaited from so flattering a demonstration is, I have no hesitation in saying, precisely and completely justified.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 847.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 611.)

Paris, May 25, 1855.

My Lord,

YESTERDAY, M. de Hübner made to Count Walewski a communication, in answer to the despatch by which the French Government refused to entertain the scheme put forward by the Austrian Government, and supported by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, for the settlement of the Eastern question.

Count Walewski told me that the Austrian despatch was of great length, and was entirely of a polemical character; that the reasoning was both good and bad, and not very conclusive; and that he had thought it necessary at once to remark to M. de Hübner on two passages.

The former of these contained the assertion that the Austrian plan contained in reality a limitation of the Russian naval force in the Black Sea. Count Walewski said that he had called M. de Hübner's attention to the difference which existed between an engagement entered into by certain Powers, to prevent the undue superiority of another Power, and an engagement taken by that other Power to restrict her forces within certain limits. The former engagement could be taken by Great Britain, France, and Austria, without the knowledge, and certainly without the consent, of Russia—but put Russia under no obligation; the latter put restrictions upon Russia, which were acknowledged by her. The belligerent Powers could not be satisfied without obtaining the latter guarantee.

The second observation which he had found it necessary to make to M. de Hübner, Count Walewski said, was of more importance. Count Buol, at the end of his despatch states, that if Austria makes any proposals of peace to Russia, she will immediately inform the maritime Powers of the fact. Count Walewski reminded M. de Hübner, that by the Treaty of the 2nd December, Austria bound herself not to enter into any arrangement with the Court of Russia without having first deliberated thereupon in common; that he must, therefore, take exception to this passage of Count Buol's despatch. If it was a fault of language, he must ask for its correction; if it was not, it was the abandonment of the Treaty of the 2nd December, and against that he must protest.

M. de Hübner read at the same time, to Count Walewski, the despatch which has been addressed to Count Colloredo for communication to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 848.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 612. Confidential.)

Paris, May 25, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to receive at 1·30 P.M. this day, your Lordship's telegraphic message dated 11 A.M., and I immediately informed Count Walewski of its contents. His Excellency remarked that it was to be apprehended that Austria would not make the declaration suggested by your Lordship, but he still thought that she would propose, in general terms, a system of limitation, and he therefore wished his plan to be adhered to.

After some conversation, his Excellency said that he thought the following programme might be adopted:—

Austria to be told that the allies cannot entertain any proposition regarding the settlement of the third point, which does not impose limitation on Russia; that Russia having refused to submit to any limitation, it was useless discussing details while the principle remained unacknowledged. Let Austria, therefore, summon the Conference, and state that, such being the case, she desires to know

whether the Russian Plenipotentiaries persist in their refusal of the principle of limitation.

If Austria agrees to do this—and Count Walewski thinks that she cannot refuse—the question is reduced to a very simple one. Either Russia will persist in her refusal, in which case the Conferences are *ipso facto* broken off; or she will accept the principle, and the details will have to be discussed.

Count Walewski grounds his belief that Austria will not object to this course on the fact that, as she has already proposed a plan which she declares that she believes will be unacceptable to Russia, she can have no valid reason for refusing to agree to the present modification of it. If she does refuse, the two Governments will have to take into consideration what further steps are to be taken. Your Lordship's suggestion might then perhaps be acted upon, and a declaration be made in Conference by their Plenipotentiaries.

Without giving any opinion as to the merits of this plan, I expressed to Count Walewski my conviction that Austria would not be brought to a simple interrogation of the Russian Plenipotentiaries such as he proposed, and I added that we ought at all events to send to Vienna the text of the words which we expected Count Buol to use. Count Walewski admitted that this would be advisable, and he immediately drew up a form of words which he said might be used, a copy of which I have the honour to inclose herewith.

I again asked Count Walewski why, if it was only her dignity that Austria was consulting, she could not close the Conference by some such words as these: "That having, in pursuance of the engagement which she conceived herself to have contracted, endeavoured to find other means of accommodation, and being persuaded that none existed that could be entertained by the allies that did not contain a system of direct limitation—system which had been rejected by Russia—she had reluctantly come to the conclusion," &c. Or she might leave out all allusion to limitation, and merely state that "she had failed in finding elements likely to be accepted by both parties."

Count Walewski said that he should not object to this course as *a pis aller*, but it is evident, whatever may be his reasons, that he is bent on the question of limitation, being, in some shape or other, again brought before the Conference; and, if I understood him rightly, he would prefer that Austria should make the proposal last sent from Vienna, and that it should be met by a counter-declaration on the part of the allied Plenipotentiaries, thus showing a difference of opinion to exist between Austria and the maritime Powers, than that Russia should not be again placed in the position of pronouncing herself upon the question of limitation.

I may add here that Count Walewski has received a telegraphic communication from Vienna stating that Aali Pasha has put off his departure indefinitely. There can, therefore, be no cause for the hurried summoning of the Conference insisted upon with so much pertinacity by Count Buol.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 848.

Draft of Declaration.

J'AI inutilement cherché les moyens de remplir la troisième garantie hors du principe de limitation.

Si la Russie persiste à rejeter le principe, la négociation doit prendre fin.

Si la Russie revient sur son refus et accepte le principe, nous chercherons à nous entendre sur son application.

No. 849.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 401.) *Foreign Office, May 26, 1855.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to the Seraskier's plan of transferring troops from the Crimea to form a part of the Turkish Contingent, which is mentioned in your Excellency's despatch No. 353 of the 14th instant, I have to state to you that to detach men from Omer Pasha's army in order to add them to General Vivian would be an injudicious measure in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government. It would add nothing to the aggregate amount of our military force, and it would weaken and disorganize Omer Pasha's army at a moment when it is about to take part in important active operations. Far better would it be to increase Omer Pasha's army instead of diminishing it.

This arrangement can only have been suggested by the malevolent jealousy of the Seraskier.

Your Excellency does not explain why you object to a large infusion of Christians into General Vivian's army. Such a measure seems to be most desirable instead of being objectionable: it would lay the foundation for a good organization of Christian troops in the Sultan's service.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 850.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 27, 11·45 P.M.)

Vienna, May 27, 1855.

(Télégraphie.)

CONSUL-GENERAL COLQUHOUN écrit de Bucharest le 27 :

"The Consul at Varna telegraphs:

"'Allied expedition arrived off Straits of Kertch on 24th. Army landed at once. Russians surprised, blew up fortifications on both sides and fled, destroying large quantity of stores, three steamers, and thirty other vessels. Steam flotilla of fourteen steamers entered Sea of Azoff to harass enemy and cut off supplies. Fifty guns taken. If not already telegraphed, communicate home.'"

No. 851.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 241.) *Vienna, May 23, 1855.*

My Lord,

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 177 of the 8th instant, I communicated to Count Buol Sir J. Milbanke's No. 28, relative to the public opinion of Bavaria in favour of the policy of Austria, and his Excellency, in expressing the pleasure he derived from the language of that despatch, stated that the information it conveyed tallied exactly with that which he had himself received from Munich.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 852.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 242.) *Vienna, May 23, 1855.*

My Lord,

THE Austrian corps d'armée from which the garrison of Vienna has hitherto been furnished, belonging to the Imperial army stationed in Gallicia and the Principalities, is in course of being moved to the main army, of which it forms a part. Its place will be supplied with the corps d'armée hitherto stationed in Styria, a portion of which has already arrived in Vienna. I regret to have to inform your Lordship that the Imperial army in Gallicia and the Principalities has suffered very severely from fevers and epidemic maladies, which have proved very fatal amongst the troops, and that they still continue to lose many men by typhus, which has raged with great virulence since the commencement of the spring.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 853.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, May 28, 1855, 8 A.M.*

NO objection to the drafts of despatch for Vienna, with exception of the last paragraph but one. The summoning Austria to execute the Treaty of December 2, appears to Count Walewski premature.

No. 854.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 619.) *Paris, May 27, 1855.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a circular despatch addressed by Count Walewski to the Emperor's Diplomatic Agents abroad, commenting on the late Russian circular on the subject of the Vienna Conferences.

This despatch has been published in the "Moniteur."

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 854.

Circular addressed by Count Walewski to the French Diplomatic Agents abroad.

Paris, le 23 Mai, 1855.

Monsieur,

TOUTES les feuilles de l'Europe ont reproduit, d'après le "Journal de Saint Pétersbourg," la circulaire que M. le Comte de Nesselrode a adressée, sous la date du 10 Mai, aux Agents de la Russie près les Cours étrangers. Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur se proposait d'attendre la clôture officielle des Conférences pour porter un jugement sur leur ensemble; mais, puisque le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg a trouvé bon de faire, sans plus de retard, un appel à l'opinion publique, personne ne s'étonnera que nous le suivions, à notre tour, dans la voie qu'il a ouverte, et j'y entre, pour ma part, avec toute la confiance que la modération et la loyauté de notre politique peuvent m'inspirer.

Je rappellerai d'abord les circonstances qui ont décidé la France et l'Angleterre à se prêter à des négociations dans un moment où l'active poursuite de la guerre paraissait devoir être l'objet principal de leurs préoccupations et de leurs

soins. Le Traité du 2 Décembre avait été conclu, et les Puissances Occidentales, par déférence pour leur nouvel allié, avaient consenti à tenter un suprême effort de conciliation, fondé sur la possibilité de faire accepter par la Russie les bases que, dans l'intérêt général de l'Europe, elles avaient assignées à la paix. On n'ignore pas que, mis pour la première fois en demeure, sur la connaissance officielle des intentions communes de la France, de l'Angleterre, de l'Autriche, et de la Turquie, de s'expliquer sur celles de sa Cour, M. le Prince Gortchakoff refusa catégoriquement d'adhérer aux conditions qui lui étaient proposées. Ce ne fut que le 7 Janvier, après une référence à St. Pétersbourg, qu'il accepta sans aucune réserve, les divers principes connus sous le nom des quatre garanties. Ce fait est attesté de la façon la plus péremptoire par le témoignage unanime des Plénipotentiaires présents à la Conférence ; bien plus, une dépêche de M. le Comte de Buol, communiquée simultanément à Paris et à Londres, constate que les négociations, dont le cadre avait été ainsi défini, n'ont été ouvertes qu'à la demande de la Russie. Il demeure donc établi que cette Puissance ne saurait nous reprocher d'avoir agi avec elle par surprise : elle a su qu'une des conditions indispensables de la paix consistait dans la cessation de sa prépondérance sur l'Euxin, et le temps ne lui a pas manqué pour se rendre compte des sacrifices que l'engagement pris à cet égard devait nécessairement lui imposer. Toute la question est de savoir si M. le Prince Gortchakoff et M. de Titoff ont rempli cet engagement, ou si, au contraire, ils ne sont pas restés au-dessous de ces limites. C'est un point, Monsieur, que j'examinerai bientôt ; mais je veux auparavant, vérifier l'exactitude de quelques unes des assertions par lesquelles débute la circulaire de M. le Comte de Nesselrode.

Déjà, dans les Conférences, MM. les Plénipotentiaires de Russie, lors de la discussion de la première garantie relative, selon eux, à la consécration des immunités de la Moldavie, de la Valachie, et de la Servie, et, suivant nous, à l'abolition de l'influence abusive exercée par le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg dans ces trois Provinces vassales de la Sublime Porte, avaient paru se méprendre sur la position vraie du débat. M. le Comte de Nesselrode développe la même thèse ; j'y répondrai par des questions. En quel moment, depuis les dernières guerres, les immunités des Principautés du Danube ont-elles reçu la moindre atteinte de la part de la Puissance Suzeraine ? A quelle époque le Sultan a-t-il songé à revenir sur aucune des concessions de son prédécesseur ? Quand la France, l'Angleterre, et l'Autriche ont-elles manifesté un autre désir que celui de maintenir, en l'améliorant, le régime d'indépendance administrative qui, on l'a trop oublié, n'était ni en Valachie, ni en Moldavie, une conquête récente, mais le résultat d'un accord librement conclu il y a des siècles, et altéré seulement du jour où les hospodars ont commencé, pendant les guerres du dix-huitième siècle, à compter davantage avec la Cour de Russie qu'avec la Sublime Porte ? C'est ainsi que la Moldavie a perdu la moitié du territoire qui lui avait été garanti par les Sultans ; c'est ainsi que cette province et la Valachie, au lieu de demeurer ce qu'elles devaient être, une barrière respectée entre l'Empire Ottoman et la Russie, ont été, même après le Traité d'Andrinople qui semblait leur reconnaître des droits mieux définis, gouvernées plutôt par des Agents du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg que par leurs propres chefs, et qu'en pleine paix, comme si elles n'eussent été qu'un prolongement du sol Russe, elles se sont trouvées, à l'improviste, occupées par une armée étrangère.

Voilà, Monsieur, les véritables maux dont ont souffert les Principautés du Danube, voilà les dangers qui les menaçaient sans cesse ; c'est aux uns et aux autres que la première des quatre garanties avait pour unique objet de mettre un terme. Que l'influence de la Russie au delà du Pruth se soit ou non exercée sous le titre légal de protectorat, la question est ailleurs, et ce serait la faire dégénérer en querelle de mots que de la poser comme le fait M. le Comte de Nesselrode. L'histoire est là pour dire ce que la Moldavie et Valachie ont gagné à la nature ancienne de leurs rapports avec la Cour de St. Pétersbourg, et c'est cet état de choses dont la France, l'Angleterre, et l'Autriche ont voulu empêcher le retour.

Je passe sur la seconde garantie : les bases de son règlement sont bonnes. Je me contenterai de faire observer que si la navigation du Danube, entravée depuis vingt-cinq ans, recouvre sa liberté, il aura fallu une guerre pour décider la Russie à ne pas laisser inutile entre ses mains un des plus magnifiques débouchés du monde. Si l'Allemagne acquiert cet immense avantage pour son commerce, elle le devra au sang répandu par la France et l'Angleterre.

Je vais arriver, Monsieur, au point capital, mais je dois encore répondre à un reproche que M. le Comte de Nesselrode adresse aux Plénipotentiaires des Puissances Occidentales. Il les accuse d'avoir retardé l'étude en Conférence d'une question de tolérance et d'humanité qui aurait, au contraire, mérité d'occuper la première place dans les délibérations, ou, pour mieux dire, de n'avoir pas pris en considération, avec autant d'empressement qu'ils l'auraient dû, le sort des sujets Chrétiens de la Sublime Porte. Il n'y a pas de discussion sans règle, et il avait été convenu que les quatre garanties seraient examinées dans leur ordre. Or, si le débat s'est arrêté à la troisième, l'obstacle n'est pas venu de nous ; ce sont les Plénipotentiaires de Russie qui l'ont élevé, et les nôtres n'ont fait que se conformer à un programme arrêté d'avance. M. le Comte de Nesselrode, du reste, se charge de justifier leur réserve qu'expliquait déjà l'annonce de la prochaine arrivée à Vienne du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Sultan. Une question religieuse, envenimée par les prétentions de la Russie, avait été la cause de la guerre. Il était naturel de ne l'aborder qu'en présence d'Aali Pacha ; en outre, elle n'était plus dans les termes où on l'avait posée. Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg avait exigé un engagement formel qui, pour ne s'appliquer en apparence qu'à des immunités religieuses, n'en eût pas moins humilié la Porte, entravé son action administrative et paralysé dans l'ordre civil toute réforme efficace. La France et l'Angleterre ont reconnu hautement que le Gouvernement Turc devait se refuser à subir de telles conditions, qui eussent été la ruine de son indépendance ; et, si l'on se réfère au texte de la quatrième garantie, il est facile de voir que la Russie s'obligeait à renoncer à les reproduire, et à laisser au Sultan, sauf l'action amicale et les conseils de ses alliés, l'initiative des mesures à prendre dans l'intérêt matériel et moral de ses sujets. Il ne devait donc pas s'agir, dans les Conférences de Vienne, de discuter théoriquement des systèmes, mais seulement de proclamer un principe tout contraire à celui dont la mission de M. le Prince Menchikoff à Constantinople avait eu le triomphe pour but. M. le Comte de Nesselrode en dit assez pour qu'il soit permis de douter que les Plénipotentiaires de Russie se fussent renfermés dans ces limites. Ils se seraient vraisemblablement, comme dans la discussion relative aux Principautés du Danube, mépris sur les motifs de la quatrième garantie, et ils auraient oublié qu'il n'y avait encore en cause qu'une exigence de la Russie, à laquelle l'Europe ne pouvait pas souscrire. Les dernières réformes opérées en Turquie, celles qu'elles provoquent, l'empressement que la Sublime Porte a mis à écouter nos conseils, prouvent que le cœur du Sultan est ouvert aux inspirations les plus généreuses. Ce qu'il faut, c'est que ces inspirations puissent être suivies sans trouble, c'est que celui qui les conçoit en ait le mérite aux yeux de ses sujets et du monde ; et, pour que ce résultat soit obtenu, il est indispensable que la Russie, à l'avenir, abandonne les armes dont elle s'est servie tour à tour, soit pour arrêter d'utiles réformes, soit pour indisposer les populations contre leur Souverain. Tel est le sens de la quatrième garantie, et, à lire la dépêche de M. le Comte de Nesselrode, on pourrait supposer qu'on ne l'envisage pas ainsi à St. Pétersbourg.

J'aborde maintenant, Monsieur, la question de la Mer Noire. Frappées, d'une part, de l'insuffisance du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, pour assurer dans la famille Européenne une place invariable à l'Empire Ottoman, et, de l'autre, des dangers que l'accroissement des forces de la Russie sur l'Euxin faisait courir à la Turquie, la France, l'Angleterre et l'Autriche ont déclaré que la Convention des Détroits devait être revisée, ou, pour mieux dire, complétée, et qu'il fallait, en mettant fin à la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire, rétablir, entre elle et l'autre Puissance riveraine de ce bassin intérieur, l'équilibre rompu par une succession d'événements désastreux. M. le Prince Gortchakoff, après une première hésitation, a adhéré, dans la Conférence préliminaire du 7 Janvier, aux deux termes de cette proposition, qui s'explique d'elle-même, qui ne prête à aucune ambiguité ; et c'est sur la foi de cette adhésion que les Représentants de la France et de l'Angleterre à Vienne ont été munis de leurs pleins pouvoirs.

Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique devaient, je le répète, supposer que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg avait pris son parti des sacrifices commandés par la situation, et dans cette attente, les Plénipotentiaires de Russie avaient été invités à se saisir d'une initiative destinée à sauvegarder la dignité de leur Cour. Sur le refus du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg d'annoncer, le premier, les concessions auxquelles il serait

disposé à consentir, les alliés de la Sublime Porte ont, d'accord avec elle, énoncé les conditions que fait connaître une des annexes du onzième Protocole.

Je n'essayerai pas, Monsieur, de justifier nos demandes; leur modération est évidente. Je n'entrerai pas davantage dans des détails devenus aujourd'hui sans objet. J'aime mieux caractériser les intérêts de l'Europe dans la Mer Noire, et examiner en suite si la double solution proposée par la Russie donne à ces intérêts la satisfaction que notre but est de leur obtenir.

Exclusivement borné par les côtes des deux États voisins, interdit aux autres marines militaires, l'Euxin était devenu comme un champ clos où des adversaires inégaux en force se trouvaient seuls en présence, le plus faible livré à la discrétion du plus puissant. Une forteresse formidable renfermait dans ses citadelles et dans ses rades une armée toujours prête à s'embarquer, une flotte toujours prête à la recevoir et à lever l'ancre. Cet appareil de guerre, inutile pour la défense, n'avait qu'une destination possible. Il constituait une menace permanente contre la capitale de la Turquie, et le mystère impénétrable qui l'entourait accroissait encore un péril dont, au moindre symptôme de crise, s'alarmait l'Europe entière. Contraintes, malgré des efforts que l'histoire appréciera, de recourir à l'emploi des armes, la France et l'Angleterre se doivent à elles-mêmes, elles doivent aussi à l'Europe, de ne les déposer que lorsque leur œuvre sera accomplie. Il faut que la paix qu'elles auront conquise soit suivie d'un repos assuré.

Cette sécurité serait-elle la conséquence de l'une ou de l'autre des combinaisons que recommande M. le Comte de Nesselrode? Ces deux systèmes, en un mot, mettraient-ils fin à la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire? Le premier, celui qui reposerait sur le principe de l'ouverture complète et réciproque des passages du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, entraîne l'abolition d'une règle que l'Empire Ottoman a toujours considérée comme sa sauvegarde, et qui, en 1841, est entrée dans le droit public de l'Europe. Aujourd'hui, la Russie, qui refuse de réduire le nombre de ses vaisseaux, en alléguant les exigences de son honneur et les prérogatives de sa souveraineté, n'hésite pas à demander à la Sublime Porte l'abdication de son indépendance dans ses eaux intérieures, dans la grande artère qui traverse sa capitale. Elle réclame un nouvel accès dans la Méditerranée, c'est-à-dire, les moyens et le prétexte d'augmenter dans de vastes proportions son développement maritime; et, en compensation de ces avantages, elle se borne à consentir à ce que des escadres étrangères pénètrent à l'avenir dans une mer où elles ne trouveraient ni port de refuge ni arsenal de ravitaillement. Pour exercer la surveillance dont le droit leur serait indirectement concédé, la France et l'Angleterre seraient obligées de s'imposer à tout jamais les sacrifices les plus onéreux. J'ajouterai, Monsieur, et cette considération a une grande force, que, conclue dans de telles conditions, la paix serait livrée au hasard du premier incident, et que l'objet même de la présence, nécessairement intermittente, des flottes Française et Anglaise dans l'Euxin, révélerait déjà un péril qui serait une menace de guerre. Ce serait la preuve, en effet, que la Russie aurait besoin d'être de nouveau contenue; sa prépondérance n'aurait donc pas cessé d'exister, et le but de la troisième garantie aurait été manqué.

Ce but serait-il mieux atteint par l'adoption du système développé en seconde ligne par M. le Prince Gortchakoff et M. de Titoff? Les Détroits, il est vrai, demeureraient fermés; mais le *statu quo* antérieur à la guerre serait rétabli, la marine Russe se réparerait et se développerait sans contrôle derrière les murailles de ses ports, et lorsque le Sultan regarderait une agression comme imminente, c'est alors seulement qu'il serait autorisé à donner l'éveil à ses alliés. La réponse à cet appel serait une nouvelle guerre qui ferait éclater en même temps l'imprévoyance des Puissances Occidentales et la force régénérée de l'ennemi qu'elles combattent aujourd'hui. Pourraient-elles, sans imprudence, consentir à une transaction qui ne leur accorderait qu'un repos momentané, troublé d'avance par leurs propres prévisions? La prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire, enfin, serait-elle anéantie s'il fallait, au moment même de la conclusion de la paix, convenir encore d'un moyen d'y mettre un jour un terme?

Il serait superflu, Monsieur, de pousser plus loin ce raisonnement, et je crois avoir démontré que, partant du principe de l'ouverture ou de la clôture des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg n'a pas tenu l'engagement qu'il avait pris en se faisant représenter aux Conférences de Vienne. Pour confirmer ce jugement, je me contenterai de rappeler que M. le Comte de

Buol, dans la dernière réunion, celle du 26 Avril, a déclaré "que le projet Russe, où il ne pouvait voir ni une solution, ni même une base de solution, indiquait seulement les moyens de réagir contre la prépondérance navale de la Russie lorsqu'elle se serait déjà élevée aux proportions d'un danger intolérable, mais ne tendait nullement à la faire cesser d'une manière permanente et dans l'état ordinaire des choses."

Les demandes des Puissances Occidentales, conformes aux vœux de la Porte, adoptées et soutenues jusqu'au bout par les Plénipotentiaires Autrichiens, comme composant un système complet et efficace, ont été, au contraire, aussi modérées dans leur expression qu'elles étaient dans le fond légitimes. Nous n'avons rien demandé à la Russie qui coûtât à sa dignité, encore moins à son honneur. Nous l'avons invitée, uniquement mus par l'intérêt général de l'Europe, à fixer sur une base équitablement calculée, et acceptée également par la Porte, le nombre des bâtiments qu'elle entretiendrait à l'avenir dans une mer où elle n'a à redouter aucune attaque et où sa marine de guerre, réduite à des proportions raisonnables, amplement suffisante pour les services réguliers auxquels elle aurait à pourvoir, se serait trouvée, en tous cas, pour le moins égale à la marine Ottomane. Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg s'est refusé à cet accord, qui aurait rendu la paix au monde. Il a décliné l'autorité des exemples qu'on lui a cités; il a oublié que lui-même, dans son dernier Traité de Paix avec la Perse, a imposé à cette Puissance l'obligation de s'interdire la navigation de la Mer Caspienne, exclusivement réservée aux flotilles de la Russie; il n'a pas voulu admettre ce que la France, l'Angleterre, les États-Unis et les Pays Bas, sous des formes et à des époques diverses, ont accepté, soit pour terminer la guerre, soit pour consolider la paix, soit pour supprimer des germes de rivalité ou de conflit entre des États voisins.

Relaterai-je un détail que M. le Comte de Nesselrode signale comme un oubli des convenances dues à la souveraineté de la Russie chez elle? Il nous reproche d'avoir voulu, contrairement au droit des gens, dénier au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg la faculté de refuser ou de retirer l'exequatur aux Consuls qui seraient installés dans les ports du littoral de l'Euxin. Jamais nous n'avons eu cette prétention. Nous avons demandé qu'aucune résidence ne fût frappée d'interdit; mais il était entendu que, selon les règles qui régissent la matière, un Consul nommé pourrait toujours, pour des motifs plausibles et inhérents à sa personne et non au poste, ne pas recevoir l'agrément du Gouvernement Russe.

J'ai terminé, Monsieur, cet exposé, et il en résultera, je l'espère, pour tous les esprits impartiaux, la conviction que les Puissances Occidentales ne sauraient être responsables de la continuation d'une guerre dont elles ont désiré arrêter les effets avec autant de sincérité et d'empressement qu'elles avaient essayé d'en prévenir l'explosion.

La France et l'Angleterre n'ont pas les sentiments qu'on leur prête, leur hostilité n'est pas, comme on le dit, implacable. Elles n'ont jamais voulu imposer à la Russie une paix attentatoire à son honneur et à sa dignité; mais la nécessité les a investies d'un rôle qu'avec l'aide de la Divine Providence elles sauront remplir, et l'Europe, raffermie sur ses bases, leur aura gré d'avoir contenu dans de justes bornes une influence qui s'efforçait de dépasser partout le cercle de son action légitime.

Je vous autorise à donner lecture de cette dépêche à M. —— et à vos collègues.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

No. 855.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 621. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, May 27, 1855.*

YOUR Lordship's telegraphic despatch, dated 6:30 yesterday evening, informing me of the decision taken by the Cabinet Council held yesterday in regard to the answer to be sent to Vienna, did not reach me until past 11 at

night. I could not see Count Walewski until this afternoon, when I found that he was already in possession of the same information through M. Baudin.

His Excellency stated to me that he had learnt with great regret the decision taken by Her Majesty's Government; that it was an error to suppose that, in offering such a proposition to Austria as that now suggested by your Lordship, Her Majesty's Government was "meeting the wishes of the Government of the Emperor;" that he must remind me that a proposition of a different nature had been made by your Lordship through me two days ago, and that he thought this far preferable to the one decided on yesterday; that seeing, however, how much Her Majesty's Government were bent on carrying through their own scheme, the French Government, though still preferring the course they had originally put forward, would, in order to keep up the harmony which existed between the two Governments, consent to send the two propositions emanating from your Lordship together to Vienna, with instructions to M. de Bourqueney to concert with Lord Westmorland and with Count Buol to see if anything could be made of either of them.

The instructions which Count Walewski proposes addressing to M. de Bourqueney in this sense will be sent to Count Persigny to-night, for communication to your Lordship, in the hope that Lord Westmorland may be furnished with similar ones.

Count Walewski expressed his conviction that Austria would not accept the last of the two propositions, viz., that agreed upon yesterday. He had not, he said, lost all hope that she might be inclined to adhere to the first. Should she refuse them both, M. de Bourqueney would be ordered to do all in his power to prevent Count Buol from summoning the Conference at all. Should Count Buol persist in doing so, and in abiding by his original proposition, nothing would remain but that the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and France should make a declaration that, the principle of limitation not having been acceded to, further negotiations were broken off.

I maintained the opinion, that if Austria was acting with good faith, and had no other object in view than to close the Conference in a dignified manner, she could not object to making a declaration, such as that suggested by your Lordship—a course which would leave all parties in the same position which they now occupied.

Count Walewski said that he had reason to believe that the object which Austria proposed to herself was, to show to Germany that the rupture of negotiations was owing to Russia's refusing all idea of limitation. He had, he said, received yesterday a despatch from M. de Bourqueney, in which that Minister, after giving Count Buol's assurances that he would not summon another Conference until the allied Plenipotentiaries were in possession of the instructions of their Governments, urged the prayer of the Austrian Government, that no time should be lost in expediting them, inasmuch as Austria could not longer delay making a communication to the Diet.

Count Walewski having in the course of this conversation expressed himself with some vivacity as to the great sacrifices which the French Government were making in order to meet the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, insinuating at the same time that France had been constantly called upon to defer to the exigencies of England, while no return had been made on the part of England, I reminded his Excellency that if it had not been for the deference which Her Majesty's Government had shown to the wishes of the Emperor, it was probable that we might not now be at war; it was certain that we should not be in our present entanglement. To please whom, I asked, had Her Majesty's Government consented, in the depth of winter, and against their better judgment, to send the British fleet into the Black Sea; and for whose sake, and at whose urgent solicitations, had they knowingly agreed to fetter themselves with an Austrian alliance? I did not bring forward these examples, I said, for the purpose of recrimination, but with a view of showing that when two countries with different modes of government, and with, to a certain extent, varied interests, were engaged in a common object, they must each make allowance for the peculiar situation of the other. It was impossible, I added, in the present state of public opinion in England, that Her Majesty's Government could consent to be parties to offering a second time to Russia conditions which had been once refused.

Count Walewski is anxious to be informed by telegraph whether your Lordship agrees to the instructions which he proposes sending to Vienna, as he is desirous, should they be approved, of forwarding them to M. Bourqueney to-morrow night.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 856.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 28, 1855.*

WE will not object to some proposal being made to Count Buol, but we earnestly desire that there should be no question of the principle of limitation; the principle alone is utterly valueless, and it would be fatal if the principle were admitted by Russia, and that we were to be entangled in discussions about details at a moment when, for the first time, we have well-founded hopes of military success.

Tell Count Walewski that I will write to him by the messenger this evening, and beg of him not to act until he has considered what I have to say.

No. 857.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 216.)
My Lord, *Berlin, May 25, 1855.*

I UNDERSTAND that CountEsterhazy, the Austrian Minister at this Court, has lately communicated three circulars to the Prussian Government. The first, transmitting copies of the Protocols of the Vienna Conferences, Russia having done so likewise. The second contains regrets at M. Drouyn de Lhuys' resignation, expresses confidence in his successor, and states that Austria holds to her engagements of the 2nd of December. The third contains the opinions of the Austrian Government on the despatch addressed to M. de Glinka, copy of which was forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch No. 200 of the 18th instant. In this despatch I am told that Count Buol invites his confederates in Germany to take no step in consequence of this Russian communication; and I am assured that though the Prussian Government was at first disposed to receive the Russian despatch with favour, and this might have been expected, as the idea is said, by persons usually well informed, to have been suggested from Berlin, it has upon reflection entered into the Austrian view of the question. Some of the smaller States are said to approve of the Russian circular; but out of deference to the opinions of the two Great German Powers they are not likely, it is believed, for the present, to commit themselves to the Russian proposal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 858.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 359.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, May 17, 1855.*

THERE is much reason to apprehend that the finances of the Turkish Government are becoming daily more embarrassed. The Porte may be said to have lived for many years from hand to mouth. The causes of its growing impoverishment are traceable to a remote period. Never having been checked they continue to operate with accelerated power. I have repeatedly endeavoured to awaken the Sultan and his Ministers to a sense of the dangers arising from

that source. Long before the present war I pressed the subject most earnestly on their attention, and suggested measures calculated, in my opinion, to relieve the Treasury, to increase its receipts, and to improve gradually the Porte's revenue. My efforts had little or no success. They are recorded in my correspondence with your Lordship's office, and I have now only the barren satisfaction of appealing to them in proof of the foresight which roused and the zeal which sustained them.

The most embarrassed Governments, it is well known, continue to evade a bankruptcy and find means of carrying on their operations through long periods of distress. Several examples of this fecundity of resource might be cited, as actually existing. The Porte also has displayed ingenuity in warding off the last extremities of an exhausted Treasury. But palliations only retard the progress of disease: and finding the worst appearances confirmed by the admissions of those who are in the secret, I can hardly doubt the approach of a painful and ruinous exposure; the more so as Fuad Pasha has expressed a wish to confer with me, and also with the French Embassy, on this subject, at a season when the different branches of the revenue are usually farmed out, and the proceeds realized by anticipation.

Though not yet possessed of exact information I am persuaded that the Porte will be obliged to raise further supplies on credit, and that hopes are entertained of borrowing on better terms by means of guarantees to be obtained from England and France.

Inconvenient as any such transactions may be, the necessities of the war are but too likely to leave the allied Governments without a choice or other consolation but that of acquiring an undoubted right to secure a proper application of the funds procured under their guaranty. Your Lordship is aware that some European control has already been exercised over a portion of the Porte's expenditure; and that, however imperfect, it has not been unattended with advantage. As a precedent, capable of being more stringently and extensively applied in future, it is, indeed, invaluable, and the Porte having consented to submit the expenditure of its loan to a Mixed Commission when there was no guaranty but that of the Egyptian tribute, may be required to accept a more direct superintendence when the guarantees proceed from London and Paris.

In that case it will be desirable to place the French and British Commissions on an equal footing with those of the Porte, and the memorandum, inclosed herewith, will serve to acquaint your Lordship with the course of proceedings which, if adopted and carried steadily into effect, might, as I conceive, go far to prevent those abuses of which there has been so much reason to complain in the Porte's expenditure.

Well would it be for the interests of this Empire, and, indeed, for the interests of its allies, in so far as they are connected with Turkish affairs, if the same kind of salutary control which is here recommended in financial matters, were to be brought to bear upon other departments of the Porte's administrative system. The Turks, when left to themselves, afford no security for the enforcement of their own reforms; and the Rayahs have too much the habits of submission to vindicate with firmness the privileges which are now in course of being assigned to them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 858.

Memorandum.

A MIXED Commission empowered to superintend the application of funds appropriated to the prosecution of the war against Russia, being formed of members appointed on one side by the Porte, and by the Embassies of England and France on the other, the course of proceeding is proposed to be as follows:

1. The Porte on receiving a requisition from any department would refer it to the Mixed Commission.

2. The Commission would make inquiry as to the object of the proposed appropriation, and give or withhold its sanction according to the result.

3. In the former case when contracts are to be made for the supply of the armies, the prices and qualities of the articles to be furnished would have to be brought under the notice of the Commission, which, on this account, must have power to examine the agents and merchants concerned.

4. When issues are to be made for paying the forces, taking up transports, or, in general, giving course to any operation of war, the Commission must, in like manner, have power to take cognizance of and to audit the expenses.

5. To insure the prompt transmission of supplies according to their destination, and the due employment of the same, the Military Commissioners at the head-quarters of the Turkish armies should be authorised to correspond with the Mixed Commission through their respective Embassies at Constantinople. It would be their duty to report any delays, deficiencies, or abuses connected therewith.

6. The Mixed Commission would, moreover, have power to inquire into the time and manner of effecting the several payments, with a view to economy and the Porte's credit.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 859.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May 29.*)

(No. 626. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, May 28, 1855.*

I THINK it right to state to your Lordship, with reference to my confidential despatch No. 621 of the 25th instant, that Count Walewski explained to me yesterday, that in employing the term "pis aller" to the plan which I suggested should be pursued towards Austria, he had intended to say, that he would not object to the proposition being made to Austria if the others which he recommended had been rejected by her. I, on the contrary, had understood him to say, that he would rather that such a proposition should be made to her than that we should refuse altogether to accept a fresh Conference.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 860.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 205.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 29, 1855.*

YOUR despatch No. 234 of the 16th has been received and laid before the Queen.

Your Excellency states in that despatch, that Count Buol has felt, that since the publication of the Protocols by Her Majesty's Government, the position of Austria in the eyes of the public would be rendered extraordinary if she did not take any measures to fulfil the words used at the last Conferences, viz., that Austria would still seek the means of bringing about an understanding between the Great Powers of Europe, and that having in view the fulfilment of this engagement, together with the object of giving to the final closing of the Conferences the dignity of an official form, Count Buol desires to convoke the Conference, and to submit to it the proposition which is inclosed in your Lordship's despatch.

Count Buol expects that this proposition will be supported by the Representatives of England and France, and that it will be rejected by the Representatives of Russia; and Count Buol would then declare, on the refusal of the Russian Plenipotentiaries to entertain the project, that there was no further object for the meeting of the Conference, which he would then formally close.

Your Excellency will convey to Count Buol the best thanks of Her Majesty's Government for this communication, which they regard as a fresh

proof of the goodwill of Austria, and of her earnest desire to promote the restoration of peace; and you will state to his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government consider that they would be wanting to the frankness and good faith which have hitherto characterized the proceedings between Austria and the Western Powers, if they hesitated to make known the objections they entertain to the course which Count Buol proposes to adopt, and the grounds on which they think that the engagement taken by his Excellency at the last Conferences, will not be effectually carried out by a project which he says he expects that Russia will reject, and which cannot be acceptable to England and France.

Either we are prepared to give up the conditions which, with the concurrence of Austria, we have hitherto demanded as the means of carrying out that object of the third point which consists in making the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea cease, or we are not prepared to do so. If we had brought our minds to despair of success in war, and were ready therefore to make peace on any terms which will at once put an end to hostilities, then the proposal which Austria offers to make on our behalf to Russia would be inexpedient, because it contains the principle of limitation to which Russia has already objected, and her objections to which she has now publicly announced in her circular of May 10; and if such were the hopeless state of our affairs, it would be necessary to make some proposal that Russia would be likely to accept, instead of one which, in the opinion of Count Buol, Russia is almost certain to reject.

But if, on the other hand, we still think the future prospects of the war sufficiently favourable to entitle us to persevere in demanding the conditions which we have put forward as affording a foundation for future security, then the proposal of Austria is open to serious objections; because, though it contains the principle of a limitation of the naval forces of Russia in the Black Sea, the principle is not applied in a manner that would be effectual for its purpose, and it does not contain the principle of Consular appointments and supervision, which is the best security that the limit which may be agreed upon might not be exceeded without the knowledge of the Sultan and his allies.

I must also observe, that the stipulation for a general amnesty is altogether omitted in the proposition of Count Buol, and no allusion is made to Sardinia, who is now in active cooperation with England and France, and for whose dignity and interests they are especially bound to provide, and who by her active cooperation in the war is entitled to become a Contracting Party to any Treaty of Peace.

But what are the inducements held out by Austria to persuade us to empower her to make such offers on our behalf to Russia?

There are, indeed, two inducements which might be held out to us as a temptation to make renewed proposals of peace to Russia.

The one would be, that the proposals intended to be made, being in their nature such as would be satisfactory to us, would on all probability be accepted by Russia, and that thus peace might be obtained on terms alike honourable to both parties and affording security against a renewal of war.

The second inducement would be, that the proposal being always in its nature such as would be satisfactory to us, Austria would engage that in the event of its being rejected by Russia, she would forthwith take part with the Western Powers in the war, and would assist them in compelling Russia to accept the conditions so proposed.

But in the present case no such inducements are held out; the conditions are not in themselves such as would be satisfactory to us.

We are told that Russia would in all probability refuse them, and Count Buol informed your Lordship that this rejection by Russia would not lead Austria to give full effect to the obligations of the Treaty of the 2nd December, by uniting her arms to ours. The only consequence then of the course of proceeding which Count Buol proposes that we should adopt, would be a formal declaration by Austria that the Conferences were at an end; and, it is to be presumed, a subsequent announcement that she had determined to maintain her neutral position, and to take no part with England and France in the war.

Undoubtedly, in the present state of things, Her Majesty's Government see no advantage in the continuance of the Conferences, and are prepared to concur in their being closed; but an announcement by Austria that she meant to take

no part in the war, would be most injurious to the cause which Austria has morally and politically espoused, and would on that account be deeply regretted by Her Majesty's Government.

The value which Her Majesty's Government attach to the Austrian alliance is too well known to Count Buol to need any fresh assurances on this occasion. His Excellency must be equally well aware of the desire of Her Majesty's Government to put a stop to the effusion of blood and to the calamities that are inseparable from a state of war, and his Excellency will not therefore doubt that his proposition has been anxiously considered by Her Majesty's Government, and that it is with extreme reluctance they have arrived at the conclusion that it does not accomplish the objects of the war, and consequently does not afford the prospect of a safe and honourable peace.

It only remains for me to express the regret of Her Majesty's Government that Count Buol should be of opinion, that by making a proposal which England and France are unable to agree to, Austria has complied with the engagements she contracted by the Treaty of the 2nd of December, 1854; but Her Majesty's Government think that, upon reflection, his Excellency will scarcely adhere to that opinion: the engagement contracted by that Treaty was, that if peace should not by a given time be assured on the basis of the four points, Austria would enter into concert with England and France for the purpose of devising the means of attaining the objects of the alliance.

The time has gone by, and peace has not been so assured. The failure has arisen from the refusal of Russia to agree to terms which Austria thought just and reasonable, and which, as such, she supported in the Conference: and the true execution of the Treaty of the 2nd of December would surely be, that Austria should enter into concert with England and France as to the best means of compelling Russia to accept the conditions so proposed to her, and of thus obtaining the great objects of the alliance.

Your Lordship is instructed to read this despatch to Count Buol, and to furnish him with a copy of it, should his Excellency desire to have one.

I am &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 861.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 206.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 29, 1855.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has communicated to me, by instructions of Count Buol, a proclamation circulated in Wallachia, and signed by Zadik Pasha and another Pole, having for its object to excite a revolt among the Poles and Gallicians in the Austrian army, and Count Colloredo informed me that Count Coronini has found it necessary to establish martial law.

The proclamation is undoubtedly calculated to disturb the minds of the people, to whom it was particularly addressed, and the Austrian General is of course bound to adopt all necessary measures for maintaining the discipline of his army.

But the Austrians occupy the Principalities as friends and defenders. They are there to maintain the rights, and liberties, and laws of the inhabitants. They are not there as conquerors, and they can have no right to supersede the established law of the land by the martial law of the Austrian army. If the soldiers of the Austrian army are guilty of indiscipline, let them be punished by the Military Code of Austria; but there is no ground of right or justice by which that Military Code can be applied to the people of the Principalities.

Such a state of things as has been established must necessarily lead to the greatest abuses; and when it is considered that the Austrian troops have already committed acts of violence and oppression in the Principalities, Her Majesty's Government may justly request the Austrian Government to instruct its General to rescind, without delay, a decree which was established without any

order from Vienna or any previous communication with the Turkish authorities, and which is so inconsistent with the political and military grounds on which the Austrian Government directed its troops to occupy the Principalities.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 862.

Count Walewski to M. Baudin.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. Baudin, May -)

Paris, le 23 Mai, 1855.

Monsieur,

J'AI reçu les dépêches que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire jusqu'au No. 88. Je crois n'avoir à revenir sur aucun des arguments que j'ai développés il y a deux jours pour démontrer l'intérêt de la France et de l'Angleterre à ne pas dissoudre le lien qui rattache à leur politique celle du Cabinet de Vienne. Le Traité du 2 Décembre, je le reconnais, n'a pas produit tous les résultats qu'on pouvait en attendre, mais il a eu cependant pour effet d'empêcher l'union complète des Puissances Germaniques—union qui se cimenterait bientôt, et, selon les événements de la guerre, se tournerait contre nous, si nous rendions à l'Autriche sa liberté d'action. Voilà, en quelques mots, Monsieur, les motifs qui avaient décidé le Gouvernement de l'Empereur à recommander au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique l'adoption des propositions de M. le Comte de Buol, bien que, ma dépêche No. 84 en fait foi, elles me semblassent susceptibles d'être amendées. En y réfléchissant davantage, j'ai pensé, et Sa Majesté Impériale a daigné donner toute son approbation à cette manière de voir, qu'il y avait un moyen plus simple et plus prompt—soit de clorre les Conférences, soit de mettre à l'épreuve l'utilité de leur continuation.

Qu'elle a été, en définitive, la base de la discussion soutenue par nos Plénipotentiaires et secondée par M. le Comte de Buol? C'est le principe de la limitation.

Quel est le principe que les Plénipotentiaires de Russie, et plus récemment encore M. le Comte de Nesselrode, ont refusé d'admettre dans les termes les plus catégoriques? C'est encore celui de la limitation.

Je proposerais donc, Monsieur, de faire observer à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche que tant que ce point fondamental de divergence existera entre les parties belligérantes, il serait oiseux de discuter un plan d'ensemble et de risquer de faire échouer notre entente avec la Cour de Vienne sur des questions de détail que nous n'envisagerions pas exactement comme elle. Nous consentirions à ce que M. le Comte de Buol réunit la Conférence, mais, au lieu d'y exposer une combinaison plus ou moins rapprochée de celle qui a été agitée dans la onzième Conférence, il se bornerait à rappeler que l'écueil contre lequel la discussion s'est heurtée consistant dans le refus absolu des Plénipotentiaires de Russie d'adhérer au principe de la limitation réciproque des forces navales des deux Puissances riveraines de l'Euxin, il deviendrait inutile de poursuivre en ce moment les négociations si M. le Prince Gortchakoff et M. de Titoff ne se déclaraient pas autorisés par leur Gouvernement à modifier leur opinion. Il les mettrait, en conséquence, en demeure de faire savoir purement et simplement s'ils veulent ou non accepter le débat sur le terrain qu'ils ont décliné jusqu'ici et le continuer en prenant pour règle de la limitation de la marine Russe l'effective actuellement à flot. Si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique se trouvait plus à propos, nous pourrions même nous abstenir de mentionner un chiffre quelconque, afin de nous réserver notre liberté ultérieure et réclamer seulement la position et l'acceptation du principe.

Au cas de rejet, tout serait dit, les négociations seraient rompues; dans l'hypothèse contraire, M. le Baron de Bourqueney et Lord Westmorland annonceraient la prochaine présentation d'un système que nous arrêterions d'abord entre nous et auquel nous nous efforcerions de rallier M. le Comte de Buol. Cette forme de procéder, je le répète, est méthodique et sensée; c'est celle que l'Empereur adopte et je vous invite à faire connaître aussitôt que possible à Lord Clarendon l'opinion à laquelle Sa Majesté s'est arrêtée après mûre délibération. Vous communiquerez en outre au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa

Majesté Britannique le projet ci-joint de dépêche télégraphique que je proposerais d'adresser dans la journée de demain, ou Vendredi au plus tard, à nos Représentants à Vienne. Aali Pacha quitte cette capitale Dimanche et il serait désirable qu'il assistât à la Conférence. Ma dépêche serait expédiée immédiatement sur l'avis que vous me transmettriez par la télégraphe. Toutefois, si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique tenait à ce que nos Plénipotentiaires reçussent des instructions plus détaillées, conformes à la teneur de cette dépêche et expliquant bien qu'il ne s'agit pas de discuter, mais seulement de convenir d'un principe, M. le Baron de Bourqueney et Lord Westmorland seraient simplement informés de la résolution des deux Cabinets et demanderaient à M. le Comte de Buol de suspendre la réunion jusqu'à l'arrivée de leurs courriers.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

No. 863.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 30*, 1855.

LORD COWLEY was directed on the 25th and 26th instant to communicate the papers sent herewith, to Count Walewski, who has now sent them to M. de Bourqueney. It is the latter one we wish to have adopted, in which no reference is made to the principle of limitation, which would be utterly useless unless it is applied in the manner we have already proposed to Russia. You may attend the Conference, if Count Buol thinks proper to convoke it, but understand distinctly that we make no proposal of any kind to Russia; that you are not authorized to enter into any discussion; and that we understand that the Conference is called for the purpose of its being finally closed.

Inclosure 1 in No. 863.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 25*, 1855.

WE think our Representatives might declare in Conference, that since, in the words of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, recorded in the 13th Protocol, Russia had rejected limitation in every form whatsoever, the British and French Governments saw no advantage to be derived from the continuance of the Conferences; or Count Buol might make the declaration in the name of the two Governments, and in the presence of the Representatives.

Inclosure 2 in No. 863.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 26*, 1855.

COUNT BUOL should be requested to state to the Conference that Austria having in pursuance of the engagements she had taken to endeavour to find means of accommodation, and having failed to discover elements likely to be accepted by both parties, she saw no use in continuing the Conferences, which were therefore closed.

No. 864.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May 30.*)

(No. 372.)

Constantinople, May 21, 1855.

My Lord,

IT is not my attention only, or that of Her Majesty's Consuls in this country, but your Lordship's attention also, that has been called to several afflicting instances of sanguinary violence and oppressive cruelty which have unhappily occurred in some of the Turkish provinces within the last ten or twelve months.

None of these atrocities have been overlooked; and measures, which ought to have answered the ends of justice, have, in most of the cases, been obtained, and put into course of execution.

The enforcement of the remedial measures thus adopted by the Porte, has, however, been so imperfect, and so little security is still afforded against the recurrence of crimes which are no less discreditable to the Government than revolting to humanity, that I have thought it necessary to carry out your Lordship's views more completely by bringing the whole question in a formal and impressive manner under the consideration of the Turkish Council, and, if need be, of the Sovereign himself.

I might have performed this duty at an earlier period had I not thought that so unpalateable an appeal would meet with a better reception, and be carried through with more effect, if I allowed ample time for testing the Porte's sincerity, and evinced a reluctance to embrace conclusions unfavourable to its character.

The official note which I have recently addressed to Fuad Pasha contains a proposal to which I hope his Excellency will accede, insomuch as it is calculated to bring into clearer light the particulars of criminality on the one side, and of remissness on the other; while, at the same time, it may help to realize more completely such further measures as may be needed for the vindication of justice, and the security of those who are exposed to administrative oppression or fanatical violence.

A copy of the note is inclosed herewith; and I shall take an early opportunity of making your Lordship acquainted with the results of its presentation. I took occasion some time ago to prepare the Sultan for the step which I had in contemplation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 864.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Fuad Pasha.

British Embassy, Pera, May 14, 1855.

IN times anterior to the present war, long habits of friendly intercourse between Great Britain and Turkey, the confidence inspired by acts of mutual advantage and interest common to both parties induced the British Government on many occasions to point out dangers which threatened the Ottoman Empire, and to suggest improvements calculated to renovate its internal strength. Such counsels, offered with sincerity and not unfrequently pressed with earnestness, never failed to be received as proofs of cordial sympathy, and were sometimes productive of salutary though imperfect results. In proportion as the progress of events brought out into fuller relief the administrative embarrassments and political complications with which the Porte was destined to contend, the admonitions of Great Britain assumed a graver tone, and expectations warranted by assistance given with success in moments of need, were frankly and impressively declared.

What was then little more than an effect of hearty goodwill, stimulated by passing occurrences and directed to objects of future importance, is now an indispensable obligation admitting of no compromise and calling imperatively for an immediate and efficient conviction of evils not only discreditable and

injurious in the highest degree to Turkey, but operating with pernicious energy on the interests of the Porte's allies, and certainly not least on those of Great Britain.

It behoves the Porte, as principal in the war against Russia, to exert all its faculties in contributing to the successful prosecution of hostilities and the early attainment of an honourable and secure peace. For these purposes it is by no means enough for the Porte to maintain its forces in an effective state, to direct their operations with vigour and to afford requisite accommodation to the auxiliary armies of its allies. Other duties remain to be performed, and among them none are more urgent than the maintenance of order, on firm and equitable principles, throughout the Sultan's dominions, the protection of those classes of the population which are more particularly exposed to oppression, and the infliction of condign punishment on criminal offenders legally convicted or taken in the act. Indifference or remissness in the performance of these paramount duties at the present juncture is necessarily attended with the most deplorable consequences. A disaffected and irritated feeling is thereby kept up among a large proportion of the industrious classes, the necessary articles of consumption required by the auxiliary armies are on that account either defectively produced or reluctantly supplied; the military operations are proportionally embarrassed or rendered more onerous, the sources of revenue become more contracted, the Porte's dependence on its allies is consequently increased, the enemies of the alliance and their traitorous adherents are encouraged and a cause recommended by its justice and ennobled by its generosity is discredited among those nations whose sympathy and support are essential to its success.

Errors of such magnitude increase, moreover, from day to day that weakness which has long been watched with sorrowful forebodings by the friends of Turkey, and whose accelerated progress, if not arrested now, can hardly fail to precipitate the whole Empire, at no distant period, into an abyss of confusion and ruin.

No one more deeply than the Undersigned partakes of the sorrow and apprehension which a future so pregnant with evil must of necessity raise in reflecting minds. Proportioned to the strength of those feelings is the sense of duty which impels him to persevere in rousing the Porte's attention to the perils of a negligent or temporising course of administration; his own very painful impressions are derived from a series of facts, reported from various quarters, and thence conveyed directly to the knowledge of the British Government. The provincial functionaries have little, unfortunately, to learn upon the subject, and it is chiefly for the correction of their deficiencies or the reinforcement of their means of action that the Undersigned appeals to the Ministry, the Council, and the Sultan himself. He would not willingly decry the value of such remedial measures as the Porte has occasionally adopted, but he laments their imperfect results, and cannot be silent so long as he perceives any active remains of a system which has proved in its working so fatal to the best interests of the Empire.

Within the last twelve months there have been, successively or simultaneously, in Bulgaria, Bosnia, Thessaly, Epirus, Albania, in various parts of Syria, in Kurdistan, and particularly in the neighbourhood of Salonica, of Scodia, and of Damascus, scenes of disorder and bloodshed, sometimes even of massacre in cold blood, which though not overlooked by the local authorities, nor left entirely without redress by the general Government, have been attended with circumstances discreditable to both, and ruinous alike to individuals and to the State.

Much, no doubt, of what we deplore is to be traced to an extraordinary state of things, and to the machinations of an enemy whose numerous partisans are unsparing in their hostility to the Porte. But it cannot be denied that the elements of mischief, brought into action by them, originally sprang from causes seated in the practical antagonism of classes, and an oppressive course of administration; that the Ottoman Ministers neglected the means submitted to them of providing for the maintenance of order in the provinces during the employment of the Sultan's regular forces on the frontier; that the commission of crime has been very inadequately repressed; that the negligence or corruption of those in office has been treated with too much tenderness; and that in each case the final triumph of the Sultan's arms or of the Porte's authority has not been obtained without the infliction of much unnecessary suffering on the inhabitants of all classes, much unjust and cruel persecution of the Rayah by

the Mussulman population, and a progressive impoverishment acting with fatal effect upon the Porte's resources in labour, recruitment, and revenue.

In several parts of Bulgaria crimes of the most revolting character have been brought to light. Information obtained by strangers, alike brave and humane, was confirmed by the Porte's own Commissioner, appointed at the suggestion of the Undersigned, and numerous criminals were arrested, and some even consigned to punishment. The Porte, however, has kept silence hitherto as to the trial and punishment of the remaining offenders, submitted to its immediate judgment by Medhed Effendi, nor has anything transpired as to the remedial measures which the prevention of similar crimes in future so loudly demands.

In Thessaly and Epirus the Sultan's arms were triumphant under the able direction of Fuad Effendi, and the Christian inhabitants acquired in general a title to the Porte's confidence and benevolent consideration by the loyal resistance which they offered to the intrigues and menaces of foreign marauders instigated by Russian agents. Some partial acts of clemency and of occasional relief, proceeding from the Porte, have mitigated here and there the sufferings of the people of both creeds. But the elements of disorder are still in fermentation; of the Porte's more zealous agents some have restrained them for the moment from breaking out by tyrannous and partial severity, while others, with more humanity and foresight, have pointed the true causes of popular discontent, and suggested measures well calculated to remove them. It still, unfortunately, remains to be seen whether the Ottoman Ministers have directed their practical attention to the representations frequently addressed to them on these matters by the Undersigned, and whether they have adopted those arrangements which would come forcibly in aid of the intended Convention between Turkey and Greece for the suppression of brigandage along their common frontier, and the conclusion of which is so imperatively required by the interests of both parties.

It is impossible to forget the wanton massacres perpetrated near Salonica and Damascus by armed Turks, bearing the Sultan's Commission. In the one case, more than twenty Greek primates, unarmed and obedient to authority, were suddenly and treacherously put to death. In the other, a whole village of Christians, remarkable for their loyalty, was deprived in a moment of all its male inhabitants, who were shot down without cause or resistance. Commissions of inquiry have been appointed in both instances, and in the former, after much delay, sentence was given, but with a degree of lenity ill suited to the occasion, nor is it known to this hour whether the condemned offenders were ever in reality punished. As to the other Commission, no result of its investigation has yet been made known to the Undersigned.

At Scodra the Mushirs have been changed, and one brutal offender invested with authority has been ordered to Constantinople for trial; but in this instance, as in the others, justice, arrested by some invisible agency, would seem to have stopped short in the execution of its duty.

In Kurdistan a violent and sanguinary rebellion has been justly put down by force of arms, and few can be found to sympathize with the captured ringleaders. It is, nevertheless, to be lamented that the triumph of a just cause should have been dishonoured by barbarous excesses, and that the progress of the Sultan's arms should have been marked with the destruction of peaceful villages and the slaughter of their loyal inhabitants.

These are grave charges, and the facts which support them, while they cast no light responsibility on the Porte, display in strong colours the manner in which authority is exercised in the Provinces by local Governors and military Commanders. Official reports are at hand to substantiate every allegation, and the Undersigned requests that a member of the Reform Council may be authorized to communicate expressly thereon with one of the principal members of Her Majesty's Embassy, and receive from him such further explanations, derived from authentic channels of correspondence, as may justify the present appeal, and leave no doubt as to the necessity of correcting abuses which are become intolerable. The existence, character, and extent of an evil which threatens such fatal consequences, are open to the knowledge of the Porte, and the frequent well-grounded remonstrances of a friendly Government, interested deeply in its removal, and entitled to command attention, can no longer be treated indifferently or superficially with any degree of prudence, consistency,

or safety. The Sultan and his allies are engaged in common resistance to a Power whose pretensions have been rejected on a clear understanding that His Majesty's Christian, or rather non-Mussulman, subjects should be relieved by their Sovereign himself from all just causes of complaint and practices of oppression.

The continued disappointment of an expectation thus seated in justice and good faith, nor less recommended by wisdom and humanity, must necessarily cast a shade over the fairest prospects of the alliance, and ultimately involve the Ottoman Empire in complications of a most embarrassing and perilous description.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 865.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 376.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 21, 1855.*

I REPEAT what I had the honour of stating in one of my previous numbers, that I do not feel myself justified in accusing the Porte of any unwillingness to fulfil the conditions of her Military Convention with us. Some causes of difficulty and delay have been already conveyed to your Lordship's knowledge. I must be allowed to add, that I had no instructions for collecting the troops before General Vivian's arrival; that I had no definitive answer to my application to Lord Raglan for his Lordship's opinion, or that of Omer Pasha; and finally, that no steps had been taken for carrying out the Vth Article of the Convention, which was of course to be done by persons of the military profession.

I have now the honour to forward herewith a correspondence which has recently passed between General Vivian and myself. Your Lordship will find in its contents a full account of what relates to the Contingent under present circumstances.

I also inclose herewith an extract or copy of a despatch received within the last few days by Fuad Pasha, from the Turkish Envoy in London.

Your Lordship will easily comprehend that the execution of the terms of the Convention is not facilitated by notices of a conflicting character, which reach the Porte from different quarters—from the Embassy on one side, from Eupatoria on the other, and again, unknown to me except by accident, from London.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 865.

Lieutenant-General Vivian to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 18, 1855.*

MAJOR-GENERAL MICHEL, my Chief of the Staff, having returned from the Crimea with information which I consider important, Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons having communicated to him the views of his Highness Omer Pasha on the subject of the formation of the Contingent which I am to command, I lose no time in bringing the matter to your Excellency's notice.

Your Lordship will remember that his Highness Omer Pasha expressed an opinion that 15,000 Infantry might be furnished for the Contingent from the army under his command in Bulgaria, and that he considered Tarnova a convenient place for commencing the formation of this Division. I see no cause for altering the opinion already given to your Lordship, as to the most convenient locality for assembling the Contingent; but as time is everything just now, and as there appears to be such difficulty in obtaining transports for

the conveyance of troops from one port to another, I would gladly make Turnova my head-quarters, provided his Highness Omer Pasha be permitted to furnish me with the 15,000 Infantry which he still says he can spare.

Your Lordship will perceive that it is only to obtain men immediately that I forego the advantage of making my head-quarters in the vicinity of Constantinople, as formerly proposed; and I conceive that nothing but the certainty of immediately completing the Contingent would compensate for the disadvantages that would necessarily accrue from my taking up a position so far inland at the commencement of the undertaking.

Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons has pointed out that if my Division is to be formed from his Highness Omer Pasha's army in Bulgaria, it will be indispensably necessary, to insure success to the project, that the selection of the troops to be handed over to me, and the order for their transfer, should be left to his Highness. I concur in this opinion, because I am satisfied that Colonel Simmons is right in affirming that his Highness entered very heartily into the original plan, and that he is ready and willing to give his full support to the measure; he would therefore naturally be disposed to use his influence in counteracting any dissatisfaction felt by parties transferred, and he would doubtless have the means of judiciously exercising this influence, when making his selection for the Contingent.

I am led to believe that the officer at present in command on the Danube may be, and is, indeed, disposed to be averse to the measure; if, therefore, the selection be left to him he would possibly offer difficulties, he might select troops of an indifferent description, and officers under the influence of fanaticism, and would probably encourage secretly a spirit of dissatisfaction which might be productive of mischievous results. It has also been urged that as his Highness Omer Pasha is known to be favourable to the project of the British Contingent, that fact alone would induce intriguing parties opposed to him to offer opposition, in order to produce a failure of any measure receiving his support.

Your Excellency will be better able to comprehend the working of these influences than I am; I, however, consider it of the highest importance to secure the continuance of the goodwill and hearty assistance of so capable and so influential a Commander as his Highness Omer Pasha, and should no reason suggest itself to your Lordship rendering the measure, in your opinion, inexpedient, I would earnestly request that the Turkish Government may be solicited to require that his Highness may select from his army in Bulgaria the 15,000 Infantry he has proposed to hand over. We are now approaching the end of May; not a single soldier has been transferred to my command, and as the difficulty of obtaining transports for the conveyance of troops from Varna, and elsewhere, would appear to render hopeless all chance of my being able to collect the contingent as formerly proposed near the Bosphorus, I trust your Lordship may deem it fit to recommend to the Porte the measure I propose as being the most favourable and speedy mode which now exists for carrying into execution the terms of the Convention, and I shall be prepared at any moment to proceed to Turnova.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. J. H. VIVIAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 865.

Lieutenant-General Vivian to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Constantinople, May 21, 1855.

My Lord,

I AM very anxious to receive your Lordship's promised reply to my letter No. 7 dated 18th instant, as, in the event of your Excellency deeming my project inexpedient, I am desirous of availing myself of an opportunity which now offers of giving employment to a number of the officers under my command. May I, therefore, venture to solicit that your Excellency will be so good as to favour me with your views on the subject of the communication above referred to at your earliest convenience?

I shall likewise esteem it a favour if your Lordship will do me the kindness to let me know the number of Turkish or other transports that may be rendered

available for the conveyance of portions of troops to form my division from the various ports where they are at present, or are to be assembled.

Major-General Shirley, who is to command the whole of the Cavalry of the Contingent, has just returned from Eupatoria. Your Lordship will, I am confident, participate in the regret I feel at learning from this officer that his Highness Omer Pasha has received an order from the Porte to detach from his army in the Crimea 5,000 men, to form a portion of my division. I do not suppose that a measure so exceedingly inexpedient is at all likely to be carried into effect; but I very much fear that the reception of this order by his Highness may indispose him to render that friendly and powerful assistance which he had proposed, for I will not disguise from your Lordship that I attach the highest importance to securing his Highness's influence on our behalf, and feel confident that his selection of officers and troops would tend greatly to insure success to our undertaking.

It occurs to me that your Excellency would probably desire to see Major-General Shirley; and in such case, I will desire him to wait on your Lordship at about 5 P.M., when, I presume, the mails will have been dispatched.

I have, &c
(Signed) R. J. H. VIVIAN.

Inclosure 3 in No. 865.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Lieutenant-General Vivian.

Sir, *Constantinople, May* 21, 1855.

I HAVE before me your letters of the 18th and 21st instants.

A messenger is just come in from England; another is going out. In consideration, however, of your anxiety to have an early answer, I set aside every other affair to meet your wishes. But I cannot be expected to make this sacrifice often.

The first point for decision concerns the number of troops to be obtained for your corps from Bulgaria, and the best place for assembling them.

I am under an impression that we had come to an agreement in this respect during our conversation, in presence of General Mitchel, and that you entertained the intention of receiving that portion of the Contingent which is to be provided here, and then proceeding, either in person or by deputing some of your officers, to take charge of that other and larger portion of it assembled at Varna.

I am still of opinion that the fulfilment of this intention is the course best calculated to promote the object in view; and I am officially informed that the Seraskier Pasha is prepared to offer to your inspection, and to place at your disposal, the day after to-morrow, 1,525 Infantry, two batteries of Horse Artillery, with 320 men, and Cavalry to the amount of 170.

I am authorized to add that a steam-vessel leaves this evening for Volos, where three battalions of Infantry and a regiment of Cavalry are ready for embarkation, amounting, if complete, to about 3,000 men, with nearly 800 horses.

The portion of the Contingent at Varna is stated to be composed of 3,930 Infantry, 830 Cavalry, and 237 Artillery.

It remains for me to notice that part of your correspondence which relates to Omer Pasha.

I agree with you in regretting that he should have been ordered to detach any part of his army from the Crimea, and in presuming that the order will not be carried into effect.

I hope that he will be instructed to point out such additional troops as may be taken from the army in Bulgaria, and placed at your disposal, together with the 5,000 already at Varna.

In this sense I propose, with your concurrence, to advise the Porte, and to write through Colonel Simmons to the Ottoman Generalissimo.

I am sorry to conclude, by stating, on the authority of Rear-Admiral Grey,

that there is no prospect whatever for the present of British steamers being available for the conveyance of your troops from Varna.

I am positively assured that the same inability exists on the part of the Turkish authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 865.

M. Musurus to Safet Effendi.

Londres, le 4 Mai, 1855.

(Extrait.)

LORD PALMERSTON m'a dit avant hier que, d'après les derniers renseignements de Constantinople, le corps de troupes Impériales destiné à être mis sous le commandement du Général Vivian n'était pas encore prêt; qu'il s'agissait de la compléter, en prélevant 2,500 hommes sur les troupes Impériales aujourd'hui à Constantinople, 7,500 sur l'armée actuelle du Danube, et 10,000 sur l'armée commandée par son Excellence Omer Pasha, en Crimée; que sa Seigneurie était d'avis qu'on ne devait point toucher à cette dernière armée et que, quant aux 10,000 hommes que celle-ci devait fournir, il vaudrait mieux les prendre sur l'armée d'Asie, où sa Seigneurie croyait plus avantageux que le Général Vivian lui-même se rendit avec les 10,000 hommes qui lui seraient fournis de Constantinople et de l'armée du Danube. En même temps, Lord Palmerston m'a prié d'insinuer de sa part au Gouvernement Impérial que, de cette manière, on pourrait confier le commandement-en-chef de l'armée d'Asie au Général Vivian, qui jouissait de la réputation d'un chef habile et expérimenté. Enfin, Lord Palmerston a insisté sur l'urgence de compléter au plutôt le corps d'armée que la Sublime Porte a pris l'engagement de mettre à la disposition du Gouvernement Britannique, sans toutefois diminuer l'armée actuellement commandée par son Excellence Omer Pasha.

Lord Clarendon, que j'ai vu hier, m'a dit que le Gouvernement Britannique était résolu d'offrir sa garantie pour l'un des deux millions restants de notre emprunt sauf au Gouvernement Français à garantir l'autre million; mais que, comme cette question ne pouvait être définitivement décidée qu'après l'adoption complète du budget, laquelle sera obtenu sous peu de jours, il esperait être bientôt à même de répondre à la note que je lui avais adressée à cet effet, après qui nous pourrions nous entendre avec le Gouvernement Français pour obtenir sa garantie sur les mêmes bases.

No. 866.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 634. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, May 29*, 1855.

YOUR Lordship's telegraphic despatch, dated 6 P.M. yesterday, did not reach my hands till nearly midnight; too late, I regret to add, to act upon it immediately.

I called upon Count Walewski as early as it was possible for him to receive me to-day. I found that he had received a telegraphic despatch from London yesterday evening, stating that Her Majesty's Government agreed to the instructions, which Count Walewski proposed sending to M. de Bourqueney, and which had been communicated to your Lordship by M. de Persigny, and that those instructions had consequently been forwarded last night to Vienna.

I informed Count Walewski of the great objection entertained by Her Majesty's Government to the principle of limitation being again mentioned at the close of the Conferences. Count Walewski, on the contrary, said that although, in deference to the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, he had abandoned the idea of putting any question to the Russian Plenipotentiaries, he yet maintained the opinion that it was the best way of terminating the Vienna negotiations. He went through the same arguments that he has used before, and I combated them in terms already known to your Lordship. Count Walewski observed that at bottom there was no difference of opinion between the French Government and Her Majesty's advisers. Both desired that the Conferences should come to an end—only the English Government were less anxious that they should close without a rupture with Austria than the French.

I did not allow this appreciation of the question to be correct. What Her Majesty's Government feared, I said, was that Russia would accept a general principle, which would bind her to nothing; that she would be supported by Austria; and that France and England would find themselves again entangled in negotiations from which both declared their anxiety to escape.

Finding that I could make no impression upon Count Walewski, I asked him whether, supposing our apprehensions to turn out to be correct, and that Russia was to endeavour to renew negotiations on the "principle of limitation," he would object to instruct M. de Bourqueney to state "séance tenante," that the maritime Powers still persisted in the terms already communicated, and to ask the Russian Plenipotentiaries whether they agreed to them or not—breaking off the Conference if they replied evasively or in the negative.

Count Walewski replied that he should have no objection to this course, and to instruct M. de Bourqueney to maintain the plan agreed to in London, or that now known as Annex B; of the two, he rather preferred the latter. I inquired whether I might give your Lordship this assurance officially, and Count Walewski replied in the affirmative.

Count Walewski authorised me further to state to your Lordship, that he had written privately to M. Bourqueney to make the latter clearly understand that, in prescribing to him the instructions which he will receive with the letter, the Emperor's intention is to close, and not to renew, negotiations; but that His Imperial Majesty wishes, if possible, to close them without showing any apparent difference of opinion between Austria and the belligerent Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 867.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon—(Received June 1.)

(No. 645. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, May 31*, 1855.

I HAVE had an opportunity of hastily perusing the correspondence which has passed between the Austrian and Prussian Governments on the subject of the communication made by the Russian Government to the different States of Germany, in order to secure the neutrality of the latter during the present war.

Count Buol's despatch is dated the 17th instant. It expresses the hope that Prussia will agree with Austria that the Russian communication shall not form the subject of discussion in the Diet, the more so as the Austrian Government is about to make a statement to that body in regard to the state of the Eastern question, and the proceedings of Austria in regard to it.

Baron Manteuffel answers by a long despatch on the 24th, the tone of which is one of superiority, and in which care is taken to mark the opinion of Prussia that all Germany is with her; that Prussia will not press for any discussion in the Diet for the present, and until Austria has made the communication which she promises. Baron Manteuffel observes, at the same time, that Prussia and Germany are under no other obligations than those emanating from the Treaty of the 10th of April and the Secret Article. That he will examine with attention the further engagements contracted by Austria, but that Prussia can only accept those which are in harmony with the interests of Germany.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 868.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 646. Confidential.)

Paris, May 31, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE had a conversation this morning with Count Walewski on the subject of M. Benedetti's late proceedings at Constantinople. His Excellency said that the Emperor had spoken to him two days ago on this very subject; that His Majesty had expressed deep regret at the differences of opinion which still prevailed in some places in the East between the Agents of His Majesty and those of the Queen, at a moment, too, when unity of thought and action was more necessary than ever; that he had enjoined Count Walewski again to express His Majesty's determination not to countenance any one who acted in opposition to these His Majesty's sentiments. Nay, His Majesty appears to have gone so far as to say, that, so resolved was he not to bear the penalty of such dissidences, he would recall any agent who, from whatever cause, did not agree with his English colleague; so that if there was any further dispute, Her Majesty's Government, and not his, must bear the blame.

With regard to M. Benedetti, His Majesty, in doing justice to that gentleman's zeal and talents, could not approve of the way in which they had lately been displayed. M. Benedetti would probably have been recalled were he not to be replaced so soon by M. Thouvenel. At the same time, His Majesty must, in conscience, say, that M. Benedetti's proceedings had been provoked by Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe's conduct towards him. The Emperor had desired that M. Thouvenel's departure for Constantinople should be hurried, and that his instructions should make him thoroughly understand the policy which His Majesty was resolved should be maintained in the East in regard to Her Majesty's Government.

With respect to the retirement of Reshid Pasha, the Emperor regrets it. He thinks that the Pasha, from his knowledge of the west of Europe, was capable of rendering good service to the Sultan. His Majesty is quite willing to accept the assurance given, that the sense of the letters written by Reshid and Kiamil Pashas (for it is asserted here that both wrote) to the Viceroy of Egypt has been misrepresented; and, as an earnest of his goodwill, Count Walewski has been directed to press the arrival at Paris of Reshid Pasha's son, who, your Lordship is aware, was some time ago named to replace Vely Pasha as Turkish Ambassador at Paris.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 869.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 217.)

Berlin, May 29, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose the translation of a despatch which has been addressed by Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim, the Prussian Minister at Vienna, in answer to an Austrian circular of the 17th instant, on the late circular of the Russian Government to the members of the Germanic Confederation.

Your Lordship will perceive, on perusing this despatch, that it breathes a spirit of malignant antagonism to Austria, and of leaning to the avowed policy of Russia towards Germany.

I shall forward by the next opportunity a copy in original of the inclosure herewith transmitted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 869.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim.

(Translation.)

Berlin, May 23, 1855.

MY despatch of the 19th instant addressed to your Excellency, was already on its way to Vienna, when Count Esterhazy was good enough to communicate to me the annexed circular of the 17th instant, together with the despatch of the same date, likewise herewith inclosed, addressed to him. Your Excellency will therefore have been already enabled to give Count Buol the certain assurance that the Russian despatch communicated by M. de Glinka to the members of the Assembly of the Diet does not appear to us to give any cause, for the moment, for proposals or explanations in the midst of that Assembly; and that we are also willing and ready to allow this document, always relating so closely to German interests, to be taken into consideration likewise, in combination with the more explicit communications of which the Imperial Austrian Cabinet has repeatedly held out the expectation.

But precisely because we reserve to ourselves for a while our judgment of the Russian explanations, conformably with the wishes of the Imperial Austrian Cabinet and in regard of the negotiations still pending at this moment, we cannot consider it as beneficial, nor even is there any foundation to view it wholly in the light and describe it in the way which has been done by Count Buol. I confess my conviction does not enable me to follow the argument which lays down that Russia aimed at the disunion of Germany, when she gives in the face of all Germany an explanation which, as is said in the Austrian circular, fills even the Imperial Austrian Government with satisfaction; and when she holds firm to results, for the recommendation and attainment of which Austria claims a merit which I am far from wishing to diminish; although it would be easy to prove that Prussia's constant endeavours also at St. Petersburgh to induce Russia to yield on the four points have been at least cooperative.

That the St. Petersburgh Cabinet was desirous to assure itself prematurely of the decisions of the German Courts by the communication of M. de Glinka, I am inclined to doubt; as, in so far as I know, and as the terms of the despatch confirm, no counter-declaration of assent of any sort was provoked—nay, even expected.

When, in former phases of the negotiations, the sincerity of the intentions of the Western Powers was, from the beginning, denied on the part of Russia, Prussia openly declared herself at St. Petersburgh against such procedure. She has done so also on similar occasions in London and Paris, unmoved by the current of public opinion, and she would consider it as opposed to the frankness which she owes to her German allies, if she did not also in the present instance denote at least an impartial and unprejudiced appreciation required by the honour and interests of Germany of the step in question of the Petersburgh Cabinet.

We are ready, as we have said, in the meantime to settle a fixed resolution, as to the part which it may, perhaps, behove us to take, as regards this especial point on a joint examination of the European position and of the obligations arising therefrom for Germany; and then after a more precise knowledge of the communications promised by Austria, to take it into closer consideration I will not here examine whether that degree of secresy at least aimed at towards us, even in a greater measure than towards other German Governments, with which Austria has surrounded her negotiations with the Western Powers, corresponds with that confidence which she, on her part, continually claims from us. On the contrary, I have expressly to observe that the Government of His Majesty the King, in full acknowledgment of the difficult position of Austria and of the endeavours making to overcome them, has no intention to press the Imperial Government in any way for further communications.

But, on the other hand, the latter herself will certainly always bear in mind that if we, out of regard for Austria, suspend our reflections and decisions, we do not yet thereby renounce the unimpaired right of the freest and fullest examination in regard to the question itself.

We stand, and with us Germany, on the basis of the April Convention and its Additional Article.

Whatever has been negotiated, concerted, or stipulated beyond this pale without the knowledge and participation of the Contracting Parties—for instance, we count among them the Treaty of December 2nd; the Protocols of the late Vienna Conferences; and those agreements which the Vienna Cabinet may possibly have taken on the basis of her late confidential exchange of notes with the Western Powers—are facts which on fixing our decision we should certainly have to take into the most serious consideration; but which rightly can have no species of reactive force on the sphere of our obligations, nor, in our opinion, on the obligations of Germany.

We shall sincerely rejoice if that which Austria has to communicate to us coincides with our repeatedly expressed point of view.

We shall indeed, I need scarcely repeat, strive on examination of the matter to prove by wish, opinion, and resolution that Prussia, both as an European and a German Power, is accustomed to consider herself as the ally of Austria. But we claim this examination with unfettered and equal right for us and Germany. And if Austria reserves to herself to judge what, in her opinion, the interests of Europe and of Germany demand, so likewise shall we have to judge at the proper time—that is, when our own interests and those of Germany and of Europe appear to us to require it—how far the Austrian views, and whatever the Imperial Cabinet may have concerted on that basis without asking our opinion, may be brought to harmonize with our convictions, and are, therefore, of a nature to pave the way for that active community of Germany and of her two Great Powers by which not only the endeavours of the German Governments, but also the wishes and hopes of the nation, will assuredly find their realization.

Your Excellency will express yourself to Count Buol in the sense of the foregoing observations, leaving with him a copy of this despatch; and we confidently hope that he will find our words of candour in conformity with the seriousness of the moment, and will acknowledge therein a renewed proof of our lively desire for a real and sincere understanding, and for a community of action founded thereon.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 870.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 420.)
Foreign Office, June 1, 1855.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government have considered your despatch No. 376, and its inclosures, respecting the Turkish Contingent to be placed under the command of General Vivian, and I have to instruct your Excellency to pay the utmost attention to that matter, and to omit no opportunity of impressing on the Porte in the strongest manner the absolute necessity of promptly carrying out to their full extent the engagements which it has contracted in this respect. If those engagements had been acted upon with reasonable diligence, the Contingent would very shortly have been in a condition to render efficient service to the common cause.

Her Majesty's Government, however, regret that the Porte has sought to remedy its shortcomings in this matter by depriving Omer Pasha of a portion of the forces under his immediate order.

Your Excellency will have received, and I hope acted upon to good purpose, the telegraphic despatch on this subject which I sent to you this morning, and of which I inclose a copy; and your Excellency will clearly understand that Her Majesty's Government attach so great importance to the maintenance of Omer Pasha's army at its full complement, and to securing that Commander from any slight or disregard of his position and wishes on the part of the Porte, that they would much rather postpone the interests of the Contingent than sanction any course of proceeding which would weaken Omer Pasha's army, or give him any just ground for dissatisfaction.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 871.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 1, 1855.*

HAVING received your Lordship's telegraphic message, I went to Count Buol, to-day, with M. de Bourqueney, who had received his messenger from Paris.

Count Buol will call the Conference for Monday. He feels himself pledged to bring forward his proposals; he has no doubt they will be refused by the Russian Plenipotentiaries, but in every case his great desire is to remain united with Baron Bourqueney and myself, in the execution of our instructions. I read to him the telegraphic despatch I had received. He has little doubt the Conference will be closed by the refusal of the Russian Plenipotentiaries to accept his proposal. At any rate it will be for Baron Bourqueney and myself to close it by the statement that we can entertain no new proposal, since the declaration of M. Drouyn de Lhuys that Russia had refused the principle of limitation in every shape.

No. 872.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 2, 1855.*

IT appears by your despatch of yesterday, that for some reason unexplained to us, Count Buol persists in bringing forward at the Conference proposals of which we disapprove. You will inform Count Buol that we object to this course, and your Lordship will take no part in any discussion beyond stating that nothing having been proposed of a nature that we can accept, your Government considers that negotiations are at an end, and that the Conference is finally closed.

You will not attend any fresh Conference, if one should be called.

If you let me know directly after the Conference that it is closed, the news might arrive before the division in the House of Commons, on Monday night, and it will be most important to have it.

No. 873.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 211.)
Foreign Office, June 2, 1855.

My Lord,

I HEREWITH transmit the copy of a despatch* from Count Buol to Count Colloredo, with its inclosures, which have been placed in my hands by Count Colloredo.

I have told the Austrian Minister that, after an attentive perusal of these documents, I could only again express my regret that proposals to which it was impossible for Her Majesty's Government to agree, should have been renewed by the Austrian Government; but that the sincerity of our regret could not be doubted by Count Buol after the many proofs that Her Majesty's Government had given of the importance they attach to the cooperation of Austria in a cause which concerns her more directly even than it does the Western Powers, and from which Her Majesty's Government could not believe that her support would now be withdrawn.

I told Count Colloredo that I had already discussed with him one of the propositions transmitted by Count Buol, and that the opinion of Her Majesty's Government upon it had been conveyed to your Lordship in my despatch of the

* No. 878.

8th of May, and communicated to Count Buol; and that the other proposition having been forwarded by your Lordship, I would read to him the answer which was about to be sent to you.

After reading to Count Colloredo my despatch No. 205 of May 29 to your Lordship, I said I wished to avoid all discussion that might be irritating, and which, from the tone of Count Buol's despatches, I was led to think would be useless; but that there were some statements in those despatches to Count Colloredo and M. de Hübner upon which I should take the liberty of offering a few remarks.

In the despatch to M. de Hübner, Count Buol states that Austria provides a progressive support of much weight and value to Turkey, by stipulating that, for each new ship that Russia may construct, the allies shall be permitted to make a proportionate addition to their naval stations in the Black Sea; and that, in the event of the Porte thinking itself menaced, it may call the allied fleets to its aid.

Upon this I begged to observe that the real object of the third basis appeared to be lost sight of, and that, so far from causing the preponderance of Russia to cease, the proposed conditions would go to establish a competition for preponderance between the allies and Russia. Such a state of things would not be peace, but a constant preparation for war, and a constant source of uneasiness to Europe.

The Porte, I said, required no permission from any other Power to call upon its allies for assistance when threatened with danger. The Sultan might at any time do so of his own free will and pleasure; and if the proposal of Austria were adopted, and no effectual limitation were placed on the Russian fleet, that fleet would be a standing menace to Turkey, and the Sultan would be continually justified in asking for the aid of his allies, who would be in honour bound to afford it. If the danger was imminent, the allied fleets might arrive too late to save Turkey; but whether the danger was imminent or prospective, the naval forces of England and France could only be summoned to the Black Sea for the purpose of repelling Russian aggression, and on every such occasion Europe would have to fear, and England and France would have to be prepared for, the renewal of hostilities.

Count Buol in the same despatch says that the common efforts of the allies should be directed to limiting the political power of Russia, so as to render it, if not impossible, at least eminently difficult for her to abuse her material resources, but that the cessation of Russian preponderance in the Black Sea would only be one of the means towards that end, as the diminution, or even the total destruction of that fleet would not alone be sufficient to deprive Russia of the advantages over Turkey which she derives from her geographical position.

I expressed my entire concurrence with Count Buol as to the desirableness of limiting the political power of Russia, but instead of entering upon a new problem, the practical solution of which was not even alluded to by Count Buol, I thought it would be more prudent for the allies to confine themselves to the question at issue, which was how to give effect to the third basis, and to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, and as yet no way so simple or so effectual had been discovered as such a limitation of her naval forces in that sea as should render their amount consistent with the safety of Turkey.

In his despatch to Count Colloredo, Count Buol expresses his firm conviction that the proposal of Austria for giving effect to the third basis would be effectual, complete, and in conformity with the interest of Europe; and his Excellency adds that its rejection by the Western Powers does not permit Austria to cast exclusively upon Russia the responsibility of the failure of the negotiations.

Upon this I remarked that England and France being at war with Russia, and having made vast sacrifices, must be allowed to judge for themselves on what terms they could make peace consistently with their honour, and with the objects for which such sacrifices had been made, and that the necessity under which they felt themselves of declining the proposals of Austria, proved that in their judgment those proposals were neither effectual nor complete, nor likely to be for the advantage of Europe. But Russia, I said, had rejected terms that Austria thought reasonable in themselves, and necessary for the peace of Europe,

and that were not inconsistent with the dignity of Russia; and because she had so rejected them, and because the Western Powers could not agree to conditions that Austria has since proposed, and which are altogether different and ineffectual for their object, it is surely unjust to say that England and France oppose obstacles to peace, and that Russia is no longer exclusively to blame for the failure of the negotiations.

I must also, I said, express my regret that Count Buol should now be of opinion that the proposal to limit the naval forces of Russia could only be considered as one of the conditions which the belligerents had expressly reserved to themselves the right of imposing beyond the four points, and which the continuation of hostilities might render necessary; for his Excellency, to the best of my belief, had not regarded the proposal in that light, even when discussing it with the Plenipotentiaries of England and France, and he had supported it in the Conference, and had recommended it to the acceptance of the Russian Plenipotentiaries, as the best means for giving effect to the third basis.

The object of the third basis is to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea; the limitation of the Russian fleet in that sea comes then strictly within that object, and is not a distinct and separate proposal apart from the four bases, and such as the allies reserved to themselves the right to bring forward, according as the events of the war might make it necessary.

I requested Count Colloredo to assure Count Buol that we did not, as he supposed, exclude by anticipation any other project that would be equally efficacious; but that we declined, and must continue to decline, all such means as are manifestly ineffectual for the objects we have in view.

Count Colloredo observed that some sacrifice should be made to secure the alliance of Austria.

I said I entirely agreed with him, and that we had shown all possible deference to Austria. It was solely out of deference to her that England and France had agreed to the four bases, and had consented to enter upon negotiations for peace; it was to meet the views, and to secure the cooperation of Austria in a cause which might be considered essentially her own, that England and France adopted a course which they would not otherwise have pursued until the events of war had more distinctly defined the relative position of the belligerent Powers.

Count Colloredo then adverted to the great interests which Austria had at stake, and the risk she would incur by going to war with Russia without being able to reckon upon the material support of the Western Powers, while she would have to fear the ill-will, if not the hostility, of Prussia and of some of the German States.

I said that so far from questioning these considerations, Her Majesty's Government gave great weight to them, and never failed to make allowance for the disadvantages under which Austria thought herself labouring. It was for Austria to decide between the considerations alluded to by Count Colloredo, and the engagements she had entered into with the Western Powers; but whatever her decision might be, and whatever view Austria might take of her own interests and obligations, no effort on the part of Her Majesty's Government would be wanting to maintain unimpaired the friendly relations that now existed between the two countries.

On the other hand, however, we must claim to be the best guardians of our own honour and the best judges of our own interests, and Austria would have no just cause for complaint if we declined to accept conditions which we might regard as inconsistent with our honour and ineffectual for the objects that England and France had pledged themselves to secure.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

P.S.—Your Lordship is instructed to read this despatch to Count Buol, and to give him a copy of it should his Excellency desire to have one.

C.

No. 874.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 539.)

Foreign Office, June 2, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's confidential despatch No. 621 of the 27th ultimo, reporting a conversation which you had with Count Walewski on the subject of the Vienna negotiations, and I have to acquaint you that I entirely approve the language held by your Excellency to the French Minister, as reported in that despatch.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 875.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 545.)

Foreign Office, June 2, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language held by your Excellency to Count Walewski, as reported in your despatch No. 634 of the 29th of May, respecting the course to be pursued at Vienna.

I have expressed myself in similar terms to the French Ambassador; and I have assured his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government were as anxious as the Government of the Emperor to avoid all course of difference with Austria, and to prevent, as far as possible, any misunderstanding that might exist from becoming apparent.

I added, however, that Her Majesty's Government were perhaps more alive than Count Walewski seemed to be to the disastrous consequences of being entangled in fresh negotiations upon some unsatisfactory proposal of Austria, vaguely accepted by Russia.

The Count de Persigny replied, that although he thought the Government of the Emperor had a greater interest than Her Majesty's Government in keeping on good terms with Austria, and might therefore be disposed to go further, in order to avoid a misunderstanding, yet that the objects of the two Governments were the same. The French Government desired that there should be no further discussion and no fresh negotiation, and that the Conferences should be definitively closed.

His Excellency also informed me that the Emperor had consented to the proposals of Count Walewski being submitted to Her Majesty's Government; but that His Majesty fully admitted the force of the objections that had been made to them.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 876.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

Foreign Office, June 2, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

YOU will have seen Lord Westmorland's despatch of yesterday on its way through Paris. I have little doubt that there is an understanding between Count Buol and the Russians. I will write again this evening to say what further instructions to Vienna we think necessary.

No. 877.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 2, 1855.

AS Count Buol persists, for reasons which he does not explain, in bringing forward at the Conference proposals to which we object, we think our Ministers should take no part in any discussion, beyond declaring that nothing having been proposed of a nature that we can accept, their Governments consider that negotiations are at an end, and that the Conference is finally closed, and that the Ministers should not attend any fresh Conference if one should be called.

We hope that instructions to that effect will be sent to M. de Bourqueney, or we shall certainly be entangled in fresh negotiations, that can lead to no useful end.

No. 878.

Count Buol to Count Colloredo.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo.)

Vienne, le 20 Mai, 1855.

M. le Comte,

LORD WESTMORLAND s'est acquitté des ordres de sa Cour en me donnant lecture d'une dépêche que Lord Clarendon lui a adressée sous la date du 8 courant, et à laquelle se trouvait jointe une autre dépêche que sa Seigneurie avait écrite à Lord Cowley, à la date du 5.

C'est avec un sentiment de sincère regret que nous avons relevé de ces pièces, dont les rapports de votre Excellence du 8 courant nous avaient déjà fait pressentir le contenu, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique n'a pas cru pouvoir accéder à nos propositions finales tendant à assurer le développement de la troisième garantie.

Lord Clarendon ayant fait observer que les détails de ces propositions, exposées à grands traits dans la dépêche du 13 Avril, dont votre Excellence a donné lecture à sa Seigneurie, ne lui étaient jamais parvenus de notre part dans une forme authentique, nous tenons à constater que M. Drouyn de Lhuys, qui, en arrivant ici après s'être abouché avec les Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique, avait été auprès de nous l'interprète de la pensée commune de l'un et de l'autre Cabinet, s'était également chargé, en nous quittant, de faire apprécier tant à son propre Gouvernement qu'à celui de la Grande Bretagne notre projet d'ultimatum, issu d'ailleurs de pourparlers confidentiels auxquels cet homme d'état ainsi que Lord John Russell avaient pris constamment part. C'est pour ne pas dévancer le compte-rendu de ce Ministre de Sa Majesté Britannique, pas plus que les ouvertures que nous avions devoir arriver à Londres par la voie de Paris, que nous nous sommes abstenus de faire parvenir directement au Cabinet de St. James la rédaction définitive de nos propositions, dont je transmets ci-près les copies. Ces propositions, dont la première comprend cinq Articles et l'autre six, auraient été présentées sous forme d'ultimatum au choix de la Russie. Vous trouverez également sous ce pli copie d'un projet de Traité entre l'Autriche, la France et la Grande Bretagne, lequel devait servir de complément à notre plan et qui stipulait le cas de guerre pour toute agression de la Russie de nature à mettre en péril l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, de même que pour le développement excessif des forces navales de la Russie dans l'Euxin.

Lord Clarendon n'attribue pas une grande valeur pratique à cette dernière stipulation, puisque, dit-il, l'Autriche a déjà déclaré ne pouvoir consentir à ce que la question de paix ou de guerre se rattache à huit ou dix vaisseaux. Mais nous nous permettons de rappeler à sa Seigneurie l'immense différence qu'il y a entre notre attitude dans la crise actuelle, où nous sommes encore libres de nos résolutions quant à la question de guerre, et la situation toute autre qui nous serait faite, le cas de guerre une fois clairement défini et stipulé par Traité. Dans cette éventualité il n'est permis à personne de douter que l'Autriche ne saurait remplir scrupuleusement les engagements contractés.

Lord Clarendon est d'avis que le moment serait arrivé pour la Grande Bretagne et la France d'inviter l'Autriche à délibérer avec elles, en exécution de

ses engagements, sur les moyens efficaces pour assurer l'objet du Traité du 2 Décembre.

Ici cependant se présente avant tout la question, quel est l'objet de l'alliance? Il n'est autre que le rétablissement de la paix sur la base des quatre principes communs. Les deux premiers de ces principes ont déjà obtenu un développement complet dans les Conférences de paix. Quant au troisième, nous avons proposé à nos alliés, en nous engageant à la soutenir au besoin par les armes, une solution qui, d'après notre intime conviction, serait efficace, complète et conforme à l'intérêt Européen.

Je ne saurais, M. le Comte, mieux vous faire connaître toutes les raisons que nous avons à produire à l'appui de ce point de vue, qu'en vous transmettant ci-près en copie les développements dans lesquels je suis entré vis-à-vis du Baron Hübner sur cette matière et que vous voudrez bien également placer sous les yeux de Lord Clarendon.

Si la Russie, mise en demeure d'accéder à l'une ou à l'autre des propositions de l'ultimatum, les eût rejetées toutes les deux, en ce cas il nous aurait été démontré qu'elle ne veut décidément point prêter son concours à la réalisation complète de la troisième garantie, en tant qu'elle a pour objet la cessation de la prépondérance Russe dans la Mer Noire. Les moyens de conciliation pour amener une paix telle que les intérêts de l'Europe et les nôtres en particulier l'exigent, ne pouvant dès lors être considérés que comme épuisés, l'Empereur notre auguste Maître était décidé à avoir recours à la force des armes pour aider à conquérir cette paix dont le besoin est si généralement senti et qui échouerait devant la résistance d'une seule Puissance. En revanche, aussi longtemps que l'absence de concours de la part de nos alliés met obstacle à cette dernière et décisive épreuve, notre appréciation impartiale ne nous permet pas de faire peser exclusivement sur la Russie la responsabilité de l'insuccès des négociations.

Nous désirons vivement que les réflexions consignés dans cette dépêche et dans celle annexée, soient de nature à modifier l'impression que notre plan a d'abord produite sur le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Si cependant contre le gré de nos désirs il n'en était point ainsi, il ne nous resterait qu'à former des vœux pour que les chances de la guerre, sur lesquelles nos alliés sont décidés à s'en reposer du soin d'amener la cessation de la prépondérance Russe dans la Mer Noire, tournent promptement de façon à atteindre ce but d'une manière qui serait, à leurs yeux, plus au niveau de leurs sacrifices que la solution que nous leur avons proposée.

Insister sur un engagement international à imposer à la Russie au sujet d'une limitation permanente de ses forces navales dans la Mer Noire, c'est là, nous sommes loins de le méconnaitre, un droit qui appartient aux belligérants, puisqu'ils se sont expressément réservé la faculté de poser en sus des quatre garanties des conditions particulières que la continuation des hostilités rendrait nécessaires. Mais nous prétendons que, produit d'une manière absolue à l'exclusion de tout autre moyen, fût-il également efficace, ce mode de solution ne saurait autoriser nos alliés d'invoquer vis-à-vis de nous les stipulations du Traité du 2 Décembre, et ne peut que rentrer dans la catégorie des conditions de paix de la nature indiquée ci-dessus et que le Protocole du 28 Décembre, en définissant la troisième garantie, fait expressément dépendre des événements de la guerre.

Fidèles à nos engagements et attachant du reste le plus grand prix aux liens qui nous unissent à l'Angleterre, nous attendrons, en nous maintenant fermes sur notre terrain politique, la tournure que prendront les événements et le moment propice pour renouer les négociations de paix, auxquelles nous ne concourrons, quoiqu'il arrive, qu'avec la résolution irrévocable de les faire aboutir au développement sérieux et efficace des quatre garanties.

Le langage que nous nous proposons de tenir à la Russie, et dont nous informerons, le cas échéant, exactement le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, sera empreint de ce même esprit.

Votre Excellence est chargé de donner à Lord Clarendon lecture et copie de cette dépêche et de ses annexes.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) BUOL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 878.

Propositions.

PREMIERE PROPOSITION.

Article 1. LES Hautes Parties Contractantes désirant que la Sublime Porte participe aux avantages du concert établi par le droit public entre les différents États de l'Europe, s'engagent chacune de son côté à respecter l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, garantissent en commun la stricte observation de cet engagement et considéreront en conséquence tout acte ou tout événement qui serait de nature à y porter atteinte, comme une question d'intérêt Européen. Si un conflit survenait entre la Porte et l'une des Puissances Contractantes, ces deux États, avant de recourir à l'emploi de la force, devraient mettre les autres Puissances en mesure de prévenir cette extrémité par les voies pacifiques.

Art. 2. Les Plénipotentiaires Russes et ceux de la Sublime Porte proposeront de commun accord à la Conférence l'effectif égal des forces navales que les deux Puissances riveraines entretiendront dans la Mer Noire et qui ne devra pas dépasser l'état actuel des bâtiments Russes à flot dans cette mer.

L'arrangement qu'ils auront pris entre eux à cet égard fera partie intégrante du Traité Général.

Seront également insérés dans le Traité les moyens dont les mêmes Plénipotentiaires seront convenus à l'effet de contrôler l'exacte et constante observation des dispositions du présent Article.

Art. 3. La règle de la clôture des Détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, consacrée par le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, restera en vigueur sauf les exceptions spécifiées dans les Articles suivants.

Art. 4. Chacune des Puissances Contractantes qui n'ont pas d'établissement dans la Mer Noire, sera autorisée par un firman de Sa Hautesse à faire entrer et stationner dans cette mer deux frégates ou bâtiments de moindre force.

Art. 5. Dans le cas où (ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise!) le Sultan serait menacé d'une agression, il se réserve le droit d'ouvrir les passages à toutes les forces navales de ses alliés.

SECONDE PROPOSITION.

Article 1. Les Hautes Parties Contractantes désirant que la Sublime Porte participe aux avantages du concert établi par le droit public entre les différents États de l'Europe, s'engagent chacune de son côté à respecter l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, garantissent en commun la stricte observation de cet engagement, et considéreront en conséquence tout acte ou tout événement qui serait de nature à y porter atteinte, comme une question d'intérêt Européen.

Si un conflit survenait entre la Porte et l'une des Puissances Contractantes, ces deux États, avant de recourir à l'emploi de la force, devraient mettre les autres Puissances en mesure de prévenir cette extrémité par les voies pacifiques.

Art. 2. La règle de la clôture des Détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, consacrée par le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, restera en vigueur sauf les exceptions spécifiées dans les Articles suivants.

Art. 3. Chacune des Puissances Contractantes qui n'ont pas d'établissement dans la Mer Noire, sera autorisée par un firman de Sa Hautesse à y faire entrer et stationner deux frégates ou bâtiments de moindre force pour protéger leur pavillon de commerce et exercer la surveillance nécessaire.

Art. 4. Si la Russie venait à augmenter l'état actuel flottant de ses forces navales, tel qu'il se trouvera dûment constaté, les Puissances Contractantes qui n'ont pas d'établissement dans la Mer Noire seraient autorisées par un firman de Sa Hautesse, en le notifiant cinq jours à l'avance, à faire entrer chacune dans cette mer un nombre additionnel de bâtiments de même classe, égal à la moitié des forces navales de la Russie.

Art. 5. En aucun tems les vaisseaux de guerre des nations étrangères, à

l'exception des bâtiments légers appartenant aux Ambassades admis jusqu'à ce jour, ne pourront jeter l'ancre à la Corne d'Or ; et en tems de paix, le nombre des vaisseaux de ligne des Puissances Contractantes qui n'ont pas d'établissements dans la Mer Noire, ne pourra être de plus de quatre à la fois devant Constantinople, dans leur trajet des Dardanelles à la Mer Noire et de la Mer Noire aux Dardanelles.

Art. 6. Dans le cas où (ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise!) le Sultan serait menacé d'une agression, il se réserve le droit d'ouvrir les passages à toutes les forces navales de ses alliés.

La lecture des six Articles terminée, les Plénipotentiaires Russes seraient confidentiellement informés que, vu la réserve faite par eux dans l'interprétation du premier Article, et qui décline l'engagement de faire respecter l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman ; vu encore leur refus d'admettre aucune limitation des forces Russes dans la Mer Noire ; l'Autriche, la France, et la Grande Bretagne, tout en respectant les droits de souveraineté de la Russie, feront usage de ces mêmes droits en convenant entre elles par un Acte formel :

1. De faire respecter, en cas de violation de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman par la Russie, le principe consacré dans le premier Article.

2. De considérer l'augmentation du nombre ou de la force de l'état naval Russe dans la Mer Noire jusqu'à l'effectif qu'il présentait au commencement de la guerre comme un cas de guerre.

Si la Russie s'engageait elle-même à ne pas dépasser ce chiffre, les trois Puissances consentiraient de leur côté à ne pas donner de publicité à la Convention.

Inclosure 2 in No. 878.

Projet de Traité.

LEURS Majestés l'Empereur d'Autriche, l'Empereur des Français, et la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande; animées du désir d'assurer l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, et voulant régler entr'elles l'exécution de l'engagement stipulé dans l'Article du Traité conclu le entre ont nommé pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, &c.

Lesquels, ayant trouvé leurs pleins pouvoirs ont arrêté les Articles suivants :

Article I. Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à employer, le cas échéant, leurs forces de terre et de mer pour atteindre le but ci-dessus indiqué.

Art. II. En conséquence si l'une des Puissances signataires du dit Traité du commettait contre l'Empire Ottoman une agression de nature à mettre en péril l'un ou l'autre des deux principes consacrés dans le préambule du présent Traité, les Hautes Parties Contractantes, sur l'appel du Sultan, concourraient à la défense de cet Empire dans des proportions déterminées pour chacune et délibérées en commun.

Art. III. Serait considéré comme un acte agressif devant donner lieu à l'application des Articles I et II, le développement excessif des forces navales de la Russie dans l'Euxin.

Art. IV. Ratifications.

Articles Secrets.

Article I. Dans le cas où la Russie viendrait à augmenter le nombre ou la force de son état naval dans la Mer Noire jusqu'à atteindre l'effectif qu'il présentait au commencement de la guerre, suivant le tableau ci-annexé, et si les remontrances adressées en commun à la Russie, ainsi que la présence des flottes alliées dans la Mer Noire, étaient restées sans effet, les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à considérer ce fait comme donnant lieu à l'application de l'Article III du Traité Patent de ce jour. En conséquence elles considéreront l'existence d'un tel effectif comme un cas de guerre et emploieraient immédiatement leurs forces de terre et de mer à l'effet de contraindre cette Puissance à rentrer dans les conditions d'équilibre que réclame l'intérêt Européen.

Art. II. Ratifications.

Inclosure 3 in No. 878.

Count Buol to Baron Hübner.

Vienne, le 20 Mai, 1855.

LE Baron de Bourqueney m'a donné lecture d'une dépêche en date du 10 de ce mois, par laquelle M. le Comte Walewski expose les motifs qui ont déterminé le Gouvernement Français à décliner les propositions que M. Drouyn de Lhuys avant de nous quitter s'était chargé de soumettre à la haute appréciation de l'Empereur son maître et dont je vous transmets ci-près copie, conjointement avec le texte d'un projet de Traité entre l'Autriche, la France et la Grande Bretagne, destiné à servir de complément à notre plan.

Les rapports que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser à la date du 9 de ce mois m'avaient préparé à cette communication, dont le contenu, je l'avoue, a été pour nous l'objet de sincères regrets. Ces regrets sont d'autant plus fondés, que la divergence d'opinion constatée par la dépêche de M. le Comte Walewski paraît porter non seulement sur les voies et moyens destinés à assurer l'application du troisième principe, mais encore sur la base de l'entente telle qu'elle a été établie à ce sujet par le Protocole du 28 Décembre dernier. M'étant empressé de rendre compte des ouvertures du Cabinet des Tuileries à l'Empereur notre auguste Maître, Sa Majesté m'a ordonné de vous faire connaître le jugement qu'elle en porte et dont vous êtes chargé de faire part à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Le Comte Walewski établit dans sa dépêche que l'Empereur Napoléon, après s'être mis d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, n'a pu trouver dans nos propositions une solution qui répondit à la fois aux sacrifices de la France et aux intérêts d'ordre Européen qui lui ont fait tirer l'épée.

Après mûr examen Sa Majesté est demeurée convaincue de l'inefficacité du système exposé dans l'ultimatum que l'Autriche était prête à adresser à la Russie, puisque ce système ne mettrait d'aucune façon un terme à la prépondérance Russe, dont la cessation est devenu le but de la guerre.

Examinons d'abord si une solution telle que notre plan la développe, répondrait effectivement si peu au but auquel visent les efforts communs des Puissances alliées ; si, faite dans les termes de notre ultimatum, la paix ne serait bonne que pour la Russie ; si, enfin, cette Puissance seule—comme l'affirme M. le Comte Walewski—aurait grandi dans la lutte qui devait la diminuer.

Pour ne pas se tromper dans cette appréciation, il importe, avant tout, d'embrasser d'un coup-d'œil l'ensemble des conditions de paix, puisque ce n'est qu'ainsi qu'on pourra se former un jugement exact sur la question si la paix réunirait, ou non, tous les caractères requis de durée, de sécurité, et de solidité.

Parmi les bases de paix qui ont servi de points de départ aux négociations, la première ainsi que la seconde ont été développées de manière à pouvoir les considérer comme complétement acquises. Quant à la troisième, elle se compose de deux objets distincts. En tant qu'elle a pour but de sauvegarder l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, le Cabinet de Paris reconnaît lui-même que notre plan ne laissait rien à désirer, puisqu'il assurait pour ainsi dire l'existence politique de la Turquie, et que dorénavant rien de ce qui la touchie, rien de ce qui la menacerait, ne serait plus une affaire à régler entre elle et son puissant voisin. Tout en convenant de l'importance de ce premier résultat, le Cabinet de Paris fait ressortir que la cessation de la prépondérance Russe dans la Mer Noire, cessation qui formerait l'autre objet de la troisième garantie, ne serait pas atteinte par nos propositions.

Qu'il nous soit permis de faire observer d'abord que toute attaque dirigée contre l'Empire Ottoman, soit du côté de la terre, soit par mer, constituerait une violation flagrante de la garantie Européenne sous laquelle il aurait été placé.

Il nous semble qu'en face de cette stipulation la flotte Russe dans la Mer Noire perderait presqu'entièrement ce qu'elle avait de dangereux pour cet

Empire. Mais, abstraction faite de cette considération générale, les exceptions au principe de la clôture des Détroits stipulées par les Articles 3 et 4 de notre seconde proposition, n'offriraient-elles pas des garanties suffisantes contre le développement excessif des forces navales de la Russie dans la Mer Noire? Quel est en effet l'objet de ces stipulations? Prenant pour point de départ l'état à flotte de la marine Russe, nous commençons par y opposer, indépendamment des forces navales de la Turquie, un contrepoids de six frégates de station et de surveillance. Pour chaque bâtiment nouveau que la Russie viendrait à construire, nous stipulons en faveur des alliés la faculté d'augmenter proportionnellement leurs stations navales dans l'Euxin. Dans l'éventualité enfin où la Sublime Porte se croirait menacée, nous lui réservons la liberté d'appeler les flottes alliées. Peut-on méconnaître le poids et la valeur de cet appui progressif prêté à la Turquie? Et qu'on ne nous objecte pas que ce système imposerait aux Puissances maritimes des sacrifices onéreux. Ces sacrifices ne dépasseraient guères les limites des stations navales qu'elles entretiennent habituellement dans la Méditerranée.

D'ailleurs, ne nous y trompons pas. Si l'Europe ne veut pas laisser son œuvre incomplète, si elle attache vraiment un intérêt sérieux à la consolidation de la Turquie, inséparable à nos yeux de l'amélioration réelle du sort des populations Chrétiennes de cet Empire, les Puissances garantes se trouveront pendant longtemps encore dans la nécessité de constater, pour ainsi dire, leur présence sur les lieux au moins par quelques vaisseaux de guerre.

Quoiqu'il en soit, est-il probable que la Russie sera très pressée de faire construire de nouveaux bâtiments dans la Mer Noire, du moment qu'elle saura que ce serait provoquer la mise en œuvre des contrepoids stipulés dans cette hypothèse?

A supposer enfin qu'elle fut néanmoins tentée de la faire, est-ce que l'engagement mutuel des Puissances de considérer comme un cas de guerre le développement des forces navales Russes au delà d'une limite convenue d'avance, ne suffirait pas pour étouffer dans le germe ces velléités?

Cela posé, peut-on avec quelque apparence de fondement prétendre que la paix ne serait bonne que pour la Russie; cette paix qui lui enlèverait, avec la protection sur les Principautés, le fruit d'une série de guerres heureuses—paix qui ouvrirait le Danube, placerait la Turquie sous la garantie de l'Europe, obligerait la Russie à renoncer, sous peine d'une rupture avec l'Europe, au développement excessif de ses forces navales dans la Mer Noire, anéantirait le principe et le prétexte de son ingérence dans les affaires des sujets Chrétiens du Sultan, et donnerait enfin naissance à un nouveau système politique, fécond en conséquences et qui, en perpétuant vis-à-vis de l'isolement de la Russie l'alliance des trois Cours, serait de nature à faire renoncer la Russie à tout jamais à la poursuite de projets ambitieux et envahissants en Orient.

Mais quittons le terrain des considérations générales et entrons encore dans l'examen spécial de la solution de la seconde partie du troisième point, puisque c'est elle qui a été la pierre d'achoppement de nos propositions. Consultant à ce sujet le texte du Protocole du 28 Décembre, auquel le Comte Walewski remonte à son tour, nous trouvons que ce texte ne fait qu'indiquer le principe de la cessation de la prépondérance Russe dans la Mer Noire, en établissant que les arrangements à prendre à cet égard dépendent trop directement des événements de la guerre pour qu'on puisse dès à présent en arrêter les bases.

Le temps a marché depuis; mais les événements de la guerre n'ayant point modifié la situation au point de fournir des éléments positifs de solution, nous n'avons pu que les emprunter à un ordre d'idées embrassant non seulement la complication du jour, mais encore et surtout les prévisions de l'avenir et les intérêts généraux de l'Europe.

Qu'on n'oublie pas d'ailleurs que l'ultimatum à présenter à la Russie lui laissait le choix entre deux modes de solution. Nous ne tenons point pour impossible que, placé dans l'alternative péremptoire et voulant se soustraire aux dangers de l'isolement politique dont il était menacé par la seconde de nos propositions finales, le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg eût opté pour l'autre, qui est au fond d'origine Française et qui a pour point de départ la limitation égale des forces navales des deux Puissances rivelaines. M. le Comte Walewski, de son côté, ne met pas en doute que la Russie ne se fut hâtée d'adhérer à la seconde proposition de l'ultimatum; tant lui semblent évidents les avantages que cette Puissance en aurait retirés. Nous sommes loin, je l'avoue, de partager à

cet égard le même sentiment de sécurité auquel se livre M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Car tout en faisant une large part à l'impression qu'aurait produite sur le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg la certitude qu'un rejet absolu de sa part de l'une et de l'autre des combinaisons aurait pour effet immédiat la guerre avec l'Autriche, nous ne saurions nous empêcher de mettre dans l'autre bassin de la balance le poids de la pression exercée sur la Cour de Russie par le sentiment national surexcité par l'opiniâtre résistance de ses armées en Crimée.

A supposer enfin que les prévisions de M. le Comte Walewski, pour l'appréciation desquelles les données au reste nous manquent, se fussent vérifiées, nous croyons avoir démontré que nous étions parfaitement autorisés à considérer de bonne foi la solution qui aurait prévalu alors, comme sérieuse et efficace.

Ajoutons encore une observation qui servira à élucider davantage ma pensée. Quel est le but de la guerre actuelle? Faire cesser la prépondérance de la Russie, répond la dépêche de M. le Comte Walewski.

Nous sommes d'accord s'il est question de la puissance politique de la Russie en général. En revanche vouloir restreindre à la Mer Noire la cessation de la prépondérance Russe, ce serait attribuer la valeur du but à ce qui n'est qu'un des moyens.

Dans notre opinion les efforts communs des alliés devraient viser à limiter la puissance politique de la Russie au point de lui rendre, si non impossible, du moins éminemment difficile l'abus de ses ressources matérielles.

La diminution, voire même la destruction totale de la flotte Russe dans la Mer Noire, ne suffirait pas à elle seule pour enlever à la Russie les avantages que lui donne vis-à-vis de la Turquie sa position géographique.

Opposer à ceux-ci un ensemble de garanties navales et de contrepoids matériels, telle était la pensée dominante de notre plan, dont l'exécution, jointe au développement du système défensif des Principautés, déposé déjà en germe dans les principes consacrés dans les Conférences, aurait offert, j'en suis convaincu, tant à l'Empire Ottoman qu'à l'Europe, les gages de sécurité que l'un et l'autre réclament à si juste titre.

Nous désirons vivement que ces réflexions soient de nature à faire paraître notre plan sous un jour plus favorable aux yeux du Cabinet Français.

Si toutefois il n'en était pas ainsi, que nous resterait-il à faire, puisque d'autres modes de solution, propres à amener un dénouement pacifique, ne se présentent point à notre esprit?

Nos alliés croyant devoir attendre un développement plus complet de la troisième garantie des chances de la guerre, nous ne pouvons que former des vœux pour qu'elles tournent de manière à amener promptement une solution qui semblerait aux belligérants plus au niveau de leurs sacrifices que celle que nous leurs avons proposée.

Décidée autant que la France à rester fidèle aux termes et à l'esprit de l'alliance, l'Autriche n'envisage pas la demande d'un engagement international à imposer à la Russie au sujet d'une limitation permanente de ses forces navales dans l'Euxin, comme rentrant dans les stipulations du Traité du 2 Décembre.

Présentée, à l'exclusion de tout autre mode de solution, fût-il également efficace, cette condition de paix appartient, selon nous, à la catégorie des questions dont la décision, aux termes mêmes du Protocole du 28 Décembre, est réservée à la marche des opérations militaires.

Nous attendrons dès lors de pied ferme la marche des événements et le moment propice pour renouer les négociations de paix, auxquelles nous ne concourrons pour notre part, quoiqu'il arrive, qu'avec la résolution irrévocable de les faire aboutir à la réalisation loyale, efficace et complète des quatre garanties.

C'est de cet esprit très positif que seraient également empreintes les ouvertures que nous ferions au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg et dont comme de raison nous ne manquerions pas, le cas échéant, d'informer exactement le Gouvernement Français.

Votre Excellence est chargée de donner lecture et copie de cette dépêche à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) BUOL.

No. 879.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)

Vienna, June 3, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

CONSUL-GENERAL COLQUHOUN écrit de Bucharest, Saturday, 11 P.M.:

"Latest intelligence from Sea of Azoff bears, that in four days the allied steam flotilla has destroyed 240 vessels, and 6,000,000 of rations of corn and flour destined for Russian army at Sebastopol. Genitchi in Azoff bombarded. Sailors and marines landed; ninety vessels burnt, and Government depôt of grain destroyed. Send home."

No. 880.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3, 7 P.M.)

Paris, June 3, 1855, 1·45 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE just had a long conversation with Count Walewski, not very satisfactory; but he will, I hope, inform M. de Bourqueney that he has seen the instructions sent to Lord Westmorland, and that he coeurs in them. He makes, however, his final consent depend on the Emperor's sanction. Count Walewski thinks that it is not made sufficiently clear in your despatch to Vienna, that Lord Westmorland is to attend the Conference to-morrow.

No. 881.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 246.)

Vienna, May 30, 1855.

My Lord,

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 194 of the 22nd instant, I transmitted to Count Buol a copy of Mr. Colquhoun's despatch (No. 25 of 29th April), in reply to the charge brought against him by General Coronini of having received into his house a Hungarian exile, and I have requested Count Buol, according to your Lordship's desire, to cause the charge question to be thoroughly investigated, and the result made known to Her Majesty's Government.

I have likewise brought before Count Buol your Lordship's observation, that no communication had been received to the reply given by Colonel Neale to the charge brought against him, and which was communicated by your Lordship to Count Colloredo on the 19th of January last.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 882.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 251.)

Vienna, May 31, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship in translation a circular despatch addressed by Count Buol to the Austrian Representatives at the German Courts, which has this day appeared in the public journals of Vienna, and which authorises the Representatives in question to communicate to the Governments to which they are accredited, the Protocols of the recent Conferences at Vienna.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 882.

Circular addressed to the Austrian Ministers at the German Courts.

(Translation.)

Vienna, May 14, 1855.

Your ,

THE resolution of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty to lay the Protocols of the Vienna Conferences before Parliament, makes the negotiations for peace carried on hitherto, public at a moment when they cannot be looked upon as terminated.

In the close of the Protocol of the twelfth Conference, Austria declares that she does not look upon the means of bringing about a solution of the negotiations relative to the third point as exhausted, and that she would regard it as her peculiar task to occupy herself with bringing about an understanding by examining the "modalités." The Plenipotentiaries of England and France declared that their instructions were exhausted, but not that the negotiations were closed, and when, subsequently, in the 13th Protocol, the refusal of a proposal of Russia's had been recorded, Austria determined to recommend confidentially some new proposals to the serious consideration of the Courts of Paris and London, in which proposals she believes a loyal and entire fulfilment of the guarantee of the third point may be found, and which His Majesty the Emperor, our Imperial Master, considers adapted to be laid as an ultimatum before the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

The last Protocols of the Conferences have therefore left the negotiations still pending, and the Austrian Government for their part would have hesitated at this moment to emerge from the due reserve which in the interest of an object equally important to all, they had imposed on themselves.

Our intention always was to inform our German allies, as soon as we should be at liberty to do so, of the entire course of the negotiations for peace, and we should have looked upon it as incompatible with our sentiments as a member of the German Confederation, to have delayed fulfilling this intention a moment longer than appeared to us necessary, out of consideration for the uninterrupted course of the pending negotiations. The announcement, in the English Parliament, of the production of the Protocols, made it therefore appear necessary to us to cause these documents to be printed, for communication to the Governments of Germany, and you are herewith desired to forward the inclosed official documents, with a copy of this despatch, to the Government of

As we make this communication before the result of the negotiations (which are not yet terminated) is determined, we attach to it no other object than the fulfilment of a due consideration towards our German allies. We do not at present combine with it any opinion on the present state of things, but shortly we may be in a situation to lay clearly before the Governments of the German Confederation our views, which cannot be uninfluenced by the answer from the Cabinets of Paris and London to our above-mentioned proposals.

Believe me, &c.

(Signed) BUOL.

No. 883.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 219.)

Berlin, May 31, 1855.

My Lord,

IN my despatch No. 217 of 29th instant, I forwarded the translation of a despatch which had been addressed by Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim, and I have now the honour to inclose herewith translations of two despatches of Count Buol's therein referred to, dated Vienna, May 17.

The one is addressed to Count George Esterhazy, the Austrian Envoy at this Court, and the other is the Austrian circular to the German Courts upon the subject of Count Nesselrode's despatch to M. de Glinka, of the 13th ultimo.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 883.

Count Buol to Count Esterhazy.

(Traduction.)

M. le Comte, *Vienne, le 17 Mai*, 1855.

LE Cabinet Prussien a eu connaissance par M. de Bismark de l'incident auquel a donné lieu à Frankfurt la démarche dont le Chargé d'Affaires de Russie, M. de Glinka, a été chargé par sa Cour. Nous sommes heureux de prendre acte de ce que M. de Bismark n'a provoqué à la Diète aucune discussion sur cette démarche de la Cour de Russie, et nous sommes certains qu'une discussion pareille ne sera provoquée ni par la Prusse ni par l'Autriche.

Pour ce qui regarde les autres Cours Allemandes, nous avons la confiance qu'elles ne voudront donner aucune suite à cette tentative réitérée de la Russie pour séparer les intérêts particuliers de l'Allemagne des intérêts généraux de l'Europe : car la Russie n'a pas d'autre but que de maintenir la disunion en Allemagne, et de s'assurer autant que possible des résolutions des Cours Allemandes avant le résultat final des Conférences à Vienne et avant que nous soyons en mesure de nous expliquer vis-à-vis de nos confédérés sur l'ensemble de cette affaire et sur les véritables obligations qui en découleront pour l'Allemagne.

Pour ne laisser subsister aucun doute sur le point de vue auquel nous nous plaçons pour apprécier la déclaration de la Russie à Frankfurt, nous adressons la circulaire ci-joint à nos Représentants en Allemagne.

Nous prions votre Excellence de la communiquer à M. de Manteuffel et d'exprimer en même temps à M. le Président du Conseil notre ferme espérance que la manière de voir du Cabinet de Berlin se trouve être conforme à la nôtre.

Inclosure 2 in No. 883.

Austrian Circular addressed to the German Courts.

Vienne, ce 17 Mai, 1855.

LE Chargé d'Affaires de Russie près la Confédération Germanique, M. de Glinka, a communiqué aux membres de l'Assemblée Fédérale la note ci-jointe de M. le Comte Nesselrode, qui contient l'assurance que Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, même dans le cas d'une rupture des Conférences de Vienne, se regardera comme lié au sujet de la solution qui est intervenu au sein des Conférences au sujet de la situation future des Principautés et du réglement de la libre navigation sur le Danube, aussi longtemps que les Cours Allemandes observeront une stricte neutralité. M. le Comte de Rechberg ayant demandé à M. de Glinka s'il était chargé de faire une communication officielle de cette note à la Diète, celui-ci a répondu négativement et a ajouté qu'il croyait se conformer aux intentions de son Gouvernement en se bornant à la communiquer individuellement aux Ministres près la Diète.

Le Comte de Rechberg a fait part confidentiellement de son entretien avec le Chargé d'Affaires de Russie aux membres de la Commission Militaire, et la majorité a été d'avis que l'ouverture du Cabinet de Pétersbourg ne devait pas être communiquée au Président et par celui à l'Assemblée Fédérale, mais simplement par le Chargé d'Affaires de Russie individuellement aux membres de la Diète. La démarche de la Cour de Russie n'a été l'objet d'aucune délibération de la part de la Diète ; les simples convenances s'opposaient à une discussion sur cet objet dans un moment aussi critique. L'Autriche est loin assurément de méconnaître le mérite de l'entente qui a été obtenue sur ces deux points dans les Conférences de Vienne. C'est sur sa recommandation que la Confédération Germanique s'est appropriée les deux points. Nos confédérés, par la communication qui leur a été faite des Protocoles des Conférences, ont pu apprécier nos efforts pour atteindre ce résultat et ce n'est pas sans un sentiment de satisfaction que nous avons vu les Gouvernements Allemands réserver la déclaration que la Russie est prête à maintenir les résultats qu'ont données les négociations, afin de mettre hors de question les intérêts Allemands. Mais, les quatre garanties des négociations de paix forment surtout pour ceux qui y ont participé, et la Diète

aussi les a reconnues dans leur ensemble comme une base propre à assurer en Europe un état de droit et de paix. Ce n'est que lorsque la crise à laquelle les négociations sont soumises à notre grand regret sera terminée que l'Autriche sera en état de juger ce que commanderont les intérêts de l'Europe et de l'Allemagne et pourra s'exprimer avec détail et sincèrement vis-à-vis de ses confédérés. Nous avons la conviction que la confiance que notre politique inspire aux membres de la Confédération Germanique ne sera qu'augmentée par l'offre de la Cour Impériale de Russie, et nous croyons pouvoir compter qu'ils ne songent nullement à attacher aux déclarations de la Russie des propositions et des résolutions qui pourraient tourner contre l'Autriche ou du moins augmenter encore les difficultés dont notre tâche est déjà hérissé.

No. 884.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 224.)

My Lord, *Berlin, May 31*, 1855.

I HAVE read to Baron Manteuffel your Lordship's despatch No. 174 of the 22nd instant, relating to Count Nesselrode's despatch of the 15th ultimo to M. de Glinka, at Frankfort.

I drew his Excellency's attention to the observation, that if the German Powers were to take an active part in the war against Russia, it would not depend upon Russia to settle the arrangements to be made about the Principalities or the Danube; because Russia would have to submit to any reasonable conditions which the allies might think it right to impose upon her, but was unable to extract any remark which might lead one to suppose that there was the most remote chance of the cooperation of Germany in the present struggle.

He gave me understand that the Russian despatch would probably not be laid before the Diet; but that even if it were so, it would not be for the purpose of provoking discussion in the Assembly, and be merely placed on record in the archives.

I endeavoured to learn whether the objection which was said to have been raised by some of the German Governments to the condition of strict neutrality which Russia requires from Germany in consideration of her concessions respecting the Principalities and the Danube, had not been referred to St. Petersburgh in the hope that the words of the despatch would be modified by that Cabinet?

His Excellency replied, that he understood Russia was not disposed to make any alteration whatever; and he evidently wished me to believe that the communication would prove a failure, and not effect the object it had been calculated to produce.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 885.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 227.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 1*, 1855.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch to Lord Westmorland No. 202 of the 29th ultimo, in which you inclose to his Lordship a copy of my telegraphic communication of the 28th ultimo (vide my despatch No. 221 of the 31st), I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I have just had some conversation with Baron Manteuffel on the subject of this despatch, and have learned from his Excellency that Count Esterhazy, in making this communication, stated that it was intended for his own personal information and for that of the King.

I inquired if the Austrian Minister had stated what reception he expected the proposals were likely to meet with in London and in Paris. His Excellency

replied that Count Esterhazy expressed the hope that they would be favourably received by the English and French Governments, but that he had been since informed that this was not likely to be the case, and that he had written to Vienna to thank Count Buol for the communication, which he considered of no value except as an historical record.

Baron Manteuffel told me in reply to a question which I put to him as to the truth of a report which had reached me, that the Austrian Government had made similar communications in the form of a circular to other German Courts; that he was not aware of any circular having been sent from Vienna, but that the Bavarian Government had received a communication on the subject, and he believed that of Hanover also, but that he could not speak as to the other Courts.

I asked his Excellency also whether the Austrian proposals were known at St. Petersburgh. He answered that he had reason to suppose that the Russian Government were ignorant of them, and that this certainly was Baron Werther's impression at the date of his last despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 886.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 5, 7·30 A.M.*)

Vienna, June 4, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

I AM just come from the Conference, which has closed its sittings.

After the opening speech of Count Buol, in bringing forward his project, I stated, after M. de Bourqueney, that I came to the Conference only at the invitation of Count Buol, and that I had no proposal to make. The Russian Plenipotentiaries desired to refer Count Buol's proposal to their Government, and the inquiry was addressed to Baron Bourqueney and myself if our instructions enabled us to agree to this. M. de Bourqueney replied that his Government considered the last refusal by Russia of any limitation of her fleet as final, and the Conference therefore as closed. I concurred with Baron Bourqueney's declaration, and stated that my Government saw no advantage to be derived from the continuance of the Conferences, and that they therefore considered the negotiations at an end, and the Conferences finally closed.

Count Buol concluded by stating that under these circumstances he considered the pledge he had given as fulfilled, and the Conference separated.

No. 887.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 5.*)

(No. 658.)

Paris, June 3, 1855.

My Lord,

I CALLED this morning at an early hour upon Count Walewski for the purpose of communicating to him the purport of your Lordship's second telegraphic despatch of yesterday's date, which reached me in the night. Upon my requesting him to send instructions by telegraph for M. de Bourqueney's guidance in the Conference to be held to-morrow, analogous to those which your Lordship informed me that you had addressed to the Earl of Westmorland, Count Walewski observed that there was no occasion for his so doing, as the written instructions with which M. de Bourqueney was already furnished coincided completely with the views of Her Majesty's Government. I found, however, upon inquiry that, although those instructions prescribed to M. de Bourqueney, in case Count Buol persisted in his intentions to make the propositions which had been objected to by the belligerent Powers, to declare the Conferences closed, there was this difference in the manner of doing it: Her Majesty's Government desire Lord Westmorland to declare "that nothing having been proposed of a nature that they can accept, they consider that negotiations are at an end, and

that the Conference is closed;" whereas M. de Bourqueney is instructed to say, "that since the principle of limitation has not been accepted by the Russian Plenipotentiaries, the French Government consider, &c." I remarked that it was this very principle of limitation that Her Majesty's Government were anxious should not be put forward, because they feared that it might be seized upon both by Austria and Russia as a handle for further negotiation.

Count Walewski answered, that in mentioning the word "limitation" he had taken it from your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 25th ultimo.

I replied that your Lordship's proposal in which the word "limitation" was to be found applied to very different circumstances. Her Majesty's Government might be willing to join in a declaration with Austria to close the Conferences, "because Russia had rejected limitation in every form;" but the matter assumed a different aspect when the Plenipotentiaries of the maritime Powers were called upon to make a declaration in opposition to proposals made by Austria.

I will not weary your Lordship with the details of a conversation which showed, as I have had the honour to remark before, a fixed intention on the part of Count Walewski, whatever may be his reasons, to bring the word "limitation" again before the Russian Plenipotentiaries. It was in vain that he attempted to persuade me that whether "limitation" was mentioned by us or not, it came to the same thing, since if Russia really meant to give way in this point, we could not prevent her taking steps of her own accord to show this intention. I remarked upon the difference between proposals emanating from Russia, and hints—not to call them offers—proceeding from ourselves, and I was forced at last to observe to him that the instructions sent to Lord Westmorland were precise, and could not be changed in the present state of public opinion in England, whoever might be Her Majesty's advisers, and it was for his Excellency therefore to consider whether he was prepared to show the Austrian and Russian Plenipotentiaries at Vienna that a difference of opinion, slight as it might be, prevailed between the Governments of the belligerent Powers. What was M. de Bourqueney to reply, if he was taken at his word, and the Russian Plenipotentiaries offered to continue negotiations on the principle of limitation, while Lord Westmorland maintained that none of Count Buol's proposals were satisfactory? Having said this, I added, I had done my duty, and should press the matter no further.

The conversation then turned on other subjects, but later Count Walewski reverted to this, and said—as if it had been a point already decided between us—that if he had the Emperor's sanction, he should write to M. de Bourqueney to say, that he had seen your Lordship's instructions of yesterday to Lord Westmorland, and that he concurred in them.

I must in justice to Count Walewski add, that throughout this conversation his Excellency was most anxious to make it appear that the French Government was as desirous as could be that of Her Majesty to close the Conferences. He reiterated that the only difference of opinion between them was, respecting the manner in which this should be done, so as to prevent Austria having an excuse to retire from the alliance and to adopt the policy of Prussia.

He was also careful to state, and he requested me to repeat it to your Lordship, that negotiations once broken off, the French Government would consider themselves unbound by anything that had passed during the Conferences, and free to act in any future negotiations in such a manner as, after preliminary consultation with Her Majesty's Government, might be deemed best for the interests of the two countries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 888.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 5.*)

(No. 662.)

Paris, June 4, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 658 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to state that Count Walewski informed M. de Bourqueney yesterday evening, by telegraph, that he had seen the instructions sent to Lord Westmor-

land, and that he found that they coincided with those with which M. de Bourqueney had himself been furnished, and that M. de Bourqueney was to take care that the language employed by himself and Lord Westmorland in the Conference of to-day, should show that no difference of opinion existed between the two Governments.

The Emperor desired that a direction to refuse all discussion should be added. Count Walewski demurred to this, as unnecessary, because M. de Bourqueney's written instructions gave strict injunctions in this respect, but the Emperor repeated his order. I am not in a position to say whether it was complied with.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 889.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir J. Milbanke.

(No. 34.) *Foreign Office, June 5, 1855.*

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 33 of the 19th ultimo, in which you mention that you had some conversation with M. Von der Pfordten on the Russian proceedings at the Conferences at Vienna, in regard to the navigation of the Danube, and as I infer from your report that his Excellency was disposed to consider the result of those proceedings as satisfactory, and that Russia had made real and valuable concessions in this respect to Germany, I have to instruct you to point out to Baron Von der Pfordten that in truth Russia has made no concession in regard to the navigation of the Danube, inasmuch as she only consented to an arrangement which had for its object to secure the doing of that which she was before bound to do, but the doing of which she has constantly, and upon the most false pretences, evaded.

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that in any Commission to be formed for regulating the navigation of the Lower Danube, it would be right that there should be a Bavarian Commissioner, because Bavaria is, according to the Treaty of Vienna, a river-bordering State, and entitled to participate in arrangements for the navigation of the river, if those arrangements are to be made in pursuance of that Treaty; and if those arrangements are to be independent of the Treaty of 1855, then Bavaria would be entitled to participate in the Commission, because she has a Treaty with Austria on the subject of the navigation of the Danube, throughout the whole extent of the Austrian dominions.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 890.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 669.) *Paris, June 5, 1855.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a copy of the telegraphic despatch by which M. de Bourqueney announced the termination of the Vienna Conferences.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 890.

Baron de Bourqueney to Count Walewski.

(Télégraphique.) *Vienne, le 4 Juin, 1855, à 4 heures du soir.*

LA Conférence s'est réunie. M. de Buol a donné lecture de son projet. Les Plénipotentiaires Russes ont déclaré qu'ils étaient sans pouvoir pour y adhérer, mais qu'ils le soumettraient à leur Cour.

Nous avons dû alors déclarer, Lord Westmorland et moi, que nos pouvoirs ne nous permettaient pas d'entrer en discussions sur un programme différent de celui qui avait été repoussé par les Plénipotentiaires dans la séance du 21 Avril, et qu'ainsi la mission de la Conférence était épuisée. Les négociations sont closes.

No. 891.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 560.)

My Lord. *Foreign Office, June 6, 1855.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that I entirely approve the language held by you to Count Walewski on the subject of the Vienna negotiations, as reported in your despatch No. 658 of the 3rd instant.

Your Excellency will inform Count Walewski that Her Majesty's Government learn with particular satisfaction that, negotiations once broken off, the French Government would consider themselves unbound by anything that had passed during the Conferences, and free to act in such a manner as, after preliminary consultation with Her Majesty's Government, might be deemed best for the interests of the two countries.

The views of Her Majesty's Government are in complete accordance with those of the Government of the Emperor upon this important subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON

No. 892.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 7.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 7, 1855.*

CONSUL-GENERAL COLQUHOUN écrit de Bucharest, 6 Juin:

"Cable across Danube, broken since 2nd.

"Wallachian service from Giurgevo here not sufficing, I have established daily messenger from Giurgevo to Bucharest, until some French employé can be sent to establish a temporary station at Giurgevo.

"Communicate home."

No. 893.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 7, 1855.*

IN my communication from Austria to the Diet we hope it will be made clear that the arrangements discussed at Vienna as a whole were to be adopted or rejected as a whole, and are not to be taken as so many substantive parts independent of each other.

The negotiations having been broken off, and the Conferences closed, we hold ourselves entitled to enter into any new negotiations entirely unfettered by past negotiations.

Inform Count Buol of this, and request him confidentially to delay making any communication to the Diet until he hears from us and the French Government, if it is his intention to assume that all that was provisionally agreed to at Vienna is to stand good as the foundation of future negotiation.

No. 894.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

Foreign Office, June 7, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE sent the following to Lord Westmorland. Ask the French Government to send a similar instruction:

"In any communication from Austria to the Diet, we hope it will be made clear that the arrangement discussed at Vienna as a whole, was to be adopted or rejected as a whole, and not to be taken as so many substantive parts independent of each other.

"The negotiations having been broken off, and the Conferences closed, we hold ourselves entitled to enter into any new negotiations entirely unfettered by past negotiations.

"Inform Count Buol of this, and request him confidentially to delay making any communication to the Diet until he hears from us and the French Government, if it is his intention to assume that all that was provisionally agreed to at Vienna is to stand good as the foundation of future negotiations."

No. 895.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 9.)

Vienna, June 8, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE read your despatch of yesterday to Count Buol. He states that he has not the intention of making an immediate communication to the Diet: you will therefore, as well as the French Cabinet, have the opportunity of transmitting any communications in writing.

Count Buol is expecting your answer to the despatch he has written to Count Colloredo, which is to be communicated to you.

No. 896.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 253.)

Vienna, June 5, 1855.

My Lord,

IMMEDIATELY upon the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 205 of the 29th ultimo,* I waited upon Count Buol, and, in pursuance of his desire, I furnished him with a copy of it in accordance with your instruction.

Count Buol, after expressing his satisfaction at the courteous expressions which your Lordship had employed in this despatch, announced his intention of replying to it through Count Colloredo; but he remarked upon some points, in which he thought his intentions in making his proposal to the Conference had not been correctly understood.

He stated that his object was, in fulfilling the pledge he had given as recorded in the last Protocol of the Conference, to make a proposition not in any way in behalf of the Governments of England and France, but entirely independent of them, and at the same time so much in unison with the views they had put forward in the course of the late negotiations, that it was entirely framed in accordance with the project M. Drouyn de Lhuys had drawn up, and had mentioned in the twelfth Conference.

* No. 860.

In preparing his own proposal, Count Buol said that he had not mentioned the details, such as the nomination of Consuls in the Russian harbours, because he considered that this point was included in the agreement proposed to be settled between the Russian and Turkish Plenipotentiaries, and afterwards to be sanctioned by the general Conference; and he considered it to be sufficiently alluded to in the wording of the 2nd Article of his Project, which stated that "seront également insérés les moyens dont les mêmes Plénipotentiaires seront convenus à l'effet de contrôler l'exacte et constante observation des dispositions du présent Traité."

With respect to the stipulation of a general amnesty, and to the necessary mention of the position and interests of Sardinia, he considered these points as belonging to the general terms required for the completion of any Treaty of Peace, and it therefore was with no intention of excluding them that he thought it unnecessary to record them in his project.

Count Buol said that in drawing up his proposal, he had no intention of giving up any of the conditions which the Governments of England and France had demanded for carrying out the object of putting an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, for his project was based upon the proposals of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, for the accuracy of which statement he could confidently appeal to all the Representatives of the Four Powers who had taken part in the discussion which had taken place on the day previous to the assembling of the twelfth Conference.

With regard to the closing part of your Lordship's despatch, which refers to the fulfilment of the obligations contracted by Austria by the Treaty of the 2nd of December, Count Buol said that this was a subject which was more immediately connected with the ultimatum which Austria had proposed to address to the Russian Government, in which was involved the question of an immediate declaration of war, and which he had submitted to your Lordship, but which it appeared you had declined, although he had not as yet received your decision upon the last communication he had made upon the subject through Count Colloredo, nor any acknowledgement of the receipt of the documents which accompanied it. He would therefore reserve himself until he received the answer he expected, before replying to your Lordship upon that part of your despatch.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 897.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 254.)

Vienna, June 9, 1855.

My Lord,

AT the Conference which took place yesterday, the result of which I reported to your Lordship in my telegraphic message, the Representatives present were Count Buol, General Baron Prokesch, M. de Bourqueney, Prince Gortchakoff, M. de Titoff, Aali Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador, and myself.

Previous to the meeting I had agreed with M. de Bourqueney (who had received directions to conform himself to the instruction given to me by your Lordship's telegraphic message of Saturday, the 2nd instant) as to the line we should pursue in the Conference; and as he would first be called upon, after Count Buol had made his proposal, to express his opinion upon it, it was settled that without taking any initiative, he would say that he considered it to be advisable that the Russian Representatives should first declare their sentiments upon this project, and that I should pursue the same line of conduct.

Your Lordship will find in the Protocol that this course was pursued, and that Prince Gortchakoff in his turn called upon M. de Bourqueney to declare whether he would support the project of Count Buol; to which interpellation he replied by explaining the position in which he was placed by his instructions.

Prince Gortchakoff then stated that he might abstain from entering upon any further discussion; but, notwithstanding, he would say that as this project was quite new to him, and as he believed it had been submitted by Count Buol

to England and France, he thought he was entitled to require that he should be allowed to refer it to his Government, and to ask their orders with regard to it.

Prince Gortchakoff also said, that in consideration of the courteous language which had been used by Count Buol in bringing forward his proposal, he would declare that as far as he was individually concerned, he did not foresee any objection on the part of his Government to the first Article of the Project. Nor did he object to that part of the second Article which proposed an agreement between his Government and the Porte as to the number of vessels of war they should respectively maintain in the Black Sea; but he considered the stipulation which limited the number of those ships of war to "l'état actuel des bâtiments Russes à flot dans cette mer," as offensive both to Turkey and to Russia, because when these Powers were called upon to settle amongst themselves what proportion of vessels was necessary for their respective service, it was not consonant to their dignity, nor to the consideration due to them, that foreign Powers should dictate to either of them the amount of force they considered it expedient to maintain.

Prince Gortchakoff therefore stated, that as far as his opinion was of any value, he should object to this limitation.

Upon the whole project, he remarked that he could not but express his belief that there might be found in it the basis of an arrangement.

M. de Titoff having adhered to the statements which had been made by Prince Gortchakoff, Aali Pasha declared that having considered the declaration made at the two last Conferences by the Russian Plenipotentiaries, that they could not agree to any limitation of the number of the Russian ships of war in the Black Sea, he had not asked for any fresh instructions from his Government, and therefore could only repeat what he had said at the preceding meetings of the Conference.

Baron Prokesch then stated that the question at present before the Conference, and which had been brought forward by Prince Gortchakoff, was, whether he could be allowed to refer the project proposed by Count Buol for the decision of his Government; and he appealed to me to know whether I felt myself empowered to agree to this proposition. I replied, that as the Russian Plenipotentiaries in the former Conferences had objected to any limitation of their vessels of war in the Black Sea, my Government saw no advantage to be derived from the continuance of the Conference; that I had no authority to take part in any discussion, but to declare that my Government considered the negotiations at an end, and the Conference as finally closed.

Baron Bourqueney said that he concurred on the part of his Government in this declaration.

Count Buol then stated that he considered the meeting might then separate. He expressed his regret at the failure of the object for which it had been assembled. He declared the mission which his Government had undertaken, and the pledge he had given to seek the means of bringing about an understanding between the Great Powers of Europe, as fulfilled; and henceforward, in the pursuit of the same object, he should not fail to take advantage of every opportunity which might present itself.

I have thus brought before your Lordship this general sketch of what took place yesterday at the Conference; the details will appear in the Protocol which I will transmit to your Lordship as soon as the lithographed copies have been distributed from the Imperial Chancery of State.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 898.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 9.*)

(No. 255. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 5, 1855.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 202 of the 20th ultimo, which remarks upon an apparent disparity between the language held by the Austrian Government to England and that which they have adopted towards

Prussia, I can only (relying upon the word of Count Buol) assure your Lordship that when his project of ultimatum was proposed to the allied members of the Conference assembled on the day previous to its twelfth sitting, he was distinctly of opinion that Russia would refuse that project, because he believed that if that Government accepted any of the proposals of arrangement which had been made to them they would prefer one containing the principle of limitation to the one which would bind the Governments of England, Austria, and France, and probably of Prussia, for ever with Turkey for the security of her integrity and independence, and which would entirely put an end to that *tête-à-tête* with Turkey which it had hitherto been the great object of Russia to maintain. Count Buol felt that a stipulation of limitation might, at the first relaxation in the entire unity of intentions which at present existed between the allies, have a chance of being evaded; whereas a Treaty amongst the Three if not the Four Great Powers of Europe, which guaranteed the safety of the Turkish Empire from all aggression, was a security for that Empire which no probable dissidence between the allied Powers would be likely to weaken or destroy.

Count Buol did therefore believe that if Russia was induced to accept any of the proposals of the allies, it would not be his own ultimatum, and therefore I cannot be surprised that he should have so represented his impressions to Her Majesty's Government and to France.

But at the date of Lord Bloomfield's telegraphic despatch (the 28th of May), of which your Lordship has sent me a copy, the communications which had been received from Count Colloredo, and which reported your Lordship's conversation with him, had decidedly given to Count Buol the impression that his ultimatum would be rejected by you. He was at that time still making a second attempt to obtain your consent to this ultimatum, which had been approved by all the Plenipotentiaries at Vienna; but I have no doubt, on referring to the date, your Lordship will be of opinion that he was justified in his impression that you would not accept it, and therefore it is possible he may so have expressed himself in his communications to Berlin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 899.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 9.*)

(No. 682.)
My Lord, *Paris, June 8, 1855.*

COUNT WALEWSKI has received M. de Bourqueney's report of the Conference of the 4th instant, written the same evening, and his Excellency has given me the following account of it.

It appears that M. de Bourqueney and Lord Westmorland had agreed, before the commencement of the Conference, that, after Count Buol had made his proposition, the Russian Plenipotentiaries should be invited to explain themselves, though, according to the usual form, it fell to M. de Bourqueney's lot to address the Conference after Count Buol had finished.

Count Buol made his proposition in the terms known to your Lordship. The Russian Plenipotentiaries, though invited by M. de Bourqueney, refused to follow until the Plenipotentiaries of the belligerent Powers had spoken.

M. de Bourqueney then declared that, since Russia had refused the project of limitation proposed by the allies at a former Conference, he must consider the negotiations closed, and the Conferences at an end.

Lord Westmorland followed in the same strain.

The Russian Plenipotentiaries then declared that they could neither accept nor refuse the Austrian propositions, but would refer them to their Government.

M. de Bourqueney says, however, that their language was much more that of acceptance than of refusal.

After this, a discussion (which M. de Bourqueney characterises as one of extreme vivacity) took place between himself and Prince Gortchakoff.

The latter endeavoured very adroitly to prove that there had never been

any difference of opinion between the Russian Plenipotentiaries and those of Austria, and that, in fact, there was nothing in the present propositions which had already been refused by the former.

M. de Bourqueney, on the contrary, established that the language now held by the Russian Plenipotentiaries was completely changed, and that they were making use of arguments which had, until now, been used against them.

I have not seen M. de Bourqueney's despatch, but this is the substance of it given by Count Walewski.

M. de Bourqueney enters into no details, referring Count Walewski to the Protocol, which was to be published on the following day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 900.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 683.) *Paris, June 8, 1855*

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship's telegraphic despatch of yesterday reached me late in the evening.

This morning I waited on Count Walewski, and, after informing him that Her Majesty's Government agreed in the opinion which his Excellency had expressed to me, that the negotiations at Vienna, once broken off, the belligerent Governments resumed their freedom, and were unfettered by any of the arrangements discussed in the Conferences, I said that Her Majesty's Government were under some apprehension lest, in the communication which Austria was about to make to the Diet, she should treat as settled those points which had been discussed, instead of considering them as parts of a whole, which could only become effective when the whole had passed under review.

I expressed a wish on your Lordship's part to Count Walewski that M. de Bourqueney should be instructed to state as much to Count Buol, should he find the intention of the Austrian Government to be such as your Lordship apprehended.

Count Walewski, while expressing his conviction that Count Buol could not put forward such pretensions, assented to your Lordship's wish, and will send instructions to M. de Bourqueney in the sense of those furnished to Lord Westmorland.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 901.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 684.) *Paris, June 8, 1855.*

My Lord,

I INQUIRED this morning of Count Walewski whether he had taken any steps at Vienna in consequence of Count Coronini having declared martial law in the Principalities, and making it applicable to strangers.

Count Walewski said that he had received this morning satisfactory explanations on the subject from Vienna, dated the 5th instant; that M. de Bourqueney had gone to Count Buol with the letter addressed by Count Coronini to the French Consuls in his hand; that Count Buol had at once disavowed the Austrian General's proceedings, and had immediately sent orders to the effect that any foreigners arrested on suspicion of suborning soldiers were to be given over to the Consul of the nation to which they belonged.

Count Walewski means to desire M. de Bourqueney to address a note to Count Buol in which the latter's declaration will be taken down in writing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 902.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 685. Confidential.)

Paris, June 8, 1855.

My Lord,

M. DE BOURQUENEY has written to Count Walewski to state that the position of the belligerent Powers at Vienna is becoming one of extreme gravity, and that great care and delicacy will be necessary in order to prevent the Austrian Government from declaring their neutrality. Every effort will naturally be made by the Russian Plenipotentiaries to obtain this concession, and Count Buol is evidently prepared to throw upon France and England a part at all events of the blame of the rupture of the Conferences.

Count Walewski wishes Her Majesty's Government to take this state of things into their earnest consideration. Every effort should be made, he thinks, to prevent Austria taking the step apprehended by M. de Bourqueney. His Excellency has desired the latter to endeavour to ascertain what the intentions of the Austrian Government really are, and to caution Count Buol, if necessary, as to the consequences which a complete separation from the allies may have for Austria.

The first question which will present itself will be the occupation of the Principalities. It will, in Count Walewski's opinion, be impossible to leave Austria in the possession of them. How could a neutral Power occupy a part of the territory of one of the belligerents?

Then it was to be apprehended that from neutrality Austria would wish to advance to mediation. Count Walewski wished your Lordship to reflect seriously on this position of affairs, and to concert with him the attitude which the two Governments should assume at Vienna.

I said that nothing could have been more cautious than the tone of your Lordship's last despatches to Vienna, and that there was not a word in them which could give Austria any pretext for separating from the Western Powers. I observed that, perhaps, one of the best methods to prevent the defalcation of Austria would be to hint that as a neutral she could not be left in possession of the Principalities.

Count Walewski said that he was of this opinion also, but that the hint must be given with courtesy and delicacy.

With regard to Austria taking the part of a mediator, I observed that luckily for the Western Powers there were declarations of Austria on record which showed that, openly at least, she utterly abjured any such pretension. Count Walewski replied that he had not forgotten this, and that during a conversation which M. de Bourqueney had lately held with Count Buol, in which the former had declared, under instructions, that the French Government could never permit that of Austria to assume such a position, Count Buol had repeated his former declarations.

Count Walewski is of opinion that it would not be prudent at the present moment to press Austria to fulfil the obligations which she contracted by the Treaty of the 2nd December. She might find in such a proceeding a pretext for declaring herself absolved from them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 903.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 686. Confidential.)

Paris, June 9, 1855

My Lord,

WITH reference to the present state of affairs at Vienna, Count Walewski has taken an opportunity, in talking confidentially to M. de Hübner of the unsettled state of Italy, to remind him that the Treaty which binds the French

Government to aid to a certain extent in the prevention of any outbreak in that country, is intimately connected with the Treaty of the 2nd December, and that if Austria fails to fulfil the engagements contracted under the latter, the stipulations of the former become null and void.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 904.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 691.) *Paris, June 8, 1855.*

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI informs me that he sent an instruction two days ago to M. de Persigny, in consequence of a note which had been addressed to the French Government lately by the Sardinian Minister, from which it appeared that the Sardinian Government demanded to be admitted into any future conferences which might be opened for the restoration of peace.

From the answer which he had received this morning from M. de Persigny, his Excellency was afraid that his ideas on the course to be taken had not been understood by your Lordship.

His proposition was this—that Sardinia should be allowed, at any future conference, to have a Plenipotentiary to attend to Sardinian interests. This Plenipotentiary would not assist at all the deliberations, but would be summoned when the clauses regarding Sardinia were discussed; but he would sign with the other Plenipotentiaries the General Treaty of Peace.

Count Walewski observed that there was a precedent for this proceeding at the Conferences of 1814 and 1815, when the smaller Courts of Europe were represented on all occasions when their interests were more particularly concerned, and he did not think that it would be prudent to place Sardinia in any more prominent position on the present occasion.

But, his Excellency added, as the question was one of great importance, and as he supposed that a similar communication will have been made to your Lordship by M. d'Azeglio, as that addressed to the French Government by M. de Villa Marina, he was exceedingly anxious that the answer returned by the two Governments to Sardinia should be identic, and he hopes that your Lordship will have no objection to communicate with him before you reply to M. d'Azeglio.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 905.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 66. Confidential.) *Frankfort, June 6, 1855.*

My Lord,

THE Whitsuntide holidays were the cause of no sitting of the Diet being held last week; but, independent of that reason, I learn that a sitting would have been avoided, and if a meeting takes place to-morrow it will be only for the purpose of getting through with business of routine, a resolution being taken not to touch the weighty questions of further warlike preparation or of neutrality for the present.

I am credibly informed that an overture has been made from Vienna to Berlin in this sense: that it being most desirable that the union of Germany should not, under present circumstances, be imperilled, it would be well that neither of the two States should take any step in the Diet, until or unless they could agree in making their proposals in common.

I have also learnt, from good authority, that M. de Bismark has expressed himself pretty much to this effect: that he was now perfectly tranquil and reassured that events were bringing Austria round to take the same view of the Eastern question as was already taken by Prussia; that consequently his Government would not take any step in the Diet to render Austria's position more difficult, but quietly await her return to what he designates as sound German policy.

I have myself had so little direct intercourse with M. de Bismark of late, that I am obliged to report these remarks of his Excellency to your Lordship at second hand. Their probability is, however, in a great degree corroborated by the sudden reserve and coldness which both myself and my French colleague have remarked on the part of all the Austrian diplomatic servants, from Count Rechberg downwards.

The last time I have had any serious conversation with the President of the Diet was immediately after the reception of the Polish deputation by the Emperor of the French, an event which impressed him very strongly, and which, as I then had the honour of reporting, his Excellency termed "une question de vie ou de mort."

Since that period Count Rechberg has studiously avoided discussion. I have, however, found occasion to express opinions of Austrian policy to other members of the Diet, pretty much to this effect:—That whereas Russia must already have been irretrievably offended, Austria's actual halting course was calculated, to say the least, to cool the friendly sentiments entertained and shown towards her by England and France, as well as to ruin her influence in Germany, by her seeming not only to shrink from contest with Russia, but to subordinate her action to Russia, playing therefore in reality a merely secondary part.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 906.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 260.)

My Lord, *Vienna, June 7, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Aali Pasha has settled to leave Vienna on Saturday next, on his return to Constantinople. He has been received here with great distinction by the Emperor, who has recently decorated him with the Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stephen, in token of the high consideration in which he is held by His Majesty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 907.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 261.)

My Lord, *Vienna, June 7, 1855.*

IT is the intention of the Emperor to proceed from Vienna on Tuesday next to inspect his army at present assembled in Gallicia and the Bukowina.

His Imperial Majesty will be accompanied by General Baron Hess, the Commander-in-chief of that army.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 908.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 9.*)

(No. 266.)

Vienna, June 7, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour of transmitting herewith to your Lordship five lithographed copies of the Protocol No. 14, to one of which the signatures of the Representatives are attached, in the order in which they are affixed to the original document.

I have reserved two copies, one of which I will transmit to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and the other to Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 908.

Protocol (No. 14) of a Conference held at Vienna, June 4, 1855.

Présens :

Pour l'Autriche—
M. le Comte de Buol-Schauenstein, et
M. le Baron de Prokesch-Osten ;

Pour la France—
M. le Baron de Bourqueney :

Pour la Grande Bretagne—
M. le Comte de Westmorland ;

Pour la Russie—
M. le Prince de Gortchakoff, et
M. de Titoff ;

Pour la Turquie—
Aali Pacha, et
Arif Effendi.

LE Comte de Buol a ouvert la séance par les paroles suivantes :

" Dans la douzième Conférence j'ai eu l'honneur d'énoncer l'opinion que les modes de solution propres à réaliser complétement la troisième garantie n'étaient point épuisés et j'ai réclamé en particulier pour l'Autriche la tâche de s'occuper de la recherche des moyens de rapprochement.

" Nous nous sommes voués à l'accomplissement de cette tâche avec un zèle proportionné à la gravité des intérêts qui se trouvent en jeu. Les éléments de la solution que je vais soumettre à l'appréciation de la Conférence, je les ai puisés dans nos délibérations précédentes. En les récapitulant dans mon esprit, je me suis convaincu que plusieurs principes, admis de part et d'autre, pouvaient être considérés comme hors de discussion. Ces principes sont :

" 1. Rattacher l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman plus complétement à l'équilibre Européen.

" 2. Établir une juste pondération des forces maritimes entre les deux Etats riverains de la Mer Noire.

" 3. Donner une nouvelle consécration à la règle de la fermeture des Détroits, tout en réservant à la Sublime Porte la faculté d'appeler les flottes de ses alliés, lorsqu'elle se croirait menacée.

" Ces bases étant acquises à la négociation, quel est l'obstacle qui s'est opposé à une entente parfaite sur l'ensemble de la troisième garantie ?

" La difficulté principale, je dirais la seule, réside dans le refus de la Russie de s'imposer par Traité une limitation unilatérale de ses forces navales dans la Mer Noire. Mais tout en qualifiant un pareil engagement d'attentatoire aux droits de souveraineté de l'Empereur, les Plénipotentiaires de Russie n'ont pas d'avance décliné l'examen de toute proposition se rattachant au principe de la limitation, et ils sont convenus qu'une stipulation de cette nature ne porterait pas atteinte à l'honneur, du moment qu'elle serait le résultat du consentement mutuel des Parties Contractantes.

" Dans le but d'écarter cette difficulté l'un de MM. les Plénipotentiaires Français, qui n'assiste plus à nos délibérations, a indiqué un expédient que j'aime à reproduire, parce qu'il constate les sentiments de modération dont ses instructions étaient empreintes.

" Une entente de gré à gré entre les Plénipotentiaires de la Russie et de la Sublime Porte sur une base de pondération de leurs forces respectives et l'annexion subséquente au Traité Général de l'arrangement signé entre eux à ce sujet, ont été proposées par M. Drouyn de Lhuys comme un moyen propre à concilier tous les intérêts et toutes les convenances.

" Ce mode, inspiré, selon nous, par une pensée éminemment conciliante, nous semblait à la fois être l'application pratique d'un mot heureux du Plénipotentiaire Britannique, qui aussi n'est plus des nôtres.

" Aux yeux de l'Angleterre—c'est ainsi qu'il s'exprima—les meilleures conditions et les seules admissibles seraient celles qui, tout en étant les plus conformes à l'honneur de la Russie, fussent à la fois suffisantes pour la sécurité de l'Europe et pour obvier au retour des complications telles que celle à laquelle il s'agit de mettre fin.

" C'est donc cette idée, dont l'honneur appartient au Cabinet Français, qui a servi de base au projet dont je vais donner lecture et qui, parfaitement honorable pour toutes les parties, réunit, à nos yeux, tous les éléments d'une solution satisfaisante de la troisième garantie."

Après cet exorde il a donné lecture du projet ci-annexé en copie.

Cette lecture terminée, il conclut en s'exprimant ainsi qu'il suit :

" L'Autriche, je suis autorisé à le déclarer, verrait dans l'acceptation de ce programme les bases complètes d'une solution efficace et honorable pour toutes les parties. Constamment fidèle aux engagements qu'elle a contractés vis-à-vis de ses alliés, fidèle aux principes qu'elle a posés, mais placée en dehors de l'action hostile qui sépare les autres parties ici représentées, elle a dû envisager comme un devoir sacré émanant de sa position exceptionnelle, d'épuiser tous les moyens pour obtenir le triomphe de ces principes, tout en mettant, s'il était possible, fin aux calamités d'une guerre qui a déjà coûté tant de nobles victimes. C'est dans ces sentiments que l'Autriche présente cette proposition, en la recommandant à la considération sérieuse et bienveillante tant de ses alliés que de la Cour de Russie."

Le Baron Bourqueney déclare que la proposition de M. le Comte Buol ayant pour base un principe si itérativement et si péremptoirement repoussé par les Plénipotentiaires de Russie, c'est à eux à prendre d'abord la parole à ce sujet.

Le Comte Westmorland établit qu'il est venu assister à la Conférence en se rendant à l'invitation de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche, mais qu'il se trouve dans la même position où il était dans la dernière séance, lorsqu'il a déclaré épuisées ses instructions.

Le Prince Gortchakoff, en contestant l'opinion du Baron Bourqueney que la proposition du Comte Buol reposait sur un principe catégoriquement rejeté par les Plénipotentiaires de Russie, prie M. le Plénipotentiaire de France de vouloir bien s'exprimer le premier.

Le Baron Bourqueney constate alors que, pressé d'émettre son opinion, il se voit obligé à revenir sur le refus péremptoire et réitéré des Plénipotentiaires de Russie d'admettre la réduction de leurs forces navales par Traité et sur une base discutée en conférence. Ce refus a, comme de raison, laissé des traces et exercé une influence positive sur les directions dont son Gouvernement l'a muni dans la prévision de la Conférence qui serait convoquée par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche pour faire connaître les moyens de rapprochement à la recherche desquels il avait déclaré vouloir se livrer. Le projet présenté par

le Comte Buol ne se trouvant pas complétement atteindre les conditions que ses instructions antérieures indiquent, il est pour sa part dans le cas de déclarer, en ce qui le concerne, la mission de la Conférence épuisée.

Le Prince Gortchakoff établit, que d'après les déclarations qu'il vient d'entendre, les Conférences de paix ont cessé *de facto*. Son droit serait donc le silence absolu, puisque vouloir entrer en matière ce serait discuter sur des bases qui aux yeux de l'Autriche sont complètes, tandis que ses alliés les jugent insuffisantes. Il ne veut cependant pas se prévaloir de ce droit. Partant du fait que les propositions Autrichiennes ont déjà été pesées par les Cabinets de Paris et de Londres, il les portera également à la connaissance de sa Cour, au jugement de laquelle il doit réserver leur libre et entière appréciation.

Il énoncera toutefois son opinion personnelle comme témoignage d'égards pour le Cabinet qui a voué tant de soins à la rédaction du projet en question.

En l'analysant, il pose d'abord en fait que ce projet ne repose pas sur le principe que les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ont invariablement repoussé et qu'ils repousseront toujours. Passant aux différents Articles, il n'a rien à objecter au principe formulé par le premier. Quant au second, il trouve que son essence réside dans l'entente directe entre les Plénipotentiaires de Russie et de la Sublime Porte sur une pondération de leurs forces navales respectives. Il ne repousse pas une combinaison semblable, tout en soutenant que la fixation du chiffre de ces forces regarde les deux Puissances directement intéressées et que les droits de souveraineté de l'une et de l'autre seraient atteints, si d'autres Puissances voulaient à ce sujet leur faire la loi. Il est d'accord avec l'Article 3. Il trouve que les Articles 4 et 5 découlent au fond de l'Article 2 du contreprojet Russe, qui laissait Sa Hautesse le Sultan souverain juge de la question de savoir, s'il serait, ou non, conforme à ses intérêts d'ouvrir exceptionnellement les Détroits.

En résumé il trouve dans les principes généraux du projet du Comte Buol les bases d'une solution possible de la troisième garantie.

M. de Titoff partage cette opinion de son collègue, et sans avoir rien à ajouter à l'appréciation personnelle exposée par ce dernier, il s'associe pleinement à sa déclaration officielle de vouloir déférer le plan d'arrangement proposés par M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche à l'examen et à la décision de sa Cour.

Aali Pacha déclare que le projet d'une entente directe entre la Sublime Porte et la Russie avait pour base, comme les autres systèmes discutés au sein de la Conférence, le principe de la limitation. Le rejet réitéré et catégorique de ce principe de la part de MM. les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ayant amené l'abandon de tout plan de ce genre, son collègue et lui n'ont pas cru devoir provoquer des instructions de leur Cour sur ce même projet, et ils se trouvent par conséquent dans la même position que MM. les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne.

Aarif Effendi adhère à cette manière de voir.

Le Baron Prokesch fait ressortir que les Plénipotentiaires de Russie ne rejettent pas absolument le principe de limitation; que leurs objections portent plutôt sur la forme sous laquelle il pourrait être appliqué. Les Plénipotentiaires de Russie s'étant déclarés prêts à soumettre la proposition Autrichienne à leur Cour, il exprime l'espoir que les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne en feront autant de leur côté.

Les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne déclinent de prendre à ce sujet un engagement.

Le Comte Buol, tout en voyant avec satisfaction que les Plénipotentiaires de Russie soumettront sa proposition à leur Cour, croit pouvoir se dispenser de répondre aux observations dont elle a été l'objet de la part du Prince Gortchakoff, puisqu'il n'y a attaché lui-même que la valeur d'impressions personnelles. Il ajoute qu'il est au reste trop juste pour ne pas reconnaître que les déclarations des Plénipotentiaires de France et de Grande Bretagne rendaient effectivement difficile au Prince Gortchakoff d'entrer dans une discussion plus approfondie. Il constate enfin, que les Plénipotentiaires des Puissances maritimes ayant eux-mêmes déclaré clairs les Conférences, l'ont dispensé d'un pénible devoir, dont, sa position lui aurait imposé l'accomplissement. En remerciant MM. les Plénipotentiaires de s'être, à son invitation, réunis pour donner aux Conférences une clôture convenable, il déclare que l'Autriche n'a plus d'autre proposition à faire; qu'elle sera cependant toujours prête, surtout si c'était dans l'intérêt de la paix

à transmettre aux Puissances belligérantes les ouvertures que l'une ou l'autre d'entre elles pourrait être dans le cas de lui adresser.

Le Baron Bourqueney prend encore une fois la parole pour bien préciser les positions respectives. Il soutient que d'après tout ce qui s'est passé dans les Conférences, son Gouvernement était parfaitement en droit de considérer tout projet fondé sur le principe de limitation comme décidément repoussé par les Plénipotentiaires de Russie; il ne pouvait par conséquent pas faire entrer une prévision contraire dans les instructions dont il a muni son Plénipotentiaire pour un Conférence de clôture. Il a été confirmé dans cette conviction par la circulaire de M. le Comte de Nesselrode, portant un jugement sur l'ensemble des Conférences, et autorisant dès lors à croire que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg les considérait lui-même comme closes. Il fait enfin observer au Prince Gortchakoff que le projet Autrichien est fondé sur le principe de limitation dans son expression la plus sévère.

Le Comte Westmorland constate qu'après le rejet catégorique du principe de limitation, son Gouvernement n'a plus vu aucun avantage à continuer les délibérations. Il a dès lors considéré comme closes les Conférences précédentes. Ses pleins pouvoirs étant épuisés il n'a plus rien à dire, si ce n'est qu'il soumettra à l'appréciation de son Gouvernement le Protocole de la Conférence de ce jour.

Le Prince Gortchakoff répondant à M. de Bourqueney constate itérativement que, et dans les Conférences et en dehors d'elles, et toutes les fois que la question a été touchée, il a constamment déclaré que toute limitation de forces qu'on chercherait à imposer à la Russie, serait envisagée par ses Plénipotentiaires comme étant une atteinte aux droits de souveraineté de leur maître et un obstacle insurmontable à la paix; qu'il est resté invariablement fidèle à ce principe et qu'il l'établit de nouveau dans cette Conférence de clôture; que du reste, il convie MM. les membres de la Conférence qui ont les Protocoles en mains, et plus particulièrement M. le Plénipotentiaire de France, à trouver dans ces actes un seul principe ou une seule parole qui ne soient pas d'accord avec ce qu'il affirme aujourd'hui; que M. le Comte de Buol ayant dit dans son discours d'introduction que le Cabinet de Vienne s'est attaché à trouver une solution également honorable pour toutes les parties, il n'a relevé et admis du second Article que la pensée qui seule est de nature à offrir une base de négociation pour des Puissances qui se respectent, c'est-à-dire, la combinaison d'amener une pondération de forces par l'entente directe et le consentement mutuel des parties intéressés.

Le Baron Bourqueney lui fait observer qu'il est pourtant bien constant que la proposition faite par M. Drouyn de Lhuys dans la onzième Conférence et portant que "les Plénipotentiaires de la Russie et de la Porte s'entendraient entre eux au sein de la Conférence sur une base de pondération de leurs forces respectives, laquelle base serait consignée dans un arrangement qu'ils signeraient entre eux et qui, annexé au Traité, aurait même valeur et même force," a été rejetée.

Le Prince Gortchakoff rappelle à M. de Bourqueney qu'il trouvera dans le Protocole de la séance à laquelle il se réfère, la preuve que ses objections n'ont point porté sur l'idée même d'une entente directe, mais sur le mode peu pratique dans lequel il avait été proposé de l'amener.

Après quelques observations du Prince Gortchakoff tendant à modifier l'impression produite sur le Baron Bourqueney par la circulaire de M. le Chancelier de l'Empire de Russie, la séance a été levée.

(Signé) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
PROKESCH-OSTEN. GORTCHAKOFF.
BOURQUENEY. TITOFF.
WESTMORLAND.
AALI.
AARIF.

Inclosure 2 in No. 908.

Annex to Protocol No. 14.

Article 1. Les Hautes Parties Contractantes, désirant que la Sublime Porte participe aux avantages du concert établi par le droit public entre les différents Etats de l'Europe, s'engagent, chacune de son côté, à respecter l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman garantissent en commun la stricte observation de cet engagement et considéreront, en conséquence, tout acte ou toute événement qui serait de nature à y porter atteinte, comme une question d'intérêt Européen.

Si un conflit survenait entre la Porte et l'une des Puissances Contractantes, ces deux Etats, avant de recourir à l'emploi de la force, devraient mettre les autres Puissances en mesure de prévenir cette extrémité par les voies pacifiques.

Art. 2. Les Plénipotentiaires Russes et ceux de la Sublime Porte proposeront de commun accord à la Conférence l'effectif égal des forces navales que les deux Puissances riveraines entretiendront dans la Mer Noire et qui ne devra pas dépasser l'état actuel des bâtiments Russes à flot dans cette mer. L'arrangement qu'ils auront pris entre eux à cet égard, fera partie intégrante du Traité Général.

Seront également insérés dans le Traité les moyens dont les mêmes Plénipotentiaires seront convenus à l'effet de contrôler l'exacte et constante observation des dispositions du présent Article.

Art. 3. La règle de la clôture des Détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, consacrée par le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, restera en vigueur, sauf les exceptions stipulées dans les Articles suivants.

Art. 4. Chacune des Puissances Contractantes qui n'a pas d'établissement dans la Mer Noire, sera autorisée par un firman de Sa Hautesse à faire entrer et stationner dans cette mer deux frégates ou bâtiments de moindre force.

Art. 5. Dans le cas où (ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise!) le Sultan serait menacé d'une agression, il se réserve le droit d'ouvrir les passages à toutes les forces navales de ses alliés.

No. 909.

Consul-General Ward to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord, *Leipzig, June 6, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to report, that during the last fortnight the German newspapers in the interest of Russia have taken great pains to vindicate the policy of continued neutrality, in the hope of separating Austria from the cause of the Western Powers. The "New Prussian Gazette," and the "Leipzig Gazette" (an organ of M. de Beust), contend that Germany has no longer any interest in the war, Russia having conceded in the Conferences everything that touches the German States, viz. the first and second of the four points, relating respectively to the Danubian Provinces, and to the free navigation of the Danube. They remark also, that Russia declared, in a recent circular note, "that she would consider the arrangements as to the Danubian Principalities and navigation, to be binding upon Russia, so long as the German Courts should strictly maintain their neutrality;" consequently the German Courts have only to follow their present course of inaction, in order to secure for themselves all the advantage that they would possibly reap from the war.

These unworthy arguments have, I am happy to observe, been fully answered by the Liberal journals, and particularly by the "National Gazette" at Berlin, and the "German Universal Gazette" at Leipzig, which have pointed out the error of supposing Germany to be interested in the first two points only, whereas Germany, as a great European Power, is deeply concerned in carrying out the third point, for guaranteeing the independence of the Ottoman Empire, as well as the fourth point, for protecting the Christian population in Turkey. They have remarked, that the Germanic Diet has already, by a specific resolution, recognized the four points taken together as the only proper basis of a peace; consequently it would be highly inconsistent, if not impossible, for any German State to make a separate arrangement with Russia founded upon two points only; and that, as the matter now stands, the assurances of Russia are of little value; for in the circular note referred to, Russia plainly declared, that in order to give effect and binding force to the arrangements respecting the Principalities and the River Danube, they must be reduced to the form of a Treaty; and this is obviously impracticable, now that the Conferences are at an end.

It appears, from the tenour of the Austrian circular despatch of the 17th of May last, that the new Russian overtures respecting the first and second points, were addressed not to the Diet, but to the States separately. No doubt, more than one of the German Courts would be disposed, if they could, to accept such overtures; but it is highly improbable they would venture to take such a step in the face of a positive resolution of the Federal Diet. The Federal Resolution of the 9th of December, was to this effect:

1. That the Germanic Confederation, as an European Power, recognizes the well-known four points in substance as a proper basis for bringing about a state of legal and peaceful security in Europe, but especially adopts and holds to the first and second point in the point of view of German interests also.

2. That the conditions of peace are to be followed up accordingly with energy upon the basis above-mentioned.

So long, therefore, as the above resolution stands unrescinded in the records of the Diet, it is impossible to believe that the Russian intrigues will succeed in inducing any Germanic State to enter into a separate compact of a different nature.

It is reported that Austria intends shortly to renew her motion in the Diet for setting the Federal army in marching order, and that Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony will oppose it, as well on the ground formerly taken,—that they are no parties to the engagements entered into by Austria with the Western Powers,—as for the additional reason that Russia is willing to concede all that German interests require, in the manner above explained. The motion of Austria will probably fail in the Diet, and this will serve her as an excuse to the Western Powers for not acting up to the spirit of the Treaty of the 2nd of December last.

The mischievous effects of the Russian influence over the German Courts is here very manifest; they are indeed precluded from treating separately with Russia; but they are able to hamper the action of Austria, and even to neutralize the effect of the resolutions which the Federal Diet has actually passed for getting the troops in readiness, and for settling the basis of peace in accordance with the views of the Western Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. WARD.

P.S.—In observing that the German States are able to hamper the action of Austria, I do not, of course, suppose that Austria has any serious intention of taking the offensive, but that she will find, in the strong desire for peace entertained by her German Federal allies, a pretext for not proceeding further in the spirit of the Treaty of the 2nd December.

J. W.

No. 910.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 217.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 12, 1855.*

YOUR despatches to No. 266 inclusive have been received and laid before the Queen.

I have the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your proceedings at the last Conference.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 911.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 223.) *Foreign Office, June 12, 1855.*

My Lord,

THE Conferences at Vienna having been closed, and the negotiations having thus come to an end, Her Majesty's Government think it right to place on record that, under these circumstances, they consider the belligerent Powers to have resumed their freedom of action in regard to any future negotiation, and to be wholly unbound by any of the arrangements discussed in the late Conferences.

Your Lordship will state this to Count Buol; and you will add that Her Majesty's Government have the satisfaction of believing that their view in this respect is fully shared by the Government of Austria, inasmuch as, in a circular despatch to the Austrian Representatives at the German Courts, dated the 17th of May, Count Buol speaks of the four points of the late negotiations, especially as regards those who were parties to them, as constituting in their entirety a basis calculated to ensure a state of right and peace in Europe, and as having been looked upon by the Diet in that light.

It having been impossible to arrive at an agreement in regard to the whole, the understanding which may have been come to in regard to specific points, as they passed under discussion, is necessarily no longer operative or binding upon any party.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 912.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 224.) *Foreign Office, June 12, 1855.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 253 of the 5th instant, in which you report that Count Buol had stated that his object was not to make a proposition, in any way, on behalf of the Governments of England and France, but entirely independent of them, I have to observe that, as the propositions were formally submitted to the Governments of England and France, those Governments, if they had agreed to them, would in honour have been bound to abide by them, and to seek no other or better terms; and Austria then, in bringing them before the Conference, would fairly have been entitled to say that she did so in behalf of the English and French Governments.

I must further observe that, although Count Buol may consider that the nomination of Consuls was sufficiently alluded to in the IInd Article of his project, yet England and France could not consent to delegate to the Russian and Turkish Plenipotentiaries the settlement of a question of so much importance as that of the right to appoint Consuls in Russian harbours for the purpose of superintending the observance of the Treaty.

And lastly, with respect to the fulfilment of the obligations contracted by Austria by the Treaty of the 2nd of December, which Count Buol said was a subject more immediately connected with the ultimatum which Austria had proposed to address to the Russian Government, in which was involved the question of an immediate declaration of war, I can only repeat that it is the wish of Her Majesty's Government to avoid an irritating discussion upon a question with respect to which the Cabinet of Vienna appears long since to have formed its opinion and taken its decision.

I shall therefore confine myself to remarking, that Austria has bound herself to concert measures with England and France for giving effect to the Treaty of the 2nd of December, if peace was not made on certain bases before a specified time. That time has long since elapsed, and the bases have been rejected by Russia; but the project of Austria would not have given effect to the bases, and would not have put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. England and France were therefore compelled to decline adhering to a

proposition which, although it may be called an ultimatum, cannot be said to have involved an immediate declaration of war, as there can be no doubt that the proposal would have been gladly accepted by Russia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 913.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 69. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, June 9, 1855.*

M. DE GLINKA, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, has returned to the charge with the note holding out the observance of the first two of the four points to Germany, but this time as the price of their actual attitude, instead of the absolute neutrality demanded in the former note.

The course now followed is, as I am informed, quite different. M. de Glinka has communicated with the President of the Diet before sounding the several members of the Diet; indeed, I do not think that more than one or two of those gentlemen, beyond the Prussian Plenipotentiary, have any knowledge of what is intended.

Unless, however, I am altogether misinformed, this second measure in the same sense has, as was the case with its precursor, been contrived at Berlin, between M. de Budberg and M. de Manteuffel, insomuch that I feel authorized to state that M. de Glinka has not received his orders from St. Petersburgh direct, but from M. de Budberg, and that the assent of his Government to the measure, in the form it now bears, has been obtained by telegraph, and at the earnest personal instance of the King of Prussia.

The step is intended as a countermove to that which was projected by Austria, viz., to endeavour to bind the Diet to her policy by a declaration which, as I am told, would be couched in a sense still holding out the expectation that in certain contingencies Austria might enter on a position of actual hostility to Russia.

I think I may venture to assure your Lordship that no discussion will be entered into on the Russian communication, which, in the form in which it is now tendered, the President will have to lay before the Diet, and probably in the sitting of next week. It will then be entered on the Protocol, and the Prussian Minister will most probably endeavour to insert some phrase which may be specially agreeable to the Petersburgh Cabinet in the acknowledgment.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 914.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 706. Secret.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 12, 1855.*

I HAVE seen letters from Berlin which state that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh is quite satisfied with the result of the last Conference.

The same letters affirm that all the dispositions for a reduction of the Austrian army by 100,000 men have been taken, and that the orders will be issued as soon as answers to certain questions, which the Austrian Government has asked of that of Russia, had been received. The writer of the letters in question did not know, however, the purport of those questions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 915.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 709.) *Paris, June 12, 1855.*

My Lord,

GENERAL LETANG, the French Military Commissioner at Vienna, has informed his Government that General Hess has set out for the head-quarters of the Austrian army, whither the Emperor of Austria is about to go, but that no invitation has been given either to General Cranfurd or to himself to join him. Under these circumstances the General asks the Emperor's orders for his guidance.

The Emperor has directed Count Walewski to propose to your Lordship to write to the French and English Commissioners to the effect that as their presence is no longer required at Vienna, they are to return home.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 916.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 711.) *Paris, June 12, 1855.*

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI informed me yesterday, that on the previous day he had received a communication from M. de Hübner of two despatches addressed to that gentleman by Count Buol.

The first of these related to the position of Austria with regard to the Western Powers. Count Buol endeavoured to show that the Austrian Government in her late proceedings had remained faithful to her engagements, and that she had reason to be surprised at the opposition manifested by the Cabinets of Paris and London to the propositions which she had submitted to their consideration. These propositions, Count Buol observed, were the same as those suggested by M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord John Russell, and, as M. Drouyn de Lhuys had been in direct communication with the British Government before he came to Vienna, the Austrian Government had a right to suppose that he would suggest nothing which he was not sure of seeing accepted. The French and English Governments objected to his, Count Buol's, proposal, because the superintendence of Consuls was not mentioned in it, and because there was too great an inequality in the forces to be maintained by Russia and those to be allowed to the maritime Powers in the Black Sea; but the Consuls had not been mentioned, because that question was to be included in the details, and the inequality of forces had been admitted by the Plenipotentiaries of the maritime Powers in one of their own plans. Count Buol must therefore express the opinion that, inasmuch as the French and English Governments had refused even to discuss conditions to which their own Plenipotentiaries had assented, while the Russian Plenipotentiaries had agreed to refer them for the consideration of their Government, the responsibility of the rupture of the negotiations could not be attributed entirely to the latter.

Count Walewski represented himself as having replied to M. de Hübner, that he demurred, in the first place, to Count Buol's assertion that the French and English Plenipotentiaries had proposed such a plan as he had described. There was no trace, either in their correspondence or in the Protocols of Conference, of any such proposition having been made. Secondly, even according to Count Buol's showing, the plan brought finally forward by him, was not entirely that represented to have emanated from the Plenipotentiaries. But however this might be, he, Count Walewski, was prepared to maintain that the rupture of negotiations was attributable to Russia alone. He was ready to show that the maritime Powers had, from the beginning of the Eastern question, exercised a forbearance and given proof of a good faith which could not be

gainsaid. That it was Russia, on the contrary, who had played a deceitful part, in accepting the third basis, without any intention of carrying it into execution; that, in the very last Conference, the Russian Plenipotentiaries had again rejected the principle of limitation, which Austria had put forward; that their pretended reference to St. Petersburgh was, therefore, a mere delusion, intended to paralyze the action of Austria. That Count Buol knew that the instructions of the French and English Plenipotentiaries would prevent them entering into any discussion of this project; and that he, Count Walewski, should therefore protest on all occasions, and in every possible way, against the inference drawn by Count Buol, that the rupture of negotiations was not the fault of Russia.

I observed to Count Walewski that he might say more; for, supposing it to be, as Count Buol asserted, and that the last Austrian proposition was the work of the French and English Plenipotentiaries, yet the French and English Governments were not bound to support their Plenipotentiaries if the latter exceeded their instructions. Nor did I think, I said, that sufficient weight was laid upon the fact that, although Austria from the very beginning had, in words at least, coincided with the allies, yet all her actions had tended to favour the cause of the Russians, whom she, at the same time, proclaimed to be in the wrong.

The second communication of M. de Hübner regarded more the future. Austria, in expressing regret at the failure of the late negotiations, and giving it to be understood that she did not consider herself as bound to go to war in consequence, expressed her readiness to profit by any occasion which might offer to renew negotiations.

Count Buol desired at the same time to maintain the ground of the Treaty of the 2nd of December, and he thought it desirable to take some official notice ("prendre acte") of the concessions made during the Conferences by Russia in regard to the two first points, and to the recognition by that Power of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. Count Buol called to mind that the object of the third point as defined by the Protocol of the 28th of December, was to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea; but the means of doing it were left to depend on the chances of the war. Now it was very possible, he observed, that the allies might obtain considerable advantages in the Crimea, but it was not sure that those advantages would make the Russian Government better inclined for peace, and it was worth consideration whether success was not more likely to prolong a war which all must deplore, and which would be more disastrous for Turkey than for any one else.

M. de Hübner pressed for an answer to this despatch.

Count Walewski replied, that without asking the Emperor's orders and consulting with Her Majesty's Government, he could not take upon himself to make an official reply; he could but state his own impressions, that it seemed to him that since the Conferences had been broken off, all discussions which had taken place, as well as the partial results obtained during them, must be considered "nuls" and "non-avenus." France and England could not be bound by one or the other, and they could not, therefore, be parties to imposing obligations on others while they claimed entire liberty for themselves. With regard to the Treaty of the 2nd of December, Count Walewski observed to M. de Hübner that that Treaty obliged Austria to take certain steps, in case peace was not made with Russia before a certain day; but peace had not been made, and Austria was consequently bound to take those further steps. If she declined so doing, it must be upon the plea that it was through the fault of the allies that peace had not been the result of the Vienna Conferences; but against this appreciation of matters, he should, as he had said before, protest, and be ready to prove the justice of his protest. In fact, nothing had been put forward by the allies of which Austria had not approved. He trusted, therefore, that Austria had no thoughts of evading this engagement, still less of escaping from it, by a declaration of neutrality; though, indeed, he might say that such a declaration was impossible, for it must raise questions of a most delicate nature. He need only call M. de Hübner's attention to the position of Austria in the Principalities. Was it one of neutrality? Was it not one of hostility towards Russia? And could it be maintained if Austria became neutral?

M. de Hübner having asked what was to become of the four points if the work of the Conferences was to be considered "nul" and "non-avenu"—were they to be abandoned?—Count Walewski replied, that M. de Hübner should

recollect that the four points represented only the minimum of what would satisfy the allies.

Yesterday Count Walewski saw the Emperor, and received His Majesty's orders to instruct M. de Persigny to ask the opinions of Her Majesty's Government as to the course to be pursued at Vienna; but Count Walewski added that, in the opinion of the French Government, it should be intimated to the Cabinet of Vienna that the Western Powers expect to hear how the Austrian Government propose to carry out the Treaty of the 2nd of December. No menace, however, should be made, and no delay fixed within which an answer must be given; but at the same time Count Buol should be made to understand clearly what is expected from the Austrian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 917.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 578.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 13, 1855.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency in reply to your despatch No. 709 of the 12th instant, that in consequence of a communication made to me this morning by M. de Persigny, that the Emperor of Austria had expressed a wish that the English and French Commissioners should remain at Vienna, Her Majesty's Government agree that they should do so, upon an understanding that it is at the special request of the Emperor Francis Joseph.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 918.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 583.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 13, 1855

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, with reference to your confidential despatch No. 685 of the 8th instant, that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur with Count Walewski that great care should be used, and that no efforts should be omitted, to prevent the Austrian Government from declaring their neutrality.

If your Excellency has not already done so, you will read to Count Walewski my despatches to the Earl of Westmorland Nos. 205 and 211 of the 29th ultimo and 2nd instant, by which his Excellency will learn that Her Majesty's Government have pointed out the great injury that would be inflicted by a declaration of neutrality upon the cause to which Austria has hitherto given her moral and political support, and likewise the reasons why, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, it would be unjust to affirm that England and France were opposed to reasonable terms of peace, or that Russia was not exclusively responsible for the rupture of the negotiations.

With respect to the occupation of the Principalities and to the impossibility of leaving Austria in possession of them, as a neutral cannot occupy a part of the territory of one of the belligerents, Her Majesty's Government would desire to remind Count Walewski that it is in virtue of a Treaty with the Porte, and without declaring war against Russia, that Austria has hitherto occupied the Principalities, and there appears to be no sufficient reason for her not continuing so to occupy them.

Austria has bound herself by that Treaty to prevent by force the return of the Russians to the Principalities; and if she were now to evacuate them, either in compliance with the wishes of England and France, or in disregard of her obligations to the Porte, there can be little doubt that the Russians would return, that the line of the Danube would be menaced, and that the Sultan for

the defence of his territory might then think it necessary to recall the greater part of Omer Pasha's army from the Crimea.

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion with Count Walewski that, in dealing with Austria at this moment, great courtesy and delicacy should be used; and they are accordingly disposed to think that a discussion upon the occupation of the Principalities should for the present be avoided; for no question is more likely to cause irritation to the Austrian Government, whose greatest fear is the occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia by a Russian army.

It must, however, be borne in mind, that even if England and France possessed the means of enforcing their demand for the withdrawal of the Austrian army from the Principalities, Austria would be justified in resisting the demand, and in pleading her engagement with the Porte to defend the Principalities, which engagements were taken by her as a neutral Power and with the full sanction of England and France.

It is possible, as Count Walewski apprehends, that from neutrality Austria might wish to advance to armed mediation; but it is hardly probable that she would resort to means which would not advance the cause of peace, but which would stamp her policy with bad faith, and would entail a rupture with England and France.

If, however, any ground for suspecting such an intention should exist, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that Count Buol should be at once reminded of the repeated declarations he had made on the subject; and at the same time he should be informed that England and France are now unfettered by engagements; that they are the sole judges of the terms on which they will make peace; and that they will resist any attempt, come from what quarter it may, to control the free exercise of their judgement upon matters which affect their honour and their interests.

Her Majesty's Government think that the attitude of the two Governments at Vienna should undergo as little change as possible. Their communications with the Cabinet of Vienna will, doubtless, not be of the same unreserved and cordial character as heretofore; but the object should be to maintain friendly relations with Austria; and it should still be assumed that her interests in the successful prosecution of the war are identical with those of the Western Powers. It may be prudent, for the reason assigned by Count Walewski, not to press Austria at the present moment to fulfil the obligations which she contracted by the Treaty of December 2; but neither, on the other hand, would it be prudent to allow the assertion, that she has fulfilled those obligations, to pass uncontradicted.

Her Majesty's Government would strongly recommend that the language of menace should not be used towards Austria: but if Austria were to adopt that tone towards England and France, she might be reminded that England and France entered into the war for reasons of the deepest importance; that the same paramount reasons will compel them to carry on the war until the objects for which it was undertaken are obtained; and that they are fully confident in their own strength for that purpose.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 919.

The Earl of Clarendon to Cowley.

(No. 585.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 13, 1855.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, with reference to your despatch No. 691 of the 8th instant, that Her Majesty's Government are decidedly of opinion that the interests of Sardinia should be represented by a Plenipotentiary at any future Conference.

The alacrity with which Sardinia responded to the appeal of England and France, the good faith with which she fulfils her engagements, and the sacrifices she is now making and is further prepared to make, constitute a claim which it would be unjust not to recognize. It must, moreover, be borne in mind, that Sardinia has acceded to the Treaty of the 10th April, 1854; and Her Majesty's

Government conceive that England and France have, by the third Article, contracted an engagement with Sardinia not to entertain any overture or any proposition having for its object the cessation of hostilities, nor to enter into any arrangement with the Imperial Court of Russia, without having first deliberated thereupon in common.

Her Majesty's Government concur with Count Walewski that it would be prudent to conform on the present occasion to the precedents established at the Congress of Vienna of 1814-1815; but in the Conferences there held the minor Powers who had actually taken part in the war, appear to have had a prominent position given to them, and to have signed some acts not immediately concerning their own particular interests, as well as the General Treaty of Peace.

Her Majesty's Government would therefore propose to the Government of the Emperor, that Sardinia should be invited to send a Plenipotentiary to any future Conference that may be held; that the Sardinian Plenipotentiary should attend all meetings of the Conference at which questions affecting the interests of Sardinia may be discussed; that he should be kept fully informed of the proceedings of such Conferences as he may not be called upon to attend; that he shall be made acquainted with all offers for peace received from or addressed to Russia; and that he shall be empowered to sign the General Treaty of Peace.

By such an arrangement Her Majesty's Government hope that the anxiety which the King and people of Sardinia naturally feel upon this important question may be satisfied, without unduly infringing upon the established order of things in Europe.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON

No. 920.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 226.)

Foreign Office, June 13, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO yesterday read to me a despatch from Count Buol, stating that he considered that the reserve made in the Protocol of December 28, with respect to the principle of putting an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, is at present in full force; that the events of war must bring about the solution of the point; and Count Buol hopes that the efforts of the allies will obtain the end in view as completely as Austria would probably have obtained it, either by peaceful methods or by joining in the war, if her allies had not rejected the last Austrian proposal. However much Count Buol regrets the rejection of that plan, the continuation of the war in no way changes the position of Austria and her allies towards each other.

Austria will maintain her rights and perform her duties as regards the Eastern question on the bases agreed upon, and, until she learns to the contrary, will conclude that her allies will do the same. Austria will more especially endeavour to maintain the concessions obtained from Russia on the first and second points, and also as regards the territorial guarantee (of the Ottoman Empire): Austrian troops will remain in the Principalities to defend Turkey from attack on the side of the Danube, until the chances of war may dispose the belligerents to resume the work of peace on the bases already admitted and partially developed.

Without giving any opinion upon the probabilities of the war, the Austrian Government cannot conceal its apprehension that the greatest successes in the Crimea may not be sufficient to induce Russia to make peace, and that the reverses of Russia may so excite the Russian people, as to render peace more difficult of attainment, so that the war may be indefinitely prolonged.

The consequences will be that the Ottoman Empire will be exhausted, and the original object of the war lost sight of. Count Buol fears that amidst these new complications the grand political end of the alliance will disappear. Austria will assuredly do nothing to hasten a result so much to be lamented; on the contrary, the Austrian Cabinet is determined to maintain its intimate relations with its allies, and Count Buol hopes to find on their part similar intentions.

I told Count Colloredo that without consulting my colleagues and learning the opinion of the French Government, I could give no answer to the despatch he had just read, and which I had listened to with much regret, as it was unfavourable to the prospects of an alliance from which we had expected so much towards bringing the war to a successful end, and from which, when peace was concluded, we had looked for important advantages to Europe.

Austria, I said, might confidently rely that England and France would maintain their engagement and perform their duties with scrupulous good faith, and that it would be their object to maintain the most friendly relations with Austria, but I would not conceal from Count Colloredo my own opinion that the continuation of the war must to a certain extent change the position of Austria and her allies towards each other, unless she took part in the war, in fulfilment of her engagements; if she did not do so, the cause must be either that it would be inconvenient to her to give effect to the Treaty of December 2, or else that her allies were to blame for the rupture of the negotiations. Upon the first cause, which was too improbable for belief, it would be unnecessary to make any remark; but against the second I must beg in the strongest manner to protest, and for the reasons which I had given in answer to another despatch of Count Buol's, which Count Colloredo had just read.

If England and France had been extravagant in their demands, or had sought to gain any advantage over Russia beyond the terms that had been agreed upon between the three Powers, Austria would have been fully justified in considering herself released from her engagements, and in throwing upon her allies the responsibility of the consequences; but no condition was pressed which had not previously been assented to by Austria, and which was not subsequently supported by her in the Conference; and because these proposals were rejected by Russia, it was difficult to understand by what process of reasoning Austria arrived at the conclusion that she was thereby emancipated from her obligations, and that her only duty was to wish success to her allies in the war which they were still determined to carry on.

The questions involved in the four points would, I said, as a matter of course, come under consideration whenever negotiations were resumed, but England and France must consider themselves entirely free to act according to circumstances, and that they must in the meanwhile regard as "non avenus" the partial arrangements made at the Conferences of Vienna.

Your Lordship will read this despatch to Count Buol, and give his Excellency a copy of it if he should desire to have one.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 921.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 227.)

Foreign Office, June 13, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO yesterday read to me a despatch from Count Buol, expressing his regret at the termination of the Conferences, and his surprise at the objections made by the Cabinets of London and Paris to the proposition which he had brought forward at the Conference on the 4th instant, which proposition, he said, had originated with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who having been in direct communication with Her Majesty's Government, was considered at Vienna to be the special representative of the policy and views of England and France.

Count Buol further stated, that objections had been taken to the omission in his proposal of any allusion to the rights of establishing Consuls in Russian harbours, to the amnesty, and to Sardinia; but that with respect to the Consuls, they had been adverted to indirectly, and in a manner not to wound the dignity of Russia, and that it had not been thought necessary to allude in terms to Sardinia or to the amnesty, as they would necessarily form part of the General Treaty.

Count Buol concluded by saying, that as the Representatives of England and France had declined to discuss the proposition to which their own Governments had agreed, and as they would not refer it to their Governments for

consideration, whereas the Russian Representatives had at once consented to refer it to St. Petersburgh, the responsibility of breaking off the negotiations could not be attributed entirely to Russia.

I told Count Colloredo that I was under the painful necessity of differing altogether from the statement and the opinions of Count Buol, and that my reasons for so doing would be best given by a recapitulation of facts as they had really occurred.

In the first place I begged to say that the proposal brought forward by Count Buol was not that of which M. Drouyn de Lhuys was the bearer from London and Paris, nor was it one which had ever formally been brought forward in Conference. A similar one had, it was true, been submitted by M. Drouyn de Lhuys for the approval of the two Governments, and it had been rejected by them, as Count Buol was aware.

Russia having declined the terms that Austria, England, and France had agreed to propose, and the Conference having been by common consent adjourned *sine die*, the English and French Governments were prepared to leave matters in that position, when they were informed that it was the wish of the Austrian Cabinet finally to close the Conference, as its indefinite adjournment was a cause of embarrassment and misunderstanding; they were also informed that Count Buol, in order to redeem the pledge he had given at the last Conference, and to be able to address to the Diet a full statement of all the proceedings at Vienna, intended to make to the Conference which he was about to summon, a proposal of the same nature as that which had already been rejected by Russia, and which, therefore, in all probability would be rejected again.

The English and French Governments replied that they had no objection to the Conference being closed; but that they declined to give any opinion upon the proposal in question until they had it before them in writing. It was accordingly transmitted; it was fully considered and deliberately declined, and of this Count Buol was informed. His Excellency nevertheless said he should proceed in the manner he had announced, and his determination was not shaken when Lord Westmorland read to him my despatch stating that Her Majesty's Government objected to his bringing forward a proposal to which they could not agree, and that although the English and French Representatives would attend the Conference, they would do so solely for the purpose of its being closed, and that they would abstain from all discussion. Lord Westmorland and M. de Bourqueney accordingly attended the Conference, and acted there in accordance with their instructions, which were previously known by Count Buol.

Yet, I said, his Excellency now expresses surprise at the opposition of England and France to a proposal which they had formally declined, and seeks to throw upon them the responsibility of the rupture of the negotiations, because their Representatives would neither discuss nor refer to their Governments a project that had already been referred to and decided upon by those Governments, and because they would not be parties to a reference of the proposition to St. Petersburgh, which would have led the Russian Plenipotentiaries to believe that if the answer of their Government were in the affirmative, the assent of England and France to the proposition might have been expected.

Count Buol, I added, was well aware that the negotiations had not been sought for by England and France, and that they had been entered into solely at the instance of Austria, and because her active cooperation in the war was made to depend upon the failure of attempts to conclude peace on the terms agreed upon between the three Powers.

Count Buol was also well aware of the good faith and the moderation which characterized all the proceedings of the English and French Plenipotentiaries throughout the negotiations, and his Excellency could not doubt (or if he did do so, the language of the Russian Plenipotentiaries at the Conference on the 4th instant must have removed any such doubt) that Russia was determined to give no effectual security to Turkey, and that she accepted the four points solely for the purpose of paralyzing the action of Austria. Russia then was the real obstacle to peace; she alone was responsible for the failure of the negotiations.

Your Lordship will read this despatch to Count Buol, and give his Excellency a copy of it if he should desire to have one.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 922.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 448.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 13, 1855.*

MR. BLUNT has transmitted to me a copy of his despatch No. 41 of the 23rd ultimo, to your Excellency, respecting the fears of the Christian subjects of the Porte in Thessaly and the neighbourhood of Salonica, with regard to the conscription; and I have to instruct your Excellency to impress upon the Turkish Government that it would certainly be not only desirable, but almost indispensable, that the Christian soldiers in Turkey should be formed into separate battalions, and be commanded by Christian officers. I have further to request your Excellency to advise the Porte to issue an order to dispel apprehensions such as those which Her Majesty's Consul at Salonica describes as existing among the Christians.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 923.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 452.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 13, 1855.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency the draft of an instruction which I had proposed to address to you respecting the recommendations to be made to the Porte in favour of its Christian subjects.

I desired Lord Cowley to show this draft to Count Walewski, in the hope that, if it met with the concurrence of the French Government, similar instructions might be given to the French Ambassador at Constantinople.

Your Excellency will see, by the inclosed copy of a *note verbale*, given by Count Walewski to Lord Cowley, the light in which the French Government look upon the suggestions stated in my draft; but I am happy to say that, although not wholly concurring in the views of Her Majesty's Government, Count Walewski has proposed that the English and French Ambassadors at Constantinople should consult together as to the advice which should be tendered to the Porte upon the points in question, and should draw up a statement of those on which they may agree, and report to their respective Governments for decision those on which their opinions may not coincide.

Her Majesty's Government, as you will perceive by the inclosed copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Lord Cowley, have concurred in this proposal; and your Excellency will, therefore, on the arrival of M. de Thouvenel, which will shortly take place, enter freely into communication with him on these matters, and in due time report to me the result of your deliberations.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 923.

Draft of Instructions to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May* . 1855.

M. MUSURUS placed in my hands, a few days ago, the memorandum of which a copy is inclosed, and which had been sent to him by Aali Pasha for communication to Her Majesty's Government.

The object of this paper is to show the course which the Porte has habitually adopted towards its Christian subjects, and the further benefit which it proposes to bestow upon them, and to deprecate the insertion in a formal

Treaty between the Sultan and other Powers of any stipulations specially in favour of this class of the Sultan's subjects, as being derogatory to the dignity of the Sultan, and at variance with the principle on which the present war was undertaken.

Although, as regards the last point, it might be observed that a guarantee to be enforced by five Powers might be attended with less embarrassment to the Porte, than a right of interference vested in one Power alone, it cannot be denied that, in principle at least, it would be no less an infringement of Turkish independence. Her Majesty's Government are certainly of opinion that the true way of settling the matter would be that the Sultan should, by his own sovereign power, do for the Christians all that is required, and that he should then communicate officially to his allies that which he had done. This would be a moral guarantee that would not derogate from the Sultan's independent authority.

But this course, if adopted, should at once be carried into execution, in which case it would have one great advantage, which would be, that the non-Mussulman population would owe their privileges and advantages not to Russia, but to their own Sovereign and to the good offices of England and France.

The points to which it would seem most important to attend, in addition to those of the abolition of the haratch and the admission of Christians into the military service by voluntary enlistment, which seem to have been provided for by the Sultan's late firman, as reported in your Excellency's despatch No. of the instant, are:

1. The eligibility of the non-Mussulman subjects of the Porte to rise to any rank in the army.

2. The admission of non-Mussulman evidence in civil as well as in criminal cases.

3. The establishment of mixed courts of justice for all cases in which Mussulmans and non-Mussulmans are parties.

4. The appointment of a Christian officer as assessor to every governor of a province when that governor is a Mussulman; such assessor to have full liberty to appeal to Constantinople against any act of the governor, unjust, or oppressive, or corrupt.

5. The eligibility of Christians to all places in the administration, whether at Constantinople or in the provinces, and a practical application of this rule, as well as of the military rule, by the appointment of Christians at once to some places of trust, civil and military.

6. The total abolition of the present system by which offices at Constantinople and in the provinces are bought and sold, and given to unfit and unworthy men for money paid or promised. Such men become tyrants in their offices, either from incapacity or bad passions, or from a desire to repay themselves the money paid for their appointments.

Furthermore, Her Majesty's Government consider that there should not only be complete toleration of non-Mussulman religion, but that all punishment on converts from Islamism, whether natives or foreigners, ought to be abolished.

Such are the points to which Her Majesty's Government conceive the attention of the Porte ought more particularly to be called; and in bringing them under the early consideration of the Sultan and his Ministers, your Excellency will add that it is of the utmost importance, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that the Sultan should lose no time in giving effect to them. By doing so the Sultan would deprive Russia of one of the strongest engines for working on the sympathies of the Christian subjects of His Highness, and he would enlist the public opinion in Europe in favour of Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 924.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 721.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 14, 1855.*

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 571 of the 11th instant only reached me at a quarter before 7 in the evening of the 12th. It was impossible, therefore, for me to carry out the instructions which it contained, that I should communicate to Count Walewski the draft of a despatch to Lord Westmorland, forming its inclosure, and report to your Lordship by telegraph if it was accepted by the French Government, so as to enable you to send it off, if agreed to, on that evening.

Indeed, it was not until late yesterday afternoon that Count Walewski could receive me. After reading the draft in question, his Excellency observed that he agreed in every word of it, and was prepared to make a similar statement to Count Buol. He thought, however, that as the two Governments would have to reply to the communication lately sent from Vienna, to which my despatch No. 711 of the 12th instant refers, it would be advisable either that the substance of your Lordship's draft should be introduced into that reply, or if Her Majesty's Government preferred making a separate communication on this matter, that it should be made after Count Buol's communication had been replied to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 925.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 723.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 14, 1855.*

I COMMUNICATED this afternoon to Count Walewski your Lordship's despatch No. 585 of yesterday's date, relating to the admission of a Sardinian Plenipotentiary to any conferences which may be held hereafter for the conclusion of peace.

His Excellency expressed his concurrence in your Lordship's views, and requested me to leave the despatch with him, in order that he may frame an answer to the Sardinian Government in accordance with it. He proposes sending the draft of this answer to London, before transmitting it to its destination, as he is desirous that the reply made by your Lordship should be identic with his.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 926.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 724. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 14, 1855.*

YESTERDAY M. de Hübner again pressed Count Walewski for an answer to the late communication from Vienna.

Count Walewski replied that until he had heard the opinions of Her Majesty's Government he could state nothing officially beyond this,—that if the Austrian Government desired to maintain the ground of the 2nd of December, the French Government would expect two things at least: that Austria should neither change her military nor her diplomatic position towards Russia. What he meant by that was, that the Austrian army should not be diminished, nor its

cantonments changed; in short, that its threatening ("comminatoire") attitude should be preserved. So with regard to the diplomatic language of Austria, the French Government would expect that in the declaration which Count Buol was about to address to Germany, he should make as much light as possible of the slight difference of opinion which had manifested itself at the last Conference between Austria and the Maritime Powers, and should declare that the understanding between the three Powers remained unbroken. If Austria refused to do this, she would prove that the estrangement between herself and the Western Powers, which would be the natural consequence, proceeded from her.

M. de Bourqueney writes word from Vienna that the late successes of the allies in the Crimea have had a perceptible effect on the public mind, and if continued, must materially influence the decisions of the Austrian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 927.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 725.)
Paris, June 14, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE read to Count Walewski your Lordship's despatch No. 583 of yesterday's date in regard to the policy to be pursued by the belligerent Powers at Vienna, in order to prevent the Austrian Government from declaring their neutrality.

His Excellency expressed an entire concurrence in your Lordship's views, and he requested me to correct an error into which your Lordship appeared to have fallen, if you thought the French Government desired to summon the Austrian Government to quit the Principalities; such had not been the idea which he had intended to convey in conversing with M. de Hübner. What he had said was this,—that if Austria declared her neutrality many questions of a delicate nature would present themselves, among others the possibility of a neutral Power occupying territory belonging to a belligerent. But, his Excellency added to me, he had never examined the question as one to be decided immediately; nor was he sure that under any circumstances a categorical demand to Austria to evacuate the Principalities would be advisable. Should the question arise, it must be decided on its own merits. He had only touched on the subject at present confidentially with M. de Hübner, in order to show him the difficulties to which a declaration of neutrality on the part of his Government would give rise.

But, Count Walewski continued, he could not agree with your Lordship that Austria could sign a Treaty which bound her to defend the Principalities from Russian aggression and still remain a neutral Power; and he said that he remembered perfectly well having stated as much to your Lordship when the Treaty was under discussion. He must maintain the opinion that the allies would be perfectly justified in declaring to Austria, if it suited them, that she could not pronounce herself neutral, and still retain possession of the Danubian Provinces.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 928.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 594.)
Foreign Office, June 15, 1855.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith drafts of two despatches which I propose to address to the Earl of Westmorland on the subject of the communications recently made to me by Count Colloredo respecting the course pursued by

Austria in the last Conference, and that which she proposes to pursue hereafter in regard to Eastern affairs.

Your Excellency will communicate these despatches to Count Walewski, in order that if they meet with his concurrence, despatches to the same effect may be addressed by him to Baron de Bourqueney.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 929.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 729. Confidential.)
Paris, June 15, 1855.

My Lord,

THE attention of the French Government has been called to the number of United States' subjects who have arrived at Calais lately with courier's passports. Between forty and fifty have passed within the last month. It is possible, Count Walewski observed to me yesterday, that some of these passports may have been given to ordinary travellers; but still his Excellency suspects that their journeys are connected with a system of propagandism. Now that the attention of the Government has been awakened, the Minister of the Interior has given orders to ascertain the direction which these reported couriers take. Until now this precaution had been neglected.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 930.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 596.)
Foreign Office, June 16, 1855.

My Lord,

YOUR Excellency will have seen from my despatch No. 578 of the 13th instant that Her Majesty's Government concur in the opinion of Count Walewski, as reported in your despatch No. 719 of the 14th instant, that in consequence of the express invitation of the Emperor Francis Joseph, the English and French Commissioners should remain at Vienna for the present.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 931.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 600.)
Foreign Office, June 16, 1855.

My Lord,

THE Count de Persigny has communicated to me the draft of a note, copy of which is inclosed,* which Count Walewski proposes to address to the Sardinian Minister in reply to his request that a Sardinian Representative should be invited to attend any future Conference.

Her Majesty's Government concur entirely in this note, and an answer in similar terms will be given to the note which I have received from the Marquis d'Azeglio.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 934.

No. 932.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Malet.

(No. 44.)

Foreign Office, June 16, 1855.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 69 of the 9th instant, stating that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Frankfort was about to make a communication to the Diet to the effect that Russia will adhere to the two first points of the Vienna Conferences, provided that the States of the Confederation maintain their present attitude in regard to the war.

You will suggest in the quarters to which you think it may be usefully addressed that Russia is offering that which she has no means of fulfilling, as it depends not on Russia, but on the Powers who are supreme in the Black Sea, to determine what effect shall be given to the two points that were partially settled at Vienna, and more particularly that which relates to the freedom of the navigation of the Danube. Russia is, moreover, well aware that the four bases for negotiation which the Western Powers agreed to adopt were to be taken in their entirety, and as Russia has rejected the third point, upon which the two others in a great measure depended, the Western Powers must consider themselves as unfettered by any arrangements made at Vienna, and perfectly free to act according to circumstances.

England and France have not sought to sow dissension among the German Powers; they have not endeavoured by hollow promises to tamper with the independent action of the Diet; and it will be for the members of the Confederation to consider whether any German interest will be served by responding to the invitation of Russia in a manner that the Western Powers will be compelled to regard as an expression of hostile feeling towards themselves.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 933.

The Marquis d'Azeglio to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 16.)

3, *Berkeley Square, Londres, le 13 Juin*, 1855.

M. le Comte,

D'APRES les ordres que je viens de recevoir de mon Gouvernement, je m'empresse de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence les réflexions suivantes, auxquelles le Cabinet du Roi mon Maître attache la plus grande importance.

Avant comme après son accession à l'alliance avec la France et l'Angleterre contre la Russie, le Gouvernement du Roi, devenue partie active dans une lutte qui lui impose de grands sacrifices et le met en état d'hostilité contre une grande Puissance, n'a cessé de considérer comme une question d'honneur et un devoir impérieux envers le pays d'être admis à examiner, du moins en ce qui touche plus directement ses intérêts, les conditions que les alliés jugeraient convenables au rétablissement de la paix avec la Russie, ou les motifs qui pourraient les déterminer à continuer la guerre. L'opinion du pays s'est manifestée si hautement sur ce point, et dans le Parlement et au dehors, que la position du Gouvernement se trouverait compromise si l'on pouvait croire que la Sardaigne est tenue à l'écart des négociations et du concert des Puissances dont elle partage les dangers.

En cet état de choses, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine comprendra si ément qu'il est de toute urgence pour la Sardaigne de bien préciser sa position C'est pourquoi, confiant dans les bonnes dispositions et dans la justice de ses alliés, le Gouvernement du Roi mon Maître ne doute pas que maintenant que les Conférences sont closes et que la guerre va, pour ainsi dire, entrer dans une nouvelle phase dans laquelle la position des différentes Puissances va se dessiner d'une manière plus nette, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine, ayant égard à ce qui a été stipulé à l'Article III du Traité d'Alliance, voudra bien reconnaître le droit qu'a incontestablement la Sardaigne de se faire représenter au sein des Conférences par un Plénipotentiaire Sarde et de prendre une part directe aux négo-

ciations qui pourront être ouvertes pour la conclusion de la paix; ainsi qu'aux discussions auxquelles peuvent donner lieu les questions à traiter, sur la mesure des intérêts moraux et matériels qui la concernent. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique sentira certainement que la Sardaigne étant entrée en lice, et ayant déclaré formellement la guerre à la Russie, doit être partie intégrante du Traité de Paix. D'ailleurs la présence d'un Plénipotentiaire Sarde au Congrès, en même tems qu'elle sauvegarderait les intérêts et la dignité de la nation et donnerait satisfaction à la susceptibilité légitime de l'opinion libérale constitutionnelle qui s'est montrée si favorable à l'alliance Anglo-Française, fournirait encore un auxiliaire utile aux Puissances Occidentales dont la Sardaigne partage entièrement les principes.

Le Gouvernement du Roi mon Maître ne reculera certes devant aucun sacrifice pour contribuer au succès de la guerre, ainsi que pour l'exécution pleine et entière du Traité du 26 Janvier; mais il ne saurait compter sur le concours du Parlement et du pays si on pouvait craindre que la Sardaigne n'occupe point dans l'alliance la position à laquelle lui donne droit la loyauté et la générosité de sa conduite, ainsi que l'empressement qu'elle a mis à remplir les engagements qu'elle a contractés.

La demande que je viens de faire au nom de mon Gouvernement et les motifs sur lesquels s'appuient ses instances semblent si évidentes et si justes, que je croirais faire tort aux sympathies et la loyauté dont Sa Majesté la Reine et son Cabinet nous ont donné tant de preuves si je doutais un seul instant que les observations qu'à ce sujet je viens de soumettre à votre Excellence, et la démarche que je viens de faire pour obtenir la reconnaissance formelle du droit dont il s'agit et déterminer l'admission de la Sardaigne dans les négociations futures, ne rencontrent auprès de Sa Majesté Britannique l'accueil le plus favorable.

Je saisis, &c.

(Signé) N. E. D'AZEGLIO.

No. 934.

Count Walewski to the Marquis de Villamarina.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. de Persigny, June 16.)

M. le Marquis,

J'AI pris les ordres de l'Empereur sur l'objet de la communication que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 6 de ce mois. Sa Majesté a examiné avec un intérêt particulier les motifs qui font désirer à votre Gouvernement qu'un Plénipotentiaire Sarde soit admis dans les Conférences qui s'ouvriront ultérieurement entre les Puissances alliées et la Russie pour traiter les conditions de la paix.

Sa Majesté Impériale, empressée de saisir cette occasion de donner au Roi votre auguste Souverain un nouveau témoignage de ses dispositions amicales et de montrer combien elle apprécie le concours loyal prêté par la Sardaigne aux Puissances alliées, m'a ordonné de vous répondre qu'il lui paraissait juste et convenable que la Sardaigne fût représentée dans les Conférences futures. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, à qui j'ai été chargé de faire connaître l'opinion de Sa Majesté Impériale, l'a complétement partagée. Ainsi, le Plénipotentiaire Sarde prendrait une part directe et personnelle à toutes les discussions dans lesquelles les intérêts particuliers de la Sardaigne se trouveraient impliqués. Les Représentants de France et d'Angleterre auraient soin de le tenir complétement informé des ouvertures ou des projets d'un intérêt général qui seraient produits ou discutés dans les séances auxquelles il ne serait point appelé. Enfin, l'Envoyé de Sa Majesté Sarde signerait le Traité Général qui réglerait les conditions de la paix.

Je vous prie, M. le Ministre, de vouloir bien porter cette réponse, qui a été préalablement concertée entre le Cabinet de Londres et celui de Paris, à la connaissance de votre Gouvernement. J'ai la confiance qu'il y verra une nouvelle preuve de l'intérêt que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur porte à la Sardaigne et du prix qu'il attache à son alliance.

PUBLIC RECORDS OFFICE, LONDON

No. 935.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 743.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 17, 1855.*

I READ yesterday to Count Walewski the two drafts of despatches, inclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 591 of the 15th instant, which you propose to address to Lord Westmorland, and I asked his Excellency to write in a similar sense to Baron Bourqueney. Count Walewski replied that he would do so, and that he had already made a statement to M. de Hübner, which coincided almost word for word with your Lordship's language to Count Colloredo.

His Excellency added that he felt himself pledged to make a more official answer to M. de Hübner's last communication, and he proposed drawing up a despatch in which he should embody the remarks contained in the draft of a despatch from your Lordship to Lord Westmorland, which I had communicated to him some days ago. This reply should be sent, previously to transmitting it to Vienna, to M. de Persigny, for the approbation of Her Majesty's Government.

The draft alluded to was inclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 571 of the 11th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 936.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—Received June 18.)

(No. 407.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, June 6, 1855.*

THE new Seraskier having expressed a wish to meet Lieutenant-General Vivian, I encouraged the interview, which took place at Constantinople last night. Fuad Posha and General Michel were present, and M. Pisani, by my direction, attended also.

From the latter I learn that much friendly discussion was exchanged between the parties. It was finally agreed that the troops at Volos, Varna, and Bourgas, destined for the Turkish Contingent, should be united here, and, together with those on the spot, be consigned to General Vivian, who undertakes to be ready for their reception on Monday, the 11th.

It is, however, a necessary condition of this arrangement that transports for embarking the troops at Varna should be provided by us.

It was further agreed that tents, supplied by the Turkish Government, should be forthwith pitched on the ground already examined and selected by General Vivian.

It is well understood that the abovementioned troops, of all arms, are to amount to 10,000 men. The Ottoman Ministers declared their readiness to detach the remaining 10,000 at once from the Bulgarian army, and to put them separately under British command, provided they were organized in the province. To this proposition I am informed that General Vivian did not assent, preferring on his own judgement to unite the whole corps in this neighbourhood, but reserving his final decision.

The Seraskier appeared to wish that the officers should be Turkish up to the rank of Binbashee, or Major, inclusive, and his Excellency's proposition met with General Vivian's approval. The Seraskier, moreover, expressed his willingness to appoint some Turkish officers for assisting the new organization if General Vivian would be content to carry it into effect in Bulgaria, and to facilitate communications here between him and the General. The reasons alleged for keeping the second part of the Contingent in Bulgaria were, the uncertainty of Austria's intentions, and the probability that the Contingent, when formed, might be wanted on the Danube, in the Crimea, or along the Asiatic frontier.

With respect to the troops expected from Volos, it was confirmed that a steamer had gone to fetch these two battalions, and that a sailing-vessel in tow of a steamer would be sent to bring up the Cavalry without delay.

A despatch is preparing for Omer Pasha, who will be invited to retain his command, and to appoint such portion of his army on the Danube, as he may think best suited for service under British command.

We know not yet when transports can be provided for embarking the troops at Varna. Sir Edmund Lyons is anxious to supply them, but the exigencies of the service elsewhere may cause delay. The Cavalry might, perhaps, be marched overland to Constantinople.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 937.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 409.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, June 7, 1855.*

I AVAIL myself of to-day's messenger to transmit herewith for your Lordship's information, in copy, the correspondence which has passed between General Vivian and me, since I last had occasion to perform a similar duty.

Your Lordship will not fail to observe that the delays and difficulties which we have experienced of late with respect to the Turkish Contingent, are principally attributable to the want of transports, and the Porte's unwillingness to diminish the Bulgarian army at a time when so large a proportion of it is absent in the Crimea with Omer Pasha.

This latter circumstance operates most naturally as a hindrance to the formation of General Vivian's corps, and such an impediment is the more to be regretted now that Her Majesty's Government appear to reckon upon the active services of the Contingent in the early part of the summer.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 937.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Lieutenant-General Vivian.

Sir, *British Embassy, Pera, June 4, 1855.*

I LEARN from Dr. Sarell, that although the situation first chosen for your encampment near Kilia, proves on further examination to be unhealthy, as stated by the Turkish authorities, yet other places in the vicinity rather more inland appear to be free from that objection, and altogether suited in the opinion of your officers for the important purpose in view. I am prepared to communicate on this matter with the Turkish Government as soon as I have the honour to receive from you an official confirmation of Dr. Sarell's report.

In the meantime, as in addition to the want of tran-ports, delay has been occasioned by the dismissal from office of the late Seraskier and the appointment of his successor in the person of Mehemet Roschi Pasha, I am anxious, as you must naturally be, to hasten the arrangement of all such matters as are necessary to prepare the actual location of troops under your command.

With this view I have instructed M. Pisani to wait on the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as he had before waited on the new Seraskier, and to ascertain with precision the final intentions of the Porte for carrying into effect its previous assurances. No time shall be lost in conveying the result of my inquiry to your knowledge. What I understand at present is, that three battalions and two field-batteries are at your disposal here, that a steam-frigate has been dispatched to bring up two battalions from Volos, that a sailing-vessel has been appointed to embark a regiment of Cavalry at the same place, and that a steamer for towing it will be added with the least practicable delay.

With respect to the troops at Varna and Bourgas, I have nothing now to state, except that Sir Edmund Lyons appears to entertain a more immediate expectation of being able to furnish transport for their conveyance hither, on which account I would beg to be favoured with your definitive decision as to the place of their reception under your command.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 937.

Lieutenant-General Vivian to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Constantinople, June 4, 1855.

My Lord,

DR. SARELL will have communicated to your Excellency the result of the examination of the Kilia ground, which took place yesterday morning. Staff-Surgeon Campbell was associated with Dr. Sarell, and Major-General Michel accompanied these gentlemen.

Good encamping ground was found, quite equal to that which had been previously surveyed (if not superior to it) at some distance from Kilia, nearer to Buyukdéré.

As this new ground is free from all presumed injurious influences, I propose that my camp shall be pitched in the vicinity of the villages named in the inclosed memorandum.

I proceeded this morning with my Chief of the Staff and Deputy Quarter-termaster-General, to the ground proposed, and find it well adapted for our purpose; and as it has been pronounced unobjectionable by the medical gentlemen who inspected it yesterday, I request that your Lordship will be so kind as to cause the necessary application being made to enable me to occupy it forthwith, as I consider there can be no possible objection to the measure.

I propose at once having the road placed in a proper state of repair; and I beg to report to your Lordship that, within three days from the time when your Excellency may convey to me the necessary sanction for taking possession of the ground, I shall be prepared to receive the Turkish troops which I inspected last week.

I require three days to complete my Commissariat arrangements for the troops.

I beg further to solicit that the Turkish authorities may be required to pitch tents, without loss of time, for the troops about to be handed over from the garrison of Constantinople, and for such others as may be expected from Volos and elsewhere.

I shall be happy to send officers to aid in pointing out the exact spots where the tents should be pitched; and my officers will be ready at any moment to accompany any Turkish authorities sent to meet them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. J. H. VIVIAN.

Inclosure 3 in No. 937.

Memorandum.

Head-Quarters, Turkish Contingent,
Buyukdéré, June 4, 1855.

THERE is sufficient ground for the encampment of one division of Infantry, one regiment of Cavalry, and two batteries of Artillery, on the ground west of Terti Koi, between that place and the stream.

Two batteries of Artillery would be advantageously placed, with regard to water, shade, and space, at the village of Dermidschi Koi. One division of Infantry at Kusup Pehiry, near Kavak. The roads communicating with these

encampments are passable for arabas, but require repair. Three batteries of Artillery and one regiment of Cavalry could be encamped on open space at the south-west extremity of Buyukdéré.

(Signed) E. R. WETHERALL,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Deputy Quartermaster-General.

Inclosure 4 in No. 937.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Lieutenant-General Vivian.

British Embassy, Pera, June 5, 1855.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch dated yesterday, confirming, in substance, Dr. Sarell's report as to the ground proposed for your encampment, and requesting that I will apply to the Porte for whatever may be necessary to enable you to occupy the situations named in a memorandum accompanying your despatch.

I shall do myself the honour of transmitting your suggestions at an early hour to the Seraskier Pasha; and it may be hoped that nothing further will occur to impede the progress of your very important duties.

I learn, from M. Pisani's report of his interview with Fuad Pasha and the Seraskier, that the Turkish Ministers are themselves desirous of fixing at once the ground for your encampment, in order to be prepared for the troops expected from Volos, which, on their arrival, will find no other place for their accommodation. I have to state, on the same authority, that the number of troops to be placed under your command here, in the first instance, amounts, with the proportion of Cavalry and Artillery, to 5,000 men. The five battalions comprised in the number are computed at 3,750 in all.

In reply to my inquiries respecting the 10,000 or 11,000 men to be drawn from the army in Bulgaria, in order to make up, with those at Varna, Bourgas, and here, a total of 20,000, the Turkish Ministers express their readiness to consign the required number of troops to you, provided they are not to be removed from their present station.

It is unnecessary for me to enter into the merits of their motive for this condition, as they propose to meet you at Constantinople to-night, with the view of discussing the whole matter, and expect from me, what I hope you will enable me to give, an acceptance of the invitation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 937.

Lieutenant-General Vivian to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Constantinople, June 6, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's communication, superscribed immediate, dated 4th instant, but received only on my return to Buyukdéré, after my interview with Fuad Pasha and the Seraskier Pasha last night.

Your Excellency was kind enough during my interview in the morning to place before me a copy of that letter, but as my communication of the same date, which was forwarded to the British Embassy on the evening of the 4th, conveys to your Excellency the information desired, I do not trouble your Lordship with any repetition of its contents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. J. H. VIVIAN.

Inclosure 6 in No. 937.

Lieutenant-General Vivian to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Constantinople, June 6, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 5th instant, subject as per margin, and I beg to state that in compliance with the invitation conveyed to me, I last night met the Turkish Ministers, in order to discuss the various subjects connected with the formation of the Turkish Contingent, which have been under consideration.

M. Pisani was good enough to give me his assistance as interpreter, and in order that no time might be lost in apprizing your Lordship of all that occurred at this interview, I requested him to communicate at once to your Excellency what transpired, and to inform you that I would as early as possible make my official report on the subject.

General Michel, my Chief of the Staff, was present at the interview. I found the Ministers well disposed to meet my views on all points except that of the withdrawal of 10,000 or 11,000 men from the army of Bulgaria; reasons were advanced which deterred me from pressing that measure, and I preferred leaving that matter an open question, until I could have the advantage of obtaining your Excellency's advice upon it. I will hereafter return to that point.

No difficulty was made in regard to the ground selected for my encampment.

The Seraskier Pasha has promised to send me officers to accompany some of my own staff to-morrow morning, when final arrangements will be concluded; he named to-morrow morning, when final arrangements will be reliable period when he could send his officers.

The Seraskier promised to send out tents forthwith, and to commence pitching them on Friday the 8th instant.

The men belonging to the garrison here, intended to form a portion of my corps, are to be marched to camp on Monday the 11th instant. I shall commence provisioning them on the following day.

I suggested that British pay should commence from the date on which the troops moved into camp. It is necessary that something should be decided in regard to this matter, and I would recommend that my suggestion should be confirmed, for it may prove an inducement to expedite the assembling of troops, when known that British pay commences from the date on which they may so arrive.

The arrangements for the conveyance of the troops from Volos, already communicated by your Excellency, was made known to me by the Turkish Ministers; they however appear to suffer real embarrassment from the want of transports; they are apparently doing all they have the means of accomplishing, but it was suggested, that if a large British steamer could be placed at their disposal for the conveyance of a portion of the Cavalry regiment—500—it would tend greatly to facilitate our arrangements, presuming Ministers to have been sincere in their statements regarding their difficulties. I beg earnestly to draw your attention to this suggestion, and to express a hope that for the good of the general cause, such assistance, if practicable, may be applied for to the Admiral.

The Seraskier Pasha then proposed to nominate an officer of his staff to attend me for the express purpose of enabling us to communicate with each other more readily; this arrangement I thought calculated to be useful, and I at once acceded to it.

Ministers next adverted to their inability to afford transports to convey to my camp the troops assembled at Varna and Bourgos. I replied that it was hoped the British Admiral would be enabled to give us assistance for the transport of these troops, and if this aid be afforded, I see no reason why I should not within a week or ten days have assembled in the vicinity of this place, a force of 10,000 men of all arms, and if your Excellency should feel justified in urging the required assistance from the Admiral, I may yet hope to have 10,000 fit to take the field by the beginning of August next, provided the men transferred be at all equal to those I have inspected here.

With regard to the 10,000 or 11,000 men from the army in Bulgaria, I was informed that they were ready to hand over that number, provided they were not removed from their present stations.

Your Excellency is acquainted with the reasons assigned for their inability to withdraw further troops from that part of the country. It was stated that in the present aspect of affairs, and considering the large body of troops that had already been withdrawn thence for the Crimea, under his Highness Omer Pasha, it would be impossible to remove more men from that quarter; nevertheless, if the point were pressed, they would submit the subject to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan and his Highness Omer Pasha, and that they were prepared to be guided by their decision.

I think your Lordship will remember that, in the earlier discussion on this subject, when his Highness Omer Pasha recommended the withdrawal of these men for the Contingent, he proposed that their places should be partially supplied by troops from Bosnia. Thus even his Highness Omer Pasha did not contemplate their removal, unless relieved to a certain extent; and I gathered from Ministers last night that they had no means of affording this relief. I certainly did not feel myself in a position to press the subject. Your Lordship will be better able to judge whether the reasons assigned be valid or otherwise.

I consider that my acceptance of the troops on the terms offered would be altogether inexpedient and objectionable; it would, in fact, be simply bringing such troops on British pay, without securing their services to the British Contingent, since the troops would have to remain at their present stations.

It is possible that, if the point had been pressed, an agreement might have been entered into to collect these 10,000 or 11,000 men at some given spot; but still the objection would have remained in full force, that the troops must have continued in Bulgaria, and that they could not be removed without the consent of the Turkish authorities.

My great desire is to have the force collected. This is most necessary, for the purpose of the practice of manœuvring a large body—a system in which Turkish troops are defective. It is, again, most requisite that, at starting, I should be near my depôts, which must be formed on the Bosphorus or at some seaport.

If I am to be removed inland, I shall have to incur the greater expense of inland carriage, and to encounter at every turn the difficulties presented by a want of transports for the conveyance of my stores,—felt already to such an extent in the mere conveyance of a portion of my troops from Varna and Volos.

Then, again, in the present condition of my Pay and Commissariat Department I have not officers sufficient to detach for the onerous duties devolving on them; and lastly, I deem it of the highest importance that at the commencement of the undertaking I should have the power of easy communication with the authorities at Constantinople, and particularly that I should not be far removed from the benefit of your Lordship's influence, which I am confident your Excellency must feel to be of the greatest importance to me.

On the first formation of the Contingent, constant reference to the Turkish authorities will be necessary, and without your Lordship's assistance I am well aware that my difficulties will be largely added to.

I have endeavoured to submit a plain and candid statement of my views on the subject; and having done so, I will only add that if in your Excellency's opinion there be no other way of forming the Contingent, I will of course in that case accept 10,000 or 11,000 men in a proper position, to be approved of by your Excellency and myself, and I must be content to organize my army in two corps, making the best arrangements I can to meet the urgency of the case.

As the troops are soon to be assembled, permit me to beg your Excellency's attention to my letter of May , respecting the Turkish rank to be conferred on the officers of the Contingent.

I have, &c.

Signed) R. J. H. VIVIAN.

No. 938.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 267.)

Vienna, June 10, 1855.

My Lord,

I MENTIONED to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 206 of the 29th ultimo, in which you announce that Count Colloredo had acquainted you with the proclamation circulated by Zadik Pasha and another Pole amongst the Poles and Gallicians of the Austrian army, which had for its object to excite them to revolt, and consequently that Count Coronini had found it necessary to establish martial law in the Principalities.

Count Buol said the issue of this proclamation was a measure, on the part of officers holding commissions in the army of the Sultan, which was calculated and intended to disturb the minds of the soldiers to whom it was addressed, and General Coronini was bound to adopt all the measures he considered necessary for maintaining the discipline of his army, and for repressing such attempts as those abovementioned, more particularly as coming from foreign agents.

It was with this view, as the excitement to revolt had come from the Turkish military authorities, that the Austrian Generals felt themselves obliged to take the strongest measures against a proceeding so much to be condemned: and if the Turkish Government, being duly sensible of the seriousness of the proceeding of their officers, asked for explanations as to the measures which had been adopted by the Austrian Government, their inquiries would be entertained, but this question could not be discussed with any other Government.

I stated that, under all the circumstances which attended the issue and the application of this decree, your Lordship thought Her Majesty's Government might justly request that it should be rescinded; but Count Buol replied that, as Her Majesty's subjects would not be affected by it, and as it was established in consequence of conduct on the part of authorities of another Government which had made no representation with regard to it, he could not conform to this invitation.

I asked Aali Pasha if he had any orders from his Government to make any representations upon this subject, but he told me that neither himself nor the Ambassador had received any instructions whatever relating to this affair and therefore that he could take no measure with regard to it.

At the same time Aali Pasha assured me that he highly condemned the conduct of the Turkish officers in signing and circulating amongst the Austrian soldiers a proclamation of the nature of the one communicated to you by Count Colloredo; and he stated that he was not surprised that General Coronini should have recourse to measures of great rigour to repress such proceedings, which he was sure his Government would not sanction.

June 11, 1855.

Since the interview above mentioned with Count Buol, I have received your Lordship's despatch No. 254 of the 6th instant, which states that notwithstanding the assurances given me by Count Buol, and reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 232 of the 16th ultimo, that the martial law which had been proclaimed in the Principalities would in no way be made applicable to any foreign residents, yet that on the 24th of May this proclamation was transmitted to the British Consulate in Jassy, from the Austrian Consul-General, for the information of British subjects and of all persons under British protection.

According to your Lordship's instructions I made this known to Count Buol, and inquired of him what measures had been taken to protect British subjects from coming under such a jurisdiction. Count Buol immediately inquired whether any case had occurred in contradiction to the assurances he had given me as to the orders which had been transmitted with regard to all foreign residents in the Principalities. I told him I had not received any notice from your Lordship, or from the British Consul at Jassy, that any such case had occurred. Count Buol then said, that the orders which he had transmitted, and which he communicated to me, had been and would be strictly observed.

Count Buol remarked, that the communication of the proclamation by the Austrian Consul-General on the 24th of May to Mr. Gardner was accounted for,

as at that time he had not received the orders which he (Count Buol) had stated to me to be about to be sent from Vienna on the 16th of that month, and in transmitting the proclamation to the British Consul, he (the Austrian Agent) had acted entirely without orders from his Government; the whole question had now been put right, and your Lordship might be assured the subjects of Her Majesty, or those enjoying British protection, would in no way be affected by the measure which had been adopted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 939.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 269.)

Vienna, June 13, 1855.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 201 of the 29th May refers to the communications which have been received from Mr. Colquhoun of the events which took place in the Principality of Wallachia and the details of which are given in the two inclosures in Mr. Colquhoun's despatch: the one from Mr. Doria, of the 2nd of April, which relates to the disorders which had taken place in the previous month at Foxani: and the other is the report from the Wallachian chief of the police at Braila, which is dated the 4th of April, and equally refers to events which had already taken place.

These statements generally have reference to circumstances which, in consequence of reports I had received from Mr. Colquhoun by his despatches Nos. 19 and 20 of the 19th and 22nd March, I brought before General Hess, and which I reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 156 of the 5th of April, and upon which I received the assurances from that officer which are stated in my despatch, and which also reported the feelings of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor with regard to them.

I have every reason to believe that the measures announced by General Hess as about to be taken have been successful, for I have not received any reports of similar acts of indiscipline; and upon mentioning the subject to Count Buol, in pursuance of your Lordship's instructions, he inquired of me whether there were any new facts affecting the interests of British subjects, of which I had orders to complain, since the explanations which had taken place in April last, and which particularly related to Foxani and Braila.

I stated that I had not any such case to bring before him, but to express a fear that the circumstances which had occurred had created ill-feeling against the Imperial troops.

Count Buol said that he believed that these feelings were exaggerated: he had reports from Bucharest which spoke in most favourable terms of the discipline and good conduct of the Austrian garrison; but he hoped the strict discipline which by the orders of the Emperor was established in the Principalities, would put an end to any further complaints from that quarter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 940.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 18.

(No 271.)

Vienna, June 13, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith an abstract of the account of the revenue and expenditure of the Austrian Empire during the years 1853 and 1854, which has just been published by the Imperial Government and which, as your Lordship will perceive, shows, particularly in the last year, a very large deficit.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 940.

ABSTRACT of Account of the Revenue and Expenditure of Austria, during the years 1853 and 1854.

REVENUE.

	1854	1853
Ordinary Revenue.	florins.	florins.
Direct Taxes	85,554,815	84,732,657
Indirect Taxes	133,255,802	130,288,412
Revenue from State Property, Mines, &c.	7,159,328	2,709,732
Excess of General Sinking Fund, and Lombardo-Venetian Amortisation Fund	10,589,790	11,285,991
Miscellaneous Revenue	8,773,989	6,923,310
Total	245,334,724	235,930,102
Extraordinary Revenue	.. ..	1,206,891
Total Revenue	245,334,724	237,136,993

EXPENDITURE.

	1854	1853
Ordinary Expenditure.	florins.	florins.
Interest on National Debt	72,148,816	66,819,175
Court	7,551,579	6,760,292
Chancery of His Imperial Majesty's Cabinet	42,740	44,938
Imperial Council	181,914	184,604
Conference of Ministers	33,901	47,141
Foreign Office	1,937,591	1,863,512
Office of Minister of Interior	19,111,710	20,546,376
Police	10,532,427	10,387,661
Army	117,401,192	111,967,916
Office of Minister of Finance	25,077,798	26,392,895
Office of Minister of Justice	17,319,184	18,088,545
Office of Minister of Worship and Education	4,075,810	4,502,016
Office of Minister of Trade and Public Works	15,475,373	15,284,992
Officers of Control	3,640,146	3,482,649
Total ..	294,529,681	286,313,610
Extraordinary Expenditure.		
Extraordinary Military Expenses	91,294,604	5,761,944
Paid to Parma in consequence of War in 1848 and 1849 ..	160,920	160,920
Paid to Modena for same cause	61,381	150,000
Paid to Russia for intervention in Hungary and Siebenbürgen in 1849	.. ..	1,574,154
Total	91,516,965	7,647,018
Total of Expenditure	386,046,646	293,960,628

	1854	1853
	florins.	florins.
Excess of Ordinary Expenditure over Ordinary Revenue ..	49,195,957	50,383,508
Excess of Extraordinary Expenditure over Extraordinary Revenue	91,516,965	6,440,127
Total Excess of Expenditure over Revenue ..	140,712,922	56,823,635

No. 941.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 272.) *Vienna, June* 13, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch to your Lordship No. 261 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to report that His Majesty the Emperor left Vienna last night on his tour of inspection of the army at present assembled in Gallicia and the Bukowina. The news of His Majesty's arrival at Cracow has already been telegraphed to Her Majesty the Empress.

His Majesty, who is accompanied only by a small portion of his staff, intends to complete this inspection of his troops as rapidly as possible and with the hope of returning to Vienna within a month. He will proceed as far as Czernowitz, on the borders of Moldavia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 942.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 273.) *Vienna, June* 13, 1855.

My Lord,

A GENERAL report having circulated in Vienna, that the Austrian army at present assembled on the frontiers of Russia was about to be reduced, I inquired of Count Buol whether there was any foundation for this report. He replied that no such measure as the reduction of the army was at present contemplated, but owing to the great amount of epidemic diseases, which had occasioned a large mortality amongst the troops, it would be necessary to change the localities of some of the corps, and to allow a part of the reserves to return home on furlough, but subject to be recalled to their regiments whenever they were required.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 943.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 274.) *Vienna, June* 13, 1855.

My Lord,

IN obedience to your Lordship's instructions I brought before Count Buol your despatch No. 211 of the 2nd of June, and I left with him a copy of it.

Count Buol was gratified by the language in which your Lordship speaks, in this despatch, of your desire to maintain unimpaired the friendly relations that now exist between England and Austria, and he desired me to state that he would return his answer to it in a despatch addressed to Count Colloredo, which would be submitted to your Lordship. Count Buol, in reading this despatch, remarked upon the expression, in the first paragraph, of regret that the proposals to which it was impossible Her Majesty's Government could agree, should have been renewed by the Austrian Government; he said, he did not consider he had renewed these proposals, for they had originally been entrusted to M. Drouyn de Lhuys and to Lord John Russell, who had undertaken to bring them before their Governments; and it was only when the Austrian Government became aware by your Lordship's despatch No. 180 of the 8th ultimo, that Her Majesty's Government were not in possession of any written document containing in precise terms the proposal that Austria was willing to make, and that these Ministers had only supplied (by notes they had themselves taken in Vienna, to assist

their own recollection) the general basis of the propositions they had agreed to; that he (Count Buol) thought it necessary to forward to your Lordship the whole of the documents relating to his proposal, together with the explanations they required.

With respect to the progressive support which the Austrian proposition provides for Turkey by the gradual addition to the naval forces of the allied Powers in the Black Sea upon the increase of the Russian fleet, and to which your Lordship objects as tending to establish a competition for preponderance between the allies and Russia, Count Buol remarked that the present Russian fleet being only six sail of the line afloat, with a corresponding number of frigates, it could be no menace to Turkey. To become one, new ships must be built, for vessels of war could not be brought into the Black Sea but by the Bosphorus and with the permission of the Sultan; this process must be gradual, it would be watched, and a counter-force would be provided, so that no danger could arise to Turkey on a sudden, and Count Buol said he had hoped that these arrangements would have avoided, as long as the Treaty which had been proposed between the three allied Powers existed, any cause of uneasiness to Europe from any preponderance on the part of Russia.

With respect to your Lordship's remark that England and France must be allowed to judge for themselves on what terms they could make peace, Count Buol gave his entire adhesion to it, and stated that in so doing he was perfectly convinced that your Lordship would concede to Austria the same rights and latitude; but he wished to assure your Lordship that according to his belief the conditions which Austria had proposed would be quite as efficient for the ultimate object entertained by the allies as the one proposed by your Lordship and which he had notwithstanding supported in Conference, although he had not agreed to make it an ultimatum, or its rejection a *casus belli*.

Count Buol stated that with respect to the consent of Her Majesty's Government to enter into negotiations, and which he was convinced was done by all parties in the desire of attaining the object for which they were undertaken, he could only regret that those negotiations had not led to a more satisfactory conclusion, but he said that Austria had not been influenced in the part she had taken in these negotiations by considerations of her own position, but by the views entertained of the best manner of bringing about a safe and durable arrangement for the peace of Europe, and he said that your Lordship might rely upon it that no effort would be wanting on his part to maintain unimpaired the friendly relations at present existing with the British Government and the engagements by which those relations were secured.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 944.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 240.) *Berlin, June* 16, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT ESTERHAZY communicated to Baron Manteuffel, at the end of last week, a copy of the closing Protocol of the Vienna Conferences; and he has since delivered to his Excellency, confidentially, copies of the last Austrian despatches addressed to London and Paris. Baron Manteuffel mentioned this to me yesterday, observing that Count Buol invited the Prussian Government to express an approval of the proceedings of Austria at the Conferences, maintaining that the policy of Austria had been dictated by just and sound motives, and in accordance with the true interests of Germany, and he hoped, therefore, would be duly appreciated at Berlin.

Baron Manteuffel said, further, that he apprehended the object of the Austrian Government in this communication was to engage Prussia to support her at Frankfort, with a view to obtain her concurrence in an appeal to be hereafter addressed to the Diet, to contribute towards defraying the military expenses incurred by Austria; that it was put forward in a spirit of conciliation,

and in order to discover the future intentions of Prussia, and frame her next communication to the German Diet accordingly. His Excellency did not give me to understand that the King had yet given any order respecting the answer to be returned to Vienna; and, to judge from his tone and manner in speaking of Austria, the feelings of the Prussian Government are not improved. At the same time, it would appear that Count Buol desires to place the relations of the two countries on a better footing; and notwithstanding the bitterness against Austria which exists at the present moment, a change may come over the King's mind at no distant period, for His Majesty is most desirous to get out of his present awkward position, and will gladly avail himself of the first favourable opportunity of doing so.

Indeed, Baron Manteuffel hinted the same to me to-day, in the course of a short conversation which I have had with him, and said that he had just sent to Paris and London despatches which he hoped would be well received there.

Prussia is clearly beginning to feel her loss of position amongst the Great Powers; her opinions may also be influenced by our late successes in the Crimea and the Sea of Azoff; and whilst she pretends to consider that her conduct entitles her to as much goodwill from the Western Powers as that of Austria has done, she is seeking to reestablish herself in the European concert. She takes advantage of the moment when Austria is apparently receding from her alliance with us, and loses no time in addressing a communication to London and Paris, with a view of reestablishing more cordial relations with the Governments of England and France, but not, I fear, with any other purpose, for there is no appearance of a change in her policy on the Eastern question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 945.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 242.) *Berlin, June* 16, 1855.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship is aware that the Austrian Minister communicated some time ago to Baron Manteuffel copies of Count Buol's despatch to Count Colloredo and M. de Hübner of the 20th of May, together with copies of the documents therein transmitted.

In making this communication, Count Esterhazy appears to have given Baron Manteuffel to understand that they contained the ultimatum of Austria, and that if approved of in London and Paris, would be forwarded to St. Petersburgh for acceptance, and if refused by the Imperial Cabinet, Austria might be called on to take up arms on the side of the Western Powers, and join them in the war.

Some time after this communication was made by Count Esterhazy, the Marquis de Moustier received a despatch from Count Walewski, stating, as one of the reasons for the rejection by the Western Powers of the Austrian propositions, that Austria did not bind herself to make their rejection by Russia a *casus belli*.

The different language held to Baron Manteuffel on this subject by my French and Austrian colleagues has been commented on by his Excellency, in his conversation with me, and I told his Excellency that I left it to his own superior judgment to decide who was right in the impression that should be produced by these Austrian despatches; that I had read them attentively, and that certainly I could not perceive any passage by which Austria bound herself to make war if Russia refused her propositions. Such an intention might be faintly shadowed forth, but there was nothing positive or binding in her assertions. Such seems now to be Baron Manteuffel's conviction.

Count Esterhazy, with whom I have also spoken respecting the different impression on this point made at Paris, and the one which he considers Count Buol's despatch was intended to convey, still maintains that if the Western

Powers had accepted the Austrian propositions, and that they had been subsequently rejected by Russia, the alliance would have been completed, and the Treaty of the 2nd of December carried out.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 946.

Brigadier-General Craufurd to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 18.*)

(No. 19.) *Vienna, June 13, 1855.*

My Lord,

UPON the evening of Friday the 8th instant an Aide-de-camp of his Excellency General Hess came to Hitzing, a village close to Vienna, where I am living, and desired to see me. He informed me that he was directed by General Hess, to convey to me the expression of the Emperor's regret at not having it in his power to take me with him upon his proposed journey to inspect the troops in Gallicia and the Bukovina; for which object it was his intention to leave this neighbourhood upon Tuesday the 12th instant. It was added that His Imperial Majesty only would take a very small suite with him, and that his visits to the principal stations of the troops would be of the most rapid and hasty nature.

I expressed my submission to the Emperor's decision upon this affair, but did not attempt to conceal my regret at not having the honour to accompany His Majesty; and I inquired if I should be able to see General Hess upon the following morning, and have an opportunity of ascertaining from him, whether my going to Gallicia as a private traveller for the purpose of visiting some of the military stations would be objected to.

The Aide-de-camp informed me, that General Hess would leave Vienna at an early hour the next morning, and that it would therefore not be in my power to see him. Gallicia, he added, was at present a very uninviting scene for travelling, as the cholera prevailed there, in addition to fever and other maladies, which have caused great ravages amongst the troops during the last winter and spring.

Upon the following morning I went to Vienna, and called immediately upon General Letzing, to whom I mentioned the communication which I had received upon the previous evening. He informed me that General Hess had called upon him during the afternoon of the 8th instant, and conveyed to him a communication from the Emperor to the same effect as the one which I had myself received. Upon consulting him further as to his views, he told me that the message which he had received had been what he had anticipated, but that even in another case he did not now intend to have done otherwise than remain in Vienna; having consulted his Government upon the subject and received instructions to that effect. He added that he thought we should probably soon be preparing to leave Vienna. He appeared to feel that although there were many reasons to explain the Emperor's wish not to take the Commissioners with him at the present moment, yet that greater frankness in conveying this conclusion to us might have been desirable.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 9 (June 5, 1855,) and to inform your Lordship in reply that I have already forwarded a detailed account of the officers' and valet schools in regiments, and herewith inclose a memorandum upon under-officers' and privates' schools.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES R. CRAUFURD.

Inclosure in No. 946.

Memorandum.

3. *The School for Non-commissioned Officers.*

THESE schools are attended by whole companies at a time—by the corporals, lance-corporals, also by those cadets who do not frequent the school for cadets, and lastly, by twelve privates, chosen for their cleverness, good conduct and smartness, and who promise to become clever officers.

The schools are open from the 1st November till the end of March.

Instruction is given in military matters, in reading and writing, German, and cyphering.

The lectures on military subjects are given by the commanders of companies themselves; reading, writing, and arithmetic, are taught by a subaltern officer, and he is assisted by a clever non-commissioned officer.

The object of the writing-school is to instruct in:

1st. Reading and writing German—the cleverer pupils writing from dictation.

2ndly. Arithmetic, viz., the first four rules and fractions.

3rdly. Drawing up tableaus respecting the duties of a corporal.

The commanders of companies must ascertain the progress made. Examinations are passed at the end of December and March, and reports thereon are made to the officers commanding the regiment.

In time of peace those non-commissioned officers only can be promoted who have passed through these schools.

Those corporals who have attended the school with a favourable result, and have acquired the necessary knowledge in the routine of the service, and have given proofs of their capacity, receive twice-a-week instruction in arithmetic, drawing up petitions and protocols, &c., from the adjutant of the battalion, in order thereby to become qualified to be made serjeants.

4. *Schools for the Privates.*

The classes in these schools are held either under an officer or a non-commissioned officer, according to the directions of the officer commanding the company.

These schools are attended regularly every winter, viz., from 1st November to the end of March; during the other months they only are attended when, on account of unfavourable weather, neither drilling nor other practical exercises can take place.

The instruction given is very simple and adapted to the capacity of the private soldier, and embraces the services of a private in garrison, camp, and outpost duty, taking to pieces fire-arms, theoretical instruction in the use of his fire-arms, &c. In Cavalry is added the tending and saddling of horses, &c.

At the beginning of spring, all which has in winter been theoretically taught is practically performed.

On Saturday the Articles of War are read and explained by the officer commanding the company.

If the dislocation of the troops does not prevent it, the chaplain, by order of the officer commanding the regiment, gives religious instruction.

Examinations are held under the officers commanding companies at the end of December and February, and by the officers commanding battalions at the end of March.

These last make a written report to the commanding officer of the regiment.

5. *Service of the Pioneers.*

In every battalion there is a special school for those who are intended to become pioneers—one lance-corporal and six privates per company—carpenters included are obliged to attend. The above are chosen from the stoutest and best-behaved men.

At the head of this school is an officer who has served in a pioneers corps, or has already passed through one of these schools.

Instruction is given from 1st November till end of April, and lasts every day for one hour and a-half; it consists in the most simple duties of pioneers when in the field.

Carpenters must be taught joining, joining different kinds of wood, &c.

6. *Instruction in Serving Guns, Artillery Practice, &c.*

This takes place at stations where there are batteries, and the respective commanders of regiments or battalions must make arrangements for this purpose with the officer commanding the battery.

Eight men from each company are to be chosen, who must attend this drill (to begin on the 1st of May) till they have acquired the necessary proficiency; then only an equal number of privates are to be taken from the next company, and this is continued till all the companies have gone through this drill.

From these latter are afterwards chosen those who are permanently intended to cover the guns.

J. R. C.

No. 947.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 232. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, June 19, 1855.

My Lord,

IF the Austrian Government concurs with the English and French Governments in desiring that the alliance established by the Treaty of December 2 should still be maintained; and if Austria is determined, notwithstanding certain recent differences of opinion, to cooperate with England and France in bringing the war to a successful termination, Her Majesty's Government confidently expect that the attitude of Austria towards Russia will undergo no change.

Her Majesty's Government trust that the Austrian army will not be materially reduced, and that the troops, if moved from their present cantonments, may not be placed in such positions as would by their nature be indications of a change of policy, as it is of great importance, with respect both to the conduct of Russia and the military operations of the allies, that Russia should not consider herself relieved from apprehension as to the course which Austria may hereafter pursue.

The policy of Germany, and the support or discouragement which Russia may derive from that policy, will much depend upon the language held to the Diet by the Cabinet of Vienna; and Her Majesty's Government accordingly hope that in any communication which may be addressed to that body, Count Buol will declare that the policy of Austria is unchanged, and that with respect to the objects of the war no difference of opinion exists between the three Powers.

Your Lordship is instructed to bring these matters under the consideration of Count Buol. You will do so in the manner you may think most expedient, and in terms which will leave no doubt on the mind of his Excellency as to the desire of Her Majesty's Government to maintain the most friendly relations with Austria; but if unfortunately Count Buol should decline to adopt the course which I have indicated in this despatch, your Lordship will not conceal from him that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government the estrangement between Austria and the Western Powers, and the responsibility of the consequences that may follow from that estrangement, will rest upon Austria alone.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 948.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 196.)

Foreign Office, June 19, 1855.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by you to Baron Manteuffel, as reported in your despatch No. 242 of the 16th instant, with respect to the rejection of the last propositions made by Austria; and I transmit to your Lordship a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, in which he states that Count Buol distinctly declared, that if Russia refused these proposals, Austria would not go to war.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 949.

Circular Despatch addressed to Her Majesty's Representatives at Foreign Courts.

Foreign Office, June 19, 1855.

Sir,

ON the 4th instant a Conference was summoned at Vienna by Count Buol, the proceedings at which are recorded in the Protocol of which I inclose a copy.†

This Protocol, together with the Protocols of the Conferences held at Vienna between the 15th of March and the 26th of April, of which copies have been transmitted to you, will place you in possession of the details of the negotiations in which Her Majesty, in conjunction with her allies, has recently been engaged, and which, to Her Majesty's great regret, have not resulted in the conclusion of a peace with the Emperor of Russia.

I consider that the present will be a fitting opportunity to state for your information and guidance the views of Her Majesty's Government upon the negotiations which have thus been brought to a close.

The stipulations for which, while reserving to themselves the right of insisting upon other special and additional conditions, Her Majesty and her allies considered it more particularly incumbent on them to provide, were as follows:

1. That the exclusive right to interfere to a certain extent in the internal affairs of provinces belonging to the Turkish Empire, which Russia had in former times wrung from the necessities of the Porte, should no longer be exercised by that Power.

2. That the channel of the Lower Danube, and more especially the outlets of that river into the Black Sea, should no longer be subject to the exclusive control of Russia, but should, on the contrary, be confided to the superintendence of delegates appointed by other Powers as well as by Russia, and who should take measures for freeing and keeping free from obstructions the great water communication of Central Germany with the rest of the world.

3. That the Turkish Empire should become part of the system of European equilibrium, and that means should be taken to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea.

4. That the pretensions of Russia officially to protect the Christian subjects of the Porte should be renounced, and that the Powers should use their influence to obtain from the Sultan, by an act of his own sovereign authority, the confirmation and observance of the religious privileges of his Christian subjects.

A communication to this effect was made to the Court of Russia at the close of last year, and was accepted by that Power as the basis on which negotiations might be entered into.

Negotiations were accordingly commenced at Vienna, but unfortunately it is only on the first and second points that anything approaching to an agreement was arrived at; for the refusal of the Russian Plenipotentiaries to

* No. 813. † Inclosure 1 in No. 905.

accede to the reasonable proposals made to them by the Plenipotentiaries of the allies on the third point stopped the progress of the negotiations upon that point, and the fourth point was in consequence not brought under discussion.

It is satisfactory, however, to Her Majesty's Government to be able to appeal to the Protocols on the first and second points as an evidence of the anxiety shown by the allies to devise terms of settlement advantageous to the general interests of Europe, and more immediately conducive to the development of the prosperity of Germany; and Her Majesty's Government, therefore, regret the more that the refusal of Russia to accept the proposals of the allies on the third point should have stood in the way of the advantages which would have resulted from the arrangements which might have been made in regard to the matters to which the two first points related.

Her Majesty's Government are aware that Count Nesselrode, in a despatch which he has recently addressed to the Russian Ministers at foreign Courts, has sought to place in a favourable light the course pursued by Russia in the discussions on the two first points, and to persuade foreign Governments, and more particularly those of Germany, that the continued preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea has no direct bearing on the questions which relate to the Principalities and to the navigation of the Danube, nor on the interests of Germany, and that Germany, therefore, ought not to cooperate with the allies in their efforts to reduce that preponderance.

Her Majesty's Government are, however, persuaded that an impartial consideration of the real facts of the case will serve to dispel the illusion which it was the object of Count Nesselrode's despatch to create. Her Majesty's Government have no desire to undervalue the importance of the matters to which the arrangements in regard to the first two points sketched out in the Protocols of the Conference relate; but Her Majesty's Government must be permitted to observe that, as regards the Principalities, any rights which Russia might possess or claim under her former Treaties were at once extinguished by the abrogation of those Treaties on the breaking out of the war, and that consequently the exemption of the Principalities from the exclusive protection of Russia is not the result of any concession made by Russia to the interests of Germany, but is the direct consequence of the violent act of aggression committed by Russia on the Turkish Empire; and as regards the navigation of the Danube, it is to be observed that although the arrangements proposed in the fifth Protocol would be to a certain extent satisfactory, yet it was mainly owing to the refusal of Russia to accede to the reasonable suggestions put forward by the Plenipotentiaries of Austria in the fourth Conference, that those proposed arrangements were not made more complete and more in conformity with the general interests of Europe.

But the arrangements proposed in regard to the first two points, even if they were to be deemed sufficient and satisfactory in themselves, could not be considered as being secured to Europe so long as those guarantees for their continued observance which might have been provided by a satisfactory arrangement on the third point, continue to be pertinaciously declined by Russia. It is not enough that Russia should stipulate that she will no longer seek authoritatively to interfere in the affairs of the Principalities and of Servia; it is not enough that she should consent to delegate by stipulation to a Commission composed of Representatives of the several States interested in the navigation of the Danube, the task of keeping clear the channels of that river and its communications with the Black Sea. The interests of Europe require, over and above these arrangements, that some valid security should be obtained that Russia should no longer possess that overwhelming moral and political influence in the Principalities which her preponderance in the Black Sea has heretofore enabled her to exercise; and that she should not, by a constant maritime superiority in that sea, have the means of supporting by her fleet the march and invasion of her army, and of thus striking a mortal blow at the heart of that Empire of which the Principalities are only the dependent extremities.

Even, therefore, as regards the first two points, the enjoyment of any advantages which might be obtained under those points would be precarious, so long as the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea were allowed to continue. But when the direct bearing of that preponderance on the great question on which the war has been undertaken is considered, the refusal of Russia to consent to any measures which would effectually put an end to that preponderance,

is a warning which Europe cannot with safety disregard, and plainly shows that Russia is not prepared to lay aside her long-cherished views of aggression on Turkey; and it affords a manifest proof that the anxiety felt by the Powers of Europe for the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire has a just and valid foundation.

Russia has asserted that a regard for her dignity precludes her from acceding to the terms proposed by the allies on the third point. But the dignity of Russia cannot require that she should keep up in time of peace, and on the immediate threshold of her weaker neighbour, a force wholly unnecessary for purposes of self-defence, but enabling her at the shortest notice to subvert the independence of that neighbour, and to change the territorial distribution of Europe. Yet such is the position which Russia has maintained in the Black Sea, and which she has even now publicly avowed her determination not to renounce.

It is needless to dwell on the absence of any motive of self-preservation to justify this determination on the part of Russia. It would be a mockery to pretend that she has anything to fear from the hostility of Turkey; and while Turkey is at peace and free from threatened attack by Russia, and while the Straits between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea are closed except to a small and limited number of ships of war of the Western Powers, Russia has nothing to fear from the naval forces of England and France; while, on the other hand, the present state of things in the Black Sea demonstrates that when war exists between Russia and Turkey, and when the Straits are consequently open to all the naval forces of the Sultan's allies, England and France, if sufficient time be afforded them, can collect in the Euxine a naval armament strong enough to sweep from the waters of that sea every ship bearing the flag of Russia.

Russia has indeed alleged that the preponderance which she wishes to maintain in the Black Sea is essential for the security of the Turkish Empire against the aggressions of other Powers; but it is not from the hostility of the Western Powers, but from the traditional, and it is not too much to say avowed, policy of Russia, that the Turkish Empire has danger to apprehend. The present war has been undertaken to provide securities against those ambitious designs of Russia which menace the safety of Turkey and the future repose of Europe, and in short, to quote the words of a recent Russian Proclamation, to prevent, as far as Turkey is concerned, the accomplishment of the wishes and the views of Peter, of Catherine, of Alexander, and of Nicholas.

The Western Powers, in conjunction with Austria, have considered that this object would most effectually be secured by restricting within reasonable bounds the power of Russia in the Black Sea. They would have preferred as the most certain means to this end that Russia and the Porte should both renounce the right to maintain in the Black Sea any naval force beyond what might be required for the mere purposes of police; but the Western Powers were willing to acquiesce in the maintenance by Russia of a limited and specified amount of naval force in the Black Sea, reserving to themselves the right of maintaining in the aggregate, on their own part, in that sea a corresponding amount of force; requiring also, however, as a security for the observance of such a stipulation, the further right to establish Consuls in all the Russian ports to the eastward of the Straits. But the Western Powers, who now hold exclusive possession of the Black Sea, where the Russian flag dares not show itself, had no intention of proposing to Russia conditions derogatory to her dignity; and they never pretended to assert that Russia should be bound to accept as Consul every individual whom they might think proper to appoint as such, and that she should be precluded from exercising the usual discretion as to withholding the *exequatur* from any person against whom well-founded objection could be raised.

Russia, however, has refused to subscribe to these reasonable proposals; and in their place she has offered two schemes of modification of the Treaty of 1841, the practical effect of which would be, that whichever of the two schemes the Western Powers might accept, those Powers would be obliged to keep up perpetually in the vicinity of the Dardanelles a large naval force prepared to act in any contingency which might occur. For according to one scheme Russia proposed that the Straits between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea should at all times be open to the ships of war of all nations; and therefore, of course, to her own Black Sea and Baltic fleets.

The effect of this scheme would have been, that Constantinople would at all times have been exposed to all the dangers which might have arisen from the sudden appearance before that city of an overwhelming Russian armament; while the tranquillity of the Mediterranean, and all the great interests in that sea, would have been liable to disturbance by the action of a powerful Russian fleet, sallying forth at any moment from the Euxine.

To guard against this double danger, the Governments of England and of France would have been compelled to maintain in the Mediterranean war-establishments in time of peace, and permanently to station their armaments at a great distance from their arsenals and resources; so that a peace concluded on such conditions would have been nothing more than an armed truce divested of the security which is the essence of peace, and unaccompanied by that cessation of expenditure which ought to follow the termination of a war.

According to the other plan proposed by Russia, by which the Straits were to be closed, while Russia was to remain at liberty to maintain an unlimited naval force in the Black Sea, there might at all times have been in that sea a Russian force equipped for war, and available for a sudden descent on the capital of the Turkish Empire, keeping alive the apprehensions of the Porte, and giving constant anxiety to Europe. This scheme would have equally imposed upon the Western Powers the necessity of maintaining in the Mediterranean a force sufficient at all times to hasten to the protection of the Turkish Empire, at any moment when the Porte might require its assistance.

Her Majesty's Government would appeal to what passed in the twelfth Conference, as recorded in the Protocols, as evidence to show how well-founded was the determination of the Western Powers to insist on the cessation of the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, as alone offering any real security for Turkey and for Europe against any ulterior designs on the part of that aggressive Power. For in that Conference the Plenipotentiaries of Russia insisted on substituting on the part of Russia a merely moral for a material guarantee of the territorial integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, and they refused to be parties to an engagement which the other Powers were prepared to contract, not only that they should themselves respect but also that they should cause, and, in case of need, by force compel, that independence and that territorial integrity to be respected by others.

The refusal of the Russian Plenipotentiaries to acquiesce in any arrangement by which the objects contemplated by the third point could be effectually secured necessarily interrupted the Conferences, and accordingly the fourth point did not come formally under discussion. The interest which England and France have uniformly taken in the welfare of the Christian subjects of the Sultan is, however, a sufficient guarantee as to the spirit in which the two Powers would have entered upon the discussion of the fourth point; and though circumstances beyond the control of those Powers closed the door against that discussion, it is with no small satisfaction they have seen that since the commencement of the war, and since the interference of Russia in Turkish affairs has been made to cease, the Sultan has continued to give effect to his benevolent intentions in favour of his Christian subjects, whose condition has of late been materially improved by the wise and spontaneous action of their own Sovereign.

I cannot, however, wholly pass over an observation which fell from the Russian Plenipotentiary, and which is recorded in the Protocol of the eighth Conference, that the question involved in the fourth point was one of conscience, and not of policy.

It would, indeed, have been fortunate for Europe if this plea of conscience had not been used as an instrument for destroying the political independence of Turkey.

By the Treaty of Kaïnardji it is provided, that the Sultan shall protect the Christian religion and its churches; and it was upon a complete misinterpretation of this Treaty, but without even an allegation that its stipulations had been violated, that Russia claimed a right of interference between the Sultan and 10,000,000 of the Sultan's Christian subjects. If the claim had been yielded to, and if a great wrong had thus been perpetrated, the authority of the Sultan within his own dominions would, in a great degree, have been transferred to a foreign Power, and an important step would have been taken towards the overthrow of the Turkish Empire, and the establishment of Russian supremacy on its ruins.

Europe, then, is indebted to the timely and energetic interference of the Western Powers for its preservation from the disastrous consequences with which such a catastrophe must inevitably have been followed.

The Conferences of Vienna are now closed, under circumstances which preclude all speculation as to the period at which negotiations for peace may with any prospect of success be renewed. But when that period shall happily arrive, Her Majesty's Government will steadily keep in view the principles which have guided them throughout the past negotiations; and while seeking to provide for the security, the welfare, and the happiness of the people of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, and to insure the removal of the obstructions which have rendered the navigation of the Danube difficult and precarious, they will neglect no means of obtaining for the Turkish Empire, and for Europe at large, sufficient guarantees against the recurrence of the danger which it is the object of the present war to avert.

In the meanwhile, Her Majesty's Government have reason to expect that the Sultan will make liberal and effectual provisions for the privileges and interests of all his Christian subjects.

You are authorized to read this despatch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Court to which you are accredited.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 950.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Marquis d'Azeglio.

Foreign Office, June 19, 1855.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant, claiming on behalf of your Government that Sardinia should be admitted to take part in any future Conferences having for their object the reestablishment of peace between the allies and Russia.

Her Majesty's Government entirely appreciate the motives which induce the Sardinian Government to desire that a Sardinian Representative should take part in any such Conferences; and they are happy to find, on communication with the Government of France, that the Emperor shares with them the satisfaction which they feel at having this opportunity of proving to the Sardinian Government the high value which they attach to the cordial cooperation of Sardinia in the present war; and that His Imperial Majesty recognizes with them the claim of Sardinia to take part in any future Conferences.

I have accordingly the honour to state to you that Her Majesty's Government, in accordance with that of France, conceive that a Sardinian Plenipotentiary should take a direct and personal share in all discussions in which questions affecting the special interests of Sardinia might be involved; that he should be kept fully informed by the Representatives of England and France, in regard to all overtures or projects of general interest which might be brought forward or discussed in the Conferences to which he might not be summoned; and that, finally, the Sardinian Plenipotentiary should sign the General Treaty by which the conditions of peace are settled.

In requesting you to convey this answer to the knowledge of your Government, I have only to add that Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that the Cabinet of Turin will look upon it as a fresh proof of the friendly feelings of the Queen towards Sardinia, and of the value which Her Majesty attaches to the alliance with that country.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 951.

Count Walewski to Baron de Bourqueney.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. de Persigny, June 19.)

Paris, Juin 1855.

M. le Baron,

APRES m'en être entendu avec le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique, je suis aujourd'hui en mesure de répondre à la dernière communication qui m'a été faite par M. le Baron de Hübner au nom de son Gouvernement.

Le Cabinet de Vienne, tout en paraissant se considérer comme dégagé par le rejet de son ultimatum de l'obligation de prendre part à la guerre contre la Russie, a jugé opportun de nous assurer que sa position vis-à-vis de ses alliés n'en sera point changée, et qu'il remplira ses devoirs conformément aux bases convenues.

Nous désirons trouver dans ce langage l'expression d'une volonté arrêtée de maintenir, dans son esprit et ses dispositions essentielles, le Traité du 2 Décembre. Mais si vif que soit notre désir d'assurer la durée d'une alliance que nous avons toujours regardée comme le moyen le plus efficace d'arriver sûrement et promptement à une paix solide et honorable, il faut bien reconnaître que cette alliance ne saurait durer qu'à la condition que toutes les Puissances qui l'ont signée donneront des gages non équivoques de leur résolution de la maintenir. Or le Cabinet de Vienne, déclinant, pour le moment, toute coopération active à une guerre que nous avons entreprise pour la défense d'une cause qui intéresse l'Europe tout entière et l'Autriche plus directement encore que nous-mêmes, il est de la dernière évidence que, si cette Puissance, soit par la réduction intempestive de ses armées, soit par la dislocation des corps qu'elle a réunis sur la frontière du nord, et qui tiennent en échec une partie des forces de la Russie, soit en négligeant de constater hautement sa résolution de continuer d'entretenir avec ses alliés des relations de confiance et de parfaite entente, modifiait l'attitude militaire et diplomatique qu'elle a prise depuis le 2 Décembre, l'alliance serait atteinte dans son essence, elle s'évanouirait d'elle-même en quelque sorte. Le Cabinet de Vienne a un sentiment trop éclairé de la situation pour ne pas comprendre, ses intentions étant, comme nous n'en doutons pas, conformes à son langage, combien il serait nécessaire qu'il voulût bien prendre l'initiative de quelque ouverture plus explicite et qui témoignât de sa détermination de rester fermement uni à la politique des Puissances Occidentales.

Nous ne saurions admettre, comme semble l'insinuer M. le Comte de Buol, que les concessions obtenues de la Russie sur le premier et le deuxième point et sur la garantie territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman pussent engager aucunement cette Puissance, pas plus que nous-mêmes, pour l'avenir. Les quatre points qui constituaient le programme des quatre garanties, formaient dans leur ensemble la base sur laquelle devaient porter les négociations. Les Conférences de Vienne sont closes, les négociations rompues ; dès-lors les Puissances belligérantes sont rentrées en possession de leur liberté d'action ; aucune obligation ne saurait dériver pour elles de l'entente partielle qui peut avoir eu lieu dans les Conférences. L'Autriche elle-même s'est pleinement associée à cette manière de voir, lorsque, dans sa circulaire du 17 Mai, elle a déclaré que les quatre points de négociations, surtout en ce qui concerne ceux qui les ont acceptés, constituaient dans leur ensemble une base destinée à assurer à l'Europe le retour du droit et de la paix.

Vous voudrez bien, M. le Baron, donner lecture de cette dépêche à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche, et même, au besoin, lui en laisser copie.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) WALEWSKI.

No. 952.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 756.)

My Lord, *Paris, June* 19, 1855.

AT an interview which M. de Hübner had yesterday with Count Walewski, he communicated to his Excellency, in virtue, as Count Buol desired him to state, of the engagement taken by Austria not to make any overture to Russia without apprizing the belligerent Powers, the copy of a despatch which the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs had addressed to the Austrian Envoy at St. Petersburgh, after the close of the Vienna Conferences. This despatch, Count Walewski said, while declaring that Austria did not separate herself from the Western Powers, was equally explicit in stating her determination not to go to war with Russia under present circumstances.

Although the tone of this despatch, Count Walewski observed, was on the whole unsatisfactory, yet there was nothing in it to which he could positively object, but he had at once protested against the construction put by Count Buol upon the obligations which Austria had contracted towards the allies. He maintained that Austria had done more than engage herself to communicate any overtures which she might make to Russia. She had, if the Treaty of the 2nd of December was of any value, bound herself not to enter into any arrangement with the Russian Government without a previous deliberation with Great Britain and France.

M. de Hübner then read to Count Walewski a despatch addressed by Count Buol to the Internuncio at Constantinople. This despatch, while recognizing the obligations imposed on Austria by the Treaty of the of June, not to interfere, during her occupation of the Principalities, with any military operations undertaken either by the Porte or its allies, expressed a hope that the Sultan, in consideration of the difficult position of Austria, would engage not to pursue hostilities against Russia upon the Danube. Count Buol added, that as this engagement, if known to Russia, might prove of disadvantage to the belligerent Powers, the utmost secresy should be observed about it.

Count Walewski assured me that he had at once taken exception to this demand on the part of Austria. The utmost, he said, that Count Buol could do would be to express a wish (un vœu) upon the subject, and that if the demand was made, the French Government would be obliged to protest against it.

After these communications had been made, Count Walewski observed to M. de Hübner, giving him however to understand that there was nothing official in his remarks, that he could not conceal his regret at what he had heard ; that the French Government was sincerely anxious to maintain the Treaty of the 2nd of December, but that they could not permit that it should be unilateral, that is, that it should bind the belligerent Powers while it left Austria free ; the least, in his opinion, which Austria could do, would be to propose a prolongation of the term at which her obligations as a belligerent would commence, grounding her proposal on the fact, that the settlement of the third point had been admitted by all parties to depend on the events of the war. If Austria was disposed, which seemed probable, to let the Treaty of the 2nd of December become a dead letter, and if the allied arms were blessed with victory, Count Buol must not deceive himself with the idea that negotiations could be resumed where they had broken off, nor indeed would Count Walewski answer that a peace would not be concluded between the belligerents alone. He should be sorry to see Austria excluded from a participation in future negotiations, as Prussia had been in those now broken off ; but he could not conceal from M. de Hübner that such might be the result of her conduct. M. de Hübner exclaimed that Austria might also make her arrangements with Russia ; but Count Walewski reminded the Austrian Envoy that there were no arrangements to make, because Austria was still at peace with Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 953.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 614.)

Foreign Office, June 20, 1855.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith, a copy of a despatch* from Count Walewski to the French Minister at Vienna, which has been communicated to me by the Count de Persigny as the answer which the French Government propose to return to the last communication made to them by the Baron de Hübner; and I have to instruct your Excellency to acquaint Count Walewski that Her Majesty's Government concur in the views of the French Government as set forth in the despatch to M. de Bourqueney, and that I have written in the same sense to Lord Westmorland.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 954.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 71.)

Frankfort, June 15, 1855.

My Lord,

THE principal incident of the sitting of the Diet held yesterday was the presentation of a note from the Russian Chargé d'Affaires.

This communication was made by the President laying before the Assembly a note from M. de Glinka, inclosing the original note from Count Nesselrode of which I spoke in my private letter to your Lordship of the 8th of May.

M. de Nesselrode's note has undergone no alteration, but states in substance, as I learn, that in reference to the four points, the first two may be considered by the members of the Confederation as to be observed by Russia towards Germany, as long as absolute neutrality was maintained on their part.

M. de Glinka's note contains the alteration to which I alluded in my despatch No. 69 of the 9th of June, and is couched, as I am informed, in words to this effect:

"That he has the honour, by order of his Imperial Master, of laying before the Diet the note of Count Nesselrode, and the satisfaction at the same time of renewing the assurance to the members of the Confederation, that they may consider the two points as established in their favour, in case they engage themselves to observe their present attitude."

The reply to this communication agreed on in the sitting, as I am informed from good authority, is to the following effect:

The President acknowledges the receipt of the two notes in the name and on behalf of the Diet, to which they have been communicated; and adds, that for himself, he has had much satisfaction in doing what was personally agreeable to M. de Glinka.

The note which I addressed to the President in consequence of your Lordship's circular despatch of the 6th refuting the misrepresentations circulated by the Russian Government, in reference to what took place at Port Baltic between the authorities of that port and Captain Watson of Her Majesty's ship "Impérieuse" concerning the rights of blockade, was also submitted to the Diet, and ordered, as I am informed, to be entered on the Protocol.

I have had the honour to submit a copy of that note to your Lordship in my preceding despatch.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

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* No. 951.

No. 955.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 418.)

Constantinople, June 10, 1855.

My Lord,

I BEG leave to remark, with respect to the first paragraph of your Lordship's instructions No. 401 of the 26th ultimo, that on learning the late Seraskier's intention to require Omer Pasha to detach 5,000 men from his army in the Crimea to make up the number of General Vivian's corps, I expressed my opinion that the measure was injudicious, and I intended to make a determined resistance to its adoption as soon as I should learn that the Turkish Commander-in-chief had submitted his objections.

In the second paragraph of the same despatch your Lordship observes, that I have given no reasons for my opinion that a large admission of Christian recruits into General Vivian's army would be objectionable. I beg to reply that, in my humble judgment, the reasons are obvious. The formation of the Turkish Contingent is an experiment. The Mussulman soldiers of this country are required for the first time to act under the command of British officers unused to their habits, and ignorant, for the most part, of their language. These incongruities endanger the success of the plan, though not, I trust, to an insurmountable degree, and although they are well encountered in prospect of the ultimate advantages, they require to be steadily kept in view, and to be managed with address and firmness. The Christian enlistment is also an innovation of doubtful issue; the more hazardous on account of its being first adopted in time of war, and in a manner ill calculated to remove all feelings of mistrust and anxiety from the minds of the conscripts. To mix up these raw and suspicious recruits with the Turkish regiments, commanded for the first time by British officers, would, I conceive, be to introduce into General Vivian's corps a fresh element of difficulty and an additional hazard of failure.

When the conscription is completed, and the recruits have received the first rudiments of military discipline, they may be more fitly united with the Turkish Contingent, itself by that time habituated to the new organization, and then indeed, it seems to me, and I believe General Vivian agrees in the opinion, that much mutual advantage may accrue from the junction of Christians with Mussulmans under British command.

An earlier attempt might end in failure at drill, or in disaster before the enemy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 956.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 424.)

Constantinople, June 11, 1855.

My Lord;

I HAVE the honour to inform you that 3,500 men, destined to form part of the Turkish Contingent, have arrived here from Varna, and that two battalions from Volos, having the same destination, are expected from day to day. These two detachments, united to three others already inspected by General Vivian, will go at once into the camp prepared for their reception on the heights between Buyukdéré, Kilia, and the Bosphorus. They may be expected to form a total of more than 7,000 men. Two, if not three, battalions of Field Artillery will be added to them. Transports have yet to be found for the regiments of Cavalry at Bourgos, or Sizeboli, and Volos. With reference to this part of the subject, I have the honour to inclose herewith copies of despatches which I have received respectively from Rear Admiral Grey and Lieutenant-Colonel Neale.

General Beatson has been joined at the Dardanelles by 750 Irregular Horsemen from Salonica, and 177 more, which have arrived here from Varna,

pass on to the Dardanelles. With respect to others collecting in Syria and Asia Minor, we are met with the difficulty of procuring steam-conveyance; and I fear that a march overland, as suggested by General Beatson, would be attended with too much loss and delay, beside the risks of desertion and disorder.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 956.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, June 6, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that three British steam transports and two sailing transports arrived in Varna on the 4th instant, for the purpose of conveying the portion of the Turkish Contingent now in Varna, to Constantinople; as also the 177 men and horses of Beatson's Horse.

The blowing weather which has prevailed for the last two days, has prevented the embarkation taking place; but it will be commenced this afternoon, and the "Clyde" steamer and one of the sailing transports may be expected to arrive in the Bosphorus on the 8th instant. The other steamers will follow in succession. No provision seems to be made, as yet, for the embarkation of the regiment of Cavalry belonging to the Contingent now at Sizeboli.

A fourth steamer, the "Jason," is expected here hourly; but the whole of these vessels will only suffice to take the troops from Varna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 956.

Rear-Admiral Grey to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Albion," Constantinople, June 8, 1855.

My Lord,

IT would have afforded me great pleasure to have complied with your Excellency's wish, to send a steamer fitted for horses to Volos, but I regret that I have no steamer available; nor do I see any prospect of having one at my disposal, till the great pressure arising from the number of animals required for the Land Transport Corps is somewhat removed.

There will be, after the vessels now in the Dardanelles shall have been loaded, still 800 animals to convey from thence to Balaklava, besides large numbers from Genoa and other ports. Your Excellency is aware of what paramount importance it is to send on these animals without any delay, and that I cannot divert any of the vessels designed for this service from it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRED. WM. GREY.

No. 957.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 426.)

Constantinople, June 11, 1855.

My Lord,

THE Servian Agent called upon me this morning, and expressed, in the name of Prince Alexander, the gratitude felt by himself, his Government, and his nation, on account of the interest which Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary had manifested at Vienna for the maintenance of their long-acquired rights and privileges. The Prince, he said, desired earnestly that I would communicate the sentiments with which he was animated to Her Majesty's Government.

In reply to the Servian Agent I remarked, that Her Majesty's Consul-General at Belgrade was the regular channel for such a communication; but that, in

compliance with the Prince's desire, I would take an opportunity of conveying to your Lordship the acknowledgments which he had transmitted to me.

The Agent said that the Prince was anxious, as, indeed, he had always been, to justify by his administrative and political conduct the interest taken by Her Majesty's Government in the welfare of Servia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 958.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 430.)

Constantinople, June 14, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the satisfaction to state that General Vivian's camp is established, and he assures me that nothing can be more promising than the conduct of the Turkish soldiers. Their number does not as yet exceed 1,600, but 4,000 more are come in from Varna, and if those from Volos are not yet arrived, they must be near at hand.

The Cavalry at Varna is to be brought up immediately.

Respecting the regiment of that arm at Volos, there is more difficulty, which however will, I trust, be surmounted. A deficiency of transport is the great impediment. In addition to this, General Vivian has need, for the moment, of more tents and Commissaries.

The General is decidedly of opinion that, in so far as the organization and future efficiency of his corps are concerned, it is advisable that the 10,000 men to be selected from the Bulgarian army shall join him here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 959.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 432.)

Constantinople, June 14, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE had your Lordship's instruction No. 420 of the 1st instant, read to the Seraskier and Fuad Pasha. Those Ministers are reported by M. Pisani to have replied that they had used their best exertions to form the Turkish Contingent; that circumstances, and particularly the want of transport, had retarded its delivery to General Vivian.

The Seraskier added, that the two battalions expected from Volos had arrived, and that the steamer which brought them is to go back in order to embark a part of the Cavalry. His Excellency stated his willingness to hand over the men from Varna and Volos as soon as General Vivian should be ready to receive them.

With respect to Omer Pasha, your Lordship is already informed that I was always adverse to the withdrawal of any of his troops from the Crimea, and that the affair of his resignation was completely and satisfactorily settled before the receipt of your Lordship's telegraphic message.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 960.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 25.*)

(No. 279.) *Vienna, June 20, 1855.*

My Lord,

HAVING been apprised, by your Lordship's confidential communication to me of the 12th instant, that you wished me to defer communicating to Count Buol your despatch No. 223 of the 12th instant until Baron Bourqueney should receive from his Government instructions to make a similar communication to the Austrian Government, or till I learned from your Lordship by telegraph that he would receive such instructions, I have the honour to state that, as no such directions have as yet reached Baron Bourqueney, and as I have not received any telegraphic communication from your Lordship, I have abstained, up to the present time, from bringing the subject of that despatch officially before Count Buol.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 961.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 25.*)

(No. 281.) *Vienna, June 21, 1855.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Prince Gortchakoff, who has hitherto been only acting temporarily as Russian Minister at this Court, has received his definitive nomination as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the Court of Russia to that of Austria.

M. de Trioff is named to represent his Sovereign at the Court of Wurtemberg.

M. de Fonton, who has long been Conseiller of the Russian Legation here, has been named Minister to the Court of Hanover.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 962.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 247.) *Foreign Office, June 25, 1855.*

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol to the Internuncio stating, for the information of the Turkish Government, that Austria would continue to occupy the Principalities until the close of the war, for the purpose of preventing the return of the Russian army; but that as her difficulty in thus fulfilling her engagements towards Turkey would be greatly increased if the Russians were attacked in Bessarabia, Austria earnestly desired that the Sultan should abstain, and that he should likewise invite his allies to abstain from carrying on the war upon the line of the Danube. Great secrecy was to be enjoined upon the Porte in order that this communication should not come to the knowledge of Russia.

I asked Count Colloredo whether I was to understand that his Government sought to prescribe to England and France the limits within which they were to make war against Russia, for if any such pretension was put forward, I could only say that they would seek their enemy wherever they thought proper, and wherever they thought they could do him the most injury.

Count Colloredo replied that the object of the despatch was merely to point out the difficulties to which Austria would be exposed in carrying out her Treaty with Turkey if Russia, being attacked on the Danube, were compelled in retaliation, or in self-defence, to evacuate the Principalities.

I told Count Colloredo that I would not conceal from him my impression that the object of the despatch was to lay the ground for not executing the Treaty, and that it would hereafter be appealed to as a sufficient warning given to the Sultan and his allies that, if Russia were attacked on the Danube, the obligations of the Treaty would be no longer binding on Austria, and that a Russian force re-entering the Principalities would have no resistance to fear from the Austrian army of occupation.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 963.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 248.) *Foreign Office, June 25, 1855.*

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol to the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburgh, in which his Excellency states that Austria can in no way be held responsible for the closing of the Conferences; on the contrary, she greatly regrets their termination, since she cannot but foresee the difficulties which will arise.

Under these circumstances she regards it as a duty to explain her views in the present crisis with the greatest frankness.

She will maintain irrevocably the principles generally admitted as bases of peace, and all her efforts will be directed to the attainment of peace in a manner conformable to her engagements.

Austria considers that no peace which did not carry out the four points, as submitted to the Conferences, would contain the guarantees which Europe has a right to require. She regards the understanding which was come to on the two first points, as so much gained towards the work of peace; she has herself pointed out the means of carrying out the third point.

Count Buol expresses his regret that the assembling of the Conference for the purpose of hearing an explanation of the views of Austria on this point should have been made the occasion for the rupture of the negotiations. Austria will wait until the belligerent Powers are better disposed to come to a serious understanding.

As regards the fourth point, which was not submitted to the Conference, it is sufficient to refer to the general interest of all Christendom in its solution.

Count Buol has no doubt, from the assurances of Russia, in spite of the war, that she will respect the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, and, from the interest which France and England have manifested in the welfare of Turkey, that this point will be arranged in a satisfactory manner.

Austria will, moreover, not forget that she has solemnly engaged herself to the principle of the territorial integrity of Turkey; she has always maintained, and will continue to maintain this principle, and she will employ all the means in her power to enforce it.

She considers herself from this moment more especially the guardian of the principle on the Danube; for this reason she will continue to occupy the Principalities until the re-establishment of a general peace.

This task she will fulfil in the spirit of her engagements with Turkey; and she hopes that no obstacles will be opposed to her in this course. She is, above all, certain that Russia will not add to her difficulties by the grave complications to which she would give rise by carrying the war beyond the Danube.

The Emperor Francis Joseph, placed in a position apart from the vicissitudes of war, and desirous of preserving to his people the benefits of peace, will maintain this position as long as his dignity and interests permit. His Majesty does not even admit the chance of any provocation being given to him which will compel him to abandon that position.

Faithful to his declaration that he will seek for no special advantages for Austria, he will on his side raise no new pretension; and if new demands are made from other quarters he will confine himself to the exercise of his influence to calm the passions of others.

Count Esterhazy is authorized to read this despatch to Count Nesselrode.

I told Count Colloredo that this formal communication to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh of the intentions of the Austrian Government could not fail to be reassuring and satisfactory to Russia, as it left no doubt with respect to the neutral position which Austria intended to maintain.

I added, that Austria, England, and France were bound not to enter into any arrangement with the Court of Russia without having first deliberated thereupon in common, and that I hoped this stipulation would be scrupulously observed; but I thought that England and France had some reason to complain of the engagement taken by Austria to appease their passions in the event of their putting forward conditions beyond the four bases which they, in common with Austria, had reserved to themselves the right to demand.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 964.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 253.) *Berlin, June 23, 1855.*

My Lord,

IN conformity with your Lordship's instructions, I have read confidentially to Baron Manteuffel your despatch No. 195 of the 19th instant, and his Excellency was gratified to learn that Her Majesty's Government desired to see an improvement in the relations of England and Prussia. When I came to that passage in your Lordship's despatch in which it is stated that the Western Powers are compelled to consider that Prussia inclined more towards Russia than towards them, his Excellency declared that this was not the case, and that the King's policy had not been more favourable to one side than the other; that this was His Majesty's resolution, and that he had repeated it to him at his last interview. I adverted to the supplies of arms sent from Germany to Russia, and to many other facilities resulting to Russia from the geographical position of the two countries, but he denied that more favour was shown to one party than would be equally shown to the other.

I then drew his Excellency's attention to that part of your Lordship's despatch in which you say that a change of policy on the part of the German Powers would now accelerate the restoration of peace, and that the time might be favourable for a closer union of Prussia with the Western Powers. His Excellency replied that he should inform the King of the nature of the communication I had made to him, and that in the meantime I might assure your Lordship that there was no intention whatever on the part of the Prussian Government to meet the advances made from Austria, and that if a change of policy on the part of Prussia were to take place, he felt it should be in the direction of the Western Powers.

His Excellency added, that he was in expectation of an answer to the despatch which he addressed to London and Paris a week ago, and that he hoped to able to speak to me further on the subject in a few days.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 965.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 255.) *Berlin, June 23, 1855.*

My Lord,

AT an interview which I have had to-day with Baron Manteuffel, I endeavoured to learn from his Excellency the exact nature of the propositions which had been made to him from Vienna, respecting the joint communications to be made to the Diet on the Eastern question.

His Excellency replied that the wishes of Austria were not as yet defined, and that he was anxiously waiting for further information, but his impression,

produced by the communication which had been made to him, was that the Austrian Government desired that Germany should accept the four points as an entirety, and accede to the Treaty of 2nd December. He observed, however, that the Vienna proposals were still so veiled in mystery that he could say no more on the subject at present, but he believed the desire of the Imperial Cabinet to be that a proposition in that sense should be made at Frankfort; he added that his personal opinion respecting such a proposal was that as the Western Powers no longer considered themselves bound by the four points, it would be useless to take the proposed step at the Diet, and that Prussia would therefore do better to remain as she was, and to continue free to act as circumstances might dictate.

The language and manner of Baron Manteuffel betokened the strongest distrust of the future intentions of Austria. He did not hold out the idea that she could possibly unite with Russia, but he is evidently under the impression that there is no longer the least prospect of a cordial understanding with the Western Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 966.

Brigadier-General Craufurd to the Earl of Clarendon —(Received June 25.)

(No. 20.)

My Lord, *Vienna, June 19, 1855.*

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 10 (June 12th, 1855), conveying the orders of Her Majesty's Government, that I should express their thanks to Captain Koplinger for the interesting papers he has communicated to me, upon the subject of military education, as carried out in the Austrian army; and I have the honour to report that I have obeyed these instructions. Inclosed in this despatch is the last part of the papers furnished me upon the subject of military education: it contains an account of the general institutions for military education in the Empire, and closes the series with which I have been furnished. I purpose visiting some of these establishments hereafter, particularly that of Wiener-Neustadt, and will endeavour to gather such further particulars upon the subject of studies for the military profession, as may promise to be of interest to the Government.

General Hess left Vienna for Cracow on the morning of the 9th instant, as had been announced. His Majesty the Emperor set out for the same place upon Tuesday the 12th instant, and arrived upon the 13th in good time at Cracow. His Imperial Majesty attended the manœuvres of the troops in Cracow and from the neighbourhood, and left it upon the 15th for Bochnia. Upon the 16th, His Imperial Majesty left Bochnia for Tarnow, where he inspected the troops, and continued upon the 17th, at a very early hour, his route to Rzessow: inspected the troops there also, and proceeded on the 18th to Laneut, whence he would probably go on to Przemisl, where one of the great entrenched camps newly constructed is situated. The journey of His Imperial Majesty will not, it is affirmed, extend beyond Czernowitz in the Bukovina; and his return is announced by letters from Galicia, as likely not to be later than the 10th of July.

Great activity is shown in bringing forward the railway line, now in course of construction, from Cracow to Lemberg; but I am unable to say at present what progress has been made.

Lord Hardinge is anxious to procure every information with respect to the new fire-arms which are in course of being issued to the Austrian army; and I am informed, at the Imperial Arsenal, that a specimen of the new firelock has been sent to several Governments, and would probably be granted upon the application of Her Majesty's Minister at this Court. I have applied for the good offices of the Earl of Westmorland to obtain one of the new arms.

His Lordship informed me this evening that the Emperor had sent a message to General Létang, expressing a wish to see him upon his return to

Vienna; and Count Buol having expressed himself to M. de Bourqueney, to the effect that such was the wish of the Emperor and of the Government, it appears settled that General Létang will remain for the present in Vienna.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES R. CRAUFURD.

Inclosure in No. 966.

Memorandum upon Military Schools.

(Translation.)

THE establishments for military education in general are classed under three different heads, viz.:—

1. Those intended for the education of non-commissioned officers: 1st, the Junior Military School; 2nd, the Senior Military School; 3rd, the School for Companies.

2. Those intended for the education of pupils as officers; the institutions for Cadets; the Military Academies.

3. Those intended partly for a special course of education, and partly for completing and perfecting the previous education of officers: 1st, the Military Teachers' School; 2nd, that for the high course of Artillery and Engineering; 3rd, the School for Military Tactics.

Each of the two first-mentioned class of schools, though forming independent establishments, are in mutual connection; the pupils of the Junior School being admitted, when they have distinguished themselves, into the institution for Cadets, and in the same manner the best pupils of the Technical Company's Schools—that is to say, of the Artillery, Engineers, Pioneers, Flotilla, and Naval Schools,—are transferred to the Academy, after which they have a claim to be appointed into the service as superior officers. On the other hand, those pupils whose progress has not been satisfactory are sent back from the Cadet Institution and the Academy to the Senior Educational Schools and the School for Companies.

The students in the military educational establishments are either on the foundation, or paying-students. The former are from the military in general, and students from military departments.

In general it is a rule that the children of superior officers are left under parental charge till the age of eleven years, while those of privates come under the charge of the State on reaching their eighth year.

On payment every Austrian subject, with the requisite conditions, has a claim to admisssion. The appointment to be placed on the foundation of any of the military establishments rests with the "Army-ober-commando." The presentation to the institution of Cadets and the Academies is reserved to His Majesty the Emperor.

A pupil once removed from one of these military establishments, for whatever cause it may be, is under no pretext to receive an officer's commission before the completion of the course of instruction.

1st. The Junior Military School consists of those on the foundation of the military department, and is reserved to the legitimate sons of persons serving in the Artillery, of officers, of invalids, military officials, &c.

The number of pupils in each of the twelve junior establishments is fixed at 100, with a four years' course of instruction. The command is held by a subaltern officer, to whom is attached one house-chaplain, one head physician, four sergeant teachers, two sergeant auxiliary teachers, six inspection corporals, &c.

Subjects of instruction.—Religion, German language, natural history, geography, mental arithmetic, arithmetic, calligraphy, sketching, taking measurements, gymnastic exercises, and swimming.

2nd. The senior military establishments, twelve in number, continue the education of the pupils of the junior establishment, who are admitted on having completed their eleventh year. At that age are admitted also those pupils under parental care who are to be on the foundation and those who are to be paying pupils, but only after satisfactory examinations.

The number of pupils is fixed at 200; the course of instruction is also four years. The command is held by a Captain, and the instruction given by two subaltern officers, a house chaplain, one head physician, four sergeant teachers, inspection corporals, &c.

To the above-mentioned course of instruction is added a second in the Austrian national languages, history, arithmetic, fencing, &c.

At the expiration of the fourth year the pupils enter the Companies' School.

The object of this latter school is to provide theoretically and practically educated under-officers for the regular troops.

The pupils leave the senior military establishment at the expiration of the four years' course, or, if they have already received private instruction, must already have completed their fifteenth year, and not passed the age of eighteen. On quitting the School Companies every pupil is enlisted, and is bound to serve eight years in the army and two in the reserve.

The command of the School Companies is held by a Captain; that of a Squadron School by a Captain of Cavalry (Rittmeister). The Infantry Company School consists of 120 pupils; the Squadron School of 60 pupils, with 71 horses. The course of instruction two years.

The Artillery, Pioneer, and Engineer School for Companies consists of 120 pupils. Course of instruction, three years.

2nd. The Institution of Cadets. The object is to prepare for military scientific instruction in the academies. There are four colleges, each with 200 pupils. The age of admission is after completing the eleventh year. The instruction comprises a course of years. The command is vested in a Field Officer, with one Adjutant, two Captains, ten Subalterns, Physicians, &c. The subjects of instruction are—religion, German, French, natural history, geography, history, arithmetic, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, plan-drawing, &c., &c. At the end of the four years' course the pupils enter into one of the military academies according to their fitness. Those pupils, in any of the classes of the first, second, or third year's course, who have made little progress, are sent back into the following year's class (viz., second, third, fourth,) in the senior military school, and transferred from the latter to one of the Infantry Company Schools.

The Military Academies: Intended to educate officers for the higher branches of the service. There are four; the one at Neustadt, the Artillery, the Engineer, and Marine Academy. In each the course is of four years. For admission the scholar must have completed his fifteenth year. The pupils to enter are more particularly those from the Cadet Colleges, the Artillery, Pioneer, and Company Schools.

Establishment for Military Teachers: Has a twofold object, providing teachers for the junior and senior Military Schools for the prescribed scientific objects of instruction, and also masters of fencing and gymnastics. In this, under-officers are employed after two years' service. The course of instruction is one year.

The Combined Course of High Engineering and Artillery: For the formation of young officers in scientific and technical respects for the higher branches of these services. To this course are admissible twenty officers, between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-six, from each branch of the service, and having special qualifications. They must be unmarried, and have served as officers at least two years with distinction. At the head of this course are placed an officer of Artillery and Engineers of high rank. The lectures are given by professors of the Artillery and Engineering Academy. The best students may be promoted out of their turn.

J. R. C.

June 19, 1855.

No. 967.

Count Buol to Count Colloredo.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, June 26.)

Vienne, le 15 Juin, 1855.

M. le Comte,

J'AI l'honneur de transmettre à votre Excellence ci-près en copie une dépêche de Lord Clarendon, dont le Comte de Westmorland a été chargé de me donner communication et qui sert de réponse à notre expédition du 20 Mai dernier.

Le but principal que Lord Clarendon semble s'être proposé dans ce travail est, de mettre en lumière que le système de contrepoids que nous avions l'intention de présenter à l'alternative du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg ne réaliserait point efficacement la troisième garantie, parcequ'il ne mettrait pas fin à la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire.

Nous nous abstenons de suivre M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat sur ce terrain, car ce serait tomber dans des redites que de vouloir reproduire les arguments qui militent à nos yeux en faveur de l'opinion contraire. Tout en nous associant au désir de sa Seigneurie d'éviter toute discussion qui n'eût pas un caractère tout-à-fait conciliant, nous ne saurions nous dispenser de consigner ici quelques courtes observations. Lord Clarendon a témoigné à votre Excellence ses regrets de ce que nous avions jugé convenable de renouveler des propositions auxquelles le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique ne pouvait adhérer.

Nous ne saurions vous dissimuler, M. le Comte, que nous avons peine à nous expliquer ce sentiment de regrets, puisque dans la dépêche adressée au Comte de Westmorland à la date du 8 Mai dernier, M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat avait expressément appuyé sur la circonstance que notre projet d'accommodement n'avait point été communiqué au Gouvernement Britannique dans une forme authentique.

En suppléant à ce défaut par notre expédition du 20 Mai dernier, nous étions donc autorisés à croire que nous allions au devant des désirs du Cabinet Anglais.

Il me reste à faire une autre observation. En posant en fait que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a toujours apprécié à leur juste valeur les difficultés que la participation active à la guerre aurait suscitées à l'Autriche, Lord Clarendon ajoute, que c'est maintenant à nous à jeter ces difficultés dans un plateau de la balance et dans l'autre les engagements contractés avec les Puissances Occidentales, mais que quel que soit le parti auquel nous nous arrêterons, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique fera tous ses efforts pour préserver de toute atteinte les relations amicales qui subsistent actuellement entre les deux pays.

Tout en rendant pleinement justice à cette intention du Gouvernement Anglais, qui rencontre auprès de nous des dispositions parfaitement analogues, nous nous permettrons de faire observer à Lord Clarendon que dans les termes où il l'a énoncée la question ne nous semble pas bien posée. Si l'Autriche avait à opter entre des embarras, fussent ils très graves, et l'accomplissement d'engagements positifs, son choix ne saurait être douteux. Mais telle n'était pas l'alternative où nous étions placés. Notre tâche se bornait à définir avec précision la limite de nos engagements, et bien que l'Empereur notre auguste Maître n'ait pas jugé conforme aux intérêts de ses peuples de la dépasser, il a le sentiment d'avoir consciencieusement rempli ses obligations par les propositions faites à ses alliés à l'égard du troisième principe et dont il était décidé à exiger l'acceptation de la part de la Russie même par la force des armes.

Les Puissances Occidentales ayant été d'avis que ces propositions n'atteignaient pas les limites de ce qu'elles jugent nécessaires pour leur honneur et pour les sûretés qu'elles se sont engagées à obtenir, nous ne pouvons, tout en regrettant un dissentiment qui recule indéfiniment les chances de la paix, que reconnaître le droit, dont elles croient devoir user en leur qualité de belligérants, de s'en remettre au sort des armes pour arriver à une solution du troisième principe qui serait à leurs yeux plus complète et plus au niveau de leurs sacrifices.

Votre Excellence est autorisé à donner lecture de cette dépêche à Lord Clarendon, et à lui en laisser copie si sa Seigneurie lui en témoignait le désir.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) BUOL.

No. 968.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 2.)

Foreign Office, June 26, 1855.

Sir,

COUNT COLLOREDO has placed in my hands a copy of a despatch from Count Buol, of which a copy is herewith inclosed.

I told Count Colloredo that I wished to avoid all irritating discussion; and that, although I did not doubt that Count Buol considered that Austria had fulfilled the engagements of the Treaty of December ?, yet I must be permitted to adhere to the opinion which I had already expressed upon the subject; and I begged to remind Count Colloredo that Austria had only intended to make a *casus belli* of what was called an "ultimatum" to Russia, but which was wholly unacceptable to England and France; and that with respect to the latter proposal, Count Buol had distinctly declared that its rejection by Russia would not constitute a *casus belli* for Austria, and that her position with respect to Russia would not undergo any change in consequence of such rejection.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 968.

Count Buol to Count Colloredo, June 15, 1855.

[See No. 967.]

No. 969.

Count Buol to Count Colloredo.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, July 2.)

Vienne, le 24 Juin, 1855.

M. le Comte,

EN me référant à la dépêche télégraphique que j'ai eu l'honneur d'adresser à votre Excellence aujourd'hui, je joins ici deux rapports, émanant l'un du Capitaine du pyroscaphe "Ferdinando I," qui avait été envoyé à l'embouchure de Soulina pour remorquer les nombreux bâtiments marchands qui s'y trouvent, et l'autre d'un délégué du Consulat Impérial et Royal à Galatz.

Il suffira de la lecture de ces pièces pour faire connaître à votre Excellence l'état d'anarchie auquelle se trouve réduit l'endroit de Soulina et les dangers et pertes très graves dont le commerce est menacé par suite de l'agglomération dans ces passages d'une foule de gens malfamés, capables de toute espèce de crimes et délivrés de la crainte d'une répression sévère.

Le bateau à vapeur "Ferdinando I" n'étant pas armé n'a pas été en mesure d'accorder aux nombreux marchands Autrichiens retenus à Soulina, la protection efficace dont ils ont si grandement besoin. C'est pour ce motif qu'il nous semble indispensable d'y envoyer un ou deux pyroscaphes de guerre, dont la présence serait de nature à contenir les mauvais penchants de la canaille qui semble s'être donné rendezvous à Soulina.

Nous espérons que Lord Clarendon appréciera les motifs et le but de cette mesure et qu'il voudra bien aussi de son côté rendre attentifs les commandants des flottes alliées dans la Mer Noire sur ce triste état de choses.

Il nous importe aussi de connaître les décisions qui pourraient être prises de la part du Gouvernement Anglais pour y remédier.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) BUOL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 969.

Report of Captain B. Suhor, of the steamer No. 16, "Ferdinand I," of Lloyd's, to the Inspecting Agency of the Austrian Lloyds at Galatz.

(Translation.)

ON the 5th instant, having left Galatz at 8 A.M., I arrived at Sulina at 5 P.M. of the same day, where, in consequence of a brisk north wind, the vessels were all at anchor in their places.

From that day until the 11th, that is to say, yesterday, the weather has remained in the same state, with winds rather rough from the first quadrant, which hindered the vessels from working.

Yesterday I proceeded to the bar of Sulina, where I sounded, and found no more than barely seven and a half Venetian feet of water; the channel which serves as a passage is narrow and somewhat crooked, with raised sides, which makes it difficult, and this being the state of the present channel over the bar of Sulina, where the vessels go in and out, it is evident that the steamer "Ferdinand" cannot possibly be serviceable to the shipping; because, with a vessel in tow, she could neither go in nor out without striking upon the so-called carcases on the right or left, with risk of serious consequences for the steamer and the ship in tow, and perhaps the loss of both.

Seeing the uselessness of staying at Sulina, I had decided to set out for Cospoli before the water should be lower, and this I should have done, if other considerations had not determined me to proceed to Galatz.

There is in Sulina an assemblage of people of all sorts, for the most part composed of the lowest dregs of society; the number of whom, "ablibanti" (?) and workmen employed in carrying grain, is above 2,500 men, and there is neither order nor law there. There is no force to restrain them, for there is nothing but a mere Russian piquet with an officer, who does not interfere with anything, as he would not be able to effect anything.

In consequence, everything is subject to the caprices of this rabble.

Exorbitant freights are asked for "allibaggi" (?) that is to say, 5,000 or 6,000 florins for a vessel of 4,000 bushels ("stagi"). The corn passing through their hands is stolen, payment is enforced with threats, and finally, the captains are menaced on board their own ships, where they are not safe.

This disorder, still further augmented by the cholera, renders the position of the many Austrian vessels which are there very difficult; wherefore the Consular Agent, yielding to the pressing demands of the captains, required in writing that the "Ferdinand" should convey them to Galatz, where they went to ask for protection and assistance from the Austrian authority.

Leaving that place in the night between the 11th and 12th, I went to Tulcia, which I left at 8 o'clock this morning. On going away, I perceived on the heights of the place a large body of cavalry standing, and many detachments marching over several of the hills: the number of all together was not small; so far as I could judge by the eye, I think there were more than 5,000.

In the meantime I have the honour to communicate, that obviously the steamer "Ferdinand" is not at all safe in the river, and that if there was a fourth more of water on the bar in that place she would not be able to get out.

(Signed) B. SUHOR.

Inclosure 2 in No. 969.

Report.

(Translation.)

IN accordance with orders received from the Austrian Consulate of Galatz, I went on board the steamer "Ferdinando I," intended to tow the steamers stationed at Sulina.

Leaving Galatz on the 5th of June, we passed before Reni and Ciatali d'Ismail, where a Russian functionary came on board to ask how many passengers there were; it was answered that there four captains who were going on board their ships at Sulina; nothing further was asked, we went on with our

voyage, and arrived at Sulina towards evening. About 250 vessels are at anchor here, of which about 80 are Austrian, according to information received; the greater part of the remaining ships are Greek.

An English war-steamer, which is cruising from time to time, was at anchor in the sea, four miles off the land.

From the 6th until the 10th the weather was stormy, so that it was not possible to go with the boats to ascertain the depth over the bar, and during that time no vessel could go into or out of the port. On the morning of the 11th the sea was somewhat calmer, so that the pilot and captain went to the bar in two boats, and found barely seven and a-half Venetian feet of depth; with this depth of water few of the vessels now at Sulina can get out, and by any longer stay there is no doubt that the cargoes of many of them will be spoiled.

Captain Girgurevick, who has been several months at Sulina, was desirous of having an empty vessel towed up from Sulina to Galatz; Captain Suhor said that this could not be done, because the steamer was too long, and that she could not turn with the vessel at the stern in those little reaches ("tavole") where the passage is crooked and narrow; it is also the opinion of the other captains that this steamer is unserviceable in all respects for the Sulina station. A depôt of coals is wanted; without it a steamer can do nothing, and under the present circumstances of Sulina, without a magazine for storing this combustible, it must be left on the shore, where it runs a risk of being destroyed by fire by the Greeks. These people are not pleased to see a steamer stationed at Sulina; they are capable of any bad act: their number amounts to 5,000 or 6,000 men, including the crews on board the ships.

Since the fire there is not a house nor a person of any other nation settled in Sulina; there are none but these Greeks, who have made little dwellings of mere reeds.

Lamentable consequences may result if this place remains without an authority, with strength at its disposal to overawe these fellows and bring them under discipline.

On the part of Russia there is an officer, with a few soldiers, who sometimes go over from the other side; the Greeks settled in Sulina do not fear them, they have little influence over them.

Two days after my arrival in Sulina some cases of cholera were declared; on the 10th of June there were six dead, who expired within five hours after they were attacked: to judge from such appearances, it can have been no other malady than cholera.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. ANDERLICK.